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
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
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




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In This Issue

The February issue opens with the 2012 AHA Presidential Address, followed by an article on antislavery in the Atlantic world and an *AHR* Forum on “Liberal Empire and International Law.” There are also three featured reviews, followed by our usual extensive book review section. “In Back Issues” draws attention to articles and features in the *AHR* from one hundred, seventy-five, and fifty years ago.

Presidential Address

In “The Republic of Letters in the American Colonies: Francis Daniel Pastorius Makes a Notebook,” outgoing AHA President **Anthony Grafton** introduces us to a man of many parts, whose work and life both exemplify a transnational intellectual community and highlight the curious position of a humanist, steeped in venerable European traditions, living in colonial America. Pastorius was born in Germany but migrated to America, settling in Germantown, Pennsylvania, in 1683, where he lived for the rest of his life. Although he came to the New World in search of a simpler existence, his life was happily burdened by intellectual and scholarly endeavors that took him deep into the culture of antiquarian erudition that still flourished at the end of the seventeenth century. Posterity remembers him for his commonplace book *Bee-Hive*, which, as Grafton points out, was only one of the “magnificent information-retrieval machines” he produced among a vast storehouse of notes, bibliographies, commentaries, marginalia, and the like that reflect his ceaseless curiosity and intellectual appetite. In looking at Pastorius’s activities, Grafton shows us how seventeenth-century scholars read, and especially how they valued books. “Pastorius’s ways of using . . . books,” he notes, “mark him off as an inhabitant of a world we have lost: a world of relative textual scarcity.” But in other ways it is a familiar world, where even the most energetic and capacious minds were challenged by the ever-increasing volume of information. And despite his antiquarian bent and deep commitment to traditional scholarship, Pastorius was, as Grafton argues, an exemplar of an overlooked source of the Enlightenment, with “roots deeply set in an older world of European learning and Christian belief.”

Article

The Haitian Revolution has, in recent years, moved from a peripheral event to a central concern for historians of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In “Haiti, Free Soil, and Antislavery in the Revolutionary Atlantic,” **Ada Ferrer** looks at the impact of that emancipatory movement on neighboring societies that were still very much invested in slavery. Focusing on a little-known case in 1817, the article explores the ways in which notions of freedom among slaves were shaped not only by the example of the Haitian Revolution but also by the actions of the Haitian state after independence. Historians have tended to argue that an independent Haiti did not intervene to promote antislavery in the region. Indeed, in its early years, every Haitian constitution explicitly disavowed such foreign intervention. Ferrer argues, however, that the 1817 case reveals an important form of engagement on the part of the government of Alexandre Pétion that has gone largely unexplored. With this case, she demonstrates that the early Haitian republic, drawing on both Old Regime attempts to restrict slavery geographically (such as “free soil” policy) and revolutionary notions of total emancipation, did in fact project its antislavery influence abroad, thus participating in the international debates on both slavery and freedom.

AHR Forum

The history of empires and imperialism has long been a prominent theme in history of all periods, but with the advent of transnational history, its centrality is greater than ever. For the most part, however, the emphasis has been on the dynamics of conquest, colonization, exploitation, and the modalities of imperial rule. And yet, despite the fact that coercion fundamentally characterized the relations between the agents of imperial power and subject peoples, Western nations with imperial ambitions were also committed to the rule of law, or at least were sensitive to the contradiction between lawless conquest and constitutional rule.

This *AHR* Forum, “Liberal Empire and International Law,” confronts aspects of that contradiction from three perspectives. In “The Liberal Traditions in the Americas: Rights, Sovereignty, and the Origins of Liberal Multilateralism,” **Greg Grandin** begins by suggesting that one aspect of the much-celebrated “exceptionalism” of the United States is rarely noted: its unique relationship to Latin America. Other world powers, such as France, Holland, and Great Britain, ruled over culturally, racially, and religiously distinct peoples, whom, moreover, they regarded as such. The settlers who colonized North America, by contrast, looked to Iberian America not as fundamentally “other” but as a competitor in a struggle to define a set of nominally shared—and also contested—values and political concepts: Christianity, republicanism, liberalism, democracy, sovereignty, rights, and, above all, the very idea of “America.” After the republican revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the relationship between the U.S. and the new nations of Spanish America was characterized by both contention and intimacy—a rivalry over a shared republican legacy. To be sure, England’s rule over its “Celtic fringe,” especially Ire-

land and Scotland, produced a somewhat similar relationship, which ultimately generated the legal basis for the latter British Empire. But in the Americas, the relationship between the U.S. and Latin American nations was played out over a longer period of time and across much vaster spaces, yielding a unique and complex history. Grandin's essay compares and contrasts the two sides of this rivalry, focusing especially on the contested notions of rights and sovereignty.

In "Empire and Legal Universalisms in the Eighteenth Century," **Jennifer Pitts** looks at various figures who commented critically from a legal perspective on European imperialism. She notes that throughout the modern period, the law of nations has been both distinctively European and universal in its aspirations. Its possible or practical universality, however, has been a vexed issue, with significant moral and political implications. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the consensus among all but a few Western European jurists was that international law, though exclusively European in origin, was authoritative for all: Europeans could and should dictate the terms of legal interaction to so-called backward peoples. For a brief period in the eighteenth century, however, there flourished largely forgotten critical approaches to the question of the scope of the European law of nations and the nature of legal relations between European and non-European states and peoples. These approaches regarded a global legal order, or a network of orders, as a constraint on the exercise and abuse of European states' power. Pitts focuses on the writings and interventions of a range of European figures, including Edmund Burke, the French orientalist Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron, and the influential Admiralty Court judge William Scott, Lord Stowell.

In "Liberalism and Empire in Nineteenth-Century International Law," **Andrew Fitzmaurice** continues along the lines of demonstrating the critical possibilities of liberalism and law in relationship to imperialism. For the most part, he notes, international law was employed to justify the domination of European states over the rest of the world. And it is assumed that the liberal apology for empire reached its apotheosis in the nineteenth century to carve up the globe. His article examines the debates over the justice of empire in international law and diplomacy in just this period. The debates focused on the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 over the partition of Africa in general and the colonization of the Congo in particular. In this context, liberal international lawyers developed a new legal vocabulary to justify the expansion of empire. But some also opposed empire, giving rise to an opposition that only strengthened as the race for empire gathered pace. The opposition was based not on humanitarian sentiment (which, in fact, often served as an apology for imperial rule), but rather on self-interested concerns about the security of liberal reforms and revolutionary changes within Europe. Evoking the concerns about empire and imperialism in the present, Fitzmaurice concludes by reminding us that while the liberal tradition has often justified expansionism, it also contains the resources to oppose it.

In his Forum comment, "Empire and Its Anxieties," **Anthony Pagden** provides a learned survey of the history of imperial rule and empires with an emphasis, in keep-

ing with the theme of this forum, on both the law of nations and international law. He plays on the distinction, brought out in Pitts's and Fitzmaurice's articles, between European empires before the nineteenth century, where cosmopolitan attitudes, moral concerns, migration from the metropole, and the potential for mutuality characterized overseas settlements; and those of the later period, where international law legitimizing the right to occupy and colonize prevailed over all other considerations. The key to this difference, he argues, is to be found in the liberal revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which joined rights with citizenship in the nation-state, for it was sovereignty that conferred the legal status by which non-European peoples were found lacking and thereby were subject to conquest. As products of those revolutions, the new nations of the Americas had even less claim to empire than their European counterparts. Nevertheless, they still were confronted with peoples and lands that had to be incorporated into the nation-state, although not through the kind of imperial conquest that would have entailed shared sovereignty. Instead, the U.S., at least, has either relied upon *de facto* justifications for intervention or foreign occupation, or "fallen back on robustly Roman declarations of political and cultural superiority in defense of supposedly universal political values." The result, Pagden concludes, has led us to the present, where "the old anxieties about the consequences for the metropolis of what its citizens do in its name beyond its frontiers have become even more acute today than they were for Edmund Burke."

April's issue of the *AHR* will include articles on the cultural history of scholastic disputation, the colonization of North America, the "Mexicanization" of American politics in the late nineteenth century, the Mediterranean slave trade in the nineteenth century, and Parisian modernism and African sculpture in the twentieth century.

In Back Issues

In the hope of encouraging readers to dip into the long history of scholarship contained in the pages of the *American Historical Review* (now in the 117th year of its publishing history), and to take advantage of the digital availability of this archive to most readers, the *AHR* editors offer a look back at issues from one hundred, seventy-five, and fifty years ago. What follows is not a comprehensive survey of the contents of those issues, but rather a glance at some of the articles and other features that might be of interest, or even of use, today.

Volume 17, Number 2 (January 1912)

Traditionally, the first issue of the year leads with the annual address of the outgoing president of the American Historical Association. In 1912, it was delivered by William M. Sloane, who taught at Princeton and Columbia after receiving his doctorate from the University of Leipzig and serving for a time as private secretary to George Bancroft, second president of the AHA. Sloane's piece, "The Substance and Vision of History," is one of those high-minded meditations on the state of history common from presidents of the association in the early years of its history. Written in an aphoristic style that strikes the modern reader as somewhat affected and mannered, if not downright pompous, it takes on the question of the relationship of history to science, and especially the new social sciences that were then challenging the primacy of the humanities in academic scholarship. There is a note of triumph in Sloane's address; for him, the scientific model as embodied in Darwinian biology or the quest for causal explanations in human affairs had lost its appeal: "the rather noisy inventors of systems and doctrines have had their day." And he gleefully notes that the present-day turn in the social sciences, from political science and sociology to archaeology, anthropology, and social psychology, was toward both more modest claims and a more historical approach. Like many, then and now, Sloane adamantly asserts that history is not a science: "The latest criticism of history as a scientific discipline is identical with the earliest: it is that history cannot predict; it can establish facts and not laws." But his sense of what history is not goes beyond the scientific model; indeed, he proclaims a series of "renunciations" that eschew not only causation, prediction, exactitude, and excessive specialization but also an interest in ordinary people ("these rude forefathers of the village"), "antiquated concepts and catch-phrases," and anything that is not "memorable," meaning "for the emulation

of posterity” or in service of understanding the present. As for what history should be, Sloane is a partisan of its belletristic features. “The historical writing which is not immediate, concrete, poignant, direct, proportionate, and clad in stylistic, attractive garb,” he proclaims, “may have some present vogue but it is foredoomed to quick oblivion.” As well, however, he seems to embrace a kind of hermeneutic approach to historical understanding, sneering at the claim to objectivity or an open mind as “not much different from a claim to idiocy.” In more measured terms, he asserts, “We go forth, every one of us, with a mind furnished . . . either with positive purposes or negative prejudices. And according to that equipment, we seek what we want and we find what we seek.”

Volume 42, Number 2 (January 1937)

Like Sloane’s, the address of Charles H. McIlwain, the English constitutional historian who taught at Harvard and Princeton as well as Oxford, Miami University, and Bowdoin College, was a big-picture discussion of the role of historians and the purpose of history in the context of the present. “The Historian’s Part in a Changing World” begins by asking “whether we, as historians, have anything practical to offer to our own country and to the world in times of crisis like the present, and if we have, how we can make our particular contribution most effectively.” Unlike Sloane, however, McIlwain pursues this question not with aphorisms or pronouncements but rather by exploring the field of history he knows best, medieval and Tudor England, and demonstrating what “lessons” its study has to offer. Despite the high expectations raised by his opening statement, however, his advice is cautious. He is clearly uncomfortable with the very notion of “lessons of history,” and suggests that our main message should be that history is “a lesson in humility.” But while acknowledging the limits of historical understanding, at the same time he aggressively pushes back against current fashions challenging the validity, value, or objectivity of historical knowledge, either from the social sciences or relativism or from those growing political forces exploiting history for ideological ends. He refuses to concede that distortion, or prejudices, or simply every generation’s need to rewrite history somehow prevents us from knowing the past “as it was.” Indeed, he insists that true historical understanding comes only from sufficient commitment and prolonged immersion in the sources, to the point where we come to realize that our present-day assumptions and ways of thinking are not only unnecessary but also irrelevant. True historical understanding comes not from a “reading in of modern modes of thought or action, but a reading out.” McIlwain demonstrates this assertion by making several brief excursions into early English history, including a discussion of what has been called “Tudor absolutism.” He discards this term as fraught with modern preconceptions and crisply lays out the basis for understanding that Tudor monarchs, despite their vast powers often abusively deployed, were still governed by constitutional limits. Our failure to understand the proper nature of Tudor rule comes from our modern tendency to confuse autocracy with despotism. These monarchs were autocrats, “absolute in the sense of having no superior,” but their rule was still limited by constitutional restrictions on its exercise. And what “lesson” does McIlwain want

us to take away from this? Aside from some rather cryptic remarks hinting at the virtue of viewing strong governmental authority as not necessarily antithetical to constitutional rights—a prescient point in the face of the growing threat of European fascist movements—he is unwilling to prescribe. “If there are any practical inferences to be drawn from this jumbled survey,” he concludes, “I leave them for you to draw.”

Volume 67, Number 2 (January 1962)

Samuel Flag Bemis, president of the AHA in 1961, likewise pitches his address to the circumstances of the present, a time too, in his estimation, of great crisis. For Bemis, however, the conditions are not those of economic depression or philosophical relativism, as they were for McIlwain, but rather the threat of communism and the twilight struggle of the Cold War. A diplomatic historian who taught at several colleges and universities, winner twice of the Pulitzer Prize, Bemis specialized in the early national period in U.S. history; he also was the editor of the eighteen-volume series *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*. His address, “American Foreign Policy and the Blessings of Liberty,” is indeed a Cold War document. Starting with the assertion that the “freedoms of the individual are the values for which the United States has stood throughout its history in the shifting configurations of power and politics in the world of nations,” he proceeds to render a sketch of U.S. foreign policy from the colonial past to the Cold War present. Despite this gesture toward a narrative account, his real concern is with the actualities of the day, which he views with alarm. In his view, the post-World War II era has nothing to offer the United States but unprecedented challenges to its heretofore unshakable “Blessings of Liberty.” He cites not only the specter of international communism, “Red imperialism,” and the advent of the “atomic age,” among other woeful developments, but also “the risen tide of color” and “the great population explosion of the pululating peoples of this globe” as a catalogue of dangers that confront the U.S. in the world. The velocity of change is itself a problem: “Things are changing so rapidly—just look at the moon!—that I have been worried lest they should change to stultify these remarks since they were submitted to the *American Historical Review*, in September, for publication in the January 1962 issue.” The question, Bemis asserts, is whether Americans have the resolve and the strength to meet these challenges. He has his doubts. Even the academic world exhibits a failure of nerve. “Have not our social studies been tending overmuch to self-study—to what is the matter with us rather than to perils and strengths that test our liberty?” And when he turns to the wider citizenry, his doubts are only magnified. There he sees an inclination toward comfort rather than strength, a populace “debauched by mass media of sight and sound,” “fed full of toys and gewgaws.” “Massive self-indulgence and massive responsibility do not go together,” he proclaims. “A great nation cannot work less and get more, with fun for all, in today’s stern posture of power.” In the penultimate paragraph of his address, Bemis quotes another, that of John F. Kennedy at his inauguration just a year previous—the famous passage “we shall pay any price, bear any burden . . .”



Anthony Grafton

Presidential Address

The Republic of Letters in the American Colonies: Francis Daniel Pastorius Makes a Notebook

ANTHONY GRAFTON

FRANCIS DANIEL PASTORIUS LOVED to make jokes.¹ Once he had made them, he tried to preserve them—even at the cost of defacing the beloved books in his library. Among his favorite writers was the Leiden University historian Georg Horn (1620–1670), who attracted attention in the 1650s and 1660s for his polemical works on the origins of the American peoples and his surveys of European history and politics.² In 1666 Horn brought out a typically short textbook on a typically big subject, the history of nature and God’s relation to it. He gave it the catchy title *Arca Mosis, sive Historia mundi* [*The Ark of Moses, or the History of the World*]. The engraved title page depicts Pharaoh’s daughter as she discovers the infant Moses. Turning toward a bare-bellied companion while her servingwomen watch, she holds the baby up in what the British still call a Moses basket. A small, grumpy-looking crocodile walks toward her, its intentions unclear. Pastorius’s copy of the 1669 edition, like a number of his other books, is in the Library Company of Philadelphia.³ Writing in a sinuous

Warm thanks to Peter Stallybrass, who introduced me to Pastorius and encouraged my interest in him with great generosity; to Brooke Palmieri and Andrew Thomas for sharing their unpublished work and for their expert advice; to Ann Blair, Natalie Zemon Davis, Laurie Nussdorfer, Nancy Siraisi, Jacob Soll, and Bethany Wiggin for comments and criticism; and to the staffs of the Rare Book and Manuscript Library of the University of Pennsylvania; the Library Company of Philadelphia; the library of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania; the Bodleian Library, Oxford; the British Library; the Department of Special Collections, Princeton University Library; and the Herzog August Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel. An earlier version of this article was presented as a paper at “The Industrious Bee: Francis Daniel Pastorius, His Manuscripts, and His World,” a conference sponsored by the McNeil Center for Early American Studies and the University of Pennsylvania Libraries, October 23–24, 2009.

¹ On Pastorius (1651–1719), the standard study is still Marion Dexter Learned, *The Life of Francis Daniel Pastorius, the Founder of Germantown* (Philadelphia, 1908). See also Marian Wokeck, “Pastorius, Francis Daniel,” American National Biography Online, www.anb.org; Christoph Schweitzer, “Introduction,” in Francis Daniel Pastorius, *Deliciae Hortenses; or, Garden-Recreations and Voluptates apianae*, ed. Schweitzer (Camden, S.C., 1982), 1–6; and Margo M. Lambert, “Francis Daniel Pastorius: An American in Early Pennsylvania, 1683–1719/20” (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 2007).

² Georg Horn, *De originibus americanis libri quatuor* (The Hague, 1652); Horn, *Dissertatio de vera aetate mundi* (Leiden, 1659); Horn, *Arca Noë* (Leiden, 1666); Horn, *Orbis politicus* (Zwickau, 1667); Horn, *Orbis imperans* (Leiden, 1668).

³ Georg Horn, *Arca Mosis, sive Historia mundi* (Leiden, 1669), Library Company of Philadelphia [hereafter LCP], Rare | Am 1668 Hor Log 798.D.

loop that follows the highlighted section of the Egyptian princess's legs and then moves onto the surface of the Nile, Pastorius has entered a line of Latin:

"Est mihi namque domi pater, est crocodilus in illo / et ipse"

(either "For I have a father at home; there's a crocodile in it" or "For I have a father at home, and he's also a crocodile").

The remark seems mysterious. But its obscurity was deliberate: it was an allusion, designed to challenge the reader. In the third of Virgil's great pastoral poems, the *Eclogues*, the shepherd Menalcas refuses to bet one of his sheep against the rival piper Damoetas, who offers a heifer. As he explains:

est mihi namque domi pater, est iniusta noverca,
bisque die numerant ambo pecus, alter et haedos.

(For I have a father at home, there's a mean stepmother,
and they both count the flock twice a day, and one of them counts the kids).⁴

Evidently something about the illustration reminded Pastorius about the ancient Roman epic poet. Perhaps, as a good Christian humanist, Pastorius meant to suggest that Virgil's imaginary shepherd and Pharaoh's daughter both struggled with problematic families. Each had a harsh father, the one counting sheep and kids and the other mistreating Jews. Perhaps his thought was simpler: while Menalcas had to deal with a wicked stepmother, Pharaoh's daughter confronted a sharp-toothed reptile. It is hard to find a more convincing punch line. Possibly you had to be there.

Yet Pastorius's bad joke is more than a tiny, learned puzzle. As cultural historians such as Robert Darnton and Carlo Ginzburg taught us long ago, it is precisely when historical actors say or do strange and paradoxical things that we need to work hardest at interpreting their actions and sayings.⁵ Our bafflement may mean that we have encountered a genuinely strange belief or practice—a clue that may help us to experience the true foreignness of the past. Pastorius was an eminently practical man. He founded Germantown, drew up its legal codes, compiled its register of properties, and served the settlement in several legal and political capacities. Why, then, did he amuse himself with erudite Latin games like this one? What did they mean to him and to others?

The decades around 1700, after all, witnessed a renewed globalization of European intellectual life. Citizens of the Republic of Letters carried out religious and scientific missions around the world. Both they and their informants also held positions in embassies, trading posts, and factories. Letters flew among them, and so did data and material objects. Astronomical observations and medical simples, botanical images and geological specimens moved around the world, from colony to

⁴ Virgil, *Eclogues* 3.33–34.

⁵ Robert Darnton, *The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History* (New York, 1984), makes this point explicitly. Carlo Ginzburg gives marvelous demonstrations of how to turn the strangest of sayings and actions into history in *The Night Battles: Witchcraft and Agrarian Cults in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, trans. John and Anne C. Tedeschi (Baltimore, 1983), and *The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller*, trans. John and Anne Tedeschi (Baltimore, 1980).




FIGURE 1: Georg Horn, *Arca Mosis* (1669), with annotation by Francis Daniel Pastorius. Library Company of Philadelphia.

metropole and colony to colony. Their massed power smashed traditional ways of understanding both the natural and the human world.⁶ Pastorius was ideally situated

⁶ Pamela H. Smith and Paula Findlen, eds., *Merchants and Marvels: Commerce, Science, and Art in Early Modern Europe* (New York, 2002); Daniela Bleichmar, Paula De Vos, Kristin Huffine, and Kevin Sheehan, eds., *Science in the Spanish and Portuguese Empires, 1500–1800* (Stanford, Calif., 2009); Daniela Bleichmar and Peter C. Mancall, eds., *Collecting across Cultures: Material Exchanges in the Early Modern Atlantic World* (Philadelphia, 2011); Daniela Bleichmar, *Visible Empire: Botanical Expeditions and Visual*

to take part in these exchanges, as his friend James Logan regularly did, and as we will see, he supplied European readers with strikingly vivid reports about his surroundings. For the most part, though, he stuck to traditional ways of gathering and assessing information.

Pastorius saw no fundamental conflict between the Latinate scholarship that he practiced as a reader and the life that he led in Pennsylvania. In fact, the learned practices he brought with him from Europe remained central to his day-to-day work, helped him deal with the personal and intellectual challenges with which the New World presented him—from deciding whether Christians could hold slaves to working out how to describe the Lenape Indians near whom he spent much of his adult life—and enabled him to build communities. And that is less surprising than it may seem. Erudition still mattered, after all, in the late seventeenth century. Reading and writing, in particular, highly skilled ways, were intimately connected with membership in the intangible but powerful community known as the Republic of Letters, which stretched across the Atlantic as it did across political and religious borders in Europe.

From the start of Pastorius's time in America, knowledge of Latin literature cemented relationships that mattered deeply to him. He met William Penn and Thomas Lloyd on the ship that brought him to the New World. He and Lloyd began what became a lifelong friendship—Pastorius became a mentor to Lloyd's children and grandchildren as well—while speaking Latin. (Pastorius and Penn spoke French.) What really won Penn's affection for Pastorius, however, was the slightly grandiose Latin inscription that the German placed over the door of his first small house in Pennsylvania: "thirty shoes long, fifteen wide, with oiled paper windows for lack of glass." "Parva domus sed amica bonis, procul este prophani," wrote Pastorius: "It's a little house but welcoming to good people: profane men, keep your distance."⁷ The second part of this inscription was a quotation from Virgil's *Aeneid*. In book 6 of the epic, Aeneas comes to Cumae, where the Sibyl explains to him how he may descend to the Underworld. As priests perform sacrifices to the chthonic gods Pluto and Proserpine, the sibyl cries: "procul, o procul este, profani . . . totoque absistite luco" ("Keep your distance, profane men . . . and shun this whole grove") (*Aeneid* 6.238–239). Apparently the incongruity of the high sentence over the low doorway of a naïve domestic house charmed Penn. According to tradition, he even laughed when he saw it—one of two occasions in his life when he laughed.⁸

When Pastorius showed off his Virgilian learning in what now seems a curious way, he was declaring his allegiance, as he did in many other ways, to a world of

Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Hispanic World (Chicago, 2011); Harold J. Cook, *Matters of Exchange: Commerce, Medicine, and Science in the Dutch Golden Age* (New Haven, Conn., 2007); Florence C. Hsia, *Sojourners in a Strange Land: Jesuits and Their Scientific Missions in Late Imperial China* (Chicago, 2009); Neil Safier, *Measuring the New World: Enlightenment Science and South America* (Chicago, 2008).

⁷ Rüdiger Mack, "Franz Daniel Pastorius: Sein Einsatz für die Quäker," *Pietismus und Neuzeit* 15 (1989): 132–171, here 140. Pastorius also inscribed similar sentiments in Latin and English above his table, on the chest that held his manuscripts, and on doors and windows. See Learned's extracts from the *Bee-Hive* in Marion Dexter Learned, "From Pastorius' Bee-Hive or Bee-Stock," *Americana Germanica* 1, no. 4 (1897): 104–106.

⁸ Mack, "Franz Daniel Pastorius," 140. According to Beatrice Pastorius Turner, "William Penn and Pastorius," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 57, no. 1 (1933): 66–90, Penn laughed only once.

bookish traditions in which he had been formed, and which he continued to draw on and use throughout his life in Pennsylvania. Doing so, as Penn's response shows, was a practical as well as a spiritual exercise: a way to reinforce a friendship. He and Pastorius used their walks and rides to explore their common interest in such questions as maintaining peace with the Indians and building a godly society. Yet as we will see, the practices of erudition that Pastorius knew were neither uniform nor unchanging. The German Enlightenment emerged, in large part, from the same learned world that produced Pastorius, and his ways of reading texts, for all their seeming quirkiness, in fact identify him as a characteristic figure of a particular cultural landscape, and even a characteristic member of one intellectual generation.

BORN A LUTHERAN IN THE Franconian town of Sommerhausen, Pastorius came from a well-off family and studied law at Altdorf, Strasbourg, and Jena. Inspired by the Pietist Philipp Jakob Spener, he sailed to America in June 1683, in pursuit of a simpler, more pious life. But simplicity proved elusive. Like most of us these days and like many of his contemporaries, Pastorius spent his life working hard at his various professions and trying to keep his head above the surface of a flood of information. His legal and political work as agent of the Frankfurt Company and bailiff, committeeman, clerk, and burgomaster at Germantown required him to master the laws of Pennsylvania.⁹ His passionate religious convictions inspired him to find, read, and excerpt every Quaker text he could—especially in his early years in America, when Quaker works in English were more accessible than other books.¹⁰ Much of Pastorius's note-taking and writing served immediate, practical ends. His *Young Country Clerk's Collection* collected the details of the Pennsylvania legal practice that he knew at first hand, and his primer reflected his experience as a teacher in Germantown and Philadelphia.

Yet Pastorius read far more than his practical duties required. As the supply of books available in Philadelphia gradually expanded, his irrepressible curiosity pushed him to explore everything from Renaissance works on world history and natural philosophy to contemporary discussions of the diseases prevalent in his part of the world and the therapies that might be available for them. He made a special study of alchemy, which fascinated him as much as it did Governor Winthrop of Connecticut, one of the few earlier inhabitants of the colonies who had been Pastorius's match for cosmopolitan erudition.¹¹

Pastorius's mind—or at least his books—buzzed with poetry and prose, proverbs and biblical verses, edible legumes and rules for surveying, bibliographies and stories about authors. He stored all of this material for use, by himself and his sons, in the margins of the books in his library and in magnificent information-retrieval ma-

⁹ Alfred L. Brophy, "‘Ingenium est Fateri per quos profeceris’: Francis Daniel Pastorius' *Young Country Clerk's Collection* and Anglo-American Legal Literature, 1682–1716," *University of Chicago Law School Roundtable* 3, no. 2 (1996): 637–742. See more generally J. M. Duffin, ed., *Acta Germanopolis: Records of the Corporation of Germantown, Pennsylvania, 1691–1707* (Philadelphia, 2008).

¹⁰ Alfred Brophy, "The Quaker Bibliographic World of Francis Daniel Pastorius's Bee Hive," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 122, no. 3 (1998): 241–291.

¹¹ Walter W. Woodward, *Prospero's America: John Winthrop, Jr., Alchemy, and the Creation of New England Culture, 1606–1676* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2010).

chines, the grandest of which is his *Bee-Hive*, the immense commonplace book that is one of the glories of the Van Pelt Library at the University of Pennsylvania.¹² If Pastorius's books reflect complex patterns of reading and sociability that seem unfamiliar in the age of the Kindle, his commonplace books are even more disorienting. Reading one of them is like entering a carnival funhouse, where texts of all kinds—excerpts and stories, jokes and reflections, history and alch  my, stories about horses and dogs—take the place of distorting mirrors. Subjects and languages blur into one another in a continual process of metamorphosis. Associations served Pastorius very much as hyperlinks serve us, both tempting and enabling him to leap from one text or subject to another. Every small tag from a great text had associations for him, which spurred him to call up and write down passages from other texts.

The marginal notes and manuscript compilations on which Pastorius lavished so much time and effort challenge modern disciplinary boundaries. How are we to map this extraordinary unknown territory? Scholars have taken two paths in recent years, and found gold at the end of each. Historians, legal scholars, Germanists, and others have read their way into Pastorius's manuscript compilations and finished writings, tagged and identified many of their sources, and re-created the larger social and cultural worlds within which he lived, worked, and read. Thanks to Alfred Brophy, Patrick Erben, Margo Lambert, and others who have illuminated Pastorius's thought in these ways, we know how he explored the magnificent labyrinths of Quaker thought and spirituality, how he developed his ideas about language and other central themes, and how he practiced as a lawyer, served his community, and taught.¹³

Historians of the book have also begun to look seriously at Pastorius's books and at his magnificently weird devices for textual storage and retrieval. Edwin Wolf collected the evidence for Pastorius's own library, showing that it was probably the largest in Philadelphia before James Logan built his collection.¹⁴ More recently, Brooke Palmieri has laid out, in gritty, granular detail, exactly how Pastorius made and expanded his notebooks and sorted and indexed his excerpts. She has revealed how Pastorius, as he worked, updated and personalized the methods for commonplacing that Renaissance humanists such as Erasmus had laid out in textbooks that reached a vast readership.¹⁵ The digital version of the *Bee-Hive* made possible by the

¹² Rare Book and Manuscript Library, University of Pennsylvania [hereafter UPL], MS Codex 726, "The Bee-Hive" (two vols. in three). See also UPL, MS Codex 89, "The Young Country Clerk's Collection"; Historical Society of Pennsylvania [hereafter HSP], Pastorius Collection, MS Am 475, "Alvearalia," "Res Propriae," and "Talia Qualia." Excerpts from the *Bee-Hive* have been printed in Marion Dexter Learned, "From Pastorius' Bee-Hive or Bee-Stock," *Americana Germanica* 1, no. 4 (1897): 67–110; 2, no. 1 (1898): 33–42; 2, no. 2 (1898): 59–70; 2, no. 4 (1899): 65–79; and Marc Shell and Werner Sollors, eds., *The Multilingual Anthology of American Literature: A Reader of Original Texts with English Translations* (New York, 2000), 12–41.

¹³ Brophy's work is cited below. See Patrick M. Erben, "Promoting Pennsylvania: Penn, Pastorius, and the Creation of a Transnational Community," *Resources for American Literary Study* 29 (2003–2004): 25–65; Erben, "'Honey-Combs' and 'Paper-Hives': Positioning Francis Daniel Pastorius's Manuscript Writings in Early Pennsylvania," *Early American Literature* 37, no. 2 (2002): 157–194; Lambert, "Francis Daniel Pastorius."

¹⁴ Edwin Wolf II, *The Book Culture of a Colonial American City: Philadelphia Books, Bookmen, and Booksellers* (Oxford, 1988). On Pastorius's library, see also Lyman W. Riley, "Books from the 'Beehive' Manuscript of Francis Daniel Pastorius," *Quaker History* 83 (1994): 116–129.

¹⁵ Brooke Palmieri, "'What the Bees Have Taken Pains For': Francis Daniel Pastorius, *The Beehive*, and Commonplacing in Colonial Pennsylvania" (B.A. thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2009), http://repository.upenn.edu/uhf_2009/7/.

National Endowment for the Humanities, which is now available on the website of the University of Pennsylvania Libraries, will for the first time enable many more scholars to make direct excursions into this difficult intellectual country.¹⁶

Much remains to be done. One major task is simply to describe Pastorius's ways of reading and to connect them with their sources in learned tradition. In recent years, historians and literary scholars have re-created the practices of the passionate, dedicated readers who taught, preached, and filled government offices in the late Renaissance and after. For generations, the learned humanists of Europe had covered the title pages of their books with everything from signatures that declared their ownership to mottos in learned languages—not to mention allusive comments on the texts that followed. The sublimely erudite Huguenot Hellenist Isaac Casaubon filled his printed working copy of the Greek historian of Rome, Polybius, with so many handwritten notes that the Bodleian Library classifies the book as a manuscript.¹⁷ He too made jokes on the title page—in his case, jokes that reflected serious thought about his author. Casaubon described the Greek historian's frequent digressions on historical method as a bug, rather than a feature, of his style: "Note: one thing we do not like in this author is that he repeats, and sets out, his plans, his goals, and his ends, so many times. Why bother to do this? Did he think he was going to be read only by Greek soldiers and centurions who smelled like goats?"¹⁸

Gabriel Harvey, the Cambridge professor of Greek and counselor to Philip Sidney and other great men, was not simply eccentric when he used the title pages of his books to record his autobiography as a reader, or when he wreathed the texts of Livy, Guicciardini, and many others with notes reminiscent of Pastorius in their obsessive concern with detail, their pedantic playfulness, their multiple languages, and their wonderfully legible handwriting.¹⁹ He was carrying on a tradition of annotation deeply rooted in the world of manuscript books. Different versions of it had served Francesco Petrarca, Angelo Poliziano, and Niccolò Machiavelli in their turn when each of them set out to master texts and make them his own.²⁰

Notebooks were also traditional. Some experts argued that marginal summaries took less time to make than massive excerpts, and were more useful. By careful visual

¹⁶ For the digitized *Bee-Hive*, see http://dla.library.upenn.edu/dla/medren/pageturn.html?id=MEDREN_2487547. Patrick Erben, Alfred Brophy, and Margo Lambert are also preparing *A Francis Daniel Pastorius Reader: Selective Edition of Published and Manuscript Writings* for the Pennsylvania State University Press.

¹⁷ Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS Casaubon 19. For Casaubon's work on Polybius, see Isaac Casaubon, *Polibio*, ed. Guerrino F. Brussich (Palermo, 1991).

¹⁸ Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS Casaubon 19, title page: "Σηαι In hoc auctore non placet nobis quod toties suum institutum, scopum et finem repetit et ob oculos ponit. Nam quorsum idem toties? Nisi putaret solum se a militibus Graecanicis lectum iri, aut hircosis centurionibus. Tale omnino vitium licet notare in Varronis lib. De L. L. Perlege principia et fines singulorum librorum, eadem ubique reperies non sine aliquo taedio, meo certe, repetita." For the smelly centurions, cf. a text that Casaubon edited, Persius *Satirae* 3.77.

¹⁹ See Lisa Jardine and Anthony Grafton, "'Studied for Action': How Gabriel Harvey Read His Livy," *Past & Present* 129, no. 1 (1990): 30–78; William H. Sherman, *John Dee: The Politics of Reading and Writing in the English Renaissance* (Amherst, Mass., 1995).

²⁰ For Petrarch, see the classic work of Pierre de Nolhac, *Pétrarque et l'humanisme*, new ed., 2 vols. (Paris, 1907); and Carol Everhart Quillen, *Rereading the Renaissance: Petrarch, Augustine, and the Language of Humanism* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1998); for Poliziano, see the materials gathered in Paolo Viti, ed., *Pico, Poliziano e l'Umanesimo di fine Quattrocento: Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, 4 novembre–31 dicembre 1994. Catalogo* (Firenze, 1994); for Machiavelli, see Alison Brown, *The Return of Lucretius to Renaissance Florence* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010).

coding—placing the most important points in the upper margins, for example—the annotator could make it easy to go back through his book and find its main points, readily outlined.²¹ Most expert humanists, however, held that even wide margins could not contain everything that annotators wanted to record, in an age when books were the prime sources of knowledge about life, the universe, and everything. Ann Blair and other historians of information management have shown that many of those who seriously wanted to survey a province of the world of books did so by keeping either *adversaria*—random notebooks in which they entered extracts as they read—or commonplace books—systematic notebooks in which they organized extracts under topical headings.²² Some, including Casaubon, kept both. When the young Sir Julius Caesar—like Pastorius, a humanist and a lawyer—set out late in the sixteenth century to master the humanities and the law, he bought a ready-made commonplace book—a set of blank pages with categories already printed on them and a preexisting index, published by the martyrologist John Foxe in 1572. Caesar showed a patience and a clear handwriting that matched those of Pastorius as he filled 1,200 large pages.²³ Like Pastorius, Caesar both collected passages from many languages and traditions and assembled materials of practical use to a British lawyer and statesman. He thus created, in William Sherman's words, “a powerful tool that anticipated the kind of indexed archive now being delivered to anyone with a computer by Google and its associates”—an information-recovery machine that, like the *Bee-Hive*, used verbal associations as its hot links.²⁴

Each of these men turned reading into a formal craft and practiced it with articulate self-consciousness. Each of them stated the rules of the game of interpretation and note-taking, in advance, as he saw them. Each of them documented his own life with books with great precision, and in a highly legible form, embracing with muscular willingness a vast effort of personal and physical self-discipline. For each of them saw reading as a deeply serious enterprise: vital for the practical affairs of everyday life and for the forging of a religious identity, for the amassing of a kind of cultural capital and for the making of links to other passionate readers. Each of them knew, and stated, that he was doing more than memorialize an apparently fleeting experience: he was carving a niche of his own in a humanistic tradition. These men dramatized reading as an act to be carried out in conditions of strenuous attentiveness, preceded by rituals and attended by elaborate equipment. Casaubon made a point of combing his hair every morning before he went upstairs to his study to speak with the ancients; Jacques Cujas worked with a book wheel and a rotating

²¹ See, e.g., Celio Calcagnini, *Opera aliquot* (Basel, 1544), 26.

²² Ann Moss, *Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought* (Oxford, 1996); Francis Goyet, *Le sublime du “lieu commun”: L'invention rhétorique dans l'Antiquité et à la Renaissance* (Paris, 1996); Earle Havens, *Commonplace Books: A History of Manuscripts and Printed Books from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century* (New Haven, Conn., 2001); Ann Blair, “Reading Strategies for Coping with Information Overload, ca. 1550–1700,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 64, no. 1 (2003): 11–28; Blair, “Note Taking as an Art of Transmission,” *Critical Inquiry* 31, no. 1 (2004): 85–107; Blair, “Scientific Reading: An Early Modernist's Perspective,” *Isis* 95, no. 3 (2004): 420–430; Blair, *Too Much to Know: Managing Scholarly Information before the Modern Age* (New Haven, Conn., 2010). Valuable material is also available on the “Commonplace Books” page of Harvard's Open Collections Program, <http://ocp.hul.harvard.edu/reading/commonplace.html>.

²³ British Library, MS Add. 6038.

²⁴ William H. Sherman, *Used Books: Marking Readers in Renaissance England* (Philadelphia, 2008).

barber's chair so that he could whirl from project to project.²⁵ And they valued their readings and the notebooks in which they recorded them. One of the standard handbooks for early modern readers, the *Aurifodina* (*Gold Mine*) of the Jesuit Jeremias Drexel, shows two sorts of mining on its title page. On one side, three literal miners dig for material gold in a cavern. On the other, a lone scholar mines gold from his book by taking careful notes. Drexel left his reader in no doubt as to which sort of mining yielded the greater and more lasting riches.²⁶

Pastorius's prized copies of several books by Georg Horn, now in the Library Company of Philadelphia, reveal how closely he adhered to these traditions. True, these books are usually not festooned with notes, as Harvey's were. But they show every sign of engaged reading in the fullest traditional style—one that combined marginal annotation with commonplacing in a single, complicated system of information storage and retrieval. Pastorius regularly entered Latin mottos—appropriate to a student reader proud of his knowledge—on their title pages. By the image of a ship in full sail at the start of the *Orbis imperans*, he wrote “Quo me Fata trahunt: retrahuntque” (“Wherever the Fates drag me, and then drag me back”), very likely a saying he had found in an earlier collection.²⁷ He also provided guidance to their contents—as in the note that summed up in advance the providential natural history that underpinned Horn's *Arca Mosis*.²⁸

Above all, Pastorius maintained an active dialogue with his books. Sometimes his comments took the modest form of dry Latin jokes and puns. When Horn mentioned Charles V's reform of the Imperial Chamber Court, which he moved to the city of Speyer, Spira in Latin, Pastorius noted: “in qua plurimae lites spirant, sed non expirant” (“here many lawsuits breathe, but never breathe their last”).²⁹ Sometimes he responded directly to the text—as when he came across a passage in the *Orbis politicus* in which Horn described Quakers, Shakers, and Fifth Monarchy Men as sectaries of essentially the same kind. Pastorius crossed out this passage and commented, at the end, “haec ultima falsa” (“this last bit is false”).³⁰ Here he put himself in a tradition that stretched all the way back to Petrarch, who regularly discussed

²⁵ Anthony Grafton and Joanna Weinberg, *“I have always loved the Holy Tongue”: Isaac Casaubon, the Jews, and a Forgotten Chapter in Renaissance Scholarship* (Cambridge, Mass., 2011), 21; Rita Calderini de-Marchi, *Jacopo Corbinelli et les érudits français d'après la correspondance inédite Corbinelli-Pinelli (1566–1587)* (Milan, 1914), 176.

²⁶ Jeremias Drexel, *Aurifodina artium et scientiarum omnium: Excerptendi solertia, omnibus litterarum amantibus monstrata* (Antwerp, 1641). Drexel dwells at length on the image on his title page in his preface “Benevolo lectori meo,” sigs. [A6 recto]–[A8 recto]. See, e.g., sig. [A 6 recto]: “Non ego te in Ophir Terram auream, non in Iberiam metallorum feracissimam, non in Aethiopiam matrem auri admodum foecundam mitto: ad tuum te museum ablego, nec manibus ferrum sed calamum ingero, et familiarissime suadeo rogoque: Hic fode. Quod non solum sine periculo et damno, sed tuo ingenti bono facies.”

²⁷ Horn, *Orbis imperans*; LCP, Rare | Am 1668 Hor Log 687.D.1.

²⁸ Horn, *Arca Mosis*, LCP, Rare | Am 1668 Hor Log 798.D, blank leaf before p. 1:

Deus creavit varias Species (p. 1)
his Benedixit (p. 100)
Et Maledixit (p. 109)
Maledictionem sustulit (p. 128)
Tandemque mundum Instaurabit (p. 219)

(God created the various species, p. 1; he blessed them, p. 100; and cursed them, p. 109; he removed the curse, p. 128; and at last he will restore the world, p. 219).

²⁹ Horn, *Orbis politicus*, LCP, Rare | Am 1668 Hor (b.w.) Log 687.D.2, 11.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 96.



FIGURE 2: Jeremias Drexel, *Aurifodina* (1641), title page. Private collection.

matters with the ancient authors he read, and even sent formal letters to Cicero and Virgil, in which he rebuked the former for his involvement with politics and expressed his regret that the latter had lived too early to be saved by Jesus.³¹ Yet Pastorius was not finished with these books once he had marked his progress through them. He listed some of them among his special favorites and planned to make excerpts from them in the *Bee-Hive*.³² Horn noted, for example, that “the skin of the Ethiopians is soft and porous, because the sun has consumed its stiff grains.”³³ Pastorius put a line beside the passage, and later copied it into the entry titled “Negro” in the *Bee-Hive*.³⁴ Pastorius’s ways of using his books suggest that he saw himself as an inhabitant of a world we have lost: a world of relative textual scarcity, in which each book was a precious possession that must serve multiple functions—and in which someone who lived in a slave society and could have examined black men and women directly still found information that he saw as useful in a Latin compendium written decades before his time.

The evidence of Pastorius’s surviving books makes it clear that he reveled in the multiple uses of print. The title of a Jesuit encyclopedia stimulated him to set off a fireworks display of Latin jokes and quotations, as well as a fancy version of his signature.³⁵ A satire on scholars and their ways by the Utopian Johann Valentin Andreae provoked sardonic remarks about the spread of both belief and deceit in an age when new inventions such as the telescope, which called perception and knowledge itself into question, were multiplying.³⁶ And a wry remark about the way that medical men’s rivalry spurred them to offer competing remedies, regardless of their utility to the sick, inspired a paradoxical reflection: “So many are helping me that I am quite overwhelmed.”³⁷ As Pastorius read one book after another, he turned them into something like tiny chapters of his autobiography as a reader, each of them

³¹ See Francesco Petrarca, *Petrarch’s Letters to Classical Authors*, trans. and ed. Mario Emilio Cosenza (Chicago, 1910).

³² See, e.g., UPL, MS Codex 726, I, 115, where Pastorius remarks about Horn’s *Orbis imperans* and *Orbis politicus*: “Of these two books I shall have use in my nominal Observations.”

³³ Horn, *Arca Mosis*, LCP, Rare | Am 1668 Hor Log 798.D, 47: “Aethiopia cutis mollis & porosa, quia sol absumsit particulas rigidas.”

³⁴ See Palmieri, “‘What the Bees Have Taken Pains For,’” 18–19 and fig. 4.

³⁵ Michael Pexenfelder, *Apparatus eruditionis tam rerum quam verborum per omnes artes et scientias* (Nuremberg, 1670); LCP, Rare | Sev Pexe Log 626.O, title page: [top:] “Mundus non alio debebat nomine dici: / Nomen ab ornatu convenienter habet”; [right margin]: “Quisquis amas mundum, tibi prospice, quo sit eundum / Est via qua vadis, via pessima, plenaque cladis”; [bottom]: “Inservio studiis Francisci Danielis Pastorij”; “Rebus in humanis omnia sunt dubia, incerta, suspensa; magisque veritati similia, quam vera. Minuc. Felix.”

³⁶ Johann Valentin Andreae, *Menippus* (Cologne, 1673); LCP, Rare | Sev Andr Log 359.D, 194. Here, between cap. 79, *Nova reperta*, and cap. 80, *Perspicilia*, Pastorius has written: “Multiplicata fides numero decrescit ab ipso, / Nunquam plus Fidei, Perfidieque fuit.”

³⁷ Horn, *Arca Mosis*, LCP, Rare | Am 1668 Hor Log 798.D, sig. ** 3 recto. Horn writes: “Nec dubium est, omnes istos famam novitate aliqua aucupantes animas statim nostras negotiari. Hinc illae circa aegros miserae sententiarum concertationes, nullo idem censente, ne videatur accessio alterius. Hinc illa infelicis monumenti inscriptio turba se medicorum perisse.” Pastorius marked the passage throughout and commented on the bottom of the same page: “Quod morbus non potuit, fecerunt Medici, / Illorum turba me peremit: / Multorum Auxilio oppressus sum.” The first phrase alludes to a famous pasquinade from seventeenth-century Rome, directed against the harm supposedly done to the city by the Barberini family: “Quod non fecerunt barbari, fecerunt Barberini” (“What the barbarians have not done, the Barberini have done”).




FIGURE 3: Georg Horn, *Orbis politicus* (1668), with annotation by Francis Daniel Pastorius. Library Company of Philadelphia.

distinctive, and each of them—at least for those who knew and appreciated him and his learning—potentially valuable.³⁸

These considerations were not purely theoretical. Pastorius's circle of friends included James Logan, the ruthless trader and fantastically erudite scholar who, in the face of considerable practical obstacles, built up the largest library in the English colonies, twice the size of that of Harvard College.³⁹ Logan loved obtaining rare books, such as the early printed edition of Ptolemy that a German friend gave him, and in return for which he sent his benefactor a buffalo skin.⁴⁰ He took pleasure in

³⁸ Compare Pastorius's remark about borrowing books: "Grata mutuo datorum librorum recordatio." Quoted in DeElla Victoria Toms, "The Intellectual and Literary Background of Francis Daniel Pastorius" (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1953), 151.

³⁹ See Frederick B. Tolles, *James Logan and the Culture of Provincial America* (Boston, 1957).

⁴⁰ Edwin Wolf 2nd, *The Library of James Logan of Philadelphia, 1674–1751* (Philadelphia, 1974).

the fact that some of his books came, directly or indirectly, from Pastorius, and recorded it with precision. On the flyleaf of one of them, Logan wrote: "I bought this book from Phillip Monckton, to whom it was sold by the son of my great friend Francis Daniel Pastorius of Germantown, 15 November 1720."⁴¹ In his turn, Pastorius seems to have liked borrowing books from Logan—at least to judge from the epigram in Latin and English that he addressed to Logan when he returned his friend's copy of the political emblem book of Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, with its impressive vision of a Christian prince.⁴² It seems quite likely that Pastorius thought with pleasure about a time after his death when friends and later scholars would collect and examine his books, and remember him and these transactions.

Not all such exchanges were commercial. By giving or lending a book, or indeed by borrowing one, one acknowledged the other party's citizenship in the Republic of Letters. Pastorius arranged his friendships deliberately so that only those who deserved to become his intimates could do so.⁴³ This did not mean that he bonded only with other males. Like a number of his contemporaries, he saw women as eminently capable of citizenship in the Republic.⁴⁴ He made this view clear when writing to a younger friend, Lloyd Zachary, in Latin, to excuse himself for having held on for far too long to a female friend's copy of volume 4 of the *Spectator*: "I humbly beg for the forgiveness of the owner, who is quite right to be annoyed, and I hope your intercession will keep her from denying me volume 5."⁴⁵ Evidently Pastorius, his correspondent, and the book's owner all belonged to a world of learned, skeptical readers, who helped one another keep abreast with the newest arrivals from London.

If Pastorius cared about the printed books that he customized, he cherished his commonplace books. A graphomane, he copied everything he could, including the journals of friends, whom he reprimanded when he felt that their diaries included so much boring, repetitive detail that it taxed even his patience: "now a days most Readers loath Superfluities in all sorts of Writings, and much more those to whose Task it falls to copy or transcribe them."⁴⁶ When a friend fell ill, his first thought was

⁴¹ James Logan, note on the flyleaf of Michael Pexenfelder, *Apparatus eruditionis tam rerum quam verborum per omnes artes et scientias*; LCP, Rare | Sev Pexe Log 626.O: "Emptus hic Liber a Phillipo Munckton cui vendidit eum filius mihi Amicissimi ffr. D. Pastorij Germanopolitani. 15.9bris. 1720." Cf. the inscription John Winthrop entered in a book that had been a favorite possession of the inventor Cornelis Drebbel, and that was given to Winthrop by Drebbel's son-in-law: Woodward, *Prospero's America*, 32.

⁴² Quoted by Toms, "The Intellectual and Literary Background of Francis Daniel Pastorius," 154.

⁴³ Pastorius to Richard and Hannah Hill, January 23, 1716/1717; HSP, Pastorius Collection, MS Am 475: "Of the old Romans we read that they had their 1st, 2d and 3d rate friends, admitting some only into the Court-yard or hall, others into the Antichamber or parlour, but their privados into their Closets, and bed-rooms. So me thinks we may do the same with a blameless partiality."

⁴⁴ April G. Shelford, *Transforming the Republic of Letters: Pierre-Daniel Huet and European Intellectual Life, 1650–1720* (Rochester, N.Y., 2007); Sarah Gwyneth Ross, *The Birth of Feminism: Woman as Intellect in Renaissance Italy and England* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009); Carol Pal, "Republic of Women: Rethinking the Republic of Letters, 1630–1680" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 2007).

⁴⁵ Pastorius to Lloyd Zachary, Germantown, December 19, 1719; HSP, Pastorius Collection, MS Am 475: "PS Remitto denique tomum IVum Spectatoris sive contemplatoris skeptici Magnae Britanniae, qui me nescio diutius inter seclusos meos libellulos in Conclavi hac hyeme parum frequentato delituit, quam illi concessissem, si non jam pridem remeasse putassem. Veniam igitur juste irascentis Proprietariae humiliter deprecor, et ne propter Peccatum hoc Ignorantiae Volumen V deneget Tua, quod spero, Intercessio procurabit." For Pastorius's correspondence with Zachary in French and Latin, see Toms, "The Intellectual and Literary Background of Francis Daniel Pastorius," 155–161.

⁴⁶ Pastorius to Lydia Norton, Germantown, June 14, 1710; HSP, Pastorius Collection, MS Am 475.

to copy out the perhaps valuable remedies that he had stored up over the years: "I heartily sympathize with thy lameness, and forasmuch as I collected out of several experienced authors many good Remedies agt bodily distempers let me know, if thou please, what you properly call it, and I shall very willingly transcribe what I find in my book."⁴⁷ Pastorius literally believed that the results of all his toil were priceless. He urged his sons not to part with the greatest of his notebook-making feats, the *Bee-Hive*, for anything in the world.⁴⁸

IT IS NOT EASY TO KNOW what to call the results of Pastorius's active and multiple ways of reading: certainly not a textual interpretation in any simple sense—far less the sort of simple, straightforward reading of texts that early Quakers had preferred to the subtleties of the learned.⁴⁹ An analysis of one phrase will give a sense of how reading and writing, tradition and the individual talent interacted as Pastorius sat over his books and his excerpts from them, crafting not only a body of notes, but a classical identity. When he began to copy out *The Young Country Clerk's Collection*, he reflected, in a nicely characteristic mixture of Latin and English, that "Ingenuum est fateri per quos profeceris, according to Plinius"—"It is honorable to acknowledge the sources through which you have derived assistance, according to Pliny."⁵⁰ Here he quoted the preface to one of the largest and most diverse compilations in classical literature, the *Natural History* of the elder Pliny. This Roman lawyer, official, and military commander, who died while inspecting the eruption of Mount Vesuvius in 79 C.E., completed his vast rag and bone shop of ancient learning, a compendium in thirty-seven long books, shortly before his death. Early modern printers often called the book *History of the World*, a title that gives some idea of its scope.⁵¹

The author's nephew, also named Pliny, described his uncle's masterpiece as "a massive and learned work, as crammed with incident as nature itself."⁵² In fact, it was something like a classical *Bee-Hive*: a massive work of compilation. The elder Pliny, as his nephew explained, laid the foundations of his own scholarship by an ascetic regime of reading. He rose at midnight or a little later, visited the emperor Vespasian before dawn, did his official job in the imperial administration and the law—and then lay in the sun and ate his meals while books were read to him. "He made extracts of everything he read, and always said that there was no book so bad that some good could not be got out of it."⁵³ At his death in the eruption of Vesuvius, he left his nephew "160 notebooks of selected passages, written in a minute hand

⁴⁷ Pastorius to Isaac Norris, n.d.; HSP, Pastorius Collection, MS Am 475.

⁴⁸ UPL, MS Codex 726, I, 1.

⁴⁹ Kate Peters, *Print Culture and the Early Quakers* (Cambridge, 2005).

⁵⁰ UPL, MS Codex 89, 1.

⁵¹ For the impact of Pliny's work in later eras, see Charles G. Nauert, Jr., "Humanists, Scientists, and Pliny: Changing Approaches to a Classical Author," *American Historical Review* 84, no. 1 (February 1979): 72–85; Arno Borst, *Das Buch der Naturgeschichte: Plinius und seine Leser im Zeitalter des Pergaments* (Heidelberg, 1994); Mary Beagon, "Pliny the Elder," in Anthony Grafton, Glenn W. Most, and Salvatore Settis, eds., *The Classical Tradition* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010), 744–745.

⁵² Pliny the Younger, *Epistolae* 3.5.6: "opus diffusum eruditum, nec minus varium quam ipsa natura."

⁵³ Ibid., 3.5.10: "Nihil enim legit quod non exciperet; dicere etiam solebat nullum esse librum tam malum ut non aliqua parte prodesset." On the portrait that this letter paints of the elder Pliny, see John Henderson, *Pliny's Statue: The Letters, Self-Portraiture and Classical Art* (Exeter, 2002), 69–103; Aude Doody, *Pliny's Encyclopedia: The Reception of the "Natural History"* (Cambridge, 2010), 14–23.

on both sides of the page, so that their number is really larger than it seems. He used to explain that when he was serving as procurator in Spain he could have sold these notebooks to Larcus Licinus for 400,000 sesterces [an ancient Rome coin], and there were far fewer of them then.”⁵⁴ To mention either Pliny, in the context of reading and note-taking, was to call this story to mind. No wonder that Pastorius wrote early in the *Bee-Hive* that he wanted “my Two Sons, . . . not to part with them for anything in this World, but rather to add thereunto some of their Own, &c. Because the price of Wisdom is above Rubies.”⁵⁵ When he called attention to the value of the notebooks, he made his reference clear. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Americans, as master historians have taught us, liked to imagine themselves as ancient Greeks and Romans not only when they wrote their political treatises, but also when they designed their houses, wrote their novels, and even when they chose their furniture (to the discerning eye, the sofa revealed the presence of a classical taste).⁵⁶ In a similar vein, Pastorius portrayed himself as an American Pliny, and his commonplace book as the American counterpart to those marvelous notebooks that the original had compiled.

For decades, modern scholars criticized Pliny for relying on books rather than the informants with practical experience whom Aristotle and Theophrastus had regularly consulted.⁵⁷ In fact, Pliny made no bones about the fact that his work consisted chiefly of facts extracted from texts. He insisted on the value of information of this kind, and remarked that his predecessors had not read and commonplacéd with his meticulous integrity.⁵⁸ As he remarked in his preface:

You will be able to judge my taste from the fact that I inserted at the beginning, the names of my authors. For I consider it to be pleasant and to indicate an honorable modesty, to acknowledge the sources whence we have derived assistance, and not to emulate the majority of those whom I have examined. For please be aware that when I compared authors with each other, I discovered that some of the most grave of our recent writers have transcribed the ancients word for word, without mentioning their names.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ Pliny the Younger, *Epistolae* 3.5.17: “Hac intentione tot ista volumina peregit electorumque commentarios centum sexaginta mihi reliquit, opisthographos quidem et minutissimis scriptos; qua ratione multiplicatur hic numerus. Referebat ipse potuisse se, cum procuraret in Hispania, vendere hos commentarios Larcio Licino quadringentis milibus nummum; et tunc aliquanto pauciores erant.” Many details of the elder Pliny’s methods of reading, annotating, and excerpting remain obscure. For some of the possibilities, see the careful, detailed analyses of Tiziano Dorandi, “Den Autoren über die Schulter geschaut: Arbeitsweise und Autographie bei den Antiken Schriftstellern,” *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 87 (1991): 11–33, here 13–15; Valérie Naas, *Le projet encyclopédique de Pline l’Ancien* (Rome, 2002), 108–136.

⁵⁵ UPL, MS Codex 726, I, 1.

⁵⁶ See, e.g., Michael O’Brien, *Conjectures of Order: Intellectual Life and the American South, 1810–1860*, 2 vols. (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2004); and Caroline Winterer, *The Mirror of Antiquity: American Women and the Classical Tradition, 1750–1900* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2007); for the sofa, see 125–131.

⁵⁷ For a classic and influential critique of Pliny’s bookishness, see G. E. R. Lloyd, *Science, Folklore and Ideology: Studies in the Life Sciences in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge, 1983), 135–149.

⁵⁸ On the nature of Pliny’s scholarship, see Sorcha Carey, *Pliny’s Catalogue of Culture: Art and Empire in the “Natural History”* (Oxford, 2003); Trevor Murphy, *Pliny the Elder’s “Natural History”: The Empire in the Encyclopedia* (Oxford, 2004), 52–73; Mary Beagon, *The Elder Pliny on the Human Animal: Natural History, Book 7* (Oxford, 2005), 20–38.

⁵⁹ Pliny the Elder, *Naturalis Historia*, *praefatio* 21–22: “Argumentum huius stomachi mei habebis quod in his voluminibus auctorum nomina praetexui. Est enim benignum, ut arbitrator, et plenum ingenui pudoris fateri per quos profeceris, non ut plerique ex iis, quos attigi, fecerunt. Scito enim conferentem auctores me deprehendisse a iuratissimis ex proximis veteres transcriptos ad verbum neque nominatos, non illa Vergilianae virtute, ut certarent, non Tullianae simplicitate, qui de re publica Platonis se comitem

Contemporary scholarship on Pliny is duly appreciative of the richness of the material he had collected, and its appropriateness to the tastes of his contemporaries. Pastorius would certainly have agreed.

In practice, Pastorius emulated Pliny in two ways: he not only identified the primary sources that he used, but also cited Pliny as his warrant for doing so. At the same time, he changed Pliny's words even as he quoted them, shortening "est enim benignum, ut arbitror, et plenum ingenui pudoris fateri per quos profeceris" ("For I consider it to be pleasant and to indicate an honorable modesty, to acknowledge the sources whence we have derived assistance") to "Ingenuum est fateri per quos profeceris, according to Plinius" ("It is honorable to acknowledge the sources through which you have derived assistance, according to Pliny"). In the section on letter-writing that appears later in the *Collection*, Pastorius cited Pliny's thought again, repeating his condensed version of the original Latin while adding a further suggestion for elegant variation later on: "it indicates an ingenuous modesty, to acknowledge the sources whence you have derived assistance. Pliny. From which you have copied."⁶⁰ In this practice of deliberate variation, Pastorius followed a standard precept of classical rhetoric. The well-educated man should take care to misquote, slightly, when he brandished a quotation from an older text: to practice elegant but apparently inadvertent variation. By doing so, he showed that he quoted from memory—the proper way for a gentleman to access his texts—even as he admitted that in practice he took extensive written notes.⁶¹

Even when Pastorius compiled an eminently practical book, in other words—a collection of model legal documents and passages from letters—he played the elaborate, self-conscious games of humanism, and assumed a classical persona. He borrowed his description of the proper way to borrow from the ancient whose note-taking prowess inspired him, and then made it his own by altering its form. In the *Bee-Hive*, he used the same tactics even more elaborately, creating a colorful patchwork of sayings about indebtedness and note-taking:

I acknowledge, with Macrobius, that in this Book all is mine, & Nothing is mine. *Omne meum, nihil meum*. And though Synesius says, It's a more unpardonable theft, to steal the labours of dead men, than their garments, *Magis impium mortuorum lucubrationes, quam Vestes, furari*, Yet the wisest of men concludes, there is no new thing under the Sun, *Nihil novi sub Sole*, and an other, that nothing can be said but what has been said already, *Nihil dicitur, quod non dictum prius*. Seneca writes to his Lucilius that there was not a day in which he did not either write some things or read & epitomize some good author.⁶²

This whole passage on acknowledging what one has borrowed is, appropriately enough, a series of borrowings. In this case, Pastorius drew the sayings he ascribed

profitetur, in consolatione filiae Crantorem, inquit, sequor, item Panaetium de officiis, quae volumina ediscenda, non modo in manibus cotidie habenda, nosti." For Pliny's understanding of intellectual property and scholarly integrity, see Eugenia Lao, "Luxury and the Creation of a Good Consumer," in Roy K. Gibson and Ruth Morello, eds., *Pliny the Elder: Themes and Contexts* (Leiden, 2011), 35–56.

⁶⁰ UPL, MS Codex 89, 301: "Ingenuum est fateri per quos profeceris. Plin. ex quibus scripseris."

⁶¹ John Whitaker, "The Value of Indirect Tradition in the Establishment of Greek Philosophical Texts or the Art of Misquotation," in John N. Grant, ed., *Editing Greek and Latin Texts: Papers Given at the Twenty-Third Annual Conference on Editorial Problems, University of Toronto, 6–7 November 1987* (New York, 1989), 63–95.

⁶² UPL, MS Codex 726, I, 2.

to Macrobius and Synesius not from their own writings but from the address to the reader, signed Democritus Junior, in Robert Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*, itself one of the seventeenth century's masterpieces of compilation.⁶³

The source of the last saying, which Pastorius attributes to Seneca, is especially revealing. At the end of this passage, most of which is in English, appears a phrase in Latin: "Vide omnino Spectator num. 316" ("See generally Number 316 of the *Spectator*"). Here Pastorius cited an article by John Hughes, a poet, musician, and librettist, in Joseph Addison's periodical. Hughes denounced his contemporaries for their idleness and offered the commonplace book as a remedy:

Seneca in his Letters to Lucilius assures him, there was not a Day in which he did not either write something, or read and epitomize some good Author; and I remember Pliny in one of his Letters, where he gives an Account of the various Methods he used to fill up every Vacancy of Time, after several Employments which he enumerates; sometimes, says he, I hunt; but even then I carry with me a Pocket-Book, that whilst my Servants are busied in disposing of the Nets and other Matters I may be employed in something that may be useful to me in my Studies; and that if I miss of my Game, I may at the least bring home some of my own Thoughts with me, and not have the Mortification of having caught nothing all Day.⁶⁴

This passage is suggestive in more than one way. It shows that Pastorius—like most commonplacers—took his quotations from intermediary sources as well as from originals. It indicates that one could conceive of commonplacing not only as an artificial memory—the way in which Pastorius himself described it—but also as an ascetic discipline, a way of forming a moral, hardworking self. And it reminds us that in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the methods and meanings of commonplacing continued to evolve, and that cutting-edge intellectuals played a role in that process. No less a modern than John Locke devised a new method for making commonplace books.⁶⁵ They were so trendy, in fact, that self-proclaimed traditionalists who proclaimed their own independence of such aids to learning denounced them. In the preface to his 1711 *Tale of a Tub*, Jonathan Swift joked that he had planned to expand his satire with a panegyric to the present and a defense of the rabble, "but finding my Common-Place-book fill much slower than I had reason to expect, I have chosen to defer them to another Occasion."⁶⁶ When Pastorius used Seneca to support his view that reading and writing, excerpting and composition were closely connected, he was not harking back to the Latin works of Erasmus, much less his classical sources, but citing a current periodical.

The Young Country Clerk's Companion and the *Bee-Hive* were both meant to serve practical purposes: the former was a guide to legal practice in Pennsylvania, the latter an aid to full mastery of the vast vocabulary of English. Yet both of them also offered

⁶³ Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, ed. Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicolas K. Kiessling, and Rhonda L. Blair, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1989–1994), 1: 11, 8. For Burton and his contemporaries' role in the history of the commonplace, see Quentin Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (Cambridge, 1996), 118–119.

⁶⁴ *Spectator*, no. 316; *The Spectator, with Illustrative Notes*, ed. Robert Bisset, 8 vols. (London, 1793–1794), 5: 126.

⁶⁵ John Locke, *A New Method of Making Common-Place-Books* (London, 1706); cf. Locke, *A Little Common Place Book* (Brooklyn, N.Y., 2010), for a commonplace book constructed on Locke's principles. For Locke's method for indexing notebooks and its influence, see Blair, *Too Much to Know*.

⁶⁶ Jonathan Swift, *A Tale of a Tub, and Other Work*, ed. Angus Ross and David Woolley (Oxford, 1986).

Pastorius opportunities, of which he took exuberant advantage, for the same sort of humanistic play in which he engaged on the title pages of his Latin books. To some extent, as we have seen, his ways of playing would have been familiar to others well read in the English literature of his day.

Still, in the English-speaking world around 1700, Pastorius stands out as a compiler for his riotous polyglot learning and his manically associative habit of mind. To enter the *Deliciae hortenses* (*Garden Delights*) or *Voluptates Apianae* (*Beekeeper's Pleasures*), a collection of sayings and poems that he assembled late in life, is to be swept away by his virtuosity. A skillful gatherer-hunter-collector of others' phrases, he was equally deft at ringing multiple changes on them. He could turn one tag into rhyming or rhythmic phrases in multiple languages, and find in all of them food for contemplation of God's ways in nature. A single thought—"Only the bee stores up honey"—could pass through seven languages as Pastorius worked his way to the maxim that God's word is even sweeter than honey:

Μόνη ἡ μέλισσα τιθαιβώσσει

Sola Apis mellificat. Die Bien allein trägt Honig ein.

Het honigh komt alleen Van Biekens by een,

Solamente le Pecchie fanno Mele. Seulement les Abeilles font du miel.

The Bees alone bring home Honey and honey-Comb.

The Bee is little among such as flie, but her Fruit is the Chief of sweet things.

Syrac. 11:3.

Qu. What is sweeter than Honey? Judg. 14:18.

Answ: God's Word. Psal. 119:103. etc.⁶⁷

Marc Shell and Werner Sollors did not exaggerate when they canonized Pastorius as the first of America's multilingual writers.⁶⁸ His collections, with their complicated games of variation and their pursuit of symbols and messages, were astonishingly cosmopolitan.

PASTORIUS'S PRACTICES CAME WITH HIM from Europe to Pennsylvania. The best way to understand more precisely what he hoped to accomplish through this vast accumulation of texts and sentiments is to follow him back into the intellectual territories in which his mind was formed—the deeply bookish world of German schools and universities in which he formed his culture, and developed his particular passions. Pastorius grew up in Windsheim, where he attended the local gymnasium. From 1668 he studied at a whole series of German universities, before he took his degree in law at Altdorf in 1676. Like so many German males from the urban patriciate, in other words, he joined the *Gelehrtenstand*—the social order of the learned. Doing this meant mastering a foreign language and culture, since the learned used Latin as their primary language in academic exercises and publications.⁶⁹ "In Winsheim," Pastorius

⁶⁷ Pastorius, *Deliciae hortenses*, ed. Schweitzer, 74.

⁶⁸ Shell and Sollors, *The Multilingual Anthology of American Literature*, 12–41.

⁶⁹ See the classic study of Erich Trunz, "Der deutsche Späthumanismus um 1600 als Standeskultur," in Richard Alewyn, ed., *Deutsche Barockforschung: Dokumentation einer Epoche* (Cologne, 1965), 147–181; for more recent perspectives, see Anton Schindling, *Humanistische Hochschule und freie Reichsstadt: Gymnasium und Akademie in Strassburg, 1538–1621* (Wiesbaden, 1977); Wilhelm Kühlmann, *Gelehrten-*

recalled in the autobiographical narrative in the *Bee-Hive*, “I had good Schooling, and mostly twenty or more young Earls, Baronets, & Noble mens Children for School fellows, there being then an excellent Rector of the Gymnasium by name Tobias Schumberg, a Hungarian by birth, who could speak almost no Dutch, so that it was not allow’d, to use any other Language but the Latin.”⁷⁰ Though he studied French, and perhaps other modern languages, at Strasbourg, he had to defend his dissertation—and the set of theses appended to it—in public in Latin.

Fluent Latin was not easy to attain. In theory, as Erasmus advised in his ever-popular textbook *On Copiousness*, the young student should simply read all Latin and Greek authors, entering excerpts in a commonplace book until he had made a rich vocabulary and a wide range of allusions his own and could deploy them deftly.⁷¹ In practice, though, as Erasmus knew perfectly well, most students would never even attempt this. The very work in which he explained how to make notebooks, *On Copiousness*, offered sprawling lists of examples that readers could plunder as they wished: hundreds of ways to say “Thank you for the letter” in good Latin, for example, and dozens more for saying “So long as I live, I shall remember you.” Erasmus’s *Adages*, which appeared in 1508, offered potted essays on thousands of subjects, each inspired by a pithy and quotable ancient saying.⁷²

These books became bestsellers, on a pan-European scale. Learned men and women across Europe used Erasmus’s words as they assured one another that the friendships they had made and hoped to sustain across the vast distances and uncertain postal services of a warring world would last forever. Ambitious writers emulated Erasmus’s magnificent effort to command a vast vocabulary, to weave a tissue of words, myths, and allusions that allowed—as Erasmus himself had shown—for play of many kinds.⁷³ And even the less ambitious majority, who harbored more modest literary goals, put on the Erasmian language of allusion, much as modern individualists wear black, as a straightforward way of asserting their membership in a literary world.⁷⁴ Pastorius’s creatively configured quotation from Pliny may well have come from Erasmus or another popular compiler, for it appears, in a similarly

republik und Fürstenstaat: Entwicklung und Kritik des deutschen Späthumanismus in der Literatur des Barockzeitalters (Tübingen, 1982); Gunter Grimm, *Literatur und Gelehrtentum in Deutschland: Untersuchungen zum Wandel ihres Verhältnisses von Humanismus bis zur Frühaufklärung* (Tübingen, 1983); Manfred Fleischer, *Späthumanismus in Schlesien: Ausgewählte Aufsätze* (Munich, 1984); Notker Hammerstein and Gerrit Walther, eds., *Späthumanismus: Studien über das Ende einer kulturhistorischen Epoche* (Göttingen, 2000); Axel E. Walter, *Späthumanismus und Konfessionspolitik: Die europäische Gelehrtenrepublik um 1600 im Spiegel der Korrespondenzen Georg Michael Lingelsheims* (Tübingen, 2004).

⁷⁰ UPL, MS Codex 726, I, 406. On Schumberg and his relationship with Pastorius, see Toms, “The Intellectual and Literary Background of Francis Daniel Pastorius,” 28, 117–118.

⁷¹ Desiderius Erasmus, *De duplici copia rerum ac verborum commentarii duo* (Paris, 1512); for an English translation by Betty I. Knott, see “Copia: Foundations of the Abundant Style,” in *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 24: *Literary and Educational Writings 2* (Toronto, 1978), 279–660.

⁷² Desiderius Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades tres ac centuriae fere totidem* (Venice, 1508); for an English translation by Roger Mynors and others, see *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vols. 31–36: *Adages* (Toronto, 1982–).

⁷³ Terence Cave, *The Cornucopian Text: Problems of Writing in the French Renaissance* (Oxford, 1979); Moss, *Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought*; Kathy Eden, *Friends Hold All Things in Common: Tradition, Intellectual Property, and the Adages of Erasmus* (New Haven, Conn., 2001).

⁷⁴ Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, *From Humanism to the Humanities: Education and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe* (London, 1986).

simplified form, in Cotton Mather's *The Christian Philosopher* and in a letter of July 25, 1744, from the Dutch scholar J. F. Gronovius to John Bartram.⁷⁵

To set Pastorius's work of compilation before this background is to see it in a clearer light. He actually set out to do what Erasmus had recommended and later Central European scholars had practiced: to read his way into a vast body of literature in many languages and make it his own, as Erasmus had eloquently advised, by excerpting and organizing it under his own categories. As always, though, Pastorius updated and reconfigured what he borrowed from others. The Baroque poets of the Germany that Pastorius knew as a young man had cultivated many languages at once, producing verse in set forms, such as the emblem book, in Latin, Italian, French, and other languages, especially in their youth, because their poetry could serve as their ticket of admission to academies or courts.⁷⁶ Pastorius focused especially on English, the language of his new community, in which his sons would live, and decanted his other languages into it. He made this clear when he described his immense—and multilingual—*Bee-Hive* as “the largest of my Manuscripts, which I in my riper years did gather out of excellent English Authors,” and left it to his sons as a precious possession.⁷⁷ Like the clear-minded late-humanist pedagogues who were inspired and informed by Erasmus but set their own sights lower, Pastorius offered young lawyers in the New World not a straight replication of the rich humanistic and legal education he had enjoyed in Germany, but something more practical, designed for his new world: model letters and contracts for replication and adaptation, and a mass of tags and anecdotes, recipes and remedies in English that could serve both their practical needs and any literary ones that might arise. His compilations mirrored his own exuberant success at transposing his own legal and notarial work from the German and Dutch languages into English—a task that some others found cripplingly difficult.⁷⁸ Yet he never abandoned his love for polyglot wordplay in the Erasmian spirit or for the sorts of riddles that had filled the emblem books.

The dominant figures in the intellectual world of the Holy Roman Empire that Pastorius saw in his youth were known, in their own time, as polyhistorians. They look nowadays like scholarly dinosaurs, especially when they appear next to nimbler contemporaries such as René Descartes, whose ideas, we know in hindsight, had the future on their side. They took all knowledge as their province: past and future, nature and culture, history and astronomy. The Jesuit Athanasius Kircher, for example, traced the history of the world's peoples from before the Flood to his own day, deciphered Egyptian hieroglyphs, clambered into the crater of Vesuvius to study the mechanism of volcanic eruption, adhered to the Copernican system at a time when Catholics were forbidden to advocate it, and played football against the Dominicans. And he presented his discoveries not only in a stately series of Latin folios, but also in the magnificent material form of the museum housed in his rooms in the

⁷⁵ Cotton Mather, *The Christian Philosopher*, ed. Winton U. Solberg (Urbana, Ill., 1994), 10; William Darlington, *Memorials of John Bartram and Humphry Marshall* (Philadelphia, 1849), 352.

⁷⁶ See Leonard Forster, *The Icy Fire: Five Studies in European Petrarchism* (London, 1969); Forster, *The Poet's Tongues: Multilingualism in Literature* (London, 1970).

⁷⁷ UPL, MS Codex 726, I, 1.

⁷⁸ See the moving case study by Donna Merwick, *Death of a Notary: Conquest and Change in Colonial New York* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1999).

Jesuit Collegio Romano.⁷⁹ This made a splendid stage on which Kircher and visitors could play out the rituals of greeting, and he could show off the giant's shinbones and other antiquities that made his collection so memorable.

The polyhistor's reach often exceeded their grasp. The Hamburg scholar Peter Lambeck, for example, never managed to complete the "history of literature" that he outlined and planned to compile, in some thirty-eight volumes, and no wonder. This enormous work would have collected information about the lives and works of all significant authors from the Creation down to his own time, as well as about the institutions of intellectual life—from the contests at which ancient Greek poets competed, through the universities of the Middle Ages, to the academies of his own day.⁸⁰ But Lambeck's failure did nothing to dissuade others from attempting the same enterprise—down to Nicolaus Gundling, who in the 1730s published a history of erudition that was almost 7,700 quarto pages long. The index alone stretched over 900 pages.⁸¹

As one might expect, methods of compilation interested these men greatly. Vincentius Placcius (1642–1699), professor of rhetoric at Hamburg, published an extensive manual on making notes in 1689. This included the first publication of a design for a *scrinium litteratum* or note closet—a piece of study furniture equipped with hooks on which the reader could fix and arrange excerpts on thousands of slips of paper. Though the plan was actually drawn up by Thomas Harrison, an English member of the circle of Samuel Hartlib, it is characteristic of the German world Pastorius knew that it was published there—and that Leibniz actually owned and used one of these *scrinia*, "though it apparently had little impact on the messiness of his papers."⁸²

Other German savants specialized in bibliography rather than straightforward compilation. But the ways in which they gathered, processed, and displayed their materials have a clear kinship with Pastorius's methods. In Germany, impoverished after the Thirty Years' War, few students could afford many books. (This was the world in which the writer Jean Paul Richter imagined an impoverished little schoolmaster, Maria Wutz, who would compose the books he imagined when he read their titles in the Frankfurt Book Fair catalogue, but that he could not afford to buy.)⁸³ Professors offered formal courses on "literary history." They would reprint the in-

⁷⁹ See in general R. J. W. Evans, *The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1550–1700: An Interpretation* (Oxford, 1979); Anthony Grafton, "The World of the Polyhistor: Humanism and Encyclopedism," *Central European History* 18, no. 1 (1985): 31–47. On Kircher, see Daniel Stolzenberg, ed., *The Great Art of Knowing: The Baroque Encyclopedia of Athanasius Kircher* (Stanford, Calif., 2001); Paula Findlen, ed., *Athanasius Kircher: The Last Man Who Knew Everything* (New York, 2004); Angela Mayer-Deutsch, *Das Musaeum Kircherianum: Kontemplative Momente, historische Rekonstruktion, Bildrhetorik* (Berlin, 2010).

⁸⁰ Peter Lambeck, *Prodromus historiae literariae, et Tabula duplex chronographica universalis*, ed. Johann Albert Fabricius (Leipzig, 1710).

⁸¹ Nicolaus Gundling, *Vollständige Geschichte der Gelahrtheit*, 5 vols. (Frankfurt, 1734–1736). See Martin Gierl, *Pietismus und Aufklärung: Theologische Polemik und die Kommunikationsreform der Wissenschaft am Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen, 1997).

⁸² Blair, *Too Much to Know*. See also Markus Krajewski, *Paper Machines: About Cards and Catalogs, 1548–1929*, trans. Peter Krapp (Cambridge, Mass., 2011), 17–21. Placcius's account of the *scrinium litteratum* appears in his *De arte excerpendi* (Stockholm, 1689), 124–159. For Harrison and the Hartlib circle, see the magnificent article by Noel Malcolm "Thomas Harrison and His 'Ark of Studies': An Episode in the History of the Organization of Knowledge," *The Seventeenth Century* 19, no. 2 (2004): 196–232.

⁸³ See Jean Paul, *Schulmeisterlein Wutz*, ed. Eva J. Engel (The Hague, 1962).

ventory of a major library, or print a list of writers, distribute it to their students, and then dictate comments on it. These courses—a Baroque counterpart to Pierre Bayard's *How to Talk about Books You Haven't Read*—offered a rich mix of basic bibliographical information, critical judgments, and literary gossip, much of it unreliable.⁸⁴ The influential Wittenberg professor Conrad Samuel Schurzfleisch, for instance, told his pupils of a rumor that the great philologist Joseph Scaliger had been castrated by his father, in order to ensure that he not marry and discredit his illustrious family. There is no further evidence in any source to support this story.⁸⁵

Students copied out what teachers told them. Sometimes the teachers then recycled their students' notes as printed textbooks, which other teachers in turn made the objects of their own lectures. Compilation and excerpting, recompilation and commentary followed one another in a seemingly endless cycle.⁸⁶ Christoph August Heumann of Göttingen surveyed all of the knowledge that counted in a *Conspectus*, 500 pages of Latin thrilling enough, or useful enough, that the book went through seven or eight editions.⁸⁷ Gottlieb Stolle of Jena offered courses in which he used Heumann's book as the textbook and dictated comments on it. Then he published his own lectures. Some student readers had their copies of Stolle on Heumann interleaved so that they could add still more information of their own.⁸⁸ The texts of these compilations grew as slowly and inevitably as glaciers, with a thin crust of slick textual ice covering a deep, dark, rocky mass of footnotes.

Biographical evidence identifies two of the ways in which Pastorius may have encountered these methods, and one of the teachers who may have helped him master them. Pastorius's own father, the jurist Melchior Adam Pastorius, was a compiler on a grand scale and a versifier almost as obsessive as his son. In 1657 he issued a study of the election and coronation of the Holy Roman Emperors. Here he amassed not only a great amount of information about the preparations and ceremonies that had attended the most recent election in 1653, but also an emperor-by-emperor account of imperial history from ancient Rome to his own time, with supplementary material on the electors.⁸⁹ Very late in life, in 1702, Melchior Adam served as the publisher as well as the author of *Franconia rediviva*, a comprehensive anthology of lists and documents regarding the noble families and monasteries, cities and institutions of the Franconian Kreis of the Holy Roman Empire.⁹⁰ Each of these books must have rested on systematic compilation—as did the extensive manuscript col-

⁸⁴ Pierre Bayard, *How to Talk about Books You Haven't Read*, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman (New York, 2007).

⁸⁵ Conrad Samuel Schurzfleisch, *Schurzfleischiana, sive varia de scriptoribus librisque iudicia*, ed. Godofredus Wagener (Wittenberg, 1741), 108: "Sunt, qui conicere audent, Iosephum a patre Iulio Caesare castratum esse, ne matrimonium iniret, neque splendorem familiae illustris detereret."

⁸⁶ The richest study of these methods, their sources, and their afterlife is Blair, *Too Much to Know*.

⁸⁷ I used Christoph August Heumann, *Conspectus reipublicae literariae: Sive Via ad historiam literariam iuventuti studiosae aperta a Christophoro Augusto Heumanno*, 5th ed. (Hanover, 1746).

⁸⁸ Gottlieb Stolle, *Anmerckungen über D. Heumanns Conspectum Reipublicae Literariae: Allen Liebhabern der Historie der Gelahrheit zu Liebe an den Tag gegeben* (Jena, 1738). I possess an interleaved copy annotated by an anonymous owner.

⁸⁹ Melchior Adam Pastorius, *Römischer Adler, oder Theatrum electionis et coronationis Romano-Caesareae* (Frankfurt am Main, 1657).

⁹⁰ Melchior Adam Pastorius, *Franconia rediviva. Das ist: Des Hochlöblichen Fränckischen Craises so wohl genealogische als historische Beschreibung* (Nuremberg, 1702).

lections of Melchior Adam's verse, interspersed with curious illustrations, that survive in Philadelphia.⁹¹

In the *Bee-Hive*, Francis Daniel Pastorius recalled that he had learned some of the principles of public law from "the renowned Dr Böckler at Strassburg."⁹² It is likely that he learned some law from the elderly jurist Johann Heinrich Boecler (1611–1672). But it is even more likely that he learned a great deal about compiling and managing information. Boecler was not only a lawyer of reputation but also a master practitioner of literary history, an expert at manipulating the rococo information machines that took in names and titles, anecdotes and maxims, and spat out textbooks and courses. At the request of Leibniz's patron, Johann Christian von Boineburg, Boecler drew up a crisp little manual of the history of letters, from the Creation to the present, for young students. It bore the modest title *A Curious Historical-Political-Philological Bibliography That Reveals the Merits and Defects of Each Writer*.⁹³ Far longer—though still less than 1,000 pages—was the *Critical Bibliography of All the Arts and Sciences* that Boecler also composed.⁹⁴ Johann Gottlieb Krause, who edited this compilation after Boecler's death in 1715, ransacked Boecler's other works for relevant passages and added them to give the book more depth and heft, intervened where he thought editorial care could improve the exposition, and turned the original, skeletal work into a relatively content-rich guide to the world of learning.⁹⁵ In his original sketch of literary history, Boecler had said of the Greek historian Herodotus that he was not a liar, and of Thucydides that he was very noble.⁹⁶ In Krause's elaborated version, the reader encountered Boecler explaining that modern travel accounts confirmed Herodotus's stories about gold-digging ants the size of wolves, and noting that Thucydides' account of the Greek states at perpetual war with one another shed a powerful light on the fragmented, militaristic Holy Roman Empire of his own day.⁹⁷ When Pastorius listed topics, entered excerpts, and drew up indexes, treating compilation as a central and valuable part of scholarly work, he practiced skills that he had encountered in youth and mastered through the long years of his university training.

Pastorius also seems to have developed his interest in preserving and collecting documents—an interest that would be central to his career as a notary and jurist in the New World—as a student. In 1676, he defended a dissertation on a revealing topic: *rasura documentorum* (the scraping, or erasure, of passages in legal docu-

⁹¹ Melchior Adam Pastorius, "Liber intimissimus omnium semper mecum continens thesaurum thesaurorum Iesum, quem diligo solum. in quo vivo et in quo moriar ego"; HSP, Pastorius Collection, MS Am 475; UPL, MS Codex 1150, for which see below.

⁹² UPL, MS Codex 726, I, 407.

⁹³ Johann Heinrich Boecler, *Bibliographia historico-politico-philologica curiosa: Quid in quovis scriptore laudem censuramve mereatur, exhibens, cui praefixa celeberrimi cujusdam viri de studio politico bene instituendo dissertatio epistolica posthuma* (Germanopolis [i.e., Frankfurt am Main], 1677). For another form of compilation—titled "excerpts," but actually consisting of discussions of such great events as the condemnation of the Templars, reduced to outline form and lists of references to the sources—see his *Excerpta controversiarum illustrium* (Strasbourg, 1680).

⁹⁴ Johann Heinrich Boecler, *Bibliographia critica scriptores omnium artium atque scientiarum ordine percensens, nunc demum integra* (Leipzig, 1715).

⁹⁵ Johann Gottlieb Krause, "Praefatio," *ibid.*, sig. b recto.

⁹⁶ Boecler, *Bibliographia historico-politico-philologica curiosa*, sig. F verso–F ii recto.

⁹⁷ Boecler, *Bibliographia critica*, 232–233.

ments).⁹⁸ In his preface, he explained that since the credibility of documents was often called into question in court, he had planned to cover all the reasons why this happened. But he discovered that the subject was too large and confined himself, for the moment, to various forms of *rasura* (beginning with all the meanings of the word, which also applied to the tonsure of Catholic clerics).⁹⁹ This proved to be a large and suggestive field in itself—as when Pastorius raised the question whether a guilty notary's hand should be amputated “when he has become so skillful in painting, or another art, that his whole intellect seems to have moved into his fingers.”¹⁰⁰ It seems likely that Pastorius already prided himself—as so many notaries did—on writing a hand so neat that it mirrored the neat divisions of property that formal documents described.¹⁰¹

Material evidence confirms that Pastorius began to master all the techniques of compilation as a student. He owned a linked set of textbooks, now in the Library Company of Philadelphia. They include chronological tables for world history from the Creation to the present drawn up by a Braunschweig theologian, Christoph Schrader; introductions to the tradition of historiography from antiquity to modernity, and to the genealogy of rulers from ancient Rome to the present; and a short textbook on geography by a Gymnasium professor, Heinrich Schaevius. Pastorius signed and dated the last of these in 1674.¹⁰² The books themselves, annotated sparsely but systematically, show how he read his way into mastery of a world of scholarly methods and materials. Schrader's chronological tables, which presented world history in the skeletal form normal at the time, were dated, in the traditional way, from the Creation forward: Pastorius followed the custom that had become widespread in the seventeenth century and added a B.C. date, reckoned backward from the Incarnation, for the start of world history. Where Schaevius, whose brief handbook of geography Pastorius read, mentioned Pliny's *Natural History* as a model compilation on cosmography, Pastorius added a marginal reference to the Renaissance classic in the field, the *Cosmography* of Sebastian Münster.¹⁰³ And where Schaevius discussed systems for describing the world's land masses, Pastorius noted, in very up-to-date terms indeed, that “the whole land mass of the world can also be divided into three parts, or great islands, around which the ocean flows: the first

⁹⁸ Francis Daniel Pastorius, *Disputatio inauguralis de rasura documentorum* (Altdorf, 1676).

⁹⁹ Ibid., 3–4. This was, of course, the period in which diplomatics and paleography, the formal arts that ascertained whether documents were authentic, first took shape. Jean Mabillon's *De re diplomatica* would appear in 1681. For a recent study, see Alfred Hiatt, “Diplomatic Arts: Hickes against Mabillon in the Republic of Letters,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 70, no. 3 (2009): 351–373.

¹⁰⁰ Pastorius, *Disputatio inauguralis de rasura documentorum*, 19; “Intricate hic controvertitur, an ob artis, quam delinquens callet, praestantiam poena debeat mitigari? Ut ecce si Notario manus sit amputanda, *vid.* 2. FF. 55. qui tamen vel pingendi, vel alterius generis arte adeo excellit, ut omne ingenium in digitos ipsi abiisse videatur?”

¹⁰¹ For the notary's art in this period, see Merwick's luminous investigation of practices in Holland and New Amsterdam, *Death of a Notary*, and the rich studies of Laurie Nussdorfer, *Brokers of Public Trust: Notaries in Early Modern Rome* (Baltimore, 2009), and Kathryn Burns, *Into the Archive: Writing and Power in Colonial Peru* (Durham, N.C., 2010).

¹⁰² Christophorus Schrader, *Tabulae chronologicae a prima rerum origine ad natum Christum* (Helmstedt, 1673); LCP, Rare | *Sev Tabu 1405.F.10.

¹⁰³ Heinrich Schaevius, *Skeleton Geographicum: In usus Poëticos & Historicos adornatum*, 4th ed. (Braunschweig, 1671), LCP, Rare | *Sev Tabu (b.w.) 1405.F.12, sig. A recto, where the text mentions “Cosmographia, quae totum mundum visibilem depingit: id quod intendit Plinius,” Pastorius adds “& Munsterus.”

contains Europe, Asia, and Africa, the second America, and the third the Magellanic lands that are also called Austral [southern] and unknown.”¹⁰⁴ Most revealing of all, though, is the list of writers on the early church, starting with the apostles and including pagans as well as Christians, that Pastorius copied into one of these books from the dissident church historian Gottfried Arnold’s work on the life of the early church.¹⁰⁵ Every book invited the reader to engage in bibliographical compilation; every ancient authority invited the reader to make comparisons with modern counterparts.

Pastorius not only applied the techniques of the polyhistor, he shared their tastes. Like Kircher, the Jesuit Michael Pexenfelder, whose odd little encyclopedia of the arts and sciences Pastorius owned, took an interest in ciphers and other forms of writing designed to conceal one’s meaning from curious readers.¹⁰⁶ He described steganography as “a clandestine form of writing, which uses secret signs that a few have agreed on.” These could be letters, standing in for one another, or numbers, or “new characters.”¹⁰⁷ Here Pastorius wrote “see the next page, near the bottom.”¹⁰⁸ He covered the next opening, which deals with the use of metal characters in printing, with ingenious prints of many different kinds of leaf. In the bottom margin he wrote that characters could be “natural, the progeny of the gardens and the fields, some of which appear in the margin, or artificial. Of the first category, absinth stands for A, beta for B, the crocus for C, ferns for F, and so on. Botanists understand them very well.”¹⁰⁹ Here we see that Pastorius’s fascination with language, in all its texture, richness, and variation, was rooted in the culture of the old Holy Roman Empire—a world in which cryptography offered the possibility of sending secret messages, something every chancery and resident ambassador regularly did, and inspired the production of a rich body of poetry by a kind of combinatorics—rather like modern language poetry. Pastorius’s mystical vision of language had its roots in a very particular milieu and moment.

This was not the only case in which Pastorius drew on the mysterious codes and

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., sig. A2 recto, where the text discusses “Divisio Terrae quintuplex,” Pastorius writes: “Totus terrarum Orbis etiam dividitur in 3. partes, sive Insulas magnas, quas Oceanus circumfluit, quarum 1a continet Europam, Asiam et Africam, 2a Americam, et 3a Megallanicam, quae et Australis et Incognita vocatur.”

¹⁰⁵ Carlo Sigonio, Marquard Freher, and David Chytraeus, *Romanorum Germanorumque Caesarum nominum, successionum et Seculorum A Nato Christo Distincta Notatio* (Helmstedt, 1666), LCP, Rare | *Sev Tabu 1405.F.11. At the end of Chytraeus’s list of historians [sig. H 2 recto] is a note: “Gottfrid Arnolds unparteyische kirchen und ketzer histori, von Christi geburt an biss auffs Jahr 1688. in folio, gedruckt zu Franckfurt.” On the verso [sig. H 2 verso] appears a manuscript, “Index scriptorum ecclesiasticorum.”

¹⁰⁶ On the study of cryptography and steganography and their relation to other forms of scholarship in this period, see Gerhard F. Strasser, *Lingua universalis: Kryptologie und Theorie der Universalsprachen im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden, 1988).

¹⁰⁷ Pexenfelder, *Apparatus eruditionis tam rerum quam verborum per omnes artes et scientias*, 309: “Steganographia est clandestina seu clancularia scribendi ratio, occultis utens signis, ex compacto paucorum, intelligibilibus, ut B pro A; C pro B. Vel numeri adhibentur pro literis, ut 1 pro a. 2. pro b. 3. pro c. Vel pro arbitrio transmutatur alphabetum. Vel novi characteres efformantur: vel inaspecti quopiam illiti succo exarantur in panno, non nisi frigida madefacti legendi, aut in charta ad lucernam transparente colligendi, &c.”

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.: “Vide pag. seq. sub finem.”

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 310–311. Pastorius has wreathed the margins with leaf prints, and where Pexenfelder writes “Characteres seu literae sunt metallicae,” Pastorius has added a note in the bottom margin: “vel Naturales, hortorum Camporumque propago, ut quaedam apparent in Margine: vel Artificiales. Ex prioribus Absinthium denotat A. Beta B. Crocus C. Filix F. &c. hasque Botanici optime intelligunt.”

poverty through wealth to poverty again, on the title page of his history of the Dutch Revolt, to suggest a way of understanding the narrative that followed.¹¹² True, Aitzinger's cycle had only six phases rather than the seven Pastorius listed—perhaps another instance of his desire to modify the treasures he collected. Basically, though, Pastorius learned from Baroque tradition how to cope with rapid modern social change.

EVEN WHAT SEEM PASTORIUS'S MOST characteristic and original writings drew nourishment from roots set deep in the layers of traditional scholarly practice. Consider, for example, the letters that he sent back to Germany, in which he described the new world that he found around him in Pennsylvania. These texts eventually became the groundwork for his most famous work, the *Umständige geographische Beschreibung der zu allerletzt erfundenen provintz Pensylvaniæ*; or, *A Detailed Geographical Description of Pennsylvania*, published in Leipzig in 1700. One of the preparatory letters, written in Latin and dated December 1, 1688, was directed to Georg Leonhard Modelius. A friend of Pastorius's, then at the University of Altdorf, Modelius eventually became rector of the Gymnasium in Windsheim that Pastorius had attended. He had asked Pastorius, in a letter we no longer have, for a description of Pennsylvania, both for himself and for his colleague Johann Christoph Wagenseil, a professor of oriental languages at Altdorf still famed for his publications both on the Meistersinger of Nuremberg and on Jewish blasphemies against Jesus.¹¹³ The text pleased its recipient so much that he communicated it to one of the new journals of the period, aimed at a literate and alert lay public, Wilhelm Ernst Tentzel's *Monatliche Unterredungen einiger guten Freunde von allerhand Büchern und andern annehmlichen Geschichten* (*Monthly Conversations among Good Friends on All Sorts of Books and Other Pleasant Stories*), where it appeared in April 1691.¹¹⁴

It is a charming text. Pastorius instructs his readers first to use their maps to zero in on the Delaware and on Philadelphia, and then to imagine themselves there in the body, recovering from seasickness and eagerly welcomed by Pastorius. He invites them to enter his house, pointing to the inscription that offers hospitality, and shows them Germantown, with its rapidly growing population: only 13 in 1683, but now over 50. Pastorius displays the prosperous houses and farms that the citizens of the new community have built, notes that they have no need as yet of a wall, and suggests that he and his guest walk out of town to see the Indians. Pastorius apparently shared William Penn's sympathy for the Lenape Indians, which made possible the early "long peace" between them and white settlers.¹¹⁵ He describes the Indians admir-

¹¹² Michael Aitzinger, *De leone Belgico, eiusque topographica atque historica descriptione liber* (Cologne, 1583). See Sir George Clark, *War and Society in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, 1958).

¹¹³ On Wagenseil, see Nathanael Riemer, *Zwischen Tradition und Häresie: "Beer Sheva"—eine Enzyklopädie des jüdischen Wissens der Frühen Neuzeit* (Wiesbaden, 2010), 31–59.

¹¹⁴ *Monatliche Unterredungen* 3 (1691): 278–288. For the rise of journals in the German world, see Hub. Laeven, *The "Acta eruditorum" under the Editorship of Otto Mencke (1644–1707): The History of an International Learned Journal between 1682 and 1707*, trans. Lynne Richards (Amsterdam, 1990); Gierl, *Pietismus und Aufklärung*, 395–417; and, more generally, Anne Goldgar, *Impolite Learning: Conduct and Community in the Republic of Letters, 1680–1750* (New Haven, Conn., 1995).

¹¹⁵ On Penn and the long peace, see James Merrell, *Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier* (New York, 1999). For the later history of relations between white settlers and

ingly and at length, offering detailed accounts of their intelligence, their use of canoes and tobacco, the personality traits and behavior of males and females, their ways of courting and marriage, their religious rituals, and their ways of caring for the sick and burying the dead. The letter winds up with a list of phrases in the Indian language and in translation. Pastorius comments: "If you can divine the origins of these Indians from these bits of evidence, or from the fact that they call their mother *ana*, their wife *squáa*, their old woman *hexis*, their devil *menitto*, their house *wicco*, their land *hockihóckon*, their cow *muss*, their pig *Kuschkusch*, I will admit you're a really good philologist."¹¹⁶

This letter adumbrates not only Pastorius's future achievements as culture-broker and populist, but also more generally the ethnographic writings of men such as Lafitau and Lahontan and their successors.¹¹⁷ Indeed, with its almost obsessive emphasis on the observer's intellectual resources and point of view, it seems to belong to the new travel writing of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. And that impression is strengthened by a passage toward the beginning of the letter. Here Pastorius, as he takes Modelius on his imaginary walk, says, "So that we don't walk in silence like sheep, let's talk a little about the origin of the Nile—or, what is equally obscure, that of our Indians. Some think, not without plausible clues, that they are the descendants of the Hebrews. But their native language suggests that some of those who live farther from here come ultimately from Wales. Your Polyhistor in Altdorf [Wagenseil] will work out for you the dates and details of their navigations across the Atlantic. But I, since I have hardly a single book, will not myself take part in this dubious battle."¹¹⁸ Here, so it seems, Pastorius ironically distanced himself from the culture of the learned in their universities. Implicitly, at least, he emphasized the superiority of direct experience of the present to book learning about the past.

It is always hard to decode the jokes and irony of past actors. Georg Horn spent much of his life devising ways to intercalate the history of China and the New World into the traditional narrative of world history, centered on the Mediterranean and Western Europe. He not only composed original textbooks, but also carried on long debates with colleagues about the origins of the Indians and the paths by which they

Native Americans in the middle colonies, see Peter Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America* (New York, 2008).

¹¹⁶ *Monatliche Unterredungen* 3 (1691): 287–288: "Ex his elementis, sive etiam, quod matrem *ana*, uxorem *squáa*, vetulam *hexis*, diabolum *menitto*, domum *wicco*, praedium *hockihócken*, vaccam *muss*, suum *Kuschkusch*, appellitent, si tu Indorum horum incunabula divinaveris, bonus mihi eris Philologus &c." For early modern scholars' theories about the origins of the Indians, see Lee Eldridge Huddleston, *Origins of the American Indians: European Concepts, 1492–1729* (Austin, Tex., 1967); Giuliano Gliozzi, *Adamo e il nuovo mondo: La nascita dell'antropologia come ideologia coloniale: Dalle genealogie bibliche alle teorie razziali (1500–1700)* (Florence, 1977); David N. Livingstone, *Adam's Ancestors: Race, Religion, and the Politics of Human Origins* (Baltimore, 2008).

¹¹⁷ Nigel Leask, *Curiosity and the Aesthetics of Travel Writing, 1770–1840: "From an Antique Land"* (Oxford, 2002).

¹¹⁸ *Monatliche Unterredungen* 3 (1691): 283: "Pergamus, et ne silentio viam transigamus veluti pecora, sermocinemur aliquid de Nili, vel quae aequae obscura est, Indorum nostrorum origine. Nam licet non desint, qui eos Ebraeorum arbitrentur prosapiam, non sine signis verosimillimis: quosdam tamen longius hinc habitantium ex Cambria emersisse, nativa illorum loquutio innuit. Quibus autem temporibus atque navigiis Atlanticum hoc mare exantlaverint, Polyhistor tuus Altdorfinus distinctius explicet: ego nec ullo pene libro instructus tam dubiam litem meam non facio."

had arrived in the New World after the Flood.¹¹⁹ In recent years, Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Daniel Smail have advanced powerful programs for decentering our histories, by abandoning our obsessions with narratives centered in Mesopotamia, the Mediterranean, and Western Europe and by combining scientific with historical evidence.¹²⁰ Horn was their seventeenth-century revisionist counterpart, and Pastorius, as we have seen and will see again, willingly learned from him. Yet Pastorius, as much as he admired Horn's books, seemingly made light of the complex historical genealogies and itineraries that filled their pages, treating them as an outworn, obsessively bookish form of knowledge.

In fact, when Pastorius offered an account of local Indian society based on direct experience, he did not rebel against the world of learning as he had known it in Germany. Rather, he carried on one of its central traditions. In the *Bee-Hive*, after all, Pastorius told his sons that they should record "all remarkable words, Phrases, Sentences or Matters of moment, which we do hear and read"—a clear instruction to combine experience and witnesses' accounts with reading.¹²¹ From the sixteenth century onward, humanists had argued that travel, and the direct experience of other countries and mores that it afforded, was essential to anyone who hoped to attain distinction in scholarship or politics. But travel, like reading, had to follow strict protocols if it was to profit those who undertook it. Theodor Zwinger, Thomas Turler, and many others drew up manuals for what they dubbed the "methodus apodemica" or formal art of travel.¹²² Dozens of writers, and hundreds of young men, bore these instructions in mind (and the books that transmitted them in their pouches) as they compiled guides to the states of Europe, memoirs of their travels, or imaginative works of literature, such as John Barclay's *Euphormionis Satyricon*, that turned on knowledge of the national characters of the different European peoples.¹²³

Pastorius's connections to this tradition were deep and organic—so much so as to make his own career as a travel writer seem almost overdetermined. Travel writing was an early pursuit. Pastorius recalled that he kept "a peculiar Manuscript Journal . . . in 8^o" of his travels down to 1682, when he arrived in Frankfurt.¹²⁴ It was also inherited. His own father, Melchior Adam Pastorius, compiled a detailed journal of his early education in the German college in Rome, his later travels, and his self-discovery in Paris, as a Protestant.¹²⁵ It is a charming medley of prose and verse, full

¹¹⁹ On Horn, see Adalbert Klempt, *Die Säkularisierung der universalhistorischen Auffassung: Zum Wandel des Geschichtsdenkens im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1960), who emphasizes his originality; and Erich Hassinger, *Empirisch-rationaler Historismus: Seine Ausbildung in der Literatur Westeuropas von Guiccardini bis Saint-Evremond* (Bern, 1978), who stresses his limitations.

¹²⁰ Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Three Ways to Be Alien: Travails and Encounters in the Early Modern World* (Walham, Mass., 2011); Daniel Lord Smail, *On Deep History and the Brain* (Berkeley, Calif., 2008).

¹²¹ UPL, MS Codex 726, I, 1: "For as much as our Memory is not capable to retain all remarkable words, Phrases, Sentences or Matters of moment, which we do hear and read, It becomes every good Scholar to have a Common Place-Book, and therein to treasure up what ever deserves his Notice, &c."

¹²² See Justin Stagl, *Apodemiken: Eine räsonnierte Bibliographie der reisetheoretischen Literatur des 16., 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts* (Paderborn, 1983); Stagl, *A History of Curiosity: The Theory of Travel, 1550–1800* (Chur, 1995).

¹²³ In addition to Stagl's studies, see Clare Howard, *English Travellers of the Renaissance* (1914; repr., New York, 1968). On Barclay, see Hassinger, *Empirisch-rationaler Historismus*.

¹²⁴ UPL, MS Codex 726, 223.

¹²⁵ UPL, MS Codex 1150: Melchior Adam Pastorius, Erfurtensis, *Itinerarium et vitae curriculum, das ist, Seine Völlige Reis-Beschreibung und gantzer Lebenslauff, sampt einigen Merckwürdigen Begeben-*

of vivid recollections. The opening poem makes a boldly self-conscious allusion to Odysseus. Melchior Adam vividly describes how melancholy he felt when he was left on his own in the great city of Ferrara and had nothing to do but visit churches, and how strange he found it that Italian nuns were surprised that he did not speak their language. Well grounded in the “methodus apodemica,” Melchior Adam took a special interest, when he traveled, in the learned men who had adorned particular cities—for example, the Flemish Tacitist and ancient historian Justus Lipsius, whose house he visited in Louvain.

As a grown man, Francis Daniel continued to share his father’s interests—even as he made gentle fun of them: “Here we should be wanting to ourselves,” he writes in the *Bee-Hive*, “to the Memory of Justus Lipsius (oh quantum nomen! to which we dare not presume so much as to aspire) if we should not insert into these our Remarks the Inscriptions and Descriptions of his three most beloved dogs, whose Counterfeits or Resemblances still are to be seen at Lovain, a City in Brabant, in the very house, wch this transcendingly learned man did inhabit.” He even gives their names: Sapphirus, Mopsulus, and Mopsus.¹²⁶

He also continued to respect books from the learned tradition of travel literature, such as Barclay’s *Satyricon*, which he warmly recommended to Lloyd Zachary as late as 1717.¹²⁷ Once again, material evidence proves especially revealing. Pastorius’s books in the Library Company of Philadelphia include *Itinerarium Italiae*, a detailed guide to the sights and antiquities of Italy, region by region, illustrated with crisp views of the major cities. Written by the Antwerp lawyer Franciscus Schottus, the book was edited after his death by his brother Andreas, a Jesuit scholar, and had a long career as a learned person’s guide to Italy.¹²⁸ It begins with a set of instructions for travelers on what to observe, neatly set out in diagrammatic form. Set topics include the geographical region, the name of the place and its founder, geographical features such as rivers and mountains, public and private buildings, political institutions, schools, and then “the customs of the ordinary people: including their ways of earning their living, their clothing and their crafts.”¹²⁹ Pastorius’s Latin report on Pennsylvania followed this outline with striking precision.

YET PASTORIUS WAS FAR FROM satisfied with the scholarly world he had known as a student. He insisted on the central importance of English when he educated his own sons, and even if they inherited the *Bee-Hive*, they practiced crafts rather than pursuing erudition. And in the preface to his published description of Philadelphia, he

heiten und anzaigungen derer iedes Orths befindlichen Raritäten, partly edited, with other materials, in Pastorius, *Des Melchior Adam Pastorius . . . Leben und Reisebeschreibungen von ihm selbst erzählt*, ed. Albert R. Schmitt (Munich, 1968).

¹²⁶ UPL, MS Codex 726; I, 307.

¹²⁷ Toms, “The Intellectual and Literary Background of Francis Daniel Pastorius,” 154.

¹²⁸ Franciscus Schottus, *Itinerarium Italiae* (Amsterdam, 1655); LCP, Rare | Sev Scho Log 654.D. On this book and its evolution, see Ludwig Schudt, “Das ‘Itinerarium Italiae’ des Franciscus Schottus,” in Adolf Goldschmidt, *Adolf Goldschmidt zu seinem siebenzigsten Geburtstag am 15. Januar 1933 dargebracht* (Berlin, 1935), 144–152; and E. S. de Beer, “François Schott’s *Itinerario d’Italia*,” *The Library*, 4th ser., 23, no. 2–3 (1942): 57–83.

¹²⁹ Schottus, *Itinerarium Italiae*, sigs. A3 verso–A4 recto, here A4 recto: “Vulgi mores: quo pertinent ratio victus et vestitus; item opificia.”

stated formally that he rejected the learned institutions of Europe. Though he deplored the wickedness he saw around him in Pennsylvania, he wrote, "Nevertheless I hope things here will never be conducted in a way so unbecoming men, as in those universities in Europe, in which a man must learn for the most part things which are to be utterly forgotten. Many professors waste their time on useless questions and clever trifling tricks, and while they detain the minds of the learners on empty questions they prevent them from aspiring to more solid matters." He rebuked the learned for preferring Greek mythology to Christ, using Aristotle to explicate Scripture, and wasting their time on "utterly useless questions and trickeries," such as looking "among the Greek declensions for the ablative case" (Latin, not Greek, has an ablative case).¹³⁰

As a critic of the German learned world, Pastorius was not alone. In fact, many of his contemporaries and even more younger scholars completely agreed. Johann Burkhard Mencke, the editor of the Leipzig periodical *Acta eruditorum*, described the etiquette of the erudite with biting wit in two satirical orations on *The Charlatanry of the Learned* in 1713 and 1715. He made brilliant fun of scholars' lust for honorific forms of address: "you see many demanding to be called *Clarissimus* who are absolutely unknown outside the walls of their city; *Magnificus*, who are oppressed by poverty; *Consultissimus*, who have little or no advice to give." He mercilessly ridiculed the elaborate Latin titles by which scholars tried to make humdrum books impressive: for example, "Public Law, or Medical Theses on Headache." And he sketched unforgettable acid-pen portraits of self-absorbed scholars such as Johann Seger of Wittenberg:

He had an engraving made on copper, showing the crucified Christ and himself. From his lips came the words, "Lord Jesus, do you love me?," and from the lips of Jesus came the answer, couched in the most laudatory terms: "Yes, most eminent, excellent and learned imperial poet laureate and rector of Wittenberg University, I do love you."¹³¹

¹³⁰ Francis Daniel Pastorius, "Circumstantial Geographical Description of Pennsylvania," in Albert Cook Myers, ed., *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania, West New Jersey and Delaware, 1630–1707* (New York, 1912), 362–363, 446–447. For a detailed discussion of this work, see Lambert, "Francis Daniel Pastorius."

¹³¹ Johann Burkhard Mencke, *The Charlatanry of the Learned*, trans. Francis E. Litz, ed. H. L. Mencken (New York, 1937), 61–62, 69, 64 (slightly altered); Mencke, *De charlataneria eruditorum declamationes duae* (Leipzig, 1715), 13, 20, 15–16. See in general Conrad Wiedemann, "Polyhistor's Glück und Ende: Von D.G. Morhof zum jungen Lessing," in Heinz Otto Burger and Klaus von See, eds., *Festschrift Gottfried Weber* (Bad Homburg, 1967), 215–235; Leonard Forster, "'Charlataneria eruditorum' zwischen Barock und Aufklärung in Deutschland," in Sebastian Neumeister and Conrad Wiedemann, eds., *Res publica litteraria: Die Institutionen der Gelehrsamkeit in der frühen Neuzeit*, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden, 1987), 1: 203–220; Gunter E. Grimm, *Letternkultur: Wissenschaftskritik und antigelehrtes Dichten in Deutschland von der Renaissance bis zum Sturm und Drang* (Tübingen, 1998); Pascale Hummel, *Moeurs érudites: Étude sur la micrologie littéraire (Allemagne, XVI^e–XVIII^e siècles)* (Geneva, 2002); Alexander Košenina, *Der gelehrte Narr: Gelehrten satire seit der Aufklärung* (Göttingen, 2003); Kasper Risbjerg Eskildsen, "How Germany Left the Republic of Letters," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 65, no. 3 (July 2004): 421–432; Marian Füssel, "'The Charlatanry of the Learned': On the Moral Economy of the Republic of Letters in Eighteenth-Century Germany," *Cultural and Social History* 3 (2006): 287–300; Herbert Jaumann, ed., *Diskurse der Gelehrtenkultur in der frühen Neuzeit: Ein Handbuch* (Berlin, 2011). On the rituals and mores of the Republic of Letters, and especially for the forms of conduct and publication that could lead to expulsion from it, see Martin Mulrow, *Die unanständige Gelehrtenrepublik: Wissen, Libertinage und Kommunikation in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Stuttgart, 2007).

Similarly, Pastorius looked back without affection to the “impertinent Ceremonies” he had undergone as a beginning student at Altdorf.¹³² His books in the Library Company show that complaints about the tediousness of traditional forms of learning and satires of the erudite piqued his interest.¹³³

Mencke denounced the universities because he hoped to improve them—as he tried to do, as professor and, eventually, rector of the University of Leipzig and editor of the major periodical his father had founded, the *Acta eruditorum*. Much evidence suggests that Pastorius, too, when he was not proclaiming the merits of life in fertile Pennsylvania, criticized the learned world not in order to destroy it but in order to save it. In the *Bee-Hive*, compiled in the last decades of his life, he continued to show an interest in Gottfried Arnold, the church historian who resigned his professorship at Giessen even before he published his history of the church and its heretics, which used the records of the past to challenge what he saw as a sterile orthodoxy in his own day. Pastorius also regularly noted books that contained information about the new university at Halle, and the Pietist orphanage and mission to the Jews there—new intellectual foundations that deliberately departed from the traditions of the past and created new forms of learning and teaching.¹³⁴ And his continued interest in the particular province of the Republic of Letters in which Pietism was giving new life to erudite traditions affords another vital hint about his goals.

Pastorius’s impatience with Latin and ceremony did not lead him to turn his back on the ceremonious, Latin-speaking world of learning. Like Mencke and Arnold, he wanted not to abandon erudition but to reconfigure it. And in that respect he resembled no one more than his close contemporary the jurist Christian Thomasius (1655–1728). In many respects, to be sure, the elegantly coiffed Thomasius, who summoned his fellow German professors to learn to behave as if they were proper courtiers, seems sharply different from Pastorius, with his Quaker-inspired belief in equality and his love of fishing and gardening. Yet the two men shared experiences and qualities. Both were trained as jurists, and belonged to a larger wave of learned lawyers committed to reforming the law and the institutions that sustained it.¹³⁵ Both came under the influence of Philipp Jakob Spener and rejected the Lutheran orthodoxy in which they had been raised. Both were steeped in the traditions of erudition. And though Thomasius sharply criticized these, more often he turned them to new ends. He attacked the universities’ monopoly on learning and promoted modern studies. He broke with tradition and lectured publicly in German at Leipzig; he recommended the cultivated French way of life as superior to the German, pedantic one; and he founded a monthly periodical for the cultivated urban reader. But in doing so, he hoped to make the sterile culture of erudition fertile again.¹³⁶

¹³² UPL, MS Codex 726, I, 406: “Anno 1668. the 31th of July I went with some others to the University of Altdorf, there to be Innitiated among Students (which they call Deponisten), giving to those Novices with abundance of impertinent Ceremonies the Salt of Wisdom, Sal Sapientiae.”

¹³³ Note especially his copy of Andreae’s *Menippus*; LCP, Rare | Sev Andr Log 359.D.

¹³⁴ See, e.g., UPL, MS Codex 726, I, 114: “Augustus Hermannus Franck his Pietas Hallensis, or historical Narration of the Orphan-house & other Charitable Institutions at Glaucha near Hall in Saxony. London in 8° 1705”; “Pietas Hallensis, or an Abstract of the Marvellous Footsteps of Divine Providence attending the Management of the Orphan house at Glaucha near Hall. London 8°. 1710.”

¹³⁵ Ian Hunter, “Christian Thomasius and the Desacralization of Philosophy,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 61, no. 4 (2000): 595–616.

¹³⁶ On Thomasius, see generally Notker Hammerstein, *Jus und Historie: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte*

Lutheran theologians claimed the right to determine what could be taught and learned at universities. They tested every proposition against what they described as the immutable truths of orthodoxy.¹³⁷ Thomasius, by contrast, argued that the intelligent, cultivated person should receive all philosophical systems with the mild, reasonable skepticism they deserved. By doing so, one could find a middle path, between the absolutist follies of the Aristotelian scholastics and the overly strong prejudices of the Cartesian innovators. The only royal road to wisdom lay in informing oneself about all the schools of philosophy, from the very beginning of human history—and then making an informed, eclectic choice among their principles.¹³⁸ For the human mind was simply incapable of creating a single, universally valid system. As Thomasius reflected, it was better to have a refitted and rebuilt ship that could sail than one that had never been repaired and was full of cracks and falling apart.¹³⁹

Thomasius's call for a reasonable eclecticism gave a new meaning to the polyhistor's pursuit of learning in general and "literary history" in particular.¹⁴⁰ Francis Bacon had suggested that a vital way to reform learning in the present was to compose a "just story" of its vicissitudes in the past. An analytical history of philosophy and the sciences, he believed, would show both which principles and which institutions had proved most productive over time. The passages in which Bacon made this argument had long inspired compilers such as Lambeck.¹⁴¹ Thomasius—and his disciples, including Gundling and Stolle, who became the most renowned compilers of their day—seized upon them as the key to creating a literary world in which every new thesis would be seen against the proper, full background, traced to its roots and fairly judged. As Martin Gierl has shown, what looks from the outside like formless erudition spilling down the thousands of pages of the literary histories actually represented a sustained effort to lead readers out of the maze of opinions that bewildered them. Erudition and eclecticism were the keys, in Thomasius's view, to cre-

des historischen Denkens an deutschen Universitäten im späten 17. und im 18. Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 1972), 43–147.

¹³⁷ Gierl, *Pietismus und Aufklärung*, 21–324.

¹³⁸ On early modern eclecticism, see in general Michael Albrecht, *Eklektik: Eine Begriffsgeschichte mit Hinweisen auf die Philosophie- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte* (Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt, 1994). On Thomasius's own position, see F. M. Barnard, "The 'Practical Philosophy' of Christian Thomasius," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 32, no. 2 (1971): 221–246; Horst Dreitzel, "Zur Entwicklung und Eigenart der 'Eklektischen Philosophie,'" *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* 18 (1991): 281–343, here 324–330; Martin Mulsow, "Eclecticism or Skepticism? A Problem of the Early Enlightenment," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 58, no. 3 (1997): 465–477.

¹³⁹ Christian Thomasius, *Introductio ad philosophiam aulicam* (Lelpzig, 1688), 46: "Ita praestat, navem habere ad navigandum aptam, etsi saepius in partibus renovatam, quae renovatio tamen identitatem non tollit, quam retinere perpetuo eandem non bene cohaerentem et rimarum plenam. Ita praestat aedificium a variis artificibus adornatum quam tuguriolum a rustico etsi uno extructum."

¹⁴⁰ Hammerstein, *Jus und Historie*, 43–147, 205–265. For the Renaissance foundations of "historia literaria," see Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, *Topica universalis: Eine Modellgeschichte humanistischer und barocker Wissenschaft* (Hamburg, 1983), 1–66; Michael C. Carhart, "Historia Literaria and Cultural History from Mylaeus to Eichhorn," in Peter N. Miller, ed., *Momigliano and Antiquarianism: Foundations of the Modern Cultural Sciences* (Toronto, 2007), 184–206; and Frank Grunert and Friedrich Vollhardt, eds., *Historia literaria: Neuordnungen des Wissens im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 2007).

¹⁴¹ See Schmidt-Biggemann, *Topica universalis*, 212–225.

ating a critical public sphere—one in which the true spiritual understanding of Christianity would come naturally to fruition.¹⁴²

This comparison can help us to dig down below the buzzing polyglot surface of the *Bee-Hive* and detect some of the deeper motives that underlay its creation. Pastorius himself described his commonplace books as memory theaters, and that they certainly were: cultural capital ready to be invested. But Isaac Casaubon also described his commonplace books as mnemonic devices.¹⁴³ And yet, as Joanna Weinberg and I have tried to show, they were also analytical tools, in which he showed how to analyze texts historically and philologically. It was there that he recorded the impressive Talmud lesson he received from a Jewish friend, Jacob Barnet, who had shown him how to surf the oceanic contents of that most complex and rebarbative of texts, moving from the text to the margins, identifying commentators and noting discrepancies between editions.¹⁴⁴ When Pastorius addressed his readers, he instructed them not just to memorize but to revise his collections:

Sis mihi Corrector, resecando superflua Lector; Veraque digneris, quae desunt jungere Veris

(Be my corrector, reader, cutting what is superfluous, and deign to add the truths that are lacking to the truths that are here).

Read not to Contradict, nor to Believe; But to *Weigh & Consider*. Fr. Bacon.¹⁴⁵

Similarly, Thomasius urged his readers to read his *Introduction to Courtly Philosophy* critically, in the hope that their corrections would make later versions of his arguments more rigorous.¹⁴⁶ Both treated erudition not as a stock of material to be drawn on, a cultural bank account, but as a challenge to the reader's intelligence: a challenge to develop prudence and discrimination. And both proved eminently capable of examining and rejecting long-established beliefs and practices.

THOMASIVS REJECTED THE PROSECUTION of witches and the torture of witnesses, using comparative arguments to show that the custom of accepting evidence obtained by torture, though old, was neither universal nor founded in reason.¹⁴⁷ On February 12, 1688, Pastorius and three friends examined the custom of slave-holding that many Quakers accepted and practiced. They rejected it, and drew up a document in which they explained why Christians could not hold African slaves. Their protest begins in

¹⁴² Gierl, *Pietismus und Aufklärung*, 487–574. For the role of religion in Thomasius's thought, see Thomas Ahnert, *Religion and the Origins of the German Enlightenment: Faith and the Reform of Learning in the Thought of Christian Thomasius* (Rochester, N.Y., 2006).

¹⁴³ Grafton and Weinberg, "I have always loved the Holy Tongue," 15.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 267–280.

¹⁴⁵ UPL, MS Codex 726, I, 5.

¹⁴⁶ Thomasius, *Introductio ad philosophiam aulicam*, sig.)o()o(2 verso: "Putavi igitur, convenientius esse si de ejusmodi aberrationibus in tempore admoneretur ab aliis veritatis amatoribus, ut in fusiore deductione hujus doctrinae ea, quae clarius et distinctius forte cogniturus essem, emendatius etiam ponerentur. Quare obligabunt me omnes atque singuli sapientiae studiosi, sive Cartesiani sive Peripatetici, sive alii cuidam sectae addicti sint, aut Philosophiam Eclecticam sequantur, si me forte incautum in devia incidentem ad genuinam veritatis semitam reducere haud gravatim velint."

¹⁴⁷ For Thomasius on witchcraft, see Christian Thomasius, *Über die Hexenprozesse*, ed. and trans. Rolf Lieberwirth (Weimar, 1967); for torture, see Lieberwirth, ed., *Über die Folter* (Weimar, 1960), excerpted in translation in Brian P. Levack, ed., *The Witchcraft Sourcebook* (London, 2005), 168–170.

a very suggestive way. It turns the tables on American slave owners by comparing them with the Ottomans: "How fearfull & fainthearted are many on sea when they see a strange vassel, being afraid it should be a Turck, and they should be tacken and sold for slaves into Turkey. Now what is this better done as Turcks doe?" It goes on to note that by holding slaves, the white inhabitants of Pennsylvania hurt the reputation of their colony: "This mackes an ill report in all those Countries of Europe, where they hear off, that ye Quackers doe here handel men licke they handel there ye Cattel. And for that reason some have no mind or inclination to come hither, and who shall maintaine this your cause or plaid for it?" Above all, it insists, with a scrupulous clarity not often found in European discussions of the table of nations, that black Africans were full humans with a full right to liberty: "Now, tho' they are black, we cannot conceive there is more liberty to have them slaves, as it is to have other white ones."¹⁴⁸

Pastorius loved to read world histories—from the compilations he used as a student to the more innovative books of Horn, with their descriptions of Asian and American societies. It was from Horn that Pastorius learned to see his new home in the Americas as part of a world system. It was in Horn's surveys of world politics and history that Pastorius read about Ottoman attacks on Europeans.¹⁴⁹ More important, it was from Horn—as we saw at the beginning—that Pastorius learned that the skin of Ethiopians had been transformed by a simple, natural process.¹⁵⁰ And, of course, it was Pastorius who was trying, as he followed the lessons he had learned from Horn and others, to represent Pennsylvania to the European world, at once attractively and accurately. The Germantown protest, with its crystalline moral clarity, emerged directly from Pastorius's lifelong concerns as scholar and reader. When he collected information and quotations about justice and injustice, humanity and inhumanity, nature and culture, he was not merely stockpiling impressive morsels of Latin. He thought hard about what they implied for the social world that he experienced every day. The same concern to make learning useful—and the same belief that erudition offered help in ordering and understanding the problems of everyday life—inspired his later efforts to craft a system of law that operated accessibly to all, in English, and preserved the safety of Lenape Indians as well as white settlers.

In this context, it is not strange that even in the last years of his life, Pastorius never ceased writing Latin epigrams to celebrate homely occasions such as the stak-

¹⁴⁸ The original text of the 1688 petition is held in the Quaker and Special Collections, Haverford College. A digitized version is available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:The_1688_germantown_quaker_petition_against_slavery.jpg. The text appears in Learned, *Pastorius*, 261–262, and in the digital collection *Slavery and Freedom in American History and Memory*, <http://www.yale.edu/glc/aces/germantown.htm>. For Pastorius's part in the 1688 Germantown Protest, see Hildegard Binder-Johnson, "The Germantown Protest of 1688 against Negro Slavery," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 65, no. 2 (1941): 145–156; and Katharine Gerbner, "Antislavery in Print: The Germantown Protest, the 'Exhortation,' and the Seventeenth-Century Quaker Debate on Slavery," *Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 9, no. 3 (2011): 552–575, who warns against hagiographical interpretations.

¹⁴⁹ Pastorius also read with great interest Giovanni Paolo Marana's *Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy* (UPL, MS Codex 726, I, 115).

¹⁵⁰ There was nothing novel in what Pastorius read in Horn. For earlier debates about the meaning of skin color, see Kim F. Hall, *Things of Darkness: Economies of Race and Gender in Early Modern England* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1995); T. F. Earle and K. J. P. Lowe, eds., *Black Africans in Renaissance Europe* (Cambridge, 2005); Natalie Zemon Davis, *Trickster Travels: A Sixteenth-Century Muslim between Worlds* (New York, 2006), 143–149.



FIGURE 6: Georg Horn, *Orbis politicus* (1668), title page. Library Company of Philadelphia.

ing of his grapevines. For, like Thomasius and other European reformers, he believed that tradition still had its value; indeed, that tradition, rightly updated, was modernity at its best. One scholar whom both Pastorius and Thomasius respected was the Franeker jurist Ulrich Huber, whose magnificent rectoral speech *On Pedantry* Thomasius reprinted twice. Thomasius denounced those “pretentious” scholars who “cite verses, proverbs, Latin, Greek and Hebrew words, scholastic technical terms, laws, medical rules, and other evidences of their learning when they serve no purpose.”¹⁵¹ Like Thomasius, Huber ridiculed the pedants who insisted on speaking Latin to people who lacked the competence in the language, or the confidence, to reply. But he insisted that Latin still had its uses as “a common chain that links the Christian peoples together,” and its unique position as “the language of the people that ruled all the rest,” and he urged the learned not to abandon it.¹⁵² The fluent Latinist could communicate both with the learned of other nations and with the learned of the past. For Huber, Latin still embodied an intellectual cosmopolitanism that deserved to be honored and preserved. It was in the same sense, as Patrick Erben has suggested, that Pastorius prefaced his highly practical collections of laws, legal documents, and deeds in German, Dutch, and English with grand title pages on which he used bold, sharp Latin axioms to give them a larger philosophical setting.¹⁵³ It was in the same sense, I would argue, that Pastorius used Latin and other elements of erudition: to maintain contact with learned friends in Europe, to make friends with William Penn, Isaac Lloyd, and James Logan, and to include younger friends, such as Lloyd Zachary, in what Pastorius continued to see as the charmed world of a millennial conversation.

Pastorius’s methods derived from a broad culture, Catholic as well as Protestant. He learned them from the Jesuits he disliked as well as the Protestant sages he admired. And he undoubtedly derived elements of his practice as a reader and recorder—including his belief in taking down both good and bad arguments, and letting the reader decide between them—in part from the Quakers he so admired, and into whose world he plunged in America, as well as from the scholarly traditions he came from.¹⁵⁴ But he seems to have had most in common with the particular brand of late humanism that flourished in Halle and elsewhere in North Germany in the years of his, and Thomasius’s, maturity. The similarity between the literary histories compiled by Thomasius and his disciples and Pastorius’s efforts to amass the treasures of Quaker spirituality, European learning, and modern medicine and alchemy

¹⁵¹ Thomasius, *Introductio ad philosophiam aulicam*, 243: “*Ostentatores sunt . . . 3. qui versiculos, sententias, verba Latina, Graeca, Hebraea, terminos scholasticos, leges, praecepta medica, aliaque eruditionis argumenta proferunt, ubi nihil usu veniunt.*”

¹⁵² Ulrich Huber, “*Oratio de pedantismo*,” *ibid.*, 292–293: “*Prorsus opera danda est. ne eruditio nostra cuidam gravis aut molesta sit; nec scio, an non huc, ipsum Latini sermonis commercium redigere nos oporteat, ut nec illud pedantismi sit expers, si absque necessitate frequentetur apud homines, quibus in promptu non est facultas hujus linguae, vel qui promiscuo ejus usu non delectantur. Dolendum equidem est, hoc commune gentium Christianarum vinculum ita resolvi in desuetudinem, ut etiam inter homines doctrinam professos Latine loqui, de rebus a studiorum disceptatione alienis, paedagogicum habeatur*”; 295: “*Demus hoc socordiae seculi et tralatitiae humanitati, ut eorum, qui Latina reformidant pudori ignoscamus; sed nunquam inter nos invicem illam gentis gentium dominae linguam cessemus reddere nobis familiarem; sine cujus exprompta facultate omnis eruditio nostra tanquam situ squalida sordescit et sapientia balbutire videtur.*”

¹⁵³ Erben, “‘Honey-Combs’ and ‘Paper-Hives.’”

¹⁵⁴ Palmieri, “‘What the Bees Have Taken Pains For.’”

for his sons seems clear. In Germany as in Philadelphia, the culture of erudition was both troubled and inspired by a pervasive dissatisfaction with existing customs and institutions. And in Germany as in Philadelphia, the combination of a strong religious motivation and a vast scholarly arsenal proved potent. In Philadelphia as in Halle, the foundations of the Enlightenment's true Holy City were located in the realms of erudition and religion—both, of course, defined in historically particular ways.¹⁵⁵

Pastorius's case, finally, sheds a distinctive light on the history of learned practices. Historians of information and its regimes have tended to look for ruptures—points where one regime succeeds another.¹⁵⁶ European historians have emphasized the tremendous changes that took place in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as colonies and trading centers transmitted objects and observations both to Europe and to one another; as vernaculars replaced Latin even in traditional book markets such as the German; and as an empirical model of knowledge production gradually replaced a bookish one. These histories accurately describe the larger climatic systems that showered information on European and colonial readers in the decades around 1700. But there were microclimates as well—or, to use the terminology created by Peter Burke, multiple impure information regimes, in which older techniques served new ends, and refluxes of traditional material entered the global circulation system.¹⁵⁷ Pastorius and his friends created one such regime—and used its tools, creatively and effectively, to build a local version of Enlightenment rooted not only in local empiricism and discovery, but also in cosmopolitan erudition and tradition. Information cultures unfold, and coil, and interfere with one another. A good way to follow these mechanisms at work is to listen to the hum of Pastorius's *Bee-Hive*.

¹⁵⁵ For recent research on various forms of these themes, see, e.g., J. G. A. Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion*, 5 vols. to date (Cambridge, 1999–); Peter N. Miller, *Peiresc's Europe: Learning and Virtue in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven, Conn., 2000); Jonathan Sheehan, *The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture* (Princeton, N.J., 2005); Jacob Soll, *Publishing "The Prince": History, Reading, and the Birth of Political Criticism* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2005); Dan Edelstein, "Humanism, l'Esprit Philosophique, and the Encyclopédie," *Republics of Letters* 1, no. 1 (2009) <http://rofl.stanford.edu/node/27>; Edelstein, *The Enlightenment: A Genealogy* (Chicago, 2010); David Sorkin, *The Religious Enlightenment: Protestants, Jews, and Catholics from London to Vienna* (Princeton, N.J., 2008); Guy G. Stroumsa, *A New Science: The Discovery of Religion in the Age of Reason* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010).

¹⁵⁶ For very recent perspectives on these questions, see "AHR Conversation: Historical Perspectives on the Circulation of Information," *American Historical Review* 116, no. 5 (December 2011): 1392–1435.

¹⁵⁷ Peter Burke, *A Social History of Knowledge: From Gutenberg to Diderot* (Cambridge, 2000); Burke, *A Social History of Knowledge II: From the Encyclopaedia to Wikipedia* (Cambridge, 2012).

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Haiti, Free Soil, and Antislavery in the Revolutionary Atlantic

ADA FERRER

IN THE LATE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, the French colony of Saint-Domingue was the richest colony in the world. Set in the Caribbean Sea, a short sail from some of the principal American colonies of Britain and Spain, in the 1780s it produced about half of all the sugar and coffee consumed in Europe and the Americas. It was, in the nomenclature of the time, the “Pearl of the Antilles,” the “Eden of the Western World.” It was there, in late August 1791, that the colony’s enslaved rose up, eventually declaring war against the regime of slavery at its seat of most extreme and opulent power. Within a month, the rebel slaves numbered in the tens of thousands, and the property destroyed amounted to more than a thousand sugar and coffee farms. With this event—the largest and best-coordinated slave rebellion the world had ever seen—the enslaved of Saint-Domingue forced the issue of slavery upon the French Revolution and the world. By August 1793, colonial authorities began decreeing abolition, and in February 1794, the National Convention in Paris ended slavery in France’s colonies, in a sense ratifying what enslaved rebels had already made real on the ground in many parts of Saint-Domingue. A decade later, those same rebels declared themselves free not only from slavery, but also from French rule. On January 1, 1804, the independent nation of Haiti was proclaimed—the second independent state in the Western Hemisphere, and the only one ever founded by former slaves and without slavery.¹

The Haitian Revolution—the name by which we now know these events—commanded the attention of everyone in the region and beyond. But surely few followed

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¹ On the Haitian Revolution, see C. L. R. James, *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution* (New York, 1963); David Patrick Geggus, *Haitian Revolutionary Studies* (Bloomington, Ind., 2002); Laurent Dubois, *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution* (Cambridge, 2004); Carolyn E. Fick, *The Making of Haiti: The Saint Domingue Revolution from Below* (Knoxville, Tenn., 1991); and Jeremy D. Popkin, *You Are All Free: The Haitian Revolution and the Abolition of Slavery* (New York, 2010).

the situation as closely as enslaved people, who apprehended that the world's most profitable and powerful system of slavery had been destroyed by its own slaves. Masters, meanwhile, heard about men much like themselves whose lives and fortunes had just been shattered by the actions of enslaved men and women like their own. Authorities in neighboring slave societies responded quickly with measures such as bans on the entry of so-called French blacks, limits on the slave trade, and surveillance of slaves in their own territory.

Whatever hopes and fears the Haitian Revolution generated across the Atlantic world, its impact on slave emancipation beyond Haiti's borders was not at all clear. In the French Empire, the emancipation of 1794 had been rescinded, and by the time of Haitian independence in 1804, slavery and the slave trade were thriving again in Guadeloupe and Martinique. While organized and popular opposition to slavery gained momentum in England, perhaps some three-quarters of a million people still lived enslaved in its colonies. In the United States, abolitionism became increasingly popular in the north, but in the south slavery remained entrenched, its advocates bent on expanding it to new American territories. In the Spanish world, meanwhile, the model of plantation slavery pioneered in the French and British Caribbean was gaining ground. In Cuba, in particular, planters strove to supplant Saint-Domingue in the world market, and the rapid expansion of slavery there turned the Spanish island into the world's largest producer of sugar and one of the greatest consumers of Africans in the nineteenth-century world.

Even with abolitionism on the rise, then, at the moment of Haiti's founding, slavery was still on the march.² The spectacular example of liberation remained localized there, and Haiti's first governments announced and continually reaffirmed that they were willing to accept that state of affairs. They were fully committed to maintaining emancipation permanently in their territory, but they publicly renounced all ambition of taking that emancipation to any of the slave societies that surrounded their new country.³ Outside of Haiti, therefore, the prospects for legal freedom from slavery in any living person's lifetime remained dim. How, then, might we understand the effects of this new "empire of liberty" in a region where the Haitian example was well known, yet where colonial slavery also continued to flourish?⁴

² Dale Tomich's notion of the "second slavery" is particularly useful here; see *Through the Prism of Slavery: Labor, Capital, and World Economy* (Oxford, 2004), esp. chaps. 3, 5, and 6. For an application of this concept in the Cuban case, see Ada Ferrer, "Cuban Slavery and Atlantic Antislavery," *Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center* 31, no. 3 (2008): 267–295. The best estimate for the number of slaves in the British Caribbean at the time is 775,000 in 1807, from B. W. Higman, *Slave Populations of the British Caribbean, 1807–1834* (Kingston, Jamaica, 1995), 72.

³ One exception was the public declaration of the indivisibility of the entire territory of the island of Hispaniola, starting with Toussaint's colonial constitution and continuing into the early national constitutions. This declaration presupposed the absorption of the Spanish (and for some period French) part of the island into the western state. Although the territorial indivisibility was in part a strategic and tactical maneuver against any possible re-enslavement or recolonization campaign, it was also couched in terms of a moral fraternity with residents from the east. Less public examples of potential violations of the non-intervention clause include Henri Christophe's aid to anticolonial rebels in Spanish Santo Domingo in 1810 and Alexandre Pétion's substantial aid to Latin American independence leaders. On the former, see Anne Eller, "'All would be equal in the effort': Santo Domingo's 'Italian Revolution,' Independence, and Haiti, 1809–1822," *Journal of Early American History* 1, no. 2 (2011): 105–141.

⁴ The phrase "empire of liberty" was used in the first paragraph of the January 1, 1804, Declaration of Independence: "We must, with one last act of national authority, forever assure the empire of liberty

Historians have begun to explore seriously the extent to which the Haitian Revolution influenced the ascendance of antislavery in the early-nineteenth-century world. Some have assessed the impact of the revolution on European and American abolitionism, examining, for example, the ways in which Haiti was used to illustrate arguments about the dangers of maintaining slavery or about the innate capacity of black men for freedom and civilization. Others have focused on the question of whether the Haitian example inspired movements of resistance and rebellion for black and brown slaves and free people across the hemisphere. In both sets of discussions, historians have faced off, some asserting, others playing down the impact of the Haitian Revolution on the global contests over slavery.⁵ Yet the relationship between Haiti and Atlantic freedom, if in part a story about the power of Haiti's example, was also centrally a story about a Haitian state that developed and projected its own brand of antislavery in the world, about a Haitian government that thought actively about and sometimes explicitly addressed itself to non-Haitian blacks in the hemisphere.

To the important work that has considered the significance of the Haitian Revolution of 1791–1804 for histories of global antislavery, the Age of Revolution, or modern political thought, therefore, we must add an exploration of the import of *post*-revolutionary Haiti, which, as the enslaved of the region well understood, continually tried to intervene in broad Atlantic debates about rights, freedom, citizenship, and sovereignty. In an era in which these concepts were being radically transformed, the Haitian state insisted that its was a critical and necessary voice.⁶ Thus despite the Haitian government's promise of non-intervention in the affairs of its neighbors, the triumph of the Haitian Revolution echoed well beyond Haiti. Indeed, it transformed the very landscape (and seascape) of freedom in the Atlantic world. In that transformation, the post-revolutionary Haitian state played a fundamental role. The laws it enacted and the policies it pursued profoundly shaped the politics, meaning, and character of antislavery at a critical moment in its global history.

An international legal dispute that emerged in 1817 provides an important example of the vital role played by the Haitian state. In January 1817, seven enslaved men from Jamaica commandeered the vessel on which they were serving and sailed

in the country of our birth; we must take any hope of re-enslaving us away from the inhuman government that for so long kept us in the most humiliating torpor. In the end we must live independent or die." Translation from David Armitage, *The Declaration of Independence: A Global History* (Cambridge, 2007), 193.

⁵ Some of these arguments about the impact (or non-impact) of the Haitian Revolution on abolitionism and slave rebellion are distilled in David Brion Davis, "The Impact of the French and Haitian Revolutions," in David P. Geggus, ed., *The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World* (Columbia, S.C., 2001), 3–9; Seymour Drescher, "The Limits of Example," *ibid.*, 10–14; and Robin Blackburn, "The Force of Example," *ibid.*, 15–20. See also Geggus, "The Caribbean in the Age of Revolution," in David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, eds., *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760–1840* (New York, 2010), 83–100.

⁶ Especially important here are Laurent Dubois's call to consider the intellectual history of Enlightenment and revolution in a way that incorporates both the Caribbean and the enslaved, and Deborah Jensen's work on Jean-Jacques Dessalines (who ruled Haiti from 1804 until his assassination in 1806) as a political author and producer of postcolonial theory. See Dubois, "An Enslaved Enlightenment: Rethinking the Intellectual History of the French Atlantic," *Social History* 31, no. 1 (February 2006): 1–14; and Jensen, *Beyond the Slave Narrative: Politics, Sex, and Manuscripts in the Haitian Revolution* (Liverpool, 2011).

to southern Haiti, where they found—as they had expected to—legal protection, freedom from slavery, and access to Haitian citizenship. Alexandre Pétion, president of the Republic of Haiti, defended the right of the men to remain there, refusing—even when challenged by their master and British authorities—to return them to slavery.⁷ He grounded his refusal on Article 44 of the Haitian constitution of 1816, which stated that

All Africans and Indians, and the descendants of their blood, born in the colonies or in foreign countries, who come to reside in the Republic will be recognized as Haitians, but will enjoy the right of citizenship only after one year of residence.⁸

Haiti, argued Pétion, was a land where no one could be enslaved, and where arrival in and of itself conferred freedom and eventually citizenship. At stake, therefore, were not only the status and the future of the seven men in question, but also Haiti's role in international struggles to define the boundaries of slavery and freedom, citizenship and rights.

The 1817 case, and the 1816 constitution on which it was based, provide fresh insight into the intellectual and political history of global antislavery and of post-independent Haiti's robust intervention in that history. Haiti's was a contribution that drew on—and in many cases substantially transformed—multiple and heterodox sources. Some of these sources were of recent vintage and were linked to notions of liberty and rights emerging on both sides of the Atlantic; others reworked longer-standing, Old Regime concepts, from Catholic sanctuary to European free soil. Still others appear to have represented a pragmatic response to specific developments on the ground, as sailors, slaves, migrants, foreign insurgents, and even abolitionists sometimes pushed the Haitian state to act more expansively on the freedom it represented, offering at key moments an opportunity for its leaders to project Haitian freedom outside its borders. Still, Haiti's intervention in global antislavery, as the

⁷ The documentation on the case appears in the National Archives of Britain [hereafter TNA], Colonial Office Papers [hereafter CO], 137/145. Some is printed in Jamaica Assembly, *A Report of a Committee of the Honourable House of Assembly of Jamaica Presented to the House, December 10, 1817* (London, 1818), which includes the testimony of James McKowen, taken in Port-Royal before the committee on November 19, 1817. Some documentation is also reprinted in Richard B. Sheridan, "From Jamaican Slavery to Haitian Freedom: The Case of the Black Crew of the Pilot Boat, *Deep Nine*," *Journal of Negro History* 67, no. 4 (Winter 1982): 328–339. The manuscript sources identify the master as McKowen; printed sources refer to him as M'Kewan. I have used McKowen throughout. Some of the manuscript sources refer to two slaves named James. I believe the second James is the same person as Jem, so named in the printed sources.

⁸ The 1816 constitution represented a revision to the constitution of 1806, generally also attributed to Pétion. The change in the 1816 version that is most often discussed is the new provision that made Pétion president for life. There is a growing body of scholarship on the early Haitian constitutions. See Claude Moïse, *Constitutions et luttes de pouvoir en Haïti (1804–1987)*, 2 vols. (Montreal, 1988–1990); Michel Hector and Laënnec Hurbon, eds., *Genèse de l'Etat haïtien, 1804–1859* (Paris, 2009); Sibylle Fischer, *Modernity Disavowed: Haiti and the Cultures of Slavery in the Age of Revolution* (Durham, N.C., 2004); Julia Gaffield, "Complexities of Imagining Haiti: A Study of National Constitutions, 1801–1807," *Journal of Social History* 41, no. 1 (Fall 2007): 81–103; and David Nicholls, *From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour and National Independence in Haiti* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1979). The original texts of most of the early constitutions appear in Louis Joseph Janvier, *Les constitutions d'Haïti (1801–1885)* (Paris, 1886). Some also appear in Constitutions of the World Online, http://www.modern-constitutions.de/nbu.php?page_id=cf2bf1a9ce737906a2cc483486798452. In French, Article 44 reads: "Tout africain, indien et ceux issus de leur sang, nés des colonies ou pays étrangers, qui viendraient résider dans la République, seront reconnus haïtiens, mais ne jouiront des droits de citoyen qu'après une année de résidence"; http://www.modern-constitutions.de/nbu.php?page_id=02a1b5a86ff139471c0b1c57f23ac196&viewmode=pages&show_doc=HT-00-1816-06-02-fr&position=8.

seven Jamaican sailors may themselves have come to understand, was rarely a straightforward tale of freedom and rights in ascent—something, of course, that can also be said about the contributions of other, better-known and more highly touted antislaveries of Europe and North America.

IN JANUARY 1817, SEVEN ENSLAVED MEN and boys from Jamaica—identified by name as Dublin, Kingston, Archy, Quashie, Robert, James, and Jem, and held as property by one James McKowen—were serving aboard the schooner *Deep Nine*. The men were accustomed to work on the seas, serving as pilots steering ships in and out of local harbors. At the beginning of the *Deep Nine*'s journey, there had been other slaves on board, but the vessel had been cruising for some time, and some of the pilot slaves had been transferred to other ships to guide them into port, so that at the time of the events in question, only the slave owner's brother, Robert McKowen, and the seven black sailors remained aboard. With the vessel low on wood and water, McKowen decided to stop for supplies at Rocky Point, Saint Thomas, on Jamaica's southeastern shore. After McKowen disembarked and the men went off on a routine search for provisions, Dublin and his shipmates took the vessel and set sail for the country of Haiti.

At the time of their escape, there were, in fact, two Haitis: the republic, headed by Alexandre Pétion, in the south, and a kingdom, ruled by Henri Christophe, in the north. Both leaders had risen to prominence during the course of the Haitian Revolution, and both were committed to a Haitian nation in which legal slavery and European colonialism would never again exist. Yet in 1807, as a result of disputes over the form and leadership of the government, the young state had split in two. The resulting entities differed in two important respects. The north, which became a kingdom in 1811, retained large-scale landholdings, which were managed by military officers and produced sugar with the "attached" labor of former slaves. In the south, which was organized as a republic, the government had divided the large estates and carried out an agrarian reform, dismantling the old plantation system and distributing almost 100,000 hectares of land, mostly in modest plots of 25 to 45 hectares. The differences between the two societies, however, were not absolute. Renting arrangements in the north provided some maneuvering room for former slaves; while in the south, much of the land distributed went to the military, with higher-ranking officers receiving larger plots.⁹

Still, it was to Pétion's south that the Jamaican men escaped. One reason for that choice may have been simple convenience: Jamaica was closer to the ports of the south than those of the north, and trade—both licit and illicit—had long bound Haiti's southern peninsula to the Jamaican coast. But there was likely some informed political calculation involved as well. In the north, where the large plantations survived and where the law, managers, and soldiers tried to limit the mobility of workers, local people were known to escape into Spanish Santo Domingo, where the land was not dominated by plantations. Of the south, meanwhile, at least one of the Jamaican sailors testified that they had heard other kinds of stories—first and foremost about

⁹ Robert K. Lacerte, "The Evolution of Land and Labor in the Haitian Revolution, 1791–1820," *The Americas* 34, no. 4 (April 1978): 449–459.

freedom, but also about the protection offered by the state and the eventual possibility of obtaining land and earning military ranks there. So it was with the south that they cast their lot.¹⁰

A few days after their escape, the men's legal owner, James McKowen, followed them to Haiti, confident that he would be able to retrieve the vessel and the seven men he claimed as his property. McKowen searched from town to town—Cap Tiburon, Les Cayes, Petite Rivière, Trou-Bonbon, Jérémie—to no avail. Finally, hoping for a more satisfactory result, he traveled to the southern capital of Port-au-Prince, where he met face to face with President Pétion. But the result was no different, and McKowen left the meeting empty-handed.

At the heart of Pétion's refusal to hand over the sailors was his invocation of Haitian law, which he said rendered him powerless to deliver them back into slavery. Specifically, he invoked the new Haitian constitution, which had been published to great fanfare in the final days of September 1816.¹¹ The sailors, he said, were "recognized to be Haitians by the 44th Article of the Constitution of the Republic from the moment they set foot on its territory."¹²

While the 1816 constitution had been drafted as a revision to the 1806 constitution, Article 44, granting protection and citizenship to non-white foreigners arriving in Haiti, was newly added, not having appeared in any form in the 1806 charter. The confrontation over the enslaved Jamaican sailors took place approximately three months after the publication of the new constitution. This was likely the first time that the new law of the land was explicitly applied and challenged. As Rear Admiral J. E. Douglas of the British navy, to whom McKowen had appealed for aid, admitted to legal counsel, the case was "altogether of a novel character."¹³ That fact made it hard for the British proponents of the men's enslavement to know how to act or argue in response. At first, McKowen simply emphasized that the men in question were his property. But Pétion countered that by virtue of their arrival in Haiti, the men were now Haitian. The law, he said, was clear: slavery could never exist in Haiti, so the men could not—by law—be slaves. Pétion thus rendered moot the question of their legal status before their Haitian landing.

Perhaps realizing the futility of an appeal based on property rights, McKowen then stressed that the men had acted criminally, stealing his vessel and the items aboard it. The proper response, he argued, was to bring them before a British court as "pirates." Here he seemed to be improvising, for even the British to whom he

¹⁰ The stories the sailors heard and shared about the south will be discussed later in the article. For more on land, labor, and the distinctions and commonalities between the north and south, see Laurent Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History* (New York, 2012), chap. 2. At roughly the same time that the Jamaican sailors escaped to the south, Christophe's government in the north was involved in a dispute with Spain over Haitian workers who had escaped from northern plantations to nearby Santo Domingo. Archivo General de Indias [hereafter AGI], Estado, legajo [leg.] 12, expediente [exp.] 53. For more on Haitian escapees to Santo Domingo, see also Eller, "'All would be equal in the effort,'" 124–125. The 1816 constitution and Article 44 survived the reunification with the north in 1821 and with Santo Domingo in 1822. The subsequent Haitian constitution of 1843 had a less powerful version of 1816's Article 44. Article 7 in 1843 stated that all Africans and Indians and their descendants were able to become Haitian, and it added that the specific details of naturalization would be fixed by laws.

¹¹ On the publication of the constitution, see Alexis Beaubrun Ardouin, *Etudes sur l'histoire d'Haïti*, 11 vols. (1865; repr., Port-au-Prince, 2005), 8: 51.

¹² Pétion to McKowen, January 30, 1817, TNA, CO, 137/145.

¹³ Rear Admiral J. E. Douglas to Wilson Crocker, Esq., February 15, 1817, *ibid.*

directed his appeal judged that the men could not be claimed or tried as pirates “on account of their being slaves.” Faced with a new kind of danger to their authority, the British subjects and officials on the ground seemed to be scrambling to find the proper language with which to confront it. When nothing persuaded Pétion that the men should be returned, McKowen turned to questions of law and diplomacy: the new constitutional article, he argued, was ill-advised and represented a serious threat to maritime trade and thus to the larger international order. “The Negroes in every drogger or small plantain boat belonging to Jamaica,” he said, would avail themselves of Haitian coasts, which would become “a place of protection and refuge . . . for the encouragement of slaves to run off with the shipping.” He threatened action from higher up: the British navy would be forced to police Haitian coasts, the Jamaican governor might have to intercede, and so on.¹⁴

Whether or not the threat of British action was real, other observers shared McKowen’s sense that the new constitutional law posed a threat to international trade and diplomacy. Since much of the maritime commerce in the Caribbean Sea involved enslaved people, either as crew or as cargo, the possibilities made real in the new constitution were not lost on the men who made their living off the labor of black sailors or by transporting black captives. Just days after the publication of Article 44, privateers were warning each other not to come too close to Haiti’s coasts with any human cargo, for “General Pétion will confiscate the Africans in the interest of their liberty, to increase his population, and to develop agriculture in his territory.”¹⁵

In northern Haiti, where King Christophe was deeply hostile to Pétion’s southern republic, the political class also saw the new law as a dangerous source of instability. Baron de Vastey, Christophe’s chief adviser, who in 1814 had announced that Haitian independence would be the precursor of a worldwide black movement for freedom, deemed Article 44 to be contrary to the Haitian Declaration of Independence and the 1806 constitution, both of which had promised non-intervention in the affairs of neighboring colonies. Vastey argued that the new law made “a direct appeal to the black and coloured population of the colonies or foreign countries, to come and settle themselves in the Republic, [offering them] an asylum in the Republic which is sacred and inviolable, a measure which tends directly to disturb the peace and internal government of those foreign colonies or countries.”¹⁶ Article 44, he argued, represented a blatant and unconstitutional form of interference in the slave regimes of the region.

McKowen, the privateers, and observers in the north were clearly motivated by

¹⁴ McKowen to Pétion, January 28, 1817, TNA, CO, 137/145.

¹⁵ Archivo Nacional de Cuba [hereafter ANC], Asuntos Políticos [hereafter AP], leg. 124, exp. 66. On the privateers, see also Paul Verna, *Pétion y Bolívar: Cuarenta años (1790–1830) de relaciones haitiano-venezolanas y su aporte a la emancipación de Hispanoamérica* (Caracas, 1969), 337–338; and José Luciano Franco, *La política continental americana de España en Cuba* (Havana, 1964), 141–142.

¹⁶ Baron de Vastey, *An Essay on the Causes of the Revolution and Civil Wars of Hayti* (Exeter, 1823), 208–209. See also Nicholls, *From Dessalines to Duvalier*, 43–47. French authorities negotiating with Pétion regarding recognition also singled out Article 44 for criticism, discussing it as one of several articles in the constitution that established a “distinction of colour which philanthropy has been labouring for upwards of half a century to destroy.” See Viscount de Fontagnes, Esmangart, Commissioners to the King (France), to Alexandre Pétion, October 30, 1816, in Vastey, *An Essay on the Causes of the Revolution and Civil Wars of Hayti*, Appendix E, no. 12.

different impulses, yet they all seemed to agree that Pétion's new policy made Haiti a safe haven for black and brown people who could manage to set foot on its territory. The policy did not represent the literal exportation of revolution; it did not purport to send revolutionary agents to instigate slave rebellions in neighboring colonies, something that every Haitian foundational document since the Haitian Declaration of Independence had shunned. Article 5 of Pétion's 1816 constitution, for instance, stated that "the Republic of Haiti will never initiate a project designed to conquer or perturb the internal peace and order of foreign States and islands." But Article 44 did elevate Haiti as a tangible source of freedom and citizenship for any black person—no matter his or her location or status—who could make it to Haitian territory. Here, then, was a potentially forceful and expansive antislavery position, and everyone involved seemed to recognize it as such.

But what of Pétion himself? To what extent was he seeking to expand and project the antislavery power of the new Haitian Republic, the non-interventionist text of Article 5 notwithstanding? The 1817 case strongly suggests that he saw the constitution and his application of specific provisions such as Article 44 as acts in a larger, universal drama about slavery and freedom, and about Haiti's international role in accelerating and shaping the passage between the two.

WHILE THE INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL position of the Haitian state in 1816–1817 was groundbreaking, it clearly involved a reworking of older, more traditional notions of freedom. At its most basic level, Pétion's argument was that by virtue of the men's color and their arrival in Haiti, Article 44 made them Haitian and therefore free. In effect, Article 44 proclaimed Haiti as legal free soil.¹⁷

The notion of free soil, or what Sue Peabody has designated "the freedom principle," predated the debates of the Age of Revolution. Although an Old Regime concept, it provides a useful prism through which to think about the Haitian state's participation in revolutionary discourses about slavery, freedom, and rights. The freedom principle—long, if fitfully, recognized in various European legal systems—held that "simply setting foot on a particular territory was enough to confer freedom upon a slave."¹⁸ In metropolitan France and England, it may have represented a juridical "extension to the countryside of a principle formulated by medieval communes whereby the 'free air' of cities was declared incompatible with bondage."¹⁹ And as early as the sixteenth century, the concept was upheld in multiple legal cases,

¹⁷ Important work on the notion of free soil has not examined the case of Haiti as an important and divergent example of the principle. Seymour Drescher's important book *Abolition: A History of Slavery and Antislavery* (New York, 2009), for example, argues that the notion of free soil was a central factor in the rise of abolitionism. Yet he argues that Haiti had a minimal impact on its progress (see chap. 6), and at one point he asserts that "by the beginning of the second quarter of the nineteenth century, 'free soil' no longer stopped at the Atlantic edge of Europe" (245)—a formulation that fails to acknowledge the potent combination of antislavery and sovereignty that Haiti represented and projected externally after 1804 and clearly in 1816.

¹⁸ Sue Peabody and Keila Grinberg, *Slavery, Freedom, and the Law in the Atlantic World: A Brief History with Documents* (Boston, 2007), 3. See also *Free Soil in the Atlantic World*, Special Issue, *Slavery and Abolition* 32, no. 3 (September 2011), edited by Peabody and Grinberg; and Peabody's pioneering book *"There Are No Slaves in France": The Political Culture of Race and Slavery in the Ancien Régime* (New York, 1996).

¹⁹ Drescher, *Abolition*, 23.

even if not all slaves who based their appeals for freedom on it emerged victorious. Indeed, the legal notion of free soil generally brooked substantial exceptions. For example, the principle was not applied to captured Muslim slaves or within either country's overseas colonies. Only metropolitan soil could confer freedom, and as chattel slavery expanded in the colonial world, limits to the freedom principle were absorbed into metropolitan law itself. Thus, the antislavery promise of the French free-soil provisions of 1759 was severely narrowed by a 1777 law that dictated that all non-whites arriving in France would be quarantined and shipped back to their colonies of origin. During the French Revolution, the National Assembly issued a proclamation on September 28, 1791, the first article of which proclaimed that "every individual, immediately on entering France, is free." As Peabody has remarked, the proclamation inscribed free soil officially as French law rather than informal maxim. In 1802, however, Napoleon reversed the policy by barring all blacks, mulattos, and people of color from entering France. That ban was reiterated in 1806 and 1817.²⁰ Thus Pétion's offer of freedom and Haitian citizenship to brown and black people arriving in Haiti was the precise inverse of prevailing French law at the time. Moreover, because the land under Pétion's rule sat in the middle of the Caribbean Sea surrounded by slave societies and ships carrying black captives, to declare the Haitian republic as free soil was to put freedom within the physical reach of all manner of enslaved persons.

Could Pétion have had free-soil precedents in mind when he wrote Article 44? Several lines of analysis suggest a provisional answer of yes. First, the French tradition and legal conflicts over the freedom principle were well known in the colonies. Pétion himself had spent time in the French port of Bordeaux, which had an early history as a "free city." There—before the heyday of the Atlantic slave trade—boatloads of captives had occasionally been freed on arrival. Even by the time of Pétion's sojourn there, well after the city had established itself as a major slave-trading port, "local pride in the free air tradition" remained strong. Yet legal suits for freedom on that basis were also much less likely to succeed. While almost 250 individuals successfully secured their freedom in the Admiralty Court in Paris between the 1730s and the 1790s, provincial courts in port towns such as Nantes and Bordeaux often expelled petitioners, sending them back to their colonies of origin, Saint-Domingue included. Conflicts over the meaning and boundaries of French free soil—from revolutionary proclamations of free soil to expulsions founded on its reversal—were thus known to people such as Pétion in colonial Saint-Domingue.²¹

In the Caribbean itself, many were familiar with another kind of arrival that legally conferred freedom: Catholic sanctuary. The Spanish government regularly granted freedom, protection, and asylum to foreign fugitive slaves who were willing

²⁰ See Peabody and Grinberg, *Slavery, Freedom, and the Law in the Atlantic World*, 6–7, 68, 179; Sue Peabody, "Slavery, Freedom, Statehood and the Law in the Atlantic World," in Charlotte Wallin and Daniel Silander, eds., *Democracy and Culture in the Transatlantic World: Third Interdisciplinary Conference, October 2004* (Maastricht, 2004), 233–240; and Jennifer Heuer, "One Drop Rule in Reverse? Interracial Marriages in Napoleonic and Restoration France," *Law and History Review* 27, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 515–548, esp. 539–541.

²¹ Peabody, "There Are No Slaves in France," 6–7, 12, 29, 47, 50–52, 55–56. The figure on the number of victorious freedom suits comes from Peabody's table on p. 55. On Pétion and Bordeaux, see Susan Buck-Morss, *Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History* (Pittsburgh, 2009), 63–65; and Robin Blackburn, *The American Crucible: Slavery, Emancipation, and Human Rights* (New York, 2011), 185–186.

to embrace Catholicism. The practice persisted until after the start of the French Revolution and served as an inducement for an unknown number of enslaved people, particularly in British, U.S., Dutch, and Danish territories, who sought sanctuary and freedom in Spanish Cuba, Puerto Rico, Florida, Trinidad, and Tierra Firme. Even French authorities complained that enslaved people—already “Catholic”—were taking advantage of the policy to escape to Spanish territory. Before the Spanish sanctuary and manumission policy was abolished in 1790 in response to disorder in France and its colonies, enslaved people in Jamaica often stole canoes and other vessels in order to make quick sea journeys to freedom in Cuba.²² After Haitian independence, and especially after the constitution of 1816, Haiti represented a new and radically different sanctuary for maritime maroons of the Caribbean: one where freedom and protection came not from king and Christ but from the antislavery constitution of an independent black state.

While French, as well as Spanish, precedents may have informed Pétion’s thinking on legal sources of freedom from enslavement, it is clear that in arguing against a Jamaican slave master, he was also making an explicit connection to English law, and specifically to the legal principles of both asylum and free soil. In a letter to Rear Admiral Douglas defending his decision not to return the Jamaican sailors, Pétion invoked the right of asylum recognized by England and also included for the first time in the Haitian constitution of 1816: “There is no doubt, Sir, but the departure of a subject of one government to another places him under the jurisdiction of the one which he has adopted, and, once under that protection, he is no longer amenable to the government he has abandoned. England herself offers an example in the right of asylum.” From asylum, Pétion moved effortlessly to the freedom principle. Here Haiti’s president seemed well aware that English law, since the widely publicized Somerset case of 1772, had effectively abolished slavery on English soil. The case, which famously argued that slavery could exist only if it was established by positive law, was well known outside of England, in part because by the early nineteenth century it had become a staple of antislavery discourse.²³ Thus Pétion wrote astutely that “if the persons claimed by Messrs. James and Robert McKowen had been able to set their feet in the territory of England, there, where no slavery exists, certainly [McKowen’s] claim would not have been admitted.”²⁴ Haiti’s con-

²² Linda M. Rupert, “Marronage, Manumission, and Maritime Trade in the Early Modern Caribbean,” *Slavery and Abolition* 30, no. 3 (2009): 361–382; Neville A. T. Hall, *Slave Society in the Danish West Indies: St. Thomas, St. John, and St. Croix*, ed. B. W. Higman (Baltimore, 1992), 124–130; Jane G. Landers, *Atlantic Creoles in the Age of Revolutions* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010), chap. 1; Julius Scott, “The Common Wind: Currents of Afro-American Communication in the Era of the Haitian Revolution” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1986), 93–103. For particular examples of Spanish sanctuary decrees for slaves, see “Recopilación de consultas y pareceres dados a S.M. en asuntos del gobierno de Indias” (1712–1765), in Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, Consejo de Indias, Códices, Libro 753 (no. 96, beginning on f. 152v) (consulted online, PARES, June 3, 2010, <http://pares.mcu.es/Bicentenarios/portal/consejoDeIndias.html>); and the Royal Order of February 20, 1773, transcribed in Biblioteca Nacional José Martí, Colección Manuscrita, Morales, t. 79, no. 136, dated April 14, 1789.

²³ There is an extensive literature on the Somerset case. For a recent and useful introduction, see “Forum: Somerset’s Case Revisited,” *Law and History Review* 24, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 601–671, including George Van Cleve, “Somerset’s Case and Its Antecedents in Imperial Perspective,” and comments by Daniel Hulsebosch and Ruth Paley. On the significance of the Somerset case for popular antislavery, see Edlie L. Wong, *Neither Fugitive nor Free: Atlantic Slavery, Freedom Suits, and the Legal Culture of Travel* (New York, 2009), chap. 1.

²⁴ Pétion to J. E. Douglas, March 29, 1817, in Jamaica Assembly, *A Report of a Committee*, 45–46.

stitution and actions in this case, he argued, were no different from the British principles of asylum and free soil. Surprisingly, authorities in London concurred. Under-Secretary of State for War and the Colonies Henry Goulburn examined the issue and concluded “that the laws of Hayti much resemble those of Great Britain, so far as not to permit persons who have once landed in that island to be considered or treated as slaves.”²⁵

Pétion’s version of free soil, however, was significantly more radical than any British or French precedent. First, his freedom principle was proclaimed not for European territories that were geographically removed from the spaces of mass chattel slavery, but instead for a former slave colony a short sail from numerous and flourishing slave regimes. Thus, his free soil was declared in the geographical space where it most mattered. Second, he made free soil not only a legal principle to be invoked and argued in specific cases, as it was in Europe, but in fact a general and inviolable principle written into the supreme law of the land. He thus drew on principles from Old Regime antislavery and combined them with elements of Haitian antislavery to expand the scope of each. Pétion’s policies broadened the concept of free soil by promising arrivals not only freedom from enslavement, but also citizenship. He simultaneously expanded the reach of the freedom won in the Haitian Revolution and reaffirmed in every Haitian constitution by making it available to strangers, to people who had not been present at the moment of the constitution’s drafting. Article 44 thus made freedom and citizenship more widely attainable, and gave the promise of Haiti’s radical antislavery a more robust life and international projection in an age and place where neighboring states remained very much invested in the regime of slavery.

IF ARTICLE 44—AND THE CONSTITUTION more broadly—represented a radicalization of longstanding free-soil precedents, it also reflected an engagement with newer, revolutionary ideas about freedom and sovereignty emerging on both sides of the Atlantic. Clearly, Article 44 reaffirmed, expanded, and projected internationally the foundational antislavery of the Haitian Revolution. Every Haitian constitution, starting with Toussaint’s colonial constitution in 1801, had specified that the abolition of slavery was guaranteed “in this territory.” Article 1 of Pétion’s 1816 constitution, like its predecessors, declared: “There cannot exist slaves within the territory of the Republic: slavery is forever abolished.” By contrast, as Sibylle Fischer’s work has emphasized, the 1789 “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen” in France famously declared that “men are born free and equal in rights” in a manner that implicitly seemed to reference all men universally, but which, by referring neither to a specific location where that freedom would be respected nor to the very real slavery that existed in France’s own territory, fell far short of ending the actual institution of slavery. By explicitly specifying the location where freedom would be made real—“in this territory” in 1801, in the territory of Haiti or of the republic after 1806—the Haitian constitutional texts made it clear that the freedom envisioned was not an abstract proposition, but freedom from real, existing slavery. Freedom was

²⁵ Henry Goulburn to John Wilson Croker, Esq., *ibid.*, 53.



FIGURE 1: Alexandre Pétion, President of the Republic of Haiti, 1807–1818. Kurt Fisher Haitian History Collection, Photographs and Prints Division, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations.

there, on that soil, guaranteed to all.²⁶ In 1816, Article 44 was novel, indeed groundbreaking, because it made that territory without slavery now expressly and legally available to outsiders, to slaves of foreign masters, subjects of foreign kings, and outcasts of other governments.

Pétion never sought to deny that the men had been held as slaves by McKowen in Jamaica, but Haitian law, he seemed to argue, unequivocally invalidated the right of property in men claimed by McKowen and recognized by every other government of the day. Pétion's 1806 constitution, as well as its revision in 1816, did guarantee, like many others, the right of property, but it explicitly defined property as including "the right to enjoy and dispose of . . . one's work and industry."²⁷ Here, then, the protection of property, which had been used elsewhere and would continue to be used for some time as a means to protect the institution of slavery, was defined in such a way as to make slavery doubly inadmissible—as a violation of the rights of man and as a violation of an individual's right to his own property or person. Haitian law—Article 1 prohibiting slavery, Article 10 defining property to include one's own labor, and Article 44 extending the rights of Haitian citizenship, and therefore freedom, to non-white foreigners—together rendered moot and invalid McKowen's (or anyone else's) claim to be the master of black persons residing in Haiti.

If Pétion's reasoning purposely ignored the legal status of the Jamaican sailors outside of Haiti, it also neutralized their master's claim that the men were criminals. Pétion did not deny that the men had stolen the *Deep Nine*; indeed, he returned the vessel to McKowen almost immediately. But he did not regard the taking of the vessel as a crime in and of itself. Instead, he argued that the men's potential crimes would be judged against a different standard. He wrote to McKowen, "If they have committed *crimes against the rights of Men*, they will be tried according to local law of the country of which *they are now citizens*."²⁸

Pétion's invocation of the rights of man suggests that he was thinking expansively about Haiti's relationship to international debates on freedom and rights. He insisted, first, that the rights of man would serve as the standard against which claims on the freedom of the men would be judged. Importantly, he also reserved that judgment to Haitian courts. By making local courts the arbiter of the rights of man, Pétion in a sense universalized Haitian law: national law would have a duty to uni-

²⁶ An insightful discussion of the meanings of the differences in wording between Toussaint's constitution of 1801 and its French precedents will appear in Sibylle Fischer, "'Here, all men are born, live, and die free and French': Toussaint Louverture's Constitution of 1801 and the Difficult Politics of Universal Human Rights" (article manuscript in preparation). It is interesting to note that the only Haitian constitution of the early post-independence period not to specify that slavery was abolished in Haiti was the first official Haitian constitution of 1805 of Dessalines, which stated simply and expansively, "L'esclavage est à jamais aboli." <http://modern-constitutions.de/HT-00:1805-07-27-fr-i.html>.

²⁷ While some important European texts had defined property as that "which men have in their persons as well as goods," constitutional texts from the period generally affirm a right to property without specifying what is meant. John Locke, *Two Treatises on Government* (London, 1821), 340.

²⁸ Emphasis added. The letter is available only in the English translation prepared by British officials in Jamaica. It is worth noting the term "rights of Men." The use of "Men" rather than "Man" reads somewhat awkwardly and raises the question of the exact phrasing in the original. Did it say *droits de l'Homme* or something else, perhaps *droits des gens* (from the Roman concept of *ius gentium*), often translated as "the Law of Nations," referring to natural or common law among states, and encompassing laws on national boundaries, extradition, prosecution of piracy, and so on? In this particular case, then, a reference to the rights of man, related to the right of liberty and the repudiation of enslavement, and a reference to the law of nations might both have been appropriate for Pétion.

versal rights. At the same time, he Haitianized universal rights: the human rights proclaimed and then denied to black people the world over would be respected and realized concretely on Haitian territory. It bears saying that this version of universal rights in Haiti did not apply to most whites, as Articles 38 and 39 of the 1816 constitution, echoing earlier ones, prohibited the entry of white men as property owners and denied them the possibility of becoming Haitian citizens, measures that were designed to impede the return of white French émigrés with potential designs of re-enslavement or reconquest.²⁹

One aspect of Pétion's invocation of rights merits further analysis. His claim that the men were citizens of Haiti seems to represent a generous reading of Article 44, which stated that arrival in Haiti gave African- and indigenous-descended people the right of nationality, with the rights of citizenship to follow a year later. The men in question had been in Haiti for less than a month, yet Pétion stated explicitly that they were "now citizens" of Haiti. It is difficult to know what to make of his reluctance to recognize the distinction between nationality and citizenship, which is explicitly established in the constitutional article itself. Comparisons to French metropolitan law may be instructive here.³⁰ Pétion's definition of nationality echoed pre-revolutionary French law, which rooted nationality in territory rather than blood, defining a French person as someone born on French soil. In Haiti, where more than two-thirds of the formerly enslaved were African-born, leaders eschewed the requirement of birth on national soil; presence rather than birth was key. Importantly, French law itself was changing as a result of the revolution, as naturalization became a matter of law rather than monarchical favor: from a 1790 decree that granted the rights of active citizenship to foreigners after five years of residence, to the revolutionary constitution of 1793, which declared that any foreigner domiciled in France for one year had the rights of a French citizen. By the time of Haitian independence in 1804, however, French law had departed from that norm with the promulgation of the Civil Code of 1803, which conceived nationality as emanating from blood rather than soil, meaning that a French citizen was defined as someone born to a French father, irrespective of his or her actual presence on French soil.³¹ The Haitian constitution thus echoed France's earlier, more inclusive definitions of nationality. In the 1817 case, Pétion's blurring of the lines between nationality and citizenship

²⁹ Article 39 allowed whites in Haiti serving either in the army or as public functionaries, and who had arrived before the 1806 constitution went into effect, to be recognized as Haitian citizens, but made it clear that no white person would enjoy the same right after the publication of the 1816 constitution. Dessalines's 1805 constitution also forbade the entry of land- or slave-owning whites and prohibited any newly arrived white person from acquiring property of any kind in Haiti (Article 12). Christophe's 1807 constitution for northern Haiti did not include prohibitions on white landownership or citizenship. See the texts in Janvier, *Les constitutions d'Haïti*. For a discussion of these property and race provisions over time, see Nicholls, *From Dessalines to Duvalier*, 53.

³⁰ That Pétion sometimes engaged directly with metropolitan precedents is suggested by his instruction to local jurists that when legal uncertainties arose in matters for which no local law could serve as a guide, and until the drafting of a Haitian civil code, jurists should use the Napoleonic Code as a basis for their decisions. See Thomas Madiou, *Histoire d'Haïti*, 8 vols. (Port-au-Prince, 1985), vol. 5: 1811–1818, 359.

³¹ On French definitions of nationality, see Patrick Weil, *How to Be French: Nationality in the Making since 1789*, trans. Catherine Porter (Durham, N.C., 2008), 11–36. For an interesting discussion of the distinction between nationality and citizenship and between simple (passive) and political (active) citizenship in the context of French revolutionary constitutions, see Peter Sahlin, *Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2004), 283–289.

served to make those definitions even more capacious. He thereby made nationality for non-whites easily obtainable and, importantly, nearly coterminous with citizenship.

There is another important way in which the 1816 constitution and the 1817 case reflected a potentially radical engagement with emerging notions of nationality, territory, and citizenship. Article 3 of the 1816 constitution announced—for the first time—the right of “sacred and inviolable” asylum.³² By the early nineteenth century, asylum in England and elsewhere in Europe was based in territorial sovereignty rather than religious sanctity, and it was offered generally to foreigners who had been banished or persecuted as a result of their political beliefs. Only in Haiti, however, was the practice incorporated into the nation’s constitution.³³ Although the Haitian constitution did not specify to whom asylum could be granted, Pétion’s actions in this case suggested that it would be available to the foreign enslaved. To offer asylum to fugitive slaves was to assert the sovereign power of the Haitian state, on the one hand, and to recognize enslavement as a form of persecution that obligated the granting of asylum, on the other. Article 44, then, cannot be fully understood without being placed in the context of the broader constitution in which it was embedded. Its full power was tangible only alongside those other articles that unequivocally illegalized slavery, rejected any definition of property that might allow a return of slavery even in a few isolated cases, and offered asylum and protection to foreigners.

The Haitian constitution of 1816 and its 1817 application in the case of the seven sailors thus represented a productive engagement with and participation in the major moral and political questions of the Age of Revolution: the fate of slavery, the relationship between rights of property and rights of liberty, and the boundaries of nationality and citizenship. However, Haiti’s engagement with these notions was nothing if not dynamic. In combining the articles in one constitution, Haiti seemed to have gone significantly beyond the conception of those rights in their European (or North American) enunciations. This does not mean that the universalist ideals of rights expressed but truncated elsewhere were realized or redeemed in Haiti by some logic of rights. Rather, in their engagement with those ideals and in their development of real-world policy informed by them, Haitian leaders actually made them something other than what they were originally meant to be. Thus the abstract right of liberty proclaimed elsewhere was transformed into a concrete prohibition on slavery, including the explicit cancellation of all debt ever contracted for the purchase of human beings (Article 2). The right to property, so fundamental to liberal constitutions, was also proclaimed, but it was explicitly defined in a way that no liberal power would have conceived at the time. The sovereign nation, as elsewhere, was imagined as a “space of citizenship in which rights would be accorded and pro-

³² On the right of asylum and the welcome of refugees, see Moïse, *Constitutions et luttes de pouvoir en Haïti*, 1: 54.

³³ The French constitution of 1793, Article 120, asserted the right of asylum to foreigners fighting for “liberty against tyranny,” but that constitution was never implemented. On the French right of asylum, or *droit d’asile*, see Greg Burgess, *Refuge in the Land of Liberty: France and Its Refugees, from the Revolution to the End of Asylum, 1787–1939* (New York, 2008), esp. chap. 1. On the transformation of notions of asylum in the eighteenth century, see S. Prakash Sinha, *Asylum and International Law* (The Hague, 1971).

tected.” But Articles 10 and 44 (and the particular applications they were given) represented a robust redefinition of a space of rights that until then had been essentially national in conception. In Haiti, the space of citizenship—made available to non-white and enslaved foreigners in 1816—was expressly transnational. And the seven sailors from Jamaica seemed to understand that quite clearly.³⁴

ARTICLE 44 AND THE 1816 CONSTITUTION were the products of a thoroughgoing intellectual engagement with both longstanding and emerging principles of freedom and rights. But they must also be understood in the context of Haitian government policy as it evolved after (and in some cases prior to) independence in 1804. Moreover, some of the policies and decisions made by Haitian governments might productively be understood as themselves responding to initiatives and demands by black and brown people in Haiti and beyond.

The Caribbean was an intensely mobile space, and in an age of sea travel, islands and coasts were often more well-connected than their neighboring mainlands and interiors. Since the first abolition of slavery in Saint-Domingue in August of 1793, foreigners of color had arrived seeking (and sometimes securing) freedom from local officials. Ashli White has examined a 1794 case in which a Philadelphia servant fled to revolutionary Saint-Domingue, where French governor Étienne Laveaux refused “to force a man against his own will to leave the land of liberty where he has taken refuge.”³⁵ Sometimes local authorities were even more aggressive in making that land of liberty accessible to strangers. In 1797, black privateers from Saint-Domingue stopped a Swedish slaving vessel that was transporting African captives to Havana, declaring their intention to take the captives to Saint-Domingue so that they “might enjoy their freedom in the land of liberty.”³⁶ Even during the revolution, then, a territorially based notion of freedom—of a land of liberty in which liberty had ex-

³⁴ European intellectual historian Samuel Moyn takes a highly critical view of recent work on the Haitian Revolution and human rights, which in his view erroneously attributes a human rights stance to Haitian revolutionaries. He refers specifically to the work of Lynn Hunt and Laurent Dubois. Moyn argues that the main difference between rights associated with the Enlightenment and the Age of Revolution and modern human rights is that in the former the nation-state (and its authority) was central, while the latter emerged expressly to transcend that authority. While Moyn’s criticism can serve as a useful warning against anachronistic back-streaming from modern notions of human rights, it does simplify more nuanced positions taken by the authors he engages. His necessarily brief discussion of Haiti and human rights does not contend with Haiti as a producer of political thought on these questions, nor with the presciently transnational potential of the rights enunciated by Haitian leaders. Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, 2010), 1–43, here 13, 31–33.

³⁵ Ashli White, *Encountering Revolution: Haiti and the Making of the Early Republic* (Baltimore, 2010), 148. Jeffrey Bolster discusses another case in 1802, in which a black sailor escaped to the then French colony claiming “the protection of a French citizen to which he was entitled, [and] that he was now at full liberty and no longer a Slave.” He appears to have won his freedom there. Bolster, *Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail* (Cambridge, 1998), 144–145.

³⁶ See ANC, Gobierno General, leg. 529, exp. 27084, Nicolás Guillarte to Juan Nepomuceno de Quintana, March 27, 1797, and testimony of crew members Fernando Deurer, Andrés Lundbenos, and Juan de Pontes. In this case, the privateers did not succeed in freeing the captives on board because they were surprised by an English vessel. “Land of liberty” might have referred to Saint-Domingue specifically or to France more broadly, as the term (*pays de la liberté*) was also used in metropolitan France. See Burgess, *Refuge in the Land of Liberty*, chap. 1.

plicit material content—appears to have had some power both for local authorities and for black people arriving to claim it.

After independence, the new leaders made it increasingly clear that the “land of liberty” referred to Haiti and not to France, which had by then reestablished slavery and the slave trade. At first, they sought to make that liberty available to black people who had been taken from revolutionary Saint-Domingue as slaves or servants and now wished to return as free men and women. Just days after Haiti’s Declaration of Independence in 1804, the first head of state, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, issued a decree offering payment to American ship captains for returning to Haiti people of color who had been removed from Saint-Domingue during the revolution.³⁷ Pétion himself later took up the idea in the south and expanded it over the years that followed. In January 1809, as Spanish officials were evacuating French residents from Spain’s American territory following the Napoleonic invasion of the Spanish Peninsula, Pétion seized the opportunity to try to repatriate those people whom the Spanish continued to call “French blacks.” He sent a ship to Cuba to bring back anyone interested in returning to Haiti. He also requested permission from Spanish authorities to keep sending such ships, as potential passengers were not likely to have the resources required to organize trips on their own, and one ship would not have been sufficient for all of the people he assumed would seek to return. Pétion referred to those he sought to repatriate as Haitians; Cuban authorities referred to them as “émigrés” or “French people of his [Pétion’s] class.” In the disencounter between these terms lurks the question of whether Pétion intended to repatriate men and women who had been taken from Saint-Domingue and were now being held as slaves in Cuba. He never got the chance; Cuban authorities prohibited the entry of the Haitian vessel and warned its captain that none would be received in the future.³⁸ Despite this setback, some repatriation apparently did occur aboard private Spanish ships in mid-1809. As ships left eastern Cuba with refugees headed to New Orleans, Charleston, and Baltimore, at least ten smaller vessels appear to have made journeys instead to Port-au-Prince and Jérémie carrying returnees, much as Pétion had requested a few months earlier.³⁹

Long before the 1816 constitution, then, Haitian leaders were already developing piecemeal policies designed to facilitate the return of black men and women who had been denied the possibility of freedom in Haiti. Article 44 now went significantly

³⁷ Ardouin, *Etudes sur l’histoire d’Haïti*, 8: 45. For the text of the law, see Jean-Jacques Dessalines, *Lois et actes sous le règne de Jean Jacques Dessalines* (Port-au-Prince, 2006), 13–14.

³⁸ See the correspondence between Pétion and Santiago governor Sebastián Kindelán, between Kindelán and Havana governor, the Marqués de Someruelos, and between Someruelos and Secretario de Estado, Madrid, in ANC, AP, leg. 209, exp. 144; and AGI, Estado, leg. 12, exp. 54.

³⁹ See the lists titled “Relación de los Extrangeros que han salido de esta Ciudad,” dated Baracoa, June and July 22, 1809, both in ANC, Gobierno General, leg. 530, exp. 27085. The lists include vessels leaving for ports in Haiti and the United States. The lists of passengers aboard U.S.-bound vessels often include designations of people as “esclavos” (slaves), “criados” (servants), or “domésticos” (domestics). Haitian-bound vessels did not identify people in servile capacities. Whether that difference is attributable to a difference in the lived status and experience of the passengers in Cuba prior to departure, or to the manner in which the lists were compiled or people were grouped together for the voyages or identified either by themselves, shipmates, or captains upon departure, is impossible to know. For related questions of status, mobility, and the law, see Rebecca Scott, “Paper Thin: Freedom and Re-Enslavement in the Diaspora of the Haitian Revolution,” *Law and History Review* 29, no. 4 (2011): 1061–1087.

further, promising freedom and citizenship not just to blacks returning to Haiti, but potentially to *all* people of color and their descendants.⁴⁰

But here again, policies and decisions that predated the 1816 constitution seemed already to be pointing in that direction in daring ways. Throughout the decade beginning in 1810, for instance, Haitian state vessels—including northern ships—captured several slave-trading vessels bound for neighboring colonies with captives taken from Africa. In these cases, the captives were liberated and allowed to remain in Haiti, and the ships were sent on to their destinations, usually with their crews but without their human cargoes. In at least one case in the north, the African captives arriving in Haiti were publicly welcomed and informed that “they were free and among brothers and compatriots.”⁴¹ The public use of the term “compatriot” suggests the former captives’ incorporation as Haitian nationals. In this way, the individual captures may have presaged what Pétion tried to extend and guarantee in the Haitian constitution of 1816: freedom and citizenship on Haitian soil for foreign persons of color who otherwise would have lived in slavery.

Not only was Haitian nationality offered to men and women liberated off slaving vessels, it was also, in at least some instances, conferred on those who came to Haiti of their own initiative. In 1814, U.S. officials complained that Pétion was regularly “seducing” sailors from all nations who entered his port. That same year, one black sailor, a native of Martinique who had been living in New Orleans for many years, decided to stay in Port-au-Prince. The man insisted that he was Haitian, despite the fact that he was “never until now in Haiti.” Thus, two years before the revision of the constitution, foreign black sailors were seeking refuge in Haiti, calling themselves Haitian, and claiming the privileges of Haitian citizenship.⁴² The case, only briefly discussed by the U.S. consul in Haiti, who felt limited in what he could raise with the president of a republic that his own government did not recognize, suggests a fascinating possibility: that Pétion’s offer of Haitian protection and citizenship to all arriving people of color may have been, at least in part, a response to—and an acknowledgment of—what some foreign blacks in the region were already claiming for themselves.

⁴⁰ The inclusion of indigenous people in Article 44 may have been symbolic, perhaps in line with the naming of the country as Haiti, its original indigenous name, or the naming of the revolutionary army as the Army of the Inca. But that symbolism itself may provide insight into how early Haitian leaders imagined their political and intellectual project. When Dessalines declared in spring 1804 that he had “avenged America,” he seemed to allude to a vision of history and justice that encompassed more than Africans. One wonders also whether the reference to indigenous people may have served obliquely as a way to address people in Spanish Santo Domingo, whom Haitian leaders sometimes referred to as descendants of Indians, as in Dessalines’s April 1805 proclamation, written after his unsuccessful attempt to drive the French out of that part of the island: “Spanish indigenes, descendants of the unfortunate Indians immolated by the cupidity and greed of the first usurpers of this land.” Quoted in Jenson, *Beyond the Slave Narrative*, 155. When Article 44 was written in 1816, slavery and Spanish rule still persisted on the eastern part of the island.

⁴¹ The quote is from *Gazette Royale d’Haïti*, October 10, 1817, quoted in Ardouin, *Etudes sur l’histoire d’Haïti*, 8: 66. For a discussion of some of these cases of captured slavers, though with a focus more on northern examples, see Ada Ferrer, “Speaking of Haiti: Slavery, Revolution, and Freedom in Cuban Slave Testimony,” in David Patrick Geggus and Norman Fiering, eds., *The World of the Haitian Revolution* (Bloomington, Ind., 2009), 240–241; and José Luciano Franco, *Comercio clandestino de esclavos* (Havana, 1996), 106–107.

⁴² U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, microfilm M9, reel 5, Consular Despatches, Cap Haitian, William Taylor to James Monroe, August 30, 1814.

BOTH PLACE AND TIME—THE SLAVEHOLDING Atlantic at the turn of the nineteenth century—were strongly present in the policies of the southern republic. By 1816, slavery had uneven power in the region. On the one hand, it had become increasingly influential in places such as Cuba and the U.S. Lower South; in old British colonies such as Jamaica, it maintained its brutal hold over hundreds of thousands of people. At the same time, both Britain and North America had abolished the slave trade, and the British were embarking on an aggressive policy of policing and suppressing the trade on the high seas. Pétion appears to have developed his free-soil policy with both realities in mind. For the enslaved in places such as Jamaica, Article 44 made Haiti an accessible place of refuge and freedom. But in a world in which both abolitionism and racism were on the rise, Article 44 promised to turn Haiti into a place of refuge also for the newly or soon to be freed, who were unable to enjoy the rights of citizenship elsewhere.

Pétion appears to have actively thought about the contest between slavery and freedom in the neighboring United States, where campaigns to limit the mobility of black men and women were in full force. U.S. law required the authorities in free states to give up anyone claimed as a fugitive slave by a putative owner from a slave state. In some northern states, legislatures contemplated restrictions on the entry of free blacks.⁴³ Meanwhile, Quakers and slaveholders, with discrepant motivations, collaborated to settle free black people in foreign territories. The Haitian constitution of 1816 appeared in the same year as the establishment of the American Colonization Society, which was dedicated to resettling freed blacks in Africa. That same year, Paul Cuffee, a free black Quaker and wealthy ship owner, made his first journey to Sierra Leone with thirty-eight free black settlers. Hearing reports from black American sailors arriving in Port-au-Prince that the U.S. government was considering forcibly removing freed blacks to Africa, Pétion sought to insert Haiti into the calculations of exit and removal being made in the United States. Through his secretary-general, Joseph Balthazar Inginac, he invited black Americans to emigrate to Haiti as a way of resisting the exclusion and abuse they faced in the U.S.

Open to their eyes the Constitution of our Republic, and let them see in its 44th Article a fraternal hand opened to their distresses. Since they are at this day refused the title of Members of the American Union, let them come among us, in a country firmly organized, and enjoy the rights of Citizens of Hayti, of happiness and peace: lastly, let them come and show to white men that there yet exist coloured and black men who can raise a fearless front secured from insult and from injury.

The letter, which also offered “bounties of land” and “open arms,” was published in New York in 1818 as the preface to an English translation of the 1816 constitution; it was also published, with excerpts from the constitution, in at least one northern newspaper.⁴⁴ Pétion’s strategy enjoyed some success, as several proponents of Af-

⁴³ See especially Don E. Fehrenbacher, *The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government’s Relations to Slavery*, completed and ed. Ward M. McAfee (New York, 2002), chap. 7. For a fascinating discussion of the freedom principle in Pennsylvania, see Richard S. Newman, “‘Lucky to Be Born in Pennsylvania’: Free Soil, Fugitive Slaves, and the Making of Pennsylvania’s Anti-Slavery Borderland,” *Slavery and Abolition* 32, no. 3 (September 2011): 413–430.

⁴⁴ Inginac to James Tredwell, November 21, 1817, in *The Constitution of Hayti* (New York, 1818), 5; retrieved from the Archive of Americana online database, June 20, 2011. A copy was published in *Niles Weekly Register*, October 17, 1818. Pétion’s attempt to disseminate news of his policies was in line

rican colonization, including Cuffee and later Loring Dewey, a founder of the American Colonization Society, began seriously considering a Haitian alternative to African colonization schemes. In the 1820s, approximately 6,000 to 13,000 African Americans migrated to Haiti, a movement clearly facilitated by Pétion's campaigns and legislative policy.⁴⁵

Even as abolitionism was on the rise in the northern states, colonization schemes and legal constraints on black mobility made it very clear to Pétion that in other nations abolition would not be tied to the rights of citizenship or equality. While the sailors from Jamaica imagined Haiti as a place to attain legal freedom, potential free black emigrants viewed it as a place to make an already existing legal freedom more consequential. It was at this critical juncture—in a place and time when the power of slavery and antislavery and racism were all palpable—that Pétion developed his free-soil policy as a means to intervene in pressing contests over the fate of slavery and the formerly enslaved. In the same way that his policies seemed to consider both Old Regime and revolutionary sources of rights and freedoms, Article 44 in 1816 clearly seemed to treat slavery as something of a dual institution in that moment—still strong and in ascent in some areas, but under increasing challenge and gradually giving way to a compromised freedom and thwarted citizenship in others.⁴⁶

If Haiti's attempt to shape U.S. emigration schemes was motivated in part by a commitment to help expand the content of freedom for black men and women abroad, it also emerged in the context of Haiti's assertion of sovereignty. After Pétion's death, his successor, Jean-Pierre Boyer, continued to advocate African American settlement in Haiti. But in 1824, when at least one U.S. scheme contemplated the establishment of "a colony . . . [with] its own laws, courts, and legislature, in *all* respects like one of the States of the United States, and *connected with* and *subject to* the government of Hayti," Boyer responded categorically: "That cannot be." He elaborated only with a general declaration of principles that again returned to the 1816 constitution, and to Article 44 in particular: "The laws of the Republic are general—and no particular laws can exist. Those who come, being children of Africa, shall be Haytiens as soon as they put their feet on the soil of Hayti."⁴⁷ For Haiti's leaders, the process of guaranteeing and giving meaning to freedom from slavery, first locally and then transnationally, was always tied to the question of sovereignty: from fighting against the French expeditionary force in 1802, when Napoleon tried

with what Deborah Jenson has recently examined for an earlier period under Dessalines, who, for example, sent copies of new laws to U.S. publishers and newspapers. See Jenson, *Beyond the Slave Narrative*, 124, 127, 130–131, 138, 142, 150. In both instances, the Haitian state was actively trying to shape its global image and to insert itself into an Atlantic sphere of debate over slavery and freedom.

⁴⁵ On American colonization and Haiti, see Sara C. Fanning, "The Roots of Early Black Nationalism: Northern African Americans' Invocation of Haiti in the Early Nineteenth Century," *Slavery and Abolition* 28, no. 1 (April 2007): 61–85; Chris Dixon, *African America and Haiti: Emigration and Black Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Westport, Conn., 2000); and Floyd J. Miller, *The Search for a Black Nationality: Black Emigration and Colonization, 1787–1863* (Urbana, Ill., 1975).

⁴⁶ In some sense, Pétion appears to have understood the extended moment as a kind of "hinge" between what Dale Tomich has called the first and second slaveries, the second being the slavery that expanded at the height of abolitionism in emerging or expanding areas of cultivation. See Tomich, *Through the Prism of Slavery*, chaps. 3, 5, and 6.

⁴⁷ Loring D. Dewey, *Correspondence Relative to the Emigration to Hayti, of the Free People of Colour, in the United States: Together with the Instructions to the Agent Sent Out by President Boyer* (New York, 1824), 4, 10.

to reimpose slavery, to declaring independence in 1804, to attempting an invasion of the eastern part of the island in 1805 when ruling French officials there invited local residents “to fan into the territory occupied by the rebels [Haiti], to run upon them, and to take prisoner anyone, of either sex, not older than fourteen years of age,” who would then be sold as slaves and deported.⁴⁸ The necessity for Haitian leaders to assert both freedom from slavery and national sovereignty, evident since 1802, appeared present again in connection with the question of African American resettlement. Haitian leaders made it clear that while “emigration” would be welcomed and sought, “colonization” would be impossible.

That Haiti’s leaders linked the fates of antislavery and sovereignty is evident also in Pétion’s engagement with South America. Since the French occupation of the Iberian Peninsula in 1808, Spanish America had become a hotbed of political agitation and uncertainty. Importantly, Pétion’s refusal to return the Jamaican sailors made reference to those political struggles in Latin America. Indeed, he even hinted that he was thinking of Latin America as up for grabs, and potentially as the hemisphere’s second free-soil territory. He wrote to McKowen, “Every country has its Laws, as you must know Sir, and fortunately for the cause of humanity, Hayti is not the only one where Slavery is abolished.”⁴⁹ His confident assertion that abolition was already a reality in at least one other country was a bold and unexpectedly public reference to the revolutionary abolition of slavery in Venezuela by Simón Bolívar in July 1816.

Pétion’s invocation of Bolívar’s emancipation of Venezuela’s slaves had particular significance, given the role that he had played in making it happen. Since December 1815, his government had provided asylum to Latin American independence leaders, including Bolívar, to whom Pétion had offered 6,000 rifles, munitions, supplies, naval vessels, a printing press, and an unknown number of Haitian sailors and soldiers.⁵⁰ With Pétion’s knowledge and approval, as many as 600 pro-independence families from Cartagena and Caracas took refuge and received support in Les Cayes. Thus the proclamation of the right to asylum written into Article 3 of the 1816 constitution consolidated and extended what had already been occurring in practice with the Haitian state’s protection of Bolívar and other like-minded men and women.⁵¹

Importantly, Pétion linked the asylum he offered Bolívar to his broader project of antislavery, thus pushing the Latin American revolutionaries toward new and more radical policies. In exchange for his support, he required two promises from Bolívar. First and famously, Bolívar pledged to abolish slavery in the new republic

⁴⁸ This stunning example is discussed in two recent works: Graham Nessler, “A Failed Emancipation? The Struggle for Hispaniola during the Haitian Revolution, 1789–1809” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2011), chap. 5; and Jenson, *Beyond the Slave Narrative*, 151–152. Both call attention to the extent to which Haitian sovereignty was actively threatened by the continuing French presence on the eastern side of the island.

⁴⁹ TNA, CO 137/145, Pétion to McKowen, January 30, 1817.

⁵⁰ On Bolívar’s time in Haiti, see Verna, *Pétion y Bolívar*; and Sibylle Fischer, “Bolívar in Haiti,” in Raphael Dalleo, Luis Duno-Gottberg, Carla Calarge, and Clevis Headley, eds., *Haiti and the Americas: Histories, Cultures, Imaginations* (Oxford, Miss., forthcoming 2012).

⁵¹ See Verna, *Pétion y Bolívar*; John Lynch, *Simón Bolívar: A Life* (New Haven, Conn., 2006), 159–181. In less impressive quantities, Pétion offered succor and aid to Francisco Javier Mina and Pedro Labatot, who organized expeditions to Mexico and New Granada, respectively. William Lewis, “Simón Bolívar and Xavier Mina: A Rendezvous in Haiti,” *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 11, no. 3 (July 1969): 458–465. On asylum and the constitution, see Moïse, *Constitutions et luttes de pouvoir en Haïti*, 1: 54.

he was fighting to establish. He sailed from Haiti for the first time in March 1816 and began the gradual abolition of slavery in May, freeing those who were willing to serve in the liberation army. By July, he had proclaimed general emancipation: "Nature, justice, and politics call for the emancipation of the slaves. From here on forward, there will only be one class of men in Venezuela: all will be citizens." It was this act, he wrote to Pétion, that gave the South American revolutions their true and most just meaning.⁵² In extracting the promise of slave emancipation, Pétion aspired to extend the geographic space of liberty, hoping to help found the hemisphere's second country without slavery.

Bolívar's second promise is less well known but equally significant. At Pétion's insistence, he pledged that any captive Africans taken from slave-trading vessels by insurgent privateers would not be sold into slavery but rather would be turned over to the Haitian government. As the slave trade to Spanish and Portuguese territories flourished and as insurgent seamen plied American waters, there was considerable opportunity to seize human cargo. Evidence exists that these privateers regularly took captive Africans and sold them in places such as Cuba. By extracting Bolívar's promise that insurgent privateers would not sell captured Africans, Pétion devised a new arrangement whereby captives on the sea would be brought to freedom on Haitian territory, thus extending the physical reach of Haitian free soil into Caribbean and Atlantic waters.⁵³

It was only three weeks after the departure of Bolívar's second expedition on December 21, 1816, that the seven sailors stole away to Haiti and were there declared free and Haitian. Bolívar's second expedition, like the first, was organized under Pétion's protection, sailing with munitions, supplies, and vessels provided by Haiti's president. One British member of the company described the troops as "principally blacks of St. Domingo or runaway slaves from the Colonies." The mention of runaways raises the question of whether some of the black men freed upon arrival on Haitian soil subsequently became foot soldiers in a new project to extend to the South American mainland the promise of what had been achieved by Haiti in 1804: freedom from slavery and European rule.⁵⁴

⁵² See "Simón Bolívar a los habitantes de la provincia de Caracas," reprinted in Simón B. O'Leary, *Memorias del General O'Leary*, 34 vols. (Caracas, 1981), 15: 84. See also Lynch, *Simón Bolívar*, 100. In fact, slavery would not be legally abolished in Venezuela until 1854. More work needs to be done considering the apparent discrepancies between the attitudes Bolívar assumed in Haiti and toward Pétion and his less broad-minded words and actions on race and slavery later.

⁵³ On the promise to bring captives to Haiti rather than sell them into slavery and on the insurgent practice of capturing slave ships and sometimes selling the captives (in at least one instance, after Bolívar's promise), see Verna, *Pétion y Bolívar*, 337–342; ANC, AP, leg. 8, exp. 39, "Expediente sobre que el Real Consulado de la Habana acredita el apresamiento de 127 embarcaciones mercantes españolas por buques insurgentes, piratas y otros desde el año 1801 hasta el de 1819"; and ANC, AP, leg. 124, exp. 48, Governor of Santiago de Min. de Estado, June 7, 1816. On insurgent privateering and the slave trade, see Lauren Benton, "Abolition and Imperial Law, 1790–1820," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 39, no. 3 (2011): 355–374; and Benton, "Una soberanía extraña: La Provincia oriental en el mundo Atlántico," *20/10 El mundo atlántico y la modernidad iberoamericana, 1750–1850* (forthcoming, 2012).

⁵⁴ The reference to the presence of runaway slaves from colonies appears in C. Brown, *Narrative of the Expedition to South America, Which Sailed from England at the Close of 1817 for the Service of the Spanish Patriots Including the Military and Naval Transactions and Ultimate Fate of That Expedition* (London, 1819), 115–116. See also Verna, *Pétion y Bolívar*, 337.

BUT WHAT OF THE ENSLAVED JAMAICAN SAILORS who found themselves at the center of the dispute over the boundaries of Haitian freedom and citizenship in 1817? Some combination of foresight and happenstance brought them to Haiti soon after the law would recognize them as Haitian and thereby as free. But how did they understand the freedom that might thus be acquired?

It comes as no surprise that their former master, McKowen, characterized the men's decision to make for Haiti in ways that minimized its legitimacy and power. He insisted that they had been seduced into escaping by a man of color who had boarded the *Deep Nine* at Rocky Point and escorted them to Haiti.⁵⁵ Some of the fugitives, he added, were "very young people, who I am confident are not capable of appreciating the value of becoming Citizens of Hayti."⁵⁶ Young, unknowing boys had been enticed or forced by the older crew members or the shady recruiter to make their way to the first black and antislavery state, unaware of the implications of their actions. Finally, complained McKowen, the recruiter had gone unpunished and was still at large at Les Cayes.

Les Cayes, along with other ports on Haiti's southern peninsula, had long been involved in the smuggling trade with Jamaica. Privateers outfitted there often made incursions into Jamaican territory and seized vessels. It was also a place of refuge for hundreds of patriot families from South America; and it was there that both Simón Bolívar and Francisco Javier Mina organized, recruited for, and launched expeditions to liberate Latin American territory. Thus what McKowen cast as a suspect relationship between a Les Cayes recruiter and unwitting Jamaican sailors may instead have signaled multiple "masterless" contacts embedded in a web of communications involving both trade and international politics.⁵⁷ Indeed, when McKowen went to Les Cayes to retrieve the men and boys he considered his property, he was distressed to find "a great number, say from thirty to forty, negroes, who avowed themselves to be runaways from [Jamaica]; and many of them were personally known to my own negroes."⁵⁸ Two of them may have been among a group of slaves who had escaped to Les Cayes at around the same time as McKowen's seven and were said to belong to Hannah French of Jamaica.⁵⁹ A few years later, in Port-au-Prince, the British consul, Charles MacKenzie, would note that "a very large proportion of the population . . . [consisted] of refugee slaves from the British colonies." In Jamaica itself, British authorities complained of Haitians who arrived in

⁵⁵ The accusation appears in TNA, CO 137/145, "Humble Memorial of Robert McKowen"; and J. E. Douglas, Rear Admiral and Commander and Chief of Jamaica Station, to Pétion, May 14, 1817, in Jamaica Assembly, *A Report of a Committee*, 48.

⁵⁶ TNA, CO 137/145, McKowen to Pétion, January 30, 1817.

⁵⁷ On Les Cayes and its connections to Jamaica, see George Ripley and Charles A. Dana, *The American Cyclopaedia: A Popular Dictionary for General Knowledge* (New York, 1883), 157. On Les Cayes corsairs in Jamaican waters, see *Royal Gazette* (Jamaica) 38, no. 43 (October 19–26, 1816): 19. On the presence of Latin American independence expeditionaries and communities there, see Verna, *Pétion y Bolívar*, 159–160, 305–307; and ANC, AP, leg. 124, exp. 83, Carlos Preval to Governor of Santiago, November 24, 1816. The notion of masterless space is taken from Scott, "The Common Wind." See also Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston, 2001).

⁵⁸ "Examination on Oath of James M'Kewan of Port-Royal, Before the Committee Appointed to Inquire into the State of the Colony," in Jamaica Assembly, *A Report of a Committee*, 29.

⁵⁹ Rear Admiral J. E. Douglas to George Lennox, Captain of HM's Ship *Esk*, March 17, 1817, *ibid.*, 41–42.

Kingston and other port cities with Haitian gazettes and with news meant to entice people to Haiti.⁶⁰

McKowen's seven sailors appear to have been very much a part of these networks. The sailor identified as Jem, who escaped to Haiti with the others but later returned to Jamaica, allegedly explained to McKowen that he and his companions "had often before been talking of going to Saint Domingo, having understood from the crews of different vessels from that place . . . that there was no danger of their being brought back, as they would not be given up, when once they got there." They had heard stories of other important inducements as well: "each [would] get a coffee plantation, or sugar work, with negroes to work for them," and "after being there twelve months, they [would] all be made officers." Here the sailors' expectations seemed to allude on the one hand to Article 44's promise of greater privileges after a year of residence, and on the other to the link between land distribution and military rank in the southern republic. The men, it seems, were up-to-date on Haitian news.

If we must make an informed inference in order to imagine the combination of expectation and adventure that led Jem and the others to Haiti, we need to do the same to think about their possible fates after arrival. Pétion appears not to have wavered in his defense of their right to remain in Haiti as free men. But beyond that, nothing is certain. For some, the experience of freedom may have comported with expectations. Dublin, for instance, appears to have secured the personal protection of a Haitian general at Jérémie, who baptized him, gave him his name, and then made him his aide-de-camp.⁶¹ But ironically, Dublin's story entered the historical record by way of Jem, who told it while back under McKowen's dominion. After escaping with the others, Jem had been pressed into service on a Haitian man-of-war, and from there he decided to escape back to McKowen, who was on board the British ship *Esk* in Port-au-Prince Harbor, still trying to recover his property in men. Neither McKowen nor the British officials who questioned Jem thought to ask him why he had declined the offer of Haitian freedom and citizenship. And Dublin, now aide-de-camp to a Haitian general, was never asked to comment on how his experience in Haiti compared to the expectations he had harbored before his escape from Jamaica to Haiti.

The case of Dublin, Jem, and the other Jamaican sailors did not become a precedent-setting case to be recorded along with Somerset in the formal legal annals of antislavery. It was, however, a key part of the efforts of the early Haitian state—as the first post-abolition state in the world—to shape the global contest over slavery and to assert its own antislavery and sovereign role in the world. Drawing on Old Regime legal precedents of free soil, emerging notions of rights and citizenship, and opportunities afforded by developments such as slave trade suppression, American emigration campaigns, and the independence struggles in South America, Pétion's policies represented a pragmatic and daring means to define and extend the bound-

⁶⁰ Charles MacKenzie to Foreign Secretary George Canning, June 2, 1826, quoted in Nicholls, *From Dessalines to Duvalier*, 62. On Haitians in Jamaica, see Jamaica Assembly, *A Report of a Committee*, 11–14.

⁶¹ "Examination," in Jamaica Assembly, *A Report of a Committee*, 29.

aries of freedom and citizenship in an Age of Revolution that otherwise offered no firm assurances of either to black and brown men and women.

FOR CENTURIES, ENSLAVED MEN AND WOMEN in the Caribbean and elsewhere had escaped to freedom. Some made their bids by sea on small vessels and headed for Spanish territory, finding protection in the well-known policies of Catholic sanctuary. A smaller number secured freedom in France or England by arriving on legal free soil. By 1816, however, another, much more radical possibility had emerged. By then, general liberty had been achieved in what had been the seat of the slave regime's most extreme power. The resulting state of Haiti stood not only as a symbol of liberty, but literally as free soil, a place in which freedom, enshrined in the law, could be real for black persons in their own lifetimes. In the 1817 case, the Haitian state offered the Jamaican sailors refuge and protection, elevating their claim to citizenship and emancipation above the legal claim of ownership asserted by their British master. Thus the slaves' bid for freedom found institutional and philosophical support in the constitution of a sovereign—and antislavery—black state.

This particular case can be read as part of a broader process in which the Haitian state shaped the possibilities and character of Atlantic freedom, for it highlights the fact that for the men and women most denied the promise of that freedom, the experience and the understanding of the political transformations of the age occurred in dialogue with Haiti itself. French revolutionary and British abolitionist ideas clearly circulated in the region, but they were engaged and transformed in dynamic and challenging ways in the colonies. Almost from the start of the ferment in Paris in 1789, free people of color questioned the legitimacy of elections and debates that excluded them as rightful participants; and over the course of the revolution, black and colored leaders delivered stinging critiques of what they cast as a false universalism espoused in Paris. They circulated accounts of French barbarism—of loyal officers drowned at sea; black men devoured daily by hunting dogs; wives and sisters made to dine and dance in rooms decorated with black heads on spikes.⁶² They condemned the French for thinking that they were destined to be the masters of colonial blacks, for thinking that “they alone formed the essence of human nature.”⁶³ The former slaves and long-free people of color announced, in other words, not just that they were the new rulers of the former colony, but also that they were the more legitimate and generous guardians of equality and liberty. After independence, they elaborated laws and policies that reworked and reimagined notions of property, territory, and citizenship. In a world in which slavery and colonialism held powerful sway, Haitian leaders crafted political and intellectual positions designed to extend the promise of radical antislavery despite the very real constraints imposed by the active rejection of neighboring states. No story of the rise of rights is complete without an engagement with the intellectual and political work done in Haiti.

⁶² AGI, Estado, leg. 2, exp. 59, Geffrard to Someruelos, 27 Fructidor an 11; and AGI, Cuba, leg. 1537B, Kindelán to Someruelos, November 14, 1803.

⁶³ November 1803 declaration by Dessalines, Christophe, and Clervaux, reprinted in translation in *Gaceta de Madrid*, March 23, 1804, 267–268.

Any history of the role of the Haitian state in the ascent of general liberty and universal rights nonetheless requires several cautionary notes. Haiti stood as an important beacon of freedom, willing to do much more—and more quickly—than the liberal powers of Europe to dismantle slavery where it most mattered. Haiti became literal free soil. That enslaved persons such as the Jamaican sailors took knowing advantage of that policy seems clear. But what the juridical freedom from enslavement signified in practice remains murky. Jem, at least, appears to have abandoned legal freedom in Haiti when it turned out to entail forced military service, voluntarily returning to slavery under a British master. The power and conviction of the Haitian leaders' commitment to antislavery and legal abolition is without question, but as Michel-Rolph Trouillot and others have commented, the liberty to which they were committed did not always coincide with the liberty imagined by Haitian—and Caribbean—black and brown people. While some legal documents offered freedom and protection to people such as the enslaved Jamaican sailors, others made it difficult for free workers to leave their place of work, or more generally to avoid the demands of what scholars have identified as the “militarized agriculture” of early postcolonial Haiti, or the increasingly extractive policies of what Trouillot calls “a republic for the merchants.”⁶⁴ Freed strangers likely faced some of the same fates as native Haitians, including attached labor on plantations, compulsory labor in public works, or, as in the case of Jem, forced service on state vessels or perhaps even on ships headed to South America to free new territory. At the same time, they may have responded as many Haitians did, becoming part of the “counter-plantation” society and the vibrant rural networks that succeeded in carving out spaces outside the purview of the Haitian state.

In some sense, the dilemmas around labor and autonomy that emerged in Haiti—the first post-slavery nation in the modern world—would be the problems faced in every subsequent post-emancipation society. Haiti's post-slavery relapses also have their echoes in later post-emancipation societies, from laws against vagrancy, to the use of penal labor colonies, to the entrenchment of debt peonage. But the fact that the Haitian state actively sought to make its own freedom from slavery a condition accessible to all black men and women from foreign slave societies has no real parallels. While Haiti's bold offer of emancipation and citizenship to outsiders does not mitigate the concrete internal and external obstacles to Haitian freedom, it does remind us that there are obvious and important counterpoints and disjunctures in any story about either the power of Haitian antislavery or the limits of Haitian freedom.

A further caveat to a celebratory account is perhaps equally uncomfortable. It is clear that Haiti—as an independent nation—intervened in an Atlantic arena of debate about slavery and freedom. Haitian intellectual production and policy after independence continued to represent a thoroughgoing and critical engagement with antislavery and rights discourses then developing and circulating in the Atlantic world. But it was one thing to do that intellectual and political work; it was quite another to have that work recognized as part of a broader international debate.

⁶⁴ Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Haiti: State against Nation—The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism* (New York, 1990); Mimi Sheller, *Democracy after Slavery: Black Publics and Peasant Radicalism in Haiti and Jamaica* (Gainesville, Fla., 2000); Dubois, *Haiti*; Nicholls, *From Dessalines to Duvalier*.

Haiti's important interventions after 1804 appear to have been projected into something of a conceptual vacuum as far as dominant antislavery or rights thought was concerned. Perhaps that lack of resonance served Pétion well: it allowed him to declare Haiti as free soil within reach of major sites of enslavement without calling too much attention to his challenge and intervention. But the vacuum also amplifies the usual problems of historical research: there is little discussion of Pétion's application of Article 44 of the 1816 constitution in this case or in any other. In contrast to the judicial archive generated by European free soil, there is no cache of petitions and legal decisions to illuminate the thinking either of the political class or of the men and women who sought freedom from slavery by its means. Thus, even if the Haitian state saw itself as making a—*the*—critical intervention in broad debates about freedom and rights, it is not clear that the other participants in those debates acknowledged them or their intervention. And we live today at least as much with the legacies of that refusal of recognition as with the legacies of Haiti's contribution.

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AHR Forum
Liberal Empire and International Law

Introduction

If anything distinguishes recent historical writing and research, it is the emphasis on what has become known as transnational history. There is much, indeed, that is new about this approach, but in one sense it has been practiced by generations of historians, especially those who study empires and imperialism. To be sure, transnational history strives to look at the patterns of imperial conquest and control with new eyes, emphasizing interactions rather than mere subjugation, and the movement of ordinary people rather than the work of official agents and soldiers. But this new kind of history has also made us appreciate the virtues of older approaches to the past. For example, many historians have now rediscovered diplomatic history, especially if recast in terms of the informal and non-governmental exchanges that transpired beneath the machinations of diplomatic protocol.

As the essays in this forum demonstrate, the same is true of the study of law, which belongs to the history of empires and imperialism just as much as it can generate insights into our understanding of transnational history. Here the emphasis is on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the development of norms for international law coincided with the increasing dominance of Western nations over other lands and peoples. Too often, however, the histories of these two phenomena are considered as entirely separate. The contributors to this forum appreciate that they were intertwined.

How does imperialism, which is historically based on coercion, subjugation, and a lack of respect for the sovereignty of subject peoples and nations, square with notions of law and legal legitimacy held dear by those nations? In "The Liberal Traditions in the Americas: Rights, Sovereignty, and the Origins of Liberal Multilateralism," Greg Grandin looks at this question in the context of the Western Hemisphere, where the United States viewed Iberian America not so much as "other"—and thus primarily ripe for conquest and control—but as rival nations with nominally shared values and political forms. In "Empire and Legal Universalisms in the Eighteenth Century," Jennifer Pitts recovers a largely forgotten strain of legal thought that offered a critique of imperialism and a potential constraint on the exercise and abuse of European states' power. Andrew Fitzmaurice's "Liberalism and Empire in Nineteenth-Century International Law" extends the analysis to the high point of European imperialism, showing how law could be deployed both to justify and to oppose imperial rule. Finally, in "Empire and Its Anxieties," Anthony Pagden offers a wide-ranging comment on these essays, providing as well an insightful summary of the political and legal history of this vexed subject.

The Liberal Traditions in the Americas: Rights, Sovereignty,
and the Origins of Liberal Multilateralism

GREG GRANDIN

America is therefore the land of the future, where, in the ages that lie before us, the burden of the World's History shall reveal itself—perhaps in a contest between North and South America.

G. W. F. Hegel, 1857

Somos más Americanos/We are more American.

Los Tigres del Norte, 2001

“WHO HAS WRITTEN ON A WESTERN HEMISPHERE scale,” Herbert Bolton asked in 1932, “the history of shipbuilding and commerce, mining, Christian missions, Indian policies, slavery and emancipation, constitutional development, arbitration, the effects of the Indian on European cultures, the rise of the common man . . . Who has tried to state the significance of the frontier in terms of the Americas?” Bolton, a student of Frederick Jackson Turner, raised the question in his presidential address to the American Historical Association, hoping to prompt an innovative approach to American studies, one that would take the so-called New History movement associated with Turner—organized around the sociology of migration, institutions, ideas, and property relations—and stretch it over a transnational frame. Bolton started his address by making what seems a commonsense comparison, noting that if European history could not be understood by studying England, France, or Germany alone, then “Greater America” could not be “adequately presented if confined to Brazil, or Chile, or Mexico, or Canada, or the United States.”¹

This effort to dilute nationalist historiography by depicting “American History as Western Hemisphere History” holds up well against the scholarly provincialism

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¹ Herbert E. Bolton, “AHA Presidential Address: The Epic of Greater America,” December 28, 1932, *American Historical Review* 38, no. 3 (April 1933): 448–474, http://www.historians.org/info/aha_history/hebolton.htm; Lewis Hanke, ed., *Do the Americas Have a Common History? A Critique of the Bolton Theory* (New York, 1964).

of Bolton's day. Yet his belief that the Western Hemisphere shared a unity of republican and anticolonial experiences and, by implication, interests led him to posit a homologous relationship between the nations of Greater America and those of Greater Europe that did not exist. America was different from half-monarchical, largely illiberal, balance-of-power Europe. More importantly, the United States' emergence as a new kind of hegemon, able to project its power and influence free from the burdens of direct territorial or administrative rule, prevented Bolton, and many who followed, from seeing a more useful comparison: between the United States' relationship with Latin America and Europe's with its colonial possessions. As a result, more recently, as intellectual historians (including Jennifer Pitts and Andrew Fitzmaurice in this *AHR* Forum) have considered the links between liberalism and empire, the United States and its dealings with Latin America have largely been ignored.

In all the debates over what is and is not distinct about the United States—in terms of national identity, political institutions, domestic history, and foreign policy—little attention has been paid to one variable that can, at least in relation to its global ascendance, unambiguously be called unique: its relationship with Latin America.² “South America will be to North America,” the *North American Review* wrote in 1821, “what Asia and Africa are to Europe.”³ Not quite. Other liberal capitalist world powers—France, Holland, and Great Britain—tended, at their apex, to rule over culturally and religiously distinct peoples in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The settlers who colonized North America, by contrast, looked to Iberian America not as an epistemic “other” but as a competitor in a fight to define a set of nominally shared but actually contested ideas and political forms: Christianity, republicanism, liberalism, democracy, sovereignty, rights, and above all the very idea of America. After the republican revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the relationship between the United States and the new nations of Spanish America developed a contentious ideological and legal intimacy—an ongoing “immanent critique”—unmatched by other comparable hegemon-periphery relations, especially one that would jump scale from the regional to the global level. England's relation to its “Celtic fringe,” especially to Ireland and Scotland, produced a somewhat similar dynamic that gave form and content, in terms of law, justifying ideologies, and administration, to the British Empire.⁴ But in the Americas, extended space (“a hemisphere to itself,” as Thomas Jefferson once put it) and time (running from Elizabethan anti-Hispanism of the seventeenth century to the neoliberal Washington Consensus of the twentieth) allowed the rivalry to play out on an unprecedented scale.

² Michael Kammen, “The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration,” *American Quarterly* 45, no. 1 (March 1993): 1–43; Sean Wilentz, “Against Exceptionalism: Class Consciousness and the American Labor Movement, 1790–1920,” *International Labor and Working Class History* 26 (Fall 1984): 1–24; Ian Tyrrell, “American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History,” *American Historical Review* 96, no. 4 (October 1991): 1031–1055; Eric Foner, “Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?” *History Workshop Journal* 17 (Spring 1984): 57–80.

³ Edward Everett, review of Gregorio Funes, *Ensayo de la historia civil del Paraguay, Buenos-Ayres, y Tucuman*, *North American Review* 12 (1821): 432–443, here 435. For Everett's authorship of this review, see Arthur P. Whitaker, *The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800–1830* (Baltimore 1941), 334.

⁴ Cf. David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 2000).

Out of this antagonism emerged a normative ideal of republican America. The origins and endurance of the United States' sense of moral purpose, distinct from the utilitarian, positive-law expositions of international diplomacy that took shape in nineteenth-century Europe, have long been the subject of scholarly inquiry. In 1820, Jefferson imagined a future when "our strength will permit us to give the law of our hemisphere," marked by "the meridian of the mid-Atlantic," which would serve as "the line of demarcation between war and peace, on this side of which no act of hostility should be committed, and the lion and the lamb lie down in peace together."⁵ Rarely, however, have scholars considered that it was South and Central America that would give substance to Jefferson's vision, through the elaboration of what the region's legal theorists and statesmen would by the early twentieth century come to call American international law—a remarkable body of jurisprudence made even more so by the way it is overlooked by intellectual historians concerned with charting out the transnational origins of liberal multilateralism.⁶

Independence leaders and jurists in the new Spanish-American nations (Brazil remained tied to Portugal through the transference of the monarchy to Rio de Janeiro and therefore did not become a republic until 1889) also believed that the Americas represented a rejuvenating world-historical force. But over time, there emerged a growing divergence over how to define the two constitutive elements of this moral and political power: individual rights and sovereignty. Put crudely, Spanish Americans and Brazilians came to hold individual rights relative to the establishment of the public common good and territorial sovereignty as absolute. In the United States, the terms were reversed; U.S. politicians defined individual rights as inherent and inalienable, and qualified state sovereignty on responsible public administration that could protect those rights.

The distinction between these related but antagonistic rights traditions is intentionally schematic. The evolution of the political culture of the United States comprises, of course, "multiple traditions"—some egalitarian, others not, some individualizing, others hierarchal—with each influenced by a diverse array of social and intellectual sources.⁷ Many of these traditions, *à la* Bolton, can be found throughout the Americas, North, Central, and South, and include artisan and workingmen's associations, trade unions, urban life, civic republican sentiment, abolitionism, migration, Christian and secular reform movements, family and gender relations, labor regimes, and "ascriptive forms" of racial and national identity.⁸ One source of national policy that is specific, at least in its degree of importance, to the United States—nineteenth-century western settlement and land entitlements—highlights

⁵ *The Jeffersonian Cyclopedia: A Comprehensive Collection of the Views of Thomas Jefferson Classified and Arranged in Alphabetical Order under Nine Thousand Titles Relating to Government, Politics, Law, Education, Political Economy, Finance, Science, Art, Literature, Religious Freedom, Morals, Etc.* (New York, 1900), 699.

⁶ See Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York, 2007); Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton, N.J., 2006); Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, 2010). But see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 2006), especially 49–68, for an appreciation of the innovation of Latin American nationalism.

⁷ Rogers Smith, "Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America," *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (1993): 549–566.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 550.

the generative tension between ideology and practice: the “free-born sons of America,” as Andrew Jackson described the American ideal in his 1812 war cry, owed their existence to a strong, structuring, and increasingly militarized state.⁹ Similarly, many of the Latin American jurists who in the late nineteenth century would weave together diverse legal arguments into an overarching theory of absolute sovereignty—used to contest what was described as an expansionist, Indian-killing, warmongering United States—were citizens of governments doing the exact same thing. The region’s most prominent liberal legal theorists were from countries—Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico—then consolidating control over their own hinterlands, engaged in wars to subdue or exterminate remaining Native American groups. These nations elaborated their own “anti-imperialist imperialism,” a civilizing mission that, by providing a rhetorically favorable contrast with U.S. Indian policy, helped divert attention away from their own violence against native peoples, such as the Yaqui and Apache in northern Mexico or the Mapuche in Patagonia.¹⁰ It turns out that the United States’ “imperial anticolonialism,” to use William Appleman Williams’s description of the nation’s motivational creed, was not so unique. But over time, this deflection produced very distinct ways of reconciling what Pitts, Fitzmaurice, and other scholars have identified as the elemental tension within liberalism between universalism and difference.¹¹

The argument that the United States was able to displace through expansion the problems that slavery and inequality presented to republican virtue and universalism is not new.¹² But placing it in the broader perspective of Greater America—that is, considered in relation to other republican and liberal traditions in the Americas—allows for reconsideration. The region that would eventually become known as Latin America also had to reconcile race and class to republicanism/liberalism.¹³ In contrast to the United States, however, its independence leaders and theorists inherited a colonial system of legal and theological thought that consciously organized “difference,” understood primarily in racial and class terms, into administrative and

⁹ Laura Jensen, *Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins of American Social Policy* (Cambridge, 2003). For another use of the term “free-born sons of America,” to help white Missourians, “upon whose birth the genius of liberty smiled,” resist the tyranny of federal efforts to restrict slavery, see Jennifer Louise Turner, “From Savagery to Slavery: Upper Louisiana and the American Nation” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 2008), 315; quotation by Senator Freeman Walker of Georgia, January 18, 1820, in U.S. Senate, *Annals of Congress*, 16th Cong., 1st sess., 175.

¹⁰ Tracy Devine Guzmán, “Our Indians in Our America: Anti-Imperialist Imperialism and the Construction of Brazilian Modernity,” *Latin American Research Review* 45, no. 3 (2010): 35–62.

¹¹ Uday Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago, 1999); Sankar Muthu, *Enlightenment against Empire* (Princeton, N.J., 2003).

¹² See William Appleman Williams, *The Contours of American History* (1961; repr., New York, 2011); Michael Paul Rogin, *Fathers and Children: Andrew Jackson and the Subjugation of the American Indian* (New York, 1975). Louis Hartz did not base his arguments concerning the primacy of Lockean liberalism in the U.S. on race violence, but did think it “obvious that the violence in the external elimination of the Indian permitted a heightened degree of peace within the American community”; Hartz, *The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia* (New York, 1964), 95.

¹³ Historians distinguish between republicanism and liberalism, particularly related to formulations of the “common good.” For the sake of highlighting the comparison I am drawing between U.S. and Latin American political culture, this essay will follow scholars who stress their overlap and similarities. See Daniel Walker Howe, *Making the American Self: Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln* (New York, 2009), 10–13; Stephen Macedo, *Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism* (Princeton, N.J., 1987).

juridical structures. And unlike the United States, these new nations at their inception had to deal with the rights and interests of other nations at their borders. As a result, the region's intellectuals, jurists, and politicians were confronted with the problem of difference both within and without their new nation-states. In response, they bridged the chasm separating their universalizing ideal of "America" from their territorial fundamentalism by laying out the legal foundation of multilateral cooperation. Based on principles of non-aggression, international arbitration, and economic justice, they developed a sovereignty–social rights complex, as I call it, that would revolutionize the interstate system.

Latin America's success in helping to socialize hemispheric liberalism and diplomacy success was short-lived. It was, nonetheless, consequential, for it allowed Washington to develop ways to project its authority and influence in a new interstate system defined not by empires but by nominally free and sovereign nations. This served the United States well, for although its expansionist–individual rights complex, as it could be described, was effective in propelling territorial enlargement and accumulating capital in the nineteenth century, it was too volatile a nationalism to underpin the kind of global power it would become in the twentieth century. One historical moment that focuses the distinction between these two rights complexes is the post–World War I Paris Peace Conference and, especially, debates that took place before and after the conference over the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. That 1823 doctrine is often presented as a succinct statement of U.S. interests, interpreted over the years to justify successive interventions in Latin America: Europe, keep out. But a closer look reveals irreconcilable assumptions embedded in the injunction. There was a tension between, on the one hand, the particular interests of an ascending world power and, on the other, a justification of policy based on universal New World moralism. "Few persons can define it," wrote the doctrine's pre-eminent historian, Dexter Perkins, "but that does not matter. One does not have to analyze in order to believe."¹⁴ Even Woodrow Wilson, on the stump after the Versailles Conference to sell the League of Nations to the U.S. public, admitted that "while . . . in Paris" he had attempted to pin down the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, but to no avail. "I will confide to you in confidence," he said, "that when I tried to define it I found that it escaped analysis."¹⁵ The same has been said about American exceptionalism, and in both instances what has been missing from a fuller consideration is Latin America.

SPANISH-AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE LEADERS and intellectuals came to stress to a greater extent, compared with the social minima of U.S. political thought, the active role of the state in promoting virtuous citizenship. Simón Bolívar, as Anthony Pagden writes, appreciated the vitality of the kind of civil society that drove the federal expansion of the United States but did not believe that the conditions for

¹⁴ Quoted in Jay Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York, 2011), 243.

¹⁵ Woodrow Wilson, *Addresses of President Wilson* (Washington, D.C., 1919), 170.

it existed in Spanish America.¹⁶ After centuries of colonialism that had left the region divided between a subjugated majority and an oligarchic elite, it would take more than the unleashing of individual interest to generate republican virtue. It would take a strong executive presiding over a moral state that would “make men good, and consequently happy.” The goal of constituted societies was, Bolívar wrote, to produce “the greatest possible sum of happiness, the greatest social security, and the highest degree of political stability.”¹⁷ There was a kind of republican Thomism on display in many of the region’s post-independence constitutions, a mix of ideas drawn from classical republicanism, Catholic monism, particularly the theology associated with Saint Thomas Aquinas, and more modern influences, including the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Benjamin Constant, and Thomas Hobbes.¹⁸ These intellectual traditions downplayed the separation between private interests and the public good and discouraged the idea, central to the Lockeanism prominent in the United States, that the individual pursuit of the former would generate the latter.

Whatever the philosophical origins of this distinction between Anglo and Hispanic republicanism, it was deeply rooted in the social history that distinguished British from Spanish colonialism in the Americas as related to the subjugation of Native Americans and Africans. Under Spanish rule, the genocide of Native Americans was frontloaded; the violence of the conquest, which within a century resulted in a demographic collapse of upwards of 90 percent of the pre-Columbian populations—by some estimates, tens of millions of people—forced a revitalization of rational natural-law theory. Even as this catastrophe was taking place, Spanish polemicists, jurists, and theologians, notably Bartolomé de las Casas, Francisco de Vitoria, and the scholars affiliated with the Universidad de Salamanca, questioned previous divine justifications, developed over centuries against Islam and initially applied to the conquest of the New World, to make war, dispossess, enslave, and rule. Historians still parse whether the “law of nations” that emerged out of this debate was based on positive or natural law, but the questions raised—concerning the equality of human beings, the source of individual rights, the nature of political sovereignty—set the terms of what would become international law.¹⁹ Vitoria, in particular, raised the bar of universalism high when, as Annabel Brett writes, he defined the law of nations as “a law neither between individual men, nor between sovereign states, but between all human beings as forming one community: ‘The whole world, which is in a sense a commonwealth, has the power to enact laws which are just and convenient to all men; and these make up the law of nations.’”²⁰

But this emerging “juridical unity,” in Brett’s words, evolved alongside a colonial

¹⁶ Anthony Pagden, *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination: Studies in European and Spanish-American Social and Political Theory, 1513–1830* (New Haven, Conn., 1998), 133–153.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 146.

¹⁸ Cf. Glen Dealy, “Prolegomena on the Spanish American Political Tradition,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 48, no. 1 (February 1968): 37–58; David Bushnell and Lester D. Langley, eds., *Simón Bolívar: Essays on the Life and Legacy of the Liberator* (Lanham, Md., 2008).

¹⁹ Annabel S. Brett, *Changes of State: Nature and the Limits of the City in Early Modern Natural Law* (Princeton, N.J., 2011), 13.

²⁰ *Ibid.* See also James Brown Scott, *The Spanish Origin of International Law: Francisco de Vitoria and His Law of Nations* (Oxford, 1934); Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge, 2005); Robert A. Williams, Jr., *The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest* (New York, 1992).

state that consciously justified itself through the administration of difference, creating a corporate hierarchy that assigned distinct obligations and privileges to specific groups, understood largely, though not exclusively, in racial terms. There was a great disparity in the administrative reach of the early Habsburg and then later Bourbon imperial states, yet from the very inception of Spanish colonialism, Native Americans, and then African slaves, *qua* Native Americans and African slaves, played key roles in the construction of Hispanic modernity. Coerced Indians and enslaved Africans were of course essential to the extraction of silver and gold, in effect the primary producers of one of the world's first truly universal standards. They were also the focal point in the creation of a bureaucratic, legal, philosophical, and religious system that, however much it was based on brute exploitation, was forced for more than three centuries to deal with difference. The tension was sustaining, creating absorptive bureaucratic channels of redress. But it was ultimately unsustainable: colonial universalism could be subdivided only so many times by a potentially infinite list of legal and vernacular caste identities—*mestizo*, *pardo*, *moreno*, *negro*, *de color*, *mulato*, *amarillo*, *trigueño*, *negro*, *jabao*, *indio*, *prieto*, *zambo*, *quinterón*, *tentenelaire*, *saltapatrás*, *tercerón*, *cuarterón*, *negro libre*, *negro pardo*, *negro ladino*, *negro bozal*, *negro criollo*, and so on—before dissolving into meaninglessness.

This history yielded, by the end of the eighteenth century, a republicanism that was more inclusive than its counterpart in the United States, in the sense that its advocates were products of a colonial regime that for centuries had openly acknowledged the problem that racial difference posed to its universalism; and also more activist, in that they envisioned a strong state as needed to transcend that regime. There existed a large distance between the broad expressions of humanism and equality that found their way into independence constitutions, many of which abolished distinctions based on race, and the reality of ongoing exploitation. Debates about how best to turn Indians and Africans into citizens, or how to end slavery, were often hypocritical and premised on cultural erasure. After independence, race-based hierarchies, primarily enforced through economics, politics, and gender ideologies, continued. Notions of progress, honor, and hygiene were also used to exclude large numbers of Native Americans, peoples of African descent, and women from the protections and rights afforded to citizens. In many countries, an activist understanding of republican virtue gave way in the late nineteenth century to authoritarian liberalism or positivism, which tilted decidedly more to progress and order than to liberty and equality, a forebear of twentieth-century civilian and military dictatorships.

But unlike the rigid, formally exclusive racialism that came to reign in the United States, race thinking in Latin America could produce powerful countervailing democratic movements and ideologies, often manifested in the collective militancy that the region has become famous for: from the prolonged, violent wars of independence, fought by armies made up of peasants, manumitted slaves, and free people of color, to the radical anti-racism of Cuba's late-nineteenth-century thirty-year war against Spain, on to the Mexican Revolution and its celebration of the *mestizo* as a national archetype.²¹ In the nineteenth century, mobilization could express itself in

²¹ Ada Ferrer, *Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868–1898* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1999); Peter Blanchard, *Under the Flags of Freedom: Slave Soldiers and the Wars of Independence in Spanish*

the idiom of what social historians of Mexico, Peru, Guatemala, Colombia, and elsewhere in Latin America call “popular liberalism” or “popular republicanism.”²² In the twentieth, it took the form of agrarianism, populism, nationalism, and different forms of socialism.

In Latin America, it was not primarily the extension of market relations and wage labor that brought forth the sense of self and self-interest that elsewhere is identified as underwriting liberalism. The extreme concentrations of economic and political power that stoked the pessimism of Bolívar were real; the spread of export capitalism led in many areas to a retrenchment and fortification of extra-economic hierarchy and privilege. In a number of countries, well after the formal abolition of slavery, generalized forms of coerced labor based on debt and vagrancy laws existed into the twentieth century. It was, rather, intense conflict that often drove forward the liberalization of society—and, in turn, the socialization of liberalism.²³

Latin America in the twentieth century would become famous for its revolutionaries; less acknowledged is the region’s contribution to global social democracy, with its jurists and politicians codifying both in country-specific constitutions and in international charters a slate of economic rights. The 1917 Mexican constitution was the world’s first fully conceived social-democratic charter, predating similar documents in Europe and India, enshrining the right to organize unions, the right to work, a minimum wage, equal pay for men and women, welfare, education, and health care. In subsequent years, similar rights were reaffirmed in the constitutions of nearly all Latin American nations, and in 1948 by the United Nations. Cuba, Chile, and the Organization of American States provided drafts for the final version of the UN Declaration of Human Rights. The Jesuit-educated Chilean socialist (and lifelong friend of Salvador Allende) Hernán Santa Cruz, who worked with Eleanor Roosevelt on the declaration’s drafting committee, was the most forceful advocate for including in the declaration the right to work, to organize labor unions, to enjoy rest, leisure time, and adequate pay, and to have access to food, clothing, housing, health care, and education. The Dominican Republic insisted on treating men and women as equals, and Mexico had the phrase “without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion” inserted into the declaration’s guarantee of the “right to marry.”²⁴

South America (Pittsburgh, 2008). See also Blanchard, “Pan Americanism and Slavery in the Era of Latin American Independence,” in David Sheinin, ed., *Beyond the Ideal: Pan Americanism in Inter-American Affairs* (Westport, Conn., 2000), 9–18, for a survey of abolition and citizenship in the early decades of Spanish-American independence.

²² Cf. James E. Sanders, *Contentious Republicans: Popular Politics, Race, and Class in Nineteenth-Century Colombia* (Durham, N.C., 2004); and Florencia E. Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley, Calif., 1995).

²³ See Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago, 2004), for an argument that emphasizes mass collective politics, rather than the spread of commercial society, as an important venue of individuation in Latin America. Cf. Charles W. Bergquist, *Labor and the Course of American Democracy: US History in Latin American Perspective* (London, 1996).

²⁴ In 1948, the same year Mexico added this clause to the “right to marry” section of the Universal Declaration, the California Supreme Court struck down an anti-miscegenation law that had prevented Andrea Pérez, the U.S.-born daughter of Mexican migrants considered white, and Sylvester Davis, an African American man, from marrying. See Mark Brilliant, *The Color of America Has Changed: How Racial Diversity Shaped Civil Rights Reform in California, 1941–1978* (Oxford, 2010), 106–114. Cf. Paolo G. Carozza, “From Conquest to Constitutions: Retrieving a Latin American Tradition of the Idea of Human Rights,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (May 2003): 281–313; Mary Ann Glendon, *A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (New York, 2001).

Central to the achievement of these social rights was the consolidation of a definition of property according to its public utility. Like the more activist, state-centered republicanism to which it was related, what Latin American jurists would by the 1960s commonly call the “social function of property” could be traced to both older, colonial Catholic notions of a just society and more recent expressions of nineteenth-century positivism.²⁵ As such, the ideal enjoyed widespread support across the political spectrum. The ability of the state to regulate property was seen by politicians of all stripes as necessary to create a modern nation, needed either to capture surplus value in order to distribute a “social wage” in the form of health care, education, and social security, or to intervene more actively in the economy, enacting agrarian reform, nationalizing industry, and taxing certain sectors, so as to stimulate manufacturing and industry. As with social rights more generally, the idea was elaborated first and most fully in Mexico’s 1917 constitution, in Article 27, which stated that “all land and water within national territory is originally owned by the nation, which has the right to transfer this ownership to individuals.” By 1980, the constitutions of Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, El Salvador, Venezuela, Paraguay, Honduras, Haiti, Panama, and Bolivia, among other countries, limited property rights according to their “social function,” as did Nicaragua’s Sandinista charter of 1987. So too did Guatemala’s 1945 constitution (but not the 1956 edition adopted after the 1954 CIA coup). Even Chile’s new 1980 charter, ratified by the government of Augusto Pinochet and supposedly modeled on the principles set forth in Friedrich von Hayek’s 1960 *Constitution for Liberty*, identified property as a social utility and assigned to the state “absolute dominion” over the nation’s hydrocarbon and mineral wealth.

IN ANGLO NORTH AMERICA, AN ALMOST exact opposite history unfolded. Native Americans themselves were *relatively* peripheral to the Anglo colonial project, at least as compared with the foundational role they played in Spanish colonialism.²⁶ Thus, the kinds of moral debates that took place following the Spanish conquest were avoided. Periodic conflict against Native Americans was justified by, and helped further define, legal arguments concerning “just war.” Episodes of extreme violence, including the near- and total extermination of specific indigenous groups, often did provoke outrage and calls for reform, such as John Eliot’s passionate outcry against the “mass enslavement” of the Algonquin.²⁷ Yet the repression of Native Americans under

²⁵ Charles Johnson, “Two Mexicos,” *Atlantic Monthly* 126 (1920): 703–709, provides a summary of the conflict that this article provoked in the United States. He writes: “the old legal doctrine of the Crown’s title to all the land has been rephrased in Article 27, to meet modern Republican conditions” (704). See Stephen Haber, Armando Razo, and Noel Maurer, *The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876–1929* (Cambridge, 2003), 1, for the creation of a more modern, though “selectively enforced,” property rights regime during Mexico’s long liberal dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911), which the 1917 constitution largely abolished.

²⁶ I am not arguing that Native Americans were not economically, politically, or ideologically important to Anglo colonialism; for the distinction I am suggesting, compare Steve J. Stern’s *Peru’s Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640* (Madison, Wis., 1993) to Richard White’s *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge, 1991).

²⁷ See Jill Lepore, *The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York, 1998), 158–167, for how early colonial war reshaped international norms.

British rule did not prompt the kind of wholesale legal and philosophical reflection that it did in Spain.

In fact, as Andrew Fitzmaurice has argued, the English quietly but deliberately defined their colonial project against that reflection.²⁸ In 1607–1608, the Council of the Virginia Company debated whether to issue a document to justify their actions in the New World. Records reveal a keen appreciation of the problems that Salamanca's "Casuists" and "Confessors" had (once they rejected treating Native Americans as "Naturally slaues") with applying natural-law doctrine to justify both sovereignty and property. Spanish logic, they felt, was "indeterminable" and "incoherent," and after "50 yeares," the Spanish king's "fryars" could reasonably justify political authority, but not the dispossession of Native American property. The Virginia Council therefore opted to avoid the question altogether: aware that they would be held "not only comparatiuely to be as good as ye Spaniards . . . but absolutely to be good agaynst ye Naturall people," members of the council decided that it would be "better to abstayne from this vnnecessary way of prouication, and reserue ourselues to ye defensiuie part."²⁹ Here, then, is a remarkably clear example of how imperial competition generated a slippery form of universalism, one that, in contrast to Spanish colonialism, denies, consciously at first but then habitually, its own contradictions. "Let the divines of Salamanca," wrote the council three years later, "discusse that question how the possessor of the west Indies first destroyed, and then instructed."³⁰

Hypocritical, inconsistent, and ineffectual in stemming abuse, Spanish "Casuists," along with their republican successors, nonetheless laid the groundwork for a universalism that acknowledged the problem of difference, which in the twentieth century seeded Latin America's strong social-democratic tradition. Their late-coming Anglo counterparts put in place something quite different. Fitzmaurice has noted how the evolution of the primal deflection of the concerns of the Salamanca School resulted in an almost perfect inversion of the "moral force" of natural-law theory, with English philosophers and colonists using it not to temper dispossession but to justify it. "Rather than recognizing that Indians lived in civil society," Fitzmaurice writes, the English "needed to start describing Native Americans as devoid of society, closer in this respect to animals than to humans."³¹ The liberal tradition that emerged from these justifications was complex and had many different political ex-

²⁸ Andrew Fitzmaurice, "Moral Uncertainty in the Dispossession of Native Americans," in Peter C. Mancall, ed., *The Atlantic World and Virginia, 1550–1624* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2007), 399. See also Anthony Pagden, "The Savage Critic: Some European Images of the Primitive," *Yearbook of English Studies* 13 (1983): 32–45, for how English ideas of natural rights were formed in relation to depictions of the Spanish conquest of Mexico. Comparative historians of the colonial Americas have recently identified "ambivalence," rather than simple "Hispanophobia," as the organizing principle of the Black Legend. See Eric Griffin, "The Specter of Spain in John Smith's Colonial Writing," in John Wood Sweet and Robert Appelbaum, eds., *Envisioning an English Empire: Jamestown and the Making of the North Atlantic World* (Philadelphia, 2005), 111–134; Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, *Puritan Conquistadors: Iberianizing the Atlantic, 1550–1700* (Stanford, Calif., 2006); J. H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1830* (New Haven, Conn., 2006); Ken MacMillan, *Sovereignty and Possession in the English New World: The Legal Foundations of Empire, 1576–1640* (Cambridge, 2006).

²⁹ The Thomas Jefferson Papers, Series 8: Virginia Records Manuscripts, 1606–1737, ed. Susan Myra Kingsbury, Records of the Virginia Company, 1606–1626, vol. III: Miscellaneous Records, "A Justification for Planting Virginia," 2–3, <http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mtj.mtjbib026605>. See also Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire*, 93.

³⁰ Griffin, "The Specter of Spain in John Smith's Colonial Writing," 126.

³¹ Fitzmaurice, "Moral Uncertainty in the Dispossession of Native Americans," 399.

pressions, but at least one strong current of it came by the mid-nineteenth century to link rights to individualism, individualism to freedom, freedom to expansion, and expansion to war and dispossession.³²

In the centuries that followed the Council of the Virginia Company debate, Anglo colonialists and then republicans continued the tradition of defining their political ideas in relation to Spanish America. By the 1820s, the region's prolonged wars of independence were providing an aging generation of founding fathers a chance to reflect on the meaning of their own revolution. Some were generous in making the comparison.³³ In 1826, for example, James Madison wrote that he thought the United States could learn from "regions south of us," particularly as they addressed the problems of having "inferior tribes adjoining a white population." If Spanish Americans achieved success in instituting "comprehended" citizenship, it might provide answers for how the United States could deal with its own "baffling" racial problems: "the black race within our bosom" and "the red on our borders."³⁴ Others, such as Edward Everett, a professor of Greek literature at Harvard and a Unitarian pastor, were less ecumenical. In an 1821 essay, he took the opportunity provided by a Spanish-American request for help against Spain to abstract the United States from the rest of the Americas, defining the U.S. against the region's "corrupt and mixed race of various shades and sorts." Spanish America, for Everett, reflected back what was singular about the United States. Its feudal institutions, seignories, and population divided into a "wealthy aristocracy and a needy peasantry" had more in common with Europe than with the United States, and its seemingly interminable, property- and people-destroying revolutions offered a close-to-home warning of the risks of a republicanism taken too far, a dangerous migration of the ideas of the French Revolution to New World soil. "Before any good omen is drawn from the analogy of our revolution," Everett wrote, decades before the idea of American exceptionalism was formulated and over a century before the phrase itself was coined, it must be remembered that "political liberty . . . is distinct from social liberty." If one did not have the latter—by which he meant a constituted civil society of free, rights-bearing individuals, which characterized British America even before its break from the metropolis—then "the question of independence of a foreign crown is one of little moment."³⁵

BOUND UP WITH THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP and rights was the question of sovereignty. The United States was born expanding, a fact that its early leaders and intellectuals

³² Throughout the nineteenth century, ongoing expropriation of Native American property contributed to the "Americanization of the law of real property," as legal scholar Howard Berman writes in his discussion of the Marshall Court's key *Fletcher v. Peck* (1810) and *Johnson v. McIntosh* (1823) decisions; Berman, "The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early History of the United States," *Buffalo Law Review* 27 (Fall 1978): 637–667. See also Stuart Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier* (Cambridge, 2005), 152; Tim Alan Garrison, *The Legal Ideology of Removal: The Southern Judiciary and the Sovereignty of Native American Nations* (Athens, Ga., 2009), 94; Patrick Griffin, *American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier* (New York, 2007).

³³ Caitlin Fitz, "Our Sister Republics: The United States in an Age of American Revolutions" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 2010), charts the evolution of popular perceptions of Spanish-American independence in the U.S., from celebratory to suspicious.

³⁴ *Letters and Other Writings of James Madison*, 4 vols. (New York, 1884), vol. 3: 1816–1828, 516.

³⁵ Everett, review of *Ensayo de la historia civil del Paraguay, Buenos-Ayres, y Tucuman*, 435.

were fully aware of and theorized. Lockean notions of dominion justified the drive into the “wild woods and uncultivated waste” of the West and consolidated notions of property rights, while Madisonian ideas of federal expansion were offered as a way to dilute the factional passions that arise from a civil society founded on those property rights.³⁶ Native Americans, of course, bore the brunt of this push west, but the growing body of case law concerning their sovereignty offered legal principles too contradictory and inconsistent to be translated into diplomatic norms. It was Spain and Spanish America, fully recognized despite their oft-commented-on shortcomings as political societies, that taught the United States how to be, legally speaking, in the world. Territorial expansion into Spanish Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and Mexico (and projected expansion into the Caribbean) produced, as the historian Brian Loveman has detailed, a set of diplomatic justifications, legal arguments, and military strategies that continue to define U.S. foreign policy to this day.³⁷

In *Empire's Workshop*, I argued for Latin America's importance in shaping the ideas, tactics, and constituencies of the United States' two great twentieth-century governing coalitions, the New Deal under FDR and the New Right under Ronald Reagan.³⁸ The argument could be extended back even further into the nineteenth century. President James Monroe's 1823 declaration that all of the Americas were off limits to European intervention was the first of many instances when debates about Spanish America, and the actions resulting from those debates, allowed a reconciliation of competing sectional interests and ideas concerning domestic and foreign policy. As the culmination of Henry Clay's “American System”—a broad, tariff-based vision of how the Western Hemisphere should be organized, with a developing U.S. economy at its center, counterpoised against Great Britain—the Monroe Doctrine helped synthesize positions as diverse as those represented by Clay, John Quincy Adams, and James Monroe.

In reaction, the rising Jacksonians built on the kind of race-based exceptionalism expressed by Everett to attack Clay and his American System; the extended congressional debate over whether the United States should attend Simón Bolívar's 1826 Panama Conference, which Adams, Clay, and others saw as an opportunity to put the system into place, allowed many of the pro-slavery future founders of Jackson's Democratic Party to focus their criticism and build their coalition. In particular, the conference's proposed agenda—which included the establishment of diplomatic re-

³⁶ Intellectual historians continue to debate the degree to which Locke's original writings justified or questioned empire. Earlier scholarship stressed the former; while more recent thinking corrects some overstatements, the justification for dispossession and colonization remains strong in his writings. See James Tully, *An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts* (Cambridge, 1993). A revision by David Armitage, “John Locke: Theorist of Empire?,” will appear in Sankar Muthu, ed., *Empire and Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge, forthcoming August 2012). The application of interpretations of Lockean ideas was less ambiguous. For instance, the Connecticut reverend John Bulkley based his 1726 argument in favor of indigenous dispossession “entirely on John Locke”; Tully, *An Approach to Political Philosophy*, 166. As late as 1868, Bulkley, as proxy for Locke, was being cited in debates over how to define property law in New York's constitution. See *Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York, Held in 1867 and 1868 in the City of Albany*, 5 vols. (Albany, N.Y., 1868), 5: 3446. See Cass R. Sunstein, “The Enlarged Republic—Then and Now,” *New York Review of Books*, March 26, 2009, for Madisonian ideas of federal expansion.

³⁷ Brian Loveman, *No Higher Law: American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere since 1776* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2010).

³⁸ Greg Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York, 2005).

lations with Haiti and “consideration of the means to be adopted for the entire abolition of the African slave trade”—tightened the loose associations in the minds of pro-slavery politicians between Spanish-American independence (fought by armies made up of a considerable number of people of color), the Haitian Revolution, and abolition.³⁹ As Jay Sexton has written, members of this “nascent Jacksonian coalition” (among them three men—Jackson, Martin Van Buren, and James Polk—who would go on to win the presidency) used the debate to exploit “racist conceptions of Latin Americans as a means of bringing together their constituencies in the North and South.”⁴⁰ Where Clay and Thomas Jefferson before him had begun to speak of a single, unified “America,” with shared interests different from those of old Europe, these early Jacksonians, according to Sexton’s close reading of the congressional minutes, began to stress, not for the first time but with particular weight, *South America* as distinct from *North*. This slicing of America in two made it into Webster’s 1828 *American Dictionary*, which divorced north from south at the Darien Gap in Panama, and took place, it should be noted, decades before Spanish Americans began to talk of “two Americas,” one “Latin,” the other “Anglo-Saxon.”⁴¹

Spanish America did more than provide ideological focus for the new Jacksonian coalition. It also provided land—through the annexation of Texas and territory seized after the war with Mexico—for the push west, which not only deferred the crisis of slavery but allowed for a satisfaction of demands generated by the potentially volatile mix of natural law, civic republicanism, and an expanded franchise. Following the Mexican-American War, the United States’ exemplary exceptionalism—the idea that the republic could serve as a model to be emulated but would largely restrain itself from imposing that model on other nations—began to transform into what might be called actionable exceptionalism, that is, direct intervention to remake the politics and economics of other nations.⁴²

But expansion also accelerated the sectional crisis, and the run-up to the Civil War is the one period in which Latin America could not reconcile the United States: the Confederacy looked south to build an “empire of slavery,” while many people of color and white abolitionists took inspiration from Spanish America, where countries such as Chile, Colombia, and Mexico had ended slavery decades earlier.⁴³ After the Civil War, Spanish America had begun to be seen by many as a place to naturally extend southern reconstruction, to build the “New Latin America” along with the “New South.” And so Mexico, in the decades after Appomattox, became, as the historian John Mason Hart has argued, Washington’s and New York’s first sustained effort to restructure a nation’s economy and politics along liberal capitalist lines, an

³⁹ “Mission to the Congress at Panama,” in *American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States*, pt. 1, vol. 5 (Washington, D.C., 1858), 860.

⁴⁰ Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine*, 80.

⁴¹ Aims McGuinness, “Searching for ‘Latin America’: Race and Sovereignty in the Americas in the 1850s,” in Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson, and Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, eds., *Race and Nation in Modern Latin America* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2003), 97–102.

⁴² Merle Curti, “Young America,” *American Historical Review* 32, no. 1 (October 1926): 34–55.

⁴³ Robert E. May, *The Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire, 1854–1861* (Baton Rouge, La., 1973). For Mexico as an imagined and real site of freedom for free people of color in New Orleans, see Mary Niall Mitchell, *Raising Freedom’s Child: Black Children and Visions of the Future after Slavery* (New York, 2008); and Sarah Cornell, “Citizens of Nowhere: Fugitive Slaves in Mexico, 1833–1862,” in Barbara Krauthamer, ed., *Unshackled Spaces: Fugitives from Slavery and Maroon Communities in the Americas* (New Haven, Conn., forthcoming).



FIGURE 1: An unknown photographer rendered this allegory of a free Cuba reconciling North and South. Ca. 1898.

endeavor that would continue after 1898 in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Panama.⁴⁴

In the drive west, Native Americans were often cast as “children,” incapable of forming the rational political society that justified both sovereignty and dominion.⁴⁵ After the frontier closed and the trope of maturity/immaturity that had long been

⁴⁴ John Mason Hart, *Empire and Revolution: The Americans in Mexico since the Civil War* (Berkeley, Calif., 2002).

⁴⁵ Rogin, *Fathers and Children*.

imposed on these supposedly stateless, property-less peoples was no longer made vital by war, Latin American nations became the new irresponsibles.⁴⁶ Prior to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, for instance, one of Woodrow Wilson's experts in the Latin American Division of the State Department drafted a classification schema that seemed to have been inspired directly by John Locke's *Second Treatise of Government*. Using his experience dealing with Latin America, he ranked countries "as mature, immature or criminal" and came up with a series of tests "to determine whether they are yet ready to be allowed to conduct their own affairs in a world to be governed by reason." "How many Cubas are there?" the document wondered.⁴⁷

Embedded in such questions is the principle that only a morally responsible nation could be sovereign. What was judged moral changed according to the circumstance: at times it meant the ability to exercise effective control of a population and territory; at other times it meant democratic or procedural legitimacy—with the best way to protect foreign private property serving as the variable determining which of these two standards Washington applied. But in either case, what counted was that the United States reserved the right, often invoking its own sense of exceptionalism, to be the judge.

In marked contrast, Spanish-American republics were conceived into confederation, nations among nations, confirmed at the time of independence by a general acceptance of colonial administrative borders as the limits of the new republics. In a series of post-independence treaties, conferences, constitutions, and declarations, regional diplomats and jurists revitalized the doctrine of *uti possidetis*, or "as you possess," which under Roman law had referred to the control of territory at the end of a conflict. They were not the first to apply the standard to the process of decolonization; the United States had done so earlier, during its revolution, in an effort to reach a settlement with Great Britain. Yet it was in South and Central America, where foreign ministries throughout the nineteenth century repeatedly invoked what they had taken to calling "uti possidetis of 1810" to insist that no part of the Americas lacked sovereignty, that the "principle developed into a rule."⁴⁸

Despite these legal affirmations, much of the region was in fact outside of administrative control (including large swaths of the Amazon, the coastal islands, Patagonia, and northern Mexico), and border lines were vague and contested; valuable resources such as rubber and oil were found on one side or the other, leading to more than a century of episodic conflict and occasional full-scale wars, from the 1825 confrontation between Brazil and Argentina over Montevideo to the Chaco War

⁴⁶ Cf. Mary A. Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915–1940* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2001), 89–130, here 333.

⁴⁷ Mark T. Gilderhus, *Pan American Visions: Woodrow Wilson in the Western Hemisphere, 1913–1921* (Tucson, Ariz., 1986), 134–135.

⁴⁸ Mikulas Fabry, *Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States since 1776* (New York, 2010), 66. For an example of "uti possidetis of 1810," see *Informe del secretario de relaciones exteriores de la Nueva Granada al congreso constitucional de 1850* (Bogota, 1850), 5–19. For the importance of Latin America in reviving *uti possidetis*, see Fabry, *Recognizing States*, 66–77; Suzanne Lalonde, *Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World: The Role of "Uti Possidetis"* (Montreal, 2002), 24–60; Sharon Korman, *The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice* (New York, 1996), 234–245. For the complexities of notions and applications of "imperial sovereignty," see Lauren A. Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900* (Cambridge, 2009). See also Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic* (Princeton, N.J., 2006).

between Paraguay and Bolivia in the 1930s. Yet every diplomatic effort to resolve these disputes appealed to *uti possidetis*, which solidified the legitimacy of the principle and led to its acceptance despite conflicting interpretations.⁴⁹ (Brazil tended to emphasize *uti possidetis de facto*, which stressed effective possession; Spanish America defended *uti possidetis juris*, which invested legitimate possession in Spanish royal decrees.) By the early 1900s, the doctrine had become the foundational principle of what Latin American jurists called American international law, based on the ideal of non-aggression, interdependence, and solidarity rather than on realpolitik rivalry.

In the United States, an ideal of individual natural rights immediately harmonized with and reinforced a definition of sovereignty conditioned on the protection of those rights. In Latin America, the link between a “common good” notion of citizenship and a “common good” vision of territorial sovereignty was at first formalistic, more of an analogy than mutually constitutive: individuals, like nations, exist not in isolation but in harmony, bound together as equals by mutual needs and limitations. But over time there developed a more dependent relationship. Efforts to institutionalize social rights entailed state intervention in the economy, which often provoked domestic and foreign interests to retaliate. Coups executed or supported by the U.S. in Guatemala in 1954, Brazil in 1964, and Chile in 1973 are among the most well-known examples of such retaliation, though there are many other examples; between 1898 and 1994, according to historian John Coatsworth, Washington had “intervened successfully to change governments in Latin America a total of at least 41 times.”⁵⁰ In turn, nationalists, social democrats, populists, and socialists came to see social rights and sovereignty as mutually constitutive. It would take a fortified executive with control over both the physical and the social space of the nation to realize the Bolivarian dream of achieving the “greatest possible sum of happiness, the greatest social security.” Theorists of American international law, such as the Chilean Alejandro Alvarez, were aware that there was a tension between their almost positive-law ideal of territorial fundamentalism and their normative notions of justice: what right did an unjust ruler or aggressive nation have to sovereignty?⁵¹ As an answer, they held up multilateral arbitration as a solution. Still, confronted with an expansionist United States, and plagued by their own interstate skirmishes, Latin American nations by the early twentieth century had deepened their commitment to *soberanía absoluta*.

⁴⁹ “I am going to insist one more time,” an Ecuadorian envoy told his Peruvian counterpart at an 1889 Quito conference convened to determine the Amazonian border separating their two countries, “that the only line that can possibly serve as a basis for agreement is that of *uti possidetis* of 1810.” Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Peru, *Memorias y documentos diplomáticos sobre la negociación del tratado de límites entre Perú y el Ecuador* (Lima, 1892), 389.

⁵⁰ John H. Coatsworth, “United States Interventions: What For?” *ReVista*, Spring/Summer 2005, 6–9, <http://www.drclas.harvard.edu/publications/revistaonline/spring-summer-2005/united-states-interventions>.

⁵¹ Alvarez (1868–1960) was a Chilean delegate to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague and the League of Nations; a judge on the International Court of Justice; the author of hundreds of essays, many of them on pan-Americanism; and the founder of the American Institute of International Law, affiliated with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Despite his analytical sophistication and range of interests, very little has been written on him. But see *Leiden Journal of International Law* 19, no. 4 (2006), a special issue devoted to his work and legacy.

THE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES–LATIN AMERICAN relations in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries is often narrated as a litany of outrages, of U.S. freebooting, interventions, counterinsurgencies, gunboat and dollar diplomacy, and pre–Cold War coups in Texas, Nicaragua, Mexico, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, the Caribbean, and Central America. But threading through this narrative of territorial and economic expansion is a slow yet steady revision of the fundamentals of international law.

A good place to chart this revision is in the competing interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine. Rarely discussed in all the considerable scholarship on the doctrine is the fact that Spanish-American diplomats and politicians did not object to Monroe's declaration that all of the Americas were off limits to European intervention. Rather, they understood its prohibition against recolonization as an affiliate and affirmation of their antecedent *uti possidetis*, and moved to incorporate the Monroe Doctrine into their emerging multilateral framework.⁵² In 1824, Colombia invoked the doctrine, asking for Washington's help against what it feared were designs on its territory by France and Spain. A year later, both Brazil and Argentina appealed to the doctrine in their dispute over Montevideo, with Argentina pointing out that since Brazil was still tied to Portugal, it therefore constituted a European power. And in 1826, Simón Bolívar invited the United States to attend the Panama Congress to "proclaim" the Monroe Doctrine and discuss how to abolish slavery.⁵³

Washington refused these specific requests for aid and resisted all efforts by Spanish Americans to define the Monroe Doctrine as international law or to read the doctrine normatively, in a way, say, that would imply the end of American slavery or suggest a revision in diplomatic protocol.⁵⁴ Through the nineteenth and the early twentieth century, presidents, secretaries of state, and politicians would broaden its interpretation in purely nationalist terms, to justify territorial expansion and unilateral policing, most famously by Theodore Roosevelt with his 1904 corollary to the doctrine.⁵⁵ American exceptionalism aside, when it came to retaining the great-power right to intervene in the affairs of other nations to protect its interests, Washington envoys steadily deflected calls for the United States to conform to what Latin Americans understood to be a specific "American" jurisprudence: after Latin Americans at the 1889 inaugural Pan-American Conference passed a number of resolutions attempting to standardize their ideas, including the adoption of arbitration to settle regional disputes as a "principle of American International Law," the U.S.

⁵² For instance, a Colombian diplomat, considering the history of border disputes between his country and Peru, wrote in 1893 that "what is called, for example, the Monroe Doctrine, is simply the application of the principle of national sovereignty to the republics of this continent." Mariano H. Cornejo and Felipe de Osma, *Memoria del Perú en el arbitraje sobre sus límites con el Ecuador*, vol. 7: *Apéndices á la Memoria del Perú* (Madrid, 1906), 121.

⁵³ Alejandro Alvarez, *The Monroe Doctrine: Its Importance in the International Life of the States of the New World* (New York, 1924), 13.

⁵⁴ Richard Drinnon, in "The Metaphysics of Empire-Building: American Imperialism in the Age of Jefferson and Monroe," *Massachusetts Review* 16, no. 4 (Autumn 1975): 666–688, describes one of Washington's first invocations of the Monroe Doctrine, to prevent Mexico from working with John Dunn Hunter to settle displaced Indians in what was then northern Mexico, leading to the creation of the opposite of an asylum of indigenous refugees: a slaver's utopia, Texas.

⁵⁵ See the special issue dedicated to interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine and U.S.–Latin American relations, *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Eighth Annual Meeting Held at Washington, D. C., April 22–25, 1914* (Washington, D.C., 1914).

delegate to the conference, William Henry Trescot, explicitly rejected the term. "There can," he said, "no more be an American international law than there can be an English, a German, or a Prussian international law"; there was just "international law," whose "old and settled meaning" was defined "long before any of the now established American nations had an independent existence."⁵⁶ When U.S. statesmen did call for the Monroe Doctrine to be entered into the "admitted canon of international law," it was to confirm their regional authority and right to intervene, as Secretary of State James Olney did in 1895 in the case of a dispute between Venezuela and Great Britain.⁵⁷

Rather than seize on the growing rift between the United States and Latin America as a marker of hypocrisy or betrayal of the "American" idea, as many Latin American intellectuals did, the Chilean jurist Alejandro Alvarez in 1909 developed an almost Hegelian argument that the roots of twentieth-century multilateralism are to be found in Monroe's nineteenth-century unilateralism.⁵⁸ Alvarez believed the Monroe Doctrine to be evolving in two distinct but dialectally related realms: *politics*, where Washington's preponderant power allowed it to interpret the doctrine according to its own interests; and *law*, which, while initially dependent on U.S. unilateralism, would eventually transcend that dependence and become international jurisprudence:

On recognizing that solidarity of interests as to the continuance of their independence existed between the states of America, Monroe did not do more than serve as an echo of the sentiment that then predominated in all the republics. Therefore, whether the famous message of 1823 had been written or not, the principles contained in it would always have been sustained in the New World. In this sense, it may be said, and not without a certain amount of truth, that the Monroe Doctrine is neither *doctrine* nor of *Monroe*.

But that which constitutes its undeniable merit and makes it famous, is that such an exact synthetic statement of the destinies of America should have been given thus early in the period of emancipation, by a people whose increasing power would not permit the rest of the world to regard that statement as merely utopian. It was this that enabled America, from the very beginning of independent life, to give to its foreign policies a safe norm instead of the vague

⁵⁶ "Minority Report on Claims and Diplomatic Intervention from the Delegate from the United States," in International American Conference, *Reports and Recommendations Concerning a Uniform Code of International Law*, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., Sen. Ex. Doc. 183 (Washington, D.C., 1890), 26, in *Reports and Recommendations, Together with the Messages of the President and the Letters of the Secretary of State Transmitting the Same to Congress* (Washington, 1890); *Reports of Committees and Discussions Thereon*, vol. 2: *Patents and Trade-Marks; Extradition of Criminals; International American Monetary Union; International American Bank; International Law; Arbitration; Miscellaneous Business of the Conference* (Washington, D.C., 1890), 1079.

⁵⁷ Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898* (1963; repr., Ithaca, N.Y., 1998), 242–283. Likewise, Argentine minister of foreign relations Luis María Drago's 1902 citation of the doctrine to protest European interventions to collect debt did become international law, albeit with U.S. reservations. The "Drago Doctrine" was based largely on the earlier work of Drago's colleague Carlos Calvo, as elaborated in his *Derecho internacional teórico y práctico de Europa y América* (Paris, 1868); see Arthur P. Whitaker, *The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1954), 86–107.

⁵⁸ For discussions of how U.S. expansion generated among Latin American intellectuals a more oppositional notion of "America," a "Latin" America contrasted against a "Saxon" one, see Greg Grandin, "Your Americanism and Mine: Americanism and Anti-Americanism in the Americas," *American Historical Review* 111, no. 4 (October 2006): 1042–1066.

ideas then existent on these subjects. In this sense the Monroe Doctrine is *doctrine* and is of *Monroe*.⁵⁹

The hard shell of U.S. unilateralism, Alvarez thought, had served its historical purpose and was now opening to reveal the ideal of multilateralism, which had, by the early twentieth century, gestated from the “merely utopian” into a global necessity.

Prior to the Paris Peace Talks in 1919, Woodrow Wilson often admitted that norms and practices worked out within the Western Hemisphere—non-aggression, arbitration, territorial sovereignty, mutual defense, and the belief that common interests (as opposed to “competitions of power”) should form the basis of international agreement—were the source of what he hoped to accomplish at war’s end.⁶⁰ Latin America’s importance in generating Wilsonian liberal internationalism is likewise revealed by the incorporation of the spirit of the doctrine of *uti possidetis* into Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant, which pledged nations to “respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.” And the League itself—Wilson’s famous fourteenth point—was directly modeled on the Pan American conferences that the United States had been participating in since 1889 and Spanish Americans had been convening since Bolívar’s 1826 Panama Congress. “Bolívar dreamt of a League of Nations,” Brazilian ambassador Manoel de Oliveira Lima said in 1920. “We call it a dream because the hour had not yet struck for the realization of such a lofty ideal—but when he attempted it, he did not relegate even Haiti to a black place.”⁶¹

The League’s final charter did include a specific reference to the Monroe Doctrine. Yet this had less to do with “universalizing” the doctrine than with trying to appease nationalists in the Senate, who were afraid of losing hemispheric privilege.⁶² Article 21, which affirmed the continued validity of “regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine,” did not win over opponents in the U.S. And it alienated supporters in Latin America, who read the article as investing the U.S. with “mandatory” powers within the Western Hemisphere, similar to those granted to Great Britain in the Middle East.⁶³ During the conference, many of the Latin American delegates had grown resentful of their marginalization. “I find that they have been left alone too much,” observed one State Department official, “and have been having Latin American Conferences among themselves,” an unwittingly apt description of dip-

⁵⁹ Alejandro Alvarez, “Latin America and International Law,” *American Journal of International Law* 3, no. 2 (April 1909): 269–353, here 311–312; emphasis in the original.

⁶⁰ Gilderhus, *Pan American Visions*, 134–136.

⁶¹ M. de Oliveira Lima, “Pan Americanism and the League of Nations,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 4, no. 2 (May 1921): 239–247, here 241.

⁶² See Charles Howard Ellis, *The Origin, Structure and Working of the League of Nations* (Boston, 1929), 92; Charles Cheney Hyde, *International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1922), 1: 97; John H. Latané, “The League of Nations and the Monroe Doctrine,” in *The World’s Work: A History of Our Time*, vol. 37: November, 1918 to April, 1919 (New York, 1919), 441–444.

⁶³ This is also how London read Article 21, believing that it would invest Washington with responsibility to enforce debt collection and ensure property rights in Latin America on behalf of Europeans; see The National Archives, Kew, UK [hereafter TNA], “The Monroe Doctrine and the League of Nations,” Foreign Office [hereafter FO] 608/174. Mexico did not join the League until 1931, with the condition that “she has never recognized the regional understanding mentioned in Article 21”; Philip Marshall Brown, “Mexico and the Monroe Doctrine,” *American Journal of International Law* 26, no. 1 (1932): 117–121, here 117.

lomats and jurists representing a region of the world that indeed held one international meeting after another leading to the elaboration of American international law. They continued the conversation in subsequent Pan-American conferences, insisting that Washington concede what now had become the overriding demand of that law: an acknowledgment of the absolute right of sovereignty of all nations. In practical terms, this meant one thing: Washington—then bogged down in a series of occupations and counterinsurgencies in the Caribbean—would have to renounce the right of intervention, which it refused to do through the 1920s.

IF THE DISCUSSION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE at the Paris Peace Conference signaled the limits of Washington's willingness to recognize territorial sovereignty as a universal norm—especially when it came to Latin America—the arrival of an uninvited guest, Alberto Pani from Mexico, highlighted its steadfast hostility to the region's emerging social-rights regime. Pani was sent by Mexican president Venustiano Carranza to observe the peace conference, even though Mexico, neutral during the war and thought to be pro-German, had not been invited to the talks. Relations between Mexico and the United States were bad because of the latter's heavy-handed interventions in the former's affairs, including a number of military incursions. They had grown worse with the ratification of Mexico's 1917 constitution. The evolution of U.S. property law is complex; by the early twentieth century, it had also incorporated the idea that public interest could mitigate inalienable rights. Yet many legal theorists who accepted this principle still viewed the Mexican constitution as heretical for explicitly stating that private property is a privilege conceded by the government. And many feared that the Mexican constitution, if legitimated, would lead other countries to a similar conclusion, thus threatening "certain hard to define but nevertheless well-internationally recognized vested individual rights."⁶⁴

The Carranza government in Paris, through its agent Pani and his team of lawyers, defended Mexico against the claims of the National Association for the Protection of American Rights in Mexico and the Oil Producers' Association, which were representing U.S. interests that had suffered destroyed or expropriated property during the revolution. These owner associations were applying pressure on Wilson to demand the revocation of the constitution and to take action that would lead to the overthrow of Carranza.⁶⁵ "We want Pan-Americanism and the Monroe Doctrine," said one hardliner, apparently attuned to the divergent meanings of rights and

⁶⁴ Raoul E. Desvernine, *Claims against Mexico: A Brief Study of the International Law Applicable to Claims of Citizens of the United States and Other Countries for Losses Sustained in Mexico during the Revolution of the Last Decade* (New York, 1921), 51–53; Ira Jewell Williams, "Confiscation of Private Property of Foreigners under Color of a Changed Constitution," *American Bar Association Journal* 5, no. 1 (1919): 152–162.

⁶⁵ Gilderhus, *Pan American Visions*, 146, 152–153. Back in Mexico, Carranza responded with a mix of concessions—postponing any serious attempt to implement Article 27 against U.S. oil and other economic interests—and rhetoric, strongly criticizing the inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine in the League's charter as a pretext for intervention and offering his own "Carranza Doctrine," which London's ambassador to Mexico, concerned with the loss of British property to the revolution, defined as a "desire to organize Latin-America in every way possible for opposition to American influence . . . a proposal to change diplomatic custom and practice entirely, declaring as its cardinal principle that no nation shall under any pretext for any reason interfere with the affairs of another"; TNA, FO 608/174, Folio 76: March 10, 1916.

sovereignty outlined above, “in its true meaning.”⁶⁶ But Carranza also went on the offensive. He instructed Pani to lobby the conference delegates to adopt the principle of absolute non-intervention and “the ideas of the new Mexican constitution” as international law.⁶⁷

That did not happen. But Mexico’s efforts do allow for an interpretation of the Paris Peace Conference outside the “Lenin vs. Wilson” rivalry, that is, as a conflict between Soviet Marxism and Wilsonian liberalism. By seizing U.S. land and oil but justifying the seizure not as a rejection of modern liberal notions of property rights but as their extension and fulfillment, Mexican revolutionaries in a way carried out a subtle and arguably more effective subversion of international law than did their Russian counterparts. Not only would other nations adopt the social rights enshrined in the Mexican constitution, but Article 27’s definition of property did migrate into Latin American law, serving as the central legal instrument of import-substitution developmentalism, of the kind associated with Raúl Prebisch and the UN’s Comisión Económica para América Latina.

The United States adamantly resisted Latin America’s sovereignty–social rights complex, until, facing strong regional opposition to its Caribbean-basin militarism and a shortfall of power caused by the contraction of the Great Depression, it didn’t. In retrospect, the extemporaneous agreement of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Cordell Hull, at the 1933 Montevideo Pan-American Conference to Latin American demands that Washington recognize the absolute sovereignty of American nations must be considered one of the most unambiguously successful foreign-policy initiatives the United States has ever undertaken. Facing militarists, fascists, and imperialists in Europe and Asia, Washington was able to use the goodwill generated by its renunciation of the right to intervention to regroup in Latin America.⁶⁸ Over time, what became known as the Good Neighbor Policy provided a blueprint for a revived globalism; it established in the Western Hemisphere what eventually became the four pillars of Washington’s postwar global diplomacy: an acceptance of national sovereignty; a way of managing that acceptance through a new array of multilateral institutions and agreements; the recognition of social rights, including the right of developing countries to regulate foreign investment and property (which gave Washington an important moral weapon in the looming Cold War); and a regional alliance system.⁶⁹

LATIN AMERICA’S CONTAINMENT OF THE United States’ intervention–individual rights complex was historically consequential, leading to the creation of a multilateral order that allowed Washington to accumulate unprecedented global power. But it was

⁶⁶ Gilderhus, *Pan American Visions*, 147.

⁶⁷ See “To Oppose Alien Rights in Mexico,” *New York Times*, January 23, 1919. A British diplomat summed up the mission of Pani and his “large staff” in Paris as to argue “(1) that no nation shall interfere with another country, even where property rights of its own citizens are concerned (2) That a Govt. by altering its constitution can legally take over any properties of which it has need”; TNA, FO 9479/127, Folio 163; February 24, 1919. The U.S. Senate responded with an investigation and report calling on Washington to intervene to protect U.S. property, including U.S.-owned oil fields. Merrill Rippey, *Oil and the Mexican Revolution* (Leiden, 1972), 157–158.

⁶⁸ Lloyd C. Gardner, *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy* (New York, 1964).

⁶⁹ See Grandin, *Empire’s Workshop*, 33–39, for a fuller discussion.

often begrudged. During his 1950 tour of Latin America, George Kennan, the man most closely associated with the policy more commonly understood as “containment,” that is, of the Soviet Union, described the taxes that U.S. oil companies paid to the Venezuelan government as “a sort of ransom to the theory of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention which we had consented to adopt.”⁷⁰ And in retrospect, it was short-lived. By the 1980s, with the ascendance of the New Right to governance in the U.S., President Ronald Reagan was again invoking the Monroe Doctrine, in the words of that hardliner at the Versailles Conference, in “its true meaning,” in its most interventionist form.⁷¹ And just as Latin America played a central role in the consolidation of multilateralism, the region would be where it was first rolled back.

The United States had “intervened” in Latin American affairs through the whole of the Cold War, but it did so in a way that did not undercut the diplomatic principles of multilateralism. The CIA’s successful 1954 Guatemalan coup and its botched 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, for example, were covert and therefore violations of sovereignty. But they did not entail a direct legal challenge to the idea of sovereignty. In fact, these interventions confirmed the principle, formally, at least, since Washington sought and received the Organization of American States’ sanction to isolate Guatemala and Cuba diplomatically. The OAS likewise endorsed, with some dissent, Lyndon Baines Johnson’s 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic.

But starting in the 1980s, Reagan’s actions in Central America and the Caribbean did rewrite the terms of law and diplomacy. The war against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, for example, was largely meant to be secret. But in response to the 1986 International Court of Justice ruling that the United States must pay Nicaragua billions of dollars for mining its harbor and conducting an illegal war of aggression, Washington opted to withdraw from the court’s jurisdiction. Legal scholar Eric Posner argues that that was a “watershed moment” in the United States’ relationship with the international community, one that George W. Bush’s ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, cited as evidence for why the U.S. should not abide by other multilateral obligations.⁷²

The 1991 invasion of Panama was another turning point, described in 2009 by Thomas Pickering, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations at the time, as paving the way for 2003’s unilateral war in Iraq.⁷³ Like most military actions, this one, coming

⁷⁰ “Diary Notes of Trip to South America,” George F. Kennan Papers, Box 232, Folder 1, entry for February 28, 1950, Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.

⁷¹ Grandin, *Empire’s Workshop*, 121–158.

⁷² Eric A. Posner, “All Justice, Too, Is Local,” *New York Times*, December 30, 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/30/opinion/30posner.html>; John R. Bolton, “Courting Danger,” *National Interest*, Winter 1998–1999, <http://nationalinterest.org/article/courting-danger-633>; see also Anthony D’Amato, “Modifying U.S. Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court,” *American Journal of International Law* 79, no. 2 (April 1985): 385–405; and D’Amato, “Trashing Customary International Law,” *American Journal of International Law* 81, no. 1 (January 1987): 101–105. The 1983 invasion of Grenada was likewise an important step in expanding the scope of unilateralism. Throughout the Cold War, an ability to move back and forth between the OAS and the UN gave Washington room to maneuver regionally while still adhering to the principles of global multilateralism. But in 1983, confronted with an increasingly hostile OAS, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Reagan’s ambassador to the UN, opted for subdivision, citing treaty obligations to the minuscule Organization of Eastern Caribbean States to justify the landing of Marines in Grenada; Stuart Malawer, “Reagan’s Law and Foreign Policy, 1981–1987: The Reagan Corollary of International Law,” *Harvard International Law Journal* 29, no. 1 (1988): 85–109.

⁷³ *Foreign Policy*, December 18, 2009.

just over a month after the fall of the Berlin Wall, was justified by a hierarchy of rationales. But high on the list, and unique in its prominence, was the goal of installing democracy in Panama. It therefore had a transformative effect on international law, one that was immediately recognized by all Latin American nations, including close U.S. allies such as Augusto Pinochet's Chile.⁷⁴ The OAS, in an emergency session, opposed the invasion by a 20 to 1 vote. In response, Luigi Einaudi, the U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States, gave a speech that explicitly reclaimed for the United States the right to intervene in the affairs of another country, not just defensively, but because it deemed the quality of its sovereignty unworthy of recognition. "Today, we are . . . living in historic times: a time when a great principle is spreading across the world like wildfire. That principle, as we all know, is the revolutionary idea that people, not governments, are sovereign."⁷⁵

Concurrent with this dilution of the ideal of territorial sovereignty was an attempt to disentwine social and political rights. In the decade prior to the invasion of Panama, Reagan embraced the rhetoric of human rights in order to reinvest U.S. military power with moral authority. Yet this embrace came with an important caveat: "All too often," wrote Richard Allen, the president's national security advisor, in 1981, "we assume that everyone means the same thing by human rights." When the United States talked about human rights, Allen stated, it meant only the defense of "life, liberty, and property" and not "economic and social rights." The expansion of human rights into the social realm, he went on, constituted a "dilution and distortion of the original and proper meaning of human rights."⁷⁶ That same year, Elliott Abrams, who soon would be appointed Reagan's assistant secretary of state for human rights, drafted an influential memo, often cited as key in Reagan's efforts to define the Cold War as a righteous fight: after announcing that "our struggle is for political liberty" and in defense of "human rights," Abrams nonetheless felt that the latter expression was too tainted by issues related to economic justice. He suggested a rebranding: "We should move away from 'human rights' as a term, and begin to speak of 'individual rights,' 'political rights' and 'civil liberties.' We can move on a name change at another time."⁷⁷

⁷⁴ "U.S. Denounced by Nations Touchy about Intervention," *New York Times*, December 21, 1989.

⁷⁵ Luigi Einaudi, "Remarks to the Organization of American States," December 22, 1989, reprinted in U.S. Department of State, *Panama: A Just Cause* (Washington, D.C., 1990). By "historic times," Einaudi was referring to the fall of the Berlin Wall, which he used to justify weakening of the idea of absolute sovereignty. The Mexican writer Carlos Fuentes drew a different lesson from that event, writing that U.S. politicians "refuse to let go of their 'sphere of influence'—Central America and the Caribbean—claiming the right to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation and dictate the terms of that nation's political life. In other words: the process of perestroika underway in Europe is not matched by an American perestroika"; in Alberto Novoa, "The Last Word: Comments on the US Invasion of Panama," *Revista Envío* 103 (February 1990), <http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/2585>. Many legal theorists likewise disagreed with Einaudi's interpretation of history; see Alan Berman, "In Mitigation of Illegality: The U.S. Invasion of Panama," *Kentucky Law Journal* 79, no. 4 (1991): 735–797.

⁷⁶ Richard Allen, "For the Record," *Washington Post*, June 4, 1981.

⁷⁷ "Memo on Human Rights," in *Historic Documents of 1981* (Washington, D.C., 1982), 779–786, <http://library.cqpress.com/historicdocuments/hsdc81-0000110851>. For Abrams's authorship of this memo, which was circulated out of the office of Deputy Secretary of State William Clark and Under Secretary for Management Richard Kennedy after Reagan's first nomination for this position, Ernest W. Lefever, was rejected by the Senate, see Aryeh Neier, *Taking Liberties: Four Decades in the Struggle*

THERE IS A STRAY COMMENT IN Herbert Bolton's "Greater America" address in which he credits the Mexican Revolution with giving rise to "rights for the common man," a reference to its guarantees of health care, welfare, education, land, and collective bargaining. Bolton's tribute captured what he believed to be the historical direction of Greater America, toward a conceptualization of democracy as social democracy. "Mexico for Mexicans, rights for the common man, and education for the common people," he said, are "slogans which sound familiar to Anglo-Americans."⁷⁸ In the years that followed, New Deal domestic politics and diplomacy did align the United States as closely as it ever would be to Latin American conceptions of social citizenship and sovereignty. Subsequent history, however, beginning during the late Cold War and quickening afterward, has been marked not by convergence but by divergence, suggesting that Bolton's remarks should be read not as an illustration of a movement toward unity, as he meant them, but as an opening to thinking about the history of Greater America as an ideological contest, an ongoing rivalry to define its exceptionalism.

for *Human Rights* (New York, 2003), 185–186; and Kathryn Sikkink, *Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2004) 156–157.

⁷⁸ Bolton, "AHA Presidential Address: The Epic of Greater America."

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Empire and Legal Universalisms in the Eighteenth Century

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RECENT WORK ON EMPIRE IN THE HISTORY of political thought has been much concerned with the connections between various forms of moral universalism and projects of conquest. This work, especially on the “mutually constitutive” relationship between liberalism and empire, has asked: What sorts of universalism have accompanied imperial expansions, whether to justify them or to reflect critically on them?¹ Is moral universalism inherently imperial? What was it about nineteenth-century liberalism, in particular, that made it so hospitable to imperial ambitions?² Liberalism has all too often had a parochializing effect on the European imagination, thanks in large part to a linear view of progress that figured European civilization as the vanguard or the telos of world history, as at once unique and a model for the rest of the world. Even as it came to understand itself in global terms, then, Europe “diminished its own ethical possibilities.”³ Paradoxically, scientific and scholarly attention to global phenomena in the nineteenth century was in part driven by, and can be said to have contributed to, European parochialism, as Europe came into an understanding of itself as an entity with global reach and global significance, both because of its outsized power and because of the apparent uniqueness of European progress in human history. This process is particularly striking in the field of inter-

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¹ David Armitage, “John Locke, Carolina, and the *Two Treatises of Government*,” *Political Theory* 32, no. 5 (October 2004): 602.

² See, e.g., Uday Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago, 1999); Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford, 1999); Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton, N.J., 2005); Jeanne Morefield, *Covenants without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire* (Princeton, N.J., 2005); Karuna Mantena, *Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism* (Princeton, N.J., 2010); Brett Bowden, *The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea* (Chicago, 2009); Duncan Bell, ed., *Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge, 2007); and, for review essays, Andrew Sartori, “The British Empire and Its Liberal Mission,” *Journal of Modern History* 78, no. 3 (2006): 623–642; and Jennifer Pitts, “Political Theory of Empire and Imperialism,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 13, no. 1 (2010): 211–235.

³ Arjun Appadurai, “Trajectory and the Making of Europe” (talk given at the conference “After Europe: Postcolonial Knowledge in the Age of Globalization,” University of Chicago, March 12, 2010).

national law, which became an increasingly disciplinary, and self-consciously European, endeavor over the course of the nineteenth century, alongside the development of that parochial moral universalism.⁴

Until recently, the dominant narrative about the history and sources of international law has been one inherited from the nineteenth century. That story said that international law had its origins within Europe, above all between sovereign European states that viewed each other as free and equal.⁵ It saw a decisive moment in the Westphalia treaties, which, it said, above all set out to protect states' independence from intervention by outsiders.⁶ And, it concluded, this essentially European system gradually came to incorporate other states as they reached the appropriate "standard of civilization," or, as more recent language would have it, as they entered the state system or decolonized and became independent.⁷ That narrative largely ignored the global and imperial contexts and sources for international law—the profound preoccupation with imperial concerns by thinkers deemed foundational, such as Vitoria and Grotius; the influence of Roman legal concepts developed in the course of Roman imperial expansion; and the inter-imperial rivalries that contributed to so many of the decisive wars, treaties, and theories.⁸

Throughout the modern period, the law of nations and later international law

⁴ Martti Koskenniemi, *From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument* (1989; repr., Cambridge, 2005), 122–154; Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870–1960* (Cambridge, 2001); Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge, 2005); Casper Sylvest, *British Liberal Internationalism, 1880–1930: Making Progress?* (Manchester, 2010); Sylvest, "'Our Passion for Legality': International Law and Imperialism in Late Nineteenth-Century Britain," *Review of International Studies* 34, no. 3 (2008): 403–423; Jennifer Pitts, "Boundaries of Victorian International Law," in Bell, *Victorian Visions of Global Order*, 67–88.

⁵ E.g., John Westlake, *Chapters on the Principles of International Law* (Cambridge, 1894): "The society of states, having European civilisation, or the international society, is the most comprehensive form of society among men . . . States are its immediate, men its ultimate members" (78); Lassa Oppenheim, *International Law: A Treatise*, 2 vols. (1905; repr., London, 1912), 1: 3–11; Wilhelm G. Grewe, *The Epochs of International Law [Epochen der Völkerrechtsgeschichte]*, trans. Michael Byers (New York, 2000); J. W. Verzijl, *International Law in Historical Perspective*, 10 vols. (Leiden, 1968–1979); and see the critical commentary on this approach by W. P. Heere and J. P. S. Offerhaus in Heere and Offerhaus, eds., *International Law in Historical Perspective*, vol. 12 (Leiden, 1998), xxx; this final volume in the series was published after Verzijl's death.

⁶ For critiques of that traditional view, see Stéphane Beaulac, *The Power of Language in the Making of International Law: The Word Sovereignty in Bodin and Vattel and the Myth of Westphalia* (Leiden, 2004); and Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations* (London, 2003).

⁷ Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of "Civilization" in International Society* (Oxford, 1984); Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge, 1990).

⁸ On Vitoria, see Anthony Pagden, "Dispossessing the Barbarian: The Language of Spanish Thomism and the Debate over the Property Rights of the American Indians," in Pagden, ed., *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 1993), 79–98; Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law*, 13–31. On Grotius, see Edward Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics* (Cambridge, 2002); Peter Borschberg, "Hugo Grotius, East India Trade and the King of Johor," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 30, no. 2 (1999): 225–248; Martine Julia van Ittersum, *Profit and Principle: Hugo Grotius, Natural Rights Theories and the Rise of Dutch Power in the East Indies, 1595–1615* (Leiden, 2006); Eric Wilson, *The Savage Republic: "De Indis" of Hugo Grotius, Republicanism and Dutch Hegemony within the Early Modern World-System (C. 1600–1619)* (Leiden, 2008); Hans W. Blom, ed., *Property, Piracy and Punishment: Hugo Grotius on War and Booty in "De iure praedae"—Concepts and Contexts* (Leiden, 2009). For a discussion of the broader tradition, see Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*. See also C. H. Alexandrowicz, "Grotius and India," *Indian Year Book of International Affairs* 3 (1954): 357–367; Alexandrowicz, "Freitas versus Grotius," *British Year Book of International Law* 35 (1959): 162–182.

have been both distinctively European and also universalist in their aspirations.⁹ The project of creating an international order has long been commingled with that of European consolidation and informed by European exceptionalism, from Christendom's global project of conversion in mediæval and early modern Church doctrine, through eighteenth-century projects for perpetual peace, to contemporary theorizations of the European Union as a democratic model for a post-sovereign world.¹⁰ The Abbé de Saint-Pierre reported that he had initially conceived his project for perpetual peace as encompassing "all the Kingdoms of the World" but had concluded that "even though in following Ages most of the Sovereigns of Asia and Africa might desire to be receiv'd into the Union, yet this Prospect would seem so remote and so full of Difficulties, that it would cast an Air of Impossibility upon the whole Project." He projected that a Christian European union "would soon become the Arbiter of the Sovereigns" of "the Indies," who would place their faith in it when they recognized that its only interest was in mutually beneficial commerce and not in conquest.¹¹ Projects for European union have in this way long seen it as having a vocation both as a political archetype for the rest of the world and as an authoritative arbiter of the political legitimacy of extra-European states: a model for the future and a judge for the present. As Greg Grandin's essay in this forum suggests, the United States' own project of "exemplary exceptionalism" within its hemisphere in some ways mirrored the European project, though it was fraught with unusually "contentious ideological intimacy," as Latin American states countered U.S. ideals of republicanism, liberalism, sovereignty, and rights with their own competing accounts of the same ideals.

European thought about the law governing interactions among states and peoples—*ius gentium*, law of nations, international law—has thus always existed in a space of tension between the European and the universal. If the dominant register in which the tension was expressed shifted from the religious to the civilizational, these shared a basic narrative structure: Europe was, for the moment, uniquely in

⁹ Europeans, as Martti Koskenniemi has noted, have never "thought of Europe in merely local terms, but generalized it into a representative of the universal": Koskenniemi, "International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal," *European Journal of International Law* 16, no. 1 (2005): 113–124. On the "messianic teleology" of "much Western legal cosmopolitanism," as well as for the provocative claim that the law of nations and international law cannot be seen as a continuous tradition, see also Koskenniemi, "International Law and *Raison d'état*: Rethinking the Prehistory of International Law," in Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann, eds., *The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire* (Oxford, 2010), 297–339, here 297; and Koskenniemi, "Legal Cosmopolitanism: Tom Franck's Messianic World," *NYU Journal of International Law and Politics* 35, no. 2 (2003): 471–486.

¹⁰ Immanuel Kant's federation of republics is described in universal language but is often read as a project of European federation; Kant, "Toward Perpetual Peace," in Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge, 1999), 311–351 (describing a "federalism that should gradually extend over all states," 327). See also James Tully, "The Kantian Idea of Europe: Critical and Cosmopolitan Perspectives," in Anthony Pagden, ed., *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union* (Cambridge, 2002), 331–358. Jürgen Habermas regards the EU as an "exemplary case" of "democracy beyond the nation-state"; Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays*, ed. Max Pensky (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), 88; see also John P. McCormick, *Weber, Habermas, and Transformations of the European State: Constitutional, Social and Supranational Democracy* (Cambridge, 2007), 204.

¹¹ The work was published as he was serving as a French secretary during the Utrecht treaty negotiations. Charles-Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe* (Utrecht, 1713), xix–xxi; translation from *A Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe* (London, [1714]), viii–ix.

possession of universal moral and political truths. The discourses also coexisted and mingled: medieval canon law deploys tropes of civilizing as well as converting infidel barbarians or wild men, and international lawyers continued to insist into the early twentieth century on the distinctively Christian character of international law.¹² To be sure, throughout this long and complex history, critical and dissenting voices have called into question these narratives and imperatives, even during periods, such as the later nineteenth century, of remarkably deep agreement about Europe's distinctive moral and political authority, as Andrew Fitzmaurice's essay in this forum attests.

The late eighteenth century saw an unusual, perhaps unmatched, flourishing of critical approaches to the question of the scope of the European law of nations and the nature of legal relations between European and non-European states. The period stands out in the history of the law of nations as one of striking openness on the part of Europeans to the possibility of shared legal frameworks and mutual obligations between Christians and non-Christians, Europeans and non-Europeans. Legal and political thinkers exemplary of these critical approaches—Edmund Burke, the French orientalist Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron, and the great Admiralty Court judge William Scott, Lord Stowell—articulated a more inclusive and pluralistic understanding of the global legal order than the view that came to prevail. None was an opponent of imperial rule as such, but they envisaged a global legal order, or network of orders, as a constraint on the exercise and abuse of European states' power. They wrote during the decades framed by the Seven Years' War and the Napoleonic Wars: a period when European states were constructing imperial constitutions of global reach, and when states as well as other actors such as trading companies and pirates competed to defend their power and interests in the terms of newly extensive legal regimes.¹³ The perhaps obvious point should be stressed that the thinkers considered here were Europeans speaking to European audiences, often with limited knowledge of the extra-European societies, languages, and legal traditions they discussed.¹⁴ They drew, likewise, on the ambiguous status of the law of nations as putatively universal despite its heavily European history. But they did so with the aim of chastening European power through legal constraints and obliga-

¹² Robert Phillimore wrote that although international law is binding among "heathen" states, "Unquestionably, however, the obligations of International Law attach with greater precision, distinctness, and accuracy to Christian States in their commerce with each other"; Phillimore, *Commentaries upon International Law*, 4 vols. (London, 1871–1874), 1: 24. See also Oppenheim, *International Law*; Robert A. Williams, *The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest* (Oxford, 1990), 107; James Muldoon, *Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels: The Church and the Non-Christian World, 1250–1550* (Philadelphia, 1979), 19–22, 119–121.

¹³ See Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in the European Empires, 1400–1900* (Cambridge, 2010); Mary Sarah Bilder, *The Transatlantic Constitution: Colonial Legal Culture and the Empire* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, *Constituting Empire: New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664–1830* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2005).

¹⁴ Recent studies of related questions that transcend European sources include Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Explorations in Connected History: Mughals and Franks* (Oxford, 2004); Nabil Matar, *Turks, Moors, and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery* (New York, 1999); Matar, ed., *In the Lands of the Christians: Arabic Travel Writing in the Seventeenth Century* (London, 2003); Simon Schaffer et al., eds., *The Brokered World: Go-Betweens and Global Intelligence, 1770–1820* (Sagamore Beach, Mass., 2009); and Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York, 2007), on early-twentieth-century Ottoman and Japanese views.

tions, including asymmetrical constraints that Europeans should recognize as binding themselves even when they could not presume to use them to bind others.

IN ROMAN LAW, THE *IUS GENTIUM* REFERRED to the law common to all peoples; it supplied the basis for legal decisions involving non-Romans living under Roman government, in contrast to civil law, which applied exclusively to Roman citizens. The *ius gentium* was considered to be based on natural reason and so to be largely in accordance with natural law, with certain key exceptions such as slavery, which was forbidden by natural law but permitted by most societies and so by the *ius gentium*. Vitoria argued that the *ius gentium* should also be taken to be the *ius inter gentes*, the law governing relations among peoples. The term “international law” was one of Jeremy Bentham’s few successful neologisms, presented in his *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789) as a translation of *droit entre les gens*, which he saw as more apt than the ambiguous *droit des gens* or *ius gentium*.¹⁵

Despite the universalist connotations of a *ius gentium* based on natural law, medieval legal thought and practice had been structured by a notion of a unified *Christianitas* predicated on hostility to infidels, even within the more inclusive strand of thought that defended the legitimacy of infidels’ property and political power (two key aspects of *dominium*), following Thomas Aquinas and the canonist Sinibaldo Fieschi (Pope Innocent IV from 1243 to 1254).¹⁶ While Renaissance humanists styled Europe more politically as a *respublica christiana*, the figure of the infidel continued to serve as a unifying opponent for many thinkers in humanist as well as more strictly theological traditions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.¹⁷ The Protestant jurist Alberico Gentili, though he is generally thought to have rebuffed theological authority with his famous “*Silete theologi in munere alieno*” (“Theologians, mind your own business”), held that alliances with infidels are wrong precisely because they are

¹⁵ Peter Stein, *Roman Law in European History* (Cambridge, 1999), 94–95 (*ius gentium*), 12–13 (*ius civile*). See also Kingsbury and Straumann, *The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations*; David A. Lupher, *Romans in a New World: Classical Models in Sixteenth-Century Spanish America* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2003); Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, c. 1500–c. 1800* (New Haven, Conn., 1995). Hidemi Suganami, “A Note on the Origin of the Word ‘International,’” *British Journal of International Studies* 4, no. 3 (1978): 226–232; David Armitage, “Globalizing Jeremy Bentham,” *History of Political Thought* 32, no. 1 (2011): 63–82. Henry Sumner Maine noted that “the confusion between *ius gentium* or law common to all nations, and *international law*, is entirely modern,” as the Romans called the latter *ius fetiale* [*feciale*]; Maine, *Ancient Law* (London, 1870), 53.

¹⁶ Muldoon, *Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels*; the opposing view that infidel rule and property was invalid, associated with the canonist Hostiensis (Henry of Segusio, a student of Innocent IV), had waned by the end of the fourteenth century. On the idea of the *ius commune* as a system of norms linking all Christians (and the crisis of that idea in the fifteenth century), see Manlio Bellomo, *The Common Legal Past of Europe, 1000–1800*, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Washington, D.C., 1995). On Dominican understandings of *dominium*, see Annabel S. Brett, *Liberty, Right and Nature: Individual Rights in Later Scholastic Thought* (Cambridge, 1997).

¹⁷ Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*, 27–29; Giulio Vismara, *Impium foedus: Le origini della “respublica christiana”* (Milan, 1974); Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (1955; repr., New York, 2008); Mark W. Janis and Carolyn Evans, eds., *Religion and International Law* (Leiden, 1999). For debate about the usefulness of Tuck’s organizing distinction between theological and humanist traditions in early modern legal thought, see the essays in Kingsbury and Straumann, *The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations*.

infidels.¹⁸ Despite deep disagreements among medieval and early modern thinkers about Christianity's implications for law and temporal power, and about the degree to which Christendom could or should be internally united, there remained a widely shared commitment to a deep division in legal status between Christendom and its enemies.

That gulf in legal status remained plausible, if increasingly contested, into the early eighteenth century. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, for instance, combined a project of "universal jurisprudence" accessible to all minds with the project of unifying the *respublica christiana* against "the plague of Mohammedanism."¹⁹ Early-eighteenth-century treaties such as Utrecht (1713) continued to refer to the *respublica christiana*, even as this language was giving way to the language of European community.²⁰ At the same time, when the East India Company sought to defend its trade monopoly in the famous 1683 case *East India Company v. Sandys*, on the grounds that only an explicit royal charter could override the religious prohibition on commercial or military alliances with infidels, a lawyer for the independent English merchants fighting the monopoly rejected "this notion of Christians not to have commerce with infidels" as "a conceit absurd, monkish, fantastical and fanatical."²¹ In 1758, the influential Swiss jurist Emer de Vattel thought that he hardly needed to address the topic at all: a treatment of treaties with infidels, he wrote, "would be superfluous in our age. The law of nature alone regulates the treaties of nations: the difference of religion is a thing absolutely foreign to them. Different people treat with each other in quality of men, and not under the character of Christians, or of Musulmans."²² And while the older Christian-infidel fault line had retreated in legal

¹⁸ Noel Malcolm, "Alberico Gentili and the Ottomans," in Kingsbury and Straumann, *The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations*, 127–144; Malcolm's colloquial translation of the Latin is at 127. See also the other essays in that volume, as well as Benedict Kingsbury, ed., *Alberico Gentili e il mondo extraeuropeo: Atti del convegno, settima Giornata gentiliana, San Ginesio, 20 settembre 1997* (Milan, 2001); Kaius Tuori, "Alberico Gentili and the Criticism of Expansion in the Roman Empire: The Invader's Remorse," *Journal of the History of International Law* 11, no. 1 (2009): 205–219.

¹⁹ See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Mars Christianissimus," in Leibniz, *Political Writings*, ed. Patrick Riley, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1988), 121–145; and Leibniz, *Caesarinus Fürstenerius*, *ibid.*, 111–120. The phrase "peste de mahoméanisme" appears in "Réflexions sur la guerre" (1687); see Ian Almond, "Leibniz, Historicism, and the 'Plague of Islam,'" *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 39, no. 4 (2006): 463–483, which identifies a "general mellowing of Leibniz's attitude to Islam from the beginning of the 1690s"; see also Almond, *History of Islam in German Thought: From Leibniz to Nietzsche* (London, 2010).

²⁰ Andreas Osiander, *The States System of Europe, 1640–1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability* (Oxford, 1994), 110. See also Denys Hay, *Europe: The Emergence of an Idea* (Edinburgh, 1957); and for an astute reading of more localist and fragmentary accounts of Christendom/Europe in the 1590s (and the present), see Jane Pettegree, "Writing Christendom in the English Renaissance: A Reappraisal of Denys Hay's View of the Emergence of 'Europe,'" in Paul Gifford and Tessa Hauswedell, eds., *Europe and Its Others: Essays on Interperception and Identity* (New York, 2010), 39–56.

²¹ Thomas Bayly Howell, Thomas Jones Howell, William Cobbett, and David Jardine, eds., *Cobbett's Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes*, 34 vols. (London, 1809–1828), 10: 392. The lawyer appealed to the authority of Grotius and argued that "the Indians have a right to trade here, and we there, and this is a right natural and human, which the Christian faith does not alter." An important essay by Richard Tuck, "Alliances with Infidels in the European Imperial Expansion," will be included in Sankar Muthu, ed., *Empire and Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge, forthcoming August 2012).

²² Vattel, *Le droit des gens: Ou principes de la loi naturelle, appliquée à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains*, bk. 2, §161; all translations from Emer de Vattel, *The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury*, ed. Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore, trans. Thomas Nugent (London, 1797; repr., Indianapolis, 2008).

thought, the stark division between barbaric and civilized nations or “races” so characteristic of the nineteenth century had not yet become entrenched.

During the nineteenth century, legal and political thinkers increasingly argued that although international law was exclusively European in origin, their law was destined, thanks to Europe’s superior civilizational status, to be authoritative for all, and Europeans had the right to dictate the terms of legal interaction to backward, barbarous, or savage peoples.²³ The tension between the European and the universal in international law, that is, came to be resolved through a view of global legality as a European order writ large. The nineteenth-century position has tended to go by the name of positivism, among both its proponents and later historians, and to be contrasted with an earlier natural law universalism.²⁴ Some claimed that unlike natural lawyers, they were not engaged in a normative project at all. They were simply interested in recording and codifying actual state practice.²⁵ But their theories belied their self-description in at least two ways. First, they were not just recording state practices but selecting the practices they considered worthy as sources of international law (and doing so on the basis of a set of poorly defended cultural and normative assumptions). Thus treaties between European powers but not between Europeans and Asian powers were relevant sources; the others were explained away, for instance, as not properly reciprocal, and so not, strictly speaking, part of international legal practice. Second, they did have universalist aspirations: they saw the European order they were codifying as the basis for a future international order that would gradually be extended to or imposed on the rest of the world, in large part through colonial conquest.

Others, including the influential Victorian jurist Sir Travers Twiss, saw the law of nature as among the sources of the law of nations but further specified that the “Law of Nations, as distinguished from the Law of Nature, is a rule of international conduct [based on the practice of civilized states] . . . the observance of which is obligatory upon every Nation that claims to participate in the common advantages of . . . civilisation.”²⁶ Although Twiss acknowledged the long history of diplomatic agreements between Christian European powers and others, especially the Ottoman Empire, he regarded these as a separate legal universe from the European, civilized,

²³ See T. J. Lawrence’s formulation: “The area within which the law of nations operates is supposed to coincide with the area of civilization. To be received within it is to obtain a kind of international testimonial of good conduct and respectability; and when a state hitherto accounted barbarous desires admission, the leading powers settle the case upon its merits. In addition to the attainment of a certain, or rather an uncertain, amount of civilization, a state must have possession of a fixed territory before it can obtain the privilege of admission into the family of nations”; Lawrence, *The Principles of International Law* (London, 1895), 59. See also William Edward Hall, *A Treatise on International Law*, 5th ed., ed. J. B. Atlay (Oxford, 1904), 40; Henry Wheaton, *History of the Law of Nations in Europe and America: From the Earliest Times to the Treaty of Washington, 1842* (New York, 1845), 555.

²⁴ E.g., Hans-Ulrich Scupin, “History of the Law of Nations: 1815 to World War I,” in Rudolf Bernhardt, ed., *Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, 5 vols. (Amsterdam, 1981–), 2: 767–793; for skepticism about this narrative, see Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations*; Casper Sylvest, “International Law in Nineteenth-Century Britain,” *British Year Book of International Law* 75, no. 1 (2004): 9–70.

²⁵ E.g., Henry Wheaton, *Elements of International Law* (New York, 1845), 327.

²⁶ Travers Twiss, *The Law of Nations Considered as Independent Political Communities* (Oxford, 1884), xxxix. See also Andrew Fitzmaurice, “The Resilience of Natural Law in the Writings of Sir Travers Twiss,” in Ian Hall and Lisa Hill, eds., *British International Thinkers from Hobbes to Namier* (New York, 2009), 37–60; Fitzmaurice, “Liberalism and Empire in Nineteenth-Century International Law,” this issue; Sylvest, “‘Our Passion for Legality.’”

and presumptively universal law of nations. He argued that in contrast to the complex customary law underpinning “the system of Public Law, which has grown up amongst the Nations of Christendom,” “between Islam and Christendom, there is no common platform, even of the simplest kind, of consuetudinary law”; but he added that capitulations could be considered “the entire body of grants and treaties, which constitute a kind of international code between Christendom and Islam [which] has been the work of ten centuries to complete.”²⁷ As Andrew Fitzmaurice details in his essay in this forum, Twiss himself was prominently involved as an unofficial British delegate during the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, which carved up Africa among the European powers, as well as in providing legal justification for the Belgian king Leopold II’s conquest of the Congo and indeed writing a draft constitution for the Congo Free State. His “projection of his vision of European sovereignty upon Africa” and his view that the community of the law of nations did not include Africans or East Asian states, though it met with criticism from fellow members of the Institut du droit international such as Charles Salomon and Gaston Jèze, may be said to have prevailed.

Even before the most recent wave of scholarship on the intersection of law and empire, a powerful revision of the standard narrative emerged in the 1950s and 1960s in the work of the international lawyer Charles Henry Alexandrowicz. Alexandrowicz’s work had both historiographic and normative aims. He meant to set the historical record straight, from what he saw as its long Victorian detour, to show that international law both in theory and in practice had been far more inclusive than it was to become in the nineteenth century. And he sought to recover that greater inclusiveness as a means of combating “European egocentricity” in international law, with all its pernicious effects in the postcolonial period.²⁸ Alexandrowicz argued that for much of the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, Asian states or rulers were routinely respected as fully sovereign; treaties with them were equal and binding, and these treaties were regarded by European lawyers and scholars as evidence of their participation in the law of nations. For instance, the Maratha state, a formidable military power in northwest India, was, he held, “clearly considered a legal entity in the . . . law of nations and there is no doubt as to its membership in the Family of Nations and its capacity of dealing with other members on a footing of equality and of concluding treaties in the meaning of international law.”²⁹ Alexan-

²⁷ Twiss, *The Law of Nations Considered as Independent Political Communities*, 464–465. See also his report to the Institut de droit international arguing that it was not yet clear whether “Orientals are capable . . . to the same degree as Western peoples, of admitting a moral basis of reciprocity with other peoples who do not accept the same religious sanctions”; “Rapport de sir Travers Twiss,” *Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international* (Oxford Session of 1881) 5 (1882): 133; and see Pitts, “Boundaries of Victorian International Law,” 71–72.

²⁸ C. H. Alexandrowicz, *An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies (16th, 17th and 18th Centuries)* (Oxford, 1967), 2.

²⁹ He added that this picture could “be considered valid for the whole period of the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries”; C. H. Alexandrowicz, “The Afro-Asian World and the Law of Nations (Historical Aspects),” *Hague Recueil* 123, no. 1 (1968): 127–128. For a recent revival of the view that “In classical writings [e.g., Grotius, Wolff, Vattel] there is nothing to suggest that the law of nations applied differently to different nations,” see Alexander Orakhelashvili, “The Idea of European International Law,” *European Journal of International Law* 17, no. 2 (2006): 315–347. Orakhelashvili persuasively explores nineteenth-century international law’s support for an “ideology of colonialism,” but following Alexandrowicz he overstates the degree to which the law of nations was considered universal prior to the nineteenth century.

drowicz argued that this naturalist universalism was displaced by positivism beginning in the late eighteenth century. He saw authors such as D. H. L. von Ompteda and J. J. von Moser as intermediate figures, with Ompteda seeking to defend the law of nature in a kind of rearguard action against the encroaching positivist ideology, and Moser a representative of the latter whose work nonetheless shows that “The concept of universalism was . . . capable of holding a qualified position of its own in spite of adverse doctrinal developments.”³⁰

As compelling and as dauntingly erudite as Alexandrowicz’s argument is, it seems flawed in several respects. First, his distinction between natural law universalism and positivism is overdrawn, for theories of the law of nations have always contained elements of both: earlier so-called natural law theories relied on the practice of nations for the content of that law, and they often specified that they meant “civilized” nations. And even the self-declared positivists of the nineteenth century who eschewed natural law held on to claims of prospective universal validity for their positive law of nations. Second, he overstated the consensus in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe that Asian states were fellow members of an international legal community, for there was much greater doubt and disagreement on this question than his claims about natural law universalism suggest.

What, then, did Europeans think were the sources of the law of nations in this period between the waning of the Christian legal community and the rise of a so-called positivism based exclusively on European practice? How could one determine its content? Why, and for whom, was it authoritative, given that there is no world state? Was it indeed universal? The major sources for the law of nations, according to writers of eighteenth-century legal textbooks, were the great legal treatises (by Grotius, Wolff, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Vattel) that had introduced Roman law in place of theology and canon law as a primary source of legal principles.³¹ Other key sources were treaty collections and diplomatic memoirs and correspondence, which were thought to provide essential contextual information about the meaning and purposes of the treaties. Treaty-collecting was a growth industry in this period, particularly after the heroic compilation published by Jean Dumont in the 1720s.³²

The great treatises of the law of nations in this period tend to be written in resolutely universalist language. Christian Wolff described his conception of the *civitas*

³⁰ C. H. Alexandrowicz, “Doctrinal Aspects of the Universality of the Law of Nations,” *British Year Book of International Law* 37 (1961): 506–515; and see Alexandrowicz, *An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies*, 8–11, on the shift from naturalism to positivism. Ompteda wrote *Literatur des gesammten sowohl natürlichen als positiven Völkerrechts* (Regensburg, 1785); Moser wrote *Beiträge zu dem neuesten europäischen Völkerrecht in Kriegszeiten* (Tübingen, 1779–1781).

³¹ Benjamin Straumann, “The *Corpus iuris* as a Source of Law between Sovereigns in Alberico Gentili’s Thought,” in Kingsbury and Straumann, *The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations*, 101–123; and Straumann, “‘Ancient Caesarian Lawyers’ in a State of Nature: Roman Tradition and Natural Rights in Hugo Grotius’s *De iure praedae*,” *Political Theory* 34, no. 3 (2006): 328–350.

³² See, for instance, Charles François Lefèvre de La Maillardière, *Précis du droit des gens, de la guerre, de la paix, et des ambassades* (Paris, 1775), x (where La Maillardière calls himself the “bee gathering the purified sugar” from Grotius, Vattel, Barbeyrac, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and others); also Pierre Joseph Neyron, *Principes du droit des gens européen conventionnel et coutumier* (Brunswick, 1783), which cites, as sources of the “droit des gens européens,” treaties, treaty collections, memoirs and negotiations, systems of this law, and political journals. For treaty collections he cites Dumont’s *Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens* (Amsterdam, 1726–1731), as well as “les Capitulaires des Francs rassemblés par Balluze, Muratori, Du Chesne, Freher, Leibnitz pour les anciens Traités. Outre cela Rymer pour l’Angleterre, Leonard pour la France, Bertodano pour l’Espagne, Faber & Lungi pour L’Allemagne.”

maxima as encompassing “all nations,” and he held that because states are equal, none has the right to impose its own interpretation of natural law on another, so that while all nations have duties of mutual assistance to one another, states cannot compel “barbarous nations” to accept their assistance. His sinophilism, with its suggestion that “pagans and atheists could be just as moral in their daily lives as practicing Christians,” led to his expulsion from his post at the University of Halle. (Characteristically, Twiss would take Wolff’s *civitas maxima* to refer specifically, though “somewhat indistinctly,” to European nations, that is, to “an ‘Inner Circle’ of the more civilized nations.”)³³ Vattel, likewise, wrote of “the bonds of that universal society which nature has established among” all nations. He looked forward to the time when the principles of the law of nations would be adopted as state practice, and “the world would have the appearance of a large republic; men would live everywhere like brothers, and each individual be a citizen of the universe.”³⁴ And as we have seen, in keeping with the more general view by this time, he insisted that a nation’s religion was irrelevant to its legal standing: “the obligation of performing the offices of humanity . . . plainly appears to be solely founded on the nature of man. Wherefore no nation can refuse them to another, under pretence of its professing a different religion: to be entitled to them, it is sufficient that the claimant is our fellow-creature.”³⁵ Still, given the emphatic universalism of Wolff and Vattel’s language, there is remarkably little in their treatises to suggest that they seriously considered the place of treaty relations or legal practices beyond Europe as germane to the emerging doctrine of the law of nations. Like Wolff’s, Vattel’s language tends to be highly abstract, and his examples are drawn primarily from dealings among Europeans.³⁶

Beyond his claim that difference of religion has no bearing on legal obligations, Vattel wrote little about how the law of nations might bind Europeans in their dealings with powers outside Europe. He did recognize the application of the law of nations outside Europe in his assertion of the universality of respect for ambassa-

³³ Christian Wolff, *Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum*, trans. Joseph H. Drake, 2 vols. (1764; repr., Oxford, 1934), 2: §§157–158. Wolff also held the practices of civilized states to be authoritative for less cultured nations (even if not to be imposed by force): “it is plain . . . that what has been approved by the more civilized nations is the law of nations”; *ibid.*, Prolegomena, 2: §§20–22. Donald F. Lach, “The Sinophilism of Christian Wolff (1679–1754),” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 14, no. 4 (1953): 561–574, here 564. Twiss, *The Law of Nations Considered as Independent Political Communities*, xxvi.

³⁴ Vattel, *The Law of Nations*, bk. 2, §16. On the universality of natural law, see also Vattel’s 1742 essay “Dissertation on This Question: Can Natural Law Bring Society to Perfection without the Assistance of Political Laws?” trans. T. J. Hochstrasser, *ibid.*, 773–781.

³⁵ Vattel, *The Law of Nations*, bk. 2, §15 (though note that Vattel’s example of this principle is the willingness of Pope Benedict XIV to protect Dutch ships from Algerine corsairs).

³⁶ In addition to Wolff and Vattel, see, e.g., Richard Zouche, *An Exposition of Feacial Law and Procedure, or of Law between Nations, and Questions concerning the Same*, trans. J. L. Brierly (Washington, D.C., 1911), pt. 1, §1.1: “That which natural reason has established among all men is respected by all alike, and is called the Law of Nations, as being a law which all nations recognize”; it includes both “the common element in the law which the peoples of single nations use among themselves” and the law observed between nations, or “*jus inter gentes*.” See also J. G. Heineccius, *A Methodical System of Universal Law; or, The Laws of Nature and Nations*, trans. George Turnbull, ed. Thomas Ahnert and Peter Schröder (1741; repr., Indianapolis, 2008), which asserts a universal law of nations based on the law of nature but says almost nothing about contemporary non-European nations (there is a brief mention of systems of barter among “barbarous countries” in “Asia, Africa, and America”; bk. 1, chap. 13, §337).

dors. He saw the inviolability of ambassadors as a principle “confirmed by the uniform practice and general consent of mankind,” pointing to observance of this rule “in Mexico . . . even among the savage tribes of North America . . . [and] in China”; he attributes violations of the rule by “the Turks” as “rather imputable to the ferocity of particular princes than to the principles of the nation at large.”³⁷ Likewise, his condemnation of the execution of the Incan emperor Atahualpa gestured at the global scope of the law of nations: “The Spaniards violated all rules, when they set themselves up as judges of the Inca Atahualpa. If that prince had violated the law of nations with respect to them, they would have had a right to punish him. But they accused him of having put some of his subjects to death, of having had several wives, &c.—things, for which he was not at all accountable to them; and, to fill up the measure of their extravagant injustice, they condemned him by the laws of Spain.”³⁸ Such claims arguably gesture at the sort of view developed by Burke and Anquetil, but Vattel devotes little attention to such extra-European encounters in comparison to either (or to the authors of nineteenth-century treatises of international law). As a Swiss subject of the Prussian Empire, he was perhaps less drawn to the global features of European wars, including the Seven Years’ War, than was true of his French and British contemporaries.³⁹ On two key matters, he departed from Wolff’s position and took, influentially, a permissive stance toward European conduct: the right to wage total war on nations deemed to protect piracy, and the colonization of so-called vacant land.⁴⁰ (As Greg Grandin shows, this combination of postures—criminalizing certain adversaries and licensing territorial expansion on agricultural grounds, which Grandin calls the “intervention–individual rights complex”—was soon to become the characteristic posture of the new United States, where Vattel’s *Droit des gens* [1758] immediately became an authoritative standard.)⁴¹ In any case, notwithstanding their universalistic language, Wolff’s and Vattel’s works

³⁷ Vattel, *The Law of Nations*, bk. 4, §103.

³⁸ Ibid., bk. 2, §55: “One sovereign cannot make himself the judge of the conduct of another.” This passage is made much of in the anonymous essay “The Effects of Contempt for International Law,” in H. Stanley, ed., *The East and the West: Our Dealings with Our Neighbours* (London, 1865), 111–138.

³⁹ On the Swiss context for Vattel’s concerns, particularly about the vulnerability of small European states, see Theodore Christov, “Vattel’s Rousseau: *Jus Gentium* and the Natural Liberty of States,” in Quentin Skinner and Martin van Gelderen, eds., *Freedom and the Construction of Europe: New Perspectives on Philosophical, Religious, and Political Controversies* (Cambridge, forthcoming 2012); and Richard Whatmore, “‘Neither Masters nor Slaves’: Small States and Empire in the Long Eighteenth Century,” in Duncan Kelly, ed., *Lineages of Empire: The Historical Roots of British Imperial Thought* (Oxford, 2009), 53–81.

⁴⁰ Vattel argued for a collective right to punish any nation that “by its manners and by the maxims of its government” fosters piracy, including the Barbary states (bk. 2, §78). On Vattel’s permissiveness with regard to violence toward an “enemy of the human race” (bk. 3, §176); see Dan Edelstein, *The Terror of Natural Right: Republicanism, the Cult of Nature, and the French Revolution* (Chicago, 2009), 39. In contrast, the Dutch jurist Cornelius van Bynkershoek specified that the Barbary states were “entitled to the rights of independent states,” even if they sometimes violated treaties or acted “with less justice than others,” because perfect respect for treaties could not be expected of any state; Bynkershoek, *Quaestionum juris publici libri duo*, trans. Tenney Frank, 2 vols. (1737; repr., Oxford, 1930), 2: 99. On Vattel’s aggressively pro-colonizing stance and its departure from Wolff, see Vattel, *The Law of Nations*, bk. 1, §§209–210; and Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*, 195–197.

⁴¹ But note Vattel’s ambiguous stance on intervention: a strong standard of non-intervention that admitted numerous exceptions. On Vattel’s influence in the new United States, see David Armitage, *The Declaration of Independence: A Global History* (Cambridge, Mass., 2008), 38–41; Charles G. Fenwick, “The Authority of Vattel,” *American Political Science Review* 7, no. 3 (1913): 395–410.

cannot be taken as evidence of a consensus that the law of nations applied outside Europe.

Moreover, the fact that European states signed treaties with so many non-Christian powers in the course of their global expansion does not show, as Alexandrowicz claimed, that they saw these treaties as foundational to the law of nations in the way that treaties within Europe were thought to be. This is not, of course, because European states scrupulously abided by their treaties with each other and violated those with powers beyond Europe. Rather, treaties with the Turks and other Asian and North African powers were generally treated differently from those within Europe, as though they belonged to a distinct legal universe. Many of the treaty collections that were seen as the basis of the law of nations did not include treaties with any non-European states at all, and they often explicitly noted that they were restricting themselves to Europe. Treaties of the East India trading companies with Asian powers were usually collected separately. Some of the most influential collections, such as Dumont's, did include treaties with non-Christian powers, especially the Ottoman Empire and the Barbary states. Indeed, Dumont, in justifying the usefulness of his collection, used as his example a hypothetical English ambassador to the king of Morocco, who would want to know the full history of Morocco's treaty relations with France in order to secure the best arrangements for England.⁴² But even though Dumont's title was *The Universal Diplomatic Corpus of the Law of Nations*, his subtitle indicated that he was including only European treaties. It is this sort of equivocation, in which "universal" and "European" seem to be used as synonyms, that suggests that we must not assume that the language of "universal" and "mankind" in works such as Vattel's was literally intended to apply globally.

Turkey was, then as later, an ambiguous case. Some saw it as outside Europe; others noted that it was technically part of Europe but not fully a participant in the European *legal* community. G. F. von Martens, for instance, writing in the 1780s, preferred the term "*European* law of nations" to "law of *civilized* nations," but he added that "European" was not quite right, either, because "although, *in* Europe, the Turks have, in many respects, rejected the positive law of nations of which I here treat; and though, *out of* Europe, the United States of America have uniformly adopted it."⁴³ The treaty collections often include caveats about the differences between Ottoman or North African treaties and standard European ones. They state that such treaties were restricted to a few key issues, or that the procedure for enforcing them was distinct. A British collection of maritime treaties published in 1779, for instance, noted that treaties with Turkey had to be different from the others,

⁴² Although the English archives would include only England's own treaties, such a diplomat would also want knowledge of all the treaties between Morocco and France so as "to procure for his Master all the same honors, that this African Monarch renders to the King of France."

⁴³ Martens's Latin text was published in 1785, the French in 1789, from which this English translation by Cobbett was published in 1795. See G. F. de Martens, *Summary of the Law of Nations, Founded on the Treaties and Customs of the Modern Nations of Europe: With a List of the Principal Treaties*, trans. William Cobbett (Philadelphia, 1795), 5. See also Karl-Heinz Ziegler, "The Peace Treaties of the Ottoman Empire with European Christian Powers," in Randall Lesaffer, ed., *Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One* (Cambridge, 2004), 338–364; and Guido Komatsu, "Die Türkei und das europäische Staatensystem im 16. Jahrhundert: Untersuchungen zu Theorie und Praxis des neuzeitlichen Völkerrechts," in Christine Roll, ed., *Recht und Reich im Zeitalter der Reformation: Festschrift für Horst Rabe* (Frankfurt am Main, 1996), 121–144.

because the Turks were “unacquainted with the Treaties made by us with other Nations in Europe,” and so the usual assumptions and procedures could not be followed.⁴⁴

Similarly, diplomatic memoirs regularly insisted that the Turks were not fully acquainted with the European law of nations, or that they refused to recognize it, and so were not properly part of the emerging interstate legal system. The English emissary Paul Rycaut argued in 1668 that “though the *Turks* make these outward demonstrations of all due reverence and religious care to preserve the persons of Ambassadors sacred and free from violence,” it was clear from their treatment of ambassadors during wars that “they have no esteem of the Law of Nations,” and it was a *principle* with them to violate their treaties with unbelievers whenever doing so would contribute to the expansion of their empire or the propagation of their faith.⁴⁵ (This was one of the claims that Anquetil was to set out to disprove.) The English diplomat Sir James Porter likewise wrote a century later that “the Turks have properly no idea of the law of nations.”⁴⁶ Both Rycaut and Porter were considered unusually sympathetic observers of the Ottomans, and Porter, in particular, insisted that the Ottoman regime was law-governed and not an oriental despotism. But he held nonetheless that the law of nations did not apply in Turkey. Clearly, many Europeans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, despite the fact that their states and trading companies were signing treaties with Asian and Muslim powers, believed these treaties to exist in a different legal space from that of the European treaties they saw as the basis for a systematic law of nations.

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CONCEPTIONS OF THE law of nations were, then, not as inclusive of Asian powers as Alexandrowicz claimed. But the contrast he drew between an earlier legal universalism and the later “European egocentrism” gets at something both historically and normatively important.⁴⁷ The notion that the law of nations was *not* exclusively European but was based on reciprocal, binding legal arrangements among a host of diverse states served in the eighteenth century as a powerful basis for criticism of European imperial conduct and the cultural presumptions that underlay it. This critical posture was not, perhaps, the dominant view, but its exponents could, and did, draw on both diplomatic practice and the most influential legal thought of the day to make their case; and their arguments had a resonance in broader public debates that they would not have in the following century.

We might divide these critical approaches, somewhat schematically, into two strands. The first, which can be found in especially well-developed form in the work of Burke and Anquetil, insisted that the law of nations applied broadly to states and

⁴⁴ See *A Complete Collection of All the Marine Treaties Subsisting between Great-Britain and France, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Russia, . . . &c.: Commencing in the Year 1546, and Including the Definitive Treaty of 1763* (London, 1779), lv.

⁴⁵ Paul Rycaut, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1668), 161; the book was quickly and widely translated and widely cited through the eighteenth century.

⁴⁶ Sir James Porter, *Observations on the Religion, Laws, Government, and Manners of the Turks*, 2nd ed. (London, 1771), 151.

⁴⁷ C. H. Alexandrowicz, “G. F. de Martens on Asian Treaty Practice,” *Indian Year Book of International Affairs* 13, pt. 1 (1964): 59–77, here 74.

societies outside as well as within Europe.⁴⁸ This was in part because it was based, in their view, on the law of nature, which was by definition universal. It was also due to Europeans' longstanding treaty relations with various Asian and African powers in particular, treaties that they thought should be understood to be among the sources of the law of nations. They argued that Europeans' contempt for international law had been a major cause of European injustices abroad, as well as of justified resistance on the part of their adversaries or victims outside Europe.⁴⁹ Although not without its own dangers, this strand of legal inclusion could be a powerful tool with which to criticize the imperial conduct of European states.

The second strand held that while there *was* a distinctively European legal enterprise known as the European law of nations, non-European states had their own recognizable legal systems that could be engaged by Europeans. This view was powerfully stated beginning in the 1790s by the influential Admiralty Court judge William Scott, later Lord Stowell, in a series of opinions around maritime controversies involving subjects of the Ottoman Empire and the Barbary states. The key difference between these approaches, then, is that while Burke's and Anquetil's approach stressed the broad scope of the law of nations, Scott stressed the possibility of communication among different legal systems. This disparity was one of emphasis rather than substantive disagreement, for Burke and Anquetil certainly recognized the distinctiveness of what was coming to be called European public law. Burke developed the idea of Europe as a distinct juridical unit in justification of British intervention in revolutionary France, justification that he had earlier sought and failed to find in Vattel.⁵⁰ Crucially, however, he did not posit this distinct corporate entity as the nucleus of the law of nations *as such*, as would the nineteenth-century treatises.

Burke and Anquetil argued that imperial depredations had been made possible by the European powers' contempt for the legal standing of Asian states, and they used similar strategies for making the case that the law of nations was as strictly binding on Europeans beyond as within Europe. Unlike the later civilizing international lawyers, these thinkers tended to direct their critique inward rather than outward: they were interested mainly in criticizing European abuses rather than the

⁴⁸ On Anquetil, see Raymond Schwab, *Vie d'Anquetil-Duperron, suivi des Usages civils et religieux des Parses* (Paris, 1934); Guido Abbattista, "Introduzione," in Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron, *Considérations philosophiques, historiques et géographiques sur les deux mondes (1780–1804)*, ed. Abbattista (Pisa, 1993); Siep Stuurman, "Cosmopolitan Egalitarianism in the Enlightenment: Anquetil Duperron on India and America," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 68, no. 2 (2007): 255–278; and Frederick Whelan, "Oriental Despotism: Anquetil-Duperron's Response to Montesquieu," *History of Political Thought* 22, no. 4 (2001): 619–647.

⁴⁹ For two unusual nineteenth-century echoes of this argument by non-jurists, see "The Effects of Contempt for International Law" (fn. 38 above) and F. W. Newman, "Indian Annexations: British Treatment of Native Princes," *Westminster Review*, n.s., 23 (1863): 115–157. In his essay in this forum, Andrew Fitzmaurice discusses the minority of nineteenth-century jurists who carried on what they saw as a tradition of legal universalism running back to Vitoria, one recognizing, as Gaston Jèze put it, that "the law of nations does not admit any distinction between barbarians and the so-called civilized"; Jèze, *Etude théorique et pratique sur l'occupation comme mode d'acquérir les territoires en droit international* (Paris, 1896).

⁵⁰ On the radically new standard for intervention in France based on Roman private law remedies that Burke developed in his 1796 *Letters on a Regicide Peace*, after finding Vattel's more restricted theory of intervention unsuited to his purposes, see *The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke*, gen. ed. Paul Langford, 9 vols. (Oxford, 1981–1997) [hereafter *WSEB*], 9: 248–251; and Iain Hampsher-Monk, "Edmund Burke's Changing Justification for Intervention," *Historical Journal* 48, no. 1 (2005): 65–100, here 97–99.

inadequacies of non-Europeans or non-Christians. They turned to the language of law primarily to chasten European power rather than to legitimate it. They shared an attention to the limits of European knowledge and European authority, a sense of humility and respect in the face of complex civilizations of which Europeans had only the most superficial knowledge, and, especially in Anquetil's case, a belief that Europeans had much to learn from these societies, which, he said, they were in the habit of seeing merely as potential markets or as curiosities rather than as true interlocutors about politics and morals. This posture of auto-critique in the face of increasing European power and the triumphalism that accompanied it was a characteristic element of the political discourse of this era, as in the writings of Denis Diderot, Johann Gottfried Herder, and Samuel Johnson, among many others, though it more rarely took the form of legal argument as we find in the figures under discussion here.⁵¹ Anquetil argued that one of the major causes of the arrest of human knowledge—along with brute ignorance and religious dogmatism—was Europe's "presumptuous science": scholars were sure that knowing Greek and Latin meant they knew everything worth knowing, even though, having been "raised in the knowledge of four to five hundred leagues of country, the rest of the Globe is foreign to us." Merchants, at least, had the curiosity that is driven by desire for profit, but they were indifferent to the human beings and the moral worlds they encountered, rather than seeking to learn from their laws, customs, and opinions.⁵²

These authors focused on European relations with Asian and Muslim agricultural and commercial states, and it might be said that in insisting on a shared legal community with Asian commercial societies, Burke and others were simply moving the boundary of exclusion further along a spectrum of development, so that societies deemed "savage" were still outside it. Burke wrote relatively little about relations with African and Native American tribal societies; he did write some about Native Americans between the 1750s and 1770s, and his characterizations can be crude and derogatory.⁵³ Anquetil wrote a long manuscript defending indigenous Americans against their European denigrators, but this was a work of sympathetic ethnography rather than an argument for legal inclusion.⁵⁴ Moreover, their arguments were not necessarily anti-imperial: Anquetil wavered on the question of whether European empires were justified, and at some stages of his career he was certainly criticizing the British with the aim of defending French claims in India.⁵⁵ Burke, too, is read

⁵¹ Sankar Muthu, *Enlightenment against Empire* (Princeton, N.J., 2003); Clement Hawes, *The British Eighteenth Century and Global Critique* (New York, 2005); Pitts, *A Turn to Empire*.

⁵² Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron, *Législation orientale: Ouvrage dans lequel, en montrant quels sont en Turquie, en Perse et dans l'Indoustan, les principes fondamentaux du gouvernement* (Amsterdam, 1778), "Dedication," iii–iv. He called for the study of Asian languages, "because it contributes to our knowledge of lands that are more considerable than Europe, and it presents us with a grand survey proper to perfect the knowledge of mankind, and above all to assure the inalienable rights of humanity" (181).

⁵³ The bulk of the material on Native Americans was co-written and is hard to attribute definitively to Burke; see *An Account of the European Settlements in America* (London, 1757). See also Margaret Kohn and Daniel I. O'Neill, "A Tale of Two Indias: Burke and Mill on Empire and Slavery in the West Indies and Americas," *Political Theory* 34, no. 2 (2006): 192–228. On the history of European legal thought about the Americas, see Williams, *The American Indian in Western Legal Thought*; Stuart Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005).

⁵⁴ Anquetil-Duperron, *Considérations philosophiques, historiques et géographiques sur les deux mondes*.

⁵⁵ He could also praise Warren Hastings, governor-general of Bengal from 1773 to 1785, for having

by some as seeking (successfully) to reform the British Empire so as to entrench its power more deeply, though he also intimated that British rule in India was irredeemably unjust.⁵⁶

Burke apparently did not cite Anquetil in his writings and speeches on India, and Anquetil's writings had neither the prominence in their day nor the longer-term influence, nor the theoretical originality, of Burke's.⁵⁷ But the marked affinities in their legal and moral arguments make it clear that Burke was not unique in basing his account of a law of nations with broad scope on an argument that European and various other legal systems were mutually intelligible and shared basic principles of legal and political order. Both Burke and Anquetil insisted on the fundamental similarities between European legal regimes and other systems widely regarded as the antithesis of legal order. Both argued, against the theory of oriental despotism associated with Montesquieu, that these societies were regulated by law, that laws protected subjects' property, and that these rulers recognized themselves as bound by law both internally, with respect to their own subjects, and in their external relations. Indeed, both argued, no society of any durability could be habitually, constitutionally lawless, as oriental despotisms were said to be. Both used such arguments to insist that these states were parties to the law of nations, and that Europeans dealing with them were bound by its key provisions, such as respect for the sovereignty and the internal constitution of other states, and an obligation to abide by treaties and contracts entered into with them.

Anquetil, an exact contemporary of Burke's, had an earlier and far more intimate knowledge of Indian laws, languages, and society; he published his *Législation orientale* in 1778 as Burke was just beginning to acquaint himself with India. Anquetil left France for India in 1755 at the age of 23, and made a three-year overland voyage from Pondicherry to Surat, where he remained studying Zoroastrian manuscripts until 1761. His *Législation orientale* was a refutation of Montesquieu's theory of oriental despotism by way of a detailed account of the legal frameworks of the Ottoman, Persian, and Mughal empires: his arguments were at once of broader scope than Burke's in addressing Turkey and Persia as well as India, and more detailed in their consideration of these societies' laws. He presented abundant evidence to show, against Montesquieu, that the rulers of these states recognized legal obligations, both toward their own subjects and toward foreigners and Europeans.

Anquetil argued that all of these societies respected the law of nations. He re-

"established the British throne with majesty on the ruins of Mogol power"; Anquetil-Duperron, *L'Inde en rapport avec l'Europe: Ouvrage divisé en deux parties* (Paris, 1798), xxiv. See also Joan-Pau Rubiés, "Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism: Botero to Montesquieu," *Journal of Early Modern History* 9, no. 1–2 (2005): 109–180, describing Anquetil as "in some ways more anti-British than anti-colonialist" (172); and on the royalist context for Anquetil's arguments, see Thomas Kaiser, "The Evil Empire? The Debate on Turkish Despotism in Eighteenth-Century French Political Culture," *Journal of Modern History* 72, no. 1 (2000): 6–34.

⁵⁶ Nicholas B. Dirks, *The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006); Robert Travers, *Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth-Century India: The British in Bengal* (Cambridge, 2007), 220; Jennifer Pitts, "Empire," in Christopher Insole and David Dwan, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Burke* (Cambridge, forthcoming 2012).

⁵⁷ In 1762, the *Annual Register* (then under Burke's editorship) devoted considerable space to translated excerpts of Anquetil's account of his voyage to India, with an introduction that lavishly praised his erudition and character; *The Annual Register; or, A View of the History, Politicks, and Literature of the Year 1762* (London, 1762), 103–129.

jected the claim by Rycaut, one of Montesquieu's sources, that Muslim rulers believed themselves "authorized . . . by the Law of their Prophet" to break treaties or alliances when doing so would increase their empire or the reach of Islam. He quoted from the ninth sura of the Qur'ān to show that Islam "orders the observation of Treaties made with Infidels who uphold their promises" and cited numerous instances in which Turkish leaders insisted on upholding treaties when interest might have dictated breaking them. It is clear, he wrote, that "the law of nations, the law of war, public faith, the security of property, that of commerce, in sum that the laws of humanity and of reason are respected by the Ottoman Monarchs as well as by their representatives." He cited as one example Sultan Ahmed's treaty with Henri IV of France reaffirming earlier agreements between the two countries. Anquetil observed that "to show such a singular respect for Treaties made by his predecessor was as much as to say to [European] nations [*les nations*] 'I have the same principles of equity as you do; the Ottomans share the same public law.'" ⁵⁸

Anquetil took ironic pleasure in using instances of Asian cruelty as evidence that these societies recognized the laws of nations and would punish European violations of them. He wrote that in 1775 the Marathas had given the Europeans "some rather cruel lessons in the law of nations." The English had committed atrocities in the course of seizing the island of Salcette near Bombay, after agreeing to come to the aid of the Marathas in a local power struggle. These atrocities, wrote Anquetil, "revolted all the people of the country, the Marathas included . . . Indignant at these violations of all the laws of war and the laws of humanity, they avenged themselves by cutting off the ears and the noses of the English who fell into their hands."⁵⁹ Unlike Burke, Anquetil did not rely on claims about the universal reach of the law of nature to make these arguments; his evidence was precisely the actual practice of states that later positivist jurists would insist restricted international law to Europe. Against Sir James Porter's claim that the Turks did not respect the law of nations, he wrote, "I ask whether the law of nations, distinguished from natural law, has other foundations than treaties and the accords made among nations. The Turks observe these Treaties, they regulate their behavior by [*se règlent sur*] these agreements, thus they have an idea of the law of nations."⁶⁰

Treaties and accords between European and Asian "nations" had, of course, long been mediated by chartered companies with shifting and ambivalent relations to their sponsoring states: the Portuguese Estado da India, the English Levant Company, the Dutch Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (United East India Company), and the English East India Company.⁶¹ The last, chartered by Elizabeth I in 1600, was, as Philip Stern has argued, a "body politic" and "political community" in some ways typical in early modern England's complexly "interlocking matrix" of commonwealths, corporations, and associations, when the prerogatives of sover-

⁵⁸ Anquetil-Duperron, *Législation orientale*, 55–56.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 6–7. In a similar if less gory instance, he wrote that even if the laws of commerce are simple and few, this does not necessarily imply that contracts are insecure. "In Surat," he wrote, "I saw a European in need of all the protection of the English, then masters of the fortress, to elude the force of . . . his creditors" (9).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁶¹ Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500–1700: A Political and Economic History* (London, 1993); Om Prakash, ed., *European Commercial Expansion in Early Modern Asia* (Aldershot, 1997).

eignty had not yet been deemed the exclusive province of the state.⁶² Its officials quickly concerned themselves not simply with commercial imperatives but with the responsibilities and prerogatives of sovereignty: governance of territories and populations, war, and diplomacy. But tensions among its commercial interests, its responsibilities as an Indian sovereign, and its status as a representative of the English and then British state and nation, perceived by the Company's critics and its own agents from the start, came to seem intolerable to many observers, especially after the Company's acquisition of vastly greater powers and territory by the end of the Seven Years' War.⁶³

Goaded by an army of pamphleteers, including disgruntled former Company employees and independent merchants, Parliament attempted to exert greater control over the Company's activities, from its "first major inquiry into the [Company's] affairs" in 1667, through Lord North's Regulating Act of 1773 establishing the position of governor-general, Charles James Fox's failed East India Bill, and a series of select committees convened to investigate allegations of corruption, despotism, and abuse of power by the Company.⁶⁴ These efforts culminated in 1786 with a vote in the House of Commons to impeach Warren Hastings, the former governor-general of Bengal, before a committee of the House of Lords, for "unwarrantable and criminal practices" that threatened the well-being of the natives of India, the fortunes of the East India Company, and the honor of the British nation and the crown.⁶⁵ Burke, the chief manager of the prosecution on behalf of the House of Commons, was hailed as a humanitarian during the early stages of one of the greatest political dramas of eighteenth-century Britain, as the public grew increasingly anxious over the Company's practices of widespread bribery and corruption, aggressive war-making, and mistreatment of Indian rulers. By the time Hastings was finally acquitted in 1795, he was regarded as the victim of Burke's vindictive and monomaniacal crusade. Burke's spectacular oratory, by turns powerful, theatrical, and overwrought, was the object of both admiration and ridicule from the large public

⁶² Philip J. Stern, *The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India* (Oxford, 2011), 9–10; Stern, "History and Historiography of the English East India Company: Past, Present, and Future!" *History Compass* 7, no. 4 (2009): 1146–1180.

⁶³ The decisive defeat of the French and their local allies at the Battle of Plassey (1757) led to the Company's acquisition of the diwani of Bengal (1765), powers of revenue collection and administration of justice delegated by the declining Mughal Empire that were widely understood as Company "sovereignty" over the vast territory. See Huw V. Bowen, "A Question of Sovereignty? The Bengal Land Revenue Issue, 1765–67," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 16, no. 2 (1988): 155–176. On the incompatibility of the interests of merchant and sovereign, see Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, ed. R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner, and W. B. Todd (Indianapolis, 1976), 637–641; Thomas Pownall, *The Right, Interest, and Duty of the State, as Concerned in the Affairs of the East Indies* (London, 1773), 3–4.

⁶⁴ Bowen, "A Question of Sovereignty?," 155.

⁶⁵ *Journals of the House of Commons*, 42: 666; quoted by P. J. Marshall in *The Impeachment of Warren Hastings* (London, 1965), 1. The trial itself began in 1788. See also Marshall, "Burke and Empire," in Stephen Taylor, Richard Connors, and Clyve Jones, eds., *Hanoverian Britain and Empire: Essays in Memory of Philip Lawson* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1998), 288–298; Geoffrey Carnall and Colin Nicholson, eds., *The Impeachment of Warren Hastings: Papers from a Bicentenary Commemoration* (Edinburgh, 1989); David Musselwhite, "The Trial of Warren Hastings," in Francis Baker, Peter Hulme, Margaret Iversen, and Diana Loxley, eds., *Literature, Politics, and Theory: Papers from the Essex Conference, 1976–84* (London, 1986), 77–103; Dirks, *The Scandal of Empire*; Mithi Mukherjee, "Justice, War, and the Imperium: India and Britain in Edmund Burke's Prosecutorial Speeches in the Impeachment Trial of Warren Hastings," *History Cooperative Journal* 23, no. 3 (2005): 589–630.

that followed it in person and in the daily press. Much has been written since about the many rhetorical registers and lines of attack that Burke took up over the course of the trial: his Whig assault on the power and patronage of the crown; his sometimes sentimental defense of traditional hierarchies in India and England against the novel wealth and power of Company agents; his anxiety over the seemingly incomprehensible alienness of Indian society to the British public; his chivalric defense of vulnerable Indian women against the "errant masculinity" of the Company; and his lurid detailing of Company misdeeds.⁶⁶ Scholars have long read the trial for evidence of Burke's motives and psychology; more recent work has recovered a compelling moral and political theory from his India speeches.⁶⁷

However ultimately self-defeating his presentation of the case against Hastings and the Company, Burke's primary aim in the trial, it is often and rightly emphasized, was moral suasion rather than legal conviction: the British public, and posterity, were as much his audience as the Lords sitting in judgment.⁶⁸ A central element of this project of persuasion was his effort to prompt a reconception of law itself, specifically the role of law in global commercial and political encounters. Burke himself understood the trial as a peculiar and potent form of global legal encounter: it mobilized British law, through the rarely used mechanism of impeachment, to check the abuse of British power abroad, and it might help to transform an overly insular British law by way of encounter with other legal orders. This meant soliciting from his British audience both a new respect for unfamiliar legal and normative systems and an unaccustomed sense of doubt about the adequacy of their own. As was typical of Burke, this was a project of both transformation and conservation, in the sense that he argued both that British legal traditions were parochial and inadequate to a global politics, and that they contained the seeds of their own reform.

By the end of the trial, during his nine-day closing speech in 1794, Burke had come to characterize his dispute with Hastings as at bottom a controversy about law. Given at a time of despair for Burke, when it was clear that the legal case against Hastings was all but lost, this speech (four hundred pages in the modern edition) is one of his least successful performances: rambling, repetitive, exaggerated, convoluted, and often vindictive. At the same time, it was in this speech that he most fully and powerfully elaborated his vision of legality in the imperial and inter-imperial

⁶⁶ "Questions of effeminacy, the decline of landed families, and the figuration of despotism as errant masculinity suddenly emerge as the substance of the Whig case against East India Company's flirtations with disturbing modes of sovereignty"; Daniel O'Quinn, *Staging Governance: Theatrical Imperialism in London, 1770–1800* (Baltimore, 2005), 124. See also Isaac Kramnick, *The Rage of Edmund Burke: Portrait of an Ambivalent Conservative* (New York, 1977); Regina Janes, "At Home Abroad: Edmund Burke in India," *Bulletin of Research in the Humanities* 82 (1979): 160–174; Frans De Bruyn, "Edmund Burke's Gothic Romance: The Portrayal of Warren Hastings in Burke's Writings and Speeches on India," *Criticism* 29, no. 4 (1987): 415–438; Sara Suleri, *The Rhetoric of English India* (Chicago, 1992); Nicole Reynolds, "Phebe Gibbes, Edmund Burke, and the Trials of Empire," *Eighteenth-Century Fiction* 20, no. 2 (2007–2008): 151–176.

⁶⁷ See especially Frederick G. Whelan, *Edmund Burke and India: Political Morality and Empire* (Pittsburgh, 1996); Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire*; and David Bromwich's essays, such as his introduction to Edmund Burke, *On Empire, Liberty, and Reform: Speeches and Letters*, ed. Bromwich (New Haven, Conn., 2000); Conor Cruise O'Brien, *The Great Melody: A Thematic Biography and Commented Anthology of Edmund Burke* (Chicago, 1992).

⁶⁸ This is especially apparent in Burke's nine-day closing speech, which F. P. Lock has called "a lengthy restatement of the moral case against Hastings, with no regard to the question of legal evidence"; Lock, *Edmund Burke*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1998–2006), 2: 468.

space that India had become. In arguing that British actions in the world beyond Europe were constrained by a complex web of laws—including positive laws of English and other origins as well as natural law and the law of nations—Burke was articulating a distinctive vision of the global legal order. His insistence on the broad reach of the law of nations and its basis in the law of nature spans the entire trial and indeed predates it.⁶⁹ This vision had its roots in the natural jurisprudence of the eighteenth century, but Burke attended more closely than its canonical exponents such as Wolff and Vattel to its potential implications for engagements beyond Europe.

Burke's reflections on these questions point us toward a notion of global legality different from the view that was emerging among thinkers as different as Vattel and Bentham, and which would triumph in the nineteenth century: the view that international law applied exclusively to states understood as equal and independent sovereign entities.⁷⁰ Vattel's *Droit des gens* was the most influential articulation in Burke's time of the idea that states are equal, free, and independent, and the exclusive subjects of the law of nations.⁷¹ In insisting on the uniformity of the international legal space and of the states that filled it, Vattel's theory may have facilitated the emergence of the view that only certain sorts of states can qualify for that status: states that fit a particular institutional and cultural description that for most nineteenth-century thinkers turned out to exist only in Europe. Such claims are not necessarily implied by Vattel's theory—indeed, they may contradict its universalistic spirit—but his insistence on legal uniformity may have made difficult the more flexible and political legal pluralism that Burke developed during the Hastings trial.⁷² Bentham's views about international law are too complex to treat here, but in his late notes toward a code of international law, he began with the principles of equal and independent states.⁷³ He also proposed that states refrain from intervening in

⁶⁹ See especially Burke's "Inquiry into the Seizure of Private Property in St. Eustatius," May 14, 1781, in *The Speeches of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, in the House of Commons, and in Westminster-Hall*, 4 vols. (London, 1816), 2: 248–263; and Burke, "Motion for an Inquiry into the Confiscation of the Effects Taken on the Island of St. Eustatius," December 4, 1781, *ibid.*, 313–325.

⁷⁰ Edward Keene has argued that as early as Grotius, we can find a bifurcated notion of law and sovereignty, so that while sovereignty in Europe was seen as unitary and absolute, the prerogatives of sovereignty in Asia were seen by European theorists as divided between semi-sovereign Asian rulers and European states and their agents; Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society*.

⁷¹ See Vattel, *Le droit des gens*, Introduction, §§14–21; the law of nations is the "science of the rights which exist between Nations or States, and of the obligations corresponding to these rights" (§3). Recent challenges to such a "monist . . . statist . . . and positivist" conception of law include William Twining, *Globalisation and Legal Theory* (London, 2000); and Robert Cover, "Nomos and Narrative," in Cover, *Narrative, Violence, and the Law: The Essays of Robert Cover*, ed. Martha Minow, Michael Ryan, and Austin Sarat (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1993), 95–172. On traditions of legal pluralism, see Paul S. Berman, "Global Legal Pluralism," *Southern California Law Review* 80 (2007): 1155–1237; Sally Engle Merry, "Legal Pluralism," *Law and Society Review* 22, no. 5 (1988): 869–896; Merry, *Colonizing Hawai'i: The Cultural Power of Law* (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Lauren Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900* (Cambridge, 2002).

⁷² On Vattel's influence on Burke, and Burke's late departures from Vattel during the war with revolutionary France, see David Armitage, "Edmund Burke and Reason of State," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 61, no. 4 (2000): 617–634; Hampsher-Monk, "Edmund Burke's Changing Justification for Intervention"; and Isaac Nakhimovsky, "Carl Schmitt's Vattel and the 'Law of Nations' between Enlightenment and Revolution," *Grotiana* 31 (2010): 141–161.

⁷³ See "International Law," June 11, 1827: "Art. 2. The equality of all is hereby recognized by all. Art. 3. Each has its own form of government, each respects the form of government of every other. Art. 4. Each has its own opinions and enactments on the subject of religion: each respects that of every other.

one another's colonies among "barbarous nations," a significant departure from his position of the 1780s that emancipation of all colonies was essential for any prospect of peace.⁷⁴

Burke, in contrast, emphasized the multiplicity of legal orders within and among states. He complicated Vattel's view of perfectly independent sovereigns in his writings not just about India but also about Europe, where in response to the French Revolution he articulated his vision of a European Commonwealth or community, the "grand vicinage of Europe," which was governed by a sort of "Law of Neighbourhood."⁷⁵ Burke saw the legal problems thrown up by both the Company in India and Jacobinism in France as unprecedented.⁷⁶ Those who viewed the war with France through the lens of simple interstate law were, he thought, mistaken. He similarly accepted the coexistence and interpenetration of multiple legal systems in India, without insisting, as Hastings and others did, that what was needed was an authoritative hierarchy or code of jurisdictions, with Europeans as the ultimate arbiters.

In rebutting Hastings's claim that Indians had "no laws [and] no rights," Burke appealed to a variety of legal and normative orders in Indian society, from property and inheritance regimes to "hereditary dignities" and systems of "honour and distinction."⁷⁷ Whereas Hastings and his lawyers held that disorder was endemic in India, for Burke, order was apparent in these overlapping normative systems, and it was the British who represented the irruption of disorder. Burke stressed the antiquity of Indian jurisprudence, as in his claim in the closing of the Hastings impeachment trial that "We have shown you that those people [in India] lived under the Law, which was formed even whilst we, I may say, were in the Forest, before we knew what Jurisprudence was," and that the British were "bound to know and to act by these Laws."⁷⁸ He suggested that India had a long history of functioning legal pluralism, disrupted by the British and their contempt for and ignorance of local structures of obligation.⁷⁹

Art. 5. Each has its own manners, customs, and opinions, each respects the manners, customs, and opinions of every other." British Library [hereafter BL], Add MS. 30151, fol. 13.

⁷⁴ Ibid., fol. 17. Compare the documents headed "Pacif. & Emancip." [Pacification and Emancipation], Bentham Papers, University College London Library, Box XXV, fols. 29–33; Gunhild Hoo-gensen, *International Relations, Security, and Jeremy Bentham* (London, 2005); and Armitage, "Globalizing Jeremy Bentham."

⁷⁵ See Burke's "First Letter on a Regicide Peace," *WSEB*, 9: 248–251, where Burke writes that writers on public law have been right to call Europe a Commonwealth, since it "is virtually one great state having the same basis of general law." He also called this European "Law of Neighbourhood" a "law of civil vicinity." "Civil laws are not all of them merely positive. Those which are rather conclusions of legal reason, than matters of statutable provision, belong to universal equity, and are universally applicable" (250).

⁷⁶ On Burke's insistent linking of "Indianism" with Jacobinism, see Sunil Agnani, "Jacobinism in India, Indianism in English Parliament: Fearing the Enlightenment and Colonial Modernity with Edmund Burke," *Cultural Critique* 68 (Winter 2008): 131–162.

⁷⁷ *WSEB*, 7: 264–265.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 285.

⁷⁹ He said that even the Muslim conquerors of India at the time of Mohammed, whom he characterized as cruel religious fanatics, "left the ancient people in possession of their states; and left the ancient Sovereigns of the Country possessed of an inferior Sovereignty; and where the nature of the Country would permit it, they suffered them to continue in a separate state of Sovereignty from them" (*WSEB*, 6: 308). The Holy Roman Empire served as one model of a system of plural legal orders to which Burke implicitly gestured in inviting his audience to imagine India on the model of Germany (5: 390ff.).

Over the course of the trial, Burke came to insist that the British should respect Indian laws not because Indians themselves were incapable of moving beyond them, as Hastings argued, but because those laws independently obligated the British. Most directly this was so for contractual reasons, as an implicit element of the agreement that, Burke claimed, underlay the Company's power in India. But while he sometimes made it clear that he meant that these local laws imposed obligations on the British *as governors*, he also regarded them as constraints on Hastings's more general "relations with the people of that Country," which is to say those outside British territory as well. Burke's argument seems to rest on a notion of the sanctity of the rule of law itself, so that a structure of legal relations should be treated with respect, across polities as well as within them. The British were not operating in a legal vacuum beyond their own territory in India. One reason, in Burke's view, that these legal systems all had normative standing is that they had been worked upon and reformed over a long period of time: they should be presumed to be distinctive but valid approximations of what he called the eternal law.⁸⁰

One of Burke's most often repeated charges was that the Company under Hastings, with a flagrant contempt for the law of nations, had violated every treaty it made with Indian powers. He used the occasion of such charges to maintain that the law of nations bound the British "with regard to all foreign powers," in India as well as in Europe.⁸¹ And he argued that the British were obligated to extend the benefit of the doubt to powers that "appear to be sovereign" or that had recently been sovereign. He framed the treaty violations not simply as a problem of bad faith or opportunism, but as the product of a dangerous legal theory. He rebuked Hastings for having questioned, in testimony before the Commons, "the validity of any Treaty that can be made at present with India."⁸² Hastings, he argued, "is bound in all transactions with foreign Powers to act according to the known, recognized rules of the Law of Nations, with regard to all powers that are Sovereign, or appear to be Sovereign, whether dependent or independent."⁸³ Burke did reject Hastings's contention that wazirs and other governors had sovereign powers, but he argued, against Hastings, that Chait Singh, the raja of Benares, was "cloathed with every one of the attributes of Sovereignty." For John Austin, whose view of sovereignty was to become dominant in the next century, the idea of a dependent sovereign would have been incoherent. Burke's more fluid conception of sovereignty encompassed the possibility of a ruler with sovereign status who had fallen into dependence on others but to whom legal obligations under the law of nations still applied.

Burke held that the British were obliged not merely to follow the law of nations

⁸⁰ As Mithi Mukherjee argues, Burke staged a "convergence . . . between two independent traditions of jurisprudence," the "exclusively national" tradition of common law and the "international discourse" of natural law; Mukherjee, "Justice, War, and the Imperium," 619.

⁸¹ *WSEB*, 7: 256 (also "we do contend that the Law of Nations is the Law of India as well as Europe" [291]).

⁸² "Your Lordships will find Mr. Hastings considers all Treaties as being weakened by a considerable degree of natural doubt and invalidity, concerning their binding and conclusive force in such a state of things as exists in India." *Ibid.*, 7: 393. In evidence before the Lords on February 25, 1788, Hastings had argued that "all the governing Powers of Hindostan are extremely averse to any Treaties or Agreements which are declared to be binding on Posterity; and I have had frequent Difficulties in many Negotiations with the native Princes on this Head; they have always pleaded 'that it was against the Custom of their Country.'"

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 7: 282.

in their dealings with Indian rulers, but also to attempt to construe those rulers' actions as if they might be in accordance with shared legal principles, and to look for evidence of shared principles in their practice and their legal documents.⁸⁴ To that end, he cited passages from Vattel to argue that Hastings had acted illegally in crushing what Hastings had called a rebellion by a local ruler. Burke argued that Chait Singh had not been rebelling but had been freed from his treaty obligations as a result of failures by the British to live up to their own. He argued that the British were obliged to recognize "the rights of natural equity, of the Law of Nations which is the birthright of us all."

Finally, Burke envisioned English law itself as being transformed by these global encounters. Municipal law had to evolve and progress by constant reference to developments in morals and society—by, as he put it, "keep[ing] Pace with the Demands of Justice, and the actual Concerns of the World."⁸⁵ He argued that the extraordinary complexity introduced by empire and global commerce made a flexible and inclusive sense of equity imperative.⁸⁶

THE SECOND STRAIN OF COSMOPOLITAN legal thinking appears most strikingly in the opinions of the Admiralty Court judge William Scott (after 1821, first Baron Stowell).⁸⁷ Educated at Oxford and the Middle Temple, Scott chose the path of civil rather than common law at time when prize cases generated by the American war were bringing renewed political and commercial importance to the civil law-based Admiralty Courts after a long decline.⁸⁸ Scott was an acquaintance of Burke's, briefly a counsel for the Hastings prosecution, and a fellow member of Samuel Johnson's circle and of the Club, the London dining club that Johnson founded with Joshua Reynolds, whose members included many of the era's leading political and literary

⁸⁴ In the course of denouncing the Jacobins for having "demolished" the jurisprudence that France shared with "other civilized countries," Burke wrote, "I have not heard of any country [except France], whether in Europe or Asia, or even in Africa on this side of Mount Atlas, which is wholly without" institutions dedicated to the conservation of that universal jurisprudence; Burke, "First Letter on a Regicide Peace," 240.

⁸⁵ *WSEB*, 7: 168. See the discussion of the *Report*, "Burke's Most Sustained Legal Writing," in Lock, *Edmund Burke*, 2: 470–474. The idea of law as a flexible instrument that evolved in response to the demands of society was one that Burke had first explored in his early *An Essay towards an Abridgment of the English History* (London, 1757).

⁸⁶ "As Commerce, with its Advantages and its Necessities, opened a Communication more largely with other Countries; as the Law of Nature and Nations (always a Part of the Law of England) came to be cultivated; as an increasing Empire; as new Views and new Combinations of Things were opened, this antique Rigour and over-done Severity gave Way to the Accommodation of Human Concerns, for which Rules were made, and not Human Concerns to bend to them"; *WSEB*, 7: 163.

⁸⁷ Scott was generally referred to by later jurists as Lord Stowell, but since his relevant opinions were delivered before his peerage, I refer to him, as the documents do, as Scott. Henry J. Bourguignon, *Sir William Scott, Lord Stowell, Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, 1798–1828* (Cambridge, 1987); R. A. Melikan, "Scott, William, Baron Stowell (1745–1836)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004); E. S. Roscoe, *Lord Stowell: His Life and the Development of English Prize Law* (Boston, 1916); Benton, "'Slave Trading Is Not a Piratical Offense': Abolition, Prize Law, and the Imperial Constitution" (paper presented at the 2010 Symposium on Comparative Early Modern Legal History: New Perspectives on Legal Pluralism, Newberry Library, Chicago, April 23, 2010).

⁸⁸ Bourguignon, *Sir William Scott*, 37. Scott took his doctorate in civil law and joined the Doctors' Commons in 1779; he also held a readership in ancient history at Oxford from 1774 through 1785. As a civil lawyer, he practiced ecclesiastical law in addition to maritime law.

figures.⁸⁹ In 1788 Scott was appointed king's advocate general, the state's chief authority on maritime and international law. He served in Parliament from 1790 until his elevation to the Lords, and from 1798 until 1828 he served as judge of the High Court of Admiralty. Scott's learned and highly respected Admiralty opinions on the frequent maritime controversies of the Napoleonic Wars, the first such judgments to be regularly collected and published, quickly became an authoritative source for maritime and international law in both Britain and America. As a civil lawyer, he was widely and deeply read in Roman law, canon law, and the continental law-of-nations tradition.⁹⁰ The English civilian tradition was committed, as the common law was not, to comparative law, foreign sources of law, and the development of law with transnational and perhaps universal validity; it looked to the past as a source not of legal authority but of conceptions and practices against which to judge contemporary principles.⁹¹ Scott was a member of the last great generation of English civilians in ecclesiastical and admiralty law; although his judgments were much admired by nineteenth-century international lawyers, it appears that they misunderstood his views on the scope of the law of nations.

Despite the difference that Burke insisted that the law of nations was based on the law of nature, while Scott described it as a historically European phenomenon, based more on state practice than on general principles, there are important affinities between the two men's views of how the law of nations should apply to non-Europeans.⁹² Scott considered his court a tribunal of the law of nations, a law that, as he put it, "has no locality": "If, therefore, I mistake the law in this matter, I mistake that which I consider, and which I mean should be considered, as the universal law upon the question."⁹³ He saw that law as rooted, certainly, in general principles, but, he wrote, "it travels with those general principles only to a certain extent," and states are required to "confine [themselves] to those modes which the common practice of mankind has employed, and to relinquish [others], those which the same practice has not brought within the ordinary exercise of war, however sanctioned by its principles and purposes."⁹⁴

As Burke did with Indian states, Scott argued for recognizing the sovereignty of

⁸⁹ He also founded—along with his brother John (later Lord Eldon), Prime Minister William Pitt's solicitor general, and Robert Chambers, one of the first justices of the Supreme Court of Calcutta—the "distinctly Tory" University College Dining Club; *ibid.*, 38.

⁹⁰ On the English civil law tradition, see *ibid.*, 1–30; Stein, *Roman Law in European History*; Peter Stein, "Continental Influences on English Legal Thought, 1600–1900," in Stein, *The Character and Influence of the Roman Civil Law: Historical Essays* (London, 1988), 209–229; Daniel R. Coquillette, *The Civilian Writers of Doctors' Commons, London: Three Centuries of Juristic Innovation in Comparative, Commercial and International Law* (Berlin, 1988); G. D. Squibb, *Doctors' Commons: A History of the College of Advocates and Doctors of Law* (Oxford, 1977); and on the awkward place of natural law in common-law thought such as Blackstone's, see David Lieberman, *The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Cambridge, 1989), 37–42.

⁹¹ See Coquillette, *The Civilian Writers of Doctors' Commons*, 16–23.

⁹² He claimed to be an impartial administrator of the law of nations, acknowledging that "the seat of judicial authority is, indeed, locally *here*, in the belligerent country, according to the known law and practice of nations: but the law itself has no locality." His biographer calls this the "diplomatically soothing, stock assertion of his predecessors," and he notes a contemporary objection to one of Scott's decisions as biased toward Britain; see Bourguignon, *Sir William Scott*, 264.

⁹³ Scott's legal decisions are cited as they appear in Chr. Robinson, *Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High Court of Admiralty; Commencing with the Judgments of the Right Hon. Sir William Scott, Michaelmas Term 1798* (London, 1799–1808), 6 vols., *Flad Oyen*, 1 Rob. 151.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, *Flad Oyen*, 1 Rob. 139–140.

the Barbary states, and he granted that certain very fundamental legal principles could be considered to bind them as well as Europeans. But he also argued for some deference toward their own laws and practices when it came to the finer points of the European law of nations. "Although their notions of justice, to be observed between nations, differ from those which we entertain," he wrote, "we do not, on that account, venture to call in question their public acts."⁹⁵ He noted that even within Europe, states could not always find unanimous agreement on the principles of the law of nations.⁹⁶ And he argued that such disagreements with Barbary states should not, as some (following Gentili) held, place them beyond the bounds of the international legal community.

Scott heard numerous cases involving the seizure of European property by Barbary ships and vice versa during the intense maritime conflicts of the Napoleonic Wars.⁹⁷ In one case, that of the *Kinders Kinder*, involving the capture of an Algerian ship by British subjects, he noted that he could offer only a "coarse sort of equitable arbitration."⁹⁸ He stressed the importance of caution because—according to "a law of nations now peculiar to themselves"—Barbary states followed a practice considered inappropriate under European law of nations: they demanded immediate compensation from any countrymen of those who had seized their property. Scott did not conclude that because the Barbary states failed to follow European law they were lawless, or that Europeans had the right to force European standards on them. Rather, he argued, Europeans should regard the Barbary states' actions as regulated by their own law of nations and as therefore to be respected even if they were unjust under European law. If Europeans wanted to do business with such countries, he noted, they would have to accept the vulnerabilities that came with that business.

In a later case involving another seizure of Algerian property by Britons, he ruled for the Algerian claimants, saying, "I do not . . . mean to apply to such claimants the exact rigour of the law of nations as understood and practiced among the civilized states of Europe; it would be to try them by a law not familiar to any law or practice of theirs," and "we must pay some attention to the rules of morality and law that prevail amongst such people."⁹⁹ Finally, in yet another case, Scott summarized his earlier reasoning as follows: "it would be extremely hard on persons residing in the kingdom of Morocco, if they should be held bound by all the rules of the law of nations, as it is practiced among European states . . . they may on some points of the law of nations, be entitled to a very relaxed application of the principles, established, by long usage, between the states of Europe, holding an intimate and constant intercourse with each other." He called this law "a pretty artificial system, which is not

⁹⁵ Ibid., *The Helena, Heslop Master*, 4 Rob. 5–6.

⁹⁶ Ibid., *Twee Juffrowen (Etjes)* (1802), 4 Rob. 242, 294.

⁹⁷ On the broader maritime context, see Martin Robson, *Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict* (London, 2011).

⁹⁸ Robinson, *Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High Court of Admiralty, Kinders Kinder* (1799), 2 Rob. 88.

⁹⁹ Ibid., *The Fortune, Smith Master* (92ff.), April 7, 1800, 2 Rob. 99. Here he cited the jurist Cornelius van Bynkershoek's judgment, against Alberico Gentili, that Europeans owed the Barbary states legal recognition (rather than seeing them as pirates), since they met all the criteria of legal sovereignty, and that "they even have some respect for treaties, as other nations have, though nations are usually more concerned about their own advantage than about treaties. That they should have complete respect for treaties, no one could require, since we cannot require that even from other nations."

familiar either to their knowledge or their observance.” He went on to except from this rule certain cases of widely known and longstanding principles, such as the principle of respecting blockades: “I must hold that they are bound to the observance of this most ancient principle, on which nations have acted in every state of civilized society, since the first records of mankind.”¹⁰⁰

Scott, then, saw the law of nations as a complex practice that combined a small set of principles that he believed were universally binding with a larger set of historically European rules that could not be said to obligate non-Europeans. Like Burke, though, Scott saw European laws as binding on Europeans in their dealings with others, even when those same laws did not bind the other party. So there is, in the thought of both men, what we might see as a kind of deferential asymmetry in the application of the laws.¹⁰¹ Scott, like Burke, saw various legal systems as mutually intelligible despite their differences. Even while he acknowledged that encounters with those outside the historical bounds of the European law of nations might be freighted with additional risk for Europeans, he resisted the temptation, which would come to dominate later nineteenth-century accounts, to insist that European law should become authoritative for all.

Scott was Britain’s foremost judicial authority on the law of nations at the turn of the nineteenth century, and his opinions had unusual influence, in part because they were considered extraordinarily well judged, and in part because his tenure on the Admiralty Court coincided with the first systematic recording of its judgments, in the volumes of Christopher Robinson. An example of his authority, as well as of his sense of the rigorous duties imposed on Britain by the law of nations, can be seen in correspondence between Scott, then advocate general, and Henry Dundas, then home secretary, on the subject of punitive levies imposed on the residents of St. Lucia after it was captured from France in 1794. Dundas, on behalf of the ministry, had requested Scott’s opinion as to the appropriateness of the levies under the law of nations (though he had already written to General Sir Charles Grey to say that the levies seemed to him “perfectly proper” as a temporary measure). Scott responded that according to the “Modern Law of Nations,” the British policy of confiscating the property of civilian residents of St. Lucia “appears to be utterly unjustifiable, and ought to be revoked”; he was, indeed, so shocked by the policy (in contrast to Dundas’s complacency about it) that “I can hardly bring myself to believe, that such a step can have been taken.”¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ “Upon such considerations, the Court has, on some occasions, laid it down that the European law of nations is not to be applied in its full rigor to the transactions of personas of the description of the present claimants, and residing in that part of the world (2nd Adm. Rep. p. 88).” Ibid., *The Hurtige Hane*, June 20, 1801, 3 Rob. 325.

¹⁰¹ Scott’s version of this argument is as follows: “In the first place it is to be recollected, that this is a Court of the Law of Nations, though sitting here under the authority of the King of Great Britain. It belongs to other nations as well as to our own; and what foreigners have a right to demand from it, is the administration of the law of nations, simply, and exclusively of the introduction of principles borrowed from our own municipal jurisprudence, to which, it is well known, they have at all times expressed no inconsiderable repugnance. In the case of a British subject it is different. To him it is a British tribunal, as well as a Court of the Law of Nations; and if he has been trampling on the known laws of his country, it is no injustice to say, that a person coming into any of the Courts of his own country, to which he is naturally amenable, on such a transaction, can receive no protection from them.” Ibid., *The Recovery*, 1807, 6 Rob. 348–349.

¹⁰² William Scott to Henry Dundas, June 1, 1794, BL, Add MS. 38353, fol. 88.

DESPITE THE CONSIDERABLE STATURE AND influence of Burke and Scott during the nineteenth century (the same cannot be said for Anquetil), the views adumbrated here left remarkably little trace in later European legal thought.¹⁰³ An increasingly hegemonic understanding of the international realm as made up of free, equal, and independent states eclipsed the earlier, more complex legal landscape of corporate polities and dependent and divided sovereignty, superannuating Burke's complexly political legal pluralism.¹⁰⁴ Europe's increasing self-confidence in light of the industrial revolution and its "great divergence"—its apparently decisive technological superiority over Asian societies whose cultural achievements had earlier commanded European respect—also surely contributed to the tendency to regard the world as divided into hierarchized legal spheres, with Europe representing the archetype and future for the rest.¹⁰⁵

If Burke's and Anquetil's legal arguments were largely ignored, Scott's view was seemingly misunderstood, or misrepresented, by later thinkers. Travers Twiss, for instance, cited Scott to make the case that the law of nations was binding only within Europe, and that because Christian powers could not expect Muslims to follow the European law of nations, there could be no legal relationship between them at all, but only, as Twiss wrote, citing Friedrich Carl von Savigny, a "purely moral" one.¹⁰⁶ This view accords with John Stuart Mill's argument that "To characterize any conduct whatever towards a barbarous people as a violation of the law of nations, only shows that he who so speaks has never considered the subject. A violation of great principles of morality it may easily be; but barbarians have no rights as a nation, except a right to such treatment as may . . . fit them for becoming one."¹⁰⁷ While the substance of Scott's view is far closer to Burke's and Anquetil's—that whatever the particular differences among legal systems, they were united by certain very basic common principles, and were mutually intelligible as law—Scott's earlier move away from a universalist and naturalist reading of the law of nations may have laid the ground for this sort of argument. Indeed, the arguments of his contemporary and acquaintance Robert Plumer Ward, in his 1795 *Law of Nations*, illustrate the ambiguous implications of the decision to abandon a commitment to the universality of the law of nations, a decision that Ward presented as the justification of his work, as against the mistaken assumptions of natural law jurisprudence:

¹⁰³ But cf. Burke's influence on nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Indian nationalists. See Ganes Prasad, "Whiggism in India," *Political Science Quarterly* 81, no. 3 (1966): 412–431; and Mukherjee, "Justice, War, and the Imperium," as well as the references to Burke in the thought of nineteenth-century imperial critics (particularly regarding his respect for Indian civilization) as noted by Gregory Claeys, *Imperial Sceptics: British Critics of Empire, 1850–1920* (Cambridge, 2010), 33, 61.

¹⁰⁴ The East India Company and the Holy Roman Empire, for instance, were both being assimilated into the modern state at the turn of the nineteenth century. On the "contagion of sovereignty" that spread the Vattelien model of the free and equal state in the wake of the American Revolution, see Armitage, *The Declaration of Independence*, 103–112.

¹⁰⁵ For the (still controversial) argument that the economic and technological divergence began at the end of the eighteenth century, much later than nineteenth-century observers convinced of Europe's cultural superiority were inclined to believe, see Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton, N.J., 2000).

¹⁰⁶ Twiss, *The Law of Nations Considered as Independent Political Communities*, 161.

¹⁰⁷ J. S. Mill, "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," in *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, ed. John M. Robson, 33 vols. (Toronto, 1963–1991), 21: 119.

It appeared to me, that we expected too much when we contended for the *universality* of the duties laid down by the Codes of the Law of Nations; that, however desirable such an universality might be . . . what is commonly called the Law of Nations . . . is not the Law of *all* nations, but only of particular classes of them; and thus there may be a *different* Law of Nations for *different* parts of the globe . . .

No one has yet laid it down in a clear, ample and precise manner that the Laws which are the objects of our enquiry are *not* the Laws of the World; of course no one has yet examined, how far they obtain with particular nations; or how far attention ought to be paid to the circumstance of their obeying another Code.¹⁰⁸

For Ward, as for Scott, the European law of nations “was not obligatory upon persons who had never been called upon to decide upon its ramifications; who might widely differ as to its application, and even as to its general and fundamental principles.”¹⁰⁹ He hoped that the example of Europe’s recent relations with Turkey, which showed some relaxation of the “horrid enmity of the Christian and Mahometan nations,” suggested that mutual legal recognition of states adhering to different law-of-nations codes was a historical probability.¹¹⁰ But like the later positivists who smuggled universalism into their apparently particularist accounts through their theories of progress and civilization, Ward belied his own seeming rejection of universalist jurisprudence in claiming that Christianity was the only true moral system.

The inclusive understanding of the law of nations as universal because rooted in the law of nature was a double-edged sword for those included. As Richard Tuck has pointed out, in addition to constituting a kind of recognition, it also morally freed Europeans for a newly aggressive imperial interventionism through treaties of alliance and military aid that once would have been forbidden as treaties with infidels.¹¹¹ But that expansive conception of the law of nations also provided the framework for a powerful line of critique of imperial injustices during this formative period for both European empires and international law. According to this critique, religious and cultural difference was no justification for differential standards of legal and political obligation. Europeans had a duty to treat their engagements outside Europe—with powers and societies that might not share European legal principles and customs in all their particulars, but that were recognizably legal orders—as just as binding, just as much a part of a global legal framework, as those within Europe.

A further danger of the broad legal inclusion through equivalence, of the kind exhibited by Burke, is that it may too readily assimilate the unfamiliar into one’s own framework, and so not recognize or give due respect to genuine differences or alternatives. Burke might be said to have done this when he claimed that he could try

¹⁰⁸ Robert Plumer Ward, *An Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations in Europe, from the Time of the Greeks and Romans to the Age of Grotius*, 2 vols. (London, 1795), 1: xiii–xiv, 169, emphasis in the original. It was Scott who reportedly first proposed that Ward, a friend of his brother, Lord Eldon, write the work; see Edmund Phipps, *Memoirs of the Political and Literary Life of Robert Plumer Ward, Esq.: With Selections from His Correspondence, Diaries, and Unpublished Literary Remains*, 2 vols. (London, 1850), 1: 15. On Ward’s counterrevolutionary politics, see Diego Panizza, *Genesi di una ideologia: Il conservatorismo moderno in Robert Ward* (Milan, 1997); and for a comparison with Bentham’s international thought, see Armitage, “Globalizing Jeremy Bentham.”

¹⁰⁹ Ward, *An Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations*, 1: xi.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 2: 321, 1: xiii–xiv.

¹¹¹ Tuck, “Alliances with Infidels in the European Imperial Expansion.”

Hastings by any law, from the Institutes of Tamerlane to the Qur'ān, and get the same result as under English law. But whatever the limitations of their approach, Burke and Anquetil were persistently self-critical, aware of the ever-present dangers of parochialism, complacency, and what Anquetil called Europe's "presumptuous science." They were alert to the ways in which the powerful may use the law as yet another tool at their disposal, and they saw the effort to secure common legal frameworks as a means of restraining abuses of power.

The greater danger of the later hegemonic universalism, the one that Arjun Appadurai rightly calls parochial, was that it assumed that the unfamiliar was unintelligible, irrational, or inferior. Its proponents assumed that their own society's beliefs constituted universal moral standards to which others ultimately would conform. Universalism premised on such a narrative of progress regards different treatment for various groups as not only defensible, but indeed required by the moral duty to assist the backward to advance. Even if the more egregious forms of this liberal imperialist universalism have been discredited, its legacies remain: as in U.S. efforts to use international law and institutions to enforce neoliberal conceptions of democracy and good governance in a project, as Grandin notes, not just of structural adjustment but of "moral adjustment." An attachment to an international hierarchy whose terms are dictated by the morally and politically advanced continues to inform liberal political thought as well as American statecraft, as in John Rawls's typology of liberal, "decent" peoples, burdened societies, and outlaw states.¹¹² The U.S. also inherited imperial Europe's resistance to the vulnerability imposed by legal constraint, as Grandin's essay in this forum so powerfully shows: U.S. leaders have insisted on understanding the Monroe Doctrine, from the time of its 1823 proclamation, as a license for unilateral intervention, rather than, as their neighbors to the south sought to read it, a mutually binding normative framework. The deferential asymmetry commended by Burke and Scott, in contrast—their insistence that powerful states limit themselves even according to laws that they cannot impose on commercial or military adversaries—counseled an acceptance of vulnerability by powerful states in their global engagements, even as they accepted the reality of empires. The vision of international law as an order of purely European origins to be imposed gradually on the rest of the world eclipsed more pluralistic understandings of possible global legalities. Those views failed to win many adherents even among the idealistic liberal internationalists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whose dream of taming state violence through international institutions and legal codes required equality only within an inner circle of "civilized" states, which together would impose law on those without.¹¹³ Recovering the earlier strands of thought even as we acknowledge their deficiencies may yet provide resources as we

¹¹² John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples: With "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited"* (Cambridge, Mass., 1999); on historical patterns of such hierarchy, see Gerry Simpson, *Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order* (Cambridge, 2004).

¹¹³ See, again, Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations*, and Morefield, *Covenants without Swords*; and note Andrew Fitzmaurice's suggestion that the most sustained criticism of empire in that period relied on the fundamentally self-interested argument that colonial despotism would come home to roost, a line of argument that Burke also deployed against the East India Company.

continue to confront the lines of political, economic, and legal exclusion bequeathed to us from a colonial order that in so many ways has survived its official demise.

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AHR Forum
Liberalism and Empire in Nineteenth-Century
International Law

ANDREW FITZMAURICE

SINCE THE PUBLICATION OF Edward Said's *Orientalism*, historians have exposed liberalism's complicity in empire.¹ Many figures in the liberal canon had close ties with colonial enterprises. More importantly, they developed their philosophies through reflection on the relative status of European and non-European peoples and consideration of the problems of empire and global commerce. The progressive or stadial theory of history, which was central to the liberal outlook, was framed by the experience of empire. Stadial theory described a hierarchical system in which the European state sat at the top, with a cascade of lesser political societies below. It was a view of the world that allowed Europeans to justify empire through the projection of their understanding of sovereignty onto societies that they judged to be inferior.

This account of liberal thought and empire has become so historiographically dominant that it has obscured the depth of liberal opposition to empire. It is true

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¹ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1978); Bhikhu Parekh, "Liberalism and Colonialism: A Critique of Locke and Mill," in Jan Nederveen Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh, eds., *The Decolonization of Imagination: Culture, Knowledge and Power* (London, 1995), 81–98; James Tully, *Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity* (Cambridge, 1995); Uday Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago, 1999); Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford, 1999). John Locke has been a focal point of these studies, not because he was a liberal but because he became a rallying point for liberals: Barbara Arneil, *John Locke and America: The Defence of English Colonialism* (Oxford, 1996); James Tully, *An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts* (Cambridge, 1993); David Armitage, "John Locke, Carolina, and the *Two Treatises of Government*," *Political Theory* 32, no. 5 (October 2004): 602–627. Recent studies point to a more supple liberalism, but one still largely beholden to empire; see, for example, Duncan Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900* (Princeton, N.J., 2007); Karuna Mantena, "The Crisis of Liberal Imperialism," in Duncan Bell, ed., *Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge, 2007), 113–135; Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton, N.J., 2005); Jeanne Morefield, *Covenants without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire* (Princeton, N.J., 2005); Casper Sylvest, *British Liberal Internationalism, 1880–1930: Making Progress?* (Manchester, 2009); Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, N.J., 2010). For a comprehensive review of the literature on empire and liberalism, see Jennifer Pitts, "Political Theory of Empire and Imperialism," *Annual Review of Political Science* 13, no. 1 (2010): 211–235.

that liberalism acted as an engine of empire, but the liberal tradition also generated debates over the justice of empire. Self-described “liberal” thinkers opposed and critiqued empire from a variety of motives. Many of these critiques came from international law. The law of nations and international law have in recent years been shown to have made a key contribution to the liberal apology for empire.² Liberals turned to international law when they sought to establish the legitimacy of empire. It was, however, within international law that a vigorous debate was also conducted about the civilizing mission, the hierarchy of nations, and the degree to which peoples at different levels of that hierarchy possessed rights. In this light, the emerging discipline of international law needs to be understood as something more than a liberal instrument created for the domination of global political society.

The skeptics of empire among international jurists were not motivated by philanthropy or humanitarianism. Indeed, most philanthropists and humanitarians have been correctly portrayed as apologists for empire.³ The skeptics were concerned with liberty rather than sovereignty. Freedom was as important in the liberal tradition as sovereignty, and the pursuit of freedom was frequently in tension with the demands of the state. For these jurists, empire posed a threat to the fragile freedoms that had been secured by the modern revolutions. Although those revolutions had, they argued, overthrown absolutism, empire created a space in which arbitrary rule and absolutism could return and could then be repatriated to Europe.

These authors were not the first European opponents of empire. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Spanish Empire had been critiqued from the point of view of rights, famously by the so-called School of Salamanca.⁴ The European empires of the seventeenth century were opposed with the humanistic argument that luxury created by empire would corrupt metropolitan virtue.⁵ As Jennifer Pitts’s essay in this forum shows, concerns about rights in the context of empire persisted through the eighteenth century. Philosophers such as Denis Diderot, Immanuel Kant, and Johann Gottfried Herder were also skeptical of empire.⁶ Some of these writers, including Montesquieu and, later in the nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville, were ambivalent about empire, but others were prepared to abandon it altogether.⁷ In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Whiggish concern with luxury and empire continued to flourish.⁸ Moreover, a third, socialist, mode of opposition to empire developed over the course of the nineteenth century.⁹ Finally, nineteenth-century liberals launched a powerful critique of empire on the basis that

² Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge, 2005); Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870–1960* (Cambridge, 2001).

³ Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations*.

⁴ Anthony Pagden, *The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology* (Cambridge, 1982).

⁵ David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 2001); Andrew Fitzmaurice, *Humanism and America: An Intellectual History of English Colonisation, 1500–1625* (Cambridge, 2003).

⁶ Sankar Muthu, *Enlightenment against Empire* (Princeton, N.J., 2003).

⁷ Jennifer Pitts, “Liberalism and Empire in a Nineteenth-Century Algerian Mirror,” *Modern Intellectual History* 6, no. 2 (2009): 287–313; Andrew Sartori, “The British Empire and Its Liberal Mission,” *Journal of Modern History* 78, no. 3 (September 2006): 623–642.

⁸ Miles Taylor, “Imperium et libertas? Rethinking the Radical Critique of Imperialism during the Nineteenth Century,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 19, no. 1 (1991): 1–23.

⁹ Gregory Claeys, “The ‘Left’ and the Critique of Empire, c. 1865–1900: Three Roots of Human-

it was a hazard to free trade, although these critics were happy, on the same grounds, to see the extension of what has been described as “informal” empire.¹⁰ In the second half of the nineteenth century, opposition to empire was nothing new, although it found new material. What was remarkable about this late-nineteenth-century critique of empire, however, was that it found a place at the heart of liberalism at a time when it had reached the high-water mark of pro-imperial sentiment. It therefore underlines the fact that, even at its most pro-imperial, liberalism was characterized by conflict over empire, rather than doctrine.

The liberal divisions over empire were deepened by debates over the Congo. Africa was a focus of the great expansion of European imperial enterprise in the 1870s and 1880s, and the discussion of empire within international law became most heated leading up to and following the carve-up of that continent. In 1884, Otto von Bismarck, the chancellor of the newly established German Empire, called a meeting in Berlin of those powers that were recognized as members of the community of nations. His intention was to establish the principles upon which European sovereignty could be extended over Africa in a manner that contained the rivalries. It was expected that international law could furnish those principles. These efforts to justify European empires provoked innovation in the legal apparatus used to justify the extension of sovereignty over non-European peoples. But the same efforts also stimulated and intensified opposition, which drew upon the longstanding critiques of empire. The debates between the jurists had a direct impact upon decisions about Africa’s destiny, as well as the broader world order, and they were mobilized through such tools as a constitution for the Congo and the creation of the concept of *territorium nullius*. Even though the critics would lose their struggle against the occupation of Africa, they drew attention to the fact that liberalism contained resources with which it was possible to oppose empire.

The thesis that liberalism drove empire is partly sustained by the notion that concepts of universal rights were eclipsed in the nineteenth century by nationalism and positivism.¹¹ The positivists scorned the idea that rights could be natural and could therefore exist outside civil authority. Rights were guaranteed only by positive law, and therefore by the state. Positivism thus encouraged the notion that peoples outside the nation could possess rights only by virtue of possessing sovereignty. If they had no sovereignty, then they could benefit only from the rights that would come from the projection of European sovereignty. There could be no *ius gentium*, no law of peoples whereby people possessed rights as people rather than as citizens or sub-

itarian Foreign Policy,” in Bell, *Victorian Visions of Global Order*, 239–266; Gregory Claeys, *Imperial Sceptics: British Critics of Empire, 1850–1920* (Cambridge, 2010).

¹⁰ For the free trade opponents to “formal” empire, see John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser., 6, no. 1 (1953): 1–15; Oliver MacDonagh, “The Anti-Imperialism of Free Trade,” *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser., 14, no. 3 (1962): 489–501; R. J. Moore, “Imperialism and Free Trade Policy in India, 1853–1854,” *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser., 17, no. 3 (1964): 135–145; Anthony Howe, “Free Trade and Global Order: The Rise and Fall of a Victorian Vision,” in Bell, *Victorian Visions of Global Order*, 26–46.

¹¹ Jeremy Waldron, ed., “Nonsense upon Stilts”: *Bentham, Burke, and Marx on the Rights of Man* (London, 1987), 151–156; J. B. Schneewind, *The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1998); Anthony Pagden, “Human Rights, Natural Rights, and Europe’s Imperial Legacy,” *Political Theory* 31, no. 2 (April 2003): 171–199; Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010), 31.

jects. In this way, positivism, combining powerfully with a stadial theory of sovereignty, has been seen as the epistemology of the liberal apology for empire. Since a self-described liberal tradition did not emerge until the nineteenth century, it would certainly appear to be more than a coincidence if the universal understanding of rights, which reached its peak in the Enlightenment, was buried at the historical moment that liberalism was born.

There are problems, however, with the representation of positivism and nationalism as hegemonic nineteenth-century discourses.¹² The purchase of positivism was at its weakest in international law, because in international space, positive law was not sanctioned by a sovereign. For many jurists, only some form of natural law sanction—such as self-preservation—could make it possible for international positive law to be regarded as law. Positivism, public opinion, historicism, and natural law combined to form a synthetic understanding of rights in the writings of many international lawyers. It was the notion of rights having universal moral force, and not just as the creation of the legal regimes of states, that fed much of the liberal critique of empire during the course of the century.

The different traditions of understanding rights in the history of Western political thought point to the fact that liberalism, within which rights held a central place, was itself divided. Nineteenth-century liberalism was a loose consensus on the desirability of liberty, rights and duties, freedom of commerce, the rule of law, and the sanctity of property. One of the central divisions within liberalism, and in political thought prior to the existence of a self-conscious liberal tradition, was precisely over the question of whether rights were the creation of states or whether certain fundamental rights belonged to humans in nature. This debate underlines what Jürgen Habermas has called the Janus-faced nature of liberalism, and both sides in it have produced assumptions that could be used to justify and to critique empire.¹³

The new race for empire in the 1870s and 1880s was stimulated by improvements in military and transport technologies, including rail and the steamship (which made fast-flowing West African rivers navigable to Europeans for the first time), as well as progress in tropical medicine. Renewed French and British empires, and a new German Empire, were also driven by ideologies, by national Darwinism, by capitalism, and by a passionate rhetoric of the civilizing mission. Jules Ferry, the French premier at the time of the Berlin Conference in 1884–1885, was a champion of the new imperialism, famously declaring in July 1885: “the superior races have a right vis-à-vis the inferior races.” He was speaking, however, during an uproar in the French Parliament. He was immediately interrupted by Jules Maigne, the Left deputy from Haute-Loire, who cried: “Oh! You dare to say that in the country where the rights of man were proclaimed.” Ferry responded by asking whether the Declaration of the Rights of Man had been written for “black people in Equatorial Africa,” and then repeated, “the superior races have a right because they have a duty.

¹² Jennifer Pitts, “Boundaries of Victorian International Law,” in Bell, *Victorian Visions of Global Order*, 67–88; Casper Sylvest, “The Foundations of Victorian International Law,” *ibid.*, 59; Sandra den Otter, “‘A Legislating Empire’: Victorian Political Theorists, Codes of Law, and Empire,” *ibid.*, 95–96; Andrew Fitzmaurice, “The Resilience of Natural Law in the Writings of Sir Travers Twiss,” in Ian Hall and Lisa Hill, eds., *British International Thinkers from Hobbes to Namier* (New York, 2009), 137–159.

¹³ Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), chap. 3.

They have a duty to civilize the inferior races." Yet again, however, he was interrupted, this time by the republican deputy Joseph Fabre, who protested: "This is excessive! You thus succeed in the abdication of the principles of 1789 [the Revolution] and 1848 [the July Revolution] . . . and consecrate the replacement of the law of justice with prerogative law [*la loi de grâce*]." ¹⁴ The responses to Ferry express what was at stake for the liberal critics of empire: namely, the possibility that empire would encourage the return of arbitrary rule, thus threatening the freedoms that had been won by the modern revolutions. This sentiment was found among critics of empire across Europe. The opposition included strident criticism of the civilizing mission, which was perceived as a threat to European freedom. ¹⁵ In this context, those jurists and politicians who defended empire took a robust view of the state as the creator of rights, while those who critiqued empire employed the argument that rights exist outside the state.

MOST LATE-NINETEENTH-CENTURY international lawyers were members or associate members of the Institut de droit international. The Institut was the first organization of international lawyers. It established the idea of international law as a profession, rather than a sideline pursued by diplomats and civil lawyers, and it rapidly deepened debate on the issues that concerned this community. ¹⁶ It was founded in 1873 as a reaction to the failure to respect the Geneva Convention during the Franco-Prussian War, but its members were moved by a broader liberal and reforming spirit. It was established by prominent liberals, men such as the Belgian politician and lawyer Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns (1835–1902), the Swiss jurist and political theorist Johann Kaspar Bluntschli (1808–1881), and Gustave Moynier (1826–1910), co-founder and president of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Membership embraced all the major European and American powers, and this group met every two years. ¹⁷ These self-described liberals aimed not only to establish a system of rules that would govern the behavior of states, but also to reform states and combat authoritarian rule. The exception to their reforming spirit, we are told, was their attitude to empire. ¹⁸ They are said to have endorsed the projection of European sovereignty abroad as enthusiastically as they pursued reform at home. In fact, they were divided in their views regarding empire, and also civilization. Many were indeed enthusiasts for European civilization, some were ambivalent, some were relativists, and yet others were damning of the "pretensions" of civilization. Importantly, the divisions between these jurists deepened from the 1870s through to the 1890s. The principal cause of this polarization was the scramble for Africa, which raised the stakes in the discussion of the justice of empire.

¹⁴ Jules Ferry, July 28, 1885, in Paul Robiquet, ed., *Discours et Opinions de Jules Ferry*, 7 vols. (Paris, 1893–1898), 5: 210–211.

¹⁵ Cf. Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930* (Stanford, Calif., 1997), 13.

¹⁶ Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations*, contains the most comprehensive history of the Institut de droit international.

¹⁷ For the constitution and objectives of the Institut, see *Revue de droit international et de législation comparée* [hereafter *RDI*] 5 (1873): 667–712.

¹⁸ Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations*, 4–5.

Auguste-Wilhelm Heffter (1796–1880), a founding member of the Institut, strongly rejected force in the conduct of empire and was similarly dismissive of the rights of civilization.¹⁹ Heffter was born in Saxe, and later became professor of law at Bonn, Halle, and Berlin and a counselor of the Supreme Court of Berlin.²⁰ For Heffter, a constitutional state, which was an expression of popular will, was the highest form of political development.²¹ He published these views in successive editions of *Das europäische Völkerrecht* in 1844 and 1848, at a time when Prussia was torn between supporters of the monarch's divine right to rule and the revolutionaries who in 1848 sought constitutional government. He wrote, moreover, when imperial designs beyond Europe were remote from German political life. Heffter's text was republished in 1873, the year the Institut was founded, and in this translation he declared: "Occupation is notably applied to areas or islands which are not inhabited or not entirely occupied, but no power on earth has the right to impose its laws upon wandering or even savage peoples." He added that while nature did not forbid empire, "propaganda about civilization" did not justify an empire's attempt to establish "domination everywhere it suits that nation."²²

Heffter's views can be contrasted with those of the Swiss-born Bluntschli, also one of the Institut founders, who was typical of the liberal apologists for empire and was in tune with the developing interest within Germany in overseas expansion in the 1870s.²³ Among his many offices, Bluntschli was a professor of constitutional law at Heidelberg, counselor to the Grand Duke Frederick I of Baden, and a member of the Baden Parliament. He devoted his life to theorizing and valorizing the state and strongly supported Prussian hegemony and Bismarck's policy of unification.²⁴ His enthusiasm for European sovereignty as the highest expression of the freedom of human beings was evident in his discussion of the occupation of the territory of "barbarian tribes." These tribes, he argued, could not be expelled; they must be allowed to "emigrate" in peace. At the same time, the colonizing state had a right to "extend its sovereignty over territory occupied by savage tribes in order to promote civilization and the extension of culture."²⁵

AT THE TIME THE INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL was established, there were already contrasting views about the justification of empire, such as those of Heffter and Bluntschli. But these differences hardened as the scramble for Africa accelerated in the late 1870s and the early years of the 1880s. Sir Travers Twiss (1809–1897), one of Bluntschli's colleagues in the Institut, expressed a similarly robust view of the rights of European nations to colonize, and he developed that view further in jus-

¹⁹ "Liste des membres effectifs de l'Institut de droit international, Octobre 1873," *RDI* 5 (1873): 711.

²⁰ Ernest Nys, *Droit international: Les principes, les théories, les faits*, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Brussels, 1904), 1: 289–290.

²¹ Auguste-Guillaume Heffter, *Le droit international public de l'Europe* (Paris, 1873), 37–39.

²² *Ibid.*, 142.

²³ On Bluntschli "parmi les modérés ou libéraux," see Alphonse Rivier, "Notice sur M. Bluntschli," in Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, *Droit international codifié*, 4th ed. (Paris, 1886), viii; and Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations*, 42–47.

²⁴ Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, *The Theory of the State* (Oxford, 1895); and "Nécrologie: M. Bluntschli," *RDI* 13 (1881): 626.

²⁵ Bluntschli, *Droit international codifié*, 176–177.

tifying the occupation of the Congo. Twiss wrote for much of his career in support of British interests.²⁶ When he wrote on the Congo, however, he was serving another sovereign.

In 1873, Twiss resigned his offices in service of the crown as the consequence of a marriage scandal.²⁷ Prior to this rupture, he had risen to advocate general, the government's adviser on civil law. Subsequently, he spent much of his energy promoting King Leopold II's claims over the Congo. Thus, he was not even engaged in the service of another nation, but rather of a private individual, Leopold, who had failed to secure the support of the Belgian government for his scheme, and a private organization, the International African Association. Leopold's Congo venture was the most extreme form of the new imperialism, insofar as it was launched by a private association and not by a state. In this instance, the ideological and technological instruments of empire can be seen to be ends in themselves. Twiss's justification of the Congo enterprise extended beyond his publications through to an involvement in the various international institutions that attempted to regulate African colonization, notably the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885. He showed that publishing and institutional activism were most effectively employed in concert.²⁸

Drawing on his knowledge of ecclesiastical law, Twiss deployed the canon law concept of *territorium nullius* in international law, a concept that would soon play a central role in the debates that revolved around the Berlin Conference. Reflecting his role as an Admiralty Court lawyer, he repeatedly employed the term "*nullius territorium*" in the 1860s and 1870s to explain that the sea could not be subject to the sovereignty of any state.²⁹ Indeed, Twiss appears to have been almost the only international lawyer in the nineteenth century to employ the concept of *nullius territorium*, or *territorium nullius*, prior to 1880.³⁰ His increasing use of the term in the late 1870s corresponded with the intensifying interest shown by European colonial

²⁶ Travers Twiss, *The Oregon Territory: Its History and Discovery* (New York, 1846). On Twiss, see Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations*, 132–133, 143; Pitts, "Boundaries of Victorian International Law," 71–72; Caspar Sylvest, "'Our Passion for Legality': International Law and Imperialism in Late Nineteenth-Century Britain," *Review of International Studies* 34, no. 3 (2008): 403–423; Fitzmaurice, "The Resilience of Natural Law in the Writings of Sir Travers Twiss"; Andrew Fitzmaurice, "The Justification of King Leopold II's Congo Enterprise by Sir Travers Twiss," in Shaunnagh Dorsett and Ian Hunter, eds., *Law and Politics in British Colonial Thought: Transpositions of Empire* (New York, 2010), 109–126.

²⁷ On the marriage scandal, see Fitzmaurice, "The Justification of King Leopold II's Congo Enterprise."

²⁸ On the need to go beyond textual analysis in the study of empire, see Frederick Cooper, "Postcolonial Studies and the Study of History," in Ania Loomba, ed., *Postcolonial Studies and Beyond* (Durham, N.C., 2005), 401–422; and Pitts, "Political Theory of Empire and Imperialism," 217.

²⁹ Sir Travers Twiss, *The Law of Nations Considered as Independent Political Communities: On the Rights and Duties of Nations in Time of War* (London, 1863), 141; Twiss, "Applicability of the European Law of Nations to African Slave States," *Law Magazine and Review* 120 (May 1876): 436; Twiss, "On the International Jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court in Civil Matters," *Law Magazine and Review* 124 (May 1877): 304; Twiss, "The Criminal Jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England: The Case of the *Francia*," *Law Magazine and Review* 123 (February 1877): 147; Twiss, "Collisions at Sea: A Scheme of International Tribunals," *Law Magazine and Review* 130 (November 1878): 4; Twiss, "Collisions on the High Seas," *Albany Law Journal* 18 (October 12, 1878): 288.

³⁰ See also Edward S. Creasy, *First Platform of International Law* (London, 1876), 232, citing Twiss. But Twiss was certainly not the originator of the term. *Territorium nullius* was relatively frequently employed in European canon law at least as early as the 1830s, and probably well before. The term was used by Catholic canonists to describe church land that could not be occupied and was not subject to sovereignty.

powers in central West Africa, but there was as yet no apparent connection made with that colonial ambition.

Leopold succeeded in converting his “humanitarian” International African Association into a state that would be responsible for the deaths of millions of Congolese people.³¹ At the outset, however, he faced significant obstacles to his ambitions, particularly insofar as the acceptance of the international community was concerned. To overcome these obstacles, he enlisted Twiss, who had been ostracized from British public life. From 1878, fears were raised that the increasing competition between the various European interests acting in the Congo could lead to conflict.³² Twiss responded that the necessary condition for peace in the Congo would be territorial sovereignty.³³ He acknowledged that some form of law existed already in the lower Congo, but he declared that “the organisation of the native races on the banks of the Congo is still *tribal*, and *territorial* Sovereignty in the sense in which it has superseded *personal* Sovereignty in Europe, is still unknown.”³⁴ He claimed that in the upper Congo it was not at all clear to whom European merchants owed obedience.³⁵ In both cases, so far as Twiss was concerned, the presence of even personal sovereignty exercised by native peoples meant that there was a void of territorial sovereignty. He was not concerned only about the native peoples of the Congo when he spoke about the vacuum of territorial sovereignty; he was also referring to the empty pretensions of certain European powers to possess sovereignty over the region, particularly the Portuguese.

In the months prior to the Berlin Conference, a tract titled *Sir Travers Twiss et le Congo* was published in Brussels. The anonymous author, identified only as “A Member of the Royal Geographical Society of Anvers,” attacked both Leopold and Twiss, accusing them of attempting to create an absolutist state.³⁶ “Who would believe,” the author stormed, that anybody would wish to spend millions civilizing central Africa out of a “simple love of humanity.” The author argued that “to demand today the recognition of absolute rights, without their even being exercised in fact, as is the case in the Congo, this would seem to us to leave the path of serious juridical debate.”³⁷ This linking of empire with absolutism was the common refrain of critics.³⁸

The British government sent five delegates to the Berlin Conference, including

³¹ The best accounts of the negotiations leading to the creation of the Congo Free State are William Roger Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization—Collected Essays* (London, 2006); and S. E. Crowe, *The Berlin West Africa Conference, 1884–1885* (London, 1942). Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa* (Boston, 1998), provides a vivid account of the terror of the Congo Free State.

³² “Propositions diverses: Proposition de M. Moynier concernant le Congo,” *Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international* 7 (1885): 237–238.

³³ Sir Travers Twiss, “La libre navigation du Congo,” *RDI* 15 (1883): 437–442; Twiss, “La libre navigation du Congo: Deuxième article,” *ibid.*, 547–563; Twiss, *An International Protectorate of the Congo River* (London, 1883), reprinted as Twiss, “An International Protectorate of the Congo River,” *Law Magazine and Review* 250 (November 1883): 1–20.

³⁴ Twiss, *An International Protectorate of the Congo River*, 17.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 16–19.

³⁶ Membre de la Société Royale de Géographie d’Anvers, *Sir Travers Twiss et le Congo: Réponse à la Revue de droit international et de législation comparée et au Law Magazine and Review* (Brussels, 1884).

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 40.

³⁸ In May 1884, Twiss responded to his attacker with a third article on the Congo in the *Revue de droit international*: Twiss, “La libre navigation du Congo: Troisième article,” *RDI* 16 (1884): 237–246.

Twiss in an unofficial capacity.³⁹ He thus contrived to return to public service simultaneously for both Britain and Leopold, even though their interests at the conference were not identical. At the conference, the powers accepted Leopold's desire to turn the International African Association into a state, because this outcome would guarantee that a large part of the Congo would be denied to the other major powers. Twiss presented Leopold's case to the British and, having prevailed, was given the task of drafting the treaty recognizing the new state.⁴⁰

The Congo Free State was now born in all but name. In anticipation of this outcome, Leopold had already commissioned a draft of its constitution. For that task, he turned once again to Twiss. This constitution confirmed the fears of Twiss's anonymous Belgian attacker. It granted prerogative rule to Leopold, giving him the power to suspend laws and officers of the state "à sa discrétion."⁴¹ Finally, Twiss was appointed to chair the commission at the Berlin Conference that would determine the rules of effective occupation.⁴² Twiss's efforts are an indication of the degree to which the jurists who belonged to the Institut were concerned that real-world consequences follow from textual debates. Most members of the Institut held diplomatic and political positions, as well as being practicing jurists, and in these roles they sought to bring their visions of global order to reality.

THE CONCERN WITH HOW TO JUSTIFY the occupation of a society that possessed some degree of law, and even sovereignty, became the focus of jurists' discussions several years after the conference. In September 1885, the Institut met in Brussels, where the members established a commission, chaired by the German professor of ecclesiastical and international law Ferdinand Martitz, to study the question of effective occupation.⁴³ In Martitz's subsequent report, a new understanding of effective occupation was being articulated, in which the measure of whether colonial occupation was possible was not property but sovereignty, and not merely sovereignty but territorial sovereignty, not *dominium* but territorial *imperium*. To this end, he applied the term *territorium nullius* to the question of colonization. Apart from Twiss's works in which *nullius territorium* had been used, the term was fresh in international law, and it had not been used to discuss colonization prior to this point. The seven members of the Brussels committee were Tobias Asser, Edouard Engelhardt, Friedrich Geffcken, Emile de Laveleye, Friedrich Martens, Martitz, and, almost inevitably, Twiss. Each member of the committee was eminent in international life. For example, Asser, who would later win the Nobel Peace Prize, and de Laveleye were among the founders of the Institut. The Belgian de Laveleye had written on the

³⁹ Granville to Malet, The National Archives, Kew, UK, Foreign Office [hereafter FO], November 14, 1884, 348, and FO 84/1814, 309v. Telegram, Malet to Lord Granville, Berlin, November 12, 1884, FO 84/1814, 310.

⁴⁰ Crowe, *The Berlin West Africa Conference*, 147.

⁴¹ "West African Conference. Confidential. Projet.—La Constitution de l'Etat.—L'Afrique Equatoriale," FO 84/1815, 80–81.

⁴² Telegram, Edward Malet to Granville, Berlin, January 19, 1885, FO 84/1820, 58.

⁴³ Edouard Engelhardt, "Sixième commission—Examen de la théorie de la conférence de Berlin sur l'occupation des territoires," *Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international* 10 (1888–1889): 173.

economics of colonization since the 1860s and was a close adviser to Leopold on the creation of the International African Association.⁴⁴

The members of the committee were divided, however, and could not reach a common position. Their division reflects the polarization of pro- and anti-imperial views among jurists over the scramble for Africa in the 1880s. Martitz's report reflected only one side of that debate. According to Martitz, "All regions are considered to be *territorium nullius* which do not find themselves effectively under sovereignty . . . no matter whether the region is inhabited or not."⁴⁵ "It is an exaggeration," he declared, "to speak of the sovereignty of savage or semi-barbarian peoples." Moreover, "international law does not recognize rights of independent tribes." For this reason, he concluded, "*territorium nullius* is not the same thing as *res nullius*."⁴⁶ The idea of *res nullius* was based upon the Roman law of occupation whereby things that were judged to have no owner became the property of the first taker. Martitz accepted that African tribes had rights under the law of *res nullius*: that is, for him, *res nullius* was a rule of property or *dominium*. The African peoples could possess property rights, and so not be inhabitants of *res nullius*, but that did not give them any rights of sovereignty, and in this sense, the *imperium* of their regions remained unrealized. All of Martitz's arguments regarding *territorium nullius* in relation to the Congo were consistent with Twiss's pronouncements on the same subject. Indeed, the test that Martitz applied to whether colonial intervention was justified was one of territorial sovereignty. *Territorium nullius* was a measure of territorial sovereignty, which, according to Twiss, was precisely the form of political organization that was absent in the Congo.⁴⁷ Indeed, *territorium nullius* was both the legal complement to treaty-making and the legal expression of the protectorate.

Just as there was a distinction in the minds of these jurists between *res nullius* and *territorium nullius*, it is also important to distinguish between *territorium nullius* and the now more commonly known term *terra nullius*. It has been said that there was a contradiction between the application of the doctrine of *terra nullius* to African peoples, denying them any rights, and the common claim to title through purchase and cession from those same tribes.⁴⁸ The term *terra nullius* was not, however, applied to Africa in the late nineteenth century. Although it had sometimes been previously employed in canon law, the term became popular in international law in early-twentieth-century debates over the polar regions, and in that context it signified

⁴⁴ For Laveleye and Leopold, see Jan Vandersmissen, *Koningen van de wereld: Leopold II en de aardrijkskundige beweging* (Leuven, 2009).

⁴⁵ M. de Martitz, "Occupation des territoires: Rapport et projet de résolutions présentés à l'Institut de droit international," *RDI* 19 (1887): 373–374.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 374.

⁴⁷ For Achille Mbembe, one of the key elements in the "European imaginary" necessary to late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century colonization was the "territorialization of the sovereign state." It was precisely this idea that *territorium nullius* articulated. According to Mbembe, the people who were to be colonized were also perceived as not being "sovereign subjects," although it is striking that the concept of *territorium nullius* was developed in order to justify even the colonization of a people who could be perceived in that way. See Mbembe, "Necropolitics," trans. Libby Meintjes, *Public Culture* 15, no. 1 (2003): 23–24.

⁴⁸ Jörg Fisch, "Africa as *Terra Nullius*: The Berlin Conference and International Law," in Stig Förster, Wolfgang J. Mommsen, and Ronald Edward Robinson, eds., *Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference, 1884–1885, and the Onset of Partition* (Oxford, 1988), 347–375; Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law*, 91; and Sylvest, "'Our Passion for Legality,'" 415.

a complete absence of rights.⁴⁹ The doctrine of *territorium nullius*, by contrast, denied rights only of territorial sovereignty. Indigenous peoples could still have rights of property and, as Twiss observed, rights of personal sovereignty without possessing territorial sovereignty. Those peoples could therefore cede through treaties those rights they were believed to have without there being any implication that they were territorially sovereign and so exempt from the laws applying to effective occupation.

Twiss had argued for the need for treaties in order to occupy *territorium nullius* in his submission on the Congo to the U.S. Congressional Committee on Foreign Relations. According to the report of that committee, the “exhaustive statements of Sir Travers Twiss” had demonstrated that the United States should recognize the International African Association as a state because “the native chiefs have the right to make these treaties” ceding “any powers” that belonged to them.⁵⁰ The effort to occupy the Congo had been accompanied by a race to make treaties with local rulers.⁵¹ The Berlin Conference then determined the destinies of those peoples without any signatories of the treaties present, a fact upon which even the British ambassador, Sir Edward Malet, felt obliged to comment: “I must remind myself that the indigenous people are not represented in our meeting” even though “the decisions of the Conference have for them an extreme gravity.”⁵²

At the 1888 meeting of the Institut de droit international at Lausanne, the meaning and scope of *territorium nullius* became the center of attention. Guido Fusinato, professor of law at the University of Turin and Italian undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, explained that “the idea of *territorium nullius* in public law corresponds with that of *res nullius* in private law.” He expanded: “As *res nullius* in private law concerns things that are not objects of property, *territorium nullius* in public law is not an object of sovereignty.” He insisted, moreover, that just as *res nullius* had been regulated by the law, so “in public law, the acquisition of *territorium nullius* must be regulated.”⁵³

At the same meeting, skeptics of colonization, including Edouard Engelhardt, protested against the understanding of occupation that jurists such as Martitz, Twiss, and Fusinato derived from the agreements made at the Berlin Conference. Engelhardt had been a member of Martitz’s commission and wrote a dissenting report in which he demanded that the Lausanne meeting of the Institut “renounce” the first article of Martitz’s report: namely, the article demanding that “all regions, whether or not they are inhabited, be regarded as *territorium nullius*.”⁵⁴ Engelhardt objected

⁴⁹ Andrew Fitzmaurice, “A Genealogy of *Terra Nullius*,” *Australian Historical Studies* 129 (April 2007): 1–15.

⁵⁰ U.S. Senate, *Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, March 26, 1884, reprinted in Henry Wellington Wack, *The Story of the Congo Free State* (New York, 1905), 492–502, here 498.

⁵¹ Henry Stanley, *The Congo, and the Founding of Its Free State: A Story of Work and Exploration*, 2 vols. (New York, 1885), 2: 379. Examples of the treaties as well as a list of treaties made through to 1883 are reprinted in Wack, *The Story of the Congo Free State*, 487–491.

⁵² Cited in Franz Ansprenger, “African Perception of the New European Policies in Africa during the 1880s,” in Förster, Mommsen, and Robinson, *Bismarck, Europe, and Africa*, 507.

⁵³ Engelhardt, “Sixième commission,” 183.

⁵⁴ Edouard Engelhardt, “Étude sur la déclaration de la conférence de Berlin relative aux occupations,” *RDI* 18 (1886): 433–441, 573–586. See also Engelhardt, “Projet de déclaration internationale,” *RDI* 19 (1887): 175–179; Engelhardt, “Conférence de Berlin,” *RDI* 18 (1886): 96–98; Engelhardt, “Sixième commission,” 179. For the first article of Martitz’s report, see Martitz, “Occupation des territoires,” 373.

that it was dangerous to apply this rule to inhabited regions.⁵⁵ Under what conditions, he asked, would a state be regarded as part of the community of nations? What was the situation of a state, such as Morocco, that recognized some of the rules of the law of nations and not others? Other societies, he insisted, were outside the law of nations and yet still deserved respect. He argued that there were even savage peoples, who were completely outside the law of nations, for whom it would nevertheless be “exorbitant to consider their territory as *territorium nullius*.”⁵⁶ Engelhardt prevailed after intensive debate, and the first article, the concept of *territorium nullius*, was suppressed. The opponents of treating Africa as *territorium nullius* were concerned about the potential for European sovereigns having arbitrary power over private property. That potential would arise if those sovereigns were able to seize power over peoples who clearly possessed both *dominium* and *imperium*. This concern was particularly strong in relation to the Congo because Leopold’s state, based upon a private company, was ruled by prerogative rather than by law. Prerogative power had, as we have seen, been legitimized by Twiss in his constitution for the new state.

THE PROJECTION OF EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY, and the principles discussed in the aftermath of the Berlin Conference, became the topic of a number of treatises in the last years of the century. Some of these subjected the Berlin agreements and the Institut debates to highly skeptical scrutiny. A number of French jurists and politicians had become critical of empire following the Franco-Prussian War in 1870–1871. The effort required to maintain the French Empire was partly blamed for domestic military weakness. By the 1880s, however, critics of empire were focused less upon the problems raised directly by the Franco-Prussian War than upon arguments used by neo-imperialists, such as Jules Ferry, who were themselves emerging from the shadow of the 1870–1871 war. Prominent among these critics of an increasingly strident imperialism were Charles Salomon and Gaston Jèze.

The Berlin Conference, according to Salomon, had recognized some of the limits in which occupation can be applied; for example, it recognized that “indigenous peoples, as indigenous peoples, are not incapable of having rights of sovereignty. Their rights of private property must [also] be respected.” But, he objected, the principles agreed at Berlin had not been respected by imperial governments.⁵⁷ Moreover, the principles established at Berlin concerning occupation were themselves “incomplete and insufficient.”⁵⁸ Indeed, in the two decades after Salomon wrote, the assurances made at Berlin regarding the property rights of native peoples were ignored by most colonial states in Africa, which deprived the native farmers and pastoralists of their land.

Salomon turned to the conditions in which occupation could be just. In Roman law, he argued, for property in something to be acquired, it must belong to no one.

⁵⁵ Engelhardt, “Sixième commission,” 177.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 178. See also Engelhardt, “Étude sur la déclaration de la conférence de Berlin.”

⁵⁷ Charles Salomon, *L’occupation des territoires sans maître: Étude de droit international* (Paris, 1889), 83–84.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 96.

In international law, it is sovereignty rather than property that is acquired. In that case, the same rule applied: namely, the object of occupation must belong to no one, but the difference was that it must not be under any form of sovereignty; it must be a *territorium nullius*. Thus he agreed that *territorium nullius* was the equivalent in international public law of *res nullius* in private Roman law.⁵⁹ But for Salomon, the territory in question must have no form of political organization at all to be a *territorium nullius*, whereas apologists for the occupation of Africa had attempted to base the concept upon a distinction between different levels of sovereignty. At issue were a different anthropology and a dramatically contrasting attitude to civilization.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, according to Salomon, all territories not inhabited by Christians were taken to be *res nullius*. In his own day, he said, an even more odious doctrine prevailed—namely, that all territories that were not civilized were treated as *res nullius*: “the argument used nowadays by civilized peoples to justify and disguise the spoliation of the weaker races, is no longer religious interest, it is the interest of civilization: modern peoples have a civilizing mission to fulfill from which they cannot escape.” “No word,” he declared, “is vaguer and has been used to commit greater iniquities than the word ‘civilization.’” Revealing the motivation for his skepticism, he warned: “Beware! The pretended right of civilization could serve to legitimize the gravest attacks, even in Europe . . . Is there not a German civilization, a Slavic civilization, a Latin civilization? Have we not often supported the incontestable superiority of one over the other?”⁶⁰

While Salomon was at one end of a spectrum that was polarized after the 1880s, his views were by no means radical in the 1890s. Authors who were ambivalent about empire, such as Henry Bonfils (1835–1897) and Frantz Despagnet (1857–1906), nevertheless expressed doubt about the civilizing mission. Bonfils was the author of probably the most influential French textbook in international law at the end of the century, in which he argued that “an absolute respect is due to the independence of savage or barbarian tribes as well as to their right to property . . . Civilized powers do not have more right to seize the territories of savages than savages have the right to occupy European continents.”⁶¹ In the light of defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, Despagnet sought a place for France in the international order whereby it could recover its grandeur and yet pursue progress, justice, and peace.⁶² “Civilization,” he observed, “is an eminently relative thing that we cannot measure.” The “pretended right to spread civilization” had been used to “despoil savage peoples of their sovereignty.” “An absolute respect,” he declared, “was due to all sovereignty, even barbarian.” Despagnet’s own absolute respect for sovereignty meant that any peoples who were not perceived to live in sovereign political systems could have their territory occupied.⁶³

Salomon, by contrast, took his concerns about the imperial mission further. His understanding of what kinds of societies possess sovereignty was extensive and in-

⁵⁹ Ibid., 191.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 192–196.

⁶¹ Henry Bonfils, *Manuel de droit international public*, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1901), 307.

⁶² Frantz Despagnet, *La diplomatie de la Troisième République et le droit des gens* (Paris, 1904), viii.

⁶³ Frantz Despagnet, *Cours de droit international public*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1899), 433–434. See also Despagnet, *Essai sur les protectorats: Étude de droit international* (Paris, 1896), 242; Despagnet, *La diplomatie de la Troisième République*, 77, 128; Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations*, 272–273.

cluded “half civilized or savage small tribes, tribes or hordes.” For such a society, “making a beginning, however rudimentary or imperfect it may be, of political organization, we say that the territory is not a *territorium nullius*, that it cannot be the object of an occupation pure and simple.” The only way occupation could proceed in such circumstances was by means of a treaty. And treaties had, as Kant insisted, to observe the rules of justice, the first of which was the genuine consent of the indigenous people.⁶⁴ Salomon concluded that the vast majority of treaties with non-European peoples had not been just. But, like most contemporary critics of empire, he left some room for treaties that met all the conditions of justice. He had little choice. Treaties were central to the law of nations, including treaties for the cession of land, and they were employed extensively between European nations as well as being a means of extending empire. The problem was not whether treaties were legitimate but how their abuse could be prevented.

Salomon used the introduction to his treatise to explain why the legality of occupation in colonial contexts troubled him. Here we do not find an author with a deeply humanitarian or philanthropic conscience. Indeed, he seems almost to be untouched by contemporary philanthropic movements, many of which pursued the civilizing mission of which he was so contemptuous. Rather, he was motivated by the possibility that legal abuses in the colonies could be repatriated to Europe. Foremost among his concerns was that imperial occupations confused sovereignty with property. *Imperium*, or sovereignty, and *dominium*, or property, had, he argued, been confused in civil law prior to the French Revolution. After the Revolution, the distinction had been clarified. It was a fundamental principle preventing the arbitrary appropriation of property by the sovereign. According to Salomon, however, while *dominium* and *imperium* had been separated in “public internal law,” the confusion had found a last refuge in public international law and in the behavior of imperial states. The threat posed by illegal occupation in empire was a threat to the Revolution itself.⁶⁵

Gaston Jèze (1869–1953), a professor of law at the Sorbonne, acknowledged criticism of the Berlin Conference by Salomon and others. He argued, however, that the Berlin Act contained enough substance to protect the sovereignty and property of African peoples, and that the subsequent abuses of those rights had arisen from states and companies acting without regard to the agreement.⁶⁶ Jèze conceded that colonization was vital to the strategic interests of the powers. Colonies also provided markets for European goods and agricultural goods for European populations, which were growing rapidly as birth rates outstripped death rates. Excess population could be sent to the colonies, as could prisoners. For all of these reasons, Jèze argued, occupation as a mode of acquiring “sovereignty” had taken on a new importance.⁶⁷ He then turned to address the justice of occupation in a way that called into question the very foundations of the “politique coloniale.” The race for empire presented two dangers. The first arose from the conflicts over competition for territory. Laws of occupation would restrain those conflicts. The second danger was the violation of

⁶⁴ Salomon, *L'occupation des territoires sans maître*, 199–200.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 7–11.

⁶⁶ Gaston Jèze, *Étude théorique et pratique sur l'occupation* (Paris, 1896), 131–156.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

the rights of colonized peoples: "Barbarian peoples are not without rights. Under the pretext of civilization, we cannot deliver them to the calculations of an immeasurable ambition . . . Ideas of humanity and of social progress too often hide a spirit of scandalous plunder."⁶⁸ Philanthropy was a veneer.

Jèze briefly surveyed the history of the idea of occupation, but he argued that the most important acts and documents concerning occupation were those arising from the Act of the Berlin Conference on February 26, 1885, and the Project on Occupation adopted by the Institut at Lausanne in 1888. He applied himself, therefore, to clarifying the rules of *territorium nullius*, which had been established through those two forums. The Institut could, he argued, have accepted Fusinato's formulation that *territorium nullius* regulates in public international law what *res nullius* regulates in civil law, namely, things that are owned by nobody. The object in question in the case of *territorium nullius* would be sovereignty, and this test would apply whether the land was inhabited or not.⁶⁹

By accepting whether indigenous sovereignty was present as a test of whether there could be colonial occupation, it may seem that Jèze had succumbed precisely to the intention of those jurists who had developed the concept of *territorium nullius*. He then insisted, however, that "savage" and "barbarian" peoples held sovereignty. If, therefore, occupation was to be permitted in the territory of barbarian peoples, it could only be with the consent of those peoples. For Jèze, as for Salomon, Kant provided the terms for what constituted a legitimate treaty. Applying Kant's rigorous test for consent, Jèze observed that "1. it must be free; 2. it must be intelligent; and 3. it must be conducted according to the customs of the country." "If the people refuse," he noted, "we cannot pass by another route."⁷⁰ He observed that proponents of colonial occupation had argued that it was not possible to make treaties with peoples who are not sovereign, but responded: "We refuse absolutely to admit such a doctrine. In the first instance, we have recognized a right of sovereignty for indigenous peoples. We can, therefore, speak legitimately of treaties."⁷¹

In addition to his insistence upon honest treaties, Jèze argued that "States alone have the right to occupy."⁷² At first sight, this clause may seem intended to restrict action in international law to the club of European states, but his target was actually Leopold's venture in the Congo. He rejected the recognition at the Berlin Conference of the International African Association as a sovereign state. His opposition to the Congo Free State was matched by his cynicism for the civilizing mission more generally.⁷³ Reviewing the anti-imperial tradition, Jèze observed: "As Vitoria already said in the sixteenth century, civilized powers have no more right to seize the territories of savages than savages have to occupy the European continent. The law of nations does not admit any distinction between the barbarians and the so-called

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 122–123.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 115–116. See also Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, in Kant, *Practical Philosophy* ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge, 1996), 490. On Kant's skepticism of empire, see Muthu, *Enlightenment against Empire*.

⁷¹ Jèze, *Étude théorique et pratique sur l'occupation*, 118–119. Compare Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations*, 107.

⁷² Jèze, *Étude théorique et pratique sur l'occupation*, 382.

⁷³ Ibid., 114. Jèze's opposition to the Congo venture did not prevent the Belgian jurist Ernest Nys from citing him to legitimize the occupation of the Congo; see Nys, *Droit international*, 1: 100–101.

civilized.”⁷⁴ Like Salomon, he did not turn to humanitarian sentiment to motivate his critique of colonial expropriation. He too was concerned by the danger that colonial abuses would be repatriated to the metropolis: “Otherwise, the argument turns against those who propose it. Is not the right of civilization invoked even in Europe? Do we not hear certain chauvinistic spirits repeat that the civilization of this or that European country is superior to a neighboring state? Must we not admit, under that pretext, that the strongest will crush the weakest?”⁷⁵

A generation later, when Mussolini’s army invaded Ethiopia, Jèze agreed to represent the king of Ethiopia, Hailé Sélassié, in bringing Ethiopia’s challenge to the Italian conquest before the League of Nations. The French monarchist and nationalist right mounted virulent demonstrations against Jèze in late 1935 and 1936.⁷⁶ When the League Council, led by the Soviet foreign minister, Maxim Litvinoff, agreed that Italy, France, and Britain would negotiate the destiny of Ethiopia outside of the council deliberations, Jèze reportedly “glared at President Litvinoff and hissed: ‘You offer us the choice between suicide and assassination. Well, we prefer assassination!’”⁷⁷ Again, during World War II, Jèze challenged the powers of the occupying German army over the French Jewish community. The two cases were connected—as Jèze well understood, the laws of occupation applied in colonies and in European wars. As jurists such as Jèze and Salomon had foretold, the practices that had been employed in empire were being repatriated to the occupation of Europe during war.⁷⁸ This critique was later taken up in the twentieth century by figures such as Raphaël Lemkin and Hannah Arendt.⁷⁹

Jèze’s legal representation of Hailé Sélassié raises the question of whether the critiques of the liberal anti-imperialists of the late nineteenth century ever had any impact upon the international political life that they tried to shape. Clearly, in the context of the Berlin Conference, figures such as Twiss won the debate and justified a new wave of empire. As the imperialism of the 1880s and 1890s gathered momentum, the opposition became stronger but still had little impact. It is true that by the 1890s Leopold was revealed to have conducted a reign of terror in the Congo, but opposition in this instance was galvanized by humanitarian sentiment, not by fears about liberty in the metropolis, so that the territory of the Congo Free State was annexed by Belgium in 1908.⁸⁰ If we are to look for a legacy from the anti-imperial critiques of the international jurists, they are more likely to be found in the

⁷⁴ Jèze, *Étude théorique et pratique sur l’occupation*, 103.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 115.

⁷⁶ Marc Milet, *La Faculté de Droit de Paris face à la vie politique: De l’affaire Scelle à l’affaire Jèze, 1925–1936* (Paris, 1996).

⁷⁷ “The League: Assassination Preferred,” *Time*, Monday, August 12, 1935.

⁷⁸ On the German occupation of Europe and imperial precedents, see, for example, Wendy Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2005).

⁷⁹ See Raphaël Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (Washington, D.C., 1944); and Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1962).

⁸⁰ Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*, which condemned the brutality of Leopold’s rule in the Congo, was also typical of the humanitarian ambivalence concerning empire. However, Edward Said’s argument that Conrad’s conscience was noble but that it was only possible for him to think imperially is based upon a Foucauldian assumption about the hegemony of imperial discourse, an assumption shared by many historians; see Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York, 1993), 19–31. For the debate over Conrad’s anti-imperialism, see the contributions to Gail Fincham and Myrtle Hooper, eds., *Under Postcolonial Eyes: Joseph Conrad after Empire* (Rondebosch, 1996).

anti-imperialism of the first fifty years of the twentieth century. They may have achieved little in the 1880s and 1890s, but they were writing on the eve of the breakup of an international order that was based upon empires, and the creation of a new system in which empires persisted but self-determining nation-states became increasingly prominent. This process was led by anti-imperial nationalism in the colonies, but it was also complemented by liberal anti-imperialists in the metropolis such as Jèze.⁸¹

LIBERAL SKEPTICISM OF EMPIRE WAS generally, then, motivated not by humanitarian sentiment but by self-interested concern about the endurance of the European revolutions. The same critics frequently identified philanthropy as the apology for empire that it was. This domestic concern about liberty abroad underlines one of the weaknesses of some of the recent influential studies produced in international history. In these accounts, the human-rights wave of the twentieth century has been presented as an international agenda pursued by the major powers in order to satisfy strategic goals, rather than as motivated by humanitarians such as Eleanor Roosevelt.⁸² The cynicism about humanitarianism is justified, but it diminishes the national, rather than international, goals of those who pursued rights. Rights theories and rights claims, it must be remembered, were developed over centuries by jurists and politicians, many of whom, whether or not they held that rights could be autonomous of states, believed that they placed a limit on state power. In the nineteenth century, those same figures frequently pursued rights in international contexts in order to secure what they believed to be fragile national freedoms.

It remains, therefore, to reconsider the relationship of liberalism to empire and the role that international law played in that relationship. International law certainly was at the forefront of the projection of sovereignty onto the non-European world, and there is no better example of that than Twiss's involvement with Leopold. But international law was also one of the domains in which opposition to empire was most strongly articulated. The liberal reformers from the generation that established the *Institut de droit international* were internationalists. Some were internationalists because they thought that international cooperation was the only means by which the expansion of empire could be organized in a way that would preserve peace, and they looked to the Berlin Conference to fulfill those ambitions. The internationalism of the skeptics of empire was motivated by a belief that only international agreements could restrain Europe from plunging into a new imperial epoch that would imperil the newfound liberty of European states. Internationalism, then, was an intellectual tool, as was international law.

They were tools that could be turned to different, and conflicting, ends. The liberal toolbox offered many such examples. Rights, too, were a tool that could be applied to conflicting ends. Rights were used to support the projection of European

⁸¹ Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford, 2007), 8.

⁸² Mark Mazower, "The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950," *Historical Journal* 47, no. 2 (2004): 379–398; Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton, N.J., 2009); Moyn, *The Last Utopia*.

sovereignty. The concept of *territorium nullius* was a species of rights argument. It was a concept that conceded that African peoples had property and even limited sovereignty but insisted that their land could still be open to the imposition of territorial sovereignty: that is, open to the creation of protectorates. But even this weapon, which seemed to point in only one direction, could be turned upon its creators. Skeptics appropriated the term and replied that Africa was not *territorium nullius*.

THE TOOL OF RIGHTS WAS USED IN other ways. Among the European jurists, diplomats, and politicians, those who were most skeptical of empire generally claimed that rights exist outside the system of state sovereignty, while those who believed rights to be the creation of states were least troubled by empire. Greg Grandin reminds us, however, that in the Americas, almost the reverse applied. U.S. expansionists insisted on the rights of property independent of the state (indeed, this was the ideology that had nourished the land speculators after the Proclamation of 1763). In Grandin's account in this forum, the opposition to this U.S. expansionism came from Latin American figures who defended the primacy of national sovereignty.

The instability of these arguments underlines a larger point about the nature of international law and liberalism. While it is true that both international law and liberalism emerged in an imperial context, that context must be understood to include both pro- and anti-imperial voices. Liberalism may have been constituted by a consensus about the desirability of liberty, rights and duties, freedom of commerce, the rule of law, and the sanctity of property, but it was also characterized by a dialogue about how to achieve these objectives and by divisions over fundamental issues such as whether the origin of rights was inside or outside the state. This dialogue was not accidental; it was an engagement between adversaries. As is clear in the case of the debate over Africa, participants in the dialogue were directly responding to each other's arguments, and their disagreement was pursued through institutions as well as texts. This dialogue and conflict, rather than doctrine, defined liberalism.

The resurgence of interest in empire among historians has been stimulated by a perceived return of empire in the twenty-first century.⁸³ Historians are divided between those who argue that empire is an inevitability and a reality that must be responsibly managed, and those who use the past to reveal the abuses of empire.⁸⁴ The argument that empire must be managed diminishes and even ignores the abuses of empire.⁸⁵ The focus on the abuses of empire, if one is to use history as a judge, has never been sufficient to curb those abuses. Indeed, humanitarian sentiment too

⁸³ Not all historians are convinced that "empire" is the appropriate term for the twentieth-century projection of power beyond the state; see, for example, Frederick Cooper, "Empire Multiplied: A Review Essay," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 46, no. 2 (April 2004): 247–272. For a contrasting view, see Pitts, "Political Theory of Empire and Imperialism."

⁸⁴ On the necessity of empire, see Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (New York, 2003); Michael Ignatieff, *Empire Lite: Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan* (London, 2003).

⁸⁵ Pitts, "Political Theory of Empire and Imperialism," 220; Jeanne Morefield, "Empire, Tragedy, and the Liberal State in the Writings of Niall Ferguson and Michael Ignatieff," *Theory and Event* 11, no. 3 (2008), http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/summary/v011/11.3.morefield.html.

often collapsed back into an apology for empire. George Steinmetz asks what a critical anti-imperialism might look like today.⁸⁶ The tradition of anti-imperial critique in international law offers some insights. It is possible to reflect on that tradition, not in search of moral lessons from history, but in order to understand the complex heritage of liberalism with which we live today, and to discover what possibilities lie within that tradition.⁸⁷ The critiques of empire that were least prone to collapsing into imperial apology were those based not so much upon a sense of common humanity but upon self-interest: that is, upon the problem of liberty at home. This form of rights-based but self-interested critique has been apparent in our own time. Imprisonment at Guantanamo Bay, for example, has been criticized from the perspective of empathy with the human rights of the prisoners, but it has also been opposed with the argument that if such abuses of rights are possible in territory outside U.S. jurisdiction, it will be only a matter of time before the same extra-judicial practices are employed within the United States.⁸⁸ Today's most potent anti-imperial critiques may therefore be said to owe much to enduring debates within the liberal tradition.

⁸⁶ George Steinmetz, "Imperialism or Colonialism? From Windhoek to Washington, by Way of Basra," in Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin W. Moore, eds., *Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power* (New York, 2006), 156; Pitts, "Political Theory of Empire and Imperialism," 221.

⁸⁷ See Cooper, "Empire Multiplied," 272, on not using past empire for policy recommendations.

⁸⁸ Jeremy Waldron, "Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House," *Columbia Law Review* 105, no. 6 (October 2005): 1740–1741.

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AHR Forum
Comment: Empire and Its Anxieties

ANTHONY PAGDEN

TWO RELATED, AND PERSISTENT, ANXIETIES followed the creation of Europe's overseas empires, from the mid-sixteenth century, when the Spanish first became aware that they now had an empire in a remote and hitherto unknown region of the world to which no previous argument for occupation could apply, until almost the end of empire (or at least of colonial rule) in the 1960s. The first was caused by uncertainty over sovereignty, the second by the fear that whatever occurred, in no matter how distant a corner of the globe, would inevitably have consequences for what took place in the metropolis. Both are, perhaps, as old as empire itself. But the European empires from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries, with which the three essays in this forum are concerned, faced them in a particularly acute form. The history of the sovereignty issue has traditionally been traced back to Francisco de Vitoria and Hugo Grotius, who figure prominently in the literature of international law in the nineteenth century as the founders of a modern positive law of nations, based upon a universal consensus. On this account, the law of nations, the *ius gentium*, was defined as that law upon which all rational beings supposedly could have agreed had what Cicero called "the republic of all the world" possessed a single legislative assembly. It was, as Grotius and many later jurists from Samuel Pufendorf to Emeric de Vattel claimed, a form of what the Glossators and Post-Glossators had originally called a "secondary" natural law. This made it inescapably universal, but it also left its actual content usefully imprecise. Grotius's famous claim that the natural law—and thus by implication the law of nations—was "unchangeable, even in the sense that it cannot be changed by God," meant also that it could easily be detached from the kind of religious determinism that had accompanied many of the early European justifications for empire.¹ It was with this legacy that the liberal theorists of the nineteenth century, and even to some degree the twentieth, despite the complete dismantling of the entire epistemological edifice of the "natural law" by Immanuel Kant and then G. W. F. Hegel, had to contend.

The writers with which these essays are concerned had, then, inherited a long and powerful tradition with which all of them were thoroughly familiar. It was its status as a body of laws which, in Jennifer Pitts's words, were at once "both distinctively European and also universalist in their aspirations" that allowed the law of nations to become the platform upon which a number of ambitious projects for a peaceful,

¹ Hugo Grotius, *De iure belli ac pacis*, I, 40.

cosmopolitan, world were subsequently erected, from Eméric Crucé's *New Cyneas* of 1623 (one of the earliest to include both Europeans and non-Europeans), through Kant's *Perpetual Peace*, to the more ambitious plans for a federal Europe in the aftermath of World War II.

Kant's attempt to provide a workable alternative to the current understanding of the law of nations, which he viewed as "simply an Idea"—and a useless one at that, because no legal code could possibly have any force in a world in which "states as such are not subject to a common external constraint"—led, however, in two ultimately contradictory directions.² Kant's *ius cosmopoliticum*, which was intended to replace the useless *ius gentium*, demanded that the cosmos (however defined) acquire a new political identity, the famously contested "representative republic," all of whose citizens would be able to recognize themselves as the ultimate authors of their sovereign's laws. For Kant, this offered an alternative to empire—or "universal monarchy," as he called it—which, he believed, no matter what its form, could only ever be the "graveyard of freedom" and a "soulless despotism."³ For some modern Kantians, most notably Jürgen Habermas, the closest modern equivalent to this, at least as a model for future interstate relations, is the European Union.

The other direction, the liberal one, and the one taken by most of the practitioners of the new "international law" in the nineteenth century, was effectively to limit the cosmos to a specific set of peoples (Europeans and former Europeans) all of whom could be said to accept the same basic legal principles. By the nineteenth century, a significant, if never very precise or consistent, distinction emerged between what was still referred to as the "law of nations" and the new "international law." The law of nations became the law that governed the relationship between any number of "civilized" states. It was a kind of club to which "a state hitherto accounted barbarous," in the words of the British international lawyer T. J. Lawrence, might apply for membership, and, as with all clubs, the members would then "settle the case upon its merits."⁴ A number of jurists, as Andrew Fitzmaurice shows, were prepared to accept that there might exist several such clusters of nations in the world, each governed by its own body of laws, and, since the law of nations had by now been entirely detached from its old *jusnaturalistic* moorings, these might be very unlike one another. (The two largest groups were the Europeans themselves and the Muslims.) International law—a term coined by Jeremy Bentham precisely, he said, in order to make a distinction between the French *droit entre les gens* and the *droit des gens*—was the law that governed the relationship between all those peoples who had their own "law between nations" and all those—the "barbarians"—who did not. It is not insignificant that Henry Maine, Regius Professor of Civil Law at the University of Cambridge and the Law Member of the Viceroy of India's Council from 1862 to 1869, should have claimed, as quoted here by Pitts, that "international law" was the modern equivalent of the Roman "fetial law," since that had very largely been concerned with the proceedings to be observed in waging a "just war," and the relationship between Europe's imperial powers and the world's "barbarians" was always

² Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, in *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1972), 103–104.

³ See Sankar Muthu, *Enlightenment against Empire* (Princeton, N.J., 2003), 172–209.

⁴ T. J. Lawrence, *The Principles of International Law* (London, 1895), 59.

ultimately bellicose. The “law of nations,” by contrast, is still understood today in many places to constitute what might be described as the jurisprudence of international relations.

This transformation in the conception of the law was in large part a response to a radical transformation in the political cultures of both the states of Europe themselves and their overseas empires. The world that Edmund Burke and Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron (as described here by Pitts) fought to defend was very different from the one that Sir Travers Twiss, Charles Salomon, and Henri Bonfils (as described here by Fitzmaurice) were struggling to define a century later. The period between 1776 and 1814 had seen the destruction of the *ancien régime* not only in France but throughout most of Europe; it had witnessed the rise and fall of the Napoleonic Empire, the last successful, if also short-lived, attempt before 1939 to create an empire on European soil; and it had seen the consolidation of the European nation-state, and with it the triumph of a new, all-pervasive ideology: nationalism. During the same period, and partly as a consequence of these transformations, the European empires had also changed dramatically. As many historians have pointed out, the distinction between a “first,” almost exclusively American, and a “second,” Asian, Australasian, and African, British Empire is, chronologically, at least, problematical.⁵ But although Britain had already established a significant presence in Asia and Africa before 1783, and maintained one in North America and the Caribbean afterward, the empires of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were significantly different from those of the nineteenth and twentieth in their administrative, structural, legal, and ideological objectives, and in how they were perceived by the metropolis. Neither was Britain the only European power to have had a “first” and “second” empire. The Treaty of Paris of 1783, which brought the British Empire in America to an end, had been preceded twenty years earlier by a treaty that had effectively extinguished the first French Empire in both North America and India; and the revolutions that began in 1810 in the Spanish-American “kingdoms” completed the job of dismantling the Spanish Empire, which had begun at the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. (Not that Spain ever acquired a second empire, despite General Francisco Franco’s repeated promises in the early years of the dictatorship to do so, unless one accepts the protectorate of Morocco from 1912 until 1956 as such.) Only the Portuguese and the Dutch, routinely ignored as they are in any discussion of liberalism and empire, had a more or less unbroken history from the seventeenth to the late nineteenth century.

These “first” empires had been relatively limited in extent compared with their nineteenth-century successors, and were predominantly settler societies. New England had famously been “in England”; the Spanish “colonies” were *de iure* (and unevenly in practice) integrated kingdoms of the Crown of Castile; New France had been a collection of feudatories governed by a body of local administrative law called the “*Coutume de Paris*,” all of whose (Catholic) residents—including Native Americans—were held, after 1664, to be “denizens and French natives.” The “new” empires, by contrast, did not encourage migration. Although the French jurist Gaston

⁵ See P. J. Marshall, “The First British Empire,” in Robin W. Winks, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 5: *Historiography* (Oxford, 1999), 43–47; and Marshall, “The First and Second British Empires: A Question of Demarcation,” *History* 49, no. 165 (1964): 13–23.

Jèze, as Fitzmaurice points out, might have believed in the final decade of the nineteenth century, as had Richard Hakluyt in the seventeenth, that colonies offered useful opportunities for “excess populations”—and in some parts of Africa in the interwar years, they certainly did—this never became the official view. In South Africa, as late as 1936, after successive interwar migrations, European settlers accounted for only 21 percent of the population. In Southern Rhodesia, they accounted for less than 5 percent.⁶ Even in places such as Algeria, which was something of an exception in having originally been intended, by Tocqueville, at least, as an “extension of France itself to the far side of the Mediterranean,” by 1931 the *colons* amounted to less than 13 percent of the population.⁷ Even British India, in many respects an exception to every rule, was a place visited by what Burke called “birds of passage and prey” rather than settled, even in the eighteenth century, and remained so until independence.

The new conception of the nation, and the new construction of overseas empire, prompted the new international jurists to think of the world in far less cosmopolitan, pluralistic terms than their predecessors had done. The “striking openness on the part of Europeans to the possibility of shared legal frameworks and mutual obligations between Christians and non-Christians, Europeans and non-Europeans,” noted by Pitts in the eighteenth century, had been animated by a vision of empire as a single, if diverse, polity, united by commerce, and operating to the mutual benefit of all its members. “‘Empire’ and ‘civil society,’” in J. G. A. Pocock’s words, were “nearly if not fully interchangeable.”⁸ By the middle of the following century, this image had given way to one in which empire had become, as Eric Hobsbawm once observed, a kind of “good ideological cement.”⁹ Instead of creating large settler bureaucracies supervised by visiting metropolitan officials, the new imperial administration attempted, where possible, to govern through local intermediaries. What F. D. Lugard, governor and governor-general of Nigeria between 1912 and 1919, was the first to describe as “indirect Rule” had, in fact, been the practice of all the European powers, with the exception of Portugal, in much of Africa and Asia since the mid-nineteenth century. It was also obviously the case that if power was to be divided with any number of local rulers, then, as Fitzmaurice points out, even the most skeptical among the new international jurists had every reason to think of international law, and the rights it conferred, as a strictly positive, rather than a universal, or natural—even a “secondary” natural—one. After all, the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen,” presented to the French National Assembly in 1789, had already established what would become in the following century a clearly recognized principle: that rights were inseparable from citizenship. It was an article of faith among nineteenth-century nationalists that a person without a nation was barely a person at all. Even today, despite the work of the United Nations (described here

⁶ These figures are from Jacques Frémeaux, *Les empires coloniaux dans le processus de mondialisation* (Paris, 2002), 168–176.

⁷ Alexis de Tocqueville, “Rapport fait par M. Tocqueville sur le projet de loi relatif aux crédits extraordinaires demandés pour l’Algérie,” in Tocqueville, *Tocqueville sur l’Algérie*, ed. Seloua Luste Boulbina (Paris, 2003), 228.

⁸ J. G. A. Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion*, vol. 4: *Barbarians, Savages and Empires* (Cambridge, 2005), 220.

⁹ E. J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875–1914* (London, 1987), 70.

by Greg Grandin) to establish a very broad-ranging conception of “human” rights to replace the older “natural” or “subjective” rights, “stateless persons” are, in effect, also rights-less ones.

All of these essays describe phases in what was, in effect, a prolonged period of crisis. Not only was one kind of empire, associated with Enlightenment universalism, displaced by another, associated with liberal imperialism, but also one kind of Europe, where, as Burke had envisaged it, every one of its inhabitants would feel at home, was rapidly and violently displaced by another, consisting of mutually suspicious, nationalist, and increasingly racist nation-states—the world that would finally destroy itself in Europe’s two great civil wars between 1914 and 1945.¹⁰

As Pitts says, the main critics of empire in the eighteenth century tended to “direct their critique inward rather than outward.” This is not to say that Burke had no genuine concern for the welfare of the “distressed” Indians. (Anquetil-Duperron’s defense of the Turks, Arabs, and Persians was prompted by an intense dislike of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and the entire circle around the *Encyclopédie*, who had made such derisive comments about his translation of the Avesta.) But what really troubled him was the danger that the kind of behavior in which Warren Hastings had indulged might eventually come to corrupt the metropolis, and even, more broadly, the whole of European culture. The servants of the East India Company, he warned, “not only bring with them the wealth which they have, but they bring with them into our country the vices by which it was acquired.” Preserving India “from oppression” meant, in effect, preserving “the British Constitution from its worst corruption.”¹¹

With the arrival of the new “imperialism,” most of this anxiety over the possibly corrupting effect of empire vanished. Although, as Fitzmaurice points out, there were some liberal critics of empire who feared that any argument for occupation in Africa might threaten what he calls the “endurance of the European revolutions” (of 1789 and 1848), in a world in which the colonies were distant outposts, administered rather than ruled, with only a scattering of settlers, any vision of empire as a single extended polity was clearly unintelligible. In the 1880s and 1890s, there was no new Burke to protest the actions of Cecil Rhodes in Matabeleland.

The key issue now became one of sovereignty, and sovereignty was primarily a legal concept. It is worth noting that although some of the debates over the legitimacy of empire before the nineteenth century were juridical, the bulk of them were moral, which is to say that they inevitably came down to being a discussion of either divine purpose or an understanding of the law of nature. (They were also, for the most part, written by men—Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Christian Wolff, Kant—who were not, or not primarily, jurists.) Burke, for instance, hardly ever mentions the question of legitimacy. For him, the “sacred trust” of empire had been “given by an incomprehensible dispensation of Divine providence into our hands.”¹² That was all that needed to be said. The situation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was almost exactly the reverse. True, there was a great deal of talk about the “civilizing mission,”

¹⁰ Edmund Burke, “Two Letters Addressed to a Member of the Present Parliament on the Proposals for Peace with the Regicide Directory of France,” in Burke, *The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke*, ed. Paul Langford, 9 vols. (Oxford, 1981–1991), 9: 248–249.

¹¹ See P. J. Marshall, *The Impeachment of Warren Hastings* (Oxford, 1965), 191.

¹² Edmund Burke, *On Empire, Liberty and Reform: Speeches and Letters*, ed. David Bromwich (New Haven, Conn., 2000), 15–16.

but even that was more often than not expressed in legal or institutional terms as the obligation to prepare the “backward races” of the world for entry into the “law of nations.” Grounds for occupation and jurisdiction, for *imperium* and *dominium*, had now to be found outside the moral and religious framing used by preceding generations. This explains the resurgence, described by Fitzmaurice, of an altered form of the older language of *res nullius*, which both Vitoria and Grotius had rejected as inapplicable in practice and incoherent in principle. Occupying unused, or improperly used, lands did not commit the occupying power to “civilizing” their inhabitants. The seemingly bizarre appropriation of a canon law coinage, *territorium nullius*, also allowed many of the new international lawyers to conflate sovereignty and property rights, which, in the juridical discourse, at least, had been kept separate since Alberico Gentili in the sixteenth century.

Matters were somewhat different, however, on the far side of the Atlantic. As Greg Grandin says, post-revolutionary America, both North and South, was very different from this “half-monarchical, largely illiberal, balance-of-power Europe.” But the Americas had inherited their legal and political cultures from Europe, and with them they had inherited the European anxieties over sovereignty; and the United States, at least, had inherited the worry over the potentially damaging consequences for the metropolis of any kind of imperialism. The new American states were all the outcome of settler revolts, and both they and the polities they ultimately created had, as Grandin argues, far more in common with one another than the exceptionalism of North American historians has generally allowed for. Both, once they had thrown over their former European masters, were faced with the need to consolidate their hold over vast territories sparsely populated by indigenous peoples. In both cases, however, the sole claim they could make to sovereignty in these regions derived from their prior status as European dependencies. Their territorial limits had been defined for them by Britain and Spain, respectively, and probably the sole legal justification for their continuing presence in the Americas, as both British and Spanish jurists had argued at one time or another, was the law of prescription, which allowed for long-term *de facto* occupation to be recognized *de iure* as conferring retrospective rights of property and of jurisdiction. But as they were now free, independent states created *ex nihilo*—a point on which all insisted—this could not provide them with any legal grounds on which to seize lands they did not already occupy. Yet if they were to become the kinds of nations they imagined themselves to be, they had to do just that. Both effectively shelved the issue by embarking on massive and devastating (for the indigenes) policies of occupation, buttressed by arguments that loosely resembled current European ones. Where territory had previously been acquired by prior contract with or purchase from private individuals, the new states, as the successors of the old imperial administrations, merely ratified them. When no such contracts existed, the Indians were declared to be “children,” in Grandin’s words, “incapable of forming the rational political society that justified both sovereignty and dominion.” Their lands were therefore, *de iure*, in the terms that were being used in Africa, *territorium nullius* if not actually *res nullius*. In both North and South America, this resulted in the creation of true *imperia*. Where, however, these clearly differed from the previous European attempts to emulate Antonine Rome was in the fact that the outcome was never intended to be, in any sense,

an “empire”; it was intended to be a nation, single and indivisible. Francisco de Miranda’s “Monarquía Incásica,” a blend of English constitutionalism and a romanticized vision of the Inca Empire, although it secured him British support for his attempt to invade Venezuela in 1806, remained a fantasy, its constitution locked away in the Public Records Office in London. The “Mexican Empires” of 1821–1823 and 1864–1867 were empires in name only. None of the American states in the nineteenth century were any less nationalist in their new political ideologies than their European counterparts, and in most cases they were, for obvious reasons, much more so. *E pluribus unum* applied equally to North and South. Debates over how to turn “Indians and Africans into citizens” may have been, as Grandin says, “hypocritical and premised on cultural erasure,” but it is hard to see, under the circumstances, how they could have been otherwise. In both North and South, making one out of many meant making the many into one.

And within the frontiers of that one, sovereignty had to be indivisible. Empire, however, most particularly in the “second” European empires, had always relied upon the practice of shared sovereignty. “Sovereignty,” as Henry Maine put it in 1887, “has always been regarded as divisible in international law.”¹³ Sharing sovereignty beyond the frontiers of the nation was, for the U.S., unthinkable. If the Constitution was to follow the flag, then any potential overseas possession, such as Hawaii or, more problematically, Puerto Rico, had somehow to be incorporated into the nation. As William Jennings Bryan, three-time contender for the presidency, said in 1900, any attempt to exercise sovereign authority outside the United States meant, in effect, violating the Constitution, and that could only mean imperialism; and “Imperialism abroad will lead quickly and inevitably to despotism at home.” His logic was not impeccable, but the anxiety was clear enough.¹⁴

The United States, for all its unilateral meddling in the affairs of other sovereign states, which Grandin describes here, is not an empire in any sense that would ever have been recognized in Europe. Because it cannot contemplate sharing sovereignty, and (at least since the beginning of the twentieth century) has had no wish to expand the Union, it is constantly driven back on the kind of *de facto* shared sovereign rule it exercised in Iraq and still exercises in Afghanistan—the kind of rule the British exercised in Egypt for seventy-two years, and which, in the words of Lord Kitchener’s “Oriental secretary,” Ronald Storrs, was conducted “in the Subjunctive, even the wistful Optative mood.”¹⁵ The U.S., however, has usually preferred outright denial to even the most wistful optative. Either that, or it has fallen back on robustly Roman declarations of political and cultural superiority in defense of supposedly universal political values. Luigi Einaudi’s declaration that the U.S. had the right to invade Panama in 1991 because in his view, as Grandin puts it, “the quality of its sovereignty” was “unworthy of recognition” assumed a division of the world into the civilized and the uncivilized analogous, at the very least, to that adopted by the European champions of imperial rule in nineteenth-century Africa. Einaudi’s petulant remarks should not, perhaps, be taken as entirely representative. But as the de-

¹³ Quoted in Edward Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics* (Cambridge, 2002), 63.

¹⁴ See Kal Raustiala, *Does the Constitution Follow the Flag? The Evolution of Territoriality in American Law* (Oxford, 2009).

¹⁵ Ronald Storrs, *The Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs* (New York, 1937), 206.

moralizing revelations of legal and moral abuse, of torture and treaty-violation, not to mention the chipping away at civil liberties represented by the Patriot Act, have made all too clear, the old anxieties about the consequences for the metropolis of what its citizens do in its name beyond its frontiers have become even more acute today than they were for Edmund Burke. For unlike eighteenth-century Britain, the United States is a democracy; and as Raymond Aron once warned, "Never forget the essential: that an empire whose metropolis is a democracy is a contradiction, because the imperial power can never maintain itself except by denying itself."¹⁶

¹⁶ Raymond Aron, *Dimensions de la conscience historique* (Paris, 1965), 47.

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Featured Reviews

ALEXANDRA HARMON. *Rich Indians: Native People and the Problem of Wealth in American History*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2010. Pp. x, 388. \$39.95.

In *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776), Adam Smith argued that aboriginal peoples' economic equality, their lack of specialization, and their failure to create capital prevented them from growing rich. According to Alexandra Harmon, similar assumptions shaped Euro-American views of Native American economic behavior for nearly four centuries. In this fascinating book, Harmon uses seven case histories to investigate how Euro-Americans reacted to Native American economic behavior and what those reactions said about both cultures from first contact through the present. Harmon argues that Indians early became associated with poverty. Europeans invoked the labor theory of value beginning in the seventeenth century to justify their claims on Indian lands and resources; they insisted that Indians perversely chose poverty despite the presence of great natural wealth. As the title indicates, though, Harmon also highlights Indians who upended this stereotype and became wealthy. "Indian affluence," she contends, "caused Indians and non-Indians to ponder a variety of questions about right and wrong" (pp. 7–8). Alongside the image of the "poor Indian," another powerful stereotype emerged: the "rich Indian," a beneficiary of accidental wealth, whether from oil rights or casino profits.

Harmon is interested in the interplay of Euro-American and Native American political economies. She contends that Indian responses to capitalism shaped American economic culture and vice versa. The morality of wealth is a classic American preoccupation, she argues, and both rich and poor Indians raised important questions for contemporaries about how to achieve wealth, who deserved wealth, and how to show wealth. Euro-Americans and Natives alike portrayed Indian culture as inimical to individual accumulation, entrepreneurship, and inequality in ways that justified a variety of forcible policy interventions, including removal, allotment of common holdings, and guardianship. Officials and writers subjected rich Indians to a critical scrutiny that other wealthy Americans escaped. Often these discussions reflected ideas about race, since many

wealthy Indians were mixed-race individuals whose entrepreneurialism, commentators assumed, arose from their connections with white culture.

This book represents a sorely needed effort to integrate Native Americans into the story of American economic development and its consequences. As is true of U.S. history in general, the metanarratives of American economic history often exclude Indians. This limits our understanding of economic change, especially its costs and benefits. Harmon's work also speaks to other questions: what has it meant to be "Indian"? What kinds of cultural, spatial, material, and ethnic change could Indians experience and yet remain Indians? Was there an essential economic component to Indian culture? Did entrepreneurial Native American wealth-accumulators cease to be real Indians? And how did material change shape Native American ethnogenesis—the process by which groups created and recreated new identities in the face of change?

This is a great topic, and Harmon tackles it with energy. Synthesizing an impressive range of material, she examines seven eras of Indian/European economic interaction, beginning with encounters in the seventeenth-century Chesapeake, when the colonists first developed perceptions of Indian economic incapacity, and ending with the contemporary successes of the Indian gaming industry. Four intermediate chapters focus on individuals or groups who achieved exceptional wealth: "Indian gentry" members Joseph Brant, Alexander McGillivray, and Coosaponakeesa in the eighteenth century; John Ross and other assimilated Cherokee leaders during the removal era; Gilded Age entrepreneurs in Indian territory; and beneficiaries of the Osage oil boom of the 1920s. The penultimate chapter investigates the interaction between government antipoverty crusades and the Indian communities they targeted in the mid-twentieth century, culminating in the "tribal renaissance" of the 1970s.

It seems unfair to ask an author who covers so much ground to do more, but Harmon's portraits of Euro-American and Native American economic culture are

rather static and lack analysis, especially of Indians' responses to economic change. In her lively first chapter, Harmon notes interesting parallels between Native American and Euro-American views on trade, class, and wealth in early Virginia. Indians and colonists eagerly sought exchange. Both groups believed that communal or customary rights could sometimes trump individual use of resources. For English colonists, as well as for the Powhatan sachem Wahunsonacock, legitimacy and power depended on the acquisition and distribution of resources. Yet for Harmon, this period of congruence—and of European economic dependence on Indians, which conferred power on the Powhatans—lasted barely two decades. Indian economic culture, which understood individual acquisition and power but stressed redistribution and collective well-being, was overtaken by an emerging Euro-American culture of entrepreneurship and a “dialectic of land acquisition and population change that beggared” the Indians (p. 54). Harmon does not use the term dependency, but she implies that Indians opted out of the larger economy.

I am not convinced that the economic marginalization of the Indians occurred so quickly. Thanks to three decades of excellent work on Native American history, we now know that much of the growth of the early American economy depended upon Native Americans. Harmon rightly highlights the fact that invasion, displacement, and catastrophic Indian mortality facilitated a massive transfer of Indian wealth and resources to Euro-Americans. But this was an extremely long process. Although econometricians who have assessed colonial economic wealth generally ignore Native Americans, Peter C. Mancall and James Weiss argue that increases in colonial GDP appear only when Indians are included in calculations (“Was Economic Growth Likely in Colonial British North America?” *Journal of Economic History* 59 [March 1999]: 17–40).

Europeans were in no position to impose their will on many Indian groups, and often had no wish to displace them. European settlements remained dependent on Indian food supplies, aid, and technology for anywhere from a few years to two centuries. The presence of Indians made colonization and expansion profitable, since fur and skin trades remained central throughout the colonial era in New France, Louisiana, and the Southeast, and well into the nineteenth century in the Missouri and Mississippi valleys. Skins were the fourth largest class of exports from the mainland English colonies to England on the eve of the American Revolution, and the Pacific fur trade proved integral to America's trade with Asia in the nineteenth century. Indians also exercised power as consumers, and European manufacturers catered to Native tastes in what was for them a crucial market. Indian labor, both free and forced, powered local economies throughout the Americas, and Indian slaves were themselves prized items in robust continental and international trade networks.

Scholars have charted the impact of these economic relationships, and some, including William Cronon and Daniel K. Richter, have argued that connection to in-

ternational markets destroyed Indian resource bases and created dependent relationships with Euro-Americans. A focus on war, furs, and trade certainly altered gender relations and power structures within Indian societies; changes illustrated in Claudio Saunt's *A New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733–1816* (1999) and Theda Perdue's *Cherokee Women: Gender and Culture Change, 1700–1835* (1998). But Native Americans also responded to market forces, opportunities, and the realities of their shrinking resources by making creative choices, and I wish that Harmon had given the constraints Indians faced and the strategies they devised in response more attention. Despite violent displacement, Native Americans controlled significant resources in land, oil, and minerals, making them players in western agriculture and extractive industries. Natives experimented effectively with different economic strategies, such as leasing land. As demonstrated repeatedly in the scholarship of R. David Edmunds, Richard White, Daniel H. Usner, Jr., Jay Gitlin, Stephen Aron, and others, when cessions and removal depleted their hunting lands, many nineteenth-century Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Navajo adopted activities that permitted continuity with older customs, including commercial stock raising. Harmon rues the fact that Indians chose agriculture rather than railroad ownership, yet many seized opportunities in manufacturing and servicing travelers. The Osage held onto oil wealth because they owned their land by purchase rather than by treaty, having used compensation from removal to enter the real estate market. Ownership did not insulate them from government interference, but the Osage example illustrates how Indians could engage with economic development on their own terms.

Harmon raises interesting questions about whether the Indians' redistributive ethos and lack of a centralized polity undermined their economic success. “It was not a taste for wealth that Indians had to develop in order to be more like enterprising Whites; it was the habit of amassing property, and either retaining it or putting it to use in the generation of additional wealth that would stay within a limited family circle” (p. 106). Her focus on “public discourse” creates an asymmetry at the heart of the book, however, since most of the commentary on Indian political economy she presents was produced by Euro-Americans for consumption by other Euro-Americans. Despite her efforts to incorporate material from native newspapers, speeches, and Congressional testimony, she references few Indian voices before the mid-twentieth century. In fact, part of her argument is that Indians' inability to shape or even engage in debate contributed to their power deficit, because “distorted images” shaped U.S. public policy (p. 207). As a result, she writes little about economic strategy within Indian country beyond an ongoing conflict between “traditionalists” and often mixed-race entrepreneurs or battles for access within the Indian elite. I was left wondering what Harmon thought of “rich Indians” herself. Contemporaries and scholars have ques-

tioned whether biracial leaders could pursue profit and yet function as protectors of Indian economic autonomy and resources. Harmon sees them as cultural “outgrowths” not “anomalies”; she defends the personal accumulation of McGillivray and Brant as fitting into Indian customs of political leadership (p. 89). Yet their behavior roused considerable controversy in Indian country. Beyond U.S. officials’ favoritism toward mixed-race individuals, how important were Euro-American ties to rich Indians’ economic success, and were there any “traditionalist” entrepreneurs who created less animosity? Harmon’s story hints at undercurrents of class and gender conflict. Cherokee leaders in the 1820s adopted legal structures that favored the wealthy as well as inheritance and citizenship rules inimical to Indian women’s interests, but these measures protected women’s property rights better than Euro-American equivalents. It would be interesting to know how Indian women fared in the communities that Harmon’s subjects constructed in post-removal Kansas, Oklahoma, and Missouri.

Considering other sources might have let Harmon explore Indian and Euro-American economic thought more fully. Native movements that battled Euro-American encroachment, including the Brothertown Indians, the Creek Red Sticks, and the Shawnee Tenskwatawa, had economic goals. Consumption offers another window into economic culture. Harmon notes that consumption strategies that commanded respect within Osage country formed “proof of their weakness and moral inferiority” to outside critics (p. 208). She indicates that feasting and food showed continuity with past values, but when rural Osage bought mink coats, luxury cars, and flapper hats were they still working within the same cultural framework and understandings of power as the seventeenth-century Powhatans, or were new influences at work? What else did Indians invest in, including education?

Ascribing political economy to Native Americans im-

plies the existence of polity. Indians remained non-citizens within America until 1924, and as Harmon notes, the modern tribal state, a collaborative creation of Indians and federal officials, did not emerge until the mid-twentieth century. Earlier kin-based, consensual societies did not conform to Euro-American notions of a state, but there was Indian political activity, and Harmon does not explore the political organizations, parties, and non-governmental institutions that Indians used to confront economic change in the same way that other Americans did. She notes the existence of a Native American Populist group, but we never hear about its activities or those of the Industrial Workers of the World and other union movements that attracted Indian participants through the 1950s. In her excellent chapter on the “tribal renaissance” of 1950–1980, Harmon charts Indian efforts to “secure, protect, and control economic resources,” in part building on economic initiatives from the Office of Economic Opportunity (p. 226). She credits this success to the activism of a rising generation of educated Indians, but she does not look back to earlier experiences or even to cross-fertilization between Indian emancipation and the struggle for black economic equality. Scholars of civil rights are pushing back the story of the movement’s origins to the nineteenth century, and a similar approach might find ways to link the modern Indian self-determination movement, which has a strong political economy component, with the previous century of Indian organizational experience. Despite the stereotypes, Indian tribal governments have done a decent job of promoting economic development; even non-casino tribes have a rate of economic growth much greater than the overall American economy. And they have done so while maintaining collectivist values of redistribution and social welfare that Harmon emphasizes in this noteworthy book.

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LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN. *Buying Power: A History of Consumer Activism in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2009. Pp. xix, 403. \$45.00.

For the past thirty years, historians have intensively investigated the evolution of consumer economy and society in the United States. They have probed the histories of getting and spending, of goods, of merchandizing and provisioning, of consumption’s role in social life, politics, and state formation, and of its centrality to modern culture. Doubtless, historians will still study the contours of consumer culture and the relationships of the state and markets, but we now have a definitive account of consumer activism. Lawrence B. Glickman’s long-awaited volume surveys the social movements animated by and through consumer actions. Consumers today routinely ponder the ethical implica-

tions of their spending for workers, the environment, and the national or local economy. Yet the myriad movements that seek to influence spending all have long and subterranean histories. Glickman’s book offers a powerful account of the ways American consumers have organized to influence spending for political and social ends from the Boston Tea Party until today.

Glickman’s previous monograph, *A Living Wage: American Workers and the Making of Consumer Society* (1997), chronicled how workers in the late nineteenth century shed their ideology of independent artisans and adopted a consumer identity by seeking better wages and work. He has previewed this new volume in sev-

eral journal articles, but these chapters now hold together as one narrative that examines the shifting meanings and forms of consumer action over two centuries. From a political perspective, there is nothing inherently virtuous about consumption; classical republican political theory and an array of commentators have long castigated spending as dangerous and corrupt behavior, the ultimate expression of luxury-seeking self-interest that weakens civic engagement. For them, consuming is apolitical at best, the acidic solvent of citizenship at worst. Almost by definition, in republican thought consumers cannot be citizens, a view most recently upheld by political theorist Benjamin Barber. However, like a number of historians before him, including T. H. Breen, Landon Storrs, Elizabeth Cohen, and Meg Jacobs, Glickman argues the opposite. Consumer activists have in fact been political theorists who were convinced that spending "is a fundamentally social act, with far-reaching consequences" and citizens bore the "ultimate responsibility for the rippling consequences of their purchases" (p. 3). Consumers have often been avidly engaged in civics, organizing to influence the market to achieve political goals. Whereas previous historians have focused on a specific movement or moment, Glickman surveys the entire scope of U.S. national history to recover "an American political tradition," a "significant and understudied strand of American political culture, a durable but flexible mode of political engagement" (p. 22).

This is no easy task of recovery; consumer activism has assumed many forms with varying and sometimes conflicting aims. Moreover, as Glickman notes, consumers acting in concert "rarely achieved their immediate objectives," (p. 2), unlike the more storied movements of labor, civil rights, or women's suffrage. Most interestingly, Glickman's history is one of discontinuity. Consumer activists had little memory of previous movements; each new cohort claimed to be original in its specific campaign against marketplace injustice by channeling spending. The only forebears organized consumers generally acknowledged were the revolutionary generation of the Boston Tea Party and non-importation. Claiming these ancestors gave consumer movements a patriotic high ground to seek reform, and to stage both boycotts (commercial "ostracism" of certain goods or sellers) and "buycotts" (advocacy of certain items to replace or counter the suspect goods of boycotts). But Glickman identifies an important problem for future scholars of marketplace activism: what sort of tradition cannot acknowledge itself as such?

This book's sweeping history periodizes the movements in three eras. The first chronicles the origins of consumer activism from the revolutionary era through the Gilded Age invention of the term boycott. The second traces the rise of national consumer movements (as opposed to *ad hoc* activism) from the Progressive era to World War II, and the third centers on the postwar disentangling of movements, activists, and the federal government during the "consumer's republic."

Glickman begins with the revolutionary generation's

long familiar campaigns against British-made goods. Adopting the boycott, a premodern communal practice of ostracizing offending merchants and goods, the colonists' non-importation and homespun movements quickly became the cornerstone of subsequent rebellion against the crown. Glickman argues that print media's reach as well as the colonists' recognition of the markets' susceptibility to influence from outsiders enabled them to generate "long-distance solidarity," a necessary hallmark of all future consumer activism. Thus he evokes but does not name Benedict Anderson's "imagined communities," another form of long distance solidarity made possible by print capitalism. In one of his most welcome contributions, Glickman next uncovers antebellum-era northern abolitionist campaigns against slave-made goods and their "free produce" alternatives, along with contemporaneous Southern non-importation campaigns against the North. The flowering of boycotts in the 1880s escalated the stakes of consumer based activism. Expanding communication networks enabled boycotters, especially labor, to extend the reach of long distance solidarities, even as their opponents could now easily brand them as unpatriotic. In an era of transnational activism and emerging socialism, consumer-led, labor-allied protests against immoral business practices or tainted goods could now be labeled anti-capitalist and un-American.

The Progressive era saw sporadic boycotts transform into a specific consumer movement, albeit one with goals that altered considerably over time. For the first time, Glickman notes, observers depicted consumers as a distinct group in the social order with specific interests. Progressive era reformers viewed consumers as the constituency essential to a revived citizenship appropriate to the industrialized mass society. Yet the consumer movement hinged on a paradox: the new democracy of consumers depended on enlightened experts to provide guidance in a complex world. The moral qualities and practices of goods, makers, and merchants were no longer transparent, and consumers needed education to make ethical choices. The National Consumers League revealed the exploitative conditions under which goods were made and agitated for protection for those making and selling goods. The Progressives' impulse in turn gave way to consumerists, the scientifically trained experts who popularized product testing and turned attention toward the plethora of goods and away from the conditions of manufacture. Consumers' Research (founded in 1929) and its rival Consumers Union (1936) embodied conflicting approaches to consumer interests. Consumers' Research adopted an individualist emphasis on scientific expertise to evaluate consumer goods themselves without attention to social conditions; Consumers Union in turn emphasized the social aspects of consuming and formed alliances with other groups, notably labor. By World War II, the United States had a vibrant consumer movement that focused on both protection against faulty goods and social responsibility in buying.

Glickman's third era centers around the impulse for

national consumer protections, the changing relationships of consumers, movements, and the federal government, and the politics of regulation. The postwar era saw consumerists targeted as subversives and communists, even as the middle class flocked to Consumers Union. The push to create a Cabinet Department of Consumer Protection, first proposed in the mid-1960s, provoked a ten-year campaign of resistance and lobbying from political conservatives and organized business. Glickman argues that conservatives' success rested on associating consumerism with liberalism itself, and attacking them both endlessly with McCarthyite associations of communism and totalitarianism. Even as the nation fought over a partially realized civil rights agenda, and other groups formed separate movements to claim political and civil rights, politicians ultimately refused to grant specific oversight to the broadest interest group of all. This campaign had implications far beyond the secretariat itself. Glickman argues that the fight against the Consumer Protection Agency (CPA) provided business and free enterprise conservatives a blueprint for their ultimate ascendancy in domestic politics in the 1980s and beyond. The defeat of consumer protection left liberalism permanently weakened. Here he unfortunately downplays other factors that fed the rise of the Right: demographic change, fundamentalism's revival in the suburbs, the decades-long business campaign to discredit and overturn the New Deal, and the corrosive effect of entrenched white privilege on the New Deal political coalition, to name a few. All were important to the rise of Reagan-era conservatism.

The study concludes with Glickman's observation that since the 1980s consumer activism has come full circle; direct consumer actions erupted in dozens of new campaigns, even as the state's support of consumer movements and interests stagnated and declined under conservative deregulation. Once more, consumers perceive compelling moral cause to purchase or boycott particular goods or manufacturers. The ascendancy of both globalization and neoliberal regimes ensures that activists must work across national borders and cultures. Ever changing in tactics and aims, current consumer activism nonetheless reveals its deep ties to the movements of the past two centuries.

This formidable book reminds us that boycotts and buycotts have been democratic tools accessible to every level of society. While many critics have dismissed consumer-based movements as middle-class diversions aimed at superficial problems, Glickman argues that consumer activism has arisen at all levels of society and has sometimes generated broad cross-class coalitions. Some of the most effective moments of consumer protest have been initiated by African Americans, most notably during the late nineteenth century and the civil rights movement. Glickman also astutely notes that the politics of pleasure lie at the heart of many consumer protests; while numerous activists have been historically suspicious of luxury and waste, he uncovers a long line of protesters who saw little conflict between plea-

sure and politics, beauty and righteousness, display and virtue. Boycotters and activists simply cannot be reduced to a cavalcade of cranks and humorless ascetics. Finally, Glickman underscores the tensions between expertise and democracy throughout this history. While consumer activists have regarded themselves as democratic, awareness of morally suspect, dangerous, or inadequate goods increasingly came to depend on expert knowledge. Boycotters and the experts who supplied them knowledge often viewed the mass of buyers as ignorant and possibly dangerous. But if consumers have been unable to generate that knowledge alone, the experts' diagnoses have often proved politically impossible or culturally unpalatable. Consumer activists have never been united on any question, and any attempt to discern a transcendent consumer interest will end in useless platitudes or endless frustration.

Glickman's work leaves us with new questions and new areas to consider. Most pressing are the origins of contemporary widespread activism; Glickman pays little attention to the recent decades since the rise of political conservatism he links so strenuously to the fate of the CPA. The emergence of a variety of green movements, slow food and locavore adherents, campaigners for corporate responsibility, and the "No Logo" and "culture jamming" initiatives all highlight that this era of consumer activism may be unprecedented in scale or numbers. How do these movements continue or differ from past campaigns? Second, we need to know more about the transnational dimensions of consumer activism. Long-distance solidarities have flourished from at least the antislavery movements to the present. As scholars turn their attention to more recent movements, global campaigns and boycotts will no doubt claim their attention.

Tantalizingly, Glickman leaves unanswered the question that runs through the book: why has there been such amnesia from one generation to the next? Consumers were civically engaged, but they did not establish clear traditions understood and embraced by subsequent activists. While Glickman points out the continuities underlying activist histories, he also notes the participants themselves had little knowledge of or interests in past movements, apart from the founders. Glickman might have turned his gaze away from movement tactics and politics and paid more attention to culture for some clues. Shopping and provisioning in everyday life do not necessarily inculcate amnesia or self-absorption, but clearly U.S. consumer society's insistent emphasis on individualism and self-interest continually reinforces barriers to long-distance solidarity. The common sense that consumers are the ultimate sovereigns of the market, and capitalist markets provide the most important resources for daily living more effectively, fairly, and efficiently than other economic systems remains powerful and ubiquitous. Institutions, media, and authorities all echo and enforce it. Consumption takes place in material settings and spaces that embody and uphold that logic. To oppose it, consumers must continually set themselves against the

grain of authority. Additionally, the contested goods of boycotts undermine possibilities for collective memory. Because most boycotted goods were largely ephemeral, later generations lacked the most tangible reminders of earlier struggles. Finally, why would the collective memories of consumer activists seem weaker than those of other movements? Perhaps the relatively small numbers of boycotters made it difficult to pass on any legacy. It is no indictment of this hidden history to note that

perhaps the very malleability of consumer protests against merchants and goods has obscured the continuities that have united them over time. Fortunately for us, this study provides a definitive history that links past and future movements so well that scholars will draw upon it for years to come.

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DAVID CIARLO. *Advertising Empire: Race and Visual Culture in Imperial Germany*. (Harvard Historical Studies, number 171.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. xvi, 419. \$49.95.

David Ciarlo has written a breakthrough book, one that provides an important point of departure for a new generation of studies of the cultural history of imperial Germany. One of the reasons for this is that *Advertising Empire* disaggregates the two entities in its title, compelling us to think about the ways in which “advertising” and “empire” complemented or diverged from one another. Resisting the all too simplistic conclusion that the presence of increasing numbers of stereotyped Africans in German advertising was a direct result of Germany’s post-1884 leap into imperial activity, Ciarlo investigates instead a wide variety of other factors that structured the Wilhelmine visual universe and shaped its fledgling advertising community. We learn something we probably should have suspected, but which nonetheless comes as a surprise: the racialization of German advertising imagery in the Wilhelmine era was not exclusively about imperial fantasies or projections. It was chiefly about selling stuff. The question then becomes, why did racialized images (and especially increasingly stereotyped images of Africans) help sell goods to an overwhelmingly white population, most of whom had never seen an African in person, and at least some of whom disapproved of German colonization? To answer this question, Ciarlo draws on little-studied aspects of Wilhelmine commercial and visual culture that take us far beyond the no longer productive assertion that imperial dreams suffused German culture during the long nineteenth century.

As with many breakthrough books, the innovation of *Advertising Empire* lies partly in its excavation of a series of new or underused sources and partly in a courageous and careful explanation of those sources. Ciarlo’s new sources are the trademark rolls of the Imperial Patent Office, where, after 1894, advertisers registered at least some of their signature designs; to these he adds images from several museum collections and wide reading, not only in the literature about German colonialism but in the literature (such as it is) about the history of German commerce, visual culture, and popular entertainments. The trademark rolls in particular allow him to obtain a chronologically specific overview of market-oriented

image making between the 1890s and 1914, making it possible to examine advertisements and poster art not, as he describes it, in individual test-tubes—as if made by artists living in a visual vacuum—but as a “down-pour” of clichés in which the historian can find patterns (p. 16). Ciarlo explores and interprets this visual language with considerable subtlety and insight; one of the delights of the book is that he is a fine reader of images, one who draws attention to specific aspects of visual language that the viewer can actually see in the images. The images themselves (including twenty-seven color plates) are well-chosen and beautifully reproduced, and Ciarlo deserves a great deal of credit for the hard work that surely went into this aspect of the volume.

Ciarlo begins his analysis with an unorthodox account of the world and colonial exhibitions and *Völkerschauen* (ethnographical shows) of the 1880s and 1890s, subjects that have been featured in many recent studies of colonial culture. Right off the bat he makes several striking observations. For example, the fact that the exhibitions gave up displaying colonial products and adopted the techniques of the *Völkerschauen* was not really an ideological move but was a response to the realities that most German colonies produced almost nothing (except bloodshed for the natives and boasting rights for the kaiser) and that visitors found exhibits of colonial goods boring. He writes that “we must resist the temptation to see the Colonial Exhibition [of 1896] through the eyes of its colonialist sponsors—as a powerful presentation of Germany’s imperial might” (p. 58); in fact, most visitors spent their time riding in hot air balloons or checking out huge new telescopes rather than wandering through product displays or even viewing the “real” native peoples. Most Germans did not even see these “exotic” peoples in the flesh, but encountered them through representations in posters, advertisements printed in magazines, and on product labels. Thus the real story of Germans’ relationships with African “others” is a story of representations, not of first-hand encounters. Therefore we need to understand the creators of the visual clichés, not just the vocal supporters of German colonialism.

Ciarlo next turns backward in time, showing that German consumers had been exposed to images of black people long before the late nineteenth century, from depictions in high art (as allegorical figures representing the continent of Africa or in depictions of the Magi) and in popular culture, as the “tobacco Moor” figure printed on packets of tobacco since the seventeenth century. But as Ciarlo points out, many of these images were composites of New and Old World types (the “tobacco Moor” combines a black body with a skirt of American tobacco leaves), and aside from their skin color Africans were not depicted as physically different than Europeans. What gave this visual tradition a jolt was the intrusion of images from the United States, led by minstrel shows already touring in the late 1830s and followed in the 1860s and afterward by P. T. Barnum and his German imitator, Carl Hagenbeck. Both the minstrel shows and Barnum’s circuses, the posters for which drew on the racist visual vocabulary of the Jim Crow era, left a lasting legacy in the form of representations of ragtag, red-lipped, and wide-eyed African-Americans. When in the 1890s it became possible to reproduce half-tone and colored illustrations cheaply, the newly-minted advertising profession had a grab-bag of images of minstrels, mammies, pickaninnies, and ape-men to deploy in their own attempt to use otherness to catch the eye.

Barnum, then, alerted savvy men of commerce that sensation sold, and American entertainers provided new, more strongly racialized images of people of African origin. But homegrown elements also contributed to the shaping of early advertising imagery in imperial Germany. One of the (again unexpected) elements to which Ciarlo draws our attention is caricature, a German strong suit beginning with Wilhelm Busch, the probable inventor of the comic strip in the 1860s, and blooming in the satirical journals *Kladderadatsch* and *Simplicissimus* by the 1890s. Early German advertisers liked visual jokes, and for many of these Africans were useful. The most long-lived of these drew on the familiar adage expressing endless frustration, “like trying to wash a Moor”; the *Möhrenwäsche* (“Moor wash”) proved to be a joke that soap manufacturers found endlessly entertaining. Images of Africans were also employed in the selling of black-colored items like ink and shoe polish, products that also lent themselves to numerous visual gags. It appears that racial difference was thought to be funny, and advertisers hoped that it would hold the viewers’ gaze long enough to sell the product. And, Ciarlo points out, from a design standpoint blackness was simply visually eye-catching, especially when advertisers were using only two or four-color images. In posters, black stood out against light-colored backdrops or walls; in advertisements for toothpaste, a black face made the whiteness of the teeth stand out. Catching the consumer’s eye was the object, whether this entailed creating a spectacle, telling a visual joke, or simply creating colorful contrasts, and in all of these areas, the black body did important work.

There were other reasons, too, for depicting Afri-

cans. Advertisers trying to sell new products like bicycles had to explain to consumers why they needed these items but wanted to do so without being condescending or overly didactic; one way to do this was to picture Africans, and especially African children, as the recipients of information about “civilizing” products. This strategy flattered viewers while telling them what to buy. Depicting clearly racial “others” also helped advertisers reach an audience that was divided by socioeconomic, educational, regional, political, and gender differences: African was one thing Germans were not, and depicting them as eternal servants, the butts of jokes, or the object of lessons was one way not to offend any member of the buying public, including (though Ciarlo does not say this) the internal “others,” such as working-class men, women, Jews, or Polish immigrants.

Ciarlo is not only interested in depictions of Africans and the usefulness of this visual language to those who wanted to sell their wares. He also wants to preserve a connection between this visual language and the history of German colonization, something he does by demonstrating that the depiction of Africans did change over time as stereotypical racial characteristics such as large, red lips became more and more exaggerated. Increasingly, he argues, Africans were presented as “man children”: adults (for depictions of children might arouse too much sympathy) with disproportionately large heads and small bodies. This new colonial figuration of Africans, he contends, did not coincide with the onset of German colonization but rather with the beginning of intense colonial warfare after the Boer Wars and with developments in lithography that made colored images and packages much cheaper to reproduce. The introduction of mass-produced advertising stamps for grocery packages also contributed to a movement toward the simplification of imagery—as did the advent of modernist design. This era witnessed both the intensification of colonial conflict and competition and a vastly increased scale and rate of image circulation—for this was also the era of trading cards and tabloids, of falling prices for illustrated journals, and mass emigration into the image-rich German cities. While not generated by political forces, these images, Ciarlo argues, surely played a role in naturalizing colonialism by insisting on racial differences (p. 155). Since advertisers had to speak to their audiences in languages they would both understand and accept, we can conclude, at the very least, that Germans did not object to picturing Africans as bodily misshapen, eternally uncivilized, happily enslaved, and sometimes dangerously irrational people. That colonizing them would not be an evil—no matter how savage the civilizing process—would be a logical conclusion to draw.

Ciarlo’s concluding section takes us briefly forward into the world of the Great War. Here his research is spotty, and his conclusions seem speculative and overdrawn. I suppose it is possible that linkages made between modernity and American images of blacks contributed to right-wing rhetoric about American mongrelization (p. 313), or that depictions of German

superiority contributed to “the detachment from realism with which the German public . . . went to war” (p. 315), but I am dubious. Surely Ciarlo is right that racialized images of Africans were used in depictions of French colonial troops (the “Black Horror”) during the war and during the Rhineland crisis of 1922–1923, but one simply does not know what to do with Ciarlo’s observation that antisemitism, though pervasive in right-wing discourse before and during the war, did not present itself in commercial imagery: “in advertising’s world of expedient color contrasts, race was constructed against Africans, not against Jews” (p. 309). Does that mean, then, that commercial images do not, at the end of the day, create racist antipathies? And then there are Ciarlo’s interesting and important remarks on the other imagery he has found in the trademarks. Depictions of Africans were by no means the most common; thin women, babies, and muscular men were depicted more frequently, and their bodies were also increasingly subject to stereotyping. Perhaps we need some investigation of these positive conventions, too, to understand

the patterns in the “downpour” of Wilhelmine visual imagery.

The most important contribution this book makes is to our understanding of visual culture and advertising strategies in the Wilhelmine era, and Ciarlo also deserves praise for decoupling empire and commercial culture, in part so that we can untangle their real relations (as once had to be done with the relationship between Nazism and big business). As I learned long ago from the classic book on the history of American advertising (Roland Marchand, *Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 1920–1940* [1985]), studying the relationship between advertising and national cultures as a whole is a tricky business, and it takes enormous ingenuity and deep immersion in both visual and political contexts to say something meaningful. Ciarlo has accomplished that with spectacular success.

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Reviews of Books

METHODS/THEORY

FRANCESCO BOLDIZZONI. *The Poverty of Clio: Resurrecting Economic History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 216. \$39.50.

Surely it was R. H. Tawney who said that a colleague is not an Amalekite to be smitten hip and thigh? Francesco Boldizzoni patently dissents from this and writes a demolition of cliometrics smiting one practitioner after another. The ad hominem approach makes for a jerkiness that is hard to review. Repeated *obiter dicta* followed by partial disclaimers add to the difficulty. It may however be said that in Boldizzoni's eyes nothing cliometricians do is right. They scarcely do research, instead making things up. They cannot read languages, which cuts them off from the *Annales* School. They are determined to replace social context by neoclassical economics. They aim to validate the American market economy by demonstrating that the entire past operated by similar rules. Boldizzoni is clever and exceptionally well read, but utterly unforgiving when hunting down heretics.

Who is in the dock in his great show trial? Chief among them are Avner Greif and Peter Temin. Greif searches the past to demonstrate that game theory "sanctions" the superiority of economic individualism, although Boldizzoni fails to show that this is wrong. Temin ignores 120 years of scholarship to construct a market economy in the ancient world from scraps of secondary evidence. Richard Posner builds his theory of economic anthropology on dubious premises. Avner Offer only parrots Tibor Scitovsky on happiness economics. Angus Maddison is able to find evidence of per capita GDP for ancient times yet maintains that Africa "is a mystery" (let us concede this one). Robert Allen engages in "acrobatic calculations" and Jan Luiten van Zanden is an anachronistic quantifier who invents evidence for "the new institutional narratives on the predestination of the West since medieval times." Jack A. Goldstone develops a "rhetorical construction" of growth in the past "without any regard to sources." Jan de Vries (of all people) makes a very selective use of the existing literature when adumbrating the industrious revolution. And Joel Mokyr's work on the industrial revolution is an incoherent bricolage of theories.

First, contrary to Boldizzoni's text, or subtext, clio-

metricians do a great deal of research. Robert William Fogel on the railroads, and Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman on slavery, dig deep into the sources. What marks their work, and that of others, is a strongly focussed quest for data to test hypotheses. It is wrong to imply that cliometricians are unaware of context simply because they do not pen general histories. Second, Boldizzoni wrongly suggest that cliometricians enjoy "splendid isolation" as he confuses finding certain foreign texts not very rewarding with an inability to read them. Third, the insinuation that conventional economics and econometric methods are complicit in a right-wing plot—Boldizzoni's unrestrained praise of anti-market scholars gives the impression this is what he thinks—is unsupported by evidence about the politics of cliometricians.

Frank Knight declared to economists, "measure, and if you can't measure, measure anyhow." This aspect of the critique does therefore sometimes stick. Econometric exercises undoubtedly leave some historians, used to more concrete pathways, *wie es eigentlich gewesen*, cold. Econometricians interpolate. A purist might deny the value of augmenting our knowledge by any such means unwarranted in the raw documents, and as a traditional economic historian I have been the first to complain of flights of fancy along these lines. Some scholars—including me—can claim to have found through casting about in the sources and traipsing around the countryside, wearing the stout boots of Tawney's celebrated advice, features of the past that cliometricians will never find. Even so, in the larger scheme of things the approaches are complementary.

Furthermore, the way cliometricians sometimes seize on implausible proxies is certainly objectionable in elevating technique over substance. It is easy to poke fun at all this, but there is no call for Boldizzoni's ceaseless *odium theologicum*. It is also easy to work oneself into a fret at the tribalism of cliometricians and their take-over of positions in economic history, though I do not see this as a concerted American "threat" to Europe. Academic politics says little about the intrinsic usefulness of the method cautiously applied, as it often is. Agreed, there is overreach, but it is hardly a conspiracy and the metatheoretical alternative Boldizzoni offers seems an unstable mélange drawn from non- and anti-market authorities. Economics has well-known limita-

tions, as do econometric methods, but this could have been rehearsed in less agonistic and disagreeably personal tones. The book is indeed so intemperate that I feel it may come to haunt the author many years hence.

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EDWARD B. BARBIER. *Scarcity and Frontiers: How Economies Have Developed through Natural Resource Exploitation*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. xviii, 748. Cloth \$105.00, paper \$48.00.

In this book, Edward B. Barbier examines the historical connections between economic development and frontier expansion. He argues that economists and economic historians have traditionally viewed natural resources as “fixed endowments”—the stuff of economic progress provided “freely by nature” and “distributed randomly across regions and countries,” such as carbon-based energy, raw materials, and land (p. 6). Today, however, the global community confronts the dangers of resource scarcity. As humans claw at the ocean floor for its remaining fish, Earth’s final frontier is being thoroughly exploited. Having eaten and burned our way through the “Golden Age” of natural resources, humans have now entered the “Age of Ecological Scarcity.”

In this heavily documented and thorough synthesis, Barbier demonstrates the relationship between resource availability and economic development since the Agricultural Transition circa 10,000 B.C.E. His purpose is modest: to illustrate that resource development is central to economic history and that this history, as we enter the “Age of Ecological Scarcity,” will hold valuable lessons for the future of humans. For Barbier, frontiers are the driver of economic history. Frontiers can be horizontal expanses, usually seen as “empty” by the exploiters, but they are almost always home to somebody. But frontiers can also be vertical expanses because mining coal and metals proved critical to early modern and modern economic development. By focusing strictly on models of economic development, Barbier appears to skirt, just barely, debates about the merits of “frontiers” in historical analysis, particularly as outlined two decades ago by the “new western historians.”

When we view frontiers as horizontal and vertical expanses, writes Barbier, “frontier expansion has clearly been pivotal to economic development for most of global history” (p. 8). Europe proved the main benefactor of this frontier bonanza through the exploitation of oceans, boreal forests, tropical lands for plantations, and temperate arable lands for grains. Barbier covers eight key historical epochs that, for those who study and teach world history, are familiar. The focal point is the moment of divergence, when the East, largely represented by China and the Islamic world, yielded to the West, represented by early modern European states. China turned inward, intensifying agriculture within its

borders, while Europe thrust outward, seeking new resources to exploit and trade.

To trace this trajectory, Barbier starts with the Agricultural Transition and the creation of surplus, cities, and empires. He examines parallels between climate change and agricultural expansion. A complex amalgam of factors, ranging from climate and culture to the “overkill hypothesis,” pushed and pulled people into settled agriculture. But frontier expansion fueled the spread of agriculture around the globe. Barbier is decidedly unconcerned with debates over technological diffusion. Rather he is interested in the fact that frontiers proved the arena for the exchange of agricultural techniques and technologies.

The Agricultural Transition led to the rise of surplus and cities, which required even more frontier resources to avoid the danger of the Malthusian crash. Barbier’s most technical section diagrams the relationship among agricultural output, population, and minimum subsistence requirements. The graphs are interesting and compelling, but, as J. M. Blaut has argued, most Malthusian theories are Eurocentric (they are usually marshaled to explain the “European miracle”) and need to be viewed with skepticism. Indeed, the fact that Barbier reverts to theoretical modeling over concrete historical examples (other than the quintessential poster child, Easter Island) is telling. But we should not bury the old English economist just yet. The population of Earth reached seven billion on October 31, 2011, which will further exacerbate the ramifications of the “Age of Ecological Scarcity.”

Barbier next turns to international trade between the great civilizations. Although it started out as a periphery, Europe stood at the center of world trade by 1500. Barbier is overly Eurocentric when explaining the “rise of Europe,” with its “abundant land relative to scarce labor,” “agricultural innovations” that improved surpluses, handy financial institutions, diversified economies, and competition between nation-states (p. 162). Such political and economic factors were indeed important but they were by no means unique to Europe. What really mattered was that Europe, for a variety of reasons ranging from geographic proximity to North America to maritime daring-do, was the first to reach the New World, infect it, and then exploit its human and natural resources. These resources then financed even greater frontier adventurism. Unlike Europe, writes Barbier, the “core economies in China, the Islamic states and India failed to translate their dominance of the world economic system into a successful strategy of sustained, trade-oriented natural-resource-based economic development” (p. 203).

After Christopher Columbus and Vasco da Gama, economic progress became inseparable from frontier expansion and the world entered the age of “Global Frontiers.” Once again, Europe emerged as the alpha male of the world pack because it was a “collection of small and highly competitive nation-states.” Because of this economic competition, explains Barbier, Europe proved better prepared to compete globally (p. 234). I

would emphasize slave labor, Caribbean sugar plantations, Potosí silver mines, and other examples of resource exploitation over the unique attributes of European culture, but I understand Barbier's basic point. By contrast, economic development in the contemporary era, from 1950 to present, has been characterized by a broadening of the gap between the wealthy, industrialized countries and the rest of the world. Sadly, we have run out of frontiers to exploit and the United States and other industrial countries control access to most of those remaining sources of energy and raw materials.

Barbier concludes with some valuable thoughts on where humans might go from here. Just as the "Age of Abundance" defined economic development in one epoch of human history, the "Age of Ecological Scarcity" will define another. Barbier minces no words: "Either we recognize the threat posed by this global scarcity problem and adopt the necessary and sufficient conditions for sustainable economic development, or we face the growing human, environmental and economic costs imposed by worsening ecological scarcity and global imbalances" (p. 713). This book is an outstanding example of why the fields of economic and environmental history have so much to offer one another.

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AVNER BEN-ZAKEN. *Reading Ḥayy Ibn-Yaḡẓān: A Cross-Cultural History of Autodidacticism*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 191. \$60.00.

Avner Ben-Zaken's latest book is really two books in one: a selective study of the reception history of *Ḥayy Ibn-Yaḡẓān*, a speculative treatise composed in the late twelfth century by the Andalusí philosopher Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn-Tufayl, and an effort to sketch out the intellectual history of autodidacticism as it relates to the early modern development of experimental method. This is an extraordinary accomplishment for a relatively slim monograph, and it is therefore unsurprising that the reception history of *Ḥayy* offered by Ben-Zaken is highly selective (giving short shrift to all but one of its early modern English translations) and that the account of autodidacticism and experimental method is idiosyncratic. This latter aspect of the volume is in keeping with the methodology found in Ben-Zaken's recent work, *Cross-Cultural Scientific Exchanges in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1560–1660* (2010), which surveyed the channels through which modern scientific thought travelled throughout Europe and the Islamic world during the period of the Scientific Revolution. Both studies take a similarly broad, synoptic view of connections across languages, cultures, and religious orientations to give an overview of the complex web that links disparate peoples across time and space. Both, moreover, are suggestive rather than exhaustive, opening up exciting new approaches to the study of premodern intellectual history.

As Ben-Zaken rightly points out, previous studies of *Ḥayy Ibn-Yaḡẓān* have tended to focus only on a single phase of the work's long life: the twelfth-century setting in al-Andalus where it was composed; its transmission in Hebrew translation and the philosophical responses engendered by it during the later Middle Ages; its reception and translation into Latin in Renaissance Florence; or its circulation in early modern England, where in various ways it influenced politics, theology, science, and philosophy. Ben-Zaken is the first to attempt to weave these various contexts of creation and reception together into a rich fabric, tracing the development of medieval and early modern thought through the brilliant glow of a single thread, Ibn-Tufayl's philosophical treatise on the pure autodidact. Ben-Zaken's study is composed in four chapters (plus introduction and conclusion), each of which puts *Ḥayy Ibn-Yaḡẓān* into a particular place and time: "Marrakesh, 1160s," "Barcelona, 1348," "Florence, 1493," and "Oxford, 1671." Each of these situations marks a turning point in the history of the work: not just the individual translations and commentaries generated by Moses Narboni, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, and Edward Pococke, but also significant moments in the development of a theory of knowledge that privileges experiential learning above received wisdom, and conceives of the autodidactic experience of the character *Ḥayy* as the ultimate test-case for this theory of knowledge.

Such an approach has limitations as well as benefits. Perhaps the most striking limitation is that a full history of the reception of *Ḥayy* is effaced in favor of a more selective account of specific, carefully chosen moments in that reception-history. Ben-Zaken anticipates this difficulty, however, and the bibliography that ends the volume includes a relatively comprehensive list of adaptations and translations of *Ḥayy*, both modern and premodern, providing a useful basis for the expansion of this aspect of his work by future generations of scholars. In addition, the intellectual history that Ben-Zaken sketches chooses certain moments in the development of experimental learning above others: for example, the conclusion includes an excursus on early modern utopias that highlights the famous work of Thomas More alongside allusions to the ideal of the "noble savage" of Jean-Jacques Rousseau; but Ben-Zaken might just as easily have turned to the *Essays* of Michel de Montaigne or Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* to illustrate a different strand in the history of autodidacticism that is also deeply indebted to the world view of *Ḥayy Ibn-Yaḡẓān*. This is not to say that Ben-Zaken should have included a fuller engagement with these authors (or others) but rather to suggest the remarkable range and breadth potentially opened up by Ben-Zaken's exploration of the readership of *Ḥayy*.

This book will inspire future scholars along three different paths. First, it encourages fuller development of the reception-history of *Ḥayy Ibn-Yaḡẓān*, especially of its many translations and adaptations; second, it opens up new directions in the study of the wider themes of autodidacticism and experimental learning in the early

modern world, even beyond those probed here by Ben-Zaken; and, finally, it illustrates a new, increasingly popular methodology in the practice of intellectual history that moves beyond the constraints of period, national literature, religious orientation, and even scholarly discipline to produce a thick description of the movement of ideas across time.

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JOSEPH A. DANE. *Out of Sorts: On Typography and Print Culture*. (Material Texts.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 242. \$59.95.

As its title suggests, this book is a polemic by a disgruntled scholar of English literature, Joseph A. Dane. Directed against both the recent approach of book history and the older tradition of analytical bibliography, it aims to reveal the chasm between grand narratives about "The Book," which Dane deems a mere abstraction or illusion, and particular histories of material books. Attacking the notion of "print culture" as developed first by Lucien Febvre and Henri-Jean Martin and then by Elizabeth Eisenstein, the author insists not only that such a culture was a construction of printers themselves, as revisionist scholars such as Adrian Johns have asserted, but that it continues to mask the reality of the *ars artificialiter scribendi* ("art of artificial writing") as it developed beginning in the mid-fifteenth century. For the misrepresentation of the book, Dane also blames bibliographers, such as Thomas Frognall Dibdin of the early nineteenth century, who, while they enabled research by gathering the books in our collections, constructed a particular *telos* of book history from the standpoint of the nineteenth century. Emphasizing that we still know very little about early printed objects, Dane's work is a manifesto for a reinvention of analytical bibliography to uncover the history of actual books. In his effort to demonstrate the problems with previous assumptions about "print culture," Dane focuses on typography. Noting that the first detailed verbal account of typefounding did not appear until 1683, he criticizes previous scholars for reading practices of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as depicted for example in the *Encyclopédie*, backward onto the era of the invention of the *ars artificialiter scribendi*, which may have involved very different methods (p. 19).

Dane's point about the historical contingency of the material form of books is best exemplified in chapters on gothic, or blackletter, type. Performing a rough experiment with fonts in Microsoft Word, Dane challenges a persistent bibliographical myth that such type, which was seen as paradoxical to the rise of humanism, was used by fifteenth-century printers because it was more economical of space than roman type. Instead, he suggests, gothic type was used by early Italian printers such as Aldus Manutius and Nicholas Jenson because their customers were used to reading certain genres of texts—such as law books—in that style of writing. Moreover, with reference to the title pages of eigh-

teenth-century books, Dane insists that the very definition of "gothic" as opposed to, say, classical, is connected not to genre but to period. Cautioning against the use of such a term to describe a material element of a book, he writes, "A critical or historical term such as 'gothic' is not problematic simply because it is vague or ambiguous. Rather, it is problematic because our very invocation of such a term creates bodies of evidence ('gothic features of title pages') that constitute illusory supporting microhistories" (p. 90). The importance of careful contextualization of extratextual elements is illustrated by another chapter, on "manicules" or fists in the margins of early folio editions of Geoffrey Chaucer's work in the sixteenth century. Asserting that the original function of these fists is unclear, Dane shows how such marginalia can nonetheless be used as evidence for the printer's copy used in subsequent editions of Chaucer's work (p. 106). The importance of attention to the original material form of a text is likewise demonstrated in a very different chapter, on the digital Piers Plowman and William Blake archives. According to Dane, despite their intention to reproduce unmediated editions of texts, both of these archives revive the notion of editorial authority against which they were directed. His discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of digital reproduction of printed texts is of significance for public historians and librarians, as well as humanities scholars.

Elsewhere, however, Dane descends into esoteric quibbling with obscure bibliographers. For example, his "Interlude" on literary critic Randall McLeod's postmodern analysis of two shape poems of seventeenth-century poet George Herbert, in which he argues that typography constrains meaning, will interest only a handful of analytical bibliographers or literary scholars. And it is not really apparent how chapter seven, on the model of linear perspective in art manuals and stage representations, fits into his main argument about the variability of books. Moreover, Dane's methods are often no more rigorous than the previous scholars he is critiquing. In the chapter on perspective, for instance, he chooses from Google Books two nineteenth-century drawing manuals, "more or less at random," without concern about their representativeness. To demonstrate his point that authors ultimately have little control over their texts, he also makes an outrageous admission that, decades ago, while employed as a typist of term papers and moot court briefs for college students, he frequently rewrote texts—sometimes with lewd comments in the middle or at the end, to see whether anyone would discover them. Finally, Dane's prose is often less than crystal clear. To take just one among many examples, in his "Interlude" on McLeod, he writes, "In other words, by following invalid codes set up by the editor of a literary text, we come to a truth that is transcendent of the half-truths held by those who naively follow valid codes of that editor" (p. 96).

In the end, Dane's collection of essays undermines the foundations of the work of analytical bibliographers and book historians without constructing any new in-

terpretation of early printing in their place. Like his earlier collection, *The Myth of Print Culture: Essays on Evidence, Textuality, and Bibliographical Method* (2003), this work serves to remind us of the singularity of books as material objects. However, the point has been made in a more coherent and persuasive form by others, most notably Johns, with whom Dane has taken issue. As presented here, Dane's work will interest only the most devoted scholars of late medieval culture and material bibliography. Toward the end of this book, Dane writes, "When we confront a problem, whether ethical or academic, most of us judge its complexity in terms of our self-interest: a discussion that does not deal with the complexities with which we are familiar is simplistic or naive; one that deals with greater complexities than we wish to confront is overly sophisticated and unnecessarily mystified" (p. 161). According to Dane's own standards, many historians will probably find that this book is not in their "self-interest."

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DOMINICK LACAPRA. *History and Its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2009. Pp. ix, 230. Cloth \$59.95, paper \$19.95.

Dominick LaCapra writes, theorizes, and criticizes what he regards as the limits of history—violence and traumatic events such as the Holocaust, genocide, and other phenomena that threaten our ordinary "historical" thought and imagination. For him history is not and should not be "ingratiating narrative" but an invitation to his (not the Frankfurt school's) "critical theory." In effect, intellectual history takes on a metadisciplinary and quasi-religious mission of "rethinking" the world. LaCapra's hope is to enlarge the possibilities of historical thought both inside and outside the discipline, indeed in the academy in general. In his remarks on canonization he recognizes non-canonical reading that permits critical and not merely historical understanding. History does not simply tell the truth as empirical scholars assume, but it reconstructs reality, and he wants to include in history animal and ecological concerns.

In "Vicissitudes of Theory and Practice" LaCapra thinks through other critical theories, regarding some as excessively speculative and others (e.g., Gabrielle Spiegel's "practice theory") as uncritical reactions to documentary history. For him the problem is "all that goes into the making of a significant, if problematic, world self-presentation, justification, prejudice, fantasy, and affect as well as experience that is not reducible to immaculate perception" (p. 50). Rethinking means a view of the sublime and the sacred that neither uncritically accepts nor rejects it. LaCapra's approach involves (in a typically convoluted sentence) not a simplistic Enlightenment faith or an equally simplistic understanding of secularization as the opposite of religion. Instead it leads to the question of intricate

nonlinear displacements, repetitions, and variations in the complex interactions of the secular and the religious. "Traumatropism" is one of LaCapra's technical terms, related to trauma studies arising out of psychoanalytic thought and including such matters as "genocides and other forms of abuse" and victimization. Trauma distorts memory and demands a different sort of treatment from ordinary forms of experience, which seems to mean that the cultural critic has an essential role of interpretation, although as usual LaCapra takes us through a maze of conflicting opinions and equivocations. For LaCapra trauma resides in the sacred and is something like a negative sublime. He often draws artistic analogies: for example, to Edvard Munch's *Scream* or the shoes on Picasso's peasant woman in *Guernica*. This line of thought leads to the phenomenon of horror and its relation to the sublime, such as Heinrich Himmler's agonizing view of annihilating Jews as sublime, arising from the conflicting roles of perpetrator, victim, and witness. LaCapra emphasizes the role of the "secondary witness" who goes beyond primary testimony, as do art, literature, and cultural criticism, which all are involved in what LaCapra calls "working through."

In chapter eight LaCapra offers a critique of violence as an antidote to a "debased sociopolitical and cultural system"—the positive side of terrorism, as trauma is another side of the sublime. Martin Heidegger's "turn" to Nazism brings into play the value of poetry as a way of rethinking and rendering problems out of the ordinary "uncanny." Yet Heidegger failed to contextualize his own thought with regard to contemporary ideologies, although he did relate the question of truth to the sacred as well as to play. LaCapra gives his own reformulation of Heidegger's thought but he prefers not to deny either of the "two registers" in which that thought can be interpreted. LaCapra's eclectic approach leads to an effort, in the name (or spirit) of religion, to blur any distinction between animal and human, humanism and the sacred, human and universal rights. For LaCapra humanism is a form of anthropocentric prejudice that relegates the non-human to the animal world, and likewise, by analogy, to the race-purging process of the Holocaust. The fact that some Nazis were inclined (like Adolf Hitler) to vegetarianism or sentimental views of animals only reinforces LaCapra's argument.

LaCapra's final chapter is really introductory in that it offers an autobiographical dimension to his trek from naïve historicism to critical and cross-disciplinary thinking. He notes his religious point of departure and the continuity with both "post-religious" and "post-secular" thought. This view, he says, is neither mystical nor messianic, but the product of a non-anthropocentric response to the other joined to an ecological understanding of modernity. LaCapra points to his own "rather serious deconversion experience," which accompanied the linguistic turn. This trauma occurred when his father, after hearing that he proposed to major in intellectual history, asked if there was also a "dumb history." The exchange may have helped lead LaCapra to scorn

the non-theoretical-critical history featured in most history departments. So he was led down the path mapped out by Jacques Derrida, Hayden White, and others.

I first met LaCapra over thirty years ago at a conference that he and a colleague organized entitled "The Future of Intellectual History," which resulted in publication of a distinguished collection of essays. The volume appeared under another title, but the original bold claim might seem prescient to many who have followed the fortunes of LaCapra and his associates in the generation since then. In any case, he has remained faithful to his posthistoricist and postrational project.

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ALAN ROSEN. *The Wonder of Their Voices: The 1946 Holocaust Interviews of David Boder*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. xvii, 310. \$74.00.

One of the most significant and sustained attempts to record Holocaust survivors' experiences occurred in the summer of 1946. David Boder, professor of psychology at Illinois Institute of Technology, went to France, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy and, over the course of two months, interviewed survivors in displaced persons camps and shelters run by Jewish organizations. Using a wire spool recorder, he gathered 130 interviews in nine different languages.

Boder had been motivated to conduct this project when he noticed that virtually all the evidence regarding the murder of the Jews that reached America in the year after the war was visual. There were pictures of bodies being bulldozed into graves, of survivors who resembled cadavers more than human beings, and of the camps. There were newsreels of respectable German citizens from surrounding towns exhibiting great shock at "discovering" what had happened in their backyards. But where, Boder wondered, were the voices of those who could speak in the first person singular about their experiences? Boder, upset by the "enormous discrepancy" between the abundance of visual material and the absence of first-hand auditory material, determined to rectify the situation.

Alan Rosen observes that Boder had a number of agendas. He wanted not only to record a firsthand account of what happened but to bring that story to the American public so that it would be more amenable to opening the country's doors to survivors. Convinced that only the interviews could fully illuminate for Americans the dark story of the Holocaust, Boder applied to the National Institute for Mental Health for a grant. They funded his initial work and, over the next seven years, provided a total of sixty thousand dollars to enable him to transcribe, analyze, and publish his findings. Despite this great show of support, Boder never finished the transcriptions.

Ironically, while these interviews are considered to be among the earliest body of oral Holocaust testimonies, Boder was upset that he had undertaken this project so late. He bemoaned the fact that he had not begun his

work a year earlier when the survivors' memories were fresher. While Boder was hardly the first person to interview survivors, he was one of the first to record them. Most of the earlier interviews, as well as those conducted in subsequent years, were edited and condensed. Some interviewers turned the survivors' remarks into a narrative. In contrast, Boder's recordings contain not just the survivors' recollections but his questions as well.

Boder also asked survivors to sing songs from the camps. As Rosen notes in this incisive work, long before Claude Lanzmann filmed Simon Srebnik singing the musical repertoire demanded by his Nazi guards, "Boder understood that remembered songs from the camps were worth pursuing aggressively" (p. 133). When Boder published a book containing the first of the interviews he had transcribed he observed that as horrifying as was the material contained therein, "they are not the grimmest stories that could be told—I did not interview the dead" (p. 141).

Rosen notes that Holocaust remembrance has returned to the situation Boder faced in 1946. The visual once again takes pride of place, with video testimony displacing aural testimony. Yad Vashem's new state-of-the-art facility for viewing video interviews has no arrangement for listening to the thousands of audio interviews in the institution's possession. Many respected scholars relegate audio testimony to secondary importance because, they argue, it disembodies the voice of the survivor. Rosen contends otherwise. In audio recordings people are more open and less self-conscious. Listeners, not distracted by visual images, pay closer attention to the words.

Over the years, as wire recorders were replaced by tape recorders, accessing Boder's recordings became increasingly difficult. The Library of Congress and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum have recently provided digital access to many of the recordings. Rosen observes that "what took Boder a little over two months to record took" many decades to be played back (p. 165). Boder's interviews are now beginning to receive well-deserved attention, and Rosen's insightful analysis by will accelerate that process.

Concentration camp guards taunted inmates, Primo Levi recalls, by saying that even if they emerged alive no one would believe their stories or want to listen to them. Long before the word Holocaust was common parlance, long before there was a body of research on the topic, and long before there was a spate of memoirs, Boder carried hundreds of pounds of equipment to Europe to interview young survivors. He captured their stories before they had become a fixed narrative. He did so for them. He did so for those who had not been there but who, he was convinced, needed to know. And he did it, as he said, for the dead.

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CAROLYN J. DEAN. *Aversion and Erasure: The Fate of the Victim after the Holocaust*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2010. Pp. viii, 193. \$29.95.

Over the last three decades the Holocaust, as the ultimate example of evil, has shaped much of the discourse about victims. Many observers have also noted that in the wake of this increased attention and sensitivity to the Holocaust, suffering and trauma have become central to identity in the United States and Western Europe. Heroes and heroic deeds have been supplanted by victims competing for recognition.

The pervasive discourse on suffering and identity in French and American debates about Jewish victims in the Holocaust is the starting point for Carolyn J. Dean's thoughtful, provocative, and original study of the victim in post-Holocaust theory and historiography. She chose to study France and the United States because these countries are home to the two largest Jewish populations outside Israel, and in both countries the discourse on suffering and trauma has been bound up with debates on minority relations. Dean's study asks how we construct and view victims, and how the discussion about the Holocaust and its impact shapes decisions about who is "really" a victim and who is not.

One of the book's central arguments is that to have a claim to victimhood accepted, a victim has to appear to have mastered his or her suffering. Victims who proclaim their injuries too loudly are regarded as having dubious motives, while a "minimalist style allegedly resolves the cultural difficulty of how to speak about having been victimized" (p. 142). Such a minimalist form represents victims as having mastered the symptoms of their suffering. One such example is Primo Levi, who was always praised and celebrated because of his measured approach to his experience in Auschwitz. He believed that emotional control would make his testimony more credible and effective.

But why do we find victims who suffer with dignity more attractive than victims that do not, and why is it that helpless victims make us uncomfortable and evoke complicated responses? Dean answers these questions by arguing that the rejection and sacralization of victims are strategies for coping with the disruption of a putatively secure moral universe. Victims challenge us, and we project onto them values and ideologies; thus the discomfort provoked by passive victims tells us more about those who did not suffer than about the actual experience of victimization. Dean notes that historians' assessments have had a limited impact on debates about Jewish victims' passivity or disempowerment. Instead, the "exemplary victim is inextricable from an ideology of stoicism in the face of pain and suffering with honor" (p. 182).

There is significant overlap between American and French victim discourses, but there are also differences. The author contends that different political cultures and ideologies provide different realities within which victimhood is constructed. Unfortunately this interesting and relevant discussion does not receive sufficient

attention. True, Dean provides an entire chapter on French discourses on the surfeit of Jewish memory, but the book would have benefited from a structured comparison of the two countries.

Dean manages to blend literary theory and historiography seamlessly throughout her study. Although the approach is hardly novel, it is often difficult to execute. The discussion and analysis flow eloquently between, for example, the usability of victim testimony as a source for historians to the issue of causality in the Holocaust. This demands a high degree of familiarity with the subject matter from the reader, as the text is dense and devoid of lengthy explanations and excurses.

At the beginning of her study Dean asks rhetorically if scholars' turn to trauma, and criticism thereof, is a symptom of too much interest in victims. Although the question does not receive a definitive answer, it is an important one, for, as this book clearly shows, scholars, knowingly or more likely unknowingly, help shape the image of the victim.

Aversion and Erasure looks at how victims are constructed and judged. It is a must read for scholars interested in the legacy of the Holocaust, trauma, and victim discourses in the contemporary world.

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COMPARATIVE/WORLD

SUSAN GILSON MILLER and MAURO BERTAGNIN, editors. *The Architecture and Memory of the Minority Quarter in the Muslim Mediterranean City*. (Aga Khan Program.) Cambridge: Harvard Graduate School of Design, distributed by Harvard University Press. 2010. Pp. 227. \$24.95.

Drawing on the combined strengths and preoccupations of historians and architects, this new volume proposes that minority quarters in Mediterranean cities should not be considered as isolated sites, but rather that these neighborhoods were implicitly connected to the wider fabric of the cities of which they were part, joined through networks of streets, mixed residential patterns, and vectors of human movement. Editors Susan Gilson Miller and Mauro Bertagnin propose to read the urban "fabric as text" (p. 18), thereby granting the built environment its place as a serious factor in Mediterranean history. This particular contribution is the book's most important one because it makes a true commitment to interdisciplinary methods, rather than a mere nod in that direction, while also highlighting the rewards of scholarly collaboration.

Interest in historic minority quarters around the rim of the Mediterranean is not a new concern, but this book charts an unprecedented path by relying upon a combination of previously untreated textual, architectural, urban, and visual sources, some of which stem from collaborative field projects carried out in cities such as Palermo, Fez, and Istanbul. Thus, the tangible goals of documenting physical structures connect to a

wider interpretive scheme. As outlined by Miller in the introduction, all of the essays respond to the burdens set up by previous scholarship, which has cast minority neighborhoods as artificially cut off from their larger urban settings or as localized aberrations on the brink of disappearance. Moreover, past research focused on the legal status of minority communities from a prescriptive position, thereby overlooking the ways in which everyday interventions on the ground transgressed group boundaries and societal expectations. In direct response to longstanding yet flawed paradigms, contributors to this volume pursue a more integrated line of questioning by looking to the dynamics of community formation, the slippery notion of belonging, the fluid relationships between different groups within the urban sphere, the uncertain status of converts, and the spatial politics of separation. To the credit of the editors, the collection resists the impulse to define the character of the Mediterranean minority quarter in stark or absolute terms, or to treat these sites in an encyclopedic fashion. Although readers may question the book's attention to Jewish over other minority neighborhoods or its exclusion of eastern Mediterranean or Iberian peninsula cities, coverage was not a major concern in this particular endeavor, and the authors signal that future studies may address apparent gaps.

The essays may be divided into three groups, following the geographical contours that they map. The first pair treats minority quarters in Sicily and southern Italy, with William Granara on Palermo and the two editors with Ilham Khuri-Makdisi on Trani on the Adriatic coast. Granara reconstructs Palermo's districts by carefully mapping historical accounts on to more recent plans of the city. Drawing on the information culled from the Cairo Geniza and medieval travelers' and residents' perspectives, he argues for seeing the Meschita neighborhood in Palermo as a cosmopolitan "shared space for Muslims, Christians, and Jews" (p. 36). The following article focuses on the rise and fall of the *giudecca*, or the Jewish Quarter, of Trani, taking the reader inside its three synagogues and locating its role as a magnet for medieval Jewish learning. Although its Jewish community was expelled or forced to convert by the mid-sixteenth century, the structure of this neighborhood has remained relatively intact over the centuries.

The essays on Fez, Marrakesh, and Tangier provide contrasting views on the configuration of Moroccan Jewish neighborhoods. Each traces the growth of the local Jewish community, showing how historic waves of migration created heterogeneous populations that thwart the notion of a monolithic Jewish society. According to Miller and Bertagnin in collaboration with Attilio Petruccioli, the founding of the Fez *mallah*, the first formal Jewish quarter in Morocco that gave its name to later establishments, was progressive and organic, rather than the result of a single act of dislocation as origin myths would have it. This chapter provides a thoroughgoing examination of the *mallah's* buildings and streets, which rely on the same architectural and

spatial paradigms found within the walls of the *madina*. Emily Gottreich follows by tracing the *mallah* in Marrakesh, which was home to local Christians as well. There, the Jewish community was defined by its central commercial role. Thus the *mallah* connected not only to the adjacent *madina* but also to an extended rural trading hinterland. The city of Tangier, as treated by Miller, stands out from the group as a port city that faced outward, having been controlled by the Portuguese, the Spanish, and then the English. Tangier's Jewish community never lived in a separate *mallah*. Rather the hybrid Beni Ider Quarter that Miller outlines was a multiethnic and multireligious domain with its diplomatic residences and Muslim, Christian, and Jewish sacred spaces.

Although it stands alone in dealing with Turkey, Karen Leal's chapter on the Balat district on the Golden Horn of Istanbul fits comfortably into the book's framework. Using court records, travelers' accounts, and the memories of past residents, Leal proposes that identity in Balat was a shifting category, constructed by individuals in varying ways for divergent audiences. She also questions the fixity of the border between the Jewish community in Balat and the Greek Orthodox one in adjacent Fener by looking at the institutions and groups that populated the liminal space between the two neighborhoods.

While the time frame of the volume might appear to be ambitiously long, stretching from the ninth century to the present, this protracted view demonstrates how local political events affected minority groups with unique gravity, such as the equitable thirteenth-century rule of Frederick II when Jewish communities flourished in Palermo and Trani or the intolerant stance of the twelfth-century Almohads who exiled or forced conversion of non-Muslims in North Africa. Evocative biographical portraits of selected city residents, such as Stella Astruc who went to court to gain the right to leave Trani in the thirteenth century, and Haim Benchimol, one of the most prosperous Jews of Tangier who engaged in many business and charitable ventures over six hundred years later, animate the featured cities.

Throughout the volume, plans and drawings serve as important resources for the cities and structures documented, particularly the modest private residences or mundane commercial establishments that have eluded previous interest. Indeed, the historic fabric of these sites, as well as some buildings, such as the Sant'Anna synagogue in Trani, is quickly eroding. In most cases, the authors integrate these visual tools purposefully into their essays, thereby tying the documentary aspect of the project to the analytical one. Even so, readers who are not accustomed to viewing such diagrams may struggle to understand them without the aid of extended didactic captions or more instructive labeling. The same could be said for the provocative historic photographs that could have benefited from further contextualization or interpretation.

I am pleased to see the appearance of a volume that treats urban space effectively as a topic for study, rather

than regarding it as a receptacle for historical activity. By taking architectural forms and urban practices into serious consideration, this book forges new ground, surpassing the proposed limits of the Mediterranean and even the overarching concern with the minority quarter. In fact, the essays presented here will help us to reconsider conventional understanding of urban groups, their institutions, and the borders, boundaries, and barriers that appear to divide them.

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R. BIN WONG and JEAN-LAURENT ROSENTHAL. *Before and Beyond Divergence: The Politics of Economic Change in China and Europe*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 276. \$45.00.

This interesting and provocative book uses economic theory to advance a political argument explaining the divergence in the long-run performance of China and Europe. R. Bin Wong and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal disagree with Kenneth Pomeranz about both the timing and the causes of the “great divergence.” In their view, divergence is evident some two centuries earlier and had little to do with the factors (coal and colonies) that Pomeranz emphasizes—hence the word “before” in the book’s title. But they are in hearty sympathy with Pomeranz’s rejection of cosmic and essentialist accounts of the profoundly different economic developments at the far ends of Eurasia, and seek to provide rigorous theoretical explanations for the paths chosen (and they really mean chosen) to replace the descriptive comparisons offered in earlier works—hence the word “beyond” in the book’s title.

Wong and Rosenthal argue that accounts of China’s economic backwardness that rely on Western social theory and that reveal faith in the normative value of the Western historical record have led us astray. These approaches find Eastern inferiority where nothing more than a finding of difference is warranted. The authors propose to replace this vast and venerable literature with falsifiable theories that can explain differences in European and Chinese economic institutions on the basis of rational, optimizing choice. In effect, they argue that Chinese actors, facing the political and geographic environments of Europe and its family structures, would have solved their problems as Europeans did, and that European actors, in a Chinese environment, would have found the Chinese solutions optimal as well.

Their Panglossian assumptions lead Wong and Rosenthal to credit imperial China with economic institutions and customs at least as efficient and growth-promoting as those found in early modern Europe. Despite this theoretical equivalence they concede that economic performance diverged well before the industrial revolution, but they attribute this to a great historical irony: the unintended consequence of what was Europe’s greatest obstacle to economic growth, its po-

litical fragmentation and consequent chronic warfare and insecurity.

Here the authors set the conventional literature on its head. Europe’s political fragmentation is commonly held in high esteem as the source of competition, the guarantor of limited government, and the spur to technological creativity. But to Wong and Rosenthal it is nothing more nor less than the generator of endless warfare, which, in turn, forces a relentless fiscalism on all European states, whatever their particular form. They then proceed to invert the venerable concept of Oriental despotism. In their eyes the vast geographic scale of the Chinese Empire is the source of powerful advantages, among which are physical security, low taxation, imperial devotion to good government, and an ample provision of public goods.

The authors do not attempt to explain the enduring excellence of Chinese imperial rule, but much of their further analysis depends on its existence. The vast size of this peaceable kingdom encouraged long-distance trade. China lacked formal market institutions and commercial courts, but this was perfectly rational since only a zone of fragmented sovereignty (Europe) that limited long-distance trade had a pressing need for such institutions. Likewise, China lacked financial institutions, a public debt, or even mortgage instruments. But Wong and Rosenthal reason from theory that a well-governed empire has no need for a public debt and provides the security to allow for the private, familial conduct of credit transactions. China did not urbanize. It appears that cities accounted for less of China’s total population in 1850 (perhaps three to five percent) than they had six hundred years earlier. Again the authors reason from theory that this was actually a great advantage. Early modern Europe was over urbanized because the endemic threat of war constrained industry to locate behind the high, costly walls of the towns. In China, manufacturing was free to locate in low-cost rural locations, which gave it significant cost advantages.

Here, as in their extended discussion of the economic efficiency of China’s extended families, Wong and Rosenthal are resourceful in developing economic models that show how a rational actor could work around China’s institutional constraints and how the absence of formal institutions addressing commercial law, factor markets, and public accountability need not be seen as anything but the product of the sensible choices of optimizing individuals. Unfortunately, historical evidence that might actually test their theories is largely unavailable. The reader is left with an account of how imperial China was economically efficient in theory, but not in fact.

The authors concede that the excellence, indeed the superiority, of China’s economic institutions notwithstanding, China did not succeed in increasing per capita income. This occurred in Europe, despite its wretched political system, or rather, because of it. Europe owed this breakthrough, they argue, to the indirect effects of its chronic warfare. Industrial production could not locate in rural areas to exploit low cost labor. In cities,

capital is cheaper and labor more expensive than in rural areas, and this led manufacturers to make the best of their "suboptimal" environment by exploring how to lower costs via capital-intensive, labor-saving technologies.

This account of European development, on which so much of the book's larger argument about China depends, might be doubted, and here the facts are actually available to test the authors' claims. European industry did not remain concentrated in cities. In most of Europe, rural manufacturing spread throughout the early modern period to become the dominant form in most sectors; rural insecurity, in most areas, was far less disabling than Wong and Rosenthal assume; investment in public goods (such as transport facilities and schooling) was much more substantial than they claim.

This stimulating book offers a virtuoso display of social scientific reasoning applied to a major historical problem. We now have a theoretically rigorous account of what Qing China could have been. But I am doubtful that we have an account of what it was in fact.

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GLENN A. MOOTS. *Politics Reformed: The Anglo-American Legacy of Covenant Theology*. (Eric Voegelin Institute Series in Political Philosophy.) Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 2010. Pp. xiv, 240. \$44.95.

In this concise and erudite book, Glenn A. Moots traces covenant theology from ancient Israel through the American founding period. By setting early modern Anglo-American political thought within this extended theological lineage, Moots suggests that sincere faith and deep communal obligations are compatible with the consensual norms of liberal democracy. The volume could be categorized as a sophisticated work of theology or politics, but its primary claims—that covenantal relationships defined Reformed Protestantism and thereby Anglo-American conceptions of good government—are fundamentally historical.

Moots begins by explaining that covenant theology is a political theology "par excellence," because it honors both the instrumental need for human cooperation and the existential need for transcendence (p. 21). Unlike contracts, Moots explains, covenants are not mere instruments for the promotion of individual interest. They entail a high degree of individual moral direction, collective responsibility, and providential accountability. For the Protestant reformers (as for Jews and Catholics) the first of the two archetypal covenants was unconditional and was made with one people, the Israelites. The second was made with Moses (and by extension all of humanity) on Mount Sinai, and this time there were stated terms to be met. Subsequent covenants followed the conditional pattern established at Sinai. The covenantal approach to relationships requires more than just religion; it depends on the guarantee of a revealed God who rewards and punishes. For

this reason, according to Moots, deism and other post-seventeenth-century varieties of natural theology cannot sustain covenant relationships. Their conception of God is simply too abstract, too much, that is, like the anti-worldly doctrine of Gnosticism. You cannot covenant with "a set of propositions" (p. 19).

The chief protagonists in Moots's book are the sixteenth-century Protestant theologians John Calvin and Henry Bullinger. Each articulated critical features of the covenant tradition. Calvin, the arch-predestinarian, viewed civil tyranny as a just punishment for a sinful society, while Bullinger allowed for a larger measure of human agency in matters of conscience and government. Yet it was Calvin who conceived a theological framework for resistance against unjust rule, while Bullinger excelled in devising forms of accommodation. Inspired by Calvin and Bullinger, the most dramatic expression of covenant theology occurred in Great Britain during the mid-seventeenth-century Wars of the Three Kingdoms. In response to Anglican impositions, the Scots revived the National Covenant and later established the Solemn League and Covenant with England. Their sometime allies, the English independents, were covenanters of another sort, intent on fostering strict, local communities of the saved. The conflict culminated in the execution of Charles I and John Bradshaw's stark accompanying assertion (later embraced by the likes of Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson) that resistance to tyrants was obedience to God.

In a single succeeding chapter, the book proceeds from the Puritans through the American Revolution. Here, Moots re-evaluates New England's long arguments over baptism, communion, and the proper limits of church membership in light of the Protestant Reformed ideal of the covenant. He maintains that attempts at covenant revival eventually succumbed to religious enthusiasm and lay control, which, ironically, corroded the covenant's utility as a source of broad moral cohesion and identity. This elegant argument requires an implicit identification of Puritanism with Americanism. By making that analytical move, Moots is able to extend the cord of covenantal reasoning from Abraham, through Calvin, Bullinger, the Puritans, and thence to the American founders without an otherwise messy excursion into the morass of colonial politics in less devoutly Reformed outposts of faith and politics such as New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Moots rightly observes that revolutionary-era Americans were sturdily Reformed in their religious and political orientation. But it is not clear that there is a necessary connection between an ecclesiastical mechanism as local as the Half-Way Covenant and early national constitutionalism. The covenant's postrevolutionary decay also begs for explanation. Moots holds the Enlightenment's deracinated, anti-revelatory system of natural theology and, to a lesser extent, contradictions within the covenantal ideal itself responsible. Yet there were clearly other forces—more prosaic, material, and fundamentally social—at play than can be fully discerned in the abstractions of theology or political theory.

But this is just to say that the book under review is a history of ideas on a grand scale, imbued with most of the virtues and a few of the weaknesses of that approach. Moots expertly demonstrates how much the founding era's commitment to the social contract ideal owed to the Hebraic and Reformed Protestant commitment to the covenant. Most impressive, however, is the way he dissects the soteriological concerns that underlay the covenant ideal and connects them to the moderate church-state separation that it sanctioned. On Moots's reading, the covenant holds together humanity's contravening tendencies toward the material and the spiritual; it reconciles works and grace, the civil and the ecclesiastical, the mundane and the transcendent. Perhaps this is too much to ask of a single theological instrument, even a transhistorical one, but it is hard not to admire the scholar who can make the case so persuasively.

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ROBIN A. BUTLIN. *Geographies of Empire: European Empires and Colonies c. 1880–1960*. (Cambridge Studies in Historical Geography.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2009. Pp. xvii, 673. Cloth \$125.00, paper \$54.00.

Robin A. Butlin's book is a wide-ranging yet meticulously detailed survey of the spatial dimensions of modern European "salt-water" empires. Chapters address a variety of topics such as the late nineteenth-century scramble for colonial possessions in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Oceania; the empire-enhancing role of cartography and of geographical sciences; economically motivated movements of peoples across boundaries; and colonial practices and policies regarding land ownership and labor. Based on secondary sources, many published since 2000, the book is a useful overview of European empires' profound impact on the global distribution of power and resources.

Butlin avoids convenient single-factor explanations of territorial scrambles. The geostrategic ambitions and fears of policy makers, commercial and financial interests, domestic politics, and humanitarian motives figure prominently in his narrative. So do individuals, from rulers (Belgium's Leopold II is the most obvious example) to explorers, missionaries, and early settlers establishing themselves on insecure frontiers. People are not lost in what could easily become a story of national-level institutions.

Likewise, Butlin's comparative approach yields instructive conclusions. Britain's strong industrial, financial, and missionary institutions permitted late nineteenth-century imperial claims and the subsequent consolidation of power to be less state-driven and centralized than those of other countries with less pluralistic, less dynamic non-governmental structures. Belgium was distinctive in the role played by one ruler, Portugal and Belgium in the desire to compensate abroad for their small land area in Europe. A common

interest in controlling the behavior of indigenous populations produced varied results and different methods of classification and codification, as in Algeria and South Africa. The British relied more heavily than other metropolises on imported indentured labor to serve their much larger, more dispersed settler population. Such comparisons enable Butlin to avoid overgeneralizing about the causes, nature, and impacts of European rule.

A particularly interesting chapter on geographic societies shows the unique role they played in fostering interactions among diverse actors: explorers, merchants, missionaries, soldiers and naval officers, academics, and government policy makers. Geographic societies were the quiet enablers and coordinators of imperialism.

Unfortunately, the book is marked by several flaws. It is written in a dry, pedestrian style that fails to hold the reader's sustained attention. At times so many details are presented in rapid succession that it is virtually impossible to keep track of them. With this kind of data overload, the forest is lost for the trees, and description trumps analysis and explanation. The author continually cites differing approaches and interpretations in the secondary literature, yet he rarely presents a coherent and sustained argument. His recurring observation that a given topic is "complex," while true, should not be a reason for failure to unravel complexity or to explore which factors might be more important than others in generating a certain outcome. An undifferentiated list of nine factors affecting interactions between colonizers and colonized in the field of medicine (pp. 163–164), for example, is not helpful.

While the book's title cites c.1880 to 1960 as the historical period covered, by far the greatest attention is paid to the period before World War II. Indeed, more pages are devoted to the imperial scrambles of the 1880s than to 1945–1960. This temporal imbalance means that the decline and fall of empires after 1945, and the nationalist movements and leaders behind this trend, are given short shrift. A brief chapter on decolonization is insufficient.

Although Butlin asserts, correctly, that the views and actions of non-Europeans should be given more attention than is common in many traditional accounts of European imperialism, he fails to deliver. He does a thorough job of recounting horrors committed against non-Europeans (for example, huge losses of life in railroad-construction projects in equatorial Africa), but this remains Eurocentric history: what foreigners did to "the natives," not what "the natives" thought or did about what the foreigners were imposing. Because of limited attention to the post-1945 period, when initiatives for substantive change passed to non-European hands, the author misses an opportunity to follow up on his commitment.

The call for a multidisciplinary approach to important, controversial issues is understandable. The field of historical geography is appealing because it deploys analytical tools from several academic fields. Whether it

integrates these fields is another question. A multidisciplinary approach risks becoming undisciplined, in the sense that it sets up a big tent under which all sorts of facts, interpretations, and worldviews are welcomed, accorded more or less equal status, and allowed to mingle uneasily with one another, if indeed they try to engage each other in conversation. Ultimately, Butlin's book does not provide the integrative framework for which many are looking.

To be fair to the author, this is neither his fault nor the fault of historical geography. At heart, the "problem" is empire. Because of its vast temporal and spatial scope, its variability, and the cross-cultural tensions and misunderstandings intrinsic in colonizer/colonized interactions, Europe's decades in the sun defy the academic impulse toward intellectual integration.

DAVID B. ABERNETHY
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MICHAEL R. AUSLIN. *Pacific Cosmopolitans: A Cultural History of U.S.-Japan Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. 315. \$49.95.

Scholars who have followed Michael R. Auslin's earlier work in history and subsequent career move to public policy will be pleased to see that he retains a hand in the study of the past. His first book, *Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy* (2004), demonstrated the role of cultural factors in Japan's delicate diplomatic dance with the West in the two decades following Commodore Matthew Perry's expedition. Here, he turns his attention to the next century and a half after that encounter, with special emphasis, as the book's title indicates, on those Japanese and Americans at the forefront of the two countries' cultural contacts. Auslin once again draws astute connections between individual and organizational ties and intergovernmental relations. While some of the more popular culture themes would have benefitted from fuller exploration, this book is an outstandingly good look at these aspects of diplomacy.

The first cosmopolitans were certainly not high end. Some, such as castaway Manjirō, were not even deliberate. Trade or, as Auslin rightly calls it, budding American consumerism was the chief driving force behind early contacts. The most famous of these was the Perry expedition, which brought U.S. goods to Japan. Some—baseball, beer, and coffee—caught on. Others—baby carriages—did not. But the impact of Perry was unmistakable, and Auslin traces the first surge of Japanese students going to U.S. colleges to the aftermath of this encounter.

These students would grow into the first generation of elite, transpacific cosmopolitans. Auslin is on firm ground in focusing on education as the root of many branches of cultural exchange. By 1900 the academy had been joined by foundations and learned societies as conduits of culture, although primarily business concerns still played their role, as in the creation of the American Asiatic Association and Japan Society of

New York. These organizations counted among their members a virtual who's who of wealthy and influential Americans such as Henry Taft (brother of William), August Belmont (son-in-law of Perry), and banker Jacob Schiff. One early achievement of these first organizations, the planting of Japanese cherry trees in Washington, remains an important cultural monument a century later.

Other legacies were not so long-lasting. Despite increasingly close contacts within elite circles, popular American dislike of Japanese immigrants darkened relations. Although Auslin's account does not explicitly draw such a connection, it reminds us that official U.S. policy permitted fairly easy access for well-off Japanese and those seeking education well into the 1930s, while turning increasingly harsh on farmers and "coolies" much earlier.

By the 1930s even, perhaps especially, the societies and foundations had turned not so cosmopolitan, emphasizing what Auslin accurately terms "cultural propaganda" (p. 156). There were exceptions. The American-Japan Society took the lead in organizing private Japanese contributions for the victims of the American gunboat *Panay*, sunk near Nanjing in 1937. Japanese-American student conferences continued until 1941. But none of these organizations mitigated the drift toward catastrophe on either side of the Pacific.

The ink was barely dry on the 1952 peace treaty when the Japan Society reopened in New York. At nearly the same time, ground was broken in Tokyo for what would become Japan's International House. Important as these were, Auslin rightly directs more attention to the explosion of academic research and even disciplines devoted to Japanese studies, and the consequent mushrooming of the cosmopolitan population on both sides of the Pacific. The rise of new frictions, this time in trade, resulted in new forms of cultural propaganda led by new centers and foundations, many with substantial government funding. This funding, Auslin argues, was a very mixed blessing not so much in its potential control of cultural exchange as in its loss in times of declining governmental revenues.

Auslin provides a well-balanced, remarkably comprehensive survey of a wide range of cultural contacts centered on the cosmopolitans. For this alone the book is well worth reading. He suggests, although he does not here explore, the further cultural impact of more popular forms of exchange, from baseball to martial arts to McDonalds to sushi bars. Given his research skills, interests in the "soft power" that can result from the interpenetration of popular culture, and hints in this study, one can only hope for a future book on transpacific exchanges at the mass level from this thoughtful scholar who remains, at heart, a historian.

MICHAEL A. BARNHART
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REBECCA KOBRIN. *Jewish Bialystok and Its Diaspora*. (The Modern Jewish Experience.) Bloomington: Indi-

ana University Press. 2010. Pp. xiv, 361. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$24.95.

In May 1920, four thousand people crowded into the Hippodrome Theatre in New York City to attend an operatic performance of *Rose Raisa*. The event, which was a fundraiser for New York's Bialystok Center, raised more than ten thousand dollars and prompted future journalists to label Raisa "the beloved daughter of Bialystok."

Over two and a half centuries Bialystok fell under the rule of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Prussia, France, the Russian Empire, and the Second Polish Republic. The city was a linguistic, ethnic, and religious hodgepodge, populated by Germans, Russians, Poles, Lithuanians, and, especially, Jews, who constituted seventy-five percent of Bialystok's urban residents in 1897. As the city became a major industrial hub, fueled by a flourishing textile industry, its Jewish population expanded still further, reaching 73,950 by 1912. More Jews lived in Warsaw, but arguably in Bialystok their imprint upon the social, economic, and quotidian fabric of the city was deeper, rendering more apt comparisons with Salonika, the so-called "Jerusalem of the Balkans," and a city that boasted a majority Jewish population in the early twentieth century.

Historians of Eastern European Jewry have long been interested in Jewish life in the region's urban, cultural, governmental, and/or industrial hubs, producing detailed, analytical studies of Jewish life and culture in, for example, Saint Petersburg, Kiev, and Odessa. Rebecca Kobrin shares much with her colleagues: an interest in social and labor history, in the politicization of East European Jewry, in Jewish responses to the 1905 Revolution and anti-Jewish violence, in patterns of charitable giving and intracommunal leadership. Her book, however, is a different sort of study. Kobrin's project is to understand Bialystok's Jewish diaspora of roughly one hundred thousand souls as a kind of transnational collective. It was produced by the flood of émigrés who migrated from Eastern Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to new homes in Australia, Argentina, the United States, and Palestine, and was sutured by the bonds of philanthropy, shared (and sometimes embellished) memory, and cultural imagination. Kobrin's book is thus a work of transnational rather than urban history—a book that has no single center of gravity (though it lists heavily toward New York City). She argues that the transnational approach has been underutilized by Jewish historians and that it is a particularly useful tool for students of migration. As she puts it: "one cannot fully understand the havoc wrought by migration on Jewish life during the twentieth century if one solely depicts Jews in dichotomous frameworks dictated by their nation-states" (p. 8).

Kobrin seeks to understand why Bialystok exerted so strong a pull upon women and men like Raisa and her four thousand fans after they had established lives elsewhere. The author also considers how the city's sym-

bolic and material role evolved over time, reflects on how Jewish Bialystok came to have different meanings for different communities within the diaspora, and explores when, why, and how Bialystok's Jewish émigrés saw fit to remember, support, or memorialize their erstwhile home.

The strongest and most original chapters of this work focus on patterns of philanthropic giving that linked Bialystok's cultural tributaries to its urban source (chapter three) and the various modes in which Bialystok was represented in émigré publications, especially *Bialystoker Stimme*, a periodical published in New York (but circulated globally) beginning in 1921 (chapter four).

In the philanthropic realm, Bialystoker Jews were prolific. They raised more than nine million dollars between 1919 and 1939, and these funds went, for the most part, to rebuild communal institutions in Bialystok. For members of the diaspora, philanthropic giving became a means of nurturing a community in need and a vehicle for self-expression—useful, for example, in drawing attention to the giver's elevated class status. In the cultural realm, Jews from Bialystok developed competing visions of the city from which they came: Bialystok could be a motherland, an imperial center, a diasporic home, or a city in crisis. In the resulting conversation Bialystoker Jews in the United States, Argentina, Australia, and Palestine struggled with the question of how one could be a Bialystoker Jew outside of Bialystok and analyzed the myriad ways the city had changed since their migration. How much more acute were these questions after Jewish Bialystok was destroyed? Modes of philanthropic giving and cultural imagining that were established before World War II, Kobrin argues, helped Bialystoker Jews come to terms with the Holocaust and also led them to shift their focus and energies on constructing a new focal point for their diaspora: a Bialystoker center in Israel.

Carefully researched and clearly written, this book offers a rich picture of a transnational Jewish community. Kobrin's novel approach to the study of Jewish history is significant for scholars committed to understanding the complex threads that wove together the early twentieth-century Jewish world. The study is shakier in its theoretical orientation, an orientation hinted at obliquely but never truly explored in depth, and it fails to satisfactorily map out the many local exigencies that differentiated Argentinian Bialystokers from Australian ones, or, for that matter, those in Brooklyn from those in the Lower East Side. To put it another way, the local is sometimes sacrificed in the interest of the diasporic. The book's major achievement is the extension of a new conceptual framework that scholars in Jewish studies and other fields should welcome.

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JAMES P. HUBBARD. *The United States and the End of British Colonial Rule in Africa, 1941–1968*. Jefferson,

N.C.: McFarland & Company. 2011. Pp. viii, 413. \$55.00.

This book is an important and welcome contribution to the growing body of book-length historical scholarship on United States-Africa relations. James P. Hubbard expands on and challenges previously published historical works that examined the policies, actions, and attitudes of the United States in the decolonization of Africa during and after World War II. His well-written, carefully researched and argued study advances our knowledge of American reactions to and involvement in decolonization in the British African colonies. U.S. foreign policy toward sub-Saharan Africa in the age of decolonization has received relatively little attention from scholars, with the bulk of the literature focusing on the Congo crisis.

The book offers important new insights in African colonial history. European colonial rule is one of the most important areas of study in African history. Hubbard examines previously overlooked actors and events to construct a fresh narrative about American foreign policy toward British colonial Africa, the relationship between Britain and the United States during African decolonization, and Britain's new post-World War II colonial policies and methods in Africa. In doing so, he broadens our understanding of why and how colonial rule ended in British Africa, the role of the United States—Britain's closest ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the impact of the Cold War, and the relative importance of Africa in global politics during the period of decolonization.

One of the strengths of this book is that the author draws on a wide range of U.S. and British governmental archival records to make a compelling case that although the United States promoted self-determination and independence, and encouraged African nationalist leaders like Tom Mboya of Kenya and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, it did not intend to accelerate the end of British colonial rule in Africa. This is contrary to most diplomatic histories of the United States that claim that the U.S. government provided help to African nationalist groups because of economic and strategic interests, thus speeding the pace of African decolonization. According to Hubbard, the United States was anticolonial without being pro-African independence. In fact, the United States supported European, particularly British, influence in Africa. Prior to 1965, Africa was a low priority in U.S. foreign policy. Starting with the Roosevelt administration in the 1940s, successive American governments through that of Lyndon B. Johnson in the late 1960s maintained an anticolonial stance without necessarily fully supporting African independence. Cold War considerations, especially the rivalry with the Soviet Union, weighed more heavily in the formulation and implementation of American policies toward African efforts to end British colonial rule. U.S. determination to win the battle for the hearts and minds of African nationalist leaders was an essential aspect of its Cold War strategy.

The book would have benefited from a nuanced discussion of African perspectives regarding the United States' engagement in British colonial Africa between 1941 and 1968. African governmental archival records and oral sources, including interviews with African policy makers, which are absent in the book, could have provided important sources of information in this regard. Contrasting the attitudes, policies, and actions of African nationalist leaders from the different regions under British colonial rule as they related to U.S. foreign policy toward African independence would have further enhanced the work.

Notwithstanding, this book deserves a wide readership. Specialists in African history, scholars of American politics and foreign policy, and anyone with an interest in the Cold War, British imperial history, neocolonialism, and world history will find this it most useful.

ALUSINE JALLOH
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GERALD HORNE. *Mau Mau in Harlem? The U.S. and the Liberation of Kenya*. (Contemporary Black History.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2009. Pp. x, 323. \$84.95.

Because most involuntary migrants taken by the Atlantic slave trade came from West Africa, the history of that region remains permanently linked to that of the United States. The struggle of African Americans for freedom and equality, however, equally connects the United States to East African nations on the Indian Ocean, particularly Kenya and Tanzania. In this book, Gerald Horne offers a compelling transnational history of the intertwined struggles of African Americans for civil rights and of Kenyans for independence from British colonial rule. Horne situates his work in the larger geopolitical context of the Cold War and decolonization. Especially important, Horne argues, was the transition from formal colonial rule to informal imperialism, or neoimperialism, with the United States and the Soviet Union functioning as competing hegemony. The Bandung Conference of 1955 indicated a growing struggle for independence from these two Cold War powers, and included countries from Yugoslavia to Egypt to Indonesia. The Suez Crisis of 1956 marked the transition from European imperial domination to new forms of global hegemony exercised by the United States. Global geopolitical ambitions, as a number of historians have shown, made the U.S. government sensitive to criticism from both the Second and Third Worlds, and thus less able to resist internal pressures for African American civil rights. The African American civil rights struggle, in turn, became a reference point for many of the movements abroad that helped it in the first place.

Horne's narrative, set primarily within this larger geopolitical context, focuses on the many personal connections among Kenyan and African American activists and leaders. Based on extensive research in archival

and print sources, it is impossible to capture in a short review the rich narrative Horne offers. At the center of the account is the relationship between Paul Robeson, the famed African American singer, actor, and communist, and Jomo Kenyatta, the Kenyan independence leader whom the British would imprison on disputed charges of leading the Mau Mau insurgency. The two met in London in the 1930s, in one of the great exile communities in history, where a still-leftist Ralph Bunche had a "gab fest" with Eric Williams and Kenyatta, and C. L. R. James gossiped about Kenyatta's friendship with Robeson (pp. 58–69). While Kenyatta's connection to Robeson helped British authorities demonize Kenyan independence as a communist movement, it, like numerous other relationships developed in Africa, Europe, and the United States, also created an important two-way conduit between African American and African freedom struggles.

Horne draws attention to the powerful symbolism of Mau Mau for many in the United States. Mau Mau, which began in 1952, symbolized to some the terrors, and to others the possibilities, of a world order without white supremacy. We see traces of this engagement in the interest of some African American nationalists in learning Swahili, including giving the Swahili term Kwanzaa to the African American holiday, as well as in the analogies Medgar Evers and other militants drew between armed defense against racism in the United States and the insurgency in Kenya.

The United States, Horne makes clear, played a highly ambivalent role in the Kenyan liberation struggle: America was both the country of the struggle for African American civil rights and the country of the Jim Crow racism against which African Americans struggled. The United States, furthermore, challenged British and other European colonial rulers partly out of a desire to become the neoimperialist hegemon of another unequal world order. This ambivalence is revealed especially in the example of Kenyan labor leader Tom Mboya, whom Horne makes a focal point of his narrative. Despite the many suspicions they aroused, Mboya's good relations with the American government pointed, Horne argues, not to neocolonial collaboration but rather to savvy political maneuvering. Mboya, in Horne's words, "solidified an anti-colonial pro-equality front that was to redound to the benefit of Africans and African Americans alike" (p. 182). Mboya's good relations with the U.S. government also paved the way for the 1959 scholarship program whose most famous recipient today is perhaps President Barack Obama's father. Mboya was assassinated in 1969, a murder that some still tie to individuals close to then President Kenyatta. Mboya's political engagements suggest a transnational activism that cut across both international politics and nationalist liberation and included a broad array of labor, anti-racist, and anti-colonial activists. This book reveals the dense interconnections of many actors. Though its detailed

narrative might deter non-specialists, it will be of interest to scholars in many fields of history.

ANDREW ZIMMERMAN

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STEVEN J. BRADY. *Eisenhower and Adenauer: Alliance Maintenance under Pressure, 1953–1960*. (The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series.) Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books. 2010. Pp. xi, 277. \$80.00.

This well-written synthesis of U.S.-German relations explores the "challenges, difficulties, and crises that the German-American alliance faced during the 1950s" (p. 2). The period under study has "sometimes been remembered as the most shining of the alliance's golden years," Steven J. Brady writes. "Yet these were, in fact, years of considerable turmoil" (p. 2). Brady demonstrates that Washington and Bonn shared fundamental objectives for Europe, including Soviet containment, West German and West European economic revitalization, and eventual German reunification. At the same time, numerous events strained the emerging partnership and rendered its success far from inevitable. Joseph Stalin's death, the Berlin uprising, West Germany's entry into NATO, the Suez Crisis, the Hungarian uprising, numerous Berlin crises, and other developments of this Cold War decade at once heightened the imperative of Western unity and exposed fractures within the alliance. "The results were better than they might have been. Indeed, better than they should have been," given the persistence of the "German problem" and of nationalist rivalries in Europe (p. 2).

Building on the scholarship of Detlef Felken, James McAllister, Hans-Peter Schwarz, Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, Marc Trachtenberg, and Thomas A. Schwartz, among others, Brady's contribution to the Harvard Cold War Studies Series serves to remind readers that the Atlantic partnership was not merely dictated by the United States. If the United States forged an empire in Europe, it was at the invitation of the major Western powers, who perceived myriad advantages in the arrangement and who were active participants, not mere pawns, in the collective security apparatus that eventuated. Konrad Adenauer demonstrated this reality particularly well. The confluence of his and John Foster Dulles's visions of an integrated, U.S.-allied Europe made partnership likely on terms favored by the United States. Yet *Der Alte* needed no tutelage from Washington to become an ardent anticommunist, and his vision of European integration long antedated the Cold War. More, even before the Federal Republic became a full-fledged member of the Atlantic "club," Adenauer readily worked to influence transatlantic relations, as shown in his attempts to shape the timing and agenda of the Washington and Berlin conferences respectively (1953) and in facilitating German rearmament and entry into NATO (1955). This determination to affect outcomes continued in the second half of the decade, with some success. Although Adenauer was not able substantively to shape the Geneva Conference (1955) or the London

Disarmament Conference (1956), and although he viewed Washington's response to both the Hungarian uprising and the Suez crisis, formulated with little input from Bonn, as extremely imprudent, the chancellor succeeded in gaining tri-power backing for his proposed reunification note to the Soviets in September 1956. In this instance, "Adenauer's government took the initiative" and "Washington followed" (pp. 181–182). Adenauer regularly "annoyed" his American counterparts by worrying over any possibility that the West might not be deterring communism or affirming Germany's post-war validity strenuously enough, yet "perhaps *no one* could have reassured Adenauer during this turbulent time that his nation was going to be consulted with, and not dictated to" (pp. 166, 182, 249). The persistence of Adenauer's effort, at every juncture, to remind Americans of his own importance and by extension of West Germany's importance to the Atlantic alliance validates the premise that, empire or not, the United States could not simply dictate Cold War policies to its allies. Consultation and negotiation based on mutual respect were imperative to the success of the partnership. When either broke down, cooperation fractured along more fault lines than simple differences of national interest might portend.

Specialists will appreciate Brady's balanced tone, his incorporation of insights from both American and German scholars, and his additional use of French- and Russian-language sources. Some might raise questions about the research base, which privileges American over German archival records. The book also contains a bibliography that lists some literature not cited in the text. Undergraduate instructors offering courses dealing with the Cold War era will welcome this lucid account, which presents a readable overview of U.S.-German high politics during a crucial Cold War decade.

DEBORAH KISATSKY
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FLURIN CONDRAU and MICHAEL WORBOYS, editors. *Tuberculosis Then and Now: Perspectives on the History of an Infectious Disease*. (McGill-Queen's/Associated Medical Services Studies in the History of Medicine, Health, and Society, number 35.) Ithaca, N.Y.: McGill-Queen's University Press. 2010. Pp. viii, 243. Cloth \$85.00, paper \$29.95.

Tuberculosis has been one of the most studied diseases from a historical perspective. Emphases have changed over time as scholars investigated specific issues related to the disease or explored its biomedical dimensions in relation to particular social, cultural, political, and economic contexts.

This diverse and vibrant body of literature reveals three lines of inquiry: tuberculosis as a biomedical topic of a revamped history of medicine, as a phenomenon relating to the history of public health, and as a socio-cultural historical problem. Recent approaches to biomedical history tend to avoid the self-celebratory narratives of the traditional history of medicine and try to

contextualize the scientific environments in which some doctors, institutions, and treatments produce certain medical achievements. Historians of public health now focus their attention on power, politics, public policy, the state, the political economy of health, and the medical profession. Finally, the sociocultural history of disease emphasizes material conditions of life, disease metaphors, the process of medicalization, healing alternatives, disciplinary discourses and socio-medical control practices, and the perspectives and responses of the sick.

The book under review is an adequate and convincing example of some of these different narratives and historiographical styles. The editors' introduction, appropriately titled "Tuberculosis and Its Histories: Then and Now," reconstructs key debates, findings, and interpretations as they were framed by Anglo-American historiography, with occasional references coming from German, French, and British Commonwealth scholarship. Tim Boom's innovative chapter explores the complex narratives of tuberculosis—literary, visual, medical—constructed in interwar Britain and the later encapsulation of these narratives in health education films. He contends that the collective experience of the illness has played a decisive role in the way patients organized their individual memories of tuberculosis. David S. Barnes focuses on the San Francisco Bay area in the late twentieth century. He examines the overlaps of epidemiological and social analysis in the search for "patient zero." Barnes describes how a practice developed for acute communicable diseases failed to identify a point of origin for tuberculosis. Flurin Condrau's essay discusses unsuccessful efforts to standardize patients' internment in German and English sanatoriums, revealing that a simplistic use of the Goffmanian concept of "total institution" needs to be tested with concrete and specific historical experiences. Alison Bashford addresses Australian health immigration policies throughout the twentieth century, discussing how perceptions of tuberculosis changed from seeing it as a domestic disease to one primarily associated with foreigners. Her study is particularly sensitive to the specific ethnic and racial framing of tuberculosis in Australian discourse, making clear that this case cannot be taken as an explanation for perceptions in all immigrant societies. John Welshman's study of postwar British immigration policies also underlines the relevance of racial, ethnic, and national factors when specialists assessed newcomers' supposed susceptibility to tuberculosis. Michael Worboys's chapter focuses on the efforts of medical doctors to explain the tuberculosis decline in Britain between 1880 and 1930. This carefully crafted biomedical history avoids anachronisms and maps out a contested field from which it is possible to read the genealogy of the influential McKeown thesis with its stress on the decisive role of social factors in the history of tuberculosis. Peter J. Atkins's essay analyzes the actions of relevant scientific and political discourses and structures of governances that shaped making of policy on bovine tuberculosis in interwar Britain. Helen

Valier's study deals with the collaborative antibiotics trials between the late 1940s and 1960s in colonial and postcolonial India. These trials are discussed as evidence of the complex and politically loaded relations between British research and health policy agencies, the World Health Organization, and local Indian actors. Valier draws attention to the extractive and even exploitative dimensions of colonial medical experimentation embedded with an internationalist humanitarian development project. Finally, the chapter by Jorge Molero-Mesa—the only essay that does not deal with the British or American experience of tuberculosis—discusses anti-tuberculosis policies in Restoration Spain as a component of social medicine that, through the application of technical solutions, attempted to counter radical working-class demands.

The organizing criteria of this book are not totally clear. I perceive a number of tensions among the tone of many of the articles, the emphasis of the introductory essay, the book's title, and the text on the back cover. I will mention two of them. First, this collection deals mainly with the past—the “then” of the title—and only marginally with contemporary aspects of tuberculosis. The misleading nature of the title is consistent with central concerns of many practitioners of the history of medicine who hope to inform current public health interventions with historical knowledge. Second, it seems that the book title as well as the tone of some articles in this volume suggest that a limited repertoire of cases narrowly focused on the United States and the British Commonwealth is sufficient for the purposes of analyzing a global phenomenon. This shortcoming is due in part to the dynamism of the British and American historiographies, as well as their inability to take note of the growing number of studies focused on other parts of the world. It is now possible to begin constructing a more global narrative of this disease that can go beyond the British-American horizon and include the peripheries of the modern world, where tuberculosis is a pressing contemporary concern.

Addressing both the global and local dimensions of the history of tuberculosis involves plenty of difficulties. Simply adding more case studies focused on particular cities or countries will not solve the specific challenges of writing the history of tuberculosis from a global perspective. At the same time, such a global narrative will inevitably sacrifice the contextualizing possibilities offered by localized approaches. This volume makes evident these tensions and is a welcome addition to a growing literature that reaffirms that scholarship on tuberculosis has always been about more than bacilli.

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CHRISTIAN GERLACH. *Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. xi, 489. Cloth \$80.00, paper \$28.99.

The unprecedented scale of death in the twentieth century spawned the research field of genocide studies. Grim as it may be, Christian Gerlach contends that scholars in the field underestimate how bloody the twentieth century was and neglect the suffering of secondary targets of genocide. As he notes early in the book, “under Nazi Germany . . . Jews were targeted for killings, but so also were disabled people, Roma and Sinti political opponents, Soviet prisoners of war, [and] the Polish leadership” (p. 2). Gerlach maintains that studies of genocide, besides limiting attention to singular racial or ethno-religious targets, focus narrowly on state-sponsored killing, lack historical perspective, and too easily divide participants into perpetrators and victims. Instead, he offers an “extremely violent societies approach” that views mass violence as an expansive, multilayered phenomenon emerging in the midst of profound socioeconomic change and involving both state and civilian actors, past and present social relations, numerous victim groups, gradations of perpetrators and victims, and diverse methods of violence. In focusing on both state action and the arena of social relations, Gerlach understands his approach as contributing to a “social history of mass violence,” which complements the “dominant political histories in the field” (p. 3).

This wider vision of the problem of mass violence courageously challenges the sacrosanct genocide paradigm and delivers a more comprehensive understanding of humanity's capacity for inhumanity. Free from the restrictions of the category of genocide, Gerlach's approach demonstrates that mass violence in the twentieth century was pervasive rather than episodic. It came from a variety of extremely violent societies in which diverse “persecutors”—the term he prefers to “perpetrator”—targeted a range of groups using systematic and unorganized killing, famine, forced relocation, rape, and economic piracy. Consequently, the mass violence endured by Indonesians, Pakistanis, Bengalis, Hindus, Vietnamese, Greeks, and a host of African and Latin American populations emerges from the margins of history and becomes central to the story of mass violence in the last century.

These worldwide experiences of mass violence support Gerlach's call for global histories of the phenomenon. Yet even as he advocates for it, he cautions about swapping the restrictive particularity of genocide for the “overgeneralization” of a new “demi-god: globalization” (p. 264). Gerlach stresses the need for rigorous empiricism, and models this safeguard by amassing an impressive array of sources from all regions of the world. Still, he often tours the world at a dizzying pace. The case studies of Indonesia and Bangladesh, for example, will likely leave non-specialists adrift in unfamiliar history and politics. Chapter five, which treats resettlement, militias, and anti-guerrilla warfare, considers the experiences of no fewer than twenty countries. In a single breakneck paragraph, Gerlach discusses Algeria, Thailand, Vietnam, Guatemala,

Mozambique, Kenya, Kurdistan, Rhodesia, Peru, and El Salvador.

Yet Gerlach's global emphasis—however swiftly he pursues it—raises a problem with the very category “extremely violent societies.” First, the phrase is an essentialist one. Although he writes that “societies are not intrinsically or inevitably violent” (p. 12), the term suggests a distinction between societies that are and are not extremely violent. Second, as Gerlach shows, mass violence typically occurs when long simmering historical antagonisms collide with war, colonization and decolonization, economic modernization, or global ideological conflicts such as the Cold War. By this rationale, nearly every society of the twentieth century was extremely violent or could have been under the right circumstances. In short, Gerlach chronicles not extremely violent societies but an extremely violent world.

This significant conceptual error does not, however, mitigate the importance of the book. Gerlach's expanded picture of mass violence in an extremely violent world reframes the field of genocide studies and forestalls efforts to treat mass violence as an aberrant experience of a few nations and populations. On the contrary, Gerlach expects genocide or mass violence to be a “recurring phenomenon” (p. 288). Prevention of it would require a fundamental reorientation of economic and political international relations to create a global community based upon mutual security, education, and equality rather than imperialism, exploitation, and inequality. Gerlach doubts that such an extremely benevolent world is in our future.

ANDREW FINSTUEN
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TERENCE DAINTITH. *Finders Keepers? How the Law of Capture Shaped the World Oil Industry*. Washington, D.C.: RFF Press. 2010. Pp. xvii, 500. Cloth \$130.00, paper \$59.95.

This is a multinational study of a rule of private property in the oil, gas, and mineral water business as well as a comparative analysis of the tenacity of the common law doctrine of capture in administrative law systems designed to rationalize subsurface rights. The law of capture endows the finder of a valuable subsurface liquid with the right to produce as much of it as possible, limited only by the capacity of an adjoining driller to pump more liquid out of the ground. The application of the law produced vast waste, overdrilling, and uncollected natural gas. Terence Daintith finds the root of the problem in “the uncontrolled exercise of private property rights in oil and gas that made the law of capture operate with such disastrous effect, and it is the excessive reverence for such rights that sustains unnecessary obstacles to rational oilfield exploitation in the United States at a time when the rest of the world's oil-producing countries have eliminated private property rights, either totally displacing the rule of capture or fitting it into a broader regime of production control” (pp. 12–13).

Daintith marshals examples of the rationalization of the oil patch from Russia, Trinidad, Netherlands, Mexico, Galicia, France, Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Greece, Libya, the United Kingdom, the Ottoman Empire, Romania, Norway, and Venezuela. Although he takes a multinational approach, Daintith does not adopt a world history approach akin to Peter Karsten's *Between Law and Custom: “High” and “Low” Legal Cultures in the Lands of the British Diaspora—The United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 1600–1900* (2002). Daintith's examples are limited to demonstrating that private property regimes are wasteful and that collective systems save oil and gas. In the case of France, mineral water was at stake. Further, “when contrasting the readiness of the French state to engage in legislative adjustments of property rights, in contrast with the profound silence of its American counterparts, we should bear in mind this substantial difference of competitive context, along with the difference in the degrees of familiarity felt by legislators on either side of the Atlantic with the industries they were called upon to deal with” (p. 119). The United States clearly lagged behind Galicia's rationalization of the oilfields with legislation by 1908, Romania's movement toward state control of subterranean resources, and Russia's regulations after 1892. Before the Bolshevik Revolution, “Russian observers of the U.S. oil industry were struck by the remarkable freedom from any kind of official regulation enjoyed by American producers” (p. 166). Perhaps a comparative analysis of legal cultures could explain the differences.

Daintith's view of U.S. regulatory inertia includes state and federal mining laws. Relying on economists rather than historians to supply data for substantiating his argument, he posits that local mining district regulations filled a “legal vacuum” in California circa 1849. In contrast to Daintith's portrayal, a substantial body of literature—including contributions from William Henry Ellison and John Phillip Reid as well as my own books—demonstrates that people brought the law of the East to the West and lived by its principles in early California.

Daintith's engagement with historiography aside, this book has several positive elements. For the specialist, it unearths Trinidad's Great Pitch Lake of La Brea to make important points. In addition, the comparative approach works well in exploring unitization of oil fields, regulations governing the spacing of wells, and conservation measures. Although Daintith does not compare the government systems that produced those different regimes of law, his work may encourage readers to pursue research along this line of inquiry.

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ASIA

TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA, editor. *The Cold War in East Asia, 1945–1991*. (Cold War International History Project Series.) Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center. 2011. Pp. xi, 340. \$55.00.

It is becoming less and less fashionable nowadays to focus on the Cold War as the main drama in the history of the world after World War II. Instead, such topics as economic globalization and the growth of multinational corporations, decolonization and postcolonialism, decentering of the West and the rise of the non-West, human rights and democratization movements, and environmental and energy crises have claimed the attention of an increasing number of historians, particularly of the younger generation. This is as it should be, given that the Cold War-centric perspective tends to obscure these and many other developments. Even if we grant that the Cold War, defined as the global power struggle among the great powers armed with nuclear weapons, affected the lives of millions of people during the third quarter of the twentieth century, many historians would argue that world history since the 1970s has entered a new phase and so requires a different conceptual scheme.

Why, then, another book on the Cold War, covering the entire period from its presumed origins in 1945 to its termination in 1991? This volume, containing essays by eleven authors, does not do much to help reconceptualize post-1945 history by adding non-geopolitical subjects such as those mentioned above. To their credit, however, all the contributors have made use of a wide variety of non-English-language material from China, the Soviet Union, Japan, and other countries. It used to be that Cold War historiography was either “orthodox” or “revisionist.” The debate is no longer taken seriously in view of the fact that it occurred at a time when most of the studies in contention only looked at U.S. material. The days of mono-archival work are now over, if one may judge from this volume.

It would appear, however, that the use of fresh material adds less to the existing literature on the Cold War than it contributes to our understanding of developments that were only remotely connected to, or products of, the superpower rivalry. Odd Arne Westad’s important study of Chinese modernization, for instance, has much to say about the Chinese leaders’ uses of the Soviet model of industrialization, education, and other programs, but the subject would fit better into the framework of nation-building than that of geopolitics. Nation-building was a far more universal phenomenon than the Cold War, so this chapter would be just as valuable in a collection of essays on post-1945 global modernization.

Likewise, Gregg A. Brazinsky’s essay on the two Koreas skillfully traces South Korea’s success in taking advantage of the waves of global economic forces that began to sweep the region and whole world after the 1970s. This is the only essay in the book that embraces

globalization as a key theme. North Korea was clearly a loser in this context, and Nobuo Shimotomai’s chapter traces how, from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, Kim Il Sung tried to play Moscow and Beijing against one another in order to enhance his own domestic base of power, only to find his country hopelessly falling behind South Korea economically and in world status. Here again, these are studies not so much of the Cold War as of globalization.

Despite such examples, editor Tsuyoshi Hasegawa may still claim that there was a distinctively East Asian phase in the history of the Cold War—although “East Asia” here seems to cover Southeast Asia, not to mention the Soviet Union and the United States. In Hasegawa’s chronology, the Cold War came to Asia in the 1970s, just as the period of détente was dawning on U.S.-Soviet relations in Europe. Toward the end of the decade, he writes, “The line was . . . clearly drawn between the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance and the U.S.-Chinese-Japanese entente” (p. 27). And yet, we read in Vladislav Zubok’s essay that Mikhail Gorbachev was soon to initiate a serious attempt to bring about a reconciliation with the Beijing regime, an undertaking that culminated in his visit to Beijing in 1989. Zubok also notes that Gorbachev’s successes vis-à-vis China were in sharp contrast to his failure to solve any outstanding problem with Japan. He was convinced that Japan would continue to remain a Cold War ally of the United States. To that extent, it must be conceded that the Cold War provides a valid framework for understanding Soviet-Japanese relations. But we know from other essays in this volume how fragile such power equations were. Even the allegedly solid U.S.-Japanese alliance faced a serious crisis when, as Kazuhiko Togo recounts anew, succeeding Japanese prime ministers during the 1970s had so much trouble communicating with President Richard Nixon.

If power equations were constantly variable, even within the allegedly solid geopolitical reality of the Cold War, it is clear that many other factors were shaping and reshaping nations and people of the world. Because in this book the decade of the 1970s is stressed as pivotal in Asian international relations, it is important to keep in mind recent historiography that offers a different view of that decade. Sarah B. Snyder, for example, shows, in *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (2011) that the Helsinki Accords of 1975 began to alter the shape of world affairs in fundamental ways, while *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (2010), a collection of essays edited by Niall Ferguson and others, chronicles “global” developments throughout the 1970s that transformed East Asia as well as the rest of the world—and the Cold War was not a crucial part of that “global” drama.

The editor and the contributors may nevertheless argue that they are collectively making a contribution to the study of international affairs by focusing on East Asia, given that few such monographs have yet been published, and that those that have are clearly out of

date. Fair enough. But is “East Asia” the right geographical framework? Zubok quotes Gorbachev as stating at a Politburo meeting in 1986 that “the center of development of civilization is shifting toward the Pacific Ocean” (p. 269). It is not clear what he meant by “civilization,” but it is important to note that even as Eurocentric a figure as Gorbachev was beginning to recognize the emerging economic power of the Pacific nations. Such an observation provides ammunition to those historians who have begun to write about “Pacific” as against “Atlantic” history. Bruce Cumings’s *Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power* (2009) and John Price’s *Orienteering Canada: Race, Empire, and the Trans-Pacific* (2011) are good examples. To the extent that the Cold War still deserves to be studied seriously, the Pacific, rather than East Asia, would seem to provide a better geographical context.

AKIRA IRIYE
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CAROL BENEDICT. *Golden-Silk Smoke: A History of Tobacco in China, 1550–2010*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 334. \$49.95.

This is a crossover book that is equally at home in the fields of world history and modern Chinese history. In that sense, it represents an important and welcome trend in both fields: situating global phenomena, such as the near universal spread of tobacco smoking, in a national historical context and showing how, especially in the last few centuries, Chinese history has been made in a global context. Carol Benedict demonstrates that commodity history can throw light on social, cultural, medical, and economic history in a national setting while framing these aspects in a comparative and interconnective global perspective.

Tobacco is admirably suited for this purpose. The importance of its addictive fellow inhalant, opium, has long been central in the narratives of modern Chinese history. Tobacco has not had such prominence or notoriety. There has been no “Tobacco War.” But arguably tobacco has had a longer lasting impact on Chinese economy, society, and even culture than did opium. Certainly more Chinese have used it and died from it, and still do.

Public health consequences are not the focus of Carol Benedict’s book, although she treats them very candidly in the closing pages. The narrative recounts how the Chinese accepted, domesticated, and reacted to tobacco since it first was brought there by European mariners. Benedict emphasizes that the Chinese, far from being passive observers, actively adapted this Western import to domestic conditions. Her book, however, does not focus exclusively on the relationship between China and the West. Benedict demonstrates the importance of trade with and cultural influences from other parts of Asia; the hookah or water pipe are the most notable outcomes of these linkages in this story. She

also makes insightful comparisons to how other colonized or semicolonized societies in the twentieth century dealt with the cultural tensions and economic implications of adopting “modern” (i.e., machine rolled) cigarettes from the West.

Benedict describes the history of tobacco smoking in China as divided into two rather distinct eras of “globalization.” In the first period, from the late sixteenth into the nineteenth century, smoking was a foreign import that had been thoroughly domesticated, or sinicized, as it spread to all social classes in almost every part of the country. Some aspects retained a foreign flavor, such as imported snuff, which became a favorite of Beijing courtiers and some Jiangnan literati in the eighteenth century. (Indeed, upper-class people at both ends of Eurasia distinguished themselves from the pipe smoking rabble by stuffing an elaborately scented and prepared tobacco product up their noses.) The important difference between the two eras of tobacco globalization is that in the cultural confidence of the High Qing era tobacco carried with it none of the concerns about Western dominance and Chinese inferiority that would arise when factory-manufactured cigarettes became potent symbols of modernity and Westernization.

These concerns are thoroughly analyzed and illustrated in Benedict’s later chapters. In one she looks at the ambivalence early twentieth-century literary notables such as Lu Xun, Lin Yutang, and Shen Congwen had about their addiction to name brand, machine-rolled cigarettes—an inescapable part of the modernity they sought (and not just because of nicotine addiction) but also a wound to national and cultural pride.

The chapter on women smoking in China is perhaps the most interesting. Before the twentieth century, many Chinese women of all social classes smoked, although not as many as men. In the republican period, female smoking became a focus of social concern and criticism by nationalist males and then virtually disappeared in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Benedict’s account of the fate of the short-haired, shorter-skirted *modeng xiaoji* (“Modern Girl”) of the 1920s is one of the highlights of the volume.

But gender questions and perceptions are only part of the complex social and cultural issues raised through the fog of tobacco smoke in a beautifully researched book that ranges through everything from customs statistics to literati reminiscences and poetry to pioneering field studies in the Chinese countryside. There is far more than can be discussed in a short review by a non-smoker.

It is customary for the reviewer to say what more he wished the author had done. My curiosity about that much more famous Chinese smoking habit, opium, was not satisfied. Could the chronology—tobacco smoking widespread among all classes by the eighteenth century and then opium in the nineteenth—suggest any credible basis for regarding that first foreign smoke as a gateway drug? More likely, the social and sexual associations of both drugs may be worth further investigation. But it is clear from this history that they are very

different substances with very different histories in China and elsewhere.

The book essentially stops at the end of the republican period with only an epilogue on the PRC that is divided rather neatly into the Mao era and the post-1978 reform era. In both, cigarette smoke, overwhelmingly male generated, clouds the history, with government recognition of smoking's attendant health costs only coming recently.

RALPH CROIZIER
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JOSEPH W. ESHERICK. *Ancestral Leaves: A Family Journey through Chinese History*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2011. Pp. xvi, 374. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$24.95.

This is a marvelous book. Historical works often trace developments from one point to another in time, focusing on events and their interactions, and periodically enlivening their narratives with examples of how individuals experienced the events covered. Joseph W. Esherick's book essentially reverses these priorities. He supplies useful summaries of the important happenings that serve as the book's spatial and temporal anchors. But the heart of the work is made up of the experiences over time of members of a large extended Chinese elite family, surnamed Ye (which means "leaf" in Chinese and is used in the book's title to suggest a number of metaphoric meanings pertaining to the family's historical trajectory). Several generations of the Ye family are tracked from the early nineteenth century to the present. We learn how fathers, mothers, sons, daughters, brothers, and sisters were affected by events, how they responded to them, and in a few cases helped shape them. Esherick is related by marriage to the Ye family, which gave him unique access through extensive interviewing to the personal lives especially of the more recent generations. Because of this ability and the rich array of written sources used—including poems, family genealogies, autobiographical accounts, and diaries—we learn much more about the intimate feelings and experiences of a family's members than is customary in works on Chinese history. Also, because the time period covered in the book spans an era of unprecedented transformation of Chinese society, we discover, among many other things, how attitudes and values changed over time, and how life experiences (education, careers, and so forth) expanded and became more diverse. We also see how the relative balances in societal status between old and young, and especially male and female, shifted, opening doors that had long been closed and occasionally creating tension in intergenerational and intrafamilial relationships. What Esherick seeks to do is give a human face to the vast changes that have shaped modern China. In this undertaking, he achieves a remarkable level of success, treating us to a rare interior view of how one Chinese family coped with the traumas and embraced the op-

portunities presented by the past two centuries of Chinese history.

The book is divided chronologically into three parts, dealing with the late imperial era, republican China, and the People's Republic. This stretch of China's history was anything but peaceful and stable, and some of the most gripping and sensitively wrought parts of the book relate to three periods of massive disruption: the Taiping and other rebellions of the mid-nineteenth century, the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), and the tragic upheavals of the last two decades of Mao Zedong's rule. These three traumatic episodes were fundamentally different in nature, and the kinds of stresses and opportunities they engendered among members of the Ye family reflected this clearly. Thus, in the face of the Taiping threat in the 1850s, the family was driven from its ancestral home in the east central city of Anqing and eventually ended up in Shaanxi province to the north. But the leading member of the family, Ye Kunhou, a local level official, by taking an active part in organizing resistance against the Taiping and other insurgents, advanced his career in the process (as did his son and brothers). The death and devastation wrought by the rebellions was horrific and the challenges of fighting—as well as reconstruction after the fighting ended—so consumed Ye and his son, both of whom served deep in the rural interior, that there is scarcely a hint in their writings of the new world crashing in on China's coastal periphery. This perspective, although sharply different from the one commonly encountered in histories of this period, is one that, there is every reason to believe, was widespread among Ye's peers.

In Esherick's accounts of the Sino-Japanese War and Maoist upheavals, we enter the world of Ye Kunhou's grandchildren. It is another world entirely from that of the grandfather, a world in which school ties and political commitments were often stronger than the bonds of family. No longer a Confucian world, it is a world shaped in vital ways by ideas and cultural practices originating in the West that were completely unknown in Ye Kunhou's day. Some of the grandchildren made lasting political decisions during the Japanese war. Some of them, including Esherick's father-in-law, to whom the book is dedicated, were tormented and imprisoned for years during the Maoist terror. Esherick concludes by noting a number of qualities characterizing the Ye family over the generations. The one that is likely to strike readers of this unusual book most forcefully was the family's resilience in the face of crisis, its capacity, however battered and bruised, to move on and even thrive once the crisis passed.

PAUL A. COHEN
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ZHONGPING CHEN. *Modern China's Network Revolution: Chambers of Commerce and Sociopolitical Change in the Early Twentieth Century*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2011. Pp. xxi, 289. Cloth \$55.00, e-book \$55.00.

As historians commemorate the centennial of the 1911 Revolution, some have posed a counterfactual question: had the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) not been toppled and the reforms it launched not been interrupted, what would China be like today? This well-researched book provides a possible answer. Eschewing the technical language (and statistical routines) of network analysis and the “trendy” focus on personal connections (*guanxi*), Zhongping Chen utilizes the concept of associational networks. He investigates how the institutional ties forged by over two hundred chambers of commerce in the lower Yangtze region as part of the dynasty’s reforms in its last years promoted an unprecedented integration of social and economic elites.

Embedded in the long tradition of largely self-regulating merchant organizations such as the *huiguan*, based variously on trade or native place, or both, and reinforced by personal relationships and common business interests, these merchant activists emerged in the country as leaders of the third realm—the public space between the state and the private sphere. Led by the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce, “the first state-legitimized association in Chinese history” established in 1904 (p. 59), their influence steadily expanded through their sponsorship of local charitable work, militia, fire-fighting brigades, and “exercise” clubs to include regional industrial and economic development through study societies, schools, provincial railroad construction, and nation-wide collective action such as the anti-American boycott of 1905. Protecting their business interests, they shared their expertise by advising officials on economic and monetary matters, organizing a national fair, and even hosting an American delegation of chambers of commerce in 1910.

While the chambers began as part of state-directed reforms, and many of their leaders held official titles or had once served in the bureaucracy (such as Yan Xinhou, the first president of the Shanghai General Chamber), their activities quickly expanded beyond the original intent of Beijing’s policy makers. Although the central government created these chambers as part of its state-building effort, and provincial officials seized this opportunity to expand their turf, these merchant elites in the lower Yangtze region proved equally at home in the language of constitutional reform and politics. Defying official restriction, they built both vertical and horizontal institutional ties from regional centers down to market towns, bringing elite and non-elite merchants together in an institutionalized hierarchy. As local and provincial officials became aware of their eroded authority, being bypassed by Beijing and challenged from below, the merchants’ multiform interaction with the state—cooperation, lobbying, confrontation—fostered a network revolution.

The author is careful to note that not all regions in the country enjoyed the same concentration and integration of merchant elite found in the lower Yangtze region. A systematic comparison with other commercial centers such as Canton, Chengdu, Hankou, and Tianjin might provide further insight as to the regional and in-

terregional dynamics of the network revolution. The lone chapter covering the Republican period (1912–1949) offers a sketch of what happened to the chambers and the merchant networks that gave them strength. Amid the rise and fall of various warlords, some chamber leaders joined the feeding frenzy to line their own pockets; others, unable or unwilling to meet the demands for loans, supplies, and levies, fled or resigned as a bargaining tactic. While chambers cabled each other for support on various issues, regional rivalries also surfaced, as in the scandal surrounding Yang Musen’s election as vice-president of the National United Chamber of Commerce in 1925. Other competing voices also emerged, as in the case of the Shanghai Citizen and Merchant League (*Shanghai shangmin xiehui*), which challenged the General Chamber’s claim to represent its members, while various trade groups and professional organizations championed their own causes by drawing on particularistic ties.

Undoubtedly, the chambers survived as a legitimate institution, but the interstitial space they operated in was being squeezed by the state’s attempts to control or incorporate them. After 1949, chambers of commerce were replaced by the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, a state-directed organization, if not a propaganda machine, to contain what remained of private enterprise and the national bourgeoisie. As Chinese capitalism blooms in the wake of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, another round of associational networking is underway. Much, of course, has changed in China since the early twentieth century, but in rejecting recent efforts to promulgate a new law on chambers of commerce, Beijing still confronts the same dilemma of change and control.

KWAN MAN BUN
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YOMI BRAESTER. *Painting the City Red: Chinese Cinema and the Urban Contract*. (Asia-Pacific: Culture, Politics, and Society.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2010. Pp. xiv, 405. Cloth \$89.95, paper \$24.95.

In this book, Yomi Braester argues that the city has been a constant preoccupation of Chinese filmmakers and playwrights since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The book’s main claim is that visual media help forge the “urban contract”—a notion Braester adapts from Manuel Castells and Jordi Borja’s work to call attention to the power dynamics among different public and private agents involved in building the city, and to the role of filmmakers in this process. A second argument is that spatial arrangements have temporal implications: each chapter elaborates a distinct “chronotope” that emerges from a selected body of works in order to show how particular ways of restructuring space help promote specific historical narratives. The book details the roles of visual media in effecting urban change by discussing over a hundred films and twenty-five plays set in Beijing, Shanghai, and Taipei. With its impressive scope, thorough archival re-

search, and wealth of historical detail based on internal memos, interviews, and filmmakers' accounts, the book is bound to be a standard reference for years to come.

Several scholars have noted the emergence of a "new urban consciousness" in the 1980s, but Braester is the first to trace its roots to Maoist China. What his investigation suggests, however, is that the city in socialist visual culture was more a metaphor for political and economic forces than a concrete place. Most 1950s and 1960s films set in Shanghai reduce the metropolis to a few iconic images: neon lights and high rises stand in for the alluring threat of capitalism, and street parades affirm the victory of the Communist Party. Rare exceptions like *City without Night* (1957) advertise ideological and architectural change, but films made in the 1960s are generally less about urban life as such than about models of revolutionary behavior.

In contrast, plays and films set in Beijing tend to represent the capital as a city of neighborhoods, using a "quasi-ethnographic aesthetics" (p. 47) that zooms in on the vicissitudes of its inhabitants. But even these representations often empty the city of its physical reality. Beijing, like all Chinese cities, was divided into self-sufficient "work units" where people lived and worked, "cities within the city" that "became a leading principle in the layout of urban space" (p. 231). It is striking that these building blocks of socialist urbanism only became subjects of representation when they began to fall apart in the 1980s. Films of the 1950s to 1970s and many theatrical productions up to the 1990s focused instead on icons of political power such as Tiananmen Square and on courtyard houses—the location of the everyday life of the urban proletariat and the symbol of a traditional way of life over which the battle for renewal and preservation was fought.

Overall, the book offers rich insights into how Chinese cinema has responded to urban policies, participating in debates on how the city should develop, disseminating images of power, documenting alternative ways of using public space, and, in recent years, helping preserve historical memory in contexts of rapid change. Chapter five cogently demonstrates the importance of urban themes in the New Taiwan Cinema that emerged in the early 1980s. It defines Taipei as "a palimpsest of simultaneously existing layers" (p. 188), an appraisal inspired by the works of such filmmakers as Tsai Ming-liang, which show the city as a place marked by disappearance. Chapter six illustrates how mainland films of the 1980s to the early 2000s, ranging from independent documentaries to mainstream comedies, have created a visual archive of a city on the brink of demolition, thus drawing attention to the need for preservation. Chapter seven examines the collaboration between real estate developers and filmmakers in a globalized Beijing. The chapter suggests that the documentary impulse has been replaced by a postcinematic aesthetics depending "on a nonmaterial space-time—a postspatial chronotope" (p. 284).

This book raises important questions, which a more extensive conclusion might have helped clarify. The

book foregrounds affinities between different artistic forms and yet suggests that the cinema has a unique power in creating the city. How are we to think of the relationship between the diverse media that the book explores, and how to assess their effects on the ways people perceive and transform urban space? How to prove that 1950s drama and cinema "retooled the audiences' vision," (p. 27) "laying out a future program for the popular perception of urban policy" (p. 41)? How did filmic reappropriations of Tiananmen Square "affect urban change . . . by tilting the balance of power" (p. 186)? In short, how are we to understand the relationship between inventing new visions of the city and actually changing it? Like most claims about the transformative power of media, such statements are inspiring and thought provoking, but difficult to substantiate.

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KENNETH J. RUOFF. *Imperial Japan at Its Zenith: The Wartime Celebration of the Empire's Two Thousand Six-hundredth Anniversary*. (Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University.) Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2010. Pp. xv, 236. \$39.95.

1940 was expected to be an important year of pageantry within the Japanese Empire. Only seventeen years after the 1923 earthquake and a decade after the city's "formal reconstruction" concluded, Tokyo would host the 1940 Summer Olympic Games and other high profile ceremonies associated with the 2,600th year anniversary of Emperor Jinmu's "mythical" ascension. While the Olympics were cancelled, the anniversary programs associated with Japan's founding continued and helped create what Kenneth J. Ruoff suggests was a "heady time" in Japan (p. 18). Using the anniversary celebrations as a starting point, Ruoff endeavors not only to illuminate this woefully understudied instance of national propaganda but also to give readers a better understanding of Japan in 1940. Has he succeeded? Yes and no. In short, he has produced an imaginative, well-researched, yet frustrating study comprised of six chapters that do not always cohere into a well-argued book.

Ruoff begins his study by documenting the "solemn" imperial ceremony of November 10, 1940. Broadcast on radio throughout the Japanese Empire, Ruoff describes it as the "crowning event in what was a nonstop series of spectacles in 1940" (p. 15). Unfortunately, he spends only three pages detailing the ceremony. Chapters one, two, and three, however, provide a thoughtful exploration of how the yearlong anniversary celebrations were constructed and consumed, creating a boom in "national history" and "imperial heritage tourism." These chapters, particularly the one on heritage tourism, are original and stimulating. Ruoff explores how travel "was endorsed as an effective means for patriotic Japanese to improve their understanding of their national heritage" (p. 84). He then illustrates how the prefectural governments of Miyazaki and Nara attempted to exploit the anniversary bonanza to secure more tour-

ist visits. Miyazaki marketed itself as the birthplace of Japan's 2,600-year-old civilization, and Nara constructed its identity as the hometown of national history. Overall, this is an excellent chapter weakened only by what seems to be a throwaway line: "Tourism undeniably had significant political value to the regime" (p. 103). What regime does Ruoff mean: the national government, prefectural governments, or the Japan Tourism Board (JTB)?

Ruoff documents the mass participation and consumption elements associated with various celebrations in more detail in chapter two. Here he does a beautiful job illustrating how "consumer sectors were enveloped by nationalism rather than displaced by it" (p. 79). Department stores marketed the anniversary to sell products. Newspapers launched popular competitions in relation to the anniversary celebrations to increase sales. All the while, people, as Ruoff describes them, were "dutiful" consumers. Does this challenge our understanding of 1930s Japan? Partly. Ruoff suggests that his findings call into question the orthodoxy of moderation, writing that "The dramatic slogans (e.g., "Luxury is the Enemy") bandied about in 1940 that called for unrelenting sacrifice are misleading, at least partially" (p. 80). Why does the author believe they were misleading? Could not appeals to consume coexist with calls for sacrifice?

Chapters four and five are innovative examinations of Japanese tours to Korea and "sacred sites" in Manchuria, but I was left wondering exactly how they fit with the commemoration of Emperor Jinmu. Ruoff admits as much, writing "If I had not already been halfway through my field research in Japan when I decided that I could no longer ignore the topic of tourism, I might have committed this entire book to this theme" (p. 183). The final chapter on overseas Japanese and the "fatherland" is the basis of yet another potential book.

So, what are we left with? In many senses, an original set of studies that are provocative yet never developed fully enough or integrated in a coherent, logical, cover-to-cover package. As a stand-alone book, it is an intellectual tease. But as a tease, it will attract attention. Ruoff implies that his book will complicate notions that the Japanese were trapped in a "dark valley" of militarism and coercion after 1931, and this is important to emphasize. He shows that people were active purveyors and consumers of nationalism and that Japan was not a top-down authoritarian state. What should replace the "dark valley" analogy? Ruoff suggests that it was a time of "dark and light," of "suffering and joy." Perhaps I am being harsh, but this strikes me as an overly simplistic characterization. He even questions whether the constructed identity of the mythical Emperor Jinmu might not have served as a surrogate charismatic leader on par with Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini (p. 29). That is a mighty long bow to draw, and there is little in this book that makes me think fascism could be useful in helping us understand what Ruoff claims correctly

were "the diverse experiences of the Japanese in 1940" (p. 18).

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ALLAN R. MILLETT. *The War for Korea, 1950–1951: They Came from the North*. (Modern War Studies.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2010. Pp. xx, 644. \$45.00.

The English-language scholarship on the Korean War is already substantial, with seminal works such as Bruce Cumings's *The Origins of the Korean War* (1981, 1990). Some of these works are concerned with advancing particular characterizations of the war (i.e., civil and revolutionary vs. proxy, local vs. international, limited vs. global, etc.). Some are less theoretical and, for the most part, straightforward narrative accounts of certain aspects of the war (e.g., the use of air power) or the experiences of particular combatants in the war (e.g., a particular brigade). In the present volume, the second in an ambitious trilogy that covers the war from its origins in Korea's partition at the end of World War II to its conclusion with the armistice agreement in 1953, Allan R. Millett makes a significant contribution to this crowded field by providing what is both a comprehensive military history and a sophisticated treatment of the war's diplomatic and political aspects.

Eschewing a particular characterization of the war, Millett emphasizes its complexity: "no conflict should be categorized as simply an interstate war or civil war or even a limited insurgency . . . Understanding the Korean War will provide . . . relevant examples of a war that embodies almost every aspect of contemporary conflict" (p. 7). That said, Millett states his intellectual approach to the war (1950–1953) as "simply the most violent phase of a struggle between two competing visions of a modern, authentic Korean nation" (p. 10) and divides the period from 1945 to 1951 into three phases: phase one (1945–1948) when the two-power occupation of Korea upon Japan's surrender led to the rise of the two rival Korean states; phase two (1948–1950) when South Korea was plagued by leftist insurrections and civil unrest while the two Koreas were engaged in an extended border war; and phase three (1950–1951) when North Korea shifted from the prior strategy of subverting South Korea to an all-out conventional war in its efforts to reunify the peninsula.

What the reader gains from this volume, which covers the period from the war's outbreak in June 1950 to the beginning of the armistice negotiations in June 1951, is an understanding of how this "conventional war of 'liberation' or 'aggression'" (p. 13) was both local and international, limited and global in its scope and repercussions. Protagonists, on the ground in the two Koreas and far afield in Washington, D.C., Moscow, Beijing, and Tokyo, shaped its unfolding in the context of the emerging global Cold War and the particular national and regional exigencies of the time. Millett covers in comprehensive detail the course of the conflict, which

is roughly as follows: Kim Il-Sung's invasion of South Korea with backing from Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong scored a quick capture of Seoul but led to a prolonged and expanded war for which Kim was unprepared, as the U.S. armed forces under the banner of a multinational UN intervention came to South Korea's rescue; the UN intervention led to the North Koreans retreating north all the way to the areas bordering China, but they were saved by the Chinese military intervention which pushed the UN and South Korean forces all the way south below the 38th parallel. This process eventually resulted in a stalemate along a front that more or less approximated the armistice demarcation line of 1953.

Millett has carefully combed an exhaustive array of English-language source materials, both primary and secondary, and also made use of Chinese, Russian, and Korean sources, which allows him to present a wide-ranging analysis of the conflict from the perspectives of all the participants. He devotes the most attention to presenting a subtle and multilayered analysis of the U.S. involvement, from Harry Truman and his advisors to Douglas MacArthur, Walton Walker, Matthew Ridgway, and down to division and battalion-level commanders and soldiers in specific battles. Millett's use of hitherto underutilized oral history collections such as interviews with U.S. and South Korean officers and the interrogation records of Chinese and North Korean POWs adds a rich human dimension to the narrative. Millett also offers an assessment of the two Koreas' armed forces and their respective performance in the war that is more comprehensive than can be found elsewhere: on balance, Millett gives more credit to the South Korean performance on the battlefield and brings to light more shortcomings in the North Korean offensive, especially in the first week of the conflict, than others have done.

The book contains 463 pages of dense text accompanied by 107 pages of notes, a substantial bibliographic essay, a comprehensive index, eighteen detailed maps, and photo insets supplying images of the war and its participants. The unpublished third volume of the trilogy will cover the years 1951–1953. The generalist reader may feel lost in a few parts of the book, such as in the introduction where Millett reviews the academic literature on war studies and in the main text where he covers specific battlefield artillery and ammunition types. Specialists may take issue with the accuracy of some facts (such as on page 463, where Koryŏ, not Silla, is mentioned as the first unified Korean state). However, this book is a compelling read that will appeal to both the generalist and the specialist.

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ERIC T. JENNINGS. *Imperial Heights: Dalat and the Making and Undoing of French Indochina*. (From Indochina to Vietnam: Revolution and War in a Global Perspective, number 4.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 352. \$49.95.

Eric T. Jennings has written an outstanding book about the city of Dalat in south-central Vietnam from its origins to the present. He begins in the 1890s when French colonialists launched a novel experiment in urban development. Europeans were alarmingly vulnerable to sickness and death in Indochina, an outcome they attributed to bad local food, "murderous" heat, and "unhealthy" soil that supposedly emitted a lethal miasma (p. 6). They excused their "barbarous" treatment of indigenous peoples by citing the native environment, which made them "more nervous, their emotions more extreme and less pleasant" (pp. 24, 22). Seeking a remedy, the intruders set out to create a mountain retreat on the model of a French alpine town in the hope that it would provide a cure for homesickness, illness, and "Indochina itself" (p. 73). Prey to morbid fantasies and wishful thinking, they repeatedly did harm to themselves as well as to others, as when carving out artificial lakes intended to heighten the picturesque ambiance of the site, thereby multiplying the hordes of malaria-breeding mosquitoes that infested the region.

In a riveting sequence of chapters, the author develops a multilayered analysis of life in Dalat, a place where it was hoped women and children could live in peace and allow the colonizers to "recompose European masculinity, domesticity, and social life" (p. 72). Schools, tennis courts, soccer pitches, and golf courses were built, and big game hunting drew crowds of adventurers. Gardens and plantations produced European fruits and vegetables for local consumption and for export, and Dalat became a religious center, as missionaries turned a blind eye to the extravagant leisure activities of their neighbors and extolled the "serenity, contemplation, and conversion" of life in the highlands (p. 205).

Jennings is fascinated by the irrational, near utopian efforts of the French to get away from Vietnam and the Vietnamese. It was a goal that could not be reached, not when local people were needed to carry the goods Europeans required to live—and the Europeans themselves—up treacherous mountain paths to the new town. Thousands of impressed laborers perished while constructing the roadways and railroad tracks that finally connected Dalat to the lowlands in the 1930s. Vietnamese worked as servants and laborers in the city and gradually fashioned places for themselves in the local economy. By 1927, they outnumbered French residents, a trend that forced the colonial authorities to contrive more and more elaborate zoning restrictions. "In the event of an epidemic," declared the head of the Pasteur Institute, "the Annamite village must be easily encircled, isolated, controlled and supervised" (cited on p. 119). At the same time, wealthy Vietnamese, including the Emperor Bao Dai and his entourage, flocked to Dalat and became part of the resort's high society, an amenity that poorer Vietnamese and Europeans could not afford.

The author calls attention to an ethnographic literature from Gerald Hickey and others on the highland peoples who lived all around Dalat, which the French

claimed to have established on an uninhabited plateau. Building on the work of Oscar Salemink in *The Ethnography of Vietnam's Central Highlanders: A Historical Contextualization, 1850–1990* (2003), Jennings shows how the colonizers initially asserted that their presence was required to protect the native population from the Vietnamese. In the 1930s, this conception gave way to the notion that the highlanders who appeared in colonial discourse first as “tribes” instead formed a distinct “nation,” one that ought to be recognized as a free-standing “federation,” again under the protection of France, with Dalat as its capital city.

The idea was stillborn, but Dalat remained under French control during the First Indochina War, in spite of Viet Minh efforts to carry the fighting into a prominent enemy stronghold. Ngo Dinh Diem, who became president of the newly created Republic of South Vietnam in 1955, opted for assimilation of the highlanders under Vietnamese authority and returned Dalat to its previous incarnation as a tourist site. Even in the midst of wartime carnage in 1971 and 1972, Dalat continued to serve as a magnet for vacationing foreigners and Vietnamese. In yet one more surprise in the history of this protean city, so adept at shedding and reassuming identities, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam followed earlier models and heavily subsidized tourism, so that sojourners can continue to relish Dalat’s “lingering yet vague reputation as a colonial haven” (p. 265).

By showing that the French borrowed from what the British were doing in India, the Dutch in the East Indies, and the United States in the Philippines, this book makes a contribution to the literature on colonialism in South and Southeast Asia. The text has important things to say about environmental factors, social and cultural life, wars, regime changes, and a resilient tourist industry. Jennings declines to make the claim, but I conclude by affirming that he has written a “total history” of Dalat.

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DAVID BIGGS. *Quagmire: Nation-building and Nature in the Mekong Delta*. Foreword by WILLIAM CRONON. (Weyerhaeuser Environmental Books.) Seattle: University of Washington Press. 2010. Pp. xviii, 300. \$35.00.

Much of the existing scholarship on modern Vietnamese history has taken the nation as its focus, exploring the high politics of revolutionary nationalism and the construction of the postcolonial state through the lens of Vietnamese elites. It has also tended to privilege historical developments in northern Vietnam, often seen as the “cradle of Vietnamese civilization,” with comparatively little attention directed to southern Vietnam. As foundational as this work remains, it elided the very heterodox and historically shifting character of Vietnamese society over time including the impact of varying regional geographies and social structures, multiple religious practices and beliefs, and remarkable ethnic

diversity in shaping what it has meant to be Vietnamese at particular times and places. More recently, historians of premodern Vietnam and cultural anthropologists working on the contemporary period have been increasingly sensitive to the complexities of the Vietnamese past and the interpretative value of approaches that not only interrogate prevailing national narratives but are also attentive to local particularities and broader global structures and forces.

David A. Biggs is one of the first historians to employ these more capacious and fluid analytical frames to twentieth-century Vietnam. He does so in a variety of generative ways, but perhaps the most important of them is his pioneering use of environmental history as well as science and technology studies as the primary conceptual and methodological optics for his project. Throughout this book, Biggs explores the history of the southern Mekong Delta by analyzing encounters among what he terms nation builders (Vietnamese, French, and American engineers, politicians, and map-makers who brought with them new technologies, investment capital, and plans), the delta’s local inhabitants (laborers or settlers invested in the new orders or insurgents and peasants opposed to them), and the natural environment of the region itself. Biggs is especially concerned with the continuities and disjunctures over the *longue durée* in the bottom-up perspectives—what he evocatively terms surface or experiential mental maps—of those who most closely inhabit the shifting hydraulic environments of southern Vietnam.

A number of novel interpretative insights emerge from this shift in perspective. In his first several chapters on French colonial efforts to transform the Mekong Delta, Biggs nicely gets at the ways in which colonial models of development and urbanization were situated in a landscape already in flux from earlier Vietnamese projects of urbanism and land reclamation in the precolonial era, as well as how the ecological crises of the late colonial period prompted a significant reconfiguration of social relations and helped shape the ideational and geographic contours of southern revolutionary activity in the delta. Biggs’s chapter on the French war departs from the existing literature that tends to focus on military and political strategy of the French and the Ho Chi Minh-led Viet Minh government in northern Vietnam. He emphasizes how the increasingly divided physical geographies of the water environment in the south encouraged political fragmentation and the rise of politico-religious groups whose control of broad swathes of territory frustrated both French and Viet Minh efforts to assert control of the Mekong Delta. In his final chapters on nation building during the U.S. war in Vietnam, Biggs brings the legacies of these earlier periods to bear in a revealing discussion of why the on-the-ground modes of development in the U.S.-backed Republic of Vietnam that controlled southern Vietnam after 1954 so often departed from the high modernist sensibilities of its American supporters. He also provides the first major historical account of the ecological devastation wrought

by the militarization of the delta and its impact on social and political relations at the local level. Biggs's persuasive arguments are rooted in impressive research in Vietnamese, French, and English archival sources (he is among the first Western historians to use important archival collections in Ho Chi Minh City on southern Vietnamese society) and a series of oral interviews with local actors, whose voices are sometimes muted in the archives.

This book is a major achievement that fundamentally recasts our understanding of twentieth-century Vietnamese history. Its deftly written chapters, simultaneously expansive in their concerns yet full of nuance and telling narrative detail, will become the new starting point for further research on the history of southern Vietnam. At the same time the broader conceptual framework of environmental history that animates his project allows Biggs to speak beyond specialists in Vietnam and Southeast Asian history to larger cross-regional historical conversations about the complex politics of the natural and built environments.

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NANDINI CHATTERJEE. *The Making of Indian Secularism: Empire, Law and Christianity, 1830–1960*. (Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. Pp. xiii, 337. \$95.00.

Moved by the murder of a Christian missionary and his two young sons in India in 1999, Nandini Chatterjee sets out to celebrate the manifold contributions of Christian missionaries to modern Indian culture. The author finds ample traces of such contributions in civil law and English-medium education. The puzzle that this book attempts to solve is the absence of mandated religious instruction even in Christian missionary-inspired institutions in modern India. This absence, as well as the pluralism of religiosity, symbolizes “Indian secularism.”

A twofold argument emerges about its history. The first part attends to the gradual separation of British Indian governments (or “state”) from their administration of Indian religious funds and bodies (representative of “church”). Chatterjee suggests that this separation occurred due to the expansion of religious toleration in Britain from the early nineteenth century; non-Anglicans, especially Dissenters, were enfranchised as citizens of the British nation-state. Their growing numbers and strength in parliament eventually compelled officials of the British East India Company to relinquish their direct administration of Indian religious endowments. The Religious Endowments Act of 1863 finally consolidated this separation, forcing Indian religions to become “private.”

As Dissenting Christians grew in strength in parliament, so did various Indian faith groups in India. In the late nineteenth century, British Indian governments extended legal and educational civic rights to the latter. The results of these extensions were educational institutions such as the Anglo-Muslim Oriental College at

Aligarh in 1875 as well as missionary-funded agricultural colleges of North India in the 1870s and 1880s and the Christian institution that began as St. Stephen's College in 1881. Furthermore, many non-Christian groups emulated Christian missionaries in their methods of fundraising by subscription. Chatterjee offers the Indian Christian Marriage Dissolution Act and the Parsi Marriage Act as examples of the impact that Christian monogamous marriage and divorce had in establishing the legality of other personal laws in the subcontinent. Together these educational and social institutions provided the personnel for colonial and postcolonial governments as well as “model public persona” of the English-educated “Indian.”

The second part of the author's argument refers to the Indianization of Christianity, a subject that has received the attention of Robert Eric Frykenberg, Richard Fox Young, Chandra Mallampalli, and others. Indian Christianity was the historical byproduct of collaborative translation projects, albeit undertaken by racially hierarchized groups of European and Indian Christians in the nineteenth century. Racial, economic, and political differences persisted within Christian communities in India. This lack of unity limited the extent of distinctly Christian contributions to anti-imperialist struggles in the early twentieth century. In fact, a coalition of Protestants demanded freedom from Hindu majoritarian domination in the form of separate electorates from 1919 onward, and eventually secured it in 1931–1932.

Dense footnotes notwithstanding, Chatterjee's argument overlooks significant contrary evidence as well as wider scholarship on the relationship between Catholic and Puritan Christianity and European colonialism after the sixteenth century. Colonialism itself is erased from the author's benign view of English-medium education in the subcontinent. Readers who wonder at the timing and reasons for the English East India Company's administration of Indian religious endowments, or for the selective nature of British colonial recognitions of “religious” communities and laws after the rebellion of 1857, will have to find their answers elsewhere.

Historians of Christianity in the subcontinent will also be puzzled by the author's neglect of Assam, a region annexed by the East India Company government between 1833 and 1838. Colonial Assam was a vast province till 1874; postcolonial regions carved out of that terrain are currently home to the greatest number of Christians. Did the presence of American Baptists and Welsh Calvinist missions through the nineteenth century in colonial Assam lead to veterinarian or agricultural colleges there? Did missionaries alone inspire such institutions, or were there other groups with similar institutions?

It would appear that Chatterjee claims both too much for Evangelical missionaries and too little for non-Christian actors and politics in the same landscape. Neglecting non-Christians means that the audiences addressed by the missionaries remain invisible. Even if we forget “conversion” for the moment, it remains difficult

to explain the reasons for ordinary men and women gathering around a Christian preacher or two. Were they simply curious? Or were they moved by expansive visions of social belonging such as those articulated in early modern traditions of dialogue and debate among Sufis, Jains, Vaisnava, Sikhs, and Buddhists? Had these communicative traditions, methods of interrogation, and engagement survived into the nineteenth century? Such questions deserve greater theoretical primacy in a study of "Indian secularism." Without them, the very hegemony of Christianity in the subcontinent is hard to explain—and Indian secularism impossible to understand or defend as the only path for a multifaith society.

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SUMATHI RAMASWAMY. *The Goddess and the Nation: Mapping Mother India*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2010. Pp. xix, 379. Cloth \$99.95, paper \$27.95.

In this sumptuously illustrated book, Sumathi Ramaswamy builds an account of Indian nationalism that puts the visual at the center of its analysis. In the process, she combines innovative approaches to South Asian studies including visual history as pioneered by Christopher Pinney, gender studies, and the critical history of cartography. In a survey that encompasses the art of Abanindranath Tagore and M. F. Hussain, as well as the more demotic fields of print, poster, and calendar art, Ramaswamy takes as her subject the evolution of a highly unorthodox new Indian deity—"Mother India" (*Bharat Mata*). Ramaswamy traces the paradoxical emergence of this curious figure, which, though garbed with antiquity, had a life cycle exactly paralleling that of modern Indian nationalism. The plethora of anthropomorphized maps and cartographized matrons flourished from the late nineteenth century to independence, and has resurfaced in the 1990s and 2000s along with renewed contestation of the nature of the Indian nation.

In an illuminating prologue, Ramaswamy argues that "Mother India" was called forth by the need, in the 1880s, to give nationalism a tangible form that could accommodate the subcontinent's great diversity. She attributes the choice of the divine feminine as the embodiment of the national essence to the highly complex role that women and concepts of the feminine were called upon to play in nationalist debates on cultural authenticity and colonial mimicry. Having explained the choice of a goddess figure, the book then explores the journey of the new goddess to find her fixed form. Ramaswamy suggests that this took place over a fifty-year period between 1880 and the 1930s, during which "Mother India" was transformed from the chaste, ethereal maiden of Tagore's revivalist "neo-Bengal" movement into the doughty, lion-flanked warrior woman depicted in mass market prints. Crucial to this process of goddess-making were the popular artists and printmakers Ramaswamy refers to as "barefoot cartographers,"

who subverted not only the tasteful refinement of Tagore's vision, but also the official "scientific" depictions of the Indian landmass associated with colonialism—the products of what the author calls "command cartography."

Ramaswamy suggests, moreover, that the change from virginal ascetic to matronly recruiting sergeant took Mother India through various metamorphoses, associated, she argues, with particular stages or groups within the broader nationalist project. Cartographized "Mother India" manifested herself as various avatars. The most common had her body shape limning that of the whole subcontinent (usually with Kashmir as her head); but she also stood upon the map of India flanked by her various sons (generally not daughters). More ghoulishly, she appeared as a bloodthirsty harpy demanding the severed heads of such martyrs as Bhagat Singh (the Sikh revolutionary). Sanskrit conventions of divine forms were also employed: "Mother India would often appear seated on a lotus petal, leg pendant; and the adoption of certain *mudras* (expressive hand gestures)." Indeed, Ramaswamy is at her most interesting in her discussion of the connections between the evolving aesthetic of this deified "geo-body" and the various stages of nationalist strategy and ideology. It was with the partial eclipse of the Gandhian non-violence moment in the late 1930s and 1940s that *Bharat Mata*'s "geo-form" achieved its most bellicose manifestation with chariot and lion consorts. Meanwhile, Ramaswamy's contrast between the visual "maternalizing" of the nation and the trapping of real women in a rigid definition of their natures as "pure" mothers echoes feminist readings of Indian nationalist culture and politics such as those of Lata Mani and Mrinalini Sinha.

Elsewhere, Ramaswamy considers the possible models for this novel deity. While acknowledging the influence of Britain's Britannia, the French Marianne, and such domestic divine antecedents as Bhu Devi, Kali, and Durga, she suggests that the evolving ideology of bourgeois motherhood—originating in Britain, but eagerly adopted in its South Asian colony—was just as decisive. *Bharat Mata* thus emerged as a veritable visual palimpsest, but one in which the "new woman" was generally the most prominent element.

This fascinating case study successfully synthesizes two important themes in the critical history of Indian nationalism: the relationship between religious and secular conceptions of power, and the appropriation of elite cartographical projects by popular groups. Ramaswamy shows that images are not mere reflections of history but its active agents.

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NEETI NAIR. *Changing Homelands: Hindu Politics and the Partition of India*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. 343. \$55.00.

The history of India's 1947 partition has largely been examined either in terms of "high politics" or its human

dimension and consequences. A number of senior scholars, including David Gilmartin, Ian Talbot, and Gurharpal Singh, have pointed out the need to integrate these strands in historical writing in order to appreciate fully the partition. Neeti Nair confidently handles the tangled responses of Punjabi Hindu politicians to the issue of minority rights and safeguards in the late colonial era, thereby shedding fresh light on Punjab's relationship to the Indian nationalist movement. She also examines memories of partition among Hindus in Delhi. Nair consults a variety of source materials and offers original interpretations for her readers. Although she teases out differentiation in the attitudes of elite Hindus in this book, she does not probe how non-elite actors understood and experienced partition. This reflects the type of sources, both documentary and human, that underpin Nair's incisive analysis.

Nair interrogates the far too readily accepted view that partition was a consequence of the triumph of "communalism" over anticolonial nationalism in Punjab. She sees the Muslim League's breakthrough in Pakistan's cornerstone province as owing more to "the propitious conditions provided by a wartime colonial state" than to deteriorating "inter-communitarian relations within the province" (p. 258). Here, the book could be usefully read alongside Farina Mir's recent argument (in *The Social Space of Language: Vernacular Culture in British Colonial Punjab* [2010]) that conventional histories have overdetermined the transforming impact of religious reform in the Punjab. Nair argues that it was not religious difference but "shockingly petty political differences" that caused partition in the final instance (p. 260). For Punjab's Hindus there was nothing inevitable about partition. There were missed opportunities for compromise at both the provincial and All-India levels of politics. The concentration on constitutional developments, however, overlooks the underlying economic causes of tension that, rather than religious differences, drove communal politics. Instead of monolithic Hindu and Muslim communities being pitted against each other, there was a struggle for power to alter or maintain the status quo involving the dominant Khatri and Arora Hindu castes, Muslim Sheikhs, and Arains. The extent to which subaltern Hindu and Muslim communities were incorporated into this struggle or were able to mobilize themselves autonomously is beyond the scope of Nair's book—yet this prevents it from being the definitive account of Hindu politics in colonial Punjab.

Nair is most convincing when she explains how changing contexts could encourage cross-community nationalist struggle even in individuals such as Swami Shraddhanand who are conventionally understood as being thoroughly "communal" in outlook. In a strikingly revisionist understanding, she suggests that Shraddhanand's leadership of the anticolonial Rowlatt agitation in Delhi in 1919 remained personally relevant throughout his later "communal" activities in the *shud-dhi* and *sangathan* movements (p. 105). Nair is at pains to produce a more nuanced understanding of Hindu re-

sponses to the prospect of partition than is provided in the juxtaposition of a "secular" Congress with "communal" opponents in the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha. With respect to those congressmen who did ultimately see partition as a means of safeguarding Hindu rights, Nair maintains that they "had no idea it would be accompanied by so much violence and displacement" (p. 259).

This leads to Nair's second theme, which is the bewilderment of many Punjabi Hindu migrants at their uprooting. This is explored through a series of Delhi-based interviews. In common with many oral accounts, the picture emerges of migrants who did not think that they would have to abandon their ancestral homes permanently. There is, as Nair acknowledges, less sense of trauma and loss in these testimonies than in other oral histories of partition because her respondents have "by and large, fared well in the world" (p. 260). Nair reveals a variety of attitudes toward Muslims among migrants, which is significant in the light of the contemporary Hindu majoritarian sentiment. Surprisingly, she does not provide evidence for anticipatory migration among upper-caste Hindus from Lahore, which Ravinder Kaur has discussed in her study of Delhi migrants (*Since 1947: Partition Narratives among Punjabi Migrants of Delhi* [2007]). In sum, Nair provides a nuanced, but by no means total insight into the Punjabi Hindu experience of partition.

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OCEANIA AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

VANESSA SMITH. *Intimate Strangers: Friendship, Exchange and Pacific Encounters*. (Critical Perspectives on Empire.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. xii, 323. Cloth \$99.00, paper \$35.99.

This is a bold and welcome contribution to a major theme in East Polynesian history: namely, the high number of friendships formed between Tahitians and foreign outsiders. Despite the book's subtitle, which suggests a wider framework of reference, Vanessa Smith focuses heavily on Tahiti and the Leeward Islands—with some references to Hawaiian history, to neighboring islands, and to New Zealand—in order to explain divergences in the cultural practices of friendship and empire in the Pacific between years 1767 and 1806.

From the outset, Smith concentrates on the epistemological significance of the term *taio* (friend), which was used by islanders to greet visitors. Unfortunately, Smith does so without exploring its cognates as recorded in the 1830s by John Davies in his *Tahitian and English Dictionary* (1851). Davies explained the relationship between the use of the words *tau'a* and *hoa* and the consolidation of missionary power. Smith neglects the political implications of friendships. She acknowledges that what was often at issue was "status reinforcement" but does not explore the political importance of

"bonded friendships." Additionally, I think it would have helped the general reader if Smith had provided a short outline of the historical background in Tahiti for the period chosen.

The book is rich with examples of the importance of personal friendships. Part one, which deals with modes of interaction between naval visitors and Tahitians, provides ample material on collective receptions. These "crowd scenes" were not always friendly and bordered, at times, on opportunistic hostility, as in the case of the grounded ship *Dolphin*. More usually, the public spaces of interaction were regulated by chiefs and commanders who established the terms of market exchanges. These formal expressions of friendship were costly for Europeans to maintain in terms of gifts, but rich in the collection of "curiosities" that still fill natural history museums. Apart from a digression into the historiography of James Cook's demise at Kealakekua Bay, this section is a thoughtful series of chapters dealing with the element of calculation in friendships that interrogates longstanding arguments about altruism and what political anthropology calls "instrumental friendships."

By contrast, I found part two's examples of "Particular Friendships" esoteric and totally unconvincing in its discussion of Tahitian travelers abroad. As Smith does not provide a conclusion pulling together her material, one must be supplied. This new series, "Critical Perspectives on Empire," is to be welcomed. The aim of its first publication, however, to "examine the languages of friendship within the politics of Empire" (p. 10), ignores the background politics in its central example, Tahiti. The author does not evaluate the vital importance of friendship pacts in maintaining political rivalries and solidarity. In broader terms, the "politics of empire" in the region resulted in longstanding British "friends" abandoning Tahiti to France (whose Catholic missionaries Tahitians expelled), opting instead to annex New Zealand, where Maori reception of strangers and settlers had been much less friendly. That, too, calls for some explanation in a series dealing with imperial studies.

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CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

JEROME TEELUCKSINGH. *The Lost Gospel: Christianity and Blacks in North America*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 2010. Pp. xvi, 162. \$52.99.

Jerome Teelucksingh's study examines the history of black Protestant Christians in the United States and Canada during the nineteenth century. The volume is centrally concerned with explaining how white Protestant Christian missionaries groomed free and enslaved blacks into Christian civility and church fellowship in an age marked by a protracted struggle between proslavery and antislavery forces. Racial segregation also plays a

major role in his discussion of black Christian history in North America.

The book is chronological in arrangement and opens with two chapters that explain the entry of blacks into Canada via the slave trade, their increase due to slavery and migrations, the rise of abolitionism, and the expansion of Canada's free black population. This sets the stage for the author to examine white Christian missions to black communities within the context of organized opposition to slavery. Teelucksingh explains how various white Christian missionaries and mission societies promoted manumission. Their efforts were stymied by the fact that Christian churches and missions could be found on either side of the slavery debates. Teelucksingh examines the resulting division among white Christians due to opposing views about blacks and slavery. But he seems not to recognize that abolitionism was an extremist, fringe movement that was always at odds with mainstream white (Christian) sentiment. Also, on at least one occasion, he advances an ahistorical claim when he attributes the migration of blacks to Canada to the failure of white churches to oppose slavery in the U.S. South. The issue was not church politics so much as the brutal reality of racial slavery, fugitive slave laws, and the general, ongoing will of blacks to resist the authority of slavery through flight.

In chapter three, Teelucksingh delves into the white missionary schools that provided education to blacks. It is here that the author best represents why blacks were compelled to affiliate with white Christians, since he ably demonstrates the practical exigencies that made Christian affiliation such an effective means of assimilation to white norms and values. His fourth chapter explains the emergence of black Christian leadership as blacks transitioned from being a small minority in overwhelmingly white congregations to constituting a critical mass, subject to segregated seating at the discretion of white parishioners. Crucial here is the rise of independent black denominations and congregations, a development he maps in both Canada and the United States. The fifth and sixth chapters conclude the volume with attention to the political and theological aspects of black Christianity that distinguished it from white Christianity. The author surmises that blacks themselves contributed to racial segregation by forming essentially black-only congregations.

Careful readers may well wonder about a number of peculiarities of the book. The discussion is essentially devoid of theoretical analysis and does not apply social theory to its examination of race as a significant social force on the constitution of religious identity. As a result, the book's aim to present Christianity as essentially race-transcending seems disconnected from the actual history of the religion. Throughout the volume, moreover, the writing is often lacking in depth and frequently assembles factoids without shaping these into a full narrative. Teelucksingh also fails to account for the anthropological, worldly throes of the Christian tradition. Slavery and racism are treated as extraneous to the

Christian church, as mere failures to grasp the religion's true essence. On several occasions, the writer describes white Christian practices of racial segregation and proslavery ideology as hypocritical distortions of the religion (pp. 22, 52, 97). This is even more peculiar given the proslavery excerpts from Christian scripture that preface the early chapters. No less perturbing is the fact that slaves are treated as having no religion until Christianized (p. 52), despite the numerous scholarly studies that examine African religions among African slaves in the Americas. This puzzling disposition toward slave religion likely accounts for the writer's concluding remark that Christianity instilled morality and ethics among black converts—the implication is that Africans who did not convert to Christianity were unethical and immoral. Teelucksingh cites the absence of “verbal outbursts, riots or protests” as evidence that Christianity uplifted the moral status of these black subjects (p. 111).

Readers desiring the most basic introduction to the history of black Christianization in Canada and the United States will find some helpful information in the volume. Teelucksingh's engagement with multiple archives yields important observations concerning the educational role of white missions for free blacks. Beyond this, much of the study seems quite limited in its ability to explicate social patterns of religious and racial power or even to properly construe these patterns.

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JOHN CLARKE. *The Ordinary People of Essex: Environment, Culture, and Economy on the Frontier of Upper Canada*. (Carleton Library Series, number 218.) Ithaca, N.Y.: McGill-Queen's University Press. 2010. Pp. xxxiii, 738. \$135.00.

John Clarke's book provides a valuable optic with which to examine the “everyday settler who, through his own sweat and that of his family, was rebuilding his world, the world of *ordinary people*” (p. xxix). This volume serves as a companion to Clarke's earlier study of Essex, a southwestern county in Upper Canada, *Land, Power, and Economics on the Frontier of Upper Canada* (2001). Indeed, in many respects the books should be read together, since the first volume provides the missing elements of this second in the series: the eighteenth-century philosophical conservatism that translated into land policies; relationships among squatters, settlers, and the state; and the equation of land and power among colonial elites, particularly those of the so-called Family Compact.

The book under review suggests how early settlers reacted to the cards dealt them and how they made decisions—where to choose land to invest their labor and how to improve it over time—based on limited environmental knowledge and cultural baggage. The county is well chosen for a case study. Essex continued to have a considerable remnant of early French Canadian col-

onists; close proximity to the United States gave it an immigration source after the American Revolution when loyalists, late loyalists, and, later, escaped slaves and free blacks took up land; and it attracted large numbers of Irish immigrants by the mid-nineteenth century. In many respects, one can only make sense of the decisions and outcomes of settlement according to prevailing understandings of the environment (such as the value of well-drained over poorly drained lands), the legacy but permutation of cultural practices, and the environment itself.

Clarke rigorously applies spatial geographic and historical methods to develop this study, drawing especially on land surveys, assessment roles, censuses (often that of 1850–1851), as well as extensive quantitative statistical analysis. It yields important conclusions. But, beyond heavy mathematical computation and statistical analyses, Clarke consistently gives just due to the wider historical circumstances, world views impossible to quantify, and contemporary environmental understandings difficult to reconstruct. For instance, the heritage of British, if not Scottish, Enlightenment idealizations of “independence” was undoubtedly an important factor in settlement. It played out in the New World through a belief in the value of hard work on cheap lands and combinations of individual and family labor investments through marriage strategies and childbearing. Indeed, given all the temptations to find environmental or universalist economic determinants for early settlement, to use the “actions of economically rational man and the tyranny of distance” (p. 439) to explain land choices, modes of agriculture, adoption of horses over oxen, or mixes of crops and livestock, Clarke raises the importance of individual agency, the continuing influence of culture—itsself adapting to new circumstances—and the changing land itself. The resulting picture reveals a process “more atomistic or seemingly chaotic in pioneer settlement than has hitherto been recognized” (p. 211).

The book expands understandings of this county's common folk, first by discussing circumstances of settlement, including the ways newcomers evaluated the land upon which to squat, take up in share, lease, or patent. Clarke extensively analyzes the county's peopling, from the indigenous and French fur trade era to the mid-nineteenth century, with attention to spatial movements among the leading immigrants, as well as loyalist and “late” loyalist Americans and black, Irish, English, and Scottish settlers. Clarke also sheds light on family sizes, age cohorts, religious affiliations, and occupations for each of these groups. He then examines the “propinquity” of cultural groupings, addressing how and where groups established communities. The greatest analysis, however, is devoted to the emerging mixed farming and subsistence activities and entry into the market with a view to points of origin, time of settlement (and therefore some of the range of choice of soils), and culture. With respect to the ongoing debate of the place of wheat as “king” in Upper Canada, Clarke adopts the more nuanced view that mixed farm-

ing prevailed, and wheat (with corn and oats) was adopted with respect to local considerations, prices, and perhaps cultural and point-of-origin experience. Valuable quantitative work is devoted to the structural and spatial dynamics of agriculture, in which the crux of Clarke's argument is borne out: land was acquired cheaply, but chosen according to its perceived value and the value it achieved with improvement. The perceived and monetary value of land affected the size of holdings and the degree to which proprietors invested human and animal labor into a lot's further cultivation and improvement. As the book's final analysis suggests there were many routes to "independence" for such settlers. These "ordinary people," then, evinced fascinating capacities to survive and search for prosperity in the pioneer environment of nineteenth-century Essex County.

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FREDERICK VAUGHAN. *Viscount Haldane: "The Wicked Step-Father of the Canadian Constitution."* Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press, for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History. 2010. Pp. xix, 307. \$65.00.

Frederick Vaughan's exhaustively researched, beautifully crafted, revisionist intellectual biography of Viscount Richard Burdon Haldane will be his enduring legacy to the expansive field of legal history. With a truly remarkable singlemindedness, Vaughan has attained a very laudable academic goal: solving one of Canada's longstanding constitutional conundrums. He offers a credible and comprehensive explanation for the British Judicial Committee of the Privy Council's (JCPC) central role in the wholesale dismantling and reconstruction of Canada's Constitution Act, 1867 (known originally as the British North America Act, 1867). According to Vaughan, JCPC lawmakers, first Lord Watson and then the remarkable Viscount Haldane dramatically transformed a defiantly monarchical, purposefully highly centralized, quasi-federalist constitution into the world's most decentralized and reluctantly republican confederation. Indeed, with the Supreme Court of Canada's controversial ruling on the secession of Quebec (1998), any province can now hold and possibly win a referendum on secession.

Vaughan is a lifelong critic of the JCPC for its deconstruction of Canada's Constitution. Yet he remains convinced that both the liberal nationalist interpretations and the sociological "living tree" explanation for this turn of events are inadequate and unconvincing. Liberal nationalist critics, including John T. Saywell in his acclaimed study *The Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism* (2002), contend that Watson and Haldane, ambitious Scots who sought advancement through the expansive British Empire, could not understand the true nature of Canada and the need for a strong central government given the centrifugal forces at work in a pluralistic, dispersed, and geo-

graphically immense country. More importantly, Watson and Haldane could not properly comprehend the origins, scope, and substance of the Constitution Act or what transpired with its implementation. They were susceptible to the blandishments and the pressure of Ontario's wily Premier Oliver Mowat, the driving force behind the provincial rights movement prior to 1900. For these reasons, Watson and Haldane reconstructed confederation framers' intent to serve the interests of the empire, the provincial governments, and their own careers. In the several JCPC decisions during the early 1930s, Lord Sankey applied the "living-tree" doctrine to come down on the side of the federal government. These unexpected rogue rulings were decisively repudiated in the *Labour Conventions* decision (1937), which reasserted the watertight-compartments conception of federalism, further diminishing federal power over trade and commerce. Ironically, by the 1970s the "living tree" doctrine was adopted by sociologically minded political scientists, including Alan Cairns, to applaud the JCPC's role in transforming Canada's monarchical constitution via a myriad of rulings favorable to the provincial governments. Early in his career Vaughan excoriated the "living tree" doctrine and academics like Cairns who espoused it.

Vaughan's exhaustive research and analysis of Haldane's intellectual background, education, and career as a lawyer, politician, and civil servant drive him to the conclusion that Haldane became the "wicked step-father of the Canadian Constitution" primarily because he was a germanophile by conviction. He was educated in part in Germany, spent considerable time vacationing there, and as head of the War Office he reformed the British Army along the Hegelian lines of the Prussian Army. Indeed, Haldane was forced to resign the chancellorship in 1915 when Canadian-born Andrew Bonar Law, Conservative Party leader, denounced him as a threat to Britain's security. But far more important to Vaughan's thesis is the fact that Haldane was a prominent Hegelian scholar. Indeed, he contends that it was the nineteenth-century philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel who was the true wicked step-father of the Constitution. Haldane channeled Hegel's philosophy in his legal, political, and administrative careers, especially his long tenure on the JCPC, where he left a lasting legacy.

A somewhat uncritical Haldane wholeheartedly embraced Hegel's doctrine of historical relativism. As such, he perceived man as a historical being. "Taking the world as we find it," argues Vaughan of Haldane, "meant understanding that history is the rational unfolding of the spirit of freedom" (p. 106). Things are forever changing, and the truth for one generation is not the truth for the next. The constitution (with its component laws) is a "living, organic tree" that needs adjustment to respond to changing times, norms, and values.

Vaughan demonstrates with a great deal of conviction and considerable evidence that it was primarily Haldane's very personal version of Hegelian doctrine,

reinforced occasionally by his Scottish nationalism and his overly ebullient British imperialism, that guided him in all of his fateful rulings concerning the nature and scope of Canada's federal constitution in innumerable cases brought before the JCPC. Haldane, like Watson, viewed the British North America Act, 1867, as a mere statute of the British imperial parliament, not a full-blown constitution. He had no interest in the framers' intent and deliberately repudiated their deeply flawed constitutional work. Haldane also displayed utter contempt for the rulings of Canada's Supreme Court. His role, as he defined it, was to put flesh and blood on the dry bones of Canada's largely unwritten constitution and its quasi-federal system of governance so that his watertight-compartment federalism could better reflect the true needs of provincial governments. Haldane showed complete disdain for the fledgling Canadian community, believing that a strong and united empire best encapsulated and represented the true ethical aims of Canadians.

The least satisfactory aspect of this otherwise enlightening study is the postscript. Vaughan contends that Hegel's historical relativism thoroughly pervades all of the important decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, especially since the Constitution Act, 1982, with its dreaded, republican-style Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Picking up where he left off in his highly opinionated *The Canadian Federalist Experiment: From Defiant Monarchy to Reluctant Republic* (2003), Vaughan goes on an unsubstantiated and misguided rant about the stranglehold that Hegelian relativism and modern liberalism's "living" constitution have over Canada's Supreme Court. Canadians, he suggests, are now living in a jurocracy that is subverting majoritarian democracy. A far more balanced assessment can be gleaned from James B. Kelly's remarkable *Governing with the Charter: Legislative and Judicial Activism and Framers' Intent* (2005), which Vaughan conveniently ignores. Nonetheless, this is an enlightening revisionist study that plumbs both the strengths and the weaknesses of a remarkable intellectual who left an enduring, but now rapidly ebbing, legal legacy.

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LISA ROSE MAR. *Brokering Belonging: Chinese in Canada's Exclusion Era, 1885–1945*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. xi, 230. \$24.95.

Few Canadian scholars or observers of Canadian politics would argue against the centrality of brokerage to the current and historical political system. Works such as John English's *The Decline of Politics: The Conservatives and the Party System, 1901–20* (1977) and Patrick James and Michael Luszti's contribution to the edited collection *Canada: The State of the Federation 2001: Canadian Political Culture(s) in Transition* (2003) emphasize the nature of electoral pragmatism within the dominant paradigm of the party system and its two so-called major parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives.

These top-down approaches have served scholars of elite political processes well, but the trend in the new political history is to examine brokerage politics from beyond these narrow confines.

To that end, Lisa Rose Mar's slim volume examines the history of some Chinese brokers who acted as "intermediaries between the Chinese and Anglo worlds of North America's West Coast" and thus reveals "a process of making history from the middle" (p. 4). Mar demonstrates this negotiated relationship in three ways. First, the story of Chinese brokers moves the issue of exclusion beyond the traditional narrative of politics, the state, and the law; her study places Chinese brokers within this history, rather than on the outside. Second, Mar positions Chinese brokers in a transnational framework including Chinese and North American linkages. Third, the book focuses on the ways that ordinary people and their leaders, working within their institutions, negotiated political relations within this transpacific world. In this way, Mar is able to move scholarship beyond the usual approach, which emphasizes naïve immigrant domination by the host society.

In five neat chapters, Mar examines the story of Chinese exclusion from its beginnings in the nineteenth century to the collapse of the exclusion period in the late 1940s. Using a case study approach supported with underutilized Chinese source materials, Mar effectively demonstrates the agency of Chinese immigrant power brokers in their negotiations with Anglo-Canadian society. Chapter one focuses on a power rivalry between Yip On and David Lew as well as their collaboration with various Anglo politicians regarding illegal Chinese immigration. Chapter two explores the means by which Chinese brokers, in this case Chinese legal interpreters (also known as Chinese lawyers), contended with a discriminatory legal system and effectively worked to make life "both possible and tolerable" in the shadow of anti-Chinese policies (p. 50). Though disenfranchised and unable to practice law, according to Mar's analysis, these Chinese legal interpreters navigated the informal confines of the ethnic dispute resolution process as it interacted with the formal justice system. Chapter three places the year-long mass protest movement against public school segregation within a much wider populism taking root across the Pacific world. Alongside the works of Belinda Huang ("Teaching Chineseness in the Trans-Pacific Society: Overseas Chinese Education in Canada and the United States, 1900–1919" [Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2009]) and Timothy J. Stanley (*Contesting White Supremacy: School Segregation, Anti-Racism, and the Making of Chinese Canadians* [2011]), Mar demonstrates how a new generation of brokers—intellectuals, labor leaders, and civil rights activists—brought grass-roots activism into Canadian brokerage politics.

Chapter four, the most innovative, recounts how intellectuals attempted to reshape public discourse about Chinese in North America by "fixing" the interview data collected by researchers affiliated with the Survey of Race Relations, directed by Robert E. Park of the

University of Chicago. In particular, the Chinese community in British Columbia cooperated with brokers to "fix knowledge" by obscuring the data that researchers would find. Instead of a stratified group of participants, researchers primarily spoke with brokers who, through a community-wide plan to manage the visiting Americans, presented a tightly coordinated viewpoint of Chinese society in an effort to alter West Coast racial politics in their favor. Lastly, chapter five outlines how a variety of brokers mobilized Chinese Canadians to protest discriminatory treatment; these included boycotting military service to protest disenfranchisement, Chinese worker dissent, and campaigns to pressure the federal government to yield on the policy of sending relief remittances to relatives in China.

Throughout her book, Mar provides helpful directions to future researchers, indicating where additional forays into ethnic brokerage politics may be made, including investigations into how these political brokers and their ideas circulated in the wider transpacific world. This highly innovative work has many merits. It only occasionally loses its way, missing the opportunity from time to time to indicate how these brokers were viewed by the Anglo-Canadians with whom they dealt. Because brokerage politics is seen as crucial to the Canadian nation-building project, it would have been helpful to have more specific links between the actions of the Chinese brokers and the reactions of Anglo-Canadian elites. This would also have bolstered Mar's efforts to place her overall emphasis on interactions as much as exclusions. In sum, this study of politics from the middle will shape the way political, immigration, and ethnic historians view power politics.

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JON PARMENTER. *The Edge of the Woods: Iroquoia, 1534–1701*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. 2010. Pp. xlix, 474. \$49.95.

For obvious reasons, the Iroquois League has attracted far more attention from historians of early America than any of the other peoples of the native Northeast. Over the last two decades, historians such as Daniel K. Richter, Matthew Dennis, and José António Brandão have re-evaluated the interactions among the Iroquois League, their Native neighbors, and Europeans in the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. In this book, Jon Parmenter addresses many of these same encounters, ranging from the first contact between the St. Lawrence Iroquoians and Jacques Cartier in 1534, to the Grand Settlement negotiated with New France and the English colony of New York in 1700 and 1701.

Historians of early America, and of the Iroquois in particular, will find that much of this is familiar, well-plowed ground. However, Parmenter's approach differs from previous efforts in that he emphasizes the changing spatial configuration of Iroquoia during this

period. Framing his tome around the five elements of the Iroquois condolence ceremony, Parmenter traces the League's mostly successful efforts to manage diplomatic, military, and trade relations while maintaining unity between their own distant communities, while controlling and defining the shifting borders of their homeland in an era of dynamic change.

Most previous scholarship dealing with the Iroquois treats the borders of their homeland as being fairly static throughout this period: In the roughly traditional schema, Iroquoia stretches west from the confluence of the Mohawk and Hudson Rivers, encompasses the Finger Lakes region beyond Lake Onondaga in central New York, and usually terminates somewhere in the vicinity of the Genesee River. By contrast, Parmenter demonstrates that the boundaries of Iroquoia changed greatly over the course of the seventeenth century, depending on the League's trading, diplomatic, and military goals of the moment. In Parmenter's telling, at the beginning of the seventeenth-century Iroquoia confined itself largely to the Finger Lakes area in present New York state; by 1667 the Iroquois reconfigured their homeland to encompass nearly all of Lake Ontario, with the Hudson River as their approximate eastern border. By the end of the century, southeastern Pennsylvania had become Iroquoia's southernmost point, and its western boundary had been reconfigured and shortened, taking in only the eastern portion of Lake Ontario.

In some ways, Parmenter's work is similar to Pekka Hämäläinen's *The Comanche Empire* (2008). Like Hämäläinen, Parmenter emphasizes how a powerful group of Native people utilized their military prowess and adroitly employed diplomacy in a long term effort to expand and, at other times, to contract their domain in response to actions by European colonists, traders, and other Native groups. Like the Comanche, the Iroquois controlled and extended trade networks. For both peoples, expanded trade could be a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, it gave them access to useful items of European manufacture, but, on the other, it encouraged dependency on their suppliers while also serving as a pathway for old world pathogens to enter their communities. The parallel between the two books is very interesting. Reading them together makes for a fascinating comparative study of two powerful, but distinct, Native American groups whose members took similar actions at different times and in different geographic contexts.

Since the nineteenth century, historians have often noted the ability of the Iroquois to project military power over vast distances; they ranged as far south as the Carolinas, as far north as Hudson's Bay, and west beyond the Mississippi River. Parmenter observes that warfare, as well as trade and diplomacy, involved the Iroquois controlling and expanding the boundaries of Iroquoia.

As one would expect in a book that deals with notions of space, there are many maps in this volume (more than twenty, if one counts the old maps listed as illus-

trations). Most of them portray the changing shape of Iroquoia, trade routes, and military campaigns by the Iroquois and their foes.

Parmenter stops his study at 1701, a watershed year in Iroquois history. Given the activities of the Iroquois in the eighteenth century (involvement in the Walking Purchase and the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix come immediately to mind), one wonders about the potential for a follow-up spatial study. Overall, Parmenter has written a book that will be a fine addition to scholarship on the Iroquois, and one that I could see being used in graduate-level courses in both early American and Native American history.

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CARY MILLER. *Ogimaag: Anishinaabeg Leadership, 1760–1845*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2010. Pp. vii, 314. \$50.00.

In this book Cary Miller decisively challenges a long-standing scholarly interpretation of Anishinaabeg social organization as “band-level or acephalous societies, communities with a heightened degree of egalitarianism marked by weak and/or fluid leadership” (p. 2). This understanding, she contends, rests on a literal reading of accounts by fur traders, missionaries, and government officials who portrayed Anishinaabe political and social organization as limited to small family groups. These same colonial records also assumed a separation of religious and political structures, leading scholars to conclude that the Anishinaabe belief system, like its Western counterpart, distinguished between sacred and profane. Miller persuasively argues to the contrary that the village was the most meaningful social unit for the Anishinaabeg; that political relations within and between villages were at once systematic, flexible, and fluid; and that the sources of religious and political authority were one and the same.

Miller’s work rests on a careful rereading of the colonial records of Ojibwe people in Wisconsin and Minnesota between the Seven Years’ War and the arrival of missionaries, who pressed for conversion to Christianity, and government officials, who agitated for land-cession treaties. Miller also draws on twentieth-century ethnographies and indigenous oral traditions. Her study thus encompasses the rise of American hegemony in the western Great Lakes region but ends before forced relocations of Ojibwes and their confinement on reservations altered indigenous leadership structures. Although she focuses on Wisconsin and Minnesota Ojibwes, Miller does not intend to limit her argument to them alone. The Ojibwes are one of the Three Fires of the Anishinaabeg, linked to the Odawas and Potawatomis by language, culture, and kinship. Nevertheless, the distinct geopolitical circumstances that have shaped each nation should suggest some caution in generalizing from Miller’s case study to other times and places.

Ogimaag is organized into five substantive chapters,

four of which treat the Ojibwe world structurally as a cultural whole and draw on evidence across the entire chronological and geographic range of her study. The fifth chapter details the fraught dealings of Edmund F. Ely, a missionary for the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), with the *gichi-anishinaabeg* (headmen) at the Fond du Lac Ojibwe community. The first chapter is devoted to a lengthy explication of the Ojibwe world view and its ramifications for the organization of all lifeways. Fundamental to this world view is the Ojibwe understanding of power, the means by which the people can live long lives without want or suffering (*minobimaadiziwin*). Power is the gift of the creator to the *manidoog*, persons-other-than-human on whom the Anishinaabeg depend for survival. Power is always in flux, flowing from those who have it to those in need; human beings demonstrate their association with powerful *manidoog* entities by their ability to care for others. This understanding of power organized Anishinaabe life as a series of interdependencies based on gift giving and reciprocity among real and fictive kin. It also organized political and religious leadership structures.

Miller identifies three overlapping forms of Anishinaabe leadership that served the three constituencies of adult society: women, young men (or warriors), and old men (or headmen or chiefs). The first of these are the *ogimaag* (singular *ogima*), or hereditary leaders, who are the subject of chapter two. Occupying a position that often passed from father to son, the *ogimaag* organized village life, settling use-rights inherent to the seasonal round of sugaring, planting, gathering, and hunting, and conducting diplomacy with other villages and people. Following Max Weber, Miller characterizes other leaders, treated in chapters three and four, as charismatic. *Mayosewininiwag*, or military leaders, tended to be young men, who achieved their position by demonstrating their power in warfare. *Gechi-midewijig* occupied the higher ranks of the *Midewiwin*, or Grand Medicine Society, to which most healers and other religious practitioners belonged. These three categories of leadership were not mutually exclusive, and they together created a politics of consensus with clear lines of authority. *Ogimaag* might first come to prominence as *mayosewininiwag*, and they were often also lower-ranked members of the *Midewiwin*. If they could not usually themselves become *ogimaag*, *mayosewininiwag* and *gechi-midewijig* nevertheless played essential roles in the conduct of village life. Women could number among these leaders, but Miller does not consider the extent to which they did so. The last substantive chapter of her book shows this leadership structure in action during an episode involving a missionary’s unauthorized attempt to build a house on Ojibwe land. The chapter depicts the emergence of a new *ogima* and provides a deep reading of the different village leaders’ cost-benefit analysis of the Reverend Ely’s presence in their midst. It is a persuasive demonstration of the power of Miller’s analysis to reshape how scholars understand

encounters between Anishinaabeg and Americans from the Anishinaabeg point of view.

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CRAIG THOMPSON FRIEND. *Kentucke's Frontiers*. (A History of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2010. Pp. xxiv, 369. \$34.95.

Craig Thompson Friend's book on the transformation of the trans-Appalachian frontier known as Kentucke into the state of Kentucky provides a detailed analysis of a narrow slice of time from the 1720s to the first decade of the nineteenth century. Opening with a brief discussion of the latest cultures of prehistory antecedent to the Native American tribes that settlers encountered, he situates readers in a chaotic, mutable world shaped by regional politics, shifting alliances, population displacement and redistribution through disease, warfare, and colonial pressure, and the rise of new but often uneasy economic relationships between colonial settlers and indigenous people. His first chapter chronicles the factors that transformed the Kentucke territory and the Ohio River Valley into a military frontier. In chapters two and three, he describes how the introduction of land-hungry settlers who began carving out tracts created a new imprint of ownership, which greatly disturbed the indigenous peoples who had long claimed the land for their own. As anti-imperialist sentiments and the Revolutionary War heated up, Kentucke became a place of increasing violence with a heightened racial atmosphere in which Indians were perceived as an external threat and enslaved people of color as a potential internal threat.

Acts of terrorism abounded on both sides, leaving a profound psychological impact on men, women, and children who felt beset by danger and either trapped inside their defensive forts and stations or exposed outside of them. In the midst of the perils of Indian attack, the settlers were frustrated by Virginia's inattention to their plight and their inability to crack open markets to the west because the Spanish prohibited navigation on the Mississippi River. As chapter five explains, political factions began to solidify as the hue and cry increased for the formation of a separate state. "Competing visions" in the 1790s led to a "multitude of expectations" (pp. 170–171), ranging from antislavery proponents fighting a losing battle against proslavery adherents and separatists who distrusted the federal government to supporters of continued union and disagreements over how to craft a mature, civilized social order in the new republic.

The final steps of the transformation of Kentucke to Kentucky, explicated in chapter six, came with the peace secured by the Treaty of Greenville and the establishment of Kentucky as the fourteenth state. The new state emphasized the empowerment of white men and the establishment of patriarchy at the expense of women and people of other races, enslaved or free. Contentious relations with the federal government over

excise taxes on whiskey, which could not be sold because of inaccessible markets, continued to plague the new commonwealth for a number of years. Ultimately, Friend contends in the seventh chapter, Kentucky made the choice to become southern by virtue of its adoption of slavery, the establishment of an agrarian economy with strong ties to the Deep South, adherence to largely Protestant Christian values, and embracing a lifestyle of gentility and refinement. The Indian threat faded, only to be replaced with the specter of slave rebellion. As time dimmed the intimate memory of frontier reality, white Kentuckians reimagined their frontier history as a heroic endeavor in a space contested between civilization and savagery, a contest in which they felt victory was preordained.

Friend's deft and fine-grained historical analysis utilizes a plethora of historical data intricately woven into a fascinating reconstruction of a world and a time that, in his view, inflicted "long-term consequences of fear and terror on the American mind and American culture" (p. 291) that resonate in our post-9/11 reality. I was particularly struck by his acknowledgment of the importance of a complex web of reactions influenced by race, age, and gender to frontier conditions. Much remains to be done concerning research on the experiences of women and children as well as the role of slavery in frontier contexts. While I could quibble over some of Friend's interpretations of specific evidence (his distinctions between Mississippian and Fort Ancient Culture, for example, or his characterization of Daniel Boone's long hunts as abandonment), these are minor disagreements and do not impinge on his reasoning or conclusions. He advances many thought-provoking ideas that should, and I hope will, spur other scholars to delve further into this foundational period in Kentucky and American history.

NANCY O'MALLEY
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GEORGE HARWOOD PHILLIPS. *Vineyards and Vaqueros: Indian Labor and the Economic Expansion of Southern California, 1771–1877*. (Before Gold: California under Spain and Mexico, number 1.) Norman, Okla.: Arthur H. Clark Company. 2010. Pp. 387. \$45.00.

George Harwood Phillips's book is a welcome and sophisticated addition to the literature on California history, and it follows a long line of significant contributions from this accomplished scholar. The book documents the experiences of Indian people in southern California, and specifically the Los Angeles region, from the earliest Spanish activities in 1771 to the formation of Indian reservations in 1877, after almost three decades of U.S. control in the area. The book does not focus primarily on settlers with Native Americans lingering as a side story, but rather emphasizes the fundamental role of indigenous peoples in the history of the region. Phillips makes that happen with a primary focus on labor as he follows Native Americans through various colonial and settler institutions such as mis-

sions, ranchos, the pueblo, and then the city itself. In fact, he makes it clear that Indian labor was fundamental to them all.

The author's goal is neither to document a history of victimization nor to recount a story of heroic Indian survival. Instead, Phillips focuses on the complexities of labor: how Native Americans engaged with it positively and negatively, how it was used and abused by those in economic and political power, how it laid a foundation for the development of Los Angeles, and how it contributed to the persistence of Indian people and culture in southern California. Understanding labor requires nuance, which Phillips offers by maneuvering between the historiographic poles of (as he terms them) defenders and denigrators, romanticists and realists, and Americanists and Hispanicists.

This focus on labor marks the major contribution of the book, as it not only recognizes a shared characteristic of these institutions and settlements but also highlights the fact that the primary relationship between "Indians and intruders" (to borrow a title phrase from one of Phillips's earlier books [1993]) revolved around labor. Phillips does a masterful job documenting these dimensions with both primary and secondary sources. As he reveals, the tenor, nature, opportunity, and severity of labor relations varied depending on several dimensions, such as whether one was a neophyte (mission convert) or an unconverted "gentile"; whether one labored as a *vaquero*, field hand, domestic servant, vineyard worker, skilled craftsman, etc.; whether one worked voluntarily or under coercion; and whether one toiled for soldiers, ranchero families, padres, or highest bidders in auctions to sell off the labor of incarcerated Indian people. Phillips makes one of his most important points when he articulates clearly that laboring in missions, pueblos, and ranchos did not translate directly into loss of Native culture (p. 323). Native Americans could add new labor practices (just as one can add new material culture) without necessarily counteracting or subtracting indigenous elements.

Phillips appropriately begins the book's core history by illuminating the cultural, economic, and labor patterns of southern California's Indian people—the Gabrielino/Tongva—to better understand their engagements with the colonial and settler labor relations they encountered. As he recognizes, though, his research does not translate into a "tribal history" per se, but rather forms an "Indian worker history." This is an important aspect to recognize and an important history to narrate. It is also critical, however, not to downplay the identity angle; at times these individuals likely saw themselves as workers, but perhaps at other times they may have seen their labor as something they did rather than who they were. For this reason, I would not quite support Phillips's assertion that "There is, however, a neutral term that fits all adult Indians—'workers'" (p. 329). The term does a good job of orienting analysis, but neutrality ends if it inappropriately homogenizes peoples and identities in terms of the economic context im-

posed upon them. This, though, is a research and political challenge all historians face.

My appreciation of this book as quality California and labor history should be apparent, but Phillips's study also offers a wealth of information for the allied disciplines of anthropology and archaeology. He makes explicit links across those disciplinary divides by drawing on pertinent archaeological and ethnographic work. I appreciated this multidisciplinary approach. I also found myself wondering about the archaeological potentials that might exist for the many specific locales in which he identifies Indian workers during the nineteenth century.

In sum, Phillips's book provides first-rate scholarship, a narrative accessible to academic and non-academic audiences, and a solid intervention in the understanding and conceptualization of both Native and colonial/settler histories in California. It should be required reading for California historians, labor historians, historical archaeologists, Native scholars, students, and the general public. Importantly, the book will go a long way toward further reestablishing California Indians in academic and popular histories that have often sidelined them and their labor.

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PAUL W. MAPP. *The Elusive West and the Contest for Empire, 1713–1763*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia. 2011. Pp. viii, 455. \$49.95.

Paul W. Mapp has taken a subject we think we know—imperial rivalry over access to the interior of North America—and shown not only how little *we* know but how little *anyone* in the eighteenth century knew. As Mapp reveals in this wide-ranging book, limited and/or erroneous perceptions of the geography and peoples of North America were particularly influential in shaping the behavior of European diplomats.

Central to Mapp's argument is the Spanish desire to protect both silver and territory. Anxiety about French ships in the Pacific during the War of the Spanish Succession led to a provision in the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht that forbade non-Spanish shipping in that ocean. Over the next several decades, the French and the British sought access to the Pacific, the French mainly across the interior of the continent and the British through Hudson's Bay to the north and Darien (Panama) to the south. Mapp's story climaxes with the seemingly erratic behavior of the Spanish during the Seven Years' War. Worried about aggressive French expansion in North America, sparked by the arrival of French traders Jean Chapuis and Louis Feuilli in New Mexico in 1752, as well as the suddenly ubiquitous British, especially the George Anson naval expedition in the Pacific (1740–1744), the Spanish were desperate to maintain a tripartite balance of power in North America. Fear of the

French led them to remain neutral throughout much of the war. Fear also led them to reject the French cession of Louisiana in 1761 and then turn around and accept it a year later, when it became clear that the French Empire in North America was at an end.

Lacking anything approaching reliable information about topography and distances, anxious Europeans were susceptible to all kinds of fantasies about their rivals. The appearance of a couple of French men in Santa Fe hardly constituted an incursion on the scale of Americans a century later. But it was enough to push nervous officials into dubious decisions. Far from masters of North America, Mapp's characters are at the mercy of rumors and speculation. Contingency conjoins with irony in a chilling portrait of immensely powerful men making decisions with consequences for millions of people like blind men groping in a dark room, startling at sudden noises, conjuring apocalyptic scenarios, thinking the worst because their brains do not have the information that might calm their emotions. Reason without evidence was reason unarmed against terror.

The most compelling parts of Mapp's book investigate why North America remained unknown to Europeans as late as the middle of the eighteenth century. Blending diplomatic, intellectual, cultural, and economic history, Mapp develops fascinating comparisons with European experience in other parts of the world. The Spanish and French were perfectly capable of acquiring solid information about the Incas and the Aztecs as well as the topography of Russia and China. Technique and instruments were not the problem in western North America, nor was the diversity of peoples and languages. The real dilemma lay in "an unfavorable ratio of possible rewards to manifest difficulties" (p. 43). In the interior of North America there were no established structures to facilitate the collection of data. Native peoples, moreover, were often untrustworthy sources, perhaps intentionally on some occasions, and probably because they themselves rarely traveled long distances. In the end, "the presence or absence of empire is a critical variable . . . Spanish and French experiences suggest that a relationship of co-operation or conquest—and conquest actually involved a good bit of cooperation—with an empire that had already or was currently engaged in investigating, organizing, and delineating space could make terrestrial reconnaissance much easier" (p. 257).

Deeply researched and carefully argued, this book succeeds in overcoming one of the major challenges of recent historiography: integrating multiple perspectives into a compelling narrative that favors no one viewpoint over the others. As comfortable with Spanish and French sources as he is with those in English and taking American Indians seriously as historical actors, Mapp patiently weaves a coherent argument out of bits of diplomatic, intellectual, and cultural history. Not surprisingly, given his familiarity with the human tendency for individuals to believe what they want to believe, Mapp approaches maps, published texts, and official correspondence cautiously. If he sometimes

engages in informed speculation, he rarely overargues his points. As important, he avoids a whiggish anticipation of the United States or any sense that the period he studies matters only because it eventually gave way to the American Revolution. Mapp's great contribution is his persuasive case for the significance of eighteenth-century North America on its own terms, as a vital dimension of global imperial history that was as much about the Pacific as the Atlantic, as much about China as Great Britain, and as much about desperation as design.

ANDREW CAYTON
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THOMAS S. KIDD. *God of Liberty: A Religious History of the American Revolution*. New York: Basic Books. 2010. Pp. vi, 298. \$26.95.

In 1966, Alan Heimert's *Religion and the American Mind: From the Great Awakening to the Revolution* challenged a longstanding consensus that liberal, Enlightenment thought inspired and guided eighteenth-century American revolutionaries. Instead, he argued, the impetus for revolution came from anti-authoritarian and visionary "evangelicals" with a millennial ideology and a vision of social equality. Edmund S. Morgan and Sidney E. Mead replied with dissenting reviews, and in 1970 Bernard Bailyn insisted that it was a "gross simplification to believe that religion as such, or any of its doctrinal elements, had a unique political role in the Revolutionary movement" ("Religion and Revolution: Three Biographical Studies," *Perspectives in American History* 4 [1970], p. 85). By 1976, however, Mark A. Noll, Harry S. Stout, Patricia U. Bonomi, and William G. McLoughlin, among others, had begun to advance subtle arguments linking religion to the American Revolution, even while Gordon S. Wood and Jon Butler continued to question its political force.

Thomas S. Kidd therefore ventures into a thicket when he argues for the "evangelical roots of Revolution" (p. 75). He does not follow Heimert in depicting liberals as self-satisfied defenders of the status quo, but he contends that the mobilization of "the people at large required a broader, [more] religiously urgent appeal" than rationalists could produce (p. 91). A consensus about religious liberty united rationalists and evangelicals and provided a "key to the success of the Revolution," but Kidd emphasizes the activities of the "evangelicals" (p. 6).

The argument begins with an assertion that five principles—religious disestablishment, belief in a creator God as the guarantor of human rights, and convictions about sin, virtue, and divine providence—united rationalists and evangelicals and encouraged American defiance. The sermons, apocalyptic sensibility, religious egalitarianism, and anti-Catholicism of the Great Awakening left a legacy that lingered in colonial culture, and the subsequent battle for religious liberty united evangelicals, liberals, and deists. Opposition to the appointment of an Anglican bishop and rage at the

1774 Quebec Act then undermined confidence in England's authority and king, so that by 1773, when battles over taxation and representation intensified, Americans were prepared to defy British administrators.

New awakenings in the 1760s reintroduced colonists to "evangelical ideas of resistance" (p. 81), and even rationalist agitators like Thomas Paine adopted a religious rhetoric. Great Britain became the Beast of the Apocalypse, and language employing this and other biblical themes mobilized resistance. Protestants, moreover, especially evangelicals, popularized an ideal of virtue that allied them with non-evangelical republicans, while the revolutionary armies attracted chaplains (mainly evangelical) who promoted religion and virtue among the soldiers while depicting the war as providential. In addition, a widespread conception of equality before God had powerful political and social consequences and fueled early opposition to slavery.

The evangelical-rationalist alliance, with evangelicals in the lead, disestablished the state churches. This led not to decline, as some had feared, but to revivals after 1775. In the battle over the Constitution, many evangelicals supported the Federalist option as well as the 1791 amendment that protected religious freedom while preventing the federal establishment of a specific denomination. (Kidd does not discuss the argument that the First Amendment was more general in scope.) While evangelicals divided over Thomas Jefferson's election nine years later, they liked it when he eschewed strict separation, accepting chaplains in Congress and the armies and allowing worship in federal government buildings.

Kidd is explicit about his larger cultural and political aims. In his epilogue, he asks secularists not to eliminate religious symbols and language from the political sphere, and he asks evangelicals to avoid a nationalist providential rhetoric, especially one that justifies war (for example, the "farce" [p. 252] of the defense of the Iraq war), to refrain from imposing their views through government institutions, and to work alongside people who do not share their religious commitments.

The book is well-researched and lucid, and a clear argument guides it. But who was an evangelical? Sometimes Kidd uses the term for revivalist groups, sometimes for opponents of religious establishments. But many clergy and laypersons who defended the Congregational establishments in Connecticut and Massachusetts saw themselves as proponents of "evangelical" doctrine, preaching, and piety. The term evangelical rarely functioned as a noun in the eighteenth century. In using it as a noun, Kidd follows a familiar historical convention—historians must categorize—but unless the aim is to link (diverse) eighteenth- and twenty-first-century "evangelicals," why not refer simply to denominational names or "Protestants" (some revivalist, some not), designations more common in the eighteenth century? And while the book is a "religious history," would not greater attention to liberal and Whig ideology and economic and demographic forces help us gauge the degree of religious influence? The American Revolu-

tion was not, after all, primarily about religion. Nonetheless, readers who want a guide to the revolutionary proclivities of eighteenth-century Protestants will find this book useful and deeply informative.

E. BROOKS HOLIFIELD
Emory University

BARBARA CLARK SMITH. *The Freedoms We Lost: Consent and Resistance in Revolutionary America*. New York: The New Press. 2010. Pp. xvi, 272. \$25.95.

Barbara Clark Smith has created a sophisticated new synthesis of the transformation of governance and consent in the American Revolution, challenging both popular notions and scholarly frameworks. This is an important book, which will be closely read, carefully considered, and widely debated.

Two approaches dominate the interpretation of the American Revolution in recent literature. Gordon S. Wood's colonials are a timid, deferential bunch, who burst through a republican moment to liberal democracy; T. H. Breen's revolutionaries—and Jon Butler's—are already liberal Americans, fulfilling their preordained destiny in an easy rejection of empire. In a sharp dissent, Smith restores George Rude? and E. P. Thompson (and a hint of the popular republican synthesis) to the American historiographical landscape. Smith's revolution was launched in a defense of the antique freedoms, freedoms that were lost—and replaced—as the revolution came to a close.

In her first two chapters, Smith describes the freedoms enjoyed, by white males, in eighteenth-century America. White men of all ranks acted in public to enact their collective self-governance, deploying "local knowledge" and "common judgment" on juries, witnessing the execution of power, and retaining the right to withhold consent in violent crowd action. Since sovereign power was exercised in the name of a distant monarch, colonial Americans were particularly free to resist, upholding their understanding of English liberties. That understanding included defiance of great men who might act to undermine the common good of the people and their households. Samuel Adams captured the essence of Smith's commonwealth "republican" understanding of a moral economy when he challenged efforts that would "put a whole Country in Two or Three people's pockets," and invoked James Harrington's "Agrarian Law" to protect the equality necessary for true liberty (pp. 81, 83, 84).

In her next two chapters, Smith rejects the model of an elite-led revolution. In her words, patriot resistance was "about the popular presence in execution of the law" (p. 87). The people's defense of traditional freedoms challenged gentry leadership and evolved directly into the agents of the revolution: the committees and conventions that protected the practices of American self-governance from British imperial reform. In particular, resistance targeted British efforts to subvert popular institutions' traditional surveillance of power, singling out those individuals taking oaths to act within

this reformed system. And the “Common Cause” of liberty required public sacrifice and cooperation, not liberal choice, manifested first in the non-consumption movement and then in public support for paper money.

Paper money is critical to Smith’s broader analysis. With its origins in colonial commonwealth expectations (pp. 77–80), government-backed paper currency emissions lay at the center of what Smith sees as the social contract uniting a “First Patriot Coalition” of 1774–1780. The common people would make sacrifices in the labor of revolution, while the gentry would sacrifice in its financial support. As she pointedly quotes Thomas Paine, “While the war was carried on by emissions . . . the poor were of equal use in government with the rich” (p. 181). In her trenchant interpretation, “the meaning of the money, as its value, thus rested on the highest Patriot authority: ‘common consent’” (p. 186).

The interpretive hinge to Smith’s book comes with the price-control crisis of 1778–1779 and the “Fort Wilson affair,” when armed violence broke out in Philadelphia between merchant gentry and common militiamen. From the early 1780s, a “Second Patriot Coalition” emerged, marginalizing the popular tradition of “common consent” and participatory governance, unifying moderate patriots—men of wealth and standing—and returning Tories into a common program of governance through finance capitalism. In states, and then the new nation, popular authority once exercised in defiance of alien monarchical power was reduced to the right to vote for a “government by the people” against which there would be no further recourse.

This book thus presents a challenging vision of the trajectory of the American Revolution, plumbing some wonderful, long-ignored materials. It is, however, not without some problems. As Smith herself admits, this is a book about the liberties of white men, generally if not exclusively propertied. Women appear in a supporting role occasionally; enslaved or free African Americans virtually never. Then, as do many books on the American Revolution, Smith focuses on northern states and New England, especially in her account of the revolutionary economy in chapter four. What is needed here is an explicit discussion of popular consent and governance in each of the regions, rather than an assumption that northern events can stand for the whole. And in skirting the revolutionary South, Smith has avoided both slavery and the extremely low rates of southern service in the Continental Army. When the next book covers this terrain, it will have to grapple with the ways in which the policing of slaves defined popular self-governance among white males in the revolutionary South.

JOHN L. BROOKE
Ohio State University

JOHN L. BROOKE. *Columbia Rising: Civil Life on the Upper Hudson from the Revolution to the Age of Jackson*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture. 2010. Pp. xiii, 629. \$45.00.

John L. Brooke’s new tome brilliantly demonstrates just how messy, chaotic, corrupt, dishonest, fragile, and contingent was the establishment of republican government and its attendant “public sphere” in the microcosmic universe of one Hudson River locale, Columbia County, New York. The experiences of that emerging county, in turn, shaped the cultural formation of Martin Van Buren, architect of what would one day be called Jacksonian Democracy, a cornerstone of the “rising” American regime of freedom. And while Brooke’s take on the revolutionary settlement in the Hudson Valley will bring little comfort to modern nation builders (they know about chaos already), it should be required reading for policymakers, generals, pundits, and wonks who today are so quick to compare the failings of others with a fictitious, triumphal American founding.

Ever since Lewis Namier published *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III* (1929), historians have known that a key to understanding eighteenth-century English politics lay in details of local connections among friends and family, patrons and clients: officers with hands on the levers of power. And for all its peculiarities, colonial politics bore a resemblance that has frustrated all who would read back into our revolutionary movement the kind of bipolar structural orientation that, since Andrew Jackson’s day, has defined the U.S. system. Most historians choose to fly over the formative period at a great altitude (confidently lecturing about Federalists and republicans) while others sink to their knees in local details of faction and intrigue that seem to defy categorization. Seldom have we managed to connect the two perspectives.

Now Brooke offers to map the emergence of a revolutionary settlement and the rise of legitimate structures of political affiliation, this time using “civil society” as the intermediate goo, the stuff from which habits, institutions, and expectations were molded and tempered until the newness wore off and the risk of regime change gradually receded. One sees in Columbia County all the perils of nation-building that so frustrate Western powers today: powerful old elites clinging to land and privilege; fiery revolutionaries desperate to install a new order; dispossessed crowds looking for private advantages; excluded groups begging admission; midwives in the form of newspaper editors, educators, commercial promoters, clergymen, lawyers, and clubmen; and, of course, assorted vultures hoping to rise on the turbulent updrafts. At one level Brooke’s story cannot be other than local history, with a cast of characters so numerous that a roster of players appended at the back proves essential. At another level Brooke tries to show readers the way from the “crisis politics” of the immediate postwar era toward a “routine politics” that could contain conflict without the threat of renewed catastrophic upheaval—a story that introduces us to dozens of clubs, prints, and organizations that eventually would constitute a modern civil society. Finally, Brooke wants to explain what made Van Buren believe and behave the way he did by the time of the Jackson presidency.

The founders' concept of popular sovereignty posited a government based on "the people" unmediated by class, dependency, or subordinate affiliation, but such a people proved illusory. In practice, political parties emerged as a necessary medium of negotiation between the governors and the governed—but so too did many other forms of civil society and association. All of them began as illegitimate, extraconstitutional, "self-created" societies engaged in a grand struggle to organize the people, to give them voice and hands to seize the reins of government. According to Brooke, Van Buren saw his Democratic Party not as one among many associations, but as the one legitimate intermediate association, desperate to disable competing institutions before they seized power and subverted the people's will forever. Because he experienced the construction of a political settlement and civil society in a locale where the fight was bitter, the stakes especially high, Van Buren carried to the end of his life a fear of rival authorities that gave his partisan rhetoric a peculiar bite—an urge to delegitimize the opposition—that left an indelible stamp on U.S. politics.

No short review does justice to a 600-page work. This book is an important contribution to our ongoing effort to understand nation-building at the turn of the eighteenth century. It offers crucial lessons for the present as well.

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DAVID JAFFEE. *A New Nation of Goods: The Material Culture of Early America*. (Early American Studies.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2010. Pp. xv, 400. \$45.00.

This physically beautiful book, with the gorgeous *Girl in Red Dress with Cat and Dog* gracing its cover, glossy pages, and dozens of handsome illustrations in both black and white and color, makes a powerful statement about material culture in its own right before one reads a single word of text. But to ignore that fulsome text with its sweeping synthesis and challenging argument would be a serious mistake. David Jaffee's interdisciplinary interrogation of American material culture from the 1790s to the 1850s makes an important contribution to the history of the market, consumer culture, and industrialization in nineteenth-century America.

To understand "the cultural work of nation-building" (p. xii), Jaffee insists that his readers look to the provincial artisans in the rural towns, villages, and river valleys of New England—not to the master craftsmen and merchants of New York City or the shoe and textile manufacturers of Lynn and Lowell—to trace the transformations in production, distribution, marketing, and consumption that collectively came to constitute the market revolution. In a series of case studies of ambitious artisan-entrepreneurs in four crafts (portrait painting, chairmaking, clockmaking, and book production and printing), Jaffee explains how new generations

of men and women took luxury goods and, by incorporating economies of scale, utilizing standardized parts, and altering divisions of labor, transformed them into mass-produced objects. Innovation was the name of the game; the reduction of grandfather clocks to mantel size offers just one example of how ensuring ease of transport and lower costs generated new patterns of consumption in far-flung communities where itinerant peddlers persuaded rural people they needed the latest goods more than simple necessities.

What is so striking about these rural artisan-entrepreneurs is the speed with which they assumed cultural authority within their region. Rather than recognizing themselves as the children of the Enlightenment like their revolutionary-age progenitors, they redefined status through their new business pursuits and their new educations in the fast developing local press, lyceums, libraries, clubs, and schools. The world of change that Jaffee paints is inexorable, harmonious, and generally meritocratic. Even the risk-takers who failed in this changing economic landscape, he suggests, accepted this newly emergent middle-class society's tenets where "cosmopolitan communities" were forged out of regional self-improvement cultures. Central to this transformation was the spread of literacy and the accessibility of print culture via a new provincial press. Jaffee suggests that in the process this two-fold democratization of commercial expansion and cultural transmission generated an enthusiastic backcountry nationalism.

By the 1840s, more and more of these artisan-entrepreneurs found themselves at the mercy of economic panics and recessions, technological transformations like steam power and mechanization that left many of them behind, and manufactories and internal improvements that undermined their market. The window of opportunity in the rural village communities where industrial transformation began, Jaffee argues, closed sharply on the subsequent generation. On the eve of the Civil War and thereafter, urban manufacturers reaped the rewards of innovations that village communities had sown, including streamlined production, improved marketing methods, deeper networks of distribution, and broader patterns of mass consumption.

Jaffee's interdisciplinary approach and prosopographical methodology serve his argument well. The depth of his knowledge of the four crafts he highlights is laudatory. His inventive reading of sources, including his ability to cross-examine material objects in multiple contextual lights, deserves emulation. His argument resets understandings of the origins of industrial development. But the book also invites further questions and new investigations. Jaffee's subjects wholeheartedly embraced Benjamin Franklin's insistence on the rewards to be secured through ambition, a driving work ethic, and innovation. Missing from Jaffee's analysis are the poorer sorts who lacked the education and the opportunity to take advantage of "the Village Enlightenment." How did the changes taking place in the workshop and in the division of labor reframe their social, cultural, and economic relationships? Jaffee's argu-

ment also presumes that the cultural transformation that spawned the market revolution was a decidedly New England phenomenon pressed south and westward in search of new mass markets. But was that the case? What was the role of changing cultural authority in the emergence of new patterns of production in the rural trade towns of the upper South, the growth of entrepôts that served the newest planter communities in the deep South, or the mushrooming of rural villages across the Ohio River Valley? To what extent did a slave society alter the trajectory of mass consumption unleashed in rural New England, and what new forms of production and marketing developed in their place? Jaffee's exhaustive work invites further investigations into how the processes he has documented in New England took shape elsewhere and in what ways they influenced these more familiar market forces.

MICHELE GILLESPIE
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WENDY BELLION. *Citizen Spectator: Art, Illusion, and Visual Perception in Early National America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia. 2011. Pp. xviii, 351. \$45.00.

Wendy Bellion's new book studies the political valences of vision as they were mediated by the cultural forms of illusion in early America. Bellion, an art historian, contends that the dialectical nature of visual perception—its capacity for judgment and susceptibility to deception—was a central political and cultural concern for postrevolutionary Americans. Her book traces the development of an early national culture of illusion across a remarkably diverse range of optical devices, trompe l'oeil pictures, and popular spectacles of deception that, Bellion claims, resonated with, contradicted, and at times parodied republican political desires for rational discernment. Chapter one examines how early nineteenth-century Philadelphia's eclectic material culture of optical illusions—its solar microscopes, camera obscuras, magic lanterns, phantasmagoria, peep shows, and cosmoramas—transformed everyday taverns, parlors, and assembly rooms into theaters of visuality. Where the first two chapters demonstrate how some cultural forms of illusion, such as Charles Willson Peale's 1795 trompe l'oeil painting *The Staircase Group*, idealized visibility as a condition of republican order and close looking as the duty of virtuous citizens, chapters three and four consider how other artifacts—such as the landscapes of William and Thomas Birch and the trompe l'oeil drawings of Samuel Lewis—challenged these notions by emphasizing the embodied and contingent nature of vision. In chapter three, for example, Bellion provocatively reads the Birches' *Views* of Philadelphia (1798–1800) not as an objective document of what the city looked like, but as a subjective record of how the city was looked at. The Birches' unsuccessful attempts at rendering perspectival space are not representational failures for Bellion so much as “a way of

seeing and knowing incumbent upon the observer's corporeal situation in the environs of a specific place” (p. 122). As a result, the *Views* signal a new order of representation that prized the subjective experience of looking over an ideal system of depiction.

The book closes with two chapters documenting how the audience for and the model of looking generated by the cultural forms of illusion would continue to evolve over the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Chapter five examines how the most popular illusionistic spectacle of the era—the Invisible Lady—exposed the gendered terms of early national ideologies of vision. While the scrutiny produced by the Invisible Lady's bewildered viewers was ultimately a faculty attained at the expense of women's vision, its active and incisive mode of looking, Bellion contends, stands in contrast to the more passive models of spectatorship generated by rival forms of visual illusion (such as the panorama). The tension between these competing modes of discernment and their respective active and passive, near and far practices of looking, Bellion suggests, would continue to characterize cultural forms of illusion for years to come. The book's final chapter finds illusionistic paintings such as François-Marius Granet's *Choir of the Capuchin Church in Rome* (1814–1815), Rembrandt Peale's *Patriae Pater* (1824), and Raphaëlle Peale's *Venus Rising from the Sea—A Deception* (c. 1822) indicative of a more general transformation in the cultural history of illusion in early America, one in which the spectator's self-awareness of looking has been replaced by her deep immersion in a picture somehow insulated from the profound political, social, and economic changes of the 1820s.

The evidence used to support some of Bellion's larger claims, particularly those pertaining to the political inflection and national scope of the kinds of looking elicited by illusionistic objects, may not satisfy every reader. The author is the first to admit this limitation, conceding that her study focuses primarily on Philadelphia and that “evidence of actual spectators' encounters with objects of illusion” is slim (p. 21). Yet, this point of criticism should not diminish the book's many accomplishments. It is a welcome addition to a growing body of scholarship exploring the relationship between politics and early American material and visual culture. With its careful contextualization and detailed, historical analysis of the cultural forms of illusion, this book firmly locates its discussion of early national visuality within the cultural practices of everyday life and thus makes a substantial contribution to the empirical history of spectatorship in the United States. Bellion's wide-ranging account of the development of a self-conscious, active, and embodied mode of looking—one actively engaging both eyes of the spectator and well in place prior to 1830—will also prompt readers to reconsider the extent to which early nineteenth-century visual culture was dominated by the camera obscura and its passive and incarnate model of observation.

CHRISTOPHER J. LUKASIK
Purdue University

SAM W. HAYNES. *Unfinished Revolution: The Early American Republic in a British World*. (Jeffersonian America.) Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. 2010. Pp. x, 378. \$29.95.

In this fresh new treatment of the early U.S. republic after the War of 1812, Sam W. Haynes argues that the next thirty years “would find Americans more preoccupied with who they were, as a nation and a people, than at any other time in their history” (p. 22). Why? Because the patriotic fervor that followed the Treaty of Ghent—conventionally identified as the moment when the United States assumed a newfound sense of nationhood, and Americans for the first time began to see themselves and behave like a continental power—actually deepened the nation’s consciousness that it remained a cultural and economic satellite to Britain. According to Haynes, Americans emerged from their second war of independence more aware than ever of incomplete separation from their parent country.

It is not news that Americans remained unduly preoccupied by their former mother country during the second quarter of the nineteenth century, a conflicted fascination described by one bemused British visitor as hovering between anglomania and anglophobia. Nor is it news that leading Americans in the period before the Civil War were anxious to see the new nation complete its transition from a colonial to an independent economy, or that the diplomatic and military successes of the years surrounding the war with Mexico—the end of Haynes’s period—ushered in a new era of national self-confidence and a greater willingness to recast Britain as an equal.

What is new is Haynes’s argument that the colonial orientation of Americans, “the transatlantic axis” of pre-independence, persisted for decades after 1815 rather than being put to rest by a successful outcome in the second round of Anglo-American conflict (p. 10). Americans during this period were still driven by perceived external threats from a British superpower rather than becoming the “arbiters of their own destiny” (p. 2). As a result, the strenuous process of identity formation that took place over the next thirty years inevitably focused on Britain. “Like many societies that would emerge from long periods of colonial rule,” Haynes writes, “the American republic harbored an innate distrust of any policy associated with the imperial parent” (p. 174). And such policies were not hard to find, because whether real or imagined, Britain’s influence was felt in each of the many tensions that were embedded in life in the United States.

In a wide-ranging, readable, and impressive volume, Haynes looks at how anglophobia permeated debates on every important issue of the period: cultural life, commerce and banking, the political controversies of the second party system, the Bank War, slavery and abolition, sectional conflict, westward expansion. In three particularly engaging early chapters, Haynes describes how Britain cast its gigantic shadow over the new nation’s cultural development, not only its emerging lit-

erature and performing arts, but also American domestic manners, which were widely pilloried in British travel literature to the intense discomfort of the nation. Viewing the entire period through the lens of anglophobia, Haynes draws imaginative connections. His astute treatment of Andrew Jackson’s charismatic appeal in chapters on party politics and political economy demonstrates that Old Hickory’s “paranoid” detection of British influence among the stockholders of the Bank of the United States, in Mexican-held Texas, and among the Indian tribes east of the Mississippi struck a deep chord in a young nation whose “sense of precariousness” is no longer easily recovered by modern Americans (p. 117). The fears of encirclement that pervaded U.S. analysis of British intentions in the West distinctly echo the defensive mentality of colonial Americans toward the French at the outset of the Seven Years’ War. The pressure on public figures like John Quincy Adams to distance themselves from their English associations dovetails neatly with earlier discussion of the emergence of the effete English aristocrat as a stock burlesque stage type in a national culture that was rapidly becoming more democratic and aggressively recasting as foreign elite cultural forms that had persisted since independence. By the 1850s, Haynes argues, Americans had finally shaken off their obsession with their former imperial metropole only to be confronted with the fact that the serious issues dividing the nation could no longer be projected onto a foreign scapegoat.

Haynes argues convincingly that the early United States had much in common with other developing nations emerging from colonial rule, but he does not offer explicit comparisons. Perhaps that is a subject for another book, but such comparisons would enrich his picture of a fledgling nation gripped by a compulsive process of identity formation, reminding readers that the American Revolution was unusual among colonial rebellions in that it began without independence as its goal. U.S. nationalism was not a cause but a consequence of the war. Contemporary British observers often commented that the American colonies had achieved nationhood prematurely; James Fenimore Cooper was irritated to meet people in London who still believed the new United States would soon break apart. This skepticism was unconsciously echoed across the Atlantic during the long goodbye portrayed in Haynes’s book.

JULIE FLAVELL
Independent Scholar

GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE. *A Slaveholders’ Union: Slavery, Politics, and the Constitution in the Early American Republic*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2010. Pp. 391. \$39.00.

We live in the era of constitutional originalism, begun by Ronald Reagan’s “strict constructionist” Justice Department to restrain liberal judicial activism and more recently refurbished (“New Originalism”) by—among others—the Federalist Society to grant conservatives a

judicial activism of their own. To establish beyond doubt the text at issue, "the Constitution as understood by those who wrote it and their contemporaries" (Charles Krauthammer, *Washington Post*, January 7, 2011), the House of Representatives began the 112th Congress by reading it aloud. Most of it. No three fifths clause. No fugitive clause.

To be a serious juridical hermeneutics, originalism must grapple with the scholarship of George William Van Cleve and others—Robin L. Einhorn, Mark A. Graber, David Waldstreicher—who in the last five years have brought us serial accounts of the Constitution's original meaning: a pact between sections that created a slaveholder's union and then for the better part of a century protected an expansive slave economy from the possibility of government intrusion. Van Cleve's book is the most comprehensive and, as such, the most convincing. Calmly and remorselessly, Van Cleve eviscerates the long-ascendant "ideological" account of the making of the American Republic (in the index of which slavery does not appear) not by frontal attack, but rather by painstaking demonstration of the sheer implausibility of any account of "the actual political and legal accommodations made to create and expand the Republic" (p. 5) that is *not* centered on the problem of slavery.

A problem it was. Demographically dynamic, the slave economy grew rapidly both in size and territorial extent throughout the founding era. The American Revolution had meant no inevitable extinction of slavery; indeed "as a political institution" (p. 7) slavery grew stronger, comprehensively secured by the Articles of Confederation. Northern gradual abolition conveyed no northern commitment to general abolition; what the sections jockeyed over in Philadelphia was the distribution of power within their new federal union, the weighting of representation and accommodation of comparative economic advantage. In all respects the political economy of slavery was carefully protected: by the three fifths clause, which approximated and provided representation for property in slaves (p. 117); by the fugitive clause; and by preservation of the prior Confederation's "legal status quo ante on slavery," measures collectively guaranteeing the slave economy the opportunity "to expand for at least an entire generation" after the Constitution's adoption (p. 9).

Expand it did, first into the Southwest territory and subsequently into the vast Louisiana territory. Throughout the republic's first thirty years, each section concentrated on preserving opportunities to migrate its political economy westward without disturbing the sectional balance hammered out in Philadelphia. Missouri shattered this accommodation. Standing north of the Ohio River line, Missouri's admission as a slave state, Van Cleve argues, was no ideological dispute over slavery but "the first 'free labor, free land' conflict over sectional expansion" (p. 10). A dispute neither side wished to see resolved by constitutional "rule of law" means, the Missouri conflict brought forth

a new union so far as slavery was concerned, a purely political bisectional balance of forces.

This book is not a complete history of the law and politics of slavery in the early republic. It does not delve into state-level slave law or labor systems or provide a detailed account of race relations. Rather, in Van Cleve's words, "it combines evidence drawn from public law and the history of a series of pivotal moments in slavery's evolution"—slavery in the British Empire and Lord Mansfield's *Somerset* decision (1772), revolution and confederation, the Philadelphia convention, abolition debates north and south, westward movement, the Missouri crisis—"to provide a better integrated account of slavery's relation to politics and law in the early Republic" (p. 3). Though readers will find new and important perspectives on the activities of familiar figures, such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, Van Cleve's aim is analysis and explanation at the most general level that his extremely thorough and persistent empirical research can support. His central concern is to show how thoroughly the republic's fundamental law simultaneously protected slave property and translated it into political power. The results are highly convincing.

This study carries considerable authority. It is the product of a mature and highly disciplined intellect, honed by thirty years of legal practice. A graceful writer and careful scholar, Van Cleve is at once dispassionate, seeking no more than "the truth of things done" and profoundly committed to history as civic education. His book arrives at an important moment. Living in an originalist age, we currently find ourselves surrounded by the noises of an originalist politics, a "constitutionalism," in Krauthammer's description, which "bases its call for minimalist government . . . in the words and meaning of the Constitution." Well and good. Let us, however, ensure that we have a complete understanding of that text's words and the reasons for its minimalist government. Let us not cut and paste our text to obscure its original intent.

CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS
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W. JASON WALLACE. *Catholics, Slaveholders, and the Dilemma of American Evangelicalism, 1835–1860*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. 2010. Pp. ix, 200. \$30.00.

The premise of W. Jason Wallace's book is that an intriguing triangle of recrimination was established in the antebellum United States when northern abolitionists' critiques of southern slaveholders began to sound increasingly like their denunciations of America's growing population of Roman Catholics. The abolitionists decried not just what they saw as inherent tyranny (masters over slaves, hierarchs over the faithful) but also the gross incompatibility of both slavery and Catholicism with American democratic ideals. Catholic bishops and defenders of the South's peculiar institution

replied in similar terms, claiming that the abolitionists threatened both orthodox Christianity and political stability.

If this book does not fully exploit the potential of its premise, it nonetheless offers solid insights about its three antagonists. Wallace nuances the complaints of abolitionists against slaveholders by noting that authors like Francis Wayland of Brown University advocated for both democratic liberty and moral coercion enforcing traditional Protestant ethics. His treatment of northern anti-Catholics highlights the general polemics of Samuel F. B. Morse (*Foreign Conspiracy against the Liberties of the United States* [1835]; *Imminent Dangers to the Free Institutions of the United States through Foreign Immigration* [1835]) and Lyman Beecher (*A Plea for the West* [1835]) as well as the abolitionists' frequent use of medieval history to document papal tyranny. In their historical polemics, abolitionist evangelicals devoted much attention to Pope Gregory VII's eleventh-century excommunication of Emperor Henry IV, they seem rarely to have mentioned the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre of 1572, and they saw Europe's 1848 revolutions as anticipating the demise of the papacy.

A chapter on southern Protestant defenders of slavery rehearses the well-known defense of "republican freedom" originally articulated by the likes of John C. Calhoun and powerfully interpreted in recent studies by Eugene D. Genovese and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese. It also shows that a few southerners, like William Brownlow of Tennessee, could be as vituperative as his northern counterparts in chastising Catholics and Democrats as irremediably despotic. Yet even as they continued to insist on the superiority of Protestantism to Catholicism, most southern evangelicals were somewhat muted in their criticism of all things Catholic. Wallace also records that the American (or Know-Nothing) Party made some progress in the South, but without the intense anti-Catholic animus that drove its northern development.

Wallace's chapter on Catholic responses to the charges of northern evangelicals is the book's strongest. It shows how Bishops John England of Charleston, Francis Kenrick of Baltimore, and John Martin Spaulding of Louisville and later Baltimore offered extensive refutations of Protestant interpretations of Catholic history, even as they defended the compatibility of their faith with the American separation of church and state and the institutions of a democratic republic. The highlight of this argumentation was Bishop England's clever defense of Gregory VII's deposition of Henry IV. According to England, once one realizes that the pope was defending the people of the Holy Roman Empire against their monarch's unjust usurpation of power, the pope's actions could be praised as a defense of freedom similar to the actions of American patriots who threw off the yoke of British tyranny. England thus turned into knots the standard argument of northern abolitionists that the American Revolution established principles of freedom that all Catholic history contradicted.

The book would have been stronger if more attention

had been paid to actors at the time who commented on the parallels that Wallace perceives between northern antislavery and northern anti-Catholicism. The author might have explored how the arguments of the three polemical factions were affected by considerations of race and by the role of the Democratic Party as the political home of most slaveholders and most Catholics. Comparisons from the era's public Catholic-Protestant debates might also have been instructive. For example, were there differences in tone or substance between the mid-state confrontation of Alexander Campbell of the Christian Church and Bishop John B. Purcell of Cincinnati (published in 1837 as *A Debate on the Roman Catholic Religion*) and the northern clash between Presbyterian John Breckinridge and Bishop John Hughes of New York (*Controversy . . . Relative to the Existing Differences in the Roman Catholic and Protestant Religions* [1833])? In addition, while the book is solid on American Protestant interpretations of the Catholic Middle Ages, it does not discuss what the same Protestants thought about the anti-liberal pronouncements of Popes Gregory XVI and Pius IX. Finally, some use of the best conceptual study of the long Catholic history of wrestling with slavery (John T. Noonan, Jr., *A Church That Can and Cannot Change: The Development of Catholic Moral Teaching* [2005]) and the best monograph on many of the issues treated in this book (Michael Hochgeschwender, *Wahrheit, Einheit, Ordnung: Die Sklavenfrage und der Amerikanische Katholizismus, 1835–1870* [2006]) would have strengthened Wallace's analysis.

MARK A. NOLL

University of Notre Dame

MARGARET ABRUZZO. *Polemical Pain: Slavery, Cruelty, and the Rise of Humanitarianism*. (New Studies in American Intellectual and Cultural History.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2011. Pp. 330. \$55.00.

Margaret Abruzzo focuses on antebellum debates over the institution of slavery to illuminate how malleable and contested were notions of humanitarianism in the early republic. She begins her study by exploring the emergence of several strands of humanitarian reform in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Both Quaker leaders and Scottish moral philosophers, argues Abruzzo, drew on changing ideas about God, benevolence, sympathy, and suffering to excoriate the practice of slavery. The author, however, is quick to note the limits of this antislavery movement. Late eighteenth-century critics of slavery generally cared more about how this institution corrupted slaveholders than how it hurt slaves.

Abruzzo views the 1830s as a turning point in Americans' evolving conceptions of humaneness and enslavement. She discusses how white abolitionists increasingly focused on the sufferings of slaves and urged their countrymen to eradicate slavery rather than merely pity its victims. The author offers a brief yet insightful dis-

cussion of how abolitionists used slave narratives and photography to mobilize public opinion against the "peculiar institution." She also explores a broad range of antislavery critics, including John Woolman, Theodore Dwight Weld, and Harriet Beecher Stowe.

Abruzzo discusses the abolitionist crusade in a richly layered analysis. Yet what makes this book especially innovative is the author's discussion of how humanitarianism undercut efforts to end slavery and to grant African Americans basic civil rights. Abruzzo first addresses this issue when she examines how colonizationists denied slaves a sense of agency by portraying them as passive sufferers. A "rhetoric of victimhood" made it easier to argue that there was no place for freed blacks in the United States and that the only humane alternative to slavery was the emigration of former slaves to Africa. Colonizationists' emphasis on the cruelty of the slave trade, cogently argues Abruzzo, elided whites' responsibility for the persistence of slavery. It also made slaveholders appear as humane people who merely inherited an evil institution.

Abruzzo's monograph is especially compelling when it investigates the proslavery polemicists who invoked humanitarian ideals to defend slavery during the 1830–1860 period. The author discusses not only notable apologists for slavery such as George Fitzhugh and James Henry Hammond but also lesser-known figures, including southern student activists at Princeton University. She details how these polemicists turned the tables on abolitionists by depicting slavery as a benevolent institution, one that allegedly provided the enslaved with material comforts, necessary labor, and Christian values. Notions of humanitarianism were so fluid and capacious, argues Abruzzo, that proslavery writers even defended whipping as a relatively benign and essential form of discipline, especially when used in moderation on unruly slaves. By the 1850s scientific racism with its claims that Africans were naturally suited for enslavement bolstered polemicists' defense of slavery as humane.

As she explores the sectional politicization of ideas about the cruelty of slavery, Abruzzo conveys how pro and antislavery writers invoked shared humanitarian values to defend their respective positions. She also examines divisions within each camp. The author discusses, for example, how members of a radical wing of the proslavery movement in the 1850s provoked dissension in their ranks when they defended the African slave trade, a practice long denounced as cruel by both northerners and southerners. Abruzzo also explores disagreements within the abolitionist camp. She notes, for example, how some antislavery writers feared that emphasizing the physical cruelties of slavery would obscure how this system stripped all slaves, even those relatively well treated, of their most basic human rights and dignity. Some abolitionists called for publicizing a basic theme: "slavery's true horror lay in 'its death-stab into the soul of the slave'" (p. 152).

Abruzzo's text shows that ultimately humanitarianism had multiple, contradictory meanings in antebel-

lum America. While documenting this theme, Abruzzo examines what she calls the "geography of suffering." Many white northerners, she stresses, avoided confronting their complicity in the slave system and their failure to tackle racism in their own communities by focusing on the sufferings of slaves in the South or West Indies.

In her epilogue Abruzzo suggests how sectional differences over the humaneness of emancipation polarized northerners and southerners during the post-Civil War era. While many northerners heralded the end of slavery as a triumph for human progress, former slaveholders denounced emancipation as cruel. They claimed that blacks endured misery when no longer protected by their former masters. Of course such arguments rested on an idealized view of slavery. They also masked the terrorism and exploitation newly freed African Americans suffered at the hands of southern whites.

Abruzzo's book is an important work of scholarship, especially for those interested in the history of slavery or humanitarian reform. Discussion in the endnotes of the historiographies of pain, sympathy, and slavery adds to its value.

MYRA C. GLENN
Elmira College

STEVEN LUBET. *Fugitive Justice: Runaways, Rescuers, and Slavery on Trial*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2010. Pp. 367. \$29.95.

Steven Lubet has produced a well-written narrative about the fugitive slave trials of the 1850s that arose out of the Christina slave riot in Pennsylvania, the rendition of Anthony Burns in Boston, and the rescue of John Price in Oberlin, Ohio. Historiographically, the book seems a bit dated. Lubet shows little interest in following the example of H. Robert Baker, who in *The Rescue of Joshua Glover: A Fugitive Slave, the Constitution, and the Coming of the Civil War* (2006) used a fugitive slave trial to explore the workings of popular constitutionalism in the antebellum period. Rather, Lubet challenges Stanley W. Campbell's decades-old argument that the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was routinely enforced and that historians had overestimated its role in the escalating sectional crisis (*The Slave Catchers: Enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law* [1970]). Although he acknowledges that most fugitive slave cases passed without incident, especially in the years before 1854, Lubet portrays the cases he studies as significant parts of the sectional conflict.

Lubet's interest centers on using court records to explore the way in which trial lawyers challenged a hostile federal legal system by defending the actions of runaway slaves in a manner that stayed within the bounds of public opinion. His argument is straightforward: individual African Americans, through a combination of their decisions to abscond from slavery or to help others do so and the misfortune of their getting captured, found in their trials "highly visible political platforms"

from which to denounce slavery. Their efforts over the course of the 1850s helped intensify the sectional conflict and led the country closer to civil war (p. 2). Shifting public opinion, moreover, enabled trial lawyers to move from narrow challenges regarding the law's application to complete denunciations of the act as the 1850s progressed.

Lawyers defending Castner Hanway, the only person to stand trial of the forty-one people indicted for treason in the wake of the 1851 Christina riot, took a narrow approach. The riot had enabled a Maryland runaway, William Parker, to flee to Canada while leaving a Maryland slaveowner dead and two of his associates seriously wounded. Facing an administration determined to enforce the recently passed Fugitive Slave Law, a hostile court, and cool public opinion, Hanway's counsel accepted the law as legitimate and focused on demonstrating that the facts did not support the case against their client. Arguments that the Fugitive Slave Law violated a higher law than the Constitution were available to Hanway's lawyers, but they consciously eschewed them. One of his attorneys, Thaddeus Stevens, even declined to address the jury because of his well-known abolitionist leanings.

By 1854, however, some trial lawyers proved more willing to mount a direct assault on the act. Defenders of Anthony Burns, a runaway from Virginia apprehended in Boston, did not challenge the act's legitimacy, but they did urge the court to yield to public opinion and interpret the law in a manner that would effectively nullify the statute. Judge Edward Greely Loring refused, and Burns was escorted by a contingent of armed men to a ship bound for Virginia. Loring then faced the wrath of public opinion, losing his teaching post at Harvard and eventually his judicial position.

By 1858, the sectional crisis had escalated to such a level that trial lawyers could flatly denounce the Fugitive Slave Law in open court. Thus, when thirty-seven people from Oberlin faced indictment for their successful effort to rescue John Price, a runaway from Kentucky, lawyers in the case drew on higher law principles, proudly defended their clients' open defiance of the law, and invited the judge and jury to reject the law. As in Boston, these lawyers worked against a backdrop of favorable public opinion, which enabled them to take a more confrontational stance against the Fugitive Slave Law, and the resulting tension contributed to the coming of the Civil War.

Lubet's chronological progression might not withstand close scrutiny. His strongest examples of opposition to the Fugitive Slave Law come from places like Boston and Oberlin—both locales that exhibited levels of sympathy toward African Americans that were hardly typical of the antebellum North. Lubet's entire account may in fact be more a matter of geography than chronology. Aside from this shortcoming and its lack of historiographical ambition, his book provides a good introduction to some of the most sensational trials of the 1850s. Specialists will find little here that is new, but

I would recommend it to non-specialists without reservation.

AUSTIN ALLEN

University of Houston–Downtown

DAVID GOLDFIELD. *America Aflame: How the Civil War Created a Nation*. New York: Bloomsbury Press. 2011. Pp. 632. \$35.00.

One paragraph into the introduction and David Goldfield's thesis is clear: "The Civil War was both the completion of the American Revolution and the beginning of a modern nation . . . The Civil War is also America's greatest failure." The cause of this failure follows immediately: "The political system could not contain the passions stoked by the infusion of evangelical Christianity into the political process" (p. 1). Goldfield here takes an old thesis identified most famously with Avery O. Craven, that the Civil War was a "needless blood-bath," and infuses it with a new cast of characters led not by bumbling politicians but by evangelical Protestant Christians.

Unlike many recent religious histories of the Civil War, Goldfield's recognition of the religious factor in hyping patriotic gore brings with it an unconcealed contempt for all things evangelical, at least in the North. Thus, for example, in looking at northern antislavery and abolitionist rhetoric, he blasts a peculiar northern evangelical "immersion" in bigotry that is utterly reprehensible because of "the blindness of self-righteousness, its certitude, and its lack of humility to understand those who disagree" (p. 3), even as he recognizes the evil of the "peculiar institution." Incredibly Goldfield distances southern evangelicals from this characterization. They were not bigots, and they did not harbor ill feelings toward Catholics and immigrants (p. 5). Yet even a cursory reading of Confederate sermons reveals a mentality equally anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant (as well as anti-Mormon, anti-spiritualist, anti-Transcendentalist, anti-Liberal, and more).

Judged as a military history of the Civil War and political history of Reconstruction, Goldfield's book offers a reliable account grounded solidly in the secondary literature, including his own. But judged as religious history, this monograph must be accounted a failure. It is clear that Goldfield detests northern evangelicals so much that he does not really care to engage them on their own terms as he does so many other commentators (Walt Whitman comes especially to mind, along with Harriet Beecher Stowe, Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, and Alexander Stephens). As political actors, evangelicals "infiltrate and influence the political process" in a "toxic" process not unlike insurgents bent on sowing mayhem and destruction everywhere (p. 3). Goldfield has clearly not mined the primary sources of evangelical Protestantism in any depth, preferring instead copious quotations from secondary sources. (This is not to say his quotations are not fully and reliably cited.)

Goldfield acknowledges that the South became side-

lined in the aftermath of the Civil War, but he does not always recognize ways in which this book contributes to the South's marginalization. His characterizations of "American" culture, moving away from evangelical religion to science and Charles Darwin, are really characterizations of northern liberal Protestant culture, a minority Christian cohort even in the North. Left out of the picture is southern American culture where evangelical religion entered an explosive area of growth after the Civil War (identified closely with the Lost Cause) that has continued stridently down to the present.

Goldfield assumes that the meaning and nature of evangelicalism is so self-evident that he needs offer no definition. But one wonders if this is because Goldfield himself cannot provide one. The individuals that fall under his evangelical umbrella include a weird mélange of characters who were often anything but evangelical. Incredibly, the Transcendentalist and Unitarian minister Theodore Parker, is identified as part of "the evangelical Christian community" (p. 47).

Once Goldfield gets over his animus for northern evangelicals in the war, he actually produces a well-written history of postwar events. Religion largely disappears in favor of a masterful account and indictment of the culture and politics of Reconstruction. Even here Goldfield cannot resist a swipe at the evangelicals, this time not Henry Ward Beecher, his chief clerical whipping boy during the war, but Dwight L. Moody, the evangelical urban revivalist who "murdered syntax in his sermons and was not half the spellbinding orator that Beecher was" (p. 510). Goldfield also apparently objects to the fact that Moody only pretended to make his revivals seem spontaneous when in fact they were carefully scripted. Even the most cursory reading of evangelicals and revivals would confirm that this was true of everyone from George Whitefield to Billy Graham. Apparently Goldfield is judging Moody and others against a standard they never attempted, namely intellectual respectability in the manner of Parker, Jonathan Edwards, or Reinhold Niebuhr. But this is like damning popular political orators because they did not opine in the manner of Henry Kissinger or George F. Kennan.

As a recentering of Civil War historiography from battles and politics to religion and culture, this book makes a contribution to a growing trend in the profession. All the more pity then that the religion reviewed and pilloried is viewed from a distance and not within the dusty archives of sustained historical research.

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DAVID SILKENAT. *Moments of Despair: Suicide, Divorce, and Debt in Civil War Era North Carolina*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2011. Pp. x, 296. \$45.00.

The experience of the Civil War and emancipation, David Silkenat contends, fundamentally "transformed the

moral framework through which North Carolinians interpreted their world" (p. 1). Examining attitudes toward suicide, divorce, and debt between 1820 and 1905, he argues that these moments of despair "functioned as barometers of change reflecting the relationship between the individual and society" and that said relationship was increasingly "predicated on race" (p. 2).

Part one examines suicide. In the wake of the war, North Carolina's newspapers brought word that the state's veterans and their families were succumbing to suicide in ever greater numbers. As reports became more frequent, Silkenat argues, local attitudes toward self-destruction began to soften to the point that many white North Carolinians came to understand decisions to die taken by former soldiers wrecked by war as "tolerable, albeit, regrettable choice[s]" (p. 10). Among the state's many black residents, however, the experience of emancipation led them in the opposite direction, eviscerating the formerly tolerant attitude toward self-destruction, which Silkenat finds among members of antebellum slave communities ravaged by physical and psychological torture.

In part two, attention turns to divorce. White women initiated two-thirds of divorce proceedings in antebellum North Carolina, though, because of the social and religious stigma attached to them, such proceedings were comparatively rare. After the war, everything changed. Returning veterans filed unprecedented numbers of divorce petitions against their estranged wives; soon enough, Silkenat suggests, divorce rates had soared and the stigma surrounding the legal dissolution of marriage had decreased dramatically. Given the realities of plantation slavery and Reconstruction, recovering even rudimentary divorce statistics for black North Carolinians is far more problematic, although Silkenat concludes that black clergymen active in the postwar period did all they could to sanctify faithful, monogamous marriage as a central institution of black life.

Part three offers an examination of various strategies for coping with debt and here, too, Silkenat identifies fundamental transformations. After 1865, personal bankruptcies among white North Carolinians began to surge while new credit-granting institutions, including general stores and pawnshops, began to replace the informal gift economy. As all this unfolded, there arose "a new understanding of the role of debt that emphasized the needs of the individual over those of the society" (p. 138). Among black residents, the social meaning of credit was also in flux, as former slaves became freedmen who could legally contract debts. Yet, Silkenat argues, while their newfound access to credit offered a valuable path to material improvement and upward social mobility, most freedmen did their best to avoid running up debts, for fear of economic enslavement to their former plantation masters.

There is much to admire in this wide-ranging account of cultural revolution. Silkenat is at his best when reconstructing moments of despair in individual lives, such as those of Hillsborough planter Dr. James Webb

and of Alice Houston, Julia Graves, and Ida Beard, three debt-stricken boardinghouse owners. This monograph draws on a refreshing variety of sources, including church and charity records, company account books, asylum log books, diaries, newspapers, grave markers, census surveys, county court divorce proceedings, the occasional poem, and even a register of artificial limbs.

From this raw material, Silkenat crafts a series of synthetic claims. First, that white antebellum North Carolinians regarded suicide, divorce, and debt as disruptive acts posing existential threats to community integrity. Second, that in the wake of the Civil War—indeed, in part, as a direct result of it—the social stigma that whites attached to these harrowing events subsided as their incidence rose and as allied processes of social atomization loosened collective bonds. Third, that among black North Carolinians, the same processes operated in reverse. As free black populations searched for order and stability after emancipation, their leaders lashed out at any act or behavior that seemed to prize individual authority over the interests of the nascent community.

To make such assertions, Silkenat has to overcome considerable obstacles. For one thing, the peculiar structure of his monograph—its three subject-specific sections, its repeated chronological reversals, and its constant switching between white and black subjects—works to undermine analytical cohesion. Moreover, the logic of the decision to build a study of changing moral sentiments around these three traumatic life events is not self-evident. Debt, after all, is rarely a momentary experience but rather a continuing condition subject to different discursive practices and rhetorics than either suicide or divorce. As a result, the four chapters on debt seem disconnected from those they follow. Likewise, the treacherous problems associated with counting suicides and with assessing the state of domestic unions among North Carolina's black population make it difficult to substantiate some of the claims offered here. That said, the book under review offers readers an interesting new perspective on an incontrovertible old truth: that the Civil War was a monumental watershed in southern history that produced lasting repercussions in the lives of both whites and blacks.

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DANIEL S. MARGOLIES. *Spaces of Law in American Foreign Relations: Extradition and Extraterritoriality in the Borderlands and Beyond, 1877–1898*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 427. Cloth \$69.95, paper \$24.95.

This book traces the course of territorial issues in U.S. law and foreign policy from the 1870s through the 1890s. It focuses on the ways in which the United States approached jurisdictional disputes with foreign states. This is the first book to study extradition not only as a

legal system, but as one of the main aspects of American foreign relations in the late nineteenth century, when the United States began to exercise its economic, military, and legal dominance worldwide.

Daniel S. Margolies presents a series of theoretical concepts that guide the study of legal spatiality in U.S. foreign relations: territoriality, extraterritoriality, jurisdiction, extradition as a foreign policy, extradition in terms of governance, and borderlands as artificial constructions for specific policy purposes. He explores the inner workings of U.S. extradition relations, examines questions of sovereignty, citizenship, and exception in the U.S. approach to governance, and explains the expansion of the activist state in foreign relations. The author also shows how extraterritorial criminal claims, treaty negotiations, trade conflicts, boundary line disputes, extradition controversies, transborder abductions, and interdiction efforts were used to construct global influence as an imperial power.

The book is based on an impressive array of archival sources, government documents, and periodicals. The text is organized thematically and covers significant aspects of U.S. involvement in extradition and in territorial and jurisdictional matters between 1877 and 1898, when the United States imposed its hegemonic power on legal spaces across the transnational system of the time. Part one focuses on the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, and part two explores extradition as a foreign policy practice in a wide variety of international relations.

First, Margolies evaluates American responses to jurisdictional, geographic, criminal, and interdiction challenges, such as extradition disputes, water-use controversies, trade competition, Chinese migration, boundary line confusion, and extraterritorial jurisdictional claims. Then, he examines the governance of the U.S. extradition system from various perspectives, including definitions of extraditable crime for violent and financial transgressions, terrorism, and dynamite bombing, among other crimes. He also considers extradition surrenders and controversies in terms of the challenges to extraterritorial jurisdiction, the rules of double criminality and specialty, and the impact of critical state and U.S. Supreme Court decisions.

The author observes that American extradition relations with foreign states formed a unique system in which American interests were safeguarded. This system was founded on the principle of double criminality, which means that in order for a crime to be extraditable, it had to be considered a crime in both the requesting and the receiving countries. The reciprocal nature of extradition, says Margolies, struck a balance between the right to request surrender of a fugitive and the right to refuse that request, but this choice was an attribute of sovereignty.

Special attention is given to the politics of extradition regimes based on the meaning of citizenship in disputes, and to the role of asylum and sovereign exception in the construction of the legal spatiality of American foreign relations. The author explains how extradition

exchanges were heavily larded with jurisdictional conflicts over citizenship, so that the United States had to argue for a global regime on fugitive surrender in which citizenship afforded no protection from the reach of American sovereignty.

Margolies explores how transborder conflicts consumed U.S.-Mexican relations during the 1870s and 1880s, causing a series of violations of territorial sovereignty on both sides of the line. He shows that the most important yet difficult issues between the United States and Mexico were migration, raids, smuggling, and fugitive escape across the border. He also illustrates how American policy makers believed that the region was more violent and lawless than others because they sensed that the justice system in Mexico was corrupt and inoperable, hence their distrust of Mexican authorities.

The author contends that the United States needed to have territorial and extraterritorial jurisdiction in order to achieve unilateral control on the border with Mexico. That is why, in the final decades of the nineteenth century, American policy makers decided to go beyond merely securing U.S. borders on a strict territorial sovereignty basis, advocating instead for a broader redesign of the balance of power, authority, and trade along the Rio Grande. They looked for order, prosperity, and social peace in the region, Margolies asserts.

He argues that the extradition relations between the United States and Mexico stood as an exception to the system developed for all other countries, because geography and governance invited local control. But, in the author's opinion, not all jurisdictional exceptions were tolerated by politicians, who believed that Mexico had no sovereign right to determine its own economic policy along the border.

As the political offenses triggered the need to carve out spaces for asylum within territorial sovereignties, asylum was considered another form of exception. Nevertheless, the author explains that recognition of a right of asylum could be seen as an attack or a limitation on sovereignty, while the denial of asylum could be cast as a reification of sovereignty.

Margolies concludes that all actions taken in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands had economic, racial, and ideological meanings that were often difficult to identify when determining the political nature of a crime. In his view, that is the reason why clear definitions of political acts in the U.S.-Mexico border were only rarely achievable, and became even less so with increasing revolutionary activity in the early 1900s.

In sum, this book's analysis on legal spatiality and territoriality and its explanation on how to conceptualize extradition in terms of foreign policy, governance, and borderlands are significant contributions to the history of American foreign relations and to U.S. legal history.

MÓNICA TOUSSAINT

Instituto de Investigaciones Dr. José María Luis Mora

EDWIN R. SWEENEY. *From Cochise to Geronimo: The Chiricahua Apaches, 1874–1886*. (The Civilization of the American Indian Series, number 268.) Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 2010. Pp. xiii, 706. \$39.95.

Edwin R. Sweeney's colossal book is a nearly day-by-day—and often even an hour-by-hour—narrative of the final twelve years of the Apache wars in the U.S. Southwest and northern Mexico. Beginning with the death of Cochise in 1874 and ending with Geronimo's surrender in 1886, Sweeney's intricate work relates the struggle of American colonialists to dominate the will of the Apache people.

This book is a throwback to an era in which western historians offered a grand chronology with little theory or cultural interpretation. Sweeney's style presents a crowded narrative that concentrates on names, dates, numbers, weapons, routes, raids, and battles. This history of men with guns does not dwell on the heart of the era's violence to explain what prompts humans to perpetuate such profound brutality. Rather, the book's central contribution is a careful, archive-driven retelling of these extraordinary events. Sweeney clearly does not want to judge men for their deeds; he just wants to say "This is how it was."

The Apache wars were an epic tragedy of cultural misunderstanding, flawed legal and political policies, hubris and avarice, bigotry and intolerance, and a horrifyingly endless bloodlust. This war was fed by American settlers' desire for Apache lands, the U.S. government's unyielding commitment to controlling American Indians, and the Mexican authorities' desperate use of genocide as a tactic of war. The Apaches, too, were guilty of mistakes and misjudgments, thefts and murder. But Sweeney's book shows how the actions of a few homicidal Apaches led to the near annihilation of all the Apache nations. Most Apaches were willing to accept the invaders' terms, if this meant peace, a small piece of land, and a future for their children. But the acquiescence of the majority of Apaches was undercut by the resolve of a minority who refused to relinquish their absolute freedom and who were willing to steal and kill for it.

Despite Sweeney's admirable attempts to incorporate Apache accounts when possible, this is a story told from the conqueror's viewpoint. A few Apache remembrances told to Grenville Goodwin and other twentieth-century anthropologists are engulfed in the sea of words written by U.S. and Mexican citizens, soldiers, and government agents as these events unfolded. These Americans, of course, were not neutral but deeply invested in the Apache people's fate. As a result, in spite of Sweeney's efforts to maintain a neutral tone, the book is subtly but consistently biased to the American perspective.

For example, Sweeney writes that Lieutenant Britton Davis, who "probably knew Geronimo better than any American," characterized the infamous Apache as a "thoroughly vicious, intractable, and treacherous man."

His only redeeming qualities were courage and determination. His word, no matter how earnestly pledged, was worthless" (p. 403). The problem is that this kind of assessment of an Apache character is never balanced with a sincere Apache assessment of the soldiers. We will never know what Geronimo, in turn, really thought of his persecutors, such as Davis, because archives do not include documents from 1874 to 1886 written by Apaches, for Apaches, in the Apache language. The Apache viewpoint of this period, when it can be plumbed at all, is filtered by time and translation; narrating the Apache wars will always be partial and incomplete. History, in this case, really does go to the winner.

Furthermore, Sweeney's style avoids an analysis that aims to make sense of the carnage that characterized this conflict. Yet, the cyclic violence of this period was twisted, the moral chaos evident at every turn in the story. Consider the Chiricahua Apache Espida (also known as Speedy). He was nearly killed by his own people while fighting them as a scout for the U.S. government; but, Espida had previously executed Charley McComas, an innocent Anglo captive child; but, Espida perpetrated this murder out of revenge for the murder of his guiltless mother by Western Apache scouts (p. 451). What are we to think of Espida? Rather than addressing these complex moral dimensions of the Apache wars—the fundamental question of the Apache response to American imperialism—Sweeney elects to present history as simple chronology. The strength of this approach is that it produces a detailed and straightforward narrative of this saga that is not mired in questions of accountability; the weakness is that it provides little understanding of who was ultimately responsible for these years of bloodshed and what can be done today to repair past injustices.

Still, these critiques ultimately do not detract from the book's impressive feat. To write such an in-depth and dense account of this key moment in American history is a major accomplishment. Sweeney's book, ambitious as it is monumental, is a remarkable piece of detailed archival research.

CHIP COLWELL-CHANTHAPHONH
Denver Museum of Nature and Science

MARK J. NOONAN. *Reading The Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine: American Literature and Culture, 1870–1893*. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 2010. Pp. xix, 235. \$65.00.

In a narrow sense, Mark J. Noonan's book is an institutional history of *Scribner's Monthly*, a mass-market literary magazine that was launched in 1870 and became, in 1881, the *Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine*. At its most ambitious, the book is a history of American literature during the last third of the nineteenth century, a feat made possible by the fact that the *Century's* lineup of writers was unquestionably remarkable. During the 1870s, the magazine was a key outlet for such noted women writers as Rebecca Harding Davis, Mary Mapes

Dodge, and Helen Hunt Jackson. During the 1880s, the *Century* was at the forefront of the rise of regionalism and realism, publishing southerners such as George Washington Cable, Edward King, Thomas Nelson Page, and Joel Chandler Harris, and regional hybrids like Mark Twain and Paul Laurence Dunbar. For three decades, the *Century's* influence was profound, and it was a direct ancestor of the mass-market middlebrow magazines that came to define the emerging consumer culture of the early twentieth century.

This book attempts to survey a vast number of complex themes, embodying in many respects the promise of "periodical studies." Periodical studies is a relatively new subdiscipline of literature that has emerged from the larger field of research on print culture and the history of the book. Although Frank Luther Mott wrote comprehensive studies of newspapers and periodicals going back to the 1930s, and since then there have been numerous studies of "little magazines" and editorial and literary coteries, the study of a single periodical such as the one Noonan undertakes is more recent and self-consciously theoretical. Noonan demands consideration for the periodical as an object worthy of analysis rather than something that is simply a carrier to individual authorial output, and contends, like fellow historians of print, that studying literature in this manner collapses artificial distinctions between canonized writers and their contemporaries, and allows literary works to be read in both their ideological and material context. This monograph illustrates both the promise and the challenges of "periodical studies."

The sheer number of questions Noonan tries to address is staggering. He surveys the *Century's* institutional and editorial history, places it in its political and cultural context, and offers individual readings of the stories, novels, poems, and non-fiction work that appeared in the magazine. But Noonan's study also cuts deeper, critically, than traditional periodical histories. In particular, Noonan is interested in the way in which race, gender, and high literature's aesthetic politics intersected in a period of canon formation and reformation.

Reading The Century documents the magazine's importance both as an outlet for women writers and as the progenitor of a new literary culture that rejected the antebellum era's insistent sentimentality and brought about the post-Civil War eclipse of women writers. This late-century pivot in gender and aesthetics was carried out, Noonan argues, in the name of "realism." Noonan claims that realism was both aesthetically and ideologically anti-feminine, and particularly didactic in its gender politics. Efforts by the *Century's* southern and western regionalists to "reproduce" authentic dialects and folk literatures was one element of the magazine's push for a new sort of literature that was "self-consciously free of melodrama" and depended "more on analysis of character than on story for its effects" (p. 90). Realism, he concludes, was about the education of female readers, stripping them of their romantic delu-

sions and, along the way, establishing male aesthetic authority over the form.

The *Century's* critique of feminine sentiment was part of a broader attack upon the antebellum spirit of humanitarian reform, a second major theme of Noonan's study. The *Century*, arguably, was the literary branch of postbellum liberalism that feared democracy, rejected racial equality, and hoped to restore the power of learned elites over the masses who were made restive by labor conflict and civil war. At times, its anti-sentimental aesthetic and its opposition to humanitarian reform were wedded. Southern regionalist fiction, Noonan shows, depicted emancipated blacks as figures without reason and incapable of self-government. Romantic, feminine, and sentimental reform, unlike "realism," was simply incapable of grasping the world "as it is."

The *Century's* conservative literary and racial politics were, at least in part, shaped by its desire to reach the southern market, even if it did publish dissenters like George Washington Cable who, in the spirit of antebellum reform, called for comprehensive equality in the South. In fact, one of the great strengths of Noonan's work is the deft way in which it handles the tension between the magazine or newspaper's ideological unity and diversity. A generation of literary theory has taught that meaning is generated, at least in part, intertextually and through the dynamics of reception. Noonan positions the *Century* ideologically, but notes at the outset that a periodical could be a site of "ideological battle[s]" and "rupture[s]" (p. x). The result is an ambitious effort to depict the history of a single magazine, in all its varied intellectual, regional, and historical contexts. Although not every question it poses is answered as comprehensively as one might like, this book deserves an audience among historians and literary critics alike.

ADAM-MAX TUCHINSKY
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HELEN LEFKOWITZ HOROWITZ. *Wild Unrest: Charlotte Perkins Gilman and the Making of "The Yellow Wall-Paper."* New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. ix, 251. \$24.95.

Charlotte Perkins Gilman's 1892 novella, *The Yellow Wall-Paper*, has become a classic in American women's literature. Widely read and taught as a feminist allegory, the story has been seen as a protest against the rest cure and a critique of patriarchal medicine. But this interpretation comes from the vantage point of hindsight, taken from reflections in Gilman's autobiography and her mature political writings, as Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz shows in her new book. Horowitz instead looks forward from the events leading up to Gilman's writing of the famous tale. And from this standpoint, she offers new and fascinating insights.

Based on Gilman's own struggles with mental illness, *The Yellow Wall-Paper* is the story of a woman who suffers with nervous disease. She undergoes a version of the "rest cure," a regimen of inactivity and isolation

prescribed by her physician/husband. Told in the first person, the narrator describes her declining mental state, made worse by her treatment and the hideous yellow wallpaper of her sickroom that seems to haunt and taunt her. Ultimately, in a fit of rage and resistance, she tears the paper down. Years later, Gilman claimed the story reflected her own experience under the care of Philadelphia neurologist, S. Weir Mitchell, in 1887, and that the story's purpose was to spare others from such treatment.

But in Horowitz's study, the story takes on new meaning, as she traces the experiences of the young Charlotte (purposely using her first name) before she became known as the feminist, Charlotte Perkins Gilman. She examines her life prior to Mitchell's treatment, as she struggled with the gender conventions and financial constraints of the time. Horowitz consults the sources of Charlotte's private life, including her daily journals, drafts of poems and essays, and intimate letters, and compares them to the diary accounts of her first husband, Charles Walter Stetson. She also mines Charlotte's diaries for notes on her reading and shows how specific poetry, fiction, and popular science shaped her consciousness and understanding of sex and gender, health and illness, emotion and intellect. Horowitz delves inside the mind and private life of Charlotte to explain the very public outpouring of emotion in *The Yellow Wall-Paper*.

As a result, Horowitz makes some bold and compelling arguments. She builds a strong case to show that *The Yellow Wall-Paper*, in its original form, did not represent a literal protest against Mitchell and his treatment. Rather, it emerged from Charlotte's troubled relationship with her husband, Walter, personified in the story's physician. In demanding a traditional wife, Walter denied Charlotte personal freedom, squelched her intellectual energy, and exacerbated her illness. The story, as Horowitz writes, "distilled, compressed, and dramatized the destructive power of nineteenth-century marriage and the ideal of true womanhood" (p. 209). *The Yellow Wall-Paper*, she argues, also resulted from Charlotte's financial needs and literary ambitions. Desperate to raise her own money so that she might live independently, and wanting to make her literary mark, Charlotte channeled her mental anguish and marital troubles into a riveting story that pleased publishers and attracted readers.

In her gripping analysis, Horowitz brings readers along to experience Charlotte's journey, through her times of high hope and down into the depths of mental illness. She helps readers feel Charlotte's "wild unrest," her personal struggle to resolve two competing sides of herself. On the one hand, she felt pulled toward marriage and motherhood; on the other, she needed autonomy and to be freed from the dictates of sex and gender. Horowitz shows this conflict to be both personal and intellectual, as she traces Charlotte's theoretical and literary grappling, especially with Herbert Spencer and evolutionary theory.

Horowitz's study adds to the literature aimed at com-

plicating Mitchell and contextualizing treatments for hysteria. But while Mitchell deserves reconsideration and should not be demonized, he remains a figure at odds with notions of female equality and autonomy. And while Charlotte found more fault with her husband than her physician at the time of Mitchell's treatment, she clearly chose to portray a regimen of rest in unflattering terms a few years later, and was echoed by other feminists.

This book is particularly interesting for its dual biographical dimensions, following two lives in the making, that of a feminist and that of a text. In the process, Horowitz properly historicizes *The Yellow Wall-Paper* by reconstructing the steps leading up to its composition. Interrogating and cross-checking sources, she writes with a watchful eye to the mythologies surrounding the novella. And yet, she maintains and illustrates the importance of this famed story. Horowitz illustrates how it reflected Charlotte's most painful mental afflictions and deepest gender conflicts, painting a vivid portrait of the circumstances that would not let her rest.

CARLA BITTEL

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CYNTHIA GRANT TUCKER. *No Silent Witness: The Eliot Parsonage Women and Their Unitarian World*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. viii, 344. \$29.95.

This study of three generations of the first family of the American Unitarian Association traces William Greenleaf Eliot (1811–1887), Abigail “Abby” Adams Cranch Eliot (1817–1908), and their descendants as they moved the Unitarian Church and its organizations across the West to Saint Louis, Portland, and then back to Boston. In her group biography, Cynthia Grant Tucker focuses on the “full throated” women who left records of their commitment, courage, and longings in diaries as well as in letters to their kin. Standing at the church’s “center of gravity—sacrificing to keep churches running and rearing the next generation of clergy,” these women, Tucker maintains, often felt like “outsiders looking in from a parallel universe” (p. 3).

Tucker’s book highlights gendered responses to deaths of infants and children as a crucial spiritual divide in Eliot parsonages. William and Abby had arrived in St. Louis in 1837 when he answered a call to become minister of Church of the Redeemer. Believing that there could not be enough Eliots, Abby gave birth to fourteen children, only five of whom lived to adulthood. Tucker eloquently captures Abby’s searing grief and her sense of dissonance with her husband’s determination to return to work immediately after each child’s death.

Tucker is blunt about the family’s class prejudices. Angling to have their children associate with the “right sort,” most members of the Eliot family shared Social Darwinist attitudes. When the Great Railroad Strike of 1877 spread to St. Louis, Abby felt that “Satan . . . in all his glory had arrived” (p. 45). Later she confessed to

Thomas and Henrietta Eliot, her son and daughter-in-law, that if folks like her cook went to heaven, “I don’t want to be with ’em!” (p. 46).

Not until Christopher Rhodes Eliot, the third surviving son of William and Abby, married Mary Jackson May in 1888 did an Eliot family break free from conventional perspectives on class and gender. A “warm-hearted, deep feeling” partner “born with insurgency” (p. 176) in her blood, Mary found the answer to her yearning for a joint parish ministry when she and Christopher visited settlement houses in London in 1892. With Mary’s blessing, Christopher eagerly accepted an appointment at Bulfinch Place Church in Boston’s West End in 1894. Following Jane Addams’s vision of the social settlement as a subjective necessity as well as an objective value, Mary Eliot relished her church work with the West End’s immigrant community and found her heaven on earth by straddling Beacon Hill and Bulfinch.

Tucker paints a glowing picture of Mary and Christopher’s two daughters, Martha and Abby, who bolted from Radcliffe’s secret society of social elites in 1913, chose women as lifelong partners, and followed professional lives. Abby became a kindergarten researcher and teacher. Martha, who described herself as a “social doctor,” extended to medicine a version of her parents’ parish ministry. With Yale Professor Edwards Park, who had also grown up in a Unitarian parsonage, she developed a community model for eliminating rickets. Opposed to the fee-for-service practice of medicine, Martha worked with the Children’s Bureau, ultimately becoming its director.

A historian may not always feel rooted in time in this book. Tucker, for example, is off by twenty-four years in recording the birth of Thomas Lamb Eliot in the genealogical chart of Abby and Will’s family. Readers learn of Martha establishing a scholarship in memory of Mary May Eliot before they are informed of her death. In addition, when certain Eliot female descendants in the 1920s hesitated to open their family’s writings to the public, Tucker describes them as “women who lived in a false, separate sphere” (p. 242). She contrasts them with Abby (the granddaughter) and Martha, who deposited their journals and records with the Schlesinger Library at Radcliffe.

As intriguing as the Eliot women are as individuals and as a family, scholars will be concerned that Tucker uses Trinitarians as a foil for Unitarians. She flattens other Protestant denominations rather than interpreting their theology as ranging across a spectrum. The reader never knows precisely who the “evangelicals” are. At times, Tucker uses Trinitarianism to signify evangelicalism and “liberal” as interchangeable with Unitarian. In reality, the parsonage, manse, or rectory—from the home of Martin Luther and Katharina von Bora to the Wesley family’s Anglican Epworth Old Rectory and those of a multitude of American denominations—functioned as a Protestant semipublic space. In terms of parsonage women’s dealing with dissonance between sermon and praxis, grief and hope, belief and

doubt, Unitarians and Trinitarians shared common ground.

The photographs are marvelous, and Tucker's writing soars with literary eloquence in places. Historical analysis, however, gets lost in details. And ultimately, Tucker's paradigm of progress from false to professional in writing about women's lives across almost two centuries is less than enlightening.

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BENJAMIN L. HARTLEY. *Evangelicals at a Crossroads: Revivalism and Social Reform in Boston, 1860–1910*. (Revisiting New England: The New Regionalism.) Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, for University of New Hampshire Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 288. Cloth \$85.00, paper \$39.95.

When it comes to religion, Boston might be one of the most interesting and well-studied cities in America. Boston's seventeenth-century Puritans, their nineteenth-century heirs—Congregationalists, Unitarians, and Episcopalians—and nineteenth- and twentieth-century Roman Catholics have been the subjects of a number of fine historical studies. Yet the revivals and the social reforms of Methodists, Baptists, and Salvation Army evangelicals had a major impact on Boston in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In this fascinating study, Benjamin L. Hartley brings to light the important role that these “evangelical late-comers” had during a critical period of socioeconomic and political change in the city.

After an introduction that situates the work in its larger historiographical context, the first chapter examines Dwight L. Moody's famous 1877 revival in Boston. Before his dramatic conversion, Moody worked as a shoe salesman in the city. After gaining international fame in the transatlantic Protestant community, he returned to Boston on the final stop of a two-year evangelistic tour. Hartley uses Moody's visit to Boston as a helpful way of framing his study, as the evangelist's campaign in the Hub City helped to draw together Protestants of several different traditions into a common cause. With Protestant memories of how slavery had recently been destroyed, Hartley contends in the second chapter, “upstart evangelicals” set out to eradicate poverty in the years following the Civil War. Inspired by holiness and theological convictions concerning the possibility of eliminating sin from one's personal life, evangelicals collaborated with one another and persons outside of the revivalistic Protestant community to build a host of institutions to address pressing social needs. This chapter reviews the work of Henry Morgan, Eben Tourjée, and Charles Cullis and the founding of the Home for Little Wanderers, Boston University, and the New England Conservatory of Music. These late nineteenth-century Protestants blended evangelism and social reform in institutions they established in the neighborhoods of Beacon Hill, the North End, the South End, and Roxbury. The third chapter pays care-

ful attention to the late nineteenth-century Boston political context. This was a time when the Irish and Boston Brahmins struggled for control of city hall. The chapter reveals that the “upstart evangelicals” were militantly anti-Roman Catholic and at the same time outspoken advocates of the growing labor movement. The fourth chapter focuses on the Salvation Army invasion of Boston and the prominent role that women played in it as well as in various foreign missionary societies and domestic reform organizations, such as the Methodists' Deaconess Home and Training School. Whereas the rise of higher criticism of the Bible, premillennialism, and the Social Gospel fractured many Protestant denominations in the late nineteenth century, as the sixth chapter demonstrates, Methodists took a more mediating and pragmatic position bridging the burgeoning conservative and liberal divide. The sixth chapter offers a case study of evangelical revivalism and social reform in the North End of Boston during the 1890s. As Italian and Jewish immigrants and migrants from rural America displaced the older Irish community, the area's reform organizations and institutions adapted to their new social context. The final chapter explores the citywide evangelistic revivals of Gipsy Smith in 1906 and J. Wilbur Chapman three years later. Hartley uses these two events as an effective way to measure the changes that had taken place not only within Boston but also inside the “upstart evangelical” community. Some within these evangelical traditions continued to stress evangelism while others focused on social reform. But the days of preaching the gospel in word and deed had come to an end. Like other Protestant traditions, the “upstart evangelicals” concentrated on one or the other as the most effective means to achieve spiritual ends.

This book is outstanding for several reasons. Not only does it provide a useful corrective to studies of the late nineteenth-century evangelical movement that interpret it through the lens of the early twentieth-century fundamentalist/modernist controversy, but it also uncovers the influential role that the Wesleyan Holiness movement played in the larger evangelical movement. For this reason, Hartley's study nicely complements Margaret Lamberts Bendroth's *Fundamentalists in the City: Conflict and Division in Boston's Churches, 1885–1950* (2005). Hartley also casts new light on the important place that religion played in urban America, demonstrating that religion was inseparably intertwined with sociopolitical and economic commitments and that changing social conditions affected religious practices and institutions. Finally, the volume sheds new light on the historic origins of the contemporary divide among Protestants over the importance of evangelism and social reform. The dynamics between the “upstart evangelicals” and the Protestant old guard might have been more thoroughly examined, along with the role of the movement to rid the city of vice manifested by the work of the New England Watch and Ward Society, an ecumenical Protestant organization that drew leaders from both the Brahmin community and the recent

"latecomers." These omissions, however, do not detract from the study's overall value. Well researched and masterfully written, Hartley's book makes an important contribution to the study of American religion.

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EDWARD P. KOHN. *Hot Time in the Old Town: The Great Heat Wave of 1896 and the Making of Theodore Roosevelt*. New York: Basic Books. 2010. Pp. xv, 288. \$27.95.

In this book Edward P. Kohn weaves the events of the summer of 1896 together into a compelling narrative about Theodore Roosevelt's efforts to build his political career, William Jennings Bryan's run for the presidency, and the extraordinary heat wave that blanketed New York City—as well as the rest of the country. What emerges is a riveting portrait of time and place in American history. Kohn provides an understanding of the lives of the people living in New York's crowded tenements, as well as a taut account of the era's key political figures.

Kohn sets his story in the New York of the 1890s, which emerges as a central character in this drama. As the temperature inched upward, New York's tenements sweltered at the center of the city's island of heat. Already vulnerable to disease without ready reserves of water or resources and stuck in cramped airless quarters, the poor suffered and died in record numbers. Kohn takes a creative and insightful look beneath the statistics of the health department to reveal the scale of the disaster, which dwarfed estimates of the time. Without clear direction from public officials or health experts, only a couple of officers, including Roosevelt, suggested affirmative steps to ameliorate the impact of the heat, such as distributing ice and letting the poor sleep out of doors in public parks. Even so, these actions came at the end of the heat wave.

Kohn's synthesis of contemporary politics proves both satisfying and insightful. Most interestingly, Kohn contrasts Bryan's political campaign with William McKinley's 1896 front porch bid. Bryan's oratorical skills met the heat head on. Traveling through Ohio and Pennsylvania, he found himself moving, as he wrote, deeper into the "enemy's territory." Bryan's campaign grew more difficult as he and his audiences struggled with the weather. At the height of the heat, Bryan delivered a speech in Madison Square Garden that was poorly received, and his fortunes never recovered. The heat provides an alluring context—metaphorical and real—to the broad tenor of the political season, but it is doubtful that the responsibility for the failure of Bryan's campaign can be attributed solely to the weather.

Kohn's discussion of Roosevelt is equally engaging. He emerges on the page as a man striving to salvage a political career. Roosevelt struggled to find his position within a party, as well as a city political machine, where his moral rectitude, vis-à-vis corruption, made him the odd man out. After the heat wave hit New York, however, he emerged as one of the few public officials who

sought to provide some relief to city residents. Through the police department, Roosevelt handed out ice to the poor, but his efforts were largely behind the scenes. Indeed, as Kohn notes, the precinct house's ice distribution happened unevenly, and Roosevelt himself spent much of the crisis out of the city, at his home on Oyster Bay. It is not clear, then, how Roosevelt's response to the crisis was so decisive, public, or notable that it changed his political fortunes. The book's subtitle does not seem entirely justified.

Kohn's analysis of the heat wave as a disaster is perhaps the least compelling aspect of the narrative. In no small part this is because the disaster's context is less well wrought than the political context. For example, Kohn seeks to distinguish between human and natural catastrophes, a distinction not made in the broader historiography. The scholarship clearly recognizes how disaster, from its impacts to its meanings, is defined by sociocultural contexts. Kohn compares the tragedy that befell New York City in the summer of 1896 only to the city's experience the following summer. Surely, it would have helped to have known more about the heat wave's effect beyond New York or how it compared to many New York summers and not just one season.

Ultimately, although I was not persuaded that Roosevelt's political career was "made" by the 1896 heat wave, I found this book satisfying. Kohn has produced a well-wrought synthesis that provides a new appreciation for place and time, bringing both the presidential politics and the hot New York summer of 1896 to life once again.

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JAMES J. CONNOLLY. *An Elusive Unity: Urban Democracy and Machine Politics in Industrializing America*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2010. Pp. xiv, 264. \$39.95.

In this book, James J. Connolly has discovered something that sounds so obvious that it has to be original: cities are full of "people." Looking at cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Connolly talks about the quest for a usable public in an age when the two things all cities had in common were their diversity of economic and ethnic groups and divergence of interests.

Everybody talked about "the people," but, as Connolly makes clear, that term meant different things to different groups. The definition generally applied to themselves and anyone else who thought like them, which, in the case of reformers, usually meant a fraction of the whole population too insignificant to take or hold power for long. The notion of pluralism was anathema; the concept of various overlapping publics just about unthinkable. There could only be one public good, whether the corrupted and ill-informed grasped its reality or not, and those who saw it must speak for the whole. Women's groups reached out from the middle class to make common cause with the less fortunate. Settlement house workers stretched to build a sense of

community that knew no confines of class or party, a "place where everybody feels at home:/ Forgets the external/ And gets fraternal."

Try as they might, however, city dwellers could not frame a cause that would unite forces that were, by their nature, determinedly separate. Binding themselves to the class character of their movement, unions and municipal labor parties defined themselves as "the people," as opposed to "the interests," only to find themselves helpless to persuade the middle class, the press, or even most workers that their agenda was the common good. Only the hard-nosed, crabby liberals like E. L. Godkin talked of defining a "people" by trimming a large share of the population off and eliminating their say with property requirements for voting.

Accommodating themselves to the critics, political machines by the turn of the century had begun to sell themselves as the closest semblance of the people's will: the brokers between various groups with various interests that, together, amounted to a whole. Reaching out to businessmen by selling the boss as an administrator, the chief executive officer handling the political equivalent of a conglomerate, appealing to women by repackaging ward chiefs as shaped by a mother's hand, the machine politicians managed to convince even some reformers and a later generation of historians that they were something more than narrow and selfish scramblers who, having clawed their way to the top, cracked the treasury crib for themselves and their choicest friends, invariably white. Their embrace of pluralism as opposed to a common goal found its echo in Progressive activists, only a few of whom came to see that even at its most inclusive, the reformers could not and the Tammanys would not find room for everyone, and that the powerless and voiceless were those surest to be left out. Nor could the Jane Addamses and Edward Wards make a dent in other civic reformers' illusory chase after a civic consensus.

This book covers the hunt for a moral consensus well, and its appreciation for how the city bosses adapted their image in the 1890s and how far social scientists besotted with pluralist theory bought into it as the reality is a discernment long overdue. As one might expect from Connolly's previous study, *The Triumph of Ethnic Progressivism: Urban Political Culture in Boston, 1900–1925* (1998), Boston plays almost as large a role as New York, with Chicago lagging somewhat behind (except for its Progressive-era reformers), Philadelphia and San Francisco still further in the distance, and most other big cities practically invisible. But one cannot fault a scholar for looking for treasure where the light is better. The thoughtful conclusions Connolly comes to would apply to civic movements in general, and most likely to machines in places ungraced by such misread and meritorious novels as *The Last Hurrah*. Scholars of boss politics or urban reform should not let Connolly's book elude them.

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EVELYN NAKANO GLENN. *Forced to Care: Coercion and Caregiving in America*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2010. Pp. 262. \$29.95.

Has it really come to this? Evelyn Nakano Glenn's excellent study convincingly connects caring and coercion in a long history rooted in the coercive labor of slavery and indenture. Our present crisis in providing care in a variety of situations saddles a broad range of Americans with responsibilities for child care, care of the disabled, and elder care. Over time, coercion has varied in form and severity, but it has been directed mainly at women. It has limited their choices and cheapened their labor so that they are expected to care for family members for free. Exploitation of women's labor has been undergirded by legal barriers, limited employment opportunities, and the domestic ideal of breadwinning husbands and bread-baking wives. While men's paid labor became the family's economic bulwark, women's economic dependency and unpaid caring—domestic chores, child care, and consumption—became "priceless and worthless" (p. 35).

Glenn presents a new framework to understand caring labor by examining the experiences of three groups of women—Native Americans, convicts, and immigrants—and women reformers' efforts to change each group. Specifically, Glenn analyzes how these groups shared a significant experience in reforming women's caring behavior at the same time that women's citizenship expanded. Imposing the dominant culture's gender norms played a pivotal role in the reforming process. For example, the Indian boarding school system trained Indian boys in agriculture and trades while girls learned housekeeping, child care, and domestic arts. Similarly, women prison reformers introduced more humane and kinder methods, such as moral uplift and training in domestic tasks to replace the physical and sexual abuse of women prisoners. "Americanization" classes for immigrant men focused on government, judicial systems, and voting while programs on homemaking, childrearing, and nutrition encouraged immigrant women to create patriotic American homes and families. Female reformers shared a common ideology and goal; they emphasized the importance of the home and the female role of domesticity in "civilizing" and then incorporating "outsiders" into the social order.

Notions about family, home, women, and caring have been traditionally linked. Until the second half of the twentieth century, most women accepted the obligation, indeed the duty, to care for their families and kin. Glenn argues that beyond the social norm of women's natural, innate, caring abilities, the state endorsed and codified women's domestic and nursing roles. Using court decisions and state statutes since the middle of the nineteenth century, Glenn demonstrates that society and the law often expected women, and especially wives and mothers, to provide unpaid care even for disabled dependents. Paid caring in the home, however, often conflicted with long-held and cherished beliefs of the special character of the home as a haven and refuge

from market transactions. This profoundly disadvantaged paid home-care workers and devalued their work as unskilled help, a labor of love, and not true work. This ideology, coupled with notions about gender, race, and class relations buttressed a separation of home and market and influenced legislation and court rulings which excluded home-care workers from labor law protection and from organizing. Remaining outside the modernization of labor relations, home-care workers were treated as dependents and denied social citizenship rights and protections such as minimum wage, overtime, safety standards, unemployment insurance, workers' compensation, and anti-discrimination laws.

Glenn expands her analysis and tackles today's enormous problem of hospitalized patients returning home sooner and much sicker. One of Glenn's sources is her own experience in using home care for her mother. With deinstitutionalization of the chronically ill, disabled, and frail elderly, the home has returned to the role it played in the early twentieth century. Glenn notes this "full circle" phenomenon with the striking differences of more acute care and complicated technological machinery in today's homes (p. 155). Missing from this discussion is the role of nurses, who in the early twentieth century—in contrast to today—found more employment in private homes than in hospitals. Glenn addresses rather fleetingly this job so identified with caring and women. In one instance she seems to infer that nursing professionalization happened in the early twentieth century, when the second half of the twentieth century would be more accurate (p. 40). This is a minor oversight, though, for a study that contributes to a more nuanced understanding of caregiving, which feminist scholars have been exploring for more than three decades. Glenn broadens the meaning of caring without romanticizing it, especially within the domestic realm, and introduces the role of nationhood and our understanding of full citizenship while focusing on paid and unpaid workers within labor market relationships.

With the numbers of elderly, disabled, and dependent individuals sharply increasing and the numbers of caregivers decreasing, Americans are facing a crisis. Glenn recommends creating a caring society, valuing care as real work, sharing caring responsibilities, and making "care central to the rights and entitlements of citizens" (p. 190). These are laudable but elusive goals in today's political climate, which favors attacking rather than increasing "entitlements." Nevertheless, Glenn provides a timely study and an insightful history of a problem that should concern all of us.

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REBECCA SHARPLESS. *Cooking in Other Women's Kitchens: Domestic Workers in the South, 1865–1960*. (The John Hope Franklin Series in African American History and Culture.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2010. Pp. xxix, 273. \$35.00.

In her excellent new history of African American cooks in the U.S. South, Rebecca Sharpless argues that cooks in private homes experienced their work primarily as employment. This is an important argument because black women's work in white families' homes has, since at least the antebellum era, been represented by white writers as an act of love rather than self-sustenance. White writers have also consistently assumed an innate racial talent for food preparation. Sharpless offers a fresh perspective on food, presenting it as the material of a particular kind of work that is itself learned and sometimes honed but always a means to a prosaic end—payday.

Sharpless provides irrefutable evidence that African American women approached cooking as work, rather than as an expression of either talent or love, and not particularly attractive work at that. They negotiated conditions to whatever extent was possible, gaining ground over time whenever individual circumstances favored them. Her most persuasive evidence that African American women saw cooking as but one form of unappealing employment is that as soon as possible they left it in great numbers for other kinds of paid employment, some even preferring agricultural labor to kitchen work.

Using a wide range of sources neatly woven together, Sharpless brings into vivid focus the many ways in which work of this particular kind was just one part of the lives of many African American women in the South after the Civil War. As often as possible, Sharpless tells the story of kitchen work in the words of the women who performed it. Finding their stories in oral histories, memoirs, court records, letters to public officials, and sometimes in fiction, Sharpless's work undermines the central trope of Kathryn Stockett's novel *The Help* (2009), which is that cooks were voiceless. Sharpless also uses accounts of cooks' actions that were either written by white women in black women's voices or directly by white women as employers for what they can tell us about the motives of all parties concerned, and unpacks their racial and class attitudes.

This monograph brings together primary and secondary sources effortlessly, constructing a multi-voice conversation in which cooks interviewed by the Federal Writers' Project and critics such as bell hooks participate as equals, so that the book reads as a collective effort. One of the most important points Sharpless makes is that African American cooks did not suffer in silence but made common cause through attempts to unionize and to take advantage of new worker protections in the 1930s. Despite the day-to-day isolation of cooking in private homes, they were in touch with contemporary issues in labor and also with other local workers. In letters sent to Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, African American cooks complained that work conditions were unfair and that racism made them worse. L. G. Huff, for example, wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt asking her to "organize something that will cause these dear house wives whom we work for" to "realize we are human even if we are a Black race" (p. 66).

The book is divided into sections by issues of employment rather than chronology, with change over time addressed in each section. Sharpless divides the cooks' experiences into the following categories: getting work, which includes acquiring training; the materials of work—food and equipment; conditions of employment, focusing on hours and pay; the ways in which domestic workers created a sense of home for their employers; and the impact of domestic work on the employee's own home life. In conclusion she emphasizes that black women escaped white kitchens as soon as they were able. The author's method allows readers to understand how different facets of working women's lives overlapped more and less problematically. She lets readers see work as part of life and life as part of work. So, for example, we get access to the white employers' relatively lavish larder through the eyes of the domestic worker who had trouble feeding her own family on the wages that she earned preparing this better and more plentiful food.

More interestingly complicated than just a restoration of agency to African American cooks, Sharpless's book offers a valuable model for labor historians, as it portrays work and life as inextricably linked but not mutually definitive. Although Sharpless does not make much of connections between the experiences of African American cooks in the postbellum era and those of housekeepers in the contemporary era, she gives us useful analytic tools to do so ourselves.

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TRACEY DEUTSCH. *Building a Housewife's Paradise: Gender, Politics, and American Grocery Stores in the Twentieth Century*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2010. Pp. 337. \$35.00.

Tracey Deutsch's well-written and impeccably researched book is a major contribution to studies of mass retailing and the politics of mass consumption. Deutsch examines how a new emphasis on low prices and self-service displaced older expectations of full service and personal attention and altered relations of power between grocery stores and women shoppers. While women in the early twentieth century asserted their authority over food pricing, "the older notion that food shopping . . . could be a route to broader economic and political authority . . . all but disappeared from public policy, business strategy, and social movements" by the late 1960s (p. 226).

In a fascinating opening chapter, Deutsch makes visible what the modern supermarket, with its emphasis on convenience and efficiency, concealed: women's work as food procurers. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, rudimentary refrigeration and inadequate space for storing perishables made food shopping a daily labor. To economize and avoid being cheated, women studied wholesale prices before venturing into public markets, shopped around for cheaper meats, and bargained for the best price. Shoppers and

small neighborhood grocers developed personal relationships, but such interactions were not always marked by trust. Because prices were negotiable and clerks selected goods for customers, shoppers worried that grocers might foist overpriced or inferior goods on them.

Deutsch's middle chapters analyze the rise of grocery store chains in the 1910s and 1920s and the emergence of consumer cooperatives and supermarkets in the 1930s and 1940s. Chains like Kroger, A&P, and National Tea Company offered women less personal attention and fewer services, but women liked them because they lowered prices and allowed shoppers to select goods themselves. Limited individual service also spared African Americans and other minorities from discrimination.

Despite such innovations, organized resistance to the new mass retailing and older family-run independent stores mounted during the 1930s and 1940s. Various groups took up the cause of protecting consumers' interests, including the General Federation of Women's Clubs, Consumers' Union, labor unions, and African American organizations, which encouraged patronage of black-owned businesses and lauded nondiscriminatory cooperatives. Consumer cooperatives evaluated and labeled goods by quality and hosted folk dances and camps to "build ties among members and inculcate egalitarian values" (p. 123). Despite these progressive impulses and women's prominent managerial roles, cooperative societies (and their critics) portrayed women as gullible consumers and unreliable political actors. Such attitudes, Deutsch argues, undermined attempts to construct consumer-directed alternatives to conventional mass retailing.

During the Great Depression, mass food retailers adopted new strategies in the face of anti-chain taxes, falling sales, and mounting suspicion of big business. They closed unprofitable stores, started selling meat alongside dry groceries, and aggressively courted upper- and middle-class consumers—partly to avoid providing in-kind relief to aid recipients. Chains encountered new price competition from supermarkets, even larger mass retail institutions that added shoe repair services, hair-styling salons, and bakeries. Chains resented supermarkets for selling below cost, and criticized them for attracting transgressive "can-opener cooks" who shopped at suspicious evening hours. Such critiques lost traction, however, as supermarkets adopted upscale features like wheeled shopping carts and feminine store décor.

Deutsch presents a fresh and compelling take on the possibilities and limitations of women's consumer activism during World War II. Although the government entrusted women with responsibility for policing retailers' compliance with food rationing and price controls, policymakers did so reluctantly, fearing that women shoppers might become overly politicized or weak enforcers. Many women proved to be effective price monitors, but shortages of goods and time pushed others to violate government mandates. Women were reluctant to report neighborhood grocers for price violations, because doing so might eliminate any chance of obtaining

future exceptions from them. Office of Price Administration (OPA) officials allied with centrally controlled stores to impose food and price controls on women customers. Not only could such stores assign staff to master and implement changing regulations, but they also proved easier to keep in line, as women were more likely to report violations when they lacked personal ties to stores.

In post-Cold War rhetoric supermarkets became emblems of American freedom, consumer choice, abundance, and women's liberation from drudgery. This vision did not fully square with reality. Processed and preserved foods eased food preparation, but women spent more time shopping in and driving to supermarkets. Postwar boycotts of supermarkets, though infrequent, revealed women's dissatisfaction with their inability to negotiate prices.

In a revealing comparison of supermarkets and hardware stores, Deutsch convincingly demonstrates how gender ideologies shaped the structure and design of mass retailing. Because hardware proprietors viewed home repairs and remodeling as challenging masculine labor and "worked to please men by focusing on their individualism," they long resisted abandoning personal attention for self-service models of retailing (p. 208). Deutsch's richly detailed and rigorously analyzed study will find an appreciative audience among historians of gender, business, labor, and consumer culture.

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PETER M. RUTKOFF and WILLIAM B. SCOTT. *Fly Away: The Great African American Cultural Migrations*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2010. Pp. xv, 408. \$45.00.

Like many scholars before them, Peter M. Rutkoff and William B. Scott reject the decades-old assertion that Africans were stripped of their culture in the Middle Passage. Examining "four pathways" from Charleston to Harlem, Birmingham to Pittsburgh, Houston to Los Angeles, and the Mississippi Delta to Chicago, they recount African Americans' journey, both physically and spiritually, from a rural to an urban world. Not only did Africans—and later African Americans—preserve a vibrant West African culture, through the Great Migration (1910–1970) they "challenged the deference of Americans toward European civilization and enabled them to take the first steps toward a multiracial, culturally eclectic society, open to a globalized world" (p. 12). For Rutkoff and Scott, this cultural legacy represents African Americans' "gift" to America and the world (pp. 3, 13).

Weaving together a rich body of secondary sources on African American migration and culture and numerous archived and exclusive interviews, the authors examine the characteristics of African American expression in language, religion, "black baseball," and music—including blues, gospel, jazz, zydeco, and

rhythm and blues. Along each "pathway" African Americans developed a distinct culture that they brought with them when more than half of the southern black population migrated north and west (p. 13). By 1930, more Mississippi-born blacks lived in Chicago than any city in Mississippi (p. 203). Following the observations of John Blassingame (*The Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South* [1972]), Rutkoff and Scott argue that racial segregation and "white hostility" led blacks to "close ranks as a people," creating a culture that served as a refuge even as it influenced American culture as a whole (pp. 85, 194, 256). While numerous scholars have examined the relationship between migration and the emergence of black culture outside of the South, *Fly Away* is unparalleled in its depth, and detail, encompassing two phases of the Great Migration in eight different cities. In their emphasis on migration to Charleston and Birmingham, the authors direct historical attention to black migration within the urban South, which is often overlooked.

The authors' assertion that "as West African culture helped define the rural South, so the culture of African American migrants helped define twentieth century urban America" is undeniably true (p. 103). Yet, this book does little to expand our historical understanding of why black culture was and continues to be so influential in American society as a whole. By framing African American's cultural influence as a "gift," Rutkoff and Scott avoid difficult and important questions of collaboration, appropriation, exploitation, and the role of capital in the production and consumption of black cultural expressions. They are similarly silent on the question of why black cultural forms have been so appealing to mainstream white America, while black people themselves were not. Instead, they note that black culture "crossed over" or that "white Los Angeles youth quickly claimed rhythm and blues as their own—re-named rock n' roll," yet the role of power in these uneven cultural exchanges is never adequately addressed (pp. 99, 320).

Despite persistent inequalities in incarceration rates, educational attainment, and employment rates and increasing residential segregation, this book concludes that by and large, African Americans successfully migrated to attain "the American middle-class dream" and that their culture "forced all Americans to reconsider the nation's ideals and unequivocally to reaffirm human freedom and equality" (pp. 334, 347). While it can be debated whether or not the United States has "unequivocally" affirmed freedom or equality, Rutkoff and Scott do achieve their objective of demonstrating the perseverance of West African culture. Although the authors' neglect of the importance of power in shaping the contours of African Americans' cultural influence limits the efficacy of their study, their penetrating discussion of black migrants' culture will prove eye-opening for many general readers. For scholars of African American migration or African American culture, this monograph offers few original insights. Nevertheless, given the elegance of their narrative and the liveliness

of its wide-ranging coverage of migrants' culture, Rutkoff and Scott's book is likely to become a staple in undergraduate courses in African American and American Studies.

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CHARLES H. MARTIN. *Benching Jim Crow: The Rise and Fall of the Color Line in Southern College Sports, 1890–1980*. (Sport and Society.) Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2010. Pp. xxiv, 374. Cloth \$95.00, paper \$30.00.

Sports hold an interesting position in American society. Teams provide communities with an identity. Games offer escape from difficult life situations or epitomize celebratory moments. Sports can legitimize cities and regions through boosterism, allow for the challenging of social morals, or strengthen one group's control over society. In the history of the American South, all of these themes played out in the racial segregation of college sports.

Charles H. Martin's book deftly examines the racial history of southern college sports. His main purpose "is to describe and analyze the shifting racial policies and practices at historically white southern universities, from 1890 through 1980" (p. xix). Following this framework, the book divides the timeline into distinct periods based on common themes. The first period focuses on the establishment of college sports programs at southern universities and the insistence on racial segregation in all activities involving school teams. Challenges to the system arose during the 1930s and 1940s. In this second period, the racial exclusion policies of southern schools came into conflict with the schools' desire for intersectional contests and national prominence. Following World War II, major social changes, such as the civil rights movement, led to the gradual integration of southern teams during the third period. The last half of the book examines the specifics of integration in the three major southern athletic conferences: the Southeastern Conference (SEC), the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), and the now defunct Southwest Conference (SWC). Martin discusses the individuals and events involved with desegregation at each member school. To add contrast to the policies of the other southern universities, he describes the success achieved by Texas Western University (TWU), now the University of Texas at El Paso, as the first major university in a former confederate state to actively recruit African American athletes, culminating in the school's 1967 National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) basketball championship.

Martin analyzes integration at smaller colleges in the South, but because of the sheer volume of material he focuses on the major athletic conferences, which dominated southern culture. The inclusion of TWU and its national championship team, whose five starting players and two reserves were African American, provides

a nice counter to the other universities' resistance to integration. The impact of TWU's success on the larger South is debatable, though, considering El Paso's geographic distance from the region's major metropolitan areas, and TWU's existence as an independent university unconnected to any of the important conferences.

Martin uses a wide range of secondary sources, newspaper articles, university archive material, and some interviews. For such a broad topic, his monograph provides a clear picture of the complex story. Segregation was not enforced in a uniform manner, and integration did not progress in a straightforward pattern. Martin explains events without editorializing. In doing so, he tells a good story, one that will be interesting to fans of sports and regional history, as well as to supporters of the universities discussed.

ROB FINK
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SHELLEY SANG-HEE LEE. *Claiming the Oriental Gateway: Prewar Seattle and Japanese America*. (Asian American History and Culture.) Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 256. \$58.50.

Shelley Sang-Hee Lee argues that Seattle, and in particular its Japanese American residents, used the ideal of cosmopolitanism to frame the city as a zone of multiracial, multiethnic, and international encounters. A flexible discourse deployed by boosters to encourage transpacific trade, city officials to manage a diverse populace, and Japanese Americans to bolster their position in a racially hostile environment, cosmopolitanism envisioned Seattle as a modern, worldly metropolis perched upon the Pacific Rim where people of different races and nationalities could coexist, trade, and prosper. Seattle's claim to be the "gateway to the Orient"—in the pre-World War II era during which Japan was the most powerful and important nation of that region—often pivoted on Japanese Americans and their uneasy racial and national positionings.

The 1909 Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition (A-Y-P) showcased possibilities for Japanese commerce. Thousands of Seattleites, cheering and waving Japanese and American flags, greeted the arrival of the Japanese delegation, which disembarked from a steamship and drove through a *torii* (Japanese ceremonial gate) erected on the dock. Although the A-Y-P glossed over anti-Japanese racism (the exclusionary Gentlemen's Agreement had been arrived at only two years earlier), local Japanese Americans sponsored parade floats and hosted receptions for Japanese dignitaries. In doing so, they hitched their fate to the exposition's cosmopolitanism, arguing that their Japaneseness should not exclude them but rather rendered them desirable citizens of Seattle.

In one of the book's most interesting chapters, Lee revives the Seattle Camera Club (SCC), a largely Japanese American group that rose to international prominence in the world of pictorialist photography during the 1920s. Members of the SCC exhibited nationally

and internationally, earning dozens of awards and shaping the image of Seattle in international eyes. Commentators inevitably praised their work in essentialist terms, arguing that they brought a Japanese sensibility to American subjects. The photographers themselves tended to concur, which demonstrates one of Lee's central assertions: that Japanese Americans negotiated their position in Seattle by acquiescing to being cast as foreign or racially other in exchange for being included under the rubric of cosmopolitanism.

Lee also shows how Japanese Americans used cosmopolitanism to counter anti-Asian sentiments in public schools and athletics. The selection of Fred Kosaka to play George Washington in a Presidents' Day celebration and the naming of Tadao Kimura as valedictorian of Franklin High School in 1924 sparked nativist backlashes assailing the assimilability of Japanese Americans. In the face of such racism, the Japanese American community actively cultivated progressive administrators and teachers, sending a few on educational missions to Japan to enhance their appreciation of Japanese history and culture. Japanese Americans also negotiated their identities on the ball fields and in the gymnasiums of Seattle, where international issues and local realities clashed. Going beyond interpretations that point to the role of sports in building ethnic solidarity, Lee argues that Japanese Americans used sports to confront and negotiate "racial, ethnic, spatial, and geographic boundaries" (p. 144). An ethnic baseball circuit connecting regions within the United States, Canada, and Japan enabled Seattle's Japanese Americans to consolidate their regional and national identities as they played against Japanese from elsewhere. One of Lee's most intriguing sections concentrates on interethnic competitions. She finds that Chinese American teams consistently participated in and even dominated the Japanese American league. As Sino-Japanese tensions arose across the Pacific in the 1930s, Seattle's Japanese and Chinese Americans continued to play amicably as fellow "Orientals"—a clear indication of the local or national nature of racialization.

Lee's account is engaging and original. Drawing upon a wealth of archival and interview-based sources, it extends Asian American historical understandings of the oft-ignored Pacific Northwest. However, contextualization of the Seattle case would be useful, because it was decidedly the third city among Japanese Americans after Los Angeles and San Francisco, both of which also vied for Pacific Rim supremacy. Lee's most important contribution is to connect discussions of Japanese American ethnic identity (by historians such as David Yoo and Lon Kurashige) and Asian American transnationalism (by scholars such as Yong Chen, Madeline Hsu, Dorothy Fujita-Rony, and Eiichiro Azuma) by arguing that Japanese Americans crafted their identities, even local ones, with scrupulous attention to international configurations. But historians have long noted that Japanese Americans in the prewar era envisioned themselves as a bridge between East and West and were influenced by sociologist Robert S. Park's marginal man

theory; hence, additional clarity about the relationships among cosmopolitanism, the bridge ideal, and marginality would be beneficial. Overall, the book under review argues convincingly that Japanese Americans fought for their place in the United States in part by locating themselves as part of a cosmopolitan, Pacific Rim city, and in doing so, helped to shape the city itself. Lee's narrative of negotiations over race, nation, and space is a welcome addition to regional, urban, and Asian American historiography.

DARYL JOJI MAEDA

University of Colorado at Boulder

DARYL J. MAEDA. *Chains of Babylon: The Rise of Asian America*. (Critical American Studies Series.) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 2009. Pp. xviii, 203. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$20.00.

Daryl J. Maeda's book highlights the self-recognition of shared experiences of racial oppression as key to the Asian American political consciousness that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. It succeeds as a cultural history of political activism during the period, when such consciousness went from incipient to full-blown.

The introduction, "From Heart Mountain to Hanoi," documents Pat Sumi's development as a radical activist and follows her from her white, middle-class community origins to a position as U.S. People's Anti-Imperialist delegate who accompanied Eldridge Cleaver to form global alliances. Maeda posits that Asian American racial identity was triangulated between blacks and whites and gained further definition within a third world versus civil rights paradigm. Sumi's international travel and her involvement with political organizations and African Americans prefigured her third world, feminist, Asian American, and cross-racial approach.

Chapter one, "Before Asian America," familiarizes readers with basic information about pre-1960s Asian American racialization. Maeda details Asian American migration and legal encounters, ranging from exclusion to citizenship, and including anti-miscegenation laws, social racialization, discrimination, racism, and comparisons across Asian American ethnic groups and other racialized minorities. He addresses pre-1960s nationalist immigrant organizing, second generation organizing, and radical organizing, suggesting that early efforts were not pan-ethnic, the 1950s were relatively inactive years, and connections between pre-1960s and 1960s radicals were limited.

Chapter two, "'Down with Hayakawa!' Assimilation vs. Third World Solidarity at San Francisco State College," concerns controversial figure S. I. Hayakawa, the semanticist who, as acting president of San Francisco State University, clamped down harshly on political activists during the Third World Liberation Front strike. Maeda traces Hayakawa's racialization and his assimilationist administrative politics and self-positioning contra whites, blacks, and Asian Americans, including Japanese Americans. Hayakawa's view that language helps unlock racism parallels Gunnar Myrdal's view

that if only well-meaning liberal white people learned about racism, it would eventually disappear.

While chapter three, "Black Panthers, Red Guards, and Chinamen: Constructing Asian American Identity through Performing Blackness," focuses primarily on the Red Guard Party and Frank Chin, it demonstrates how Asian American radicals relied upon black radical politicians as models of how to reject assimilation and claim a radical politics while asserting Asian American specificity. Chin critiqued the Red Guard Party for mimicking blacks, and he drew distinctions between blacks and Asian Americans, while also borrowing from black power to recuperate an Asian American phallic, heroic cultural tradition.

In chapter four, "'Are We Not Also Asians?' Building Solidarity through Opposition to the Viet Nam War," Maeda writes about the Bay Area Asian Coalition against the War (BAACAW), Asian American antiwar groups, and popular culture (e.g., plays and newspapers) that, together, produced an anti-imperialist consciousness, linking the experience of Asian American racism at home with Vietnamese suffering from U.S. imperialism abroad. BAACAW asserted a multi-ethnic identity, underscoring the interlinked plights of Asian Americans and Vietnamese. Maeda then illustrates how Asian Americans both opposed the war and fought in it, sometimes resulting in unique psychological traumas for Asian American vets.

In chapter five, "Performing Radical Culture: A Grain of Sand and the Language of Liberty," Maeda discusses the multi-ethnic musical group A Grain of Sand (1970–1974), which infused political content into music and adopted an anti-imperialist, anti-racist, multi-ethnic, cross-racial, and transnational musical politics. Part biography, part intellectual history, the chapter traces members' shifting consciousness, communist connections, and alliances with Asian American activists, Black Panthers, Young Lords, and the Native Americans who occupied Alcatraz.

The final chapter, "Fighting for the Heart of Asian America," makes three arguments about the Asian American movement: it produced the politically useful term "Asian American," it created a "usable past" meaningful today and in the future, and it rejected arbitrary boundaries between Asian Americans and other groups, creating alliances defined politically rather than ethnically.

The book features biographical, political, and intellectual contributions—especially on politics and art—by key political groups and figures such as Sumi, Hayakawa, Chin, Melvyn Escueta, Nobuko Miyamoto, and Chris Iijima. Activists became committed to principles of domestic and international collective activism. Domestically, collective activism developed through knowledge of and experiences with other racial minorities. Internationally, U.S. imperialism in Vietnam led to antiwar activism that paid attention to both Vietnamese and American experiences.

The book presciently draws attention to activists whose politics prefigured contemporary Asian Ameri-

can scholarly interests in transnationalism, anti-essentialism, empire, and ethnicity, as well as the unities among the cultural, the affective, and the personal as political.

KENT A. ONO

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RICK BALDOZ. *The Third Asiatic Invasion: Empire and Migration in Filipino America, 1898–1946*. (Nation of Newcomers: Immigrant History as American History.) New York: New York University Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 301. Cloth \$79.00, paper \$25.00.

Following on the heels of Chinese and Japanese exclusion, Filipino immigration to the United States was often referred to by twentieth-century American nativists as the "third Asiatic invasion." Rick Baldoz's book explores the ramifications of Filipino immigration understood as a kind of ongoing war on white society. The U.S. invasion and occupation of the Philippines opened up the pathways for Filipino labor migration to Hawai'i and the United States between 1906 and 1934. The increasing number of largely male migrants—at one point, estimated to be near 50,000 in the West Coast alone—was seen by nativist groups as a kind of invasion and colonization of the United States by its own colonial subjects. Filipino migrants were stunned and dismayed at the racial discrimination and harsh working conditions they were subjected to in the metropole. Baldoz traces the history of this other Filipino-American war as it set in motion a series of conflicts: among nativists seeking the exclusion of Filipinos and Filipino immigrants insisting on their right to civil recognition, and between local officials and federal judges struggling to parse and clarify the profoundly ambiguous status of Filipinos as "nationals." As Baldoz points out, such conflicts highlighted the irresolvable contradictions between domestic fears of non-white immigrants contaminating white society and the imperial project of territorial expansion and the colonial uplift of racially heterogeneous populations.

In 1901 President William McKinley authorized the recruitment of Filipinos to the U.S. Navy, thus inaugurating a long history of employing America's colonial subjects to fight the country's wars. By 1906, the first group of contract laborers was recruited by the Hawai'i Sugar Planters Association to fill the vacuum created by the exclusion of the Chinese. Filipinos soon formed unions and in coalition with Japanese workers conducted a series of costly strikes through the mid-1920s. Seeking to escape the hardships of plantation labor, many Filipinos were drawn to jobs in the booming agricultural industry of the West Coast. They were soon followed by thousands of single Filipino young men, a workforce highly sought after by growers in California, Oregon, Washington, by the canneries in Alaska, and by hotels and restaurants to perform jobs that whites were unable or unwilling to take on.

This book provides insight on the foundational roles of race, labor, and immigration in U.S. history. Drawing

upon a wide array of sources that include court documents, newspaper accounts, personal memoirs, and Congressional records, Baldoz produces a gripping narrative of nativist efforts to socially isolate and physically exclude Filipinos along with Filipino attempts at refusing such efforts. The war between nativists and immigrants amounts to a displacement and continuation of other wars, from the Civil War to the wars of 1898. The debate between imperialists and anti-imperialists, as Baldoz points out, grew out of the vexed legacy of Reconstruction: to wit, were whites capable of incorporating and civilizing non-white populations or were the latter irrevocably backward, thereby threatening the integrity of white civility? While imperialists would win the argument, their victory was fragile. Empire would always be shadowed by its anti-imperialist nativist sibling as seen in the history of Filipinos in the United States.

The ongoing tension between imperialists and anti-imperialists was in part predicated in the way by which the American invasion and occupation of the Philippines produced a new and highly ambiguous identity for Filipinos. Juridically and racially, Filipinos were neither citizens nor aliens, but “nationals” who were not “Mongolians” but “Malays.” Armed with this novel identity, Filipinos eluded racial quotas on immigration, traveling freely in and out of the United States. But freedom of entry contrasted sharply with the severe restrictions on their mobility imposed by the color line. Mobilized by the fear of contamination and racial death, nativists sought to counter the rising tide of Filipinos with legal and extralegal means. They passed laws on residential segregation, banned miscegenation and ownership of property, sought to reclassify Filipinos as “Mongolians,” and, when these efforts were frustrated, resorted to mob violence, bombings, and lynching from 1927 to the early 1930s. But Filipinos refused to back down. They sought legal recognition as citizens rather than colonial subjects entitled to the same rights as whites, openly kept the company of white women, argued for the right to marry across racial lines, formed unions often allied with the Communist Party, and struck for better working conditions.

Seeking the exclusion of Filipinos, nativists along with labor and agricultural interests lobbied Congress for relief. Forming an odd and uneasy alliance with Filipino representatives working for independence, nativists finally succeeded. Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffy Act in 1934, which reclassified Filipinos as aliens barred from the United States. With the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, the United States turned once again to its colonial subjects for military service and received an enthusiastic response. Baldoz provides a penetrating analysis of the ways Filipino military service during World War II complicated the racial basis of American citizenship. Existing laws had to be revised to allow “nationals” to join up and subsequently become entitled to veterans’ benefits and naturalization. The Rescission Act of 1946 reneged on the promise of equal pay and assistance for Filipinos who

had served in the U.S. military. Thus war shaped and was shaped by the color line, constructing its contours, eroding its edges, but only to reconfigure its force. In closely tracing the complexity of this most telling theme of the twentieth century, Baldoz’s book contributes to our understanding of both U.S. and Philippine national histories as irrevocably linked to the vicissitudes of colonial power and imperial projects. It truly deserves a wide readership.

VICENTE L. RAFAEL
University of Washington

DAVID GOODMAN. *Radio’s Civic Ambition: American Broadcasting and Democracy in the 1930s*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. xx, 337. \$49.95.

ALEXANDER RUSSO. *Points on the Dial: Golden Age Radio beyond the Networks*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2010. Pp. xi, 278. Cloth \$84.95, paper \$23.95.

In the 1930s, an American broadcasting system—characterized by the rise of commercially controlled radio networks and national in scope—coalesced in the United States. In their respective studies, David Goodman and Alexander Russo challenge this widely held notion. While neither overturns fundamental understandings of radio before World War II, both help complicate those understandings and, at their best, demand that readers rethink their presuppositions.

Goodman’s is the more ambitious of the two books. He sets out to refute the notion that private ownership of radio networks wholly shaped American radio in the 1930s. He rejects the idea of American broadcasting as simply a for-profit system, cast entirely in opposition to contemporary state-run systems. Instead, Goodman argues, the desire to ward off potential government reform structured broadcasting practices in the United States. Wary of intervention, broadcasters accepted that they had civic responsibilities and built public service into the commercial system. Consequently, a powerful counter to commercial concerns emerged: the civic paradigm, Goodman calls it.

This civic paradigm lies at the heart of Goodman’s argument: it was instrumental in shaping radio through the New Deal era. According to this line of thinking, the purpose of radio was to make listeners better citizens. By that, believers in the civic paradigm meant radio should foster thinkers who were active and critical, rational and tolerant, able to form their own opinions and respectful of diverse views. Put another way, radio should mass produce individualism by presenting all views and perspectives and letting listeners make decisions for themselves. It is, Goodman explains, an appealing ideology, but not one without flaws. Through the 1930s, he argues, the pluralism of the civic paradigm could not find a way to include the thinking of those who found the idea of tolerance for multiple views itself troubling. In the end, then, the civic paradigm divided America and broke apart, leaving broadcasting without a clear public role in the aftermath of World War II.

To develop this argument, Goodman insightfully juxtaposes a staggering array of ideas and sources. He brings an amazing wealth of research to bear, often showing familiar materials in a new light. The book moves between building the argument and demonstrating how it plays out in specific instances; for better and for worse, some of the chapters read as much like independent essays as parts of a larger whole. After defining the civic paradigm and where it came from, Goodman explores his themes through case studies of classical music and discussion forum programs. In considering where the civic paradigm fell short in the late 1930s, he looks at Orson Welles's *War of the Worlds* broadcast. In the concluding chapters, he examines the breakdown of the civic paradigm in World War II and its aftermath, including a terrific discussion of intellectual debates over the proper role of media in the post-war world. Goodman's work contains a tremendously provocative line of thinking. As the argument unfolds, readers familiar with the materials and debates will be forced to wrestle with Goodman's ideas and their own.

Many readers, however, will find Goodman's argument more stimulating than persuasive. The case for the resonance of the civic paradigm relies on several unexplored assumptions. Certainly, some genres of civic programming that existed on the air in the 1930s declined after World War II. But does that indicate the power of the civic paradigm or the evolution of an economic model in which companies increasingly sought to buy airtime? A consideration of economics, vital to the point, is lacking. Similarly, Goodman asserts that broadcasters adopted the view that radio should represent diversity on the air without consideration of either the many contemporary critics who claimed radio failed to do just that, or radio's poor record on representing African-American perspectives. On a narrower level, Goodman's case studies periodically veer away from supporting the argument. The chapter on classical music, for instance, is an excellent investigation into that genre of programming and listening, but it does not always make the case for the power of the civic paradigm. Moreover, despite Goodman's impressive research, some specific claims are oddly under sourced or the sources do not fully speak to the point in question.

Equally significantly, it is not always clear whose story Goodman is telling. The implication is that the civic paradigm represents the view held by a consensus among the middle and upper classes. But, while Goodman at times surveys a large array of voices on radio, frequently the study focuses on the radio industry's rhetoric about itself, uncritically accepting the industry's statements as representative of common views. When Goodman refers to "radio," it is not always clear if he means the industry, the programs, listeners' experiences, the contested social and culture space the medium occupied, or some combination.

Russo, in all likelihood, would levy one more critique: that in focusing on the programming and rhetoric of the national networks, Goodman implicitly presumes those national systems dictated the way listeners re-

ceived radio. Russo argues that American radio in the 1930s and 1940s should not be understood only as a national system; regional and local alternatives were very much alive too. There is modesty to this claim: Russo does not reject the importance of national networks. He argues instead that a hybrid system existed with a variety of means of distributing programming regionally and locally as well as nationally.

This, Russo suggests, had important implications. Radio in the pre-television era was not homogeneous. It might foster a national imagined community, but at the same time it could also encourage regional or local identities and connections. Radio, even in the network era, could address both mass and niche audiences. The longer story of radio's structural history, then, features more continuity than often noted, as many practices that embodied radio in the age of television can be traced to the 1930s. Even at the peak of the national system, Russo explains, broadcasters found a variety of ways to define audiences and commodify the attention of those audiences.

Developing this argument, Russo focuses on the structure of the industry, particularly the ways stations and networks got programs and advertisements to audiences. He provides a very fine examination of how material was actually disseminated, eclipsing the picture of national networks using phone lines. Individual affiliate stations, Russo notes, could reject or modify network programming on occasion. Alternatives existed. Russo traces the rise of regional networks—particularly in New England—which supplied stations with programming distinct from national offerings. Similarly, the development of recorded programs, Russo notes, allowed for the comparatively inexpensive distribution of programs, again outside national network control. Individual stations also occasionally defied the network model that bundled programs with commercials, through the sale of spot advertisements, which they interspersed throughout programs. In each of these cases, Russo details the presence of regional and local programs and advertisements, creating the possibility of regional or local communities. His final chapter, on advertisers' efforts to capture the attention of inattentive listeners, does not fit that point, but it further illustrates that even before television, radio began developing a new model of programming, and, as with the rest of the book, it argues against a homogeneous radio experience.

That Russo has written a history of advertising by radio more than a history of audiences is both a strength and a limitation here. His narrow focus enables him to craft a thorough and very sound account of the business of radio, with an eye toward how that structure shaped radio's impact. But without a consideration of the question of what listeners heard, readers will wonder how significant these counters to a national system truly were at the time. Ultimately, Russo admits these alternatives did not overthrow network dominance. But because he has couched his argument narrowly, Russo can allow that and still present a convincing case.

Russo's book does not demand that we rethink what we already know about radio. By setting up the idea of radio in the network era as fully homogeneous and national, Russo has created something of a straw man to knock down. Media scholars have long known that alternatives to network radio abounded in the 1930s and 1940s. The presence of studies emphasizing network radio reflects the reach of those networks and the sense that national broadcasting represented something new in the United States, not that alternatives were lacking. The originality and strength of Russo's study lies in providing real insights into how those alternatives worked, not in arguing for the existence of a hybrid system.

For students unfamiliar with the basic understandings of broadcasting in the 1930s that these books revise, Goodman and Russo may make their cases too forcefully. For scholars in the field, however, both works provide new insights into fundamental issues related to radio's meaning and, in Russo's case, structure. Russo's picture of non-network means of disseminating radio content is new and detailed. And whether one finds Goodman's work fully convincing or not, it pushes readers to rethink what they know about the ideology of radio in the 1930s and the possibilities for media in a democratic state.

BRUCE LENTHALL
University of Pennsylvania

JAMES J. COOKE. *Chewing Gum, Candy Bars, and Beer: The Army PX in World War II*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 2009. Pp. 186. \$39.95.

In June 1943, the Camp Van Dorn Post Exchange (PX) sent out a plea for more supplies, noting that "Beer without a doubt, is one of the biggest morale builders a Post Exchange can offer to an enlisted man" (p. 87). Soldiers appreciated chewing gum and candy bars, but they craved beer and cigarettes. In the first comprehensive study of the development of the Army PX during World War II, James J. Cooke argues that it quickly grew into the "world's largest department store . . . run by civilians in uniform" (p. 10). He explains the need for a PX and describes the Army's efforts to supply nicotine, low-grade alcohol, and other "comfort items" to individual fighting men on a regular basis (p. 7). Cooke has produced a detailed military history that focuses on morale, that intangible yet essential quality of a strong fighting force.

Cooke traces the early history of the PX back to Civil War "sutlers" who sold their wares to needy troops from tents. These tents later gave way to canteens, and during World War I the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) offered "comfort items" to men in uniform. General John J. Pershing, however, insisted that soldiers eschew "charity" (p. 14). Army rules required the YMCA to charge for even the smallest items, while other agencies ignored this rule and gave free candy bars to service men. These shifting practices betrayed an overall disorganization in the Army, angered soldiers, and lowered morale. The Army Exchange Service

(AES) emerged in 1941 both to provide soldiers with a steady supply of affordable nicotine, alcohol, and sweets and to confirm military awareness that troop morale mattered. The AES competed for shipping space with well-meaning non-profits and a few disreputable enterprises that wanted to send cigarettes to soldiers. Shortages of domestic tobacco and beer stymied AES attempts to keep PXs stocked abroad and at home. Soldiers settled for Army beer, which contained 3.2% alcohol, but demanded "Lucky Strike, Chesterfield, Camel, and Phillip Morris" cigarettes over all others (p. 107). The AES met challenges from the Women's Army Corps to stock PX shelves with makeup and other personal items. Thanks to the PX, all American soldiers "appeared to be rich" at the time of liberation in Europe (p. 143). GI dependence on the organization led to its expansion and solidified its place in Army life after the war.

Cooke derives the bulk of his evidence from government documents and soldiers' letters to friends and relatives back home. The narrative is at its liveliest when drawing from these letters. The author takes a chronological rather than a thematic approach to the topic, and this limits the book's scope for analysis. For example, servicemen, like many Americans at the time, smoked cigarettes, but unlike civilians, servicemen depended on the Red Cross and later the Army PX to make cigarettes available to them. Congress investigated cigarette shortages in the Army, because soldiers deserved their "fair share" of civilian comforts (p. 8). A discussion by the author of the negative effects of constant nicotine withdrawal on the soldier's capacity to perform might have connected this work to the literature on medical history. Cooke's book compares favorably to earlier studies on the central role alcohol has played in military life. It is engaging and informative, especially for those interested in a thorough account of the Army's need to create an efficient distribution system during wartime. Readers interested in issues of morale-building, masculinity, systems and individuals, and World War II will find important evidence here.

MEGHAN K. WINCHELL
Nebraska Wesleyan University

RICHARD LENTZ and KARLA K. GOWER. *The Opinions of Mankind: Racial Issues, Press, and Propaganda in the Cold War*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 2010. Pp. vi, 349. \$39.95.

The connection between domestic events and foreign relations in U.S. history is a relatively new scholarly emphasis. In some respects, it is understandable that researchers have often overlooked this connection. After all, it might well seem counterintuitive to posit a relationship between, say, an obscure occurrence in a remote area of the United States and a strained diplomatic dialogue between the White House and a developing nation. Yet with the tremendous acceleration of communication technology since the 1940s, such connections are increasingly possible. Nowadays, local

events can swiftly attract international attention, and they can thereby become bones of contention among international actors.

In this book, Richard Lentz and Karla K. Gower investigate the means by which seemingly out-of-the-way incidents in the civil rights struggle of the 1950s and 1960s grew into foreign-policy dilemmas. In a general sense, the project thus reiterates findings on the international implications of the movement, as in work by Thomas Borstelmann, Mary L. Dudziak, Azza Salama Layton, Doug McAdam, and John David Skrentny, among others.

Yet Lentz and Gower's account adds a new wrinkle to these explorations by stressing the relationship of the civil rights battles to the Cold War propaganda struggle. In a well-researched examination of archival sources and period media, they convincingly demonstrate that even the remotest incidents of racial hatred in the Deep South frequently became fodder not only in widely disseminated communist criticisms of the United States but also in the press reports of developing nations whose favor both sides coveted. As the book astutely observes, it was difficult for American diplomats to woo nations with troubled colonial histories when the Soviets were using the latest racist occurrences in Dixie to denounce the United States as "the land of the Fettered and the home of the Bigot" (p. 12).

The study draws a complex and fascinating picture of civil rights incidents on their journey from local news to international condemnation to subsequent domestic reactions. No domestic news sources could afford to support reporters in every locale, and foreign publications were even further removed. Thus, descriptions and photographs of racist abuses at a local protest march or sit-in generally emanated from nearby reporters, at least initially. These reports and pictures were spread domestically by wire services and then sent abroad. There, friends and enemies alike used the news as they wished, as when photographs of Bull Connor's police dogs attacking peaceful demonstrators became the basis for vicious propaganda attacks from communist publications. Curiously, however, such foreign criticisms often produced a backlash from the very same media sources that had initiated the reports, leading to commentary that stressed the alleged progress of racial relations in the United States and implored domestic racists to quit embarrassing the country.

As the book gradually progresses from 1946 to 1965, this pattern recurs again and again. Civil rights activists repeatedly find new places and ways to stretch the color line, racists react violently, local reporters break the story, news wires spread the information, the news goes international, foreign propagandists use it to attack the United States, and the whole cycle results in much hand-wringing at home, press accounts claiming that race relations are not *that* bad, and increased pressure on the government to make changes. Frankly, the cumulative effect of this repetitious cycle on the reader is somewhat numbing, eventually leading one to wonder

if any of those involved were aware of their contributions in prolonging it.

At length, this numbing effect becomes the primary drawback to Lentz and Gower's account. Most of the chapters vary primarily in the circumstances that generated the local civil rights incident(s). The subsequent cycle of reporting, disseminating, propagandizing, and reacting, however, almost always comes across as being quite similar from year to year and from chapter to chapter. The result is a repetitive narrative trajectory, leaving individual chapters with surprisingly little to distinguish them from each other. Of course, this is how much of the history occurred, so it is unfair in some respects to expect an analysis of that history to avoid falling into the same cycle. Yet perhaps it might have been advisable to combine several of the chapters, or to otherwise change up the shape of the narrative elements as a means of differentiating events for the reader.

This criticism notwithstanding, the book is undeniably a valuable contribution to our understanding of the events in the civil rights struggle within a much broader context. While it might have been easy for those involved in that struggle to be unaware of the international impact of their actions, it is incumbent on those who look back at the fight to recognize that events in Selma, Greensboro, and Little Rock reverberated far beyond their local origins, ultimately helping shape the propaganda salvos of the Cold War itself.

JAMES J. KIMBLE
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MICHAEL E. LATHAM. *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2011. Pp. ix, 246. Cloth \$69.95, paper \$22.95.

In recent years, the study of development has taken off in international history and particularly in the related field of U.S. foreign relations. Michael E. Latham was one of the earliest contributors to this lively discussion with his incisive *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (2000). His latest work continues this trend by opening a window on the variety of new scholarship on the issue in this excellent primer on the place of modernization in U.S. foreign relations.

Joining other recent scholars, Latham argues that modernization was not a pure product of the Cold War but part of a longer tradition of development ideas that have deep roots in U.S. and world history. Nevertheless, the global Cold War and the complications of a worldwide rush of nationalist, anticolonial revolutions demanded a revised approach. The United States had to compete with Soviet (and later Chinese and Cuban, among other) communist visions of modernity. They responded with what was "fundamentally a liberal idea" (p. 123). Latham describes modernization as a sort of "global New Deal" to "create capitalist, market-based

economies and liberal states" that Americans offered the nationalist regimes of the "new nations" (p. 7).

Through case studies that include Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana, Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt, and Jawaharlal Nehru's India, Latham shows that this vision did not include all that these leaders (and their people) wanted. Facing resistance and increasingly worried about dramatic population growth in what had become known as the "Third World," American planners intensified their reliance on technocratic fixes, from ambitious population control programs to the innovations offered to world agriculture by the "Green Revolution." In places like South Vietnam and Guatemala, modernization ideas were enlisted to tamp down insurgent movements and the ideas that motivated them.

The results were ironic. Programs to support a liberal vision turned out to sponsor and propagate violence and oppression. Technologies that Americans put great stock in to solve problems had a host of unintended consequences, often creating tensions and instability in the very societies the United States was attempting to steady.

The assumptions behind modernization broke down under the pressures of war in Vietnam and the critiques of modern society intensified by the global upheaval of the 1960s. Many came to doubt the efficacy of these policies and the ideas behind them, and they fell from favor. However, Latham, like other scholars, asserts that they merely lay dormant in U.S. and international affairs. Neoliberal policies, particularly those offering a specific type of "globalization," repositioned basic assumptions of modernization in their view that all peoples were moving in one direction toward a certain type of high-tech, modern society dramatized by the West and epitomized by the United States. The latent attractiveness of modernization ideas meant that they quickly asserted themselves when, at the start of the twenty-first century, the United States embarked on "nation building" and counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq that echoed similar odysseys during the Cold War. Latham suggests that these efforts might not have much more success than their predecessors.

Writing with clarity and verve, Latham makes complicated topics accessible and diverse situations comparable. His précis of the origins of modernization theory and its rapid spread across the American social sciences is fluent and does much to explicate why the concept seemed like an attractive solution to so many problems for policy makers and scholars alike. He makes clear that modernization was not just an activity conducted by the American state. It had considerable support from a collection of non-governmental advocates that included universities, foundations, and missionary groups. Latham also gives room to the governments and leaders of those countries the United States sought to modernize, reminding readers of their agency. However, at points the development projects themselves are overshadowed by accounts of the diplomatic wrangling between the United States and the regimes it sought to influence. This is a weakness in one

respect, but in another it is a strength. Such emphasis connects modernization to the established narratives of U.S. policy during the Cold War. It demonstrates how often complicated political and social problems were viewed through the lens of development in Washington and among the host of non-governmental groups committed to the cause of modernization.

Latham has captured and synthesized the fresh and exciting scholarship on this rich issue, while adding to it in a manner accessible to students and stimulating for scholars.

DAVID EKBLADH
Tufts University

LINDA SARGENT WOOD. *A More Perfect Union: Holistic Worldviews and the Transformation of American Culture after World War II*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. ix, 339. \$49.95.

In this book Linda Sargent Wood "contends that one of the most powerful visions to guide Americans between World War II and the mid-1970s was a holistic, communal, and often utopian worldview" (p. vii). To make this argument convincing, Wood focuses in six chapters on five individuals and one institution. The chapters take up Rachel Carson, R. Buckminster Fuller, Martin Luther King, Jr., Abraham Maslow, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and the Esalen Institute in Big Sur, California. Wood believes that a holistic worldview "fundamentally altered American history" (p. 6). She sees holism as cooperative and ethical, knitting together science and religion, body and soul, individual and society. It fostered civil rights activism, environmentalism, feminism, health movements, and more.

The book's strength comes from Wood's wide and careful reading of published sources and her new angle on post-World War II cultural shifts. Its weakness lies in the broadness of its thesis, which is completely focused on a holistic worldview. But "holism" itself is an elastic term, as Wood candidly admits. She marvels at its "amazing plasticity" (p. 16). Only one of her protagonists—Maslow—even used the word. Yet instead of seeking precision, Wood expands holism to include ecology, technological utopianism, race relations, New Age spiritualism, and everything in between. In a German framework holism is often placed within a romantic and even antisemitic context, as in Anne Harrington's *Reenchanted Science: Holism in German Culture from Wilhelm II to Hitler* (1996). In Wood's usage, any social or religious thinker who appealed to the health of the whole society could be classified as a holistic. For Wood, both Carson, a technological skeptic, and Fuller, a technological enthusiast, are holistic thinkers, but what separates them might be larger than what unites them. Indeed, Wood spends no effort in justifying the choice of those to whom she dedicates chapters; and it would not be difficult to draw up another list of influential writers who were prominent in the sixties and who might be judged holistic, such as

John Kenneth Galbraith, Jane Jacobs, and Lewis Mumford.

Wood is well aware that her argument on the centrality of holism might vanish in a cloud of smoke, and repeats it relentlessly, as if repetition makes it more convincing. She cites Aristotle—"The whole is more than the sum of its parts"—but this idea might be reversed for her book. The parts are better than the whole. When she is farthest from her thesis, the book is the strongest. When she is closest to it, the book flags. Her effort to link Carson and King as companion holistic thinkers is strained at best. "While Carson imagined food chains and connections between wind, water, and soil, [King] focused on human beings of every stripe . . . united by love and bound together by bonds of mutuality. She employed her holism to fight the chemical industry; he used his rendition to combat economic, political, and social institutions that perpetuated racism" (p. 84). Where she is least convincing her prose gets convoluted. "King read the problem [racism] holistically because he saw the world and community relations holistically" (p. 101).

The chapter on the Esalen Institute may be Wood's best. The links to holism are also most obvious if only because psychologists like Frederick "Fritz" Perls became a resident guru. Perls, a refugee from Germany, had studied and written about Gestalt psychology, which has a legitimate claim to be called holistic. By the 1960s, however, Perls moved far from the original Gestalt psychology to group psychology and psychodrama. His shift reflected a general trend at Esalen, which became a bazaar for therapists hawking self-liberation, gurus preaching mystical religions, and doctors selling holistic health. Again, Wood is well aware of the vagaries of Esalen, but she gamely insists that its story "has much to tell about holism" (p. 173). It does, but it hardly supports Wood's main argument. In fact the opposite thesis is more convincing. Whatever holism can be found in American thought, it rapidly succumbs to good old American individualism. Esalen's "holism" devolved into self-help, yoga, and health manias that entered the mainstream. When Wood cites the holistic slogan of the upscale grocery chain Whole Foods, which has fought unionization—"Whole foods, whole people, whole planet"—we see that her thesis that holism transformed American culture has been turned on its head. Nevertheless, Wood has written a thoughtful exploration of several thinkers and one institution that flourished in the early 1960s.

RUSSELL JACOBY
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Los Angeles*

ROBERT A. JACOBS. *The Dragon's Tail: Americans Face the Atomic Age*. (Culture, Politics, and the Cold War.) Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 2010. Pp. xii, 151. Cloth \$80.00, paper \$24.95.

It is hard to fight the feeling that the atomic age and its attendant anxieties have already become somehow ir-

relevant, relegated to the irradiated dustbin of history. Despite the continuing presence of massive nuclear arsenals, now morphed and subsumed into post-9/11 weapons of mass destruction, and despite recent trenchant warnings about the dangers of nuclear energy and technology, as in Japan's tsunami-ravaged Fukushima nuclear power plant, nuclear discourse and iconography now seem arcane and even quaint relics of an increasingly distant Cold War past. Thermonuclear weapons and bomb shelters, Bert the Turtle and mutant Alamogordo giant ants appear to have lost their power to inform and to inspire terror, especially for younger generations of Americans.

Robert A. Jacobs has stepped into this amnesiac nuclear breach to remind readers of the time when such language and icons did speak to Americans learning to enter a newly dangerous and transformative age. Jacobs revives interest in the historical and cultural links between atomic age culture and the Cold War through what he deems the "alchemical narrative," the "primary nuclear narrative" that guided understandings of nuclear weapons as "signifiers of transformation or fundamental change" (p. 3). Tying nuclear science and nuclear imagery to notions of alchemy allows Jacobs to explore how nuclear narratives veered into the realm of the fantastic, the magical, and the mythic, and he argues that most Americans indeed experienced nuclear weapons through such lenses. This approach works particularly well for discussions about radiation, given its invisibility yet deadly dangerousness and its real and imagined capacity for mutation.

Jacobs centers attention on the era of atmospheric or above-ground nuclear testing and claims logically enough that these years rendered nuclear weapons most visible and their attendant release of radiation—however invisible—most apparent and appalling. Looking in particular at the impact of the tests conducted at the Pacific Proving Ground and the Nevada Proving Ground (later the Nevada Test Site) throughout the 1950s and into the early 1960s—until the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 moved the tests underground—Jacobs examines science fiction, civil defense literature and film, social science, bomb shelters and survivalism, atomic soldiers and downwinders, and American youth experiences in order to assess both fantastic nuclear narratives and the government's more mundane counternarratives about its "good" or "clean" bomb (p. 94). Because the 1954 Bravo test of the hydrogen bomb at the Bikini atoll had made fully and fearfully public the range and danger of nuclear radiation, the government—and the Atomic Energy Commission in particular—relied on its narratives about good, clean American bombs (smaller explosions yielding less radiation) in order to forestall worries for the atomic servicemen and civilians operating in or living downwind of the Nevada Test Site.

Government counternarratives appeared especially necessary in Nevada because, as Jacobs points out through an analysis of the mutant irradiated monsters of 1950s popular culture, the "Nevada desert had be-

come a mythic zone where supernatural events could be *expected* to happen” (p. 37, emphasis in original). Jacobs misses an opportunity to complicate his treatment of the presumably supernatural Nevada landscape, however, when he ascribes construction of counternarratives about the freakish, fantastic terrain of the Nevada Test Site largely to the federal government alone. Some Americans, especially Las Vegas residents and tourists, provided a stunning (and somewhat freakish) counternarrative of their own, as an atomic bomb-test watching craze erupted in the desert. This was, after all, an era of profitable atomic tourism for Las Vegas, which hospitably provided atomic cocktails, atomic hair-dos, and the 1957 Miss Atomic Bomb contest along with the vistas necessary to see the atomic flashes and mushroom clouds from the Nevada Test Site.

Jacobs’s fine study of the multiple narratives informing the era of atmospheric nuclear testing is a lean and concise one, and greater depth of analysis may have been sacrificed for brevity’s sake. One of the book’s most effective sections, dealing with “the atomic kid” (p. 99) and the 1951 civil defense film *Duck and Cover*, is compelling because of its deep reading of the text and its ability to make a bygone icon like Bert the Turtle return to a place of complex cultural relevance for Americans beyond the baby boom generation. *The Dragon’s Tail* may pique the curiosity of those unfamiliar with early atomic age culture, but for baby boomers and historians already schooled in the subject this study will seem familiar as it covers a nuclear time and space treated in other historical works on atomic age culture and technology. It is nonetheless a welcome addition to the literature and an intelligent recapitulation of the cultural narratives swirling amid the above-ground nuclear tests conducted by the United States.

MARGOT A. HENRIKSEN
University of Hawai‘i at Manoa

CAMPBELL CRAIG and FREDRIK LOGEVALL. *America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2009. Pp. 439. \$26.95.

In their book, Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall accomplish something amazing: in a mere 370 pages of text they present a cogent, well-written, highly informative, yet accessible narrative of the forty-five-year history of the Cold War. Of course it helps immeasurably that both authors are eminent historians and leading scholars in their respective subfields. Logevall is the author of the classic *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (1999); Craig is the author of three previous books, most notably *The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War* (2008) with Sergey Radchenko and *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War* (1998). Together they bring a level of expertise to more facets of the Cold War than the vast majority of single-authored works could possibly emulate.

The book is divided into nine chapters beginning with

the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s, when America’s commitments to the world were limited and opposition to involvement in European affairs remained firm. It then discusses the origins of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation, the significant intensification of the Cold War in the aftermath of the communist victory in China and the first atomic bomb test by the Soviet Union, and, of course, the Korean War. The study examines President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s efforts to stem the massive surge in conventional military spending through heavy reliance on nuclear weapons. Meanwhile Eisenhower would “evade” nuclear war during the numerous Cold War crises of the 1950s through adoption of an all-or-nothing strategy—either the United States would launch a massive nuclear strike or it would not use nuclear weapons at all. Eisenhower steadfastly refused calls from his own military command, his secretary of state, and the academic community to explore the use of limited nuclear options in order to provide a third option. This strategy would come into play during the two Quemoy-Matsu crises of 1954 and 1958 as well as the Berlin Crisis of 1958. John F. Kennedy’s administration tried its best to sidestep the all-or-nothing paradox through the doctrine of Flexible Response designed to give the president both conventional and limited nuclear options, but it too lacked the strategy or capabilities (especially conventional) that were required to support it. Craig and Logevall explain how the Kennedy administration was able to resolve the Berlin and Cuban missile crises through compromise and negotiation rather than nuclear brinkmanship.

The authors then tackle the tragedy of Vietnam. Logevall presents an excellent summary of the case he made in *Choosing War*, demonstrating that Lyndon B. Johnson’s public rationale for the Americanization of the war was not even accepted by his administration’s foreign policy leadership and that Johnson himself possessed grave doubts regarding the morality of sending young Americans to die in a war he recognized as unwinnable. The consequences we all know: a devastating war that caused the deaths of over 58,000 Americans and nearly two million Vietnamese while maiming countless others. The economic consequences were similarly dire; deficit spending to pay for the conflict caused inflation that would ultimately force the United States to abandon the gold standard and float the U.S. dollar freely on the world market, effectively scuttling the Bretton Woods economic system that had operated since the end of World War II.

From Vietnam the book turns to Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s efforts to create détente with the Soviet Union, open relations with China, and resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. It also chronicles the demise of the Nixon presidency over the Watergate Hotel break-in. Logevall and Craig examine the impact of Jimmy Carter’s presidency and the importance he placed on promoting human rights, an emphasis Carter primarily conceived of to distinguish his foreign policy from the realpolitik of the Nixon-Kissinger years. The narrative focuses on the collapse of détente in the mid-1970s that

culminated in the revival of the Cold War. The authors then cover the Cold War's ultimate end with rapprochement between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. In a powerful and thought-provoking conclusion, Logevall and Craig assess the Cold War, agreeing that it ended in total victory for the United States but at a cost far higher than necessary had the U.S. government stuck to the limited containment policies of George F. Kennan.

There is much to applaud in this work and the authors will, I am sure, reap many accolades because of it. Due to its brevity and jargon-free writing style the book will be especially useful for undergraduates as well as the general public, but even specialists will find it worth reading.

GREGORY MITROVICH

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JONATHAN P. HERZOG. *The Spiritual-Industrial Complex: America's Religious Battle against Communism in the Early Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 273. \$34.95.

Jonathan P. Herzog has made a valuable scholarly contribution to what appears an emerging subgenre of Cold War studies focused on the role of religion. Herzog builds on existing scholarship, adding a great deal of detail and new material from a wide range of sources and archives that he has effectively mined to produce a compelling narrative, informed by thought-provoking perspectives. Erudite, well written, and a very good read, the book will appeal to a wide audience. It will fascinate and entertain scholars within the field as well as a more general readership.

Complementing scholarly publications examining the significance of religion in U.S. foreign policy, Herzog's meticulous exegesis emphasizes developments on the home front. Certainly some of the material will be familiar to those well versed in the domestic Cold War and the McCarthy period. The value of the book, however, resides in its focus on religion and its explication of how and why religion assumed such importance. Herzog explores the instrumentalization of religion according to a Cold War rationale that subsequently had profound consequences for American politics and society and American Christianity.

Herzog's title is, of course, a clever wordplay on the military-industrial complex against which Dwight D. Eisenhower warned in his farewell address. The president was himself deeply implicated in using religion as part of his own Cold War initiatives at home and abroad. Herzog illustrates how what he terms the "spiritual-industrial complex" manufactured a religious revival born in board rooms. It was a product of commercial and government interests intended to serve Cold War purposes. Earlier religious revivals had spread from the bottom up; this one, like McCarthyism, came from the top down. Herzog contends, however,

that in the long term binding religious faith to the communist threat served to weaken mainstream religion.

In part one Herzog reviews the process by which secular institutions assumed those functions that were once the primary domain of religion and how the idea that communism was a religion evolved. Herzog argues that had the latter not happened, religion would have remained peripheral to the ideological struggle that emerged between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

In part two Herzog examines the spiritual mobilization of American society, including the rhetoric, policies, and actions that constituted the spiritual-industrial complex and the way in which American propagandists came to recognize that religious belief could be highly instrumental in the Cold War struggle. His analysis embraces individual leaders, political institutions, national security institutions, and areas such as education, the media, corporations, voluntary associations, and entertainment.

The final part evaluates the outcomes and achievements of the spiritual-industrial complex and why the endeavor faded by the beginning of the 1960s. Herzog's final analysis explores the legacy of the spiritual-industrial complex, suggesting that it created a platform from which both modern religious and political conservatism grew.

Herzog's study is as important for American religious history as it is for studies of the Cold War. An important theme that informs the study is the tension "between America the secular nation and American the covenant nation" (p. 9). At a time when secularization is a fiercely debated topic and scholars are contesting the degree to which the United States did or did not succumb to it, Herzog's approach is guaranteed to invoke some debate. Noting that scholars often study the process by which covenant societies become secular ones, Herzog claims to be doing the reverse, examining how a postwar secular United States strove to become a covenant nation. Herzog concludes that the Cold War and its early leaders "altered the relationship between sacred and secular in America by rallying to the belief—doubted once by secular prophets, religious leaders, and common folk—that religion could be of use not only to individuals but to society as well" (p. 216). One response from the contested area of secularization will be that this was always America's dominant discourse. It is a conclusion that will undoubtedly be challenged by scholars who discern more continuity than change in the historical relationship between sacred and secular America, including, of course, opponents of the secularization thesis.

Herzog has produced a welcome study that will undoubtedly provoke a good deal of scholarly debate and disagreement in a number of fields, most especially among the growing cohort of scholars looking at the Cold War's religious dimension. My major criticism is not of the author but of the publisher. As with any piece of worthwhile scholarship, the book is based on diverse archival research and a wide range of secondary

sources, making the inclusion of a bibliography of immense value to its academic audience. But this book lacks a bibliography. Certainly Oxford University Press is not alone in sacrificing the bibliography to the word count. It is unfortunate that commercial considerations can compromise a pioneering study such as Herzog has delivered. As the book is likely to be a popular addition to undergraduate reading lists, it is to be hoped that future editions will rectify this lamentable omission.

DIANNE KIRBY
University of Ulster

DARREN DOCHUK. *From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-Folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism*. New York: W. W. Norton. 2011. Pp. xxiv, 520. \$35.00.

Southern California became a land of promise during the middle decades of the twentieth century. Industrial development beckoned millions of sojourners from Texas and Tennessee, Arkansas and Oklahoma, men and women whose religious outlook would “southernize” evangelicalism in their new home and promote portentous changes in the politics of the state and, later, the nation. The origins of the religious Right, as Darren Dochuk explains in this nimbly written book, owe much to these Southland evangelicals.

By 1970 more southern-born residents lived in California than in any other state outside the South, and they had been moving there in droves ever since the Depression. Jobs drew them, and with the coming of World War II, booming defense industries turned the corridor between Los Angeles and Long Beach into the second largest industrial area west of Chicago. “Okies” and “Arkies” settled there as well as in the San Fernando Valley and Orange County, creating raw, sprawling, blue-collar communities composed of a hodgepodge of factories, dairy and citrus farms, and small homes and clustered around nothing in particular. The newcomers also built churches as soon and as cheaply as they could manage, and entire neighborhoods often identified as Southern Baptist, Church of Christ, Pentecostal, or Nazarene. Dochuk finds that these southern plain-folk transplants showed a distinctive religious disposition: they were rigid on doctrinal matters but inventive and pragmatic in their methods of proselytizing, which included regular revivals and door-to-door campaigns. The passage of time would sand off the rougher edges of their theology (as well as their racism), while their limber approach to spreading the gospel would foster a dynamic religious culture characterized by entrepreneurialism and experimentation.

If southern evangelicals in the Southland had a firm sense of their beliefs and mission, the first generation of sojourners had no clear political imperatives. The great strength of Dochuk’s analysis is illustrating the process by which their political attitudes coalesced, their objectives sharpened, and their strategy evolved during the postwar decades. In his view, plain-folk evangelicals were “Jeffersonians” who embraced pris-

tine capitalism, individualism, and localism—values which made them wary of labor unions and the New Deal state. But that these southern Democrats of the late 1940s would bond with a burgeoning conservative movement celebrating untrammelled free enterprise and condemning big government was anything but a foregone conclusion.

Dochuk shows how and why they did in a series of fascinating chapters that vividly evoke the people and institutions who brokered that alliance during the 1950s and 1960s. In the vanguard of those bridging the distance between southern plain-folk and secular conservatives were evangelical preachers, entrepreneurs, and entertainers. There was Billy Graham, who made the southern evangelical message more beckoning to a rising middle class; there was Billy James Hargis, who preached Christianity as a bulwark against communism; there was E. V. Hill, the charismatic African American preacher who criticized the civil rights movement and argued for eliminating racial prejudice one reclaimed soul at a time. Among business leaders there was George Pepperdine, the auto supply magnate whose charity funded the college (later university) that became the intellectual center for Christian libertarian thought, and Bill Bright, the candy manufacturer whose ingenuity hatched the Campus Crusade for Christ. As these latter efforts suggest, targeting the young through evangelistic and educational outreach was key to the strategy of the emerging religious Right.

By the time of Barry Goldwater’s run for the presidency in 1964, southern California’s evangelicals had entered the orbit of the Republican Right, and their first triumph came two years later with the election of Ronald Reagan to the governorship. Southern evangelicalism had ceased being a poor person’s religion, Dochuk pointedly observes, and that description no longer fit many of its adherents in the Southland. Prosperity had turned their hardscrabble settler communities into comfortable suburbs, and makeshift churches had given way to worship palaces like the Crystal Cathedral.

Dochuk’s narrative loses some momentum once it moves into the 1970s, when his southern evangelicals begin to think and act like political insiders. And southern California drifts from the center of his story as the successful political synthesis of religious and secular conservatives goes national with Richard Nixon’s drive for the presidency. But those are minor disappointments in a book that more than delivers on its opening promise to persuade the reader that the religious Right did not emerge full-blown from the ambitions of Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson in the late 1970s. On the contrary, that awesome political force slowly gathered power as southern California became another notch on the Bible Belt and the engineers of that evangelical crusade made unexpected alliances with Republicans taking a hard turn right.

CHRISTINE LEIGH HEYRMAN
University of Delaware

ANTHONY BURKE SMITH. *The Look of Catholics: Portrayals in Popular Culture from the Great Depression to the Cold War*. (CultureAmerica.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2010. Pp. xi, 284. \$34.95.

Anthony Burke Smith's outstanding study treats the intersections of U.S. religion, culture, and politics from the 1930s to the 1950s. He demonstrates how mass media portrayals of Catholics indicated shifting emphases in American life, from the Depression era's affirmation of the "public good" and its positive disposition toward social reform to the Cold War era's privileging of private prosperity and security and its resurgence of social and political conservatism. On the one hand, the book examines nonsectarian depictions of Catholics, including *Life* magazine photo-essays and feature films distributed by MGM and Universal. On the other, it analyzes identifiably Catholic subjects like the familiar radio and television personality Fulton J. Sheen and Academy Award-winning director John Ford, both of whom pursued Catholic perspectives in their popular productions. Ultimately, Smith argues persuasively that Catholicism—long suspect in Protestant-dominated America—supplied a powerful symbolic language for articulating and promoting key developments in national life during the decades before John F. Kennedy's election to the presidency.

Depression-era Hollywood's portrayals of Catholics commonly pursued two themes: their strong sense of ethnic identification and their uneasiness about inequality in industrial society. Expanding on the work of Lary May, Smith points out that both of these themes provided a means for engaging broad popular interest in communal solidarity in 1930s America, an interest that undergirded the New Deal. For example, he argues that the recognizably Catholic characters of the gangster and the priest in *Angels with Dirty Faces* (1938) voiced a shared critique of capitalism for leaving many to suffer in dens of urban poverty and iniquity. Other contemporary films, including *Boys Town* (1938) and *San Francisco Docks* (1940), explored the same message through Catholic characters. Appealing to broad audiences, such depictions, Smith writes, indicated "an extended Catholic moment in the country's collective psyche" (p. 15), a moment during which Catholicism would be a favored vehicle for exploring the meaning of American identity. In the earlier part of this "Catholic moment," religion was regarded as crucial to both cultivating a sense of shared social identification and challenging economic disparity.

But by the early 1940s, depictions of Catholics changed. Where previously Catholicism had signaled broad social commitments, it would become a medium for celebrating privacy and familial security during World War II and the Cold War. In making this point, Smith echoes Robert B. Westbrook's insights about how war stirred Americans' private, home-centered interests, even as they cheered far-flung military battles against totalitarianism. Blockbusters like *The Song of Bernadette* (1943) and *Going My Way* (1944) empha-

sized a privatized faith: in the former case, a religion that sustained devout individuals hemmed in by a world of doubters and secularists; in the latter, a religion that one could comfortably embrace within the domain of lace curtains, finely appointed dining tables, and general middle-class good taste. By the era of the Cold War, Smith argues, this shift toward Catholics representing private values mirrored a diminished popular interest in economic disparity and a more conservative turn in national politics. Of course, it also paralleled Euro-American Catholics' movement into the middle class and their subsequent abandonment of tight-knit urban, ethnic enclaves.

Smith indicates that American Catholics took pride that their faith could articulate American values, regardless of whether they were of a communitarian or individualist variety. Yet, he also demonstrates that popular culture's identification of Catholicism with communal aspirations did not entirely disappear in the 1940s, a point affirmed by James T. Fisher's recent study of *On the Waterfront* (1954). Smith shows that Fulton Sheen—in whom he sees a perverse emphasis on the spiritual value of the individual's physical and emotional suffering—championed private and interior dimensions of faith but also used radio and television to impress upon 1950s audiences their social responsibilities. He examines how John Ford, son of Irish-Catholic immigrants to Yankee New England, used religion in his films to advance his vision of a just society that could encompass a range of groups perceived as inassimilable "outsiders," a vision carrying 1930s concerns forward into the Cold War era.

In an intriguing chapter on Henry Luce's *Life* magazine, Smith shows how this Protestant media magnate saw Catholicism as a means to advance his vision of an "American Century" of global capitalism bolstered by military might. Another chapter on the oeuvre of Leo McCarey, the man behind *Going My Way* and other Catholic-themed films, traces this influential figure's conflation of religious piety, individualist values, and patriotic anticommunism.

This is a rich, sophisticated book that will help frame a broader narrative of religion and public life extending into the era of the "religious right," when American evangelicals and fundamentalists would take important cues from Catholics.

JAMES P. MCCARTIN
Seton Hall University

MARK S. MASSA. *The American Catholic Revolution: How the Sixties Changed the Church Forever*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. xvi, 191. \$27.95.

RICHARD LINTS. *Progressive and Conservative Religious Ideologies: The Tumultuous Decade of the 1960s*. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2010. Pp. viii, 244. \$89.95.

Each of these books is written with clarity of style and reflects an impressive and well-documented erudition.

Each in its own way takes readers beyond conventional stereotypes of progressives and conservatives and presents them with a deeper and more nuanced vision of the religious and cultural conflicts of America in the 1960s, which, in turn, provides insights into later cultural developments.

Mark S. Massa's "American Catholic revolution" began in November 1964, when the changes to the celebration of the Mass mandated by the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) were first implemented. Most obviously, the Mass was now being said in the vernacular, not in Latin as had been the rule for hundreds of years. This and other changes made it abundantly clear that the Roman Catholic Church evolves. Once awakened, however, historical consciousness took on a life among the laity different from what the bishops of the council had anticipated, precipitating an identity crisis among U.S. Catholics that has generated conflict between progressives and traditionalists ever since.

Massa intends his book to be read as an essay in the history of ideas, with the crucial idea being historical consciousness. This well-established idea carried such explosive force for Catholics because for centuries the ecclesiastical hierarchy had insisted that the church was uniquely the place where one encountered that which did not, and indeed could not, change: the supernatural.

The subjects to which Massa devotes individual chapters are exceptionally varied and include the role of Father Frederick R. McManus in persuading priests and others through his writings that there were sound historical reasons for the changes Vatican II had called for in the forms of Sunday worship; the papal encyclical *Humanae Vitae*, which condemned contraception; the fate of Father Charles Curran, a leading theologian who publically dissented from the teaching of the encyclical; the actions of one order of religious sisters in response to Vatican II's general call for the renewal of religious life; the use of civil disobedience by a group of nine Catholics including two priests, Daniel and Philip Berrigan, to protest the Vietnam War; and the complex career trajectory of the Catholic priest, theologian, and later cardinal Avery Dulles. This variety not only makes for a rich and engaging narrative, but it also enables Massa to demonstrate the explanatory power of the idea of historical consciousness.

Particularly impressive is Massa's handling of the controversial encyclical *Humanae Vitae*, which was promulgated by Pope Paul VI in 1968. Massa is admirably lucid in his presentation of both the traditional natural law reasoning used by the pope and the arguments used by those moral theologians who wrote in response to the encyclical. He argues persuasively that not only major critics but also major supporters found Paul VI's natural law arguments wanting. In discussing responses to the encyclical, Massa summarizes the basic contentions put forward by an array of major Catholic moral theologians over the next quarter century. In its scope and subtlety, this chapter is a tour de force.

Since Massa focuses on change within the church, his

book would benefit from a discussion of the work of John Courtney Murray, S.J., a major American theologian and the chief architect of Vatican II's *Declaration on Religious Freedom*. This was the most controversial of all the documents of the council because its teaching, while declaring itself to be a "development" of previous church theology, appeared to many to represent a sharp break from it.

If there is one serious flaw in Massa's thesis that Catholicism since Vatican II is discontinuous with pre-Vatican II Catholicism, it is his failure to examine arguments for essential continuity, such as those of Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI. To give an example, Massa briefly summarizes the reaction of John Paul II to the results of the council, suggesting that he attempted "to put the historicist genie back in the bottle" (p. 27). But John Paul II was a serious thinker and surely deserves more careful consideration than this. The same problem may be viewed from another angle at the end of the first chapter, where Massa discusses the profound issues raised by some of the bishops' decisions. Although liberal/progressive Catholics welcomed change, they would soon face the daunting specter of historical relativism. Massa frames the question vividly: "Was the gospel itself just another historically conditioned project, soon to be displaced by a better message?" (p. 14). But he never adequately answers it. Massa ought to have made it plain from the outset that the Catholic Church has always understood itself to have been entrusted by Christ and the Apostles with a message that must be handed on faithfully till the end of time.

So long as readers are alert to its onesidedness, Massa's book is worthy of a wide audience. Readers will find it illuminating, instructive, and wonderfully readable.

Richard Lints has also written an illuminating and instructive book dealing with the religious conflicts that arose between progressives and conservatives in America in the 1960s. Like Massa, he sees the 1960s as a revolutionary period with an unmistakable "before" and "after." He too wears his learning lightly. But the chief similarities with Massa's book end there. Whereas Massa focuses on internal developments within the U.S. Catholic Church, Lints focuses on external influences on American religion and culture; whereas Massa uses the idea of historical consciousness as the key to interpreting his material, Lints uses the categories of modernity and postmodernity.

Before introducing his wide range of subjects, Lints explores the assumptions of "the postmodern state of mind." Notable among these are globalization (and with it a growing sense of religious relativism), democratization (including a drive toward greater individual autonomy), and commodification (which renders all things marketable). Some of the subjects that Lints discusses are linked with concrete events: the civil rights movement, second-wave feminism, the anti-war movement, and the Jesus movement. Other topics are more abstract and deal with ideological controversies: the critique of mass culture and the prematurely heralded

"end of ideology"; the end of epistemology and the death of foundationalism; and the Death of God movement. There is also a chapter on how the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, then an atheist, grew increasingly critical of secularity throughout this period.

Lints persuasively demonstrates that the cultural upheavals of the 1960s in America were inspired by a hope for change to the status quo, even while the voices of protest were voices of retrieval. The civil rights movement provides perhaps the clearest illustration of this phenomenon. Although it was a protest movement, it simultaneously hearkened back to the impassioned call for individual rights that had fueled the American Revolution. It was thus, paradoxically, "a progressive movement whose core arguments were entirely traditional" (p. 52).

Lints argues that "the standard cultural war typology of religious conservatives versus secular progressives does not tell the full story" (p. 31). His analysis of evangelicalism in the 1960s provides a compelling illustration of this view. Although popularly perceived as having been a conservative force in American culture, evangelicalism found itself "a surprising ally with secular foes of religion in the fight against the establishment powers of the 1960s" (p. 9). Far from seeking a safe haven from the world, evangelicals were engaged in a revolution to overthrow the powers that be. The story of the evangelical movement told by Lints reinforces his thesis that the 1960s were marked by significant complexity and ambiguity.

This is a very interesting book on what its subtitle calls "the tumultuous decade of the 1960s." The use of the term "religious" in the main title, however, is problematic inasmuch as religion is secondary to much of the book. For example, the chapter titled "The Critique of Mass Culture and the End of Ideology" is not obviously linked to religion at all. Had the main title omitted the word religious altogether, it would be a more accurate reflection of the book's contents. Lints's study is best categorized as a work of cultural analysis, with religion arising from time to time in the course of that analysis. That said, the book is erudite and wide ranging and offers interesting insights on virtually every page.

ERIC PLUMER

University of Scranton

MARK HULLIUNG, editor. *The American Liberal Tradition Reconsidered: The Contested Legacy of Louis Hartz*. (American Political Thought.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2010. Pp. ix, 285. \$34.95.

In his principal contribution to this stimulating and erudite collection of essays, editor Mark Hulliung contends that Louis Hartz's *The Liberal Tradition in America* remains "a great book, fully deserving the attention it has received" since its publication in 1955 (p. 46). What the essays convincingly demonstrate is that continued attention to Hartz's basic thesis allows scholars in various humanities disciplines to cast considerable light on the political development of the United States

between the revolution and the present, even as the collection leaves the reader even more ready to relinquish Hartz and his rigid theorizing.

In Hartz's view, the United States, in contrast to all of Europe, was politically dominated by a form of Lockean liberalism that sprang from the lack of a feudal past in the American colonies, leaving the new nation locked in the embrace of a universally understood doctrine of private property rights, venture capitalism, limited government, and individual rights. Not only did the young nation avoid the class-based, violent social upheavals of countries such as France in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but in fact the whole history of the United States up to Hartz's day was marked by a thinly veiled political and social uniformity. Oblivious to the social dislocations that feudalism bequeathed to the Old World, the United States could never create political space for socialism or other forms of radical politics.

While some of the distinguished contributors to Hulliung's volume find parts of Hartz's thesis valuable in a limited way, all of them spend much of the space allotted to them contesting or qualifying it in detail. To an historian, this is hardly surprising, and definitely welcome. As James T. Kloppenberg argues in his graceful and incisive essay, Hartz's picture of the broad sweep of American history is deeply problematic because it lacks due attention to questions of religious affiliation and belief, racial and ethnic disunity, governmental regulation of economy and society, and bitter fights for economic power between classes and interests. Most importantly, and most obviously for a historian, Kloppenberg points to the contingency of the historical record: even if historical actors and movements failed to press their entire program on a diverse nation, they often did change the course of America's political development in important ways, a fact obscured by an insistence upon a totalizing and unbending thematic framework that dismisses or downplays important organizing strands of the country's past. After Hulliung's analytical overview of Hartz's theoretical framework and its relationship to earlier intellectual readings of American history, Kloppenberg, Rogers Smith, Desmond King, Marc Stears, and Alan Gibson all point to the complex ways in which political reformers and state actors have driven constitutional and political change, influenced by economic imperatives, racial ideologies, and socially egalitarian programs at different times in history that have at least as much credibility as Hartz's partial and (in Kloppenberg's view) maddeningly imprecise reading of eighteenth-century liberalism. Richard J. Ellis and Carol Nackenoff argue that twenty-first-century politics and jurisprudence illustrate deep social and religious divisions over what America is about. Such conflict defines the nation today just as plausibly as some barely disguised consensus masquerading as political debate.

What gives this volume its intellectual power and coherence is not principally its wide-ranging critique of Hartz's perspective on American history, although all

the essays contribute to such an endeavor. Rather, the contributors use Hartz as a launching pad for their own exegesis of American political development, focusing variously on political philosophy, key historical episodes in American history, constitutional jurisprudence, or national politics. In addition, several essays prompt scholars to read Hartz with a view to understanding the political passions of 1950s America more clearly. King and Stears accomplish this particularly well when they argue that Hartz was keen to play up a national fear of the state in the post-Civil War years because he wanted to explain and contest the irrational fears of anti-statists and McCarthyites in the early 1950s. A number of essays work well as stand-alone pieces on the place of race and the South in American political development or the significance of progressivism and social reform to twentieth-century American politics, two themes that particularly impressed this reader. Occasionally I found the necessary explanations of Hartz and his limitations repetitive, but I was consistently impressed by the essays' high quality and intellectual reach. Although I will not be returning to Hartz's *Liberal Tradition* itself, I will return to this lively and wide-ranging collection of essays that testify to the richness and complexity of both the historical American political experience and the scholarship that helps us understand it.

JONATHAN BELL
University of Reading

CARL MIRRA. *The Admirable Radical: Staughton Lynd and Cold War Dissent, 1945–1970*. Foreword by HOWARD ZINN. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 2010. Pp. xvi, 224. \$34.95.

Carl Mirra has written a sympathetic biography of historian and radical activist Staughton Lynd, a prominent dissenter who paid a dear price for consistently expressing sometimes controversial views on a range of political and social issues in the latter half of the twentieth century. Mirra seeks to share the radical dissenter's perspective on a turbulent era involving anticommunist politics, the civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, and other social upheavals. The author's chief contribution is to provide the dissenting Left's view of these events. By focusing on one prominent individual in different contexts he offers readers a better grasp of these complex but interrelated happenings. The Lynd that emerges is a principled man, unapologetically political but not necessarily politic.

Mirra skillfully outlines Lynd's radical vision as an architect of the New Left, thereby highlighting difference from the Old Left. In their landmark sociological study of the 1920s, *Middletown*, Robert and Helen Lynd wrote of the "mainstream" tendencies in American society and culture. As members of the Old Left, the Lynds walked among intellectual elites who valued bureaucracies and top-down, coordinated activism. Their son, however, spent much of his life as an outsider who severed ties to many establishment organizations and

searched for kinship in alternative communities at the grass-roots level. He claimed, for example, conscientious objector status during the Korean War and the army discharged him; he fled a middle-class existence among intellectuals in favor of a utopian commune in rural Georgia; offered an Ivy League appointment, Lynd instead joined the faculty at a historically black college; he battled Democratic Party liberals because he believed their concessions slowed progress on civil rights; and his antiwar activities alienated his liberal colleagues at Yale, who denied him tenure. Lynd's life reminds us that radicals often clashed with liberals as much as with conservatives.

Although Lynd's communities changed, Mirra argues that his ethics remained remarkably consistent. Others evolved; Lynd often remained static and certain. Even as a young man in his twenties, Lynd had developed a clearly defined worldview built upon ideas of collective social justice and activism. He and his wife Alice recalled their time at the Georgia commune as the "definitive experience of their lives" (p. 32), but it soon broke up when other members embraced religious fundamentalism. In the 1960s, a leader of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) referred to Lynd as a "moral lodestone" (p. 78) who attracted younger activists. For someone who tenaciously questioned the motives of the mainstream, Lynd apparently rarely examined himself or his own assumptions. There are few instances of Lynd's personal introspection or intellectual evolution, even when events warranted it. During the Korean War, for example, the conscientious objector served as a medic. By assuming a supportive role in the military, had he discovered a way to participate in a war that he opposed? In later years, when Lynd vigorously protested the Vietnam War, did he ever express reservations about his earlier decisions? Readers are left to speculate.

The author crafts an image of Lynd as a moral-minded and committed activist who, despite knowing the consequences for his candor, challenged Americans to live up to their democratic ideals. Yet in his defense of Lynd, Mirra resists opportunities to scrutinize his subject's motives. Lynd eschewed movement elites in favor of the grass roots, but by the 1960s, he had become a celebrity who embraced high-profile conflict. He and other radical activists undertook a controversial and well-publicized fact-finding mission to Hanoi in 1965. Since then, Mirra complains that historians have taken unfounded, "backhanded swipes" at them (p. 101). A more evenhanded observation might acknowledge that Lynd was naïve to believe that his self-interested hosts welcomed him to further understanding; they appreciated his visit for propaganda purposes, not for an honest exchange of ideas. Mirra makes an exhaustive study of Lynd's tenure case and rightly looks at the event in terms of academic freedom, but he fails to address Lynd's role as a willing victim. Later, when Lynd sought the presidency of the American Historical Association, other leftist historians disapproved of the "theatrics" surrounding his candidacy (p. 155).

As the title suggests, Mirra views Lynd as a heroic prophet who often came down on the right side of history long before other Americans adopted his convictions about the aggressive tactics of anticommunists, the need for integration, and the hopelessness of the Vietnam War. The author's unprecedented access to Lynd's papers and private correspondence provides excellent insight into Lynd's thoughts and motivations; and while Mirra's personal relationship with Lynd and his wife enriches the book, such access has resulted in something approaching a personal memoir. "I do not conceal my admiration for my subject," Mirra boldly admits, yet he seeks to avoid "creating an exalted figure" or "sentimentalizing him" (p. 3). Readers may appreciate the author's candor, and enjoy a book with many merits, but they may also wonder whether the author successfully walked the fine line he set out for himself.

ANDREW J. FALK
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ERIC MILLER. *Hope in a Scattering Time: A Life of Christopher Lasch*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans. 2010. Pp. xx, 394. \$32.00.

From the mid-1960s until his death in 1994, Christopher Lasch was a major force in American historical writing and on the public scene. His *The New Radicalism in America, 1889–1963: The Intellectual as a Social Type* (1965) was a brilliant rereading of the Progressive impulse, tracing a line of frustration with estrangement from "real life" from Jane Addams through the *New Republic's* fervent support of World War I to the realists just then plunging the nation into war in Vietnam. His *Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged* (1977) was an angry historical account of the bourgeois family as beset by the forces of capitalism, post-Freudian feminists, and, above all, the expert legions of the therapeutic state. *The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations* (1978), his bestselling and deeply pessimistic reading of the hollowed-out ego of the modern self, caught the ear of President Jimmy Carter, who recycled a variant of its rhetoric in his "malaise" speech. In his last, knotty, and difficult book, *The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics* (1991), Lasch came back to hope. Not through faith in progress, whose promise of infinite improvement he thought a liberal bamboozlement, but through a tradition of valuing limits, sufficiency, justice, and immediate moral and social relationships that he cored out of the American intellectual past and associated particularly with its populist, lower-middle-class, small-producer countercurrents. Few have driven a path through historical scholarship as broad as Lasch's, as fully in the public eye, or as sharp in its shifts in mood and direction.

Lasch was a public intellectual and an unceasingly political one. He moved in and out of dozens of efforts to remake the political-cultural Left and give it new intellectual heft and substance. He passed through intel-

lectual allegiances with similarly restless dissatisfaction: Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, the New Left, and the antifeminist cultural Right. He was a brilliant essayist, reviewer, and polemicist. He was "the Richard Hofstadter of our generation," John Patrick Diggins wrote (pp. 378–379). But that catches only half the political-intellectual passions of Lasch's work or the controversies it left in its wake.

Lasch has been the subject of many essays of criticism and recollection. Now in *Hope in a Scattering Time* Lasch's turbulent work and times have been given a first-rate history. Lasch was a prolific letter writer, who left behind an extraordinarily rich record of his life and ideas. But the value Eric Miller has added can in no way be underestimated. He draws an affecting portrait of the painful rift between Lasch's political-intellectual trajectory and the much steadier Left-Progressive positions of his parents. He recounts well the way in which the effort to construct a critical mass of left-wing historians at the University of Rochester burst apart in bitter recriminations. Miller downplays none of the anger, the polemical excesses, the bruises, or the feelings of betrayal that Lasch both inflicted and felt himself.

Above all, Miller offers consistently insightful readings of Lasch's books and ideas. More than others who have been attracted to Lasch's work, Miller has an interest in Lasch's gradually growing appreciation of religious faith, but he does not exaggerate or overplay the theme. He sets Lasch deftly in the intellectual and political currents that swirled around him. In doing so, Miller resists the temptation to make Lasch into a representative figure of his scattering and urgent times. With a mind this full of contradictions and a final destination this quixotic, he was no more representative of his times than Henry Adams was of his. Miller leaves us with no well-trussed and buttressed edifice of Laschian thought. He shows us something more important and more difficult for the biographer to describe: a person thinking his way through his times with passion, engagement, and painful shifts in direction.

Published by a firm that specializes in religious titles, *Hope in a Scattering Time* has not received the attention it should have attracted. Miller recaptures a critically turbulent moment in the past of the American historical profession. This important book merits a wide and diverse readership.

DANIEL T. RODGERS
Princeton University

PAUL T. MILLER. *The Postwar Struggle for Civil Rights: African Americans in San Francisco, 1945–1975*. (Studies in African American History and Culture.) New York: Routledge. 2010. Pp. xvi, 167. \$95.00.

The study of African American urban communities following World War II remains one of the most exciting fields in American history. Indeed, many excellent monographs have appeared in the past two decades. Thomas Sugrue's magisterial work, *Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North*

(2008), challenged scholars to reconsider the southern framework that they have adopted in assessing the civil rights movement. Few historians have paid careful attention, however, to a parallel civil rights movement in the western states and territories. Paul T. Miller's brief book reveals that black westerners waged a civil rights struggle every bit as vigorous as that of their northern counterparts. Although the book is largely a work of synthesis, Miller has effectively mined local newspapers, particularly the San Francisco *Sun-Reporter* and the San Francisco *Chronicle*, in his effort to reconstruct the black community's attempt to gain full equality.

Like that of many West Coast cities, San Francisco's African American population exploded during the World War II era as southern migrants poured into the bay cities in search of work in wartime defense industries. The bay area shipyards proved especially attractive to African Americans because they paid high wages and actively recruited black southern migrants. Yet black wartime workers also brought a new militancy and desire to end racial discrimination in wartime industries. Thus Joseph James, a black migrant and president of the San Francisco branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), successfully organized black shipyard workers to fight their relegation to a segregated auxiliary union in a case that reached the California Supreme Court.

One of Miller's contributions is a meticulous description of black leadership's persistence during the postwar years in demanding an end to employment and housing discrimination, as well as an improvement in the quality of education for black children in San Francisco's public schools. Although the war years opened many doors for black San Franciscans, they also unleashed a torrent of hostility toward black migrants, the majority of whom remained in San Francisco and challenged whites and Asians for employment, housing, and public space. African American workers slowly began to make inroads in many skilled, white-collar, and professional jobs. But San Francisco's unions closed their doors to the vast majority of African American blue-collar workers and permitted only a small number of skilled blacks to become members. Black and white leaders challenged these policies through Carleton Goodlett's *Sun-Reporter*, a weekly black newspaper every bit as militant as the Chicago *Defender* or the Pittsburgh *Courier*. The San Francisco chapter of the NAACP, which formed in 1915 and had carried on a long struggle for racial equity prior to World War II, spearheaded the postwar campaign for full equality. Through its local branch and the newly formed West Coast regional office, headed by Franklin Williams, the NAACP succeeded in breaking down many racial barriers in San Francisco.

Miller paints a convincing picture of San Francisco as a city in crisis during the 1960s and early 1970s as it tried to come to terms with de facto discrimination in public schools, police brutality, and urban renewal. The author's extended discussion of how white policy makers led by Justin Herman, who headed the city's redevelop-

ment agency, earmarked large sections of the Fillmore district as blighted in order to attract middle-class whites to this area and to ease traffic flow for white commuters to their jobs downtown is the book's most significant contribution. Urban renewal or "Negro removal," as many of its critics dubbed this policy, tore the social fabric of one of the largest black communities in San Francisco, a practice that redevelopment officials would replicate in other American cities.

Miller's book will be useful to students of urban and western history, and his research uncovers some fresh material in the Labor Archives and Research Center. For example, he examines the unrest in 1968 at San Francisco State College that led to a prolonged student strike and ultimately to the creation of the first Black Studies Program in the nation. Unlike many foundational works in black urban history, Miller's study offers no comparisons with events in other cities. Nor does he examine how other racial and ethnic groups fared relative to African Americans in San Francisco and the nation, and he does little to explain the significance of class within the city's black community. Despite these reservations, both students and scholars will find much to admire in the book.

ALBERT S. BROUSSARD
Texas A&M University

SHANA BERNSTEIN. *Bridges of Reform: Interracial Civil Rights Activism in Twentieth-Century Los Angeles*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 339. \$24.95.

MARK BRILLIANT. *The Color of America Has Changed: How Racial Diversity Shaped Civil Rights Reform in California, 1941–1978*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. xii, 364. \$34.95.

Since the Kerner Commission's 1968 declaration that the United States was becoming two unequal societies of black and white, historians have devoted extensive research to understanding the roots of racial inequality and the failings of American democracy. However, a biracial approach has proved inadequate to grapple with the dynamics of the nation's increasingly diverse character. New books by Shana Bernstein and Mark Brilliant add to a now significant body of literature viewing the multi-ethnic histories of twentieth-century Los Angeles and California as precursors to our nation's present and future.

In a parallel universe, Bernstein and Brilliant could and perhaps should have worked cooperatively on a single monograph. Moreover, although their findings appear contradictory on the surface—Bernstein stresses interracial unity, whereas Brilliant foregrounds divergence—they are really two sides of the same coin and best considered jointly. Alas, Bernstein and Brilliant (like most of us) exist in a professional orbit that mandates the production of single-authored monographs. So let us consider how these two books fare side by side.

In *The Color of America Has Changed*, Brilliant examines examples of litigation and legislation mainly in-

volving black, Mexican, Chinese, and Japanese Americans in postwar California to highlight “the unique challenges and disparate shapes of civil rights making in multiracial places” (p. 6). In contrast with the book’s ambitious scope, Brilliant advances a modest thesis that “different axes of discrimination” necessitated “different avenues of redress” for the respective ethnic groups (p. 14).

While this argument mostly reinforces those of prior works, the author’s case studies offer some interesting insights. For instance, while National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) leaders prioritized fair employment and housing, Asian and Mexican Americans were more likely to push for measures that either extended rights to the foreign-born or served the social needs of immigrant communities. Historians as well as policy makers will have to wrestle with the tensions Brilliant describes. At the same time, I suspect some readers may want Brilliant to explain further how and why he chose the legal and historical cases he analyzes, what makes them pivotal over others not considered, and how they fit within the longer historical trajectories of the communities under study. Still there is no disputing his basic assertion that a shared general interest in ending discrimination did not guarantee full cooperation in practice. In some cases, the pursuit of different avenues of redress put communities of color into direct conflict with each other. In perhaps the book’s most intriguing and complicated chapter, Brilliant notes that the NAACP’s desire to disperse students throughout the San Francisco school district in the interest of promoting integration was questioned by Chinese American parents pushing for a neighborhood school with resources for bilingual instruction.

Multiracial coalitions did not always congeal from the grass roots, but certain forms of multi-ethnic political strategy emerged consciously or unconsciously from the top down. Whereas liberal Democrats like Pat Brown often prioritized the concerns of black political leaders, given that community’s relatively high rate of citizenship and electoral participation, conservative Republicans like Ronald Reagan responded by championing issues like bilingual education to attract Latinos and Asians and thereby split the “minority” vote. Ultimately the GOP’s Golden State resurgence hinged more on its ability to play up white victimhood and win over voters who viewed civil rights measures as an impediment to individual freedom and a form of reverse discrimination. Ironically, resisting that brand of revanchism would provide a new basis of interethnic solidarity for the post-civil rights era, although such consideration is beyond the scope of this book (which surprisingly does not reference any of the paradigm shifts in racial identity and politics that arose with the black, brown, and yellow power movements of the 1960s).

By contrast, “interracial civil rights activism” and coalition building are the core subjects of Bernstein’s *Bridges of Reform*, which focuses its geographic scope on Los Angeles. While Bernstein is concerned with

many of the same groups as Brilliant—the NAACP, Community Service Organization (CSO), Japanese American Citizens League—her conclusion differs from his. “Interracial cooperation,” she contends, “shaped the public consciousness on civil rights, fostered careers, and generated influential local and national civil rights initiatives and even victories that, though limited, represented significant transformations” (pp. 8–9).

The first difference here is one of emphasis: Bernstein sees the glass of interracial unity as half full. This is partly because her discussion of “interracial unity” more explicitly draws attention to the central role Jewish leaders played in civil rights organizing involving communities of color. In this regard, her primary research has been bolstered by mining California State University Northridge’s Jewish Federation-Council of Greater Los Angeles’ Community Relations Committee archive—a massive and invaluable collection that was being catalogued when she was a doctoral candidate. Jewish leaders believed that the best strategy to fight antisemitism was a broad-based one that promoted tolerance and understanding more generally.

In addition, Bernstein trains her eye more on mass-based community organizing efforts that invited popular participation and less on the type of litigation and lobbying efforts that tended to remain the preserve of professionals and specialists. The former lend themselves to inclusive discourses more than the latter. For instance, in a manner that Bernstein suggests foreshadows the Obama era, Edward Roybal won election to the Los Angeles City Council as an insurgent who worked with the CSO to register a wave of new voters and consciously strove to link his base in the Mexican American community to a multiracial coalition of supporters.

While Brilliant’s book is significantly longer and more detailed, Bernstein’s book does more to situate its case studies within historical and political contexts. Although both studies revolve around civil rights discourses shaped by Cold War liberalism, Bernstein shows how the stances adopted by anticommunist civil rights activists represented both continuity with Popular Front-era organizing and a repudiation of certain Left principles and people perceived as taboo. One need not valorize the general program or ideology of the organized Left to recognize that it was a key progenitor of expressions of multiracial solidarity and organizing campaigns that brought diverse Americans into dialogue for the first time.

Bernstein defends the move by anticommunist liberals to claim the vital center and critiques previous scholarship (my own could be included here) for not fully investigating their achievements. But she also provides ample evidence for readers to judge for themselves whether the choices of civil rights liberals should be viewed as pragmatic or parochial. In this sense, she also helps us to see how the differences of approach and interest between the groups described by Brilliant represented competing attempts to promote visions of reform that fit within the narrowing parameters of Cold

War liberalism. Notwithstanding Bernstein's recuperation of Earl Warren (whose rallying cries for Japanese American interment she portrays as an exception to a consistent commitment to civil rights), American liberalism has always traded in false universalist discourse, and its repudiation of white supremacist exclusion meant subjecting minorities to a regime of unequal and differential inclusion.

Whereas Brilliant tends to take the differences between the civil rights leaders he studies at face value, Bernstein seeks to historicize them in a manner that places her book relatively more in line with ethnic studies and postnationalist American studies scholars such as Eric Avila, Clement Lai, Natalia Molina, Laura Pulido, Greg Robinson, George Sánchez, and Daniel Widener. She goes to greater lengths to explore how transnational developments influenced ethnic identities and community agendas. She also takes more cues from scholars who have studied race as a relational construct, demonstrating, for instance, that blackness is defined by how it is positioned with reference to whites, Asians, and Latinos. As such, she devotes more effort to making sense of the production of racial knowledge and the production of difference itself.

Taken collectively, these two books ought to signal a crossroads moment in multi-ethnic studies of California (and the United States). The imperative to think in multi-ethnic terms and employ a multipolar analytical framework has now been firmly established. These works will encourage new generations of scholars to take on more case studies revealing the complicated history of diversity. While this remains necessary work, it must be connected to the theoretical and epistemological debates on race, culture, and politics that have animated cutting-edge research in ethnic studies. For those seeking to learn more about the intricate details of legal cases and legislation involving land rights, interracial marriage, fair employment and housing, school integration, and bilingual education, Brilliant offers a well-researched and documented source book. To put these phenomena in the context of social history and social movements, use Bernstein's book as a pathway into a much larger body of developing literature and analysis.

SCOTT KURASHIGE
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HOWELL S. BAUM. *Brown in Baltimore: School Desegregation and the Limits of Liberalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2010. Pp. xv, 274. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$24.95.

Howell S. Baum's book begins with a description of how Baltimore desegregated its public schools after the Supreme Court's ruling in *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954). Almost immediately after the high court made its decision, Baltimore modified a long-established open enrollment policy that had allowed black and white students to attend any school that had been designated for their race. Henceforth, students were al-

lowed to attend any school without regard to race. Black leaders welcomed this freedom, either as a first step toward racially balanced integration or because they did not object to racially disproportionate enrollments, if such enrollments were not compelled by law. "Many blacks who remembered legal segregation did not want anyone of any race ever again telling them where to go to school" (p. 184).

Due to white flight, racial enrollments in Baltimore went from sixty-three percent white and thirty-seven percent black in 1954 to eighty percent black thirty years later. Some schools became almost all black while others remained mostly white. This prompted liberal activists and federal civil rights lawyers to demand what they considered a better balance in racial enrollments: a racial mix in each school that did not depart too far from the citywide racial ratio. Baum concedes that the sequence of "interim plans, plans, and revised plans . . . And the back-and-forth of these proposals and federal critiques could numb the mind." This indeed is the case. Baum's detailed description of these developments is thoroughly researched but not a book that one would read for pleasure. Fortunately, however, it also illuminates what Baum calls the "big picture" of school desegregation (p. 184).

In the 1950s and early 1960s, Baltimore was widely praised for complying with *Brown*. Baum, however, finds fault with those who defined desegregation as freedom from coercive racial discrimination. He does so because free choice allowed white students and strong black students to gravitate toward predominantly white schools, and this allegedly damaged other black students. It would have been better, Baum maintains, if liberals had rejected "egoistic individualism," had embraced the "obligations of a collective identity," and had assigned students by race to achieve racially balanced enrollments at individual schools (p. 16)..

Baum implicitly censures Chief Justice Earl Warren for wording the implementation order, known as *Brown II*, to call for an end to racial discrimination rather than an end to racial imbalance. Baum believes that liberals were mistaken to think "that school enrollment should be a matter of individual choice, free of coercion by local or national government" (p. 184). He believes that these mistakes eventually led to "resegregation"—not only in Baltimore but also in other cities such as Washington, D.C., thirty miles south of Baltimore, where after *Brown* all students were required to attend schools in their neighborhoods, but the overall enrollment shifted from sixty percent black and forty percent white in 1954 to ninety-five percent black and three percent white twenty years later.

Baum rejects sociologist James S. Coleman's explanation of the trend: that it was "quite understandable" for whites and middle-class blacks to avoid schools with sizeable black enrollments, since many of these schools "failed to control lower-class black children" and had to spend "90 percent of the time . . . not on instruction but on discipline" (Coleman, quoted in *National Observer*, June 7, 1975). Baum concedes that some Baltimore par-

ents were concerned about “rumors of sexual promiscuity, drug abuse, and violence” (p. 130). He acknowledges that whites became especially apprehensive after the race riots of 1968, which in Baltimore involved 1,208 major fires and the destruction of 1,049 businesses, along with 6 killed, 600 injured, and 5,512 arrested (“nearly all black”) (p. 135). But Baum’s emphasis is on two other points: the shortcomings of a liberalism that extolled individual choice and “repudiated a public interest in racial mixing” (pp. 79–80), and a persistent white racism—a pattern of “irrational thinking that led whites to resist contacts with blacks” (p. 221). According to Baum, whites acted with “sheer irrationality” (p. 5). They refused to recognize that “social research showed” that children of both races benefited if they attended schools that were racially balanced (p. 10).

Some scholars have seconded Baum’s views, but others have dissented, among them David J. Armor, Christine H. Rossell, Nancy St. John, Abigail M. Thernstrom, Stephan Thernstrom, and Herbert J. Walberg. As Chief Justice John G. Roberts noted in *Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1* (2007), there is no consensus when it comes to “whether racial diversity in schools in fact has a marked impact on test scores . . . or achieves intangible socialization benefits.” Baum, however, neither refutes nor even mentions the work of what might be called “the dissenting scholars.” He simply asserts a proposition that is debatable if not demonstrably false: that research shows that black children benefit, and white children do not suffer, from attending racially balanced schools. This is a weak foundation for the sort of coercion that Baum recommends.

RAYMOND WOLTERS
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JAMES T. PATTERSON. *Freedom Is Not Enough: The Moynihan Report and America’s Struggle over Black Family Life—from LBJ to Obama*. New York: Basic Books. 2010. Pp. xvii, 264. \$26.95.

James T. Patterson offers a book-length consideration of the U.S. Department of Labor study from 1965 that has been remembered as the “Moynihan Report.” Patterson surveys the arguments that the report’s author, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, made before the report was published, in the report itself, and on behalf of the report in the years that followed. Patterson places Moynihan’s claims in historical context and treats some of them skeptically. He also endorses some of Moynihan’s arguments directly and discusses sympathetically other well-known actions and utterances by Moynihan, such as his call for the “benign neglect” of urban problems while an official of the Nixon administration.

Long-term readers of social policy scholarship will find much of the ground covered here familiar. As in some public discussions of poverty and family patterns, Patterson claims that the discussions of illegitimacy and single parenting in the Moynihan Report were “prophetic” (p. xvi) and “prescient” (p. 63). He describes

negative reactions to the report as products primarily of misunderstanding: readers focused too much on Moynihan’s treatment of African American behavior and his language about sex and gender. But Moynihan’s “central message,” Patterson insists, “blamed white racism and structural forces” (p. 62) for African American poverty and the relatively low levels of marriage among African American parents. According to Patterson, the brief period in 1965 during which Moynihan completed his report and President Lyndon B. Johnson called for “equality of result” in a commencement speech at Howard University represented a high-water mark for the consideration of expansive social policy in the United States. The widespread rejection of Moynihan’s report, Patterson continues, had negative effects: it helped foreclose the possibility of new macroeconomic policies that would have made jobs available to low-income men, and it generated an unnatural silence in which “many liberals and civil rights leaders . . . avoid[ed] talking about many black family issues” (p. xvi). Patterson argues as well that Moynihan has been vindicated. Renewed interest in the behavior of African American poor people since the 1980s, including the rise of the troubled but influential category of “the underclass” and the castigation of black fathers by public figures such as Bill Cosby and Barack Obama, demonstrates to Patterson that the tide turned and intelligent opinion came to accept the main features of the Moynihan Report.

Most problematic is this book’s limited engagement with critiques of Moynihan’s ideas, including those by Patterson’s scholarly colleagues and especially by feminists. Patterson references the work of black feminists from the 1970s, such as Michele Wallace and Joyce Ladner. But he does not engage the work of more recent feminist historians or social policy scholars who have written about the Moynihan Report, Moynihan’s Family Assistance Plan initiative from the late 1960s, the Family Support Act of the 1980s, and theories similar to Moynihan’s such as those of sociologist William Julius Wilson. Such critics have argued that Moynihan, Wilson, and others who have focused on African American sexual and family behavior treated African American women’s poverty as a social problem not worth solving in itself, except insofar as its solution demanded educational or workforce investments directed at men.

Although Patterson claims otherwise, in the years after the Moynihan Report was published, no scholarly consensus emerged about the relationship between poverty and family structure. Feminists continued to argue that governmental efforts to reduce women’s poverty should focus on the labor market and public benefits, as well as on efforts to ameliorate sexism, racism, homophobia, and the unfair treatment of disabled people. Historians of the debate over the Moynihan Report should note that feminists in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s tried to direct research and public policies away from the question of whether women were married or unmarried, and toward questions such as women’s educational access, segregation in employment, levels of

unionization, experiences of intimate violence, and child care costs. Policies designed to create or sustain marriages, feminists predicted, would probably fail; they would also run the risk of making it more difficult for women (and men) to exit violent or unworkable relationships. By contrast, public benefits that provided a floor of decent support for poor women and labor market policies that interrupted segregation and provided access to education could reduce women's poverty.

Patterson writes of the "destructive controversies that followed release" (p. xii) of the Moynihan Report. From the perspectives of women's and African American history, however, the controversies may have been more productive than destructive, calling into question stereotypical characterizations of black parents that had circulated among both scholars and non-scholars for many years.

FELICIA KORNBLUH
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PHILIP F. RUBIO. *There's Always Work at the Post Office: African American Postal Workers and the Fight for Jobs, Justice, and Equality*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2010. Pp. xxiii, 446. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$24.95.

Given the recent attacks on the rights and livelihoods of public sector workers and the cut backs in the United States Postal Service (USPS), Philip F. Rubio's book on postal workers is a timely reminder of the historical struggle waged by public servants for social justice. His analysis of racial politics and workplace rights in the USPS, one of the largest employers in the United States, deserves a prominent place in a growing historiography on public sector workers. Even though federal workers have neither the protection of the National Labor Relations Act nor the right to strike, they have been active participants in the labor movement, as evidenced by Rubio's analysis of the 1970 postal worker strike, "the largest nationwide wildcat strike in U.S. labor history" (p. 7). Despite the need for clarity in some of the arguments presented, Rubio's book illustrates how public workers advanced the cause for labor and civil rights in the twentieth century.

Rubio—a former postal employee with a feel for the ethos of postal work—casts his gaze on black postal workers, who have long leveraged their employment for economic stability and a toehold in the middle class. Using the myriad postal unions as his focal point, Rubio argues that African American workers, especially those in the National Alliance of Postal Employees (later the National Alliance of Postal and Federal Employees [NAPFE]), served as a powerful force for labor and civil rights from the early twentieth century to the 1970s. Toward the middle of the book, he advances a secondary but critical thesis concerning the obstacles faced by progressive unions during the 1940s and 1950s.

Rubio takes issue with historians who "blame the cold war" for destroying the black-left-labor coalitions that had emerged during the Great Depression (p. 76).

Instead, he stresses that the NAPFE continued to pursue civil rights unionism despite an inhospitable environment, pointing out that the difficulties it faced in achieving its fair employment agenda had more to do with the white supremacy prevalent among all-white unions and postal supervisors than with anticommunism. If this were the case, then why did white supremacy, which clearly predated this era, intensify during the late 1940s and 1950s? Was racial prejudice amplified by Cold War anticommunism? Later in the book, Rubio acknowledges that Jim Crow and McCarthyism were "mass-based interlocking systems that enforced conformity of political thought and action, and reinforced the system of white privilege and black discrimination" (pp. 114–115). This conclusion seems compatible with the views of blame-the-Cold-War historians (whose identities are rather vague and frequently missing from end-notes), who would concur that white supremacists often used anticommunism to maintain racial hierarchies. Moreover, the latter assertion more clearly recognizes that anticommunism, antistatism, and racism frequently blended seamlessly; at times, for instance, anticommunist attacks on federal authority undercut the ability of activists to use the federal government to end local Jim Crow practices. Finally, Rubio's chapter on McCarthy-era loyalty purges in the post office provides ample evidence of the relevance of anticommunism to the fate of social justice activists. Ultimately, a more succinct, direct analysis of the complex interplay of race and class in the post office and its unions may have clarified how his argument truly differs from other historical treatments of the topic.

Among the strongest chapters in the book are those dealing with the 1970 wildcat strike, a compelling and untold story of worker outrage and courage. Reading this section, one senses how poor pay, difficult working conditions, and a feudalistic management culture led postal workers, who since 1962 had only very limited collective bargaining rights and no right to strike, to walk out in March 1970. Starting in New York City and quickly spreading to other key cities, the spontaneous strike strangled the mail and commerce for over a week. It ended with a significant pay raise and other concessions, but it also marginalized the postal service industrial unions, especially the NAPFE, and could not halt the partial privatization and corporatization of the post office. Despite its history of civil rights unionism, NAPFE leaders did not support the strike, although many of its members did. Rubio offers an exceptional discussion of how NAPFE embraced some but not all aspects of the black power movement. Similarly, he emphasizes the role played by militant black veterans and black postal workers in framing the strike, their demands, and organization, although NAPFE remained in the background during the strike. Its ambivalence suggests the tangled relationship between civil rights activism and the causes and aims of the walkout. In sum, Rubio's book mines new and necessary areas of study and points to the instrumental role black public workers

played in the American labor and civil rights movements.

MARGARET C. RUNG
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TOBIN MILLER SHEARER. *Daily Demonstrators: The Civil Rights Movement in Mennonite Homes and Sanctuaries*. (Young Center Books in Anabaptist and Pietist Studies.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2010. Pp. xxi, 360. \$65.00.

Tobin Miller Shearer's study of the two largest Mennonite denominations, the (Old) Mennonite Church and the General Conference Mennonite Church, which had 88,947 and 36,458 members respectively in 1971, makes a useful, if not always convincing, contribution to growing scholarship about the response of religious groups to the U.S. civil rights movement. Largely eschewing conventional organizational history, Shearer combines traditional sources such as archival collections, diaries, and interviews with analysis of photographs and Mennonite costume to produce case studies intended to broaden our conception of civil rights movement participation and place Mennonites at its center. Shearer seeks to redefine civil rights movement activity to include what he calls "daily demonstration," meaning "interracial off-street action" (p. 238) in Mennonite homes and churches that, in his view, constituted "active sites of, rather than staging grounds for, civil rights activity" (p. xii) and "made possible a historic transition in post-World War II American society" (p. ix).

Following an overview of Mennonites and race between 1918 and 1971, Shearer devotes chapters to African American and white female Mennonite opponents of segregation in the Mennonite Church, black children who stayed in white Mennonite rural homes for one to two weeks in the Fresh Air program, Mennonite pastor and civil rights activist Vincent Harding, Mennonites and racial intermarriage, church integration, responses to the Black Manifesto, and a thematic summation claiming to advance "A New Civil Rights Story" (p. 221). Many of Shearer's findings are in line with studies of other predominantly white denominations. For example, church leaders and officials were generally ahead of their white congregants in accepting racial change, African American and white members were diverse and not monolithic in their response to racial discrimination, and Mennonite attention to race declined significantly after 1971.

While some black and white Mennonites participated in civil rights marches during the 1960s, most Mennonites opposed such action, predominantly on the traditional Mennonite grounds of separation from a sinful society and refusal to promote change through coercive methods. Harding, an African American New Yorker who advocated direct action, endured jail for participating in a civil rights demonstration in Albany, Georgia, and worked with Martin Luther King, Jr., left the General Conference Mennonite Church in the mid-

1960s frustrated by the failure of his vociferous advocacy to align the church behind the civil rights movement. Shearer acknowledges that Mennonite churches and missions typically mirrored secular *de facto* and *de jure* segregation in the North and South, most white Mennonites continued to oppose racial intermarriage when their church accepted it, and paternalism pervaded Mennonite treatment of African Americans. He is also attentive to differences between Mennonite denominations. More committed to evangelism, the (Old) Mennonite Church gained more African American members than the General Conference and consequently developed an African American leadership that challenged racism in the church but proved unable to eliminate it.

Unfortunately, Shearer often overstates his case, overestimates the significance of the Mennonites in civil rights history, and advances some dubious assertions in search of interpretive novelty. He argues that Mennonites were "disproportionately influential across the nation" but does not explain by what criteria (p. xvii). He promises "new insights about the civil rights movement" but does not define the movement and seems unfamiliar with much of its historiography (p. 231). He advances claims for novelty with phrases such as "than previously thought," "than is usually suggested," and "than traditional scholarship has suggested" but often without footnotes (pp. 231–232). His claim to offer a "new story of the Second Reconstruction [that] flattens out the civil rights timeline" misses a wealth of scholarship (p. 233). To argue that Mennonites "took part in the civil rights movement whilst staying at home and going to church" makes the movement too amorphous and deprives it of analytical precision (p. xx). Shearer's assertion that "Those who ventured across racial lines in intimate settings displayed courage equal to that of demonstrators who faced fire hoses and attack dogs" is highly doubtful (p. ix), and his argument that "white Mennonites demonstrated on a daily basis to bring an end to segregation in the church" is unsubstantiated (p. 220).

Shearer sometimes overstates an argument and then retreats from it. He asserts that African American children who participated in the Fresh Air program "disrupted the lives of their hosts to such an extent . . . that they changed their hosts' racial attitudes" (p. 61), yet subsequently concedes "Many . . . hosts . . . remained disinterested in the racial lessons proffered by their young guests" (p. 92). Shearer also contends that "Fresh Air children demonstrated on the front lines of the civil rights movement" (p. 240) and "brought the movement to communities untouched by adult organizers" (p. 228), although his evidence suggests that the children were seeking a vacation and did not regard themselves as civil rights participants.

MARK NEWMAN
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CLIVE WEBB. *Rabble Rousers: The American Far Right in the Civil Rights Era*. (Politics and Culture in the Twen-

tieth-Century South.) Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2010. Pp. xi, 301. \$24.95.

In recent years, David Chappell, Kevin Kruse, and George Lewis have followed in the footsteps of Numan Bartley and begun to analyze in depth the southern massive resistance movement that emerged in the wake of the *Brown* decision in 1954. For the most part, these historians have focused on mainstream segregationists and paid little attention to the white militants who openly advocated violent resistance to racial integration. Now Clive Webb, who previously explored black-Jewish relations in the civil rights-era South, has broadened and deepened our understanding of massive resistance by shining a spotlight on the racial extremists who, ironically, may have ultimately damaged and discredited the segregationist cause through their virulent rhetoric and violent actions.

Webb focuses on five individuals in particular. Bryant Bowles of the National Association for the Advancement of White People and John Kasper of the Seaboard White Citizens' Council mobilized grass-roots resistance to school integration in Delaware, Virginia, and Tennessee. Rear Admiral John G. Crommelin repeatedly (and unsuccessfully) ran for public office in his home state of Alabama after he left active duty and participated in a network of far right organizations. Major General Edwin Walker, who had commanded the 101st Airborne Division during the Little Rock Crisis of 1957, later led the violent opposition to the admission of James Meredith to the University of Mississippi in 1962. Both men also consorted with a cabal of retired senior military officers who flirted with the idea of overthrowing the government. Finally, J. B. Stoner spent six decades travelling the South and promoting (if not practicing) violence in the name of white supremacy.

Webb offers a number of interesting and compelling insights. First, he documents convincingly how anti-semitism permeated the far Right and constituted a significant difference, at least in degree if not in kind, between militant and mainstream segregationists. Second, Webb asserts logically, although with less hard evidence, that white extremists strengthened the segregationist cause by making southern conservatives appear more moderate and respectable in comparison. Finally, the author argues persuasively that it is overly simplistic and reductionist to dismiss the individuals in question as pathological and unprincipled. On the contrary, he contends, they were products of their environment and heritage who sincerely believed in the offensive ideas and causes they espoused.

Here Webb perhaps pushes his argument too far. While it is undoubtedly correct to see these militants as products of their racist and antisemitic environment, it is equally hard not to see them as at least partly pathological in their views given their at times bizarre personal histories. Kasper, for example, had a twisted relationship with the controversial poet Ezra Pound (based on their personal correspondence) and may have been bisexual, with black lovers of both sexes. In

short, it seems quite possible that these extremists were both pathological and products of their society. Webb also makes claims for their influence that seem exaggerated or unproven. He frequently generalizes about how racial militants energized and mobilized large numbers of grass-roots southern whites. Yet none of these individuals attracted mass followings, and when Crommelin and Stoner ran for public office, they always lost by large margins. This may indicate how *sui generis* they were, although in fairness the extremist message was probably co-opted to an extent by more "respectable" and popular segregationists.

Nevertheless, Webb's monograph adds significantly to our knowledge of the far Right in the civil rights era. The author might have mentioned that Asa Carter, who worked with John Kasper, served as a speechwriter for Alabama Governor George Wallace, and helped create the slogan "Segregation today, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever," later became a novelist and, under the pen name Forrest Carter, wrote two bestsellers, *The Rebel Outlaw: Josey Wales* and *The Education of Little Tree* (purportedly the memoir of a Native American). But Webb has performed a real service for the profession by wading through documents, speeches, and pamphlets that others might not want to touch, let alone analyze. Certainly it is difficult to read these racist, fascist, and antisemitic claims and not come away with a deep sense of disgust and revulsion, combined with a renewed appreciation for the courage and conviction of those who opposed them.

MICHAEL FLAMM

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WILLIAM S. CLAYSON. *Freedom Is Not Enough: The War on Poverty and the Civil Rights Movement in Texas*. Austin: University of Texas Press. 2010. Pp. x, 210. \$55.00.

In this work William S. Clayson draws several lines of argument. First, he identifies the unintended but inextricable relationship between President Lyndon B. Johnson's War on Poverty and the civil rights movement in the 1960s. He notes that the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), created just one year after the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, was designed to promote "the colorblind ideal in regard to the War on Poverty" (p. 9). In other words, poor whites as well as poor minorities were to benefit from the OEO's various programs. In spite of that intention, whites clearly identified the War on Poverty with minority groups, including those deeply involved in the civil rights movement, and so avoided taking part in OEO-sponsored programs. As a result, not only were impoverished African Americans and Mexican Americans the main beneficiaries of agencies such as Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), Head Start, and Job Corps, but they also became the local administrators of these organizations—that is, insofar as a number of younger, militant, and anti-assimilationist leaders were able to supplant middle-class, white idealists.

A second point "is to demonstrate how significant the

War on Poverty was to Texas in the 1960s" (p. 6). Clayson cites both positive and negative outcomes. For example, OEO-based programs in Texas achieved a record of lifting up a sizable percentage of economically marginalized populations from poverty. However, serious tensions surfaced between Mexican Americans and African Americans as each group competed for limited government funds that they hoped would help accomplish their respective goals of self-determination.

Last, the book challenges the view commonly held by earlier scholars that the War on Poverty was a colossal failure in the history of U.S. public policy. On the contrary, Clayson argues that the War on Poverty succeeded insofar as it strengthened or gave birth to antipoverty efforts at the grass-roots level. He substantiates this claim by pointing to the gains of vibrant action groups such as Communities Organized for Public Service in San Antonio (COPS), the El Paso Interreligious Sponsoring Organization (EPISO), and The Metropolitan Organization in Houston (TMO).

This book has at least two major strengths. First, its beginning chapters provide non-specialists with helpful overviews of Texas politics, economics, and race relations in the 1950s and early 1960s and the general impetus, legislation, and implementation of the War on Poverty, including the Texas scene. Second, the author skillfully compares the establishment, objectives, and results of various OEO programs within the distinct contexts of three urban centers—San Antonio, El Paso, and Houston—highlighting both similarities and differences. As Clayson also notes, Texas serves as a particularly useful "statewide case study" (p. 5) in that such a large proportion of its residents were poor in the 1960s and its identity both as a southern and western state uniquely highlights relationships among Mexican Americans, African Americans, and white bureaucrats. That the originator of the War on Poverty, President Johnson, was himself a Texan provides even more justification for examining its development in that state. One possible weakness of the book is its failure to provide detailed characterizations of some of the leaders of the War on Poverty in Texas. While hardly necessary, including personal vignettes may have helped to shed more light on the motives and strategies of those most intimately involved in local antipoverty measures.

This study joins a growing body of literature that seeks to recover the positive aspects of the War on Poverty. In contrast, earlier studies tended to dismiss any lasting success on the part of the OEO. Their authors often approached the War on Poverty from a limited perspective that focused mainly on goals and outcomes as envisioned by leaders and administered by bureaucrats on the national level. When a conservative backlash led to the dismantling of the program—commencing with the Nixon administration—the War on Poverty was interpreted as little more than a dismal failure. By approaching the War on Poverty as it was fought in specific locales, however, Clayson contributes to the rehabilitation begun by scholars such as Robert Bauman (*Race and the War on Poverty: From Watts to East L.A.*

[2008]) and the contributors to *The War on Poverty: A New Grassroots History, 1964–1980* edited by Annelise Orleck and Lisa Gayle Hazirjian (2011).

ALAN J. WATT

Independent Scholar

WILLIAM S. BUSH. *Who Gets a Childhood? Race and Juvenile Justice in Twentieth-Century Texas*. (Politics and Culture in the Twentieth-Century South.) Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2010. Pp. x, 257. Cloth \$59.95, paper \$24.95.

William S. Bush's book is a detailed history of juvenile corrections in Texas through most of the twentieth century, based on extensive archival research. Race partially shapes the story, as it often seems that "therapeutic rehabilitation" was only for younger white juveniles and "correctional retribution" for everyone else (p. 108). Only the former might receive the consideration due children or adolescents. Bush regards adolescence as, ideally, an extended, protected childhood. Race and gender are, however, secondary themes. Oppressive institutional regimes that denied juvenile delinquents a sheltered adolescence and the struggles to defend or alter those regimes occupy center stage. Most boys and girls, whether lower-class white, African American, or Latino, endured prisonlike discipline and extensive physical abuse (boys somewhat more than girls) in the large correctional institutions that constituted the state's main response to juvenile delinquency. These training schools and the fates of their inmates form the book's main subject, although a chapter also describes community-based programs in Houston.

The book is loosely structured around multiple cycles of tentative reform (in the 1910s, 1940s, and from the 1960s through 1980s), followed in each case by panic over juvenile crime and backsliding into regimentation and brutality. Located in rural settings far from the big cities that supplied most inmates and supervised by bureaucrats and business-dominated boards who cared mostly for control, the training schools proved resistant to change until the 1970s. Bush blames drastic underfunding by the state legislature plus an alliance of "recalcitrant townspeople" and ill-paid staff, most locally recruited, for whom a high school diploma constituted solid credentials. He identifies civic groups, women's clubs, and social scientific professionals as reformers but seldom reports enduring successes. Although the author ably describes national trends in juvenile justice, in most instances Texas followed, if at all, very slowly. Indeed, he offers only brief descriptions of most developments he considers successes. The greatest reform triumph came with *Morales v. Turman* (1974), which Bush discusses at length and which not only forbade corporal punishment but soon forced the closing of the two most egregiously repressive schools for boys. Yet by the 1990s Texas was again gripped by panic over juvenile predators and nearly tripled its capacity to incarcerate youngsters.

Juvenile courts are peripheral to this account; indeed, their judges sometimes criticized the training schools and were reluctant to send youths there. Skeptical judges and many other critics of training schools repeatedly called for smaller treatment centers that would provide individual remediation and be located closer to the young people's homes. Bush shrewdly details how, again and again, administrators in league with supportive boards and politicians either ignored reformers or counterattacked in the legislature. Bush even treats readers to the angry marginalia with which one splenetic administrator decorated critics' reports.

Physical violence was endemic. The author's research yields almost a plethora of well-told stories from bruised and frightened inmates, who talked even though complaining to outside investigators often meant further beatings and commonly doomed any immediate chance for parole. Besides punches, kicks, and strapping, obstreperous teens endured isolation or monotonous labor and enforced silence. Although girls at one or two schools received fairly decent treatment, in 1952 a sixteen-year-old girl was released under court order after spending 186 of 210 days in a "steel-lined isolation cell" euphemistically termed the "reflection room" (p. 111). At Mountain View, the most oppressive of the schools, squads of boys on punishment detail in 1972 spent entire days in total silence, chopping in unison with heavy hoes on barren ground.

Bush examines juvenile corrections from multiple perspectives: analyzing media images of delinquents (from the rambunctious boy next door to the predatory gang member); sketching changing theories of adolescence, delinquency, and penology; reporting statistics on age, race, gender, and inmates' offenses; supplying what amount to brief curriculum vitae of corrections officials, consultants and other experts, reformers, and some inmates; and at least hinting at changing political climates in Texas. The level of detail can, however, overwhelm a reader at times. Many paragraphs are rather long, assembled from disparate topics. Abrupt shifts of focus and digressive passages sometimes leave one wondering where the discussion is heading. Still, the book under review is an immensely informative account of the complexities of reform and repression within the training schools of a state known for its tough penal culture.

DAVID I. MACLEOD
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ANDREW L. JOHNS. *Vietnam's Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 2010. Pp. x, 434. \$40.00.

Andrew L. Johns has written an important book that contributes significantly to our understanding of Vietnam and American politics. Covering the period of escalation through Vietnamization, Johns maintains that domestic political calculations were central to the policies adopted by Presidents John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon, leading each to

wage a war they regarded largely as futile. Constant pressure from Republican lawmakers, party elders, and media outlets led Kennedy and Johnson to expand the American commitment to Saigon, fearing the ramifications of a Democratic defeat in Southeast Asia. Nixon, too, worried about a right-wing backlash; his pursuit of "peace with honor" stemmed from the presumed consequences, both political and geopolitical, of a hasty withdrawal from Vietnam. Yet Congress was just as culpable as these presidents for America's entrance into the conflict and its persistence in waging it. Johns's attention to this complicity, particularly on the part of the GOP, establishes his book as a valuable resource for expanding our understanding of the war on the "second front."

Of those advocating for war, it was Nixon who shaped U.S. policy on Vietnam more significantly and more persistently than any other figure in the Republican Party. Moving from the right to the center of the political spectrum, Nixon secured the presidential nomination in 1968 without having to adopt a specific position on Vietnam. Once in the White House, politics continued to inform his efforts at winding down America's involvement in Southeast Asia. "Nothing drove him more than the thought of his second term," Johns argues, as all aspects of Vietnamization were geared to that electoral triumph (p. 282).

Johns situates Nixon's machinations within a broader context of Republican maneuvering on the war, offering vivid descriptions of intraparty challenges as well as of political careers won and lost. The GOP fractured along hawkish, dovish, and centrist lines, creating bipartisan coalitions for a more aggressive war-fighting posture as well as for a cease-fire and withdrawal of American troops. Those camps were never static, with legislators moving in and out of them during the course of the conflict. By 1968, the party itself was moving to the right, as Ronald Reagan's selection to lead the Republican Governors Association heralded a conservative tilt that, through ebbs and flows, would emerge triumphant in 1980. Indeed, as Johns argues, Vietnam created the conditions for Reagan's ascendance just as it would for Nixon's resurgence, serving the uncompromising, anticommunist vision of one and the peacemaking aspirations of the other. Not as fortunate were one-time presidential hopefuls George Romney and Nelson Rockefeller, both of whom proved unable to navigate the politics of Vietnam. Johns's depiction of their struggles, which he offers in great detail, injects helpful nuance into the 1968 presidential campaign. While that year's general election is often regarded as one that turned on issues of "law and order," the primary season revolved around Vietnam.

Republicans were particularly interested in de-Americanizing the conflict, an objective that emerged well before Nixon sought more famously to Vietnamize the war. Scholars have long recognized Melvin Laird's contribution to that process, but Johns demonstrates that talk about de-Americanization was common among hawkish as well as dovish GOP lawmakers prior

to the Nixon presidency. Laird himself emerges as a vigorous advocate of that position, one that became politically attractive during 1968 as party members sought to offer fresh ideas on ending the war. By focusing on Laird's stances during his time in Congress as well as in the Nixon administration, Johns advances our understanding of Laird's connection to de-Americanization and to the endgame of the war itself.

Despite his focus on the politics of Vietnamization, Johns is relatively silent on the decent interval thesis, the notion that Nixon timed the withdrawal of American troops to the 1972 presidential election, allowing him to reap the electoral benefits of forging the peace while avoiding responsibility for Saigon's expected collapse. Given his claims about Nixon's utterly political approach to the war, Johns might have engaged this matter more forcefully. A more concrete and sustained discussion of how Vietnam intersected with the Great Society might also have illuminated the precise manner in which Johnson, as Johns rightly argues, sought to manage multiple and shifting constituencies. Finally, stray errant statements, such as a reference to Senator Eugene McCarthy's "stunning upset" (p. 217) of President Johnson in the 1968 New Hampshire primary—a contest that Johnson actually won—are minor blemishes on this splendid, deeply researched account of the war and its partisan components. It is a powerful reminder, if one is still needed in this day and age, that politics does not stop at the water's edge.

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THOMAS L. AHERN, JR. *Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency*. Foreword by DONALD P. GREGG. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 2010. Pp. xxiii, 450. \$40.00.

Thomas L. Ahern, Jr.'s minutely detailed history of the Vietnam War is a noteworthy addition to the scholarly literature on the war. The book offers an in-depth analysis of how the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) understood and operated a host of rural pacification and counterinsurgency programs in South Vietnam. The longstanding efforts the CIA made to win the "hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese people have been chronicled by others, but never in such detail. That this story is told by a former CIA operations officer makes it particularly intriguing.

The origins of the book lay in Ahern's tours of duty as a CIA officer in Vietnam. When he left Vietnam in 1965, he recounts, "I knew we were losing, but I had no idea why the Saigon government was in retreat in the countryside, and the VC ascendant" (p. xviii). This book, then, offers something of a meditation on that sense of loss and the CIA's pervasive ignorance of its enemy. This is no memoir though: "my account of the CIA pacification programs there adopts a field perspective, not only to describe the programs and their effect but also to illuminate agency assumptions about the nature of the insurgency and about the means best suited

to counter it" (p. 4). The work is comprehensive in scope and provides a powerful rebuttal to the growing list of revisionist works about the Vietnam War that argue that the U.S. could have won.

Originally published as an in-house, classified history of the CIA, this study offers a counterpoint to other recent histories of the CIA. While Tim Weiner's *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* (2007) chronicled one disaster after another, Ahern's story of the CIA in Vietnam is far different in tone and content. It is not filled with bumbling fools who concocted harebrained schemes. The CIA officers portrayed here were aware of the limits of their actions, possessed a seasoned respect for their adversaries, and were free of excessive optimism concerning the progress of the war. How, then, can one explain the failure? For Ahern the CIA never took the time fully to appreciate the source of the Viet Cong's power and was often dragged into internecine bureaucratic battles within the South Vietnam government. Given these strategic and tactical errors, victory remained elusive.

Ahern's work begins with the first U.S. involvement in Vietnam after World War II and continues until the last helicopter left Saigon in 1975. With each passing year the CIA became increasingly involved in the war, yet it was only partially successful at providing accurate analysis and pacification strategies. The reasons for this failure are by now familiar: its enemy, the Viet Cong, was genuinely admired by the bulk of the South Vietnamese population; its allies, a series of South Vietnamese governments, were riddled with corruption and incompetent leadership; and its patron, the U.S. government, was filled with individuals who could only see the conflict through a Cold War lens and did not understand the nationalist aspirations of its foe. In other words, the CIA was very bad at intelligence, at analysis, and at getting others to see the war in a different light. In this sense, then, Ahern's work bears more than a passing similarity to the harsher critique leveled against the CIA offered by Weiner.

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CATHY MORAN HAJO. *Birth Control on Main Street: Organizing Clinics in the United States, 1916–1939*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2010. Pp. x, 251. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$25.00.

Birth control has long been at the center of contested policy and political debates in U.S. history. Claimed by feminists and socialists before World War I as a tool to help eradicate class and gender oppression, after the war birth control became an instrument of professional demographers, social workers, and physicians. Some of these professionals, particularly those influenced by eugenics, hoped that increased contraceptive availability and government funding for birth control could be used to manipulate populations both at home and abroad. Important histories of these national political and pol-

icy debates surrounding birth control include Linda Gordon's foundational *Woman's Body, Woman's Right: A Social History of Birth Control* (revised as *The Moral Property of Women: A History of Birth Control Politics in America* in 2003) and Carole McCann's *Birth Control Politics in the United States, 1916–1945* (1994). These works spotlight national birth control organizations like the American Birth Control League and Sanger's Birth Control Clinic Research Bureau, an approach that, according to Cathy Moran Hajo, places disproportionate attention on national political debates and a narrative of the professionalization of the birth control movement. Hajo concentrates instead on what she describes as "local concerns, smoothed over in the descriptions of clinics made both by the national birth control movement and by most historians" (p. 3). To get at these local concerns, she relies on birth control journals with descriptions of local birth control leagues and neighborhood clinics, newspapers, medical journals, and the Margaret Sanger Papers Project, for which the author is an associate editor.

Hajo's attention to local concerns uncovers a proliferation of birth control centers (over 650) between 1916 and 1939 that were created and operated by laywomen activists without medical training. These female birth control activists were the "wives of professional men, amateur social workers, and local philanthropists" (p. 73) who organized birth control leagues and founded freestanding clinics independent from hospitals or state public health services. Preferred by patients, many independent clinics provided care designed to help their female patients feel more comfortable discussing sensitive sexual matters. While local leagues and independent medical centers often received initial inspiration from Sanger and the American Birth Control League, local birth controllers usually shaped their clinics to meet community needs. The community focus of these independent clinics is offset by what Hajo refers to as "institutional clinics," linked to "hospitals, settlement houses and public health agencies" (p. 28), which did not provide birth control as a first priority. Rather, birth control activists pressed these pre-existing organizations to add birth control to their repertoire of services. Institutional clinics expanded rapidly in the 1930s with antipoverty funds aimed at those hit hard by the economic downturn. Yet, according to Hajo, these centers were less successful than the independent clinics, particularly when they existed in hospitals, because birth control was not their primary aim and was often perceived as unprofitable and too controversial to expand beyond marginal consideration.

Hajo's close examination of the operation of local birth control centers also reveals that laywomen birth control activists usually adhered to relatively conservative and narrow visions of the purpose of birth control and who should have access to it. Most clinics emphasized contraception as a family planning tool that would strengthen a married woman's ability to perform her primary tasks as wife and mother rather than liberate her to pursue autonomous goals. The author also finds

that clinic activists were not motivated by racist desires to reduce the number of immigrants, working-class, or people of color. Instead, the targeted clinic patient was white, married, and already the mother of several children. If anything, women of color were excluded from many local clinics. The ideal patient could not afford a private physician and thus sought access to a reliable method of contraception at community health centers because she was highly motivated to prevent or defer further childbearing. Birth controllers promoted this image to dispel stereotypes of contraception as immoral and the cause of premarital or extramarital sexual liaisons.

Hajo's book brings a fresh perspective to the history of birth control by focusing on the birth control clinics both founded and operated by women in their own communities. These women raised money for birth control, volunteered in clinics, and handled all of the operational logistics other than actual medical care of patients. According to Hajo, these women maintained control over their centers throughout the 1930s because most of the men who controlled the national movement were interested in broad policy and political debate rather than in the daily tasks of clinic operation.

JENNIFER NELSON

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ELAINE TYLER MAY. *America and the Pill: A History of Promise, Peril, and Liberation*. New York: Basic Books. 2010. Pp. vii, 214. \$25.95.

While many scholars have tackled the birth control pill as a topic for historical inquiry, Elaine Tyler May's book is the first to offer a succinct yet comprehensive analysis of its role in America's last half century. Upon its approval for contraceptive use by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1960, proponents touted it as the solution to world hunger, marital dysfunction, and poverty. Opponents feared it would lead to moral decay. While the pill failed to live up to any of these claims, it did play a central role in some of the "most profound developments in both public and private life," according to May (p. 168). May's history captures the complexities of what has become the most popular form of birth control in the United States.

Although male scientists John Rock and Gregory Pincus were primarily responsible for the pill, their efforts would not have existed without the vision and determination of Margaret Sanger. Despite Sanger's involvement in the eugenics movement, her motives for ensuring the creation of a birth control pill were grounded in feminism, May argues. With the financial backing of philanthropist Katharine McCormick, Sanger ensured that the development of an oral contraceptive would attract both popular and scholarly attention.

Once on the market, the pill's most vocal champions were not scientists or feminists but population control advocates. Fears of overpopulation escalated in the 1960s, buttressed by Paul Ehrlich's 1968 best seller, *The*

Population Bomb, which sold two million copies by 1974 (p. 44). Oral contraceptives were promoted as a tool to curb population growth, thereby reducing poverty and the competition for natural resources. As May points out, however, the pill did not bring an end to world hunger or overpopulation.

A slightly quieter storm was brewing among the women actually taking the pill, whose voices, initially at least, had trouble being heard over the clamor of population controllers. May echoes the arguments of other historians such as Elizabeth Watkins and Andrea Tone that the pill did not actually cause the sexual revolution as much as benefit from it. Those most likely to have access to the contraceptive in the first decade of its availability were married women, not newly liberated singles. As in other sections of her book, May effectively portrays the mixed reception that the pill received among sexually active women in search of the perfect contraceptive. Some celebrated the pill's ability to separate the sexual act from procreation, while others demanded more information about the potential risks and side effects of a drug that millions of healthy women swallowed daily. Angered by the dismissal of women's own experiences on the pill in scientific studies to determine its safety, some women joined the growing women's health movement that demanded more information and influence over contraceptive research and regulation.

Those familiar with the scholarship on the birth control pill will not be surprised by May's findings, though the juxtaposition of different voices—from Sanger to Hugh Hefner to those promoting the development of male birth control—is refreshing. Adding to the book's originality is the inclusion of respondents to May's internet questionnaire regarding women's experiences on the pill in the recent past. These fascinating accounts provide additional evidence of the pill's continuing influence on a new generation of women, who reflect on everything from side effects to sex education.

May's study is not only informative; it is also fun to read. May draws on a wide range of sources, from song lyrics and television shows to scientific studies. She includes her own story as well, as both a participant in a clinical trial for the pill, and the daughter of a clinical researcher who played an important role in the FDA approval of the pill (she did not realize the extent of that involvement until she began research for this project). The book will undoubtedly entertain and educate those interested in the history of sexuality and reproductive rights, and its brevity and price should facilitate widespread classroom use as well.

WENDY KLINE
University of Cincinnati

WENDY KLINE. *Bodies of Knowledge: Sexuality, Reproduction, and Women's Health in the Second Wave*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2010. Pp. xiv, 202. \$22.50.

In the late 1960s, feminist activists, forerunners of what would become an influential women's health movement, began to develop a forceful critique of medical expertise and the doctors who embodied it. Angered by a medical system which, they concluded, privileged (male) expertise over (female) experience, these activists "challenged, expanded, and reinvented constructions of the female body and in particular reproductive health" (p. 3).

Bodies of Knowledge consists of five case studies, each one illuminating an important feminist reproductive priority in the 1970s and 1980s: the demystification of the female body, abortion, the depersonalization of women patients, hormonal birth control, and childbirth. A chapter on the origins and evolution of *Our Bodies, Ourselves* (1973) analyzes the ways in which women's own experience of their bodies was presented as a new model for understanding reproductive health and disease. The lessons of the early editions of *Our Bodies, Ourselves*—trust your own experience, be extremely skeptical of the medical establishment—also guided the lay midwives profiled in another chapter. Kline suggests that many women during this period, feminist or not, wanted to "transform the process of childbirth by reclaiming it as a natural rather than a medical event" (p. 127). However, personal experience never did succeed in eclipsing expertise completely. In addition to antagonisms between midwives and obstetricians, internecine conflicts emerged between lay and professional midwives, and between advocates of home births and hospital-based birthing centers.

Two chapters document the ways in which women's experience was initially privileged, but later challenged, as a guiding paradigm for feminist health activism. One deals with an unusual teaching program at Harvard Medical School in which feminist health activists, serving as "model patients," attempted to teach medical students "'a healthy way to perform a well-woman gynecological examination with non-sexist, nonheterosexist, nonelitist assumptions'" (p. 53). This controversial program became even more so when the activists refused to work with male medical students. Then they demanded that women medical students agree not only to learn how to conduct pelvic examinations but also be subject to them. Unsurprisingly, the medical school refused. And Kline's chapter on the transformation of "Jane," Chicago's underground feminist abortion-provider group, into a reproductive rights action network once *Roe v. Wade* (1973) legalized abortion, effectively illuminates the difficulties inherent in any attempt on the part of one group of women to enforce a unitary model for feminist health activism.

Kline's study of the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) Board of Inquiry hearings in 1983 on the safety of the injectable contraceptive Depo-Provera weaves together many of the book's major themes. The Depo-Provera controversy followed earlier contentious debates over oral contraceptives and the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device. When Congress had held hearings on the safety of the birth control pill in 1970, women

activists were not permitted to testify, even though the hearings had been inspired by one of them, Barbara Seaman, author of *The Doctors' Case against the Pill* (1969). But Hugh Davis, the male gynecologist who wrote the foreword to Seaman's book, did testify, using his time to extol the safety and effectiveness of the Dalkon Shield. Hundreds of thousands of young women fled the pill for the Shield. Davis had, however, lied to Congress when he claimed that his views were unbiased. In fact, he not only invented the Dalkon Shield but also falsified the data that supposedly demonstrated its safety. The pill was dealt a temporary blow by the 1970 hearings; the Dalkon Shield was felled by lawsuits. By 1974, more than two hundred thousand documented cases of serious complications from the device forced its removal from the American market.

For the 1983 Depo-Provera hearings, the FDA invited women's health activists to testify, an indication of their growing influence. Convinced that first-person testimonies would persuade the FDA to disapprove Depo-Provera, the activists were taken aback when their legal counsel demurred. Concentrate instead, they were told, on scientific studies and expert witnesses. They agreed, and this strategy worked, at least for the short term. However, in the end, Kline argues, in the Depo-Provera controversy and in feminist health activism in general, this kind of decision—to take on the medical and scientific establishment on its own terms—left feminists with something less than they had hoped. Women did achieve greater access to the medical profession, as more women became doctors and researchers. Kline concludes, however, that this victory “weakened the movement's ideological basis—albeit slippery to begin with—by undermining the notion that knowledge and power are rooted in the biological body” (p. 125).

Crisply argued, creatively researched, and with enough controversy to provoke discussion within and beyond feminist scholarship, this fine book deserves a wide audience among health care professionals as well as scholars.

MARGARET MARSH
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CAROLYN HERBST LEWIS. *Prescription for Heterosexuality: Sexual Citizenship in the Cold War Era*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2010. Pp. xi, 228. \$34.95.

Recently scholars like Margot Canaday and David Johnson have revealed the significance of heterosexuality to conceptions of national security and state formation in the postwar United States. In her book, Carolyn Herbst Lewis builds on their work by contending that the Cold War's combined preoccupations with civil defense, national security, and moral decline led to a policing of what she calls “sexual citizenship,” which placed a premium on heterosexual maturity for both men and women. What sets Lewis's study apart from earlier works is her subject: physicians. Drawing on

both general and specialized journals published by medical societies (along with popular periodical literature), Lewis aims to show that doctors—especially family physicians—played a constitutive role in determining the parameters of healthy sexuality in the Cold War era. The result is an engaging, lively book that successfully draws on the histories of medicine and sexuality to illuminate the larger history of Cold War culture.

Lewis's study proceeds from two entwined premises: that the Cold War needed doctors, and that doctors needed the Cold War. In the first case, medical practitioners defined themselves as “the guardians of the sexual well-being of Americans” at mid-century (p. 5). This guardianship was important, Lewis contends, because Cold War rhetoric identified the familial realm as the seedbed of strong citizenship: a healthy, strong nation required healthy, strong citizens, and the white, heteronormative family was the linchpin that connected the individual to the larger society. Such a family required that both men and women exhibit the hallmarks of sexual maturity, and it was up to the family physician to help them achieve that goal. At the same time, Lewis points out that the Cold War enabled physicians to solidify their own professional authority at a time when it was being undermined by other fields and institutions, including psychology and psychoanalysis, organized religion, and the public schools. Indeed, part of what makes Lewis's analysis so interesting is that this moment represented, as she puts it, “both the height and the last gasp of medical authority over sexuality” (p. 6).

The chapters of the book are organized around both the ailments and treatments that received sustained attention in the era's medical literature. Two chapters focus on the parallel problems of female frigidity and male impotence. Lewis shows how family physicians believed that both ailments signaled a failure to achieve full sexual maturity. Reflecting the influence of Sigmund Freud at mid-century, most physicians understood female frigidity as a failure to achieve a vaginal (rather than clitoral) orgasm from penile penetration. Meanwhile, they sought to understand both the causes of and effective treatments for male impotence, which they defined (somewhat paradoxically) as both an ever-increasing problem and, more reassuringly, as a periodic occurrence even in the healthiest marriages. The book's later chapters look at two common treatments of the time. The first, pelvic exams, were often part of premarital sex consultations. Medical practitioners argued that these exams mitigated fears of penetration among their (presumptively virginal) female patients, but in truth physicians used the exams to shore up their own authority. The second procedure was artificial insemination. Physicians served as gatekeepers of what at the time was a cutting-edge reproductive technology by ensuring that only “suitable” (i.e., married, heterosexual) couples had access to the procedure. Doctors also believed that insemination should remain a guarded secret, thus helping to maintain fictions of biological fatherhood. A fascinating case study of the intersections

between culture and technology, Lewis's discussion of artificial insemination illustrates how—thanks to family physicians—a technology that would later undermine the heteronormative family initially helped to secure its borders.

While this book offers an incisive look at the roles of elites in policing sexuality, it has a key shortcoming, indeed one that Lewis herself suspects. At the end of her introduction, she acknowledges that her story reveals little about what actually happened in physicians' offices. The rules protecting patient confidentiality, among other things, limit her ability to uncover whether—and how—family doctors put their prescriptive medical literature into practice. In short, we do not get a sense of how patients responded to their physicians' recommendations. Indeed, the patients are largely absent from this study. While Lewis's research difficulties in this regard were no doubt formidable, I found myself wishing she had found creative ways to fill this void. The most powerful historical accounts of expert discourse, such as Linda Gordon's *Heroes of Their Own Lives: The Politics and History of Family Violence* (1988), are those that manage to uncover the complex interactions between experts and laypeople, as well as the counterintuitive ways that laypeople have appropriated expert advice. What makes this absence doubly frustrating is that the feminist health movement of the 1970s—something that Lewis alludes to in her conclusion—emerged partly in response to women's experiences in their doctors' offices in the 1950s and 1960s. This limitation notwithstanding, Lewis has written an elegant book that illuminates the intersection of medicine, sexuality, and citizenship in the Cold War era.

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HEATHER MURRAY. *Not in This Family: Gays and the Meaning of Kinship in Postwar North America*. (Politics and Culture in Modern America.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2010. Pp. xvii, 289. \$45.00.

Heather Murray traces the transformation of relationships between North American adult gay children and their parents during the second half of the twentieth century, when homosexuality, once a hidden and taboo topic, became increasingly public and political. She argues that the constant throughout these years—regardless of whether gays felt obliged to be covert and lie to their parents about their sexuality or to be confrontational and flaunt it—was an intense desire for attachment.

Murray's chronology begins with the socially conservative post-World War II years, when an emerging self-awareness on the part of gay people was accompanied by well-founded concerns about revealing themselves to their families. As Murray shows through letters, diaries, and articles in popular magazines, some parents were sympathetic when they learned that their adult child was homosexual, even admonishing other parents

of gays that they must overcome their shocked senses and offer support; but parental distress was the more usual response. Murray talks about the dire "cures" for homosexuality to which stunned and grieving parents were willing to submit their children in the late 1940s and the 1950s, including lobotomies. Even into the 1960s, popular culture suggested that the revelation that an adult child was homosexual was a family calamity, as horrific as if that child had been taken away by death.

By the later 1960s and early 1970s, many gay people, influenced by civil rights movements, drew parallels between the oppression of racial and ethnic minorities and their own oppression, and they adopted a "liberation" perspective. Influenced too by hippie freedom, they abandoned "discretion," insisting that the term implied shame. They declared that it was the family that needed to change to accommodate its gay children and not the reverse. They were critical of the very notion of the nuclear family and viewed their parents as ambassadors of a repressive society and banal sexuality. The irony of this portrait of parents, Murray asserts, generalizing rather sweepingly, "is that it highlights, in its vehemence, the abiding hold of the family [on gay people] and [their] longing for family life that it seems to belittle or diminish" (p. 43).

Murray devotes an interesting chapter to lesbian feminism in the 1970s, a phenomenon that was particularly confusing to the parents whose daughters had previously identified as heterosexual and who now flaunted their new-found lesbianism as a political choice. "If people are gaited that way, OK," one mother typically argued with her daughter, "but I can't see why anyone would want to cultivate it" (p. 87). Daughters argued back that their mothers were complicit in accepting oppression from men, and they even suggested that their mothers would be better off if they too chose to become lesbians. Bolstered by powerful lesbian feminist writing, Murray says, the decade of the 1970s was perhaps the first time many lesbians were able to adopt a "rhetoric of confidence" (p. 93) in the viability of their lives as lesbians. The personal correspondence between parents and children that Murray presents in this and other sections of the book is particularly poignant.

Gay people's increasing openness with their families led eventually to significant changes in the attitudes of many parents. As early as 1972, some parents started taking an activist role in the gay movement, even marching in gay pride parades with signs that exhorted "Parents of Gays Unite" and "Support Our Children." They agitated for gay rights as well. For example, Murray discusses a parent group in the mid-1970s that was a precursor to Parents, Families and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG) and was instrumental in getting the Civil Service Commission to lift its ban on employment of gays.

The AIDS crisis in the 1980s—when parents sometimes learned that a son was gay at the same time that they learned he was afflicted by the devastating disease—had various effects on the relationships between

parents and their gay male children. Some parents banished their ill sons permanently from their lives. Others struggled between fear of contamination and the desire to show compassion. Yet others, becoming closer than ever to their gay sons, battled discrimination and were resolute activists, demanding changes in the health care system, fighting for the availability of life-prolonging AIDS drugs, and working to make the public acknowledge that AIDS sufferers were also family members. Murray shows that the crisis sometimes brought about what had been unthinkable in earlier eras—a family blending: that is, the AIDS patient's biological family and his chosen gay family came together in order to care for and support him. The liberation movements of the late 1960s and 1970s and AIDS in the 1980s virtually put an end to the gay closet, Murray concludes. By the early 1990s, gays felt an "obligation to confess," and telling the family became "a central, necessary stage of self-revelation" (p. 193).

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BROCK THOMPSON. *The Un-Natural State: Arkansas and the Queer South*. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press. 2010. Pp. xi, 247. \$29.95.

In his new book Brock Thompson makes a surprisingly compelling case that Arkansas—a state that is widely regarded as one of the most backward places in the United States—may be lesbian and gay historiography's next big thing. His study also aims to improve understanding of U.S. lesbian and gay history by upending several widely accepted beliefs about it.

Thompson's monograph is obviously not the first word on the history of queer life below the Mason-Dixon Line, nor is it likely to be the last. But it is an important contribution to what is finally starting to be an actual conversation thanks to the growing number of scholars who are beginning to recognize that our conception of queer history has been shaped over the past several decades by assumptions that arguably occlude even as they help to reveal. The first and most obvious of these is the widely held belief that "homosex" and gender nonconformity are somehow distinctly urban phenomena. They are not, and Thompson's study makes this abundantly clear. The second is the belief that places like Arkansas—deeply southern, often predominantly rural—somehow lag behind the bustling American metropolises. They do not. In fact, if Thompson can be said to pursue one argument more zealously than others, it is precisely the claim that "Arkansas was never behind; Arkansas never played catch-up to modern alternatives found elsewhere in the nation. Rather," he contends, "Arkansas offered and operated under specific social and cultural conditions that shaped it as an alternative modernity" (p. 9).

Organizationally, Thompson arranges his investigation of Arkansas's "alternative modernity" into three

sections, each with a unique thematic lens. For example, section one traces the emergence of gay male drag culture in Arkansas from a much older tradition of rural folk performance known as the "womanless wedding." Section two investigates the unexpected connection between what sociologist Laud Humphreys famously dubbed the "tearoom trade" and Arkansas's surprising decision to write a brand new anti-sodomy statute in 1977 after having removed its existing anti-sodomy law just one year earlier. Section three focuses on the woefully understudied history of lesbian separatism. Additionally, it tells the remarkable story of Eureka Springs, a small village in the heart of the Ozarks that was pulled back from the brink of municipal extinction during the 1970s and 1980s by the revitalizing and unexpectedly synergistic effects of Christ-centered entrepreneurialism and new age sexual liberationism. In short, Thompson's book is an assemblage of unexpectedly queer southern histories, none of which can be said to represent the whole story where the history of "homosex" and gender nonconformity in "the natural state" is concerned, but none of which can be left out of that history either.

Of course, anyone who is familiar with the existing literature on the history of gender and sexuality in the American South will feel inclined to compare Thompson's book to John Howard's *Men Like That: A Southern Queer History* (1999). And given that Thompson was one of Howard's students, it should probably come as no surprise that there are some similarities. For instance, like Howard, Thompson attends primarily to the postwar period. He also takes another important cue from his mentor by reiterating the importance of movement and mobility in non-metropolitan contexts. But Thompson's text is more than Howard redux. Among other significant differences, Thompson dedicates a third of his study to a discussion of the experiences of women. An Arkansas native, he also adopts a conspicuously autobiographical approach to his subject in some places, a strategy that actually works surprisingly well from an organizational standpoint, and, crucially, a strategy that affords Thompson the opportunity to be uncommonly expressive and even eloquent at times.

Ultimately, what Thompson's book establishes most persuasively is the fact that Arkansas is not, and never has been, New York, San Francisco, or any of the other gay metropolises about which historians of queer life in the United States have taught us so much. And that is precisely why we should all be queuing up to buy a copy and read it.

COLIN R. JOHNSON
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DEWAR MACLEOD. *Kids of the Black Hole: Punk Rock in Postsuburban California*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 2010. Pp. ix, 177. \$19.95.

Punk rock is finally getting its due attention from historians, much as the 1960s counterculture got its treat-

ment earlier. Dewar MacLeod's fine book tells a story about punk's development and changes in Los Angeles over a short period of time, from about 1977 to the early 1980s. There are important insights and stories about *Slash* magazine, the creation of venues like the Masque, and the formation of bands who had lasting resonance like the Dickies, X, and the Plugz. MacLeod traces out the inherent tensions when a "subculture" dedicated to "authenticity" also struggles to remain open, flexible, and inclusive to the new and bizarre (p. 39). The author pays attention to intellectual debates about the "meaning of punk," especially the rambling writings of Claude Bessy, chief editor of *Slash* (p. 67). There was always, MacLeod argues, a "contested nature of the definition of punk," especially as some bands started to break big and gain popularity (p. 75) and as something called "New Wave" (with bands like the Go-Gos and the Knack) cracked mainstream culture in the late 1970s. This has been the struggle of rebellious cultural experimenters throughout the American past: aspirations to change society clashing with the desire to remain pure or true to founding principles.

After setting out the earlier parts of the story of Los Angeles's punk, MacLeod turns to "Hardcore" music, the final episode in his rather short story. Bands like the Middle Class and Black Flag, who were faster and more confrontational in their music and stage antics, started to break. These bands never bothered to try to play to or impress the earlier subculture that centered around Hollywood; instead they remained attached to "the suburban towns of the Valleys and the South Bay area in Los Angeles County and in the coastal and nearby towns of Orange County" (p. 3) and the Huntington Beach area. With an embrace of violence and confrontation, witnessed especially in the troubling antics of Henry Rollins, the lead singer of Black Flag who enjoyed punching and getting punched by his fans, hardcore "emphasized punk's exclusivity," MacLeod contends (p. 96). There were also increased confrontations between punks and police that started to define punk's struggle for self-definition. Herein lies MacLeod's declension narrative. "Violence" had become "endemic to the 'scene' and to the creation of that scene" (p. 130). It was also a "male music" scene, utterly limited in its capacity to reach out, unlike the looser, earlier punk renditions.

Some might object that MacLeod's take on the later hardcore scene fixates on violence and exclusivity. How does one explain the interest that the band Minutemen—a working-class, politically astute group that eschewed violence—had in playing with groups like Black Flag? Maybe there was more openness than MacLeod suggests. Other readers will be put off by the book's style, or rather its chaotic styles, which do not always work well together. The book starts off almost as a memoir of MacLeod's own interaction with the Los Angeles punk scene but then slides into heavy theoretical ponderings (punk created "a postmodern 'bricolage,' a random assembling of the best and detritus of society" [p. 16]). The musings about "postsuburbia" (a term that

still appears vague at the end of the book) and the esoteric ramblings of the Situationist International writers do not illuminate the activities of a local punk rock scene as much as MacLeod would like. These quibbles aside, however, the book makes an important contribution to understanding a vital if contested subculture in U.S. history.

KEVIN MATTSON
Ohio University

SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, *The Last Gasp: The Rise and Fall of the American Gas Chamber*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2010. Pp. xiv, 325. \$27.50.

Scott Christianson's book is more than a study of the American gas chamber as a site of execution. It covers the modern transatlantic history of killing with gas, from the trenches of World War I in early twentieth-century Europe to the introduction of the gas chamber in Nevada in 1921 and its subsequent adoption in several American states. The book continues to explore the transatlantic network of the chemical industries on both sides of the Atlantic in the interwar period and the systematic annihilation of European Jews in the Nazi gas chambers during World War II. Christianson then takes his readers to the ongoing use of lethal gas in the death penalty systems of various American states, even after the Shoah. He discusses the general criticism of the death penalty in 1960s and 1970s America and its temporary unconstitutionality, and then examines the gas chamber's "last gasp" in the execution of Walter LaGrand in Arizona on March 3, 1999.

Without a doubt this is an important contribution to the historiography of capital punishment, and the book fills a gap in existing death penalty research. Christianson does for the gas chamber what others have done for the guillotine in nineteenth-century France and other parts of Europe and for the electric chair and lethal injection in twentieth- and twenty-first-century America. Thus, in the history and sociology of capital punishment, the book follows a familiar train of thought that critiques the twisted logic of "humanizing" the death penalty by unmasking modern states' efforts to execute humanely and without pain and suffering as a distorted fallacy.

Yet Christianson's book aspires to do more. Most significantly and admirably, the author embeds the U.S. death penalty system in the larger historical configuration of "modernity" by seeking to explore wider and more general transatlantic efforts to make killing on behalf of the state more humane, rational, and also more efficient. No execution technique makes the ambivalence and implausibility of this effort more obvious than the gas chamber. Initially invented and developed as a noble instrument with the intent to execute painlessly and put the condemned to sleep peacefully, the gas chamber proved to be a gruesome means to a torturous death. Even more than that, the efficiency of gas in killing masses paved the way for its systematic and

industrialized employment in the annihilation of millions of Jews and others in the Nazi genocide of World War II.

Unfortunately, the great strength of the book's approach also exposes one of its weaknesses. Even though the author stresses that he in no way seeks to equate the Holocaust with the American execution system or "blame the Americans for the Nazi atrocities" (p. 8), the book's style and approach are investigative at times, as its author seems to be on the hunt for more clear-cut ties among the American chemical industry, the U.S. death penalty system, and Nazi genocide. However, he does not succeed in uncovering such connections. No proof exists that the Nazis studied American gas chambers, nor does the book present evidence that American death penalty states debated whether they should continue to use gas for executions after World War II and Auschwitz.

Although the introduction to the book lays out tools of social and cultural theory that Michel Foucault, David Garland, and others have used to analyze punishment and its larger sociocultural significance, the author hardly seems to employ them to explore the topic or navigate the material. Drawing more inspiration from the existing body of theories of punishment might have helped to unfold interdependencies in the transatlantic twentieth-century history of killing with gas that go beyond simple causal ties and show to what extent mechanized executions and industrialized mass killings constituted part of the same discursive formation. Thus the book too often remains anecdotal, even though the author has collected an impressive amount of material and done a great deal of original research. Nevertheless, Christianson's book makes a significant contribution to the historiography of capital punishment and should inspire more research on this important topic.

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CAROLYN DE LA PEÑA. *Empty Pleasures: The Story of Artificial Sweeteners from Saccharin to Splenda*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2010. Pp. 279. \$32.50.

Artificial and non-nutritive sweeteners have been available since the 1880s when a German sugar chemist named Constantin Fahlberg began manufacturing saccharin. Scientists saw saccharin as a great achievement on a par with artificial dyes. Doctors hoped that diabetics could now enjoy sweets without increasing their blood sugar level, and dyspeptics—Theodore Roosevelt was a notable example—could enjoy sweets without increasing their weight. Food processors saw that saccharin was much cheaper than sugar, at least per unit of sweetening power, and equally good as a preservative. And during times when sugar was scarce, many consumers saw saccharin as better than nothing. In *We the Living* (1936), Ayn Rand provides powerful images of saccharin in revolutionary Petrograd. The sugar in-

dustry, by contrast, saw saccharin as a threat to its business and urged federal and state governments to limit its use, if not ban it altogether. Some clinical trials were held, but they convinced only the already committed.

Similar stories unfolded when cyclamates were introduced in the 1950s, and when aspartame and sucralose followed somewhat later. As Carolyn de la Peña explains, the postwar period was a time of plenty when some Americans worried about their weight and saw chemicals as a solution to their problems, and when some Americans worried about the amount of chemicals in their lives. In response to this latter concern, the U.S. Congress in 1958 passed an Additives Amendment to the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; this amendment banned additives that had "not been adequately tested to establish their safety," and its so-called Delaney Clause said that no additive would be deemed safe if it induced cancer in "man or animal."

Scientists, many of them supported by the sugar lobby, then pumped cyclamates into lab animals and, when the dosage was sufficiently high, found evidence of cancer. That meant that cyclamates could no longer be "generally recognized as safe" and foods containing cyclamates could no longer remain on the market. When scientists found similar results with saccharin, the public rebelled, arguing that they should be able to weigh the risks and benefits for themselves. Congress responded by putting the saccharin ban on hold from year to year, eventually deciding that chemical additives in processed foods, as well as residues on fruits and vegetables, would be permitted if they were present in such small quantities that there could be "reasonable certainty" that they would cause no harm.

De la Peña is keenly attentive to the social and cultural meanings of foods, and how these may differ depending on whether one is a producer or a consumer, a marketing professional or a mother. She reads the texts and subtexts of advertisements and examines the complex relationships between sweetener manufacturers and food manufacturers. Always aware of race and gender, she tells us, time and again, that this was largely a story of white men in lab coats, and white women as consumers.

The Special Collections of the University of California, Davis, houses the papers of the California Canners and Growers, a cooperative network of farmers who sent their fruit to be combined, processed, and sold under one label. Richmond Chase (the predecessor firm) had introduced a Diet Delight brand of unsweetened canned fruit in 1946, and was open to the possibility of using cyclamate for this purpose. And because its chief technologist preserved his papers and the relevant trade literature that came his way, de la Peña can explore the complex interactions between Abbott Laboratories, the major manufacturer of cyclamates, and one of the first important food processors to use cyclamates. She also makes good use of the papers of Tillie Lewis, a California businesswoman who successfully promoted artificially sweetened dietetic foods, and

the letters sent to the Food and Drug Administration protesting the planned saccharin ban of 1977.

One concern I have with this book pertains to the assumption that, since artificially sweetened food was not advertised in the African American press, African Americans did not eat it. Another pertains to Walter Landor, the marketing guru who in 1956, at the behest of the Spreckels Sugar Company, announced that "sugar is sugar." While de la Peña reads this as evidence that sugar had no distinctive image for average American consumers, I would argue that Spreckels, along with other beet sugar firms, was striving to overcome the widespread notion that cane sugar tasted better than that made from beets. Careful consumers today can distinguish packages of "pure sugar" from those of "pure cane sugar."

Such matters aside, this book does an excellent job of exploring the contested history of artificial sweeteners and their use in packaged food and drink. In de la Peña's hands these substances become windows onto important aspects of the American experience.

DEBORAH JEAN WARNER

National Museum of American History

DAVID E. NYE, *When the Lights Went Out: A History of Blackouts in America*. Cambridge: MIT Press. 2010. Pp. x, 292. \$27.95.

David E. Nye has written a deceptively simple book. It includes thematic chapters arranged in a rough chronological order including a variety of blackout experiences: military blackouts, the Great Northeastern Blackout of 1965, the New York Blackout in 1977, terrorism and blackouts, and voluntary "greenouts." Although focused on the United States, the themes in the book are much more universal. Nye's objective in this fine history is not simple, however. He links physical blackouts with numerous cultural concerns from economic growth to labor unrest, from consumerism to global warming. "Blackouts," he states, "are breaks in the flow of social time" (p. 3). Nye draws attention to the union between blackouts and modern life. As we have become increasingly dependent on electricity in an energy-intensive society, we are forced to confront that dependence when the lights go out. Yet Nye is not exclusively interested in this observation, or in assessing blame for blackouts. Instead, blackouts become a means to comment on cultural issues in a novel way.

The first chapter discusses increased dependence on electricity, the electrical grid as the primary delivery system, and causes of blackouts. Nye reminds us, "In a blackout, one suddenly must live in the here and now. With each passing decade, the disorientation caused by confronting an electrified world becomes more profound" (p. 35). Nye addresses this issue by exploring both causes and impacts of blackouts and carefully correlating the two. Blackouts result in people being swallowed up in the dark, but whether the event was intentional or unintentional imposes different outcomes, as does the timing of the blackout itself.

In subsequent chapters, Nye goes beyond caveats about the modern world's dependence on electricity to confront blackouts in a variety of settings and from varied perspectives. Chapter two on "War" deals with enforced blackouts imposed as a shield against enemy attack—"artificial darkness"—desirable and necessary in an aviation age. The blackout was a disguise, changing in time from "an element of military planning to a coordinated civilian exercise" (p. 41). The blackout, in this case, also was a form of technological control, not technical failure. In chapters three and four, Nye turns to blackouts as accidents, that is, unintended technical failures. The systems that produced and generated electrical power became more complex, more centralized, and in some cases more vulnerable, even as customers developed increased reliance on them. Thus, glitches or serious problems in the systems were magnified. The 1965 blackout struck without warning, which distinguished it from the military blackout in a major way. How did people respond? In the case of the 1965 blackout, most people experienced inconvenience, not panic: a little fear but also little reactionary behavior. Some people even stopped to reflect on the "strange beauty" of the city without lights. Twelve years later, the 1977 blackout produced a much different response, induced by high temperatures, shaky economic conditions, and memories of the energy crisis in the early 1970s. Arson, looting, and rioting replaced the more quiet resignation of 1965. Nye compares these different responses in detail to demonstrate the need to pay attention to change over time. Blackouts as a category of events are no more static or uniform than the conditions in which they occur.

In chapters five through seven, Nye moves to a different set of blackouts and blackout experiences. "Rolling blackouts" (chapter five) were planned and not accidental, and resulted from more fully integrated electrical systems not less developed ones. Such events thus fly in the face of common notions of technological progress. Rising concerns over terrorism in the 1990s (chapter six) made blackouts a new type of weapon. While military blackouts concealed society's human and infrastructural assets, terrorists could use the darkness to cripple services, conduct stealthy activities, and disconnect people from their communities. Greenouts (chapter seven) are more benign in impact, but politically charged. Dimming power to demonstrate problems of overconsumption (or to advocate reduced use of electricity in the name of sustainability) used the blackout in a unique way.

Thus what appears simple and straightforward in the title of this book encourages much deeper reflection on a range of societal issues, connected not only to energy use but to how we view our world, how we manipulate technology, how we came to depend on an environment with perpetual light, and more. Nye guides us through many of these themes, but what makes the book highly

valuable is that he encourages our own speculation and reflection. Not many books do that, or do it so well.

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MARK V. BARROW, JR. *Nature's Ghosts: Confronting Extinction from the Age of Jefferson to the Age of Ecology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2009. Pp. xi, 497. \$35.00.

A specter has long haunted American naturalists—the specter of extinction. According to Mark V. Barrow, Jr.'s absorbing book, the ethereal presence of those animals no longer living “alerted [naturalists] to the growing problem of human-caused loss of plants and animals while fostering sympathy for their desperate plight” (p. 13). That thesis is, in the author's words, “straightforward” (p. 13). But the book's accumulation of detail, attention to overlooked naturalists, and critical rendering of the way systematics informed the development of conservation make it a must read for environmental historians and historians of science.

Concern over extinction did not begin with the age of ecology, but with the age of Thomas Jefferson. During the height of the American Revolution, Jefferson spent a good deal of intellectual energy attempting to refute European notions that the New World environment was incapable of producing robust life. A key piece of Jefferson's evidence was the “Mammoth or Big Buffalo” known at the time as the “*incognitum*” (p. 17). And yet Jefferson could not produce live mammoths, only fossils: what did that say about the New World? Jefferson offered scientific explanations—the mammoth was confined to areas not yet explored—and philosophical ones—the great chain of being demanded the mammoths' presence—for the lack of live Virginia specimens. Plainly, Jefferson could not accept the reality of extinction. But by the time of his passing in 1826, many scientists, prodded by the discovery of new fossils and French scientist Georges Cuvier's comparative anatomy, had begun to embrace the historical reality of life-forms no longer living.

By the mid-nineteenth century, naturalists understood that many forms of life had long historical records, and that contemporary flora and fauna were subject to extermination. Extinction became a pressing concern, and the American bison embodied the problem. Among those alarmed by the bison's fate was Joel Asaph Allen, a curator at Harvard's Museum of Comparative Zoology. Allen, one of Barrow's overlooked naturalists, began writing about the bison in 1876. He wrote for both scientific and popular audiences and advocated for wildlife reserves and strict hunting regulations. Nor was Allen alone in his concerns. Many scientists and concerned citizens, especially those, like Allen, associated with the Audubon movement, formed organizations devoted to protecting wildlife.

Concern about conservation was not confined to species indigenous to the United States. One of the great strengths of Barrow's book is its exploration of how the

alarm over extinction was exported abroad. Among the chief exporters was Harold J. Coolidge, another associate of the Museum of Comparative Zoology, who helped form the American Committee for International Wild Life Protection in 1930. Coolidge and his fellows—mostly scientific elites flush with imperial arrogance—focused on African wildlife. The continuing development of scientific information broadened conservationist anxieties, both ideologically and geographically.

Thanks to the centennial of Charles Darwin's visit to the Galapagos, a dramatic decline in migratory waterfowl, and increased political interest in Latin America, naturalists turned their attention to the Western Hemisphere. Prodded by the new political attitude toward Latin America embodied by Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy, conservationists produced in 1933 a landmark in international wildlife law: the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere. This law helped spur many conservation efforts and was a significant precedent to the Endangered Species Act of 1973.

The Endangered Species Act reflected the importance of the science of ecology in myriad ways that the earlier convention did not. By the 1950s ecologists learned to think of animals as members of interdependent communities, thus fostering a reconsideration of the value of animals beyond traditional use or aesthetic standards. This switch was particularly important in thinking about top predators, which Barrow demonstrates in an excellent chapter on efforts to preserve raptors during the interwar years. And yet ecologists of the 1940s and 1950s were deeply conflicted about the relationship between their scientific interests and their politics. The Ecological Society of America supported a preservation committee only to balk at its politics; eventually the committee separated from the scientific organization and over time grew into The Nature Conservancy, a leading contemporary environmental organization.

Barrow concludes with two chapters that explore more contemporary debates, delving into controversies and campaigns over whooping cranes, the American alligator (a crusade encouraged by University of Florida conservationist Archie Carr), big cats, and marine mammals. Like their predecessors, contemporary scientists struggle with the boundaries between their scientific and political commitments. But in some ways such lines do not matter: whether a species is preserved due to scientific interest or for moral or aesthetic reasons, it is still preserved.

Given that most ecologists argue that we currently reside in one of the great mass extinction episodes in history, with extinction between 1,000 to 10,000 times the background (natural) rates, this book could not be more timely. As humans continue to remake the earth, the fate of other life forms, and how their fate inevitably intertwines with humanity's, will undoubtedly remain a topic of vital public debate. That larger public dialogue

is mostly missing from this volume; Barrow limits his attention to professional naturalists, a necessary concession for a single volume. Readers should not assume, however, that conservation has only been a preoccupation of scientific elites. Rather, from its earliest days conservation secured broad public appeal. The larger story of how mass social movements addressed the extinction issue remains to be written. When such a volume appears, it will greatly benefit from Barrow's important work.

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CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA

LOWELL GUDMUNDSON and JUSTIN WOLFE, editors. *Blacks and Blackness in Central America: Between Race and Place*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2010. Pp. viii, 406. Cloth \$89.95, paper \$24.95.

This collection of essays aims to make space in the historiography of the African diaspora for those areas of the Central American isthmus colonized by Spain or later absorbed into the nations that emerged from Spanish rule. It successfully contributes to documenting the extensive presence of Africans and their descendants in these areas, to exploring these Afro-Central Americans' struggles for security, freedom, and power, and to tracing the erasure of blacks and blackness in elite constructions of national identity focused on "Spanish and Indian antecedents and contributions" (p. 2). A second aim is to overcome the marginalization of these histories from Spanish Central American historiography.

This volume, the product of a 2004 conference of Mexicanists, Colombianists, and Central Americanists, is divided into two sections: the first on the Spanish colonial period, comprising five chapters, and the second on the period since independence from Spain to about 1940, comprising six chapters. There is dialogue among the chapters both within and between sections. The volume does not cover all of Central America but rather focuses attention on non-coastal Guatemala and Nicaragua, and the Caribbean coasts of what became Nicaragua (Mosquitia), Panama, and Costa Rica. The one clear exception to this is Rina Cáceres Gómez's essay on the port of Omoa in modern-day Honduran territory.

The first section analyzes slave labor on sugar plantations in south-central Guatemala and in cacao production in eastern Costa Rica, the complex ethnic and political region of the Mosquitia, waged slavery at Omoa's fort, and urban slavery and processes of emancipation in Guatemala. Paul Lokken shows how slaves developed mechanisms for escaping sugar plantation slavery and how, as they blended into the free non-Indian population, bases for a strong collective black identity weakened. Russell Lohse demonstrates how a similar process in Costa Rica resulted from the extreme autonomy of male cacao slaves, which bred social con-

fidence and eroded slavery. Cáceres Gómez likewise shows how the economic and political strength of Omoa's slaves resulted in early mass manumission, although she does not comment on post-slavery issues of black identity. Catherine Komisaruk documents a range of strategies deployed by slaves in late colonial Guatemala to obtain freedom. Komisaruk confirms Lokken's findings and concludes that "crossing over into free Hispanic society helped occlude consciousness in the nineteenth century of African heritage in Guatemala" (p. 170). Karl H. Offen acknowledges "the intersection of British and Spanish empires" in the isthmus (p. 92) and provides a lucid explanation of the way Mosquitia's power relations nurtured racial pride among the Afro-Amerindian Sambo and Tawira Mosquito peoples, who "interacted with the British and the Spanish as equals" (p. 121). As in Matthew Restall's work on Afro-Yucatecans, indigenous people are not a backdrop in Offen's chapter.

Section two has a stronger emphasis on Nicaragua. Juliet Hooker extends Offen's analysis by showing how the post-independence Nicaraguan elite was obsessed with physically incorporating the Mosquitia into the republic while denying full citizenship to its supposedly uncivilized indigenous, black, and mixed peoples. She shows how coastal leaders, especially Creoles, eloquently contested such discursive and legal discrimination. Among the Nicaraguan elites disparaging the coast were Liberal politicians of black descent from western Nicaragua analyzed by Justin Wolfe, who links the erosion of their radicalism to their self-distancing from a specifically black identity. Lowell Gudmundson examines the 1883 Nicaraguan census, which was unusual in the non-British isthmus of the time for including categories that captured black appearance if not identity, to demonstrate the extent of black presence in the population of four western towns, including in their local elites. Mauricio Meléndez Obando uses genealogical records to succinctly trace the often unacknowledged African roots of many notable Nicaraguans and Costa Ricans.

Lara Putnam's and Ronald Harpelle's essays deal with the new infusion of people of African descent after 1870 into the isthmus to work on the Panama Canal, banana plantations, and railroads. Putnam provides rich evidence of their presence in coastal Panama and Costa Rica. She explains those nations' restrictions on black immigration and internal migration from the mid-1920s with reference to their elites' practical and ideological attractions to U.S.-fueled eugenic thinking. Indeed, the eugenic character of emerging projects of national *mestizaje* in formerly Spanish Central America merits further analysis. Harpelle's account of white United Fruit Company wives living in company compounds in eastern Honduras, Costa Rica, and western Guatemala relates best to the volume's core theme when he discusses these women's fraught relations with black English-speaking maids and cooks, who were clearly as much protagonists of their own lives as were

the enslaved women of colonial Omoa who “struck” effectively in 1800.

This book is a major contribution to the scholarly literature, but its conceptual framework leads to a lost opportunity that arguably impoverishes its goals of documenting the diversity of black histories in the isthmus and of impacting African diaspora and Spanish Central American historiographies. Second only to the Caribbean archipelago and perhaps northeastern South America, the Central American isthmus has been a zone of competing imperialisms, regionalisms, and nationalisms since the early 1500s. This reality is implicit in many of the book’s chapters, and explicit in Offen’s and Hooker’s, but it is absent from the editors’ introduction and thus does not frame the collection as a whole. Although both editors and other contributors rather frequently write as if their subject is the entire geographical isthmus (pp. vii, 5, 9, 147, 209–210, 335), the opening definition of “the Hispanic mainland Caribbean nations from Mexico through Central America and Panama, to Colombia and Venezuela” (p. 1) clearly serves to exclude Belize, the one British territory that was never absorbed into a ladino-dominated national territory or a project of *mestizaje*. El Salvador is also marginalized. Mentions of Belize and its colonial antecedents are far more frequent than indicated in the index, but the contributors’ disinterest in learning from the historiography of Belize, integrating Belize into comparative analyses, or using their own scholarship to inspire new work on Belize is disappointing, especially as the exclusion of Belize is never acknowledged or justified.

Five of the many ways in which the Belize case could be usefully integrated into this volume are as follows. Offen’s portrayal of the Mosquito kingdom’s strength and how it weakened British, Spanish, and Nicaraguan colonial projects bears comparison to how the Itza Maya kingdom documented by Grant D. Jones prevented effective Spanish colonization of the Belize area. Lohse’s analysis of male cacao slaves in Costa Rica would benefit from comparison with Nigel Bolland’s pathbreaking analysis of similar gender dynamics in forestry slave labor in Belizean territory from the mid-1600s to emancipation in the 1830s. Wolfe will find other politically ambitious Afro-Central Americans distancing themselves from their black ancestry in my work on middle-class Belizean Creoles and their late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century efforts to extract greater political rights from Britain. Putnam and Harpelle could attend more deliberately to the presence of Belizeans and Bay Islanders in the canal and banana zones; among them in the 1940s was Belizean labor leader Antonio Soberanis Gómez, who returned home to articulate a vision of a historically black and indigenous nation. Finally, Hooker’s concluding discussion on contemporary tensions among mestizos, Creoles, and indigenous people in eastern Nicaragua would be enriched via dialogue with Laurie Kroshus Medina’s and Mark Moberg’s work on dynamics among Belizean Creoles, Garifuna, Maya, and mestizos, and immigrant

Hondurans, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans in post-independence Belize’s citrus and banana industries. Indeed, a chapter on the Garifuna version of Central American blackness would have facilitated the inclusion of Belize in this collection, which in turn would have transformed the meaning of “Central America” from an imperially bounded space to a geographical place.

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PAUL K. EISS. *In the Name of El Pueblo: Place, Community, and the Politics of History in Yucatán*. (Latin America Otherwise: Languages, Empires, Nations.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2010. Pp. xv, 337. Cloth \$84.95, paper \$23.95.

The Spanish term *pueblo* cannot be translated into English by a single word as it may either mean “village” or “people,” referring to a place, a community that inhabits a place, or a political collectivity. The term became a standard reference in political discourse starting in the late eighteenth century, when a rhetoric of popular sovereignty emerged in opposition to the *ancien régime* and colonial rule. *El pueblo*, Paul K. Eiss argues, has become “a focus of contention . . . within which divergent conceptions of community and collectivity came into conflict” (p. 5). Eiss combines historical and anthropological data, methods, and approaches (micro-history, ethnography, and the history of the present) to explore the concept as realized in the Hunucmá region located in the northwest of Mexico’s Yucatán peninsula. His book is not a classic community study but “a study of communalism in a defined region” (p. 10). Eiss wants to show that practices of making or claiming *el pueblo* were elaborated “in dialogue with the wider political rhetorics and frameworks of governance” (p. 11). Following Michel Foucault, he does not consider communal identifications as stable but holds that present and previous modes of communal and collective identification may be radically different.

The book develops in chronological order. The first three chapters span the period from late colonial rule in the eighteenth century to the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution in the early twentieth century. They illustrate the—sometimes legal and at other times violent—struggle of Hunucmá’s indigenous villagers in defense of their communal lands against dispossession by mestizo landlords and the colonial and postcolonial state. Among other things, the rise of haciendas based on the production of henequen and the industry’s repercussions on the indigenous peasants and workers are discussed. Subsequent chapters scrutinize how *el pueblo* became “a subject of politics and an object of governance” in the revolutionary and postrevolutionary periods until the 1990s. Eiss’s analysis shows how the communalists’ struggle changed from a fight against the haciendas into a revolutionary war for land and freedom. Indeed, an agrarian reform was realized and the

ejido, a new form of collective land tenure, was established in Yucatán as in the rest of Mexico after the triumph of the revolution. However, many peasants remained dependent workers laboring for hacienda owners who were controlled by the state bureaucracy that now organized henequen production and agrarian credit. The book's third section focuses on the weakening of *el pueblo* as a framework for political mediation and control due to neoliberal policies, which led to a further decline of the peasant economy. Eiss describes regional attempts to organize a labor movement independent of state control in the 1980s and 1990s. Independent movements engendered massive popular protests but ultimately failed under state repression. The fiesta and guild system surrounding the cult of the Virgin of the *pueblo* of Tetiz are discussed in chapter eight. Eiss focuses on the cult's role in the elaboration of historical memory and communal identity. The cult, he notes, provides shared experiences and a common sense of identity for the villagers in spite of growing social and economic differentiation. Chapter nine explores the life of Anacleto Cetina Aguilar, a political activist, poet, teacher, and historian who tries to counteract the alienating tendencies of migration and modernization, especially among youth, through the recovery of local history and culture.

While topics such as the alienation of indigenous community lands, the rise and fall of the henequen industry, and the failure of agrarian reform in Yucatán have already been studied, this book adds a local perspective to these more general accounts. By bringing to light the mostly forgotten local resistance against the authoritarian Porfirian regime in the early twentieth century, Eiss modifies earlier interpretations that suggested the Mexican revolution had (almost) no local roots and came to Yucatán largely from without. The book's broad historical perspective aids understanding of the continuities and ruptures in Hunucmá's history. While resistance to the alienation of communal lands had determined the villagers' struggle for centuries, recent economic developments that have made wage work in local *maquiladoras* and migration labor abroad major sources of income mark a fundamental change in people's lives and self-conceptions.

Eiss's book is based on a wealth of archival documentation as well as on years of ethnographic fieldwork. It is written in a clear and accessible style. All chapters unfold around concrete cases such as a legal struggle or the biography of a specific individual such as "Hunucmá's Zapata," Feliciano Canul Reyes, a major figure in the revolutionary struggle. While Eiss presents a wide array of perspectives, the reviewer would have welcomed the author's development of his own arguments and interpretations somewhat more explicitly as a complement to the rich material presented.

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PAUL GILLINGHAM. *Cuauhtémoc's Bones: Forging National Identity in Modern Mexico*. (Diálogos.) Albuquerque:

University of New Mexico Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 338. \$28.95.

Latin American history may be approaching the saturation point for studies on nationalism and its sketchy origins, but Paul Gillingham's book represents a welcome breath of fresh air. At the most basic level, he offers a doggedly researched, entertaining history of nationalist fabrication in an out-of-the-way corner of Mexico (rural Guerrero). But he also provides a thoughtful discussion of his case study's place in wider debates about national identity formation and popular politics. Gillingham's artful presentation of theory, historiography, and the exploitation of history make this book a valuable resource for undergraduates and graduate students interested in Latin American nationalism. Furthermore, the author's investment in exhaustive research and his clear, engaging prose make the text exemplary in terms of archival diligence and scholarly style.

At the center of the book we find a bungling small town charlatan's effort to convince the Mexican state and public that the last Aztec emperor's remains had incongruously come to rest beneath the altar of his pueblo's church. Not surprisingly the incorrigible forger fancied himself the sole guardian of the alleged relics as well. As Gillingham points out, however, this is not the usual story of a state-directed "invented tradition" fashioned to sanctify and consolidate an elite group's power and hold on the discourse of origins and destinies. Quite to the contrary, he unravels a sloppy but remarkably enduring case of "grassroots instrumentalism" (p. 203). Rural Mexicans far from the halls of power concocted a historical fable and planted evidence in hopes of securing concrete personal gains and bolstering local prestige. As Gillingham shows, from the very first news of the bones' excavation, most experts and observers were deeply suspicious. Those who actually investigated were even more dismissive. However, a range of factors and ambitious, bandwagon-jumping outsiders kept the scheme alive. Perhaps even more surprising, although their claims were never officially ratified, a number of the key players derived clear and lasting benefits from the sham and the nationalist puffery they deployed to make their case.

To set the stage for the "discovery" of Cuauhtémoc's bones in 1949, Gillingham leads the reader through the twists and turns of the ill-fated Aztec ruler's biography and emergence as the ultimate national hero. Much of what is discussed is history of the intellectuals and politicians who made use of the Cuauhtémoc story while crafting a Mexican nationalist saga (in brief, the primordial nation's valiant resistance to Spanish domination and gradual patriotic conquest of autonomy and genuine cultural freedom). Thus the book provides a useful synthesis of Mexican nation-building endeavors from more or less the eighteenth through the early twentieth century. More novel contributions emerge when the author weaves in a late nineteenth-century plot to plant evidence of the famed Tlatoani's inter-

ment. He shows how relatively humble rural actors kept up with elite efforts to conjure the nation and then took up the game of nation-making with their own interests in mind.

Gillingham also leads readers into the tempest of debate, ambition, and petty rivalries fueled by the messy archaeological dig that unearthed the fake relics. Thus we learn how the governor of Guerrero manipulated the story to bolster his political position. Here, we are treated to an entertaining close-up of contentious academic politics in mid-twentieth-century Mexico. Essentially a scholar who championed Cuauhtemoc's bones exploited prevailing *indigenismo* and the overheated climate of state-sponsored nationalism to carve out a lasting academic fiefdom, despite offering only a porous defense of her own methods and the bones' provenance. The hoax at least netted the townspeople a much-needed road linking their community to the nation's expanding highway infrastructure.

If there is a flaw in this book it is a case of too much of a good thing. Gillingham tracked every lead through a variety of archives and remote locations, and he demonstrates a thorough knowledge of secondary sources. However, at times it appears as if he was reluctant to let any evidentiary nugget go unmentioned or unexplained. This is a potential trap for all historians researching popular cultural phenomena. A tighter, more economical presentation would attract a wider audience. Nonetheless this work represents a fine example of new scholarship on modern Mexico.

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RICK A. LÓPEZ. *Crafting Mexico: Intellectuals, Artisans, and the State after the Revolution*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2010. Pp. x, 408. Cloth \$89.95, paper \$24.95.

From Hernán Cortés to the well-heeled tourists of today, foreigners have long marveled at the handicrafts produced by indigenous Mexican artisans. Rick A. López tells the fascinating story of how folk art produced by anonymous potters, weavers, and wood carvers became a "proud symbol of Mexico's authentic national identity" (p. 2). His excellent monograph advances our understanding of Mexico's cultural revolution—the state policies, artistic movements, and commercial developments that transformed a regionally fragmented postwar society into a unified nation-state with an ethnically inclusive national identity. Focusing mainly on the postrevolutionary decades (1920–1940), López offers a twofold perspective on the role of native craft industries in the historic construction of this ethnicized identity. Part one begins in Mexico City, where influential cultural nationalists debated the meaning of Indianness and forged paternalistic policies to uplift, secularize, and integrate indigenous peoples into the postrevolutionary nation. They also fashioned a newly inclusive nation-building discourse that "celebrated the living indigenous heritage as a vital compo-

nent" of national identity. While often denigrating native culture and religion, intellectuals simultaneously set out to (re)discover, investigate, and collect folk art, recasting handicrafts from "symbols of peasant backwardness" into iconic showpieces of Mexican art and identity (p. 68). They collaborated with American and European artists, ethnographers, diplomats, and collectors. Transnational support and patronage lent international legitimacy to the nationalist project and produced major exhibits of indigenous folk art and new markets for it at home and abroad. López emphasizes that nonstate actors initiated an *indigenista* project meant to valorize indigenous cultures. But the state institutionalized their movement in the 1930s, thereafter co-opting cultural nationalist intellectuals with employment and fickle but enduring budgetary support. This section concludes with institutional genealogies of what became two renowned public agencies, one dedicated to investigating national history and anthropology (now the Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia) and the other to showcasing folk arts and assisting the artisans who produce them (today's Fondo Nacional para el Fomento de las Artesanías).

By 1940, López argues, Mexico's crafting produced "the mass-based and inclusive identity that most Mexicans and foreigners today take for granted" (p. 14). What proves this "palpable reality?" One indication is that ethnicized cultural nationalism became official policy, enhancing the state's "claims to revolutionary legitimacy" (p. 147). Moreover, intellectuals no longer feared that racial fragmentation threatened political cohesion. But was "cultural hegemony" really achieved even as "the media continued to idealize whiteness" (p. 150)? López alludes to resistance from unspecified "artistic elites" and the middle class. He acknowledges that "success varied by locality" (p. 22), with notable resistance from the North. But he contends that the construction of regional identities in opposition to the dominant narrative actually "reinforced an ethnicized identity as the hegemonic cultural nationalist discourse" (p. 145). For this reviewer, contestation does not confirm hegemonic status, and López perhaps downplays the countervailing forces of regionalism, conservative Catholic Hispanism, and emigration that historians find operating against *indigenista* cultural nationalism. Such forces transformed the figure of the *charro* (cowboy) and mariachi music symbolic of rural, western, mestizo, and *criollo* cultures into secular nationalist icons. López's study calls for and makes possible a less bifurcated understanding of Mexico's postrevolutionary identity (re)formation. One hopes it inspires researchers to weigh how Mexicans of diverse class, ethnic, or provincial backgrounds made sense of these nationalist discourses as they evolved over the twentieth century into the unified cultural fabric of "authentic Mexicanness."

A notable history of ideas, policy making, and nation building becomes a pioneering work because López examines what the ethnicization of national identity meant for the Indian artisans who embodied the cul-

tural nation. Postrevolutionary nationalists not only exalted native handicrafts; they pledged to uplift down-trodden indigenous communities by marketing their arts and delivering them services. A briefer part two (pp. 195–298) presents a “bottom-up study” of Olinalá (Guerrero), a southeastern mountain community whose artisans have crafted lacquer boxes, chests, lecterns, and drinking gourds since Aztec times. The book’s twenty-three archival photos and sixteen colored plates nicely illustrate these artisans and their museum-quality art. The “transnational renaissance” of native handicrafts initially bypassed Olinalá’s workshops. Drawing on ethnographies and oral interviews, López recounts the artisans’ struggles against imitative Asian competition, exploitative commercial middlemen, and local oligarchs who resisted postrevolutionary reform. By the 1960s, craftsmanship declined, artisans quit, and Olinalá remained mired in stunning levels of poverty, illiteracy, and political violence. Studies of postrevolutionary Mexico often end with dashed dreams of working people and their socially conscious intellectual allies. Not here. López smartly bridges the 1930s with the populist-nationalist revival of the 1970s, when Olinalá’s artisans strategically deployed their indigenism to court meaningful state patronage. Thus arrived schools, highway and bus links, effective marketing and extension services, and a revitalized lacquerware industry. This book thereby demonstrates why, despite decades of policy failures, corruption, and repression, even belated clientelism kept the ruling PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) in power for seven decades.

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AARON W. NAVARRO. *Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico, 1938–1954*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 2010. Pp. xiv, 301. \$64.95.

Much of the historiography of postrevolutionary Mexico has been concerned with the formation and consolidation of state structures and one-party rule before the late 1930s, or with the foundations of Mexico’s industrial economy in the 1950s and 1960s, or with the political explosions of 1968 and its aftermath. This book offers a corrective to these biases by placing the 1940s at the heart of its analysis. Aaron W. Navarro shows that political and institutional developments in this decade were central to the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) capacity to consolidate its power, and key to twentieth-century Mexican state formation more generally. Navarro focuses on the political opposition confronting the PRI in the lead-up to and aftermath of the 1940 presidential election as well as on a resurgent military opposition during the Aleman administration (1946–1952). His book offers a new interpretive angle by examining these political conflicts through the lens of the military-civilian tensions that persisted even after formal demilitarization of the state. Navarro’s most original contribution, however, is his examination of

the origins and institutional evolution of state security services in Mexico. This book, therefore, breaks new ground in the study of Mexico’s intelligence apparatus, and will most likely be the starting point for further historiographical work on the topic.

Within a broad discussion of the “previously-loyal” opposition forces that the PRI confronted between 1939 and 1957, Navarro devotes an entire chapter to the secret service organizations used to document and undermine the activities of potential enemies of the state. Although he briefly discusses the origins of political intelligence services in the mid-1920s, he directs most of his attention to the founding of the Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (DGIPS) and to the agency’s subsequent reorganization in the late 1940s as the Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS). In so doing, Navarro unveils the heretofore hidden dynamics of a critical and important set of institutions whose formation reflected the larger political tensions within the PRI-led state and whose emergence finally made it possible for the PRI to centralize its authority and successfully consolidate its power over opposition elements by the mid-1950s.

As one might expect given the elusive nature of the subject at hand, Navarro’s documentation of how the secret service institutions actually worked in terms of chains of authority, and on whose behalf, remains somewhat spotty. Some of this may owe to difficulties in finding “smoking gun” materials that give evidence of activities that are meant to be clandestine. The author relies heavily on a few primary resources, but also cites a range of memos, letters, and intelligence reports that reveal the attributes and characteristics of those under surveillance. Because of the nature of the documents available to him, it should not be entirely surprising that he is able to offer little about which actors or agencies solicited investigative reports, through which institutional chains of authority, and why. Because this field is in its infancy, and because such materials are inevitably quite difficult to locate, Navarro should still be applauded for the intensity of his efforts. This book produces some important findings, particularly in regards to FBI involvement in Mexican intelligence services and the overlap between different intelligence organizations (DGIPS and DFS). Yet it is somewhat disappointing that even these key findings seem under analyzed. How exactly did the FBI work with the DFS, and did all aspects of the PRI and/or Mexican state apparatus accept this relationship? Did the DGIPS and DFS compete in their activities, and what were the implications of the existence of two distinct security services for the larger political conflicts within and between the PRI and opposition movements?

Some basic facts about intelligence operations also seem cloudy, both with respect to chronology and to the relationship between intelligence services and other coercive forces of the state. For one, the narrative account in which Navarro identifies the main aims and ethos of the intelligence services shifts in temporal focus from

page to page, and sometimes from paragraph to paragraph, leaving the reader unclear as to whether its function was the same in all periods, and if not, whether intelligence orientations shifted as the PRI's power centralized over time. There also seems to be a lot of ambiguity as to whether the intelligence services worked with or for policing or military agencies, particularly in discussions of Mexico City's police, whose direct activities in intelligence gathering are noted by Navarro.

Even so, Navarro makes great headway in documenting the process of intelligence service centralization, and the ongoing efforts of Mexico's political leaders to coordinate security services. He skillfully documents the relatively amateurish tools and dubious interpretive techniques used by secret service personnel in their surveillance activities. He also helps us understand the extent to which the Mexican state security apparatus continually reinvented itself both through nomenclature and organizational leadership.

To account for much of this, Navarro frames his narrative of intelligence behavior through the lens of "professionalization." To a certain degree, this seems partly out of place because it requires him to evaluate Mexican intelligence services on the basis of some universal standard of conduct, a technique that serves to sideline the blatantly political objectives and context of intelligence gathering even at later stages when the intelligence service organizations were supposed to have reached professional "maturity." Despite this emphasis on professionalization, the intrastate conflicts and external opposition movements that riddled the Mexican state during the 1940s and 1950s come through loud and clear. This book makes a major contribution to our understanding of these conflicts and tensions. Navarro's focus on the role that Mexico's intelligence services played in monitoring and managing these conflicts is both novel and welcome.

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MOLLY TODD. *Beyond Displacement: Campesinos, Refugees, and Collective Action in the Salvadoran Civil War*. (Critical Human Rights.) Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 2010. Pp. xviii, 286. Paper \$19.95, e-book \$29.95.

The civil war in El Salvador (1980–1992) has received a fair amount of scholarly attention and will rightly continue to do so in the future. One challenge that historians of the conflict face is a lack of primary sources. In the absence of an extant documentary, interviews often provide valuable evidence.

Molly Todd's fine work on peasant refugees in Northern El Salvador resolves the challenge of sources partly through interviews and partly through documents housed in Honduras and at the United Nations. Certainly one of the noteworthy aspects of her book is the lacuna it fills in our knowledge; this is one of the first historical studies of refugees during El Salvador's civil

war, and it complements Joaquín M. Chávez's recent (2010) dissertation on insurgent organizing in El Salvador during the 1960s and 1970s as well as the anthropologist Irina Carlota Silber's recent book, *Everyday Revolutionaries: Gender, Violence, and Disillusionment in Postwar El Salvador* (2011).

Todd's work brings to mind Eric Wolf's classic, *Europe and the People without History* (1982), in the sense that she sets out to tell the story of people who have not been included in historical narratives to date. The author rightly points out that studies of the Salvadoran civil war tend to be "state-centric," and thus "more often than not . . . the rural population simply does not appear" in them (p. 5). Even those studies that do examine rural areas, Todd claims, tend to portray the peasantry with a "narrative of nonagency" (p. 5).

Generally, Todd's arguments are well supported, especially when she gets into the period best suited to her sources: the war itself. Some of the book's claims regarding the prewar era lack substantiation. One particularly interesting example is Todd's brief look at the paramilitary organization ORDEN (National Democratic Organization). Typically, scholars have portrayed ORDEN as a state-sponsored institution of right-wing terror that utilized tens of thousands of peasant foot soldiers to brutalize anyone suspected of opposing the status quo. That description is accurate in many respects. But as part of her effort to advance her claims about peasant agency, Todd argues that even progressive peasants might join on occasion if ORDEN provided them with opportunities unavailable elsewhere. I would have liked to see that topic more thoroughly developed and better substantiated, but in Todd's defense, it is not a major focus of her study.

Todd's evidence is strong when she examines the war and the strategies adopted by peasant refugees to survive its unpredictable and deadly conditions. Central topics of analysis include the tactics peasants used to hide from the military; the system of flight (*guinda*) they used to flee in advance of military assaults; the ways in which they conceived of and utilized the refugee camps across the border in Honduras; the ways in which they acted in defense of their interests while in those camps; the ways they explained to themselves the nature of the conflict in El Salvador; and the strategies they employed for returning home. Todd does a fine job of showing that the rural dwellers of El Salvador indeed possessed agency and worked diligently as individuals and in communities to manifest that agency in ways that they perceived to be in their best interests.

Todd's book does not overturn any existing argument about the war per se. Instead, her study stands as a benchmark reminder for any of us who might venture into the study of the civil war, or into the study of any era in Salvadoran history for that matter, that the peasants and "the displaced are people with histories" (p. 227).

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CHAD THOMAS BLACK. *The Limits of Gender Domination: Women, the Law, and Political Crisis in Quito, 1765–1830*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 2010. Pp. xii, 355. \$29.95.

Just as Douglas R. Cope asserted that race did not always play a dominant role in determining one's status in colonial Mexico City (1994), Chad Thomas Black argues that "customary legal practice performed a fundamental role limiting gender domination" in late colonial Ecuador (p. 1). Black persuasively shows that the Bourbon government failed to increase its social control through a stricter application of gender laws; it is only with independence and the advent of liberal ideologies that one finds consistently strict interpretations of gender laws. Black places this transition within a more general argument that patriarchy began with independence rather than in the late colonial period; this aspect of his argument falls short due to an inflexible definition of patriarchy and a failure to engage meaningfully with current scholarship. Even so, Black's book offers a rich analysis of the intersection of laws and customs in the shift from colony to republic in Ecuador.

Opening chapters discuss the Bourbon state's failed attempts to tighten control over colonial society via morality, especially around gender matters. Chapter two, for example, addresses a marked increase in the state's interest in moral crimes such as sex offenses, with women more likely to be taken into custody than men. Yet Bourbon attempts to tighten control fell short of their aims because many men and women were unwilling to denounce each other. Black's insights in this chapter are particularly innovative, and they suggest ways that we should be rethinking the Bourbon era more generally. In chapter three, Black shows that women rarely discussed whether or not they had their husbands' permission to act independently in court, and judges were likely to assume a husband's permission in many cases. Although these discussions are illuminating, some of Black's conclusions fail to capture the breadth of gender politics. For example, Black states that an attorney in a case "moved discussion of gender inequality to the much more familiar ground of the need for protection of interests of the supposedly weaker groups in society" (p. 127). However, virtually all of the so-called "weaker groups" in colonial society were defined as such based at least partly on gender ideologies.

Later chapters explore the changing application of gender laws following independence. Chapters five and six examine how the independence and early republican periods "accelerated the long and contested slide in legal rights to for the *corregimiento's* women" (p. 202). Black asserts that liberal commitment to the rule of law resulted in stricter interpretations of patriarchal precepts. Although women attempted to claim their rights as citizens, they often failed because citizenship was defined as the domain of literate men. Here, Black's discussion offers a close and much-needed examination of gender in Ecuadorian independence, and his findings

reinforce and complement studies of other areas of Latin America for this period.

Black closes the book by returning to his definition of patriarchy, in which he emphasizes men's complete authoritarian control of women and women's complete lack of legal and economic rights (pp. 261–262). He uses this definition to suggest that the Spanish colonial state was not patriarchal, and therefore that other historians are mistaken when they claim that nineteenth-century patriarchy was a colonial holdover. However, his definition of patriarchy is so rigid that it does not fit the republican period either, which he does see as patriarchal. Moreover, Black's discussion of the historiographical disagreement over patriarchy in the colonial period lacks depth: he often makes only general claims in his text, followed by lengthy footnotes that sometimes exaggerate other scholars' claims, since few of the works that Black cites actually assert that post-independence patriarchy was merely a colonial holdover. By oversimplifying both patriarchy and gender historiography, Black misses a chance to engage the reader in a substantive and meaningful discussion of patriarchy and history in Latin America. Black also loses some opportunities to bolster his arguments, as evident when he discusses events in Quito in 1809 at length, whereas consideration and analysis of liberal exclusionary and gender concepts would have done a better job of supporting his claims that gender inequalities increased due to liberal political practices and ideas.

Despite these limitations, Black's book makes a strong contribution to our understanding of the transition from colony to republic. It will be of interest to many scholars for its innovative discussion of how local legal customs often trumped state laws in late colonial Quito, and about the central role of gender laws and practices in the independence period. Black's findings open the door for further exploration of the relative strength of local versus centralized legal customs and agendas in other parts of Spanish America.

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CAROLYN DEAN. *A Culture of Stone: Inka Perspectives on Rock*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2010. Pp. xvi, 297. Cloth \$84.95, paper \$23.95.

Few of the world's great cultures managed to leave their stamp on history with images as simple as those of beautifully dressed and fitted, but otherwise unadorned, stones. Yet this is precisely the legacy of the great, if short-lived, Andean empire of the Inka. In her exquisitely researched, articulate, and annotated book, Carolyn Dean explores the Inka love affair with stone and demonstrates the near-universal role played by the material in Inka cultural and spiritual life. She approaches her task from a background in art history but makes it clear from the outset that, for the Inka, the incorporation and manipulation of stone into their world was not "art" in the Western sense but something far more "numinous." Stone was the living essence of *Pacha*

Mama, the Inka Earth Mother, and its power was nothing less than supernatural.

Dean shows how the Inka used stone in numerous ways to impose their quasi-messianic sense of order on what they saw as the chaotic wilderness all around them, and to celebrate the successful marriage of man and nature once order was established. Whether used architecturally, in terrain enhancement or as *waka* to commemorate important people, places or events, the message was clear: Inka stonework was synonymous with the Inkas themselves, and with whatever they wished to memorialize. To this day, Andean Indians regard Inka stones and *waka* with reverence. These are not “reminders” of glories long past; they are those glories, still alive and vibrant despite centuries of alien rule. There is, however, always risk in attributing thoughts, feelings, and ideas to a people or culture long gone. This is especially true when much of the evidence has been filtered through the minds and words of alien chroniclers who were generally hostile to the ideology they observed. Nevertheless, Dean does an excellent job of documenting her assertions, and I suspect few knowledgeable readers will find fault with her basic conclusions.

As an architect, I have passed much of my professional life in the company of builders, stonemasons, and, more recently, archaeologists. I thus come to Dean’s subject from nearly the opposite end of the spectrum than she does, with prejudices to match. In her book’s title, introduction, and text, Dean uses the words “stone” and “rock” interchangeably. I found this distracting. While the Quechua word *rumi* clearly refers to both, and as the material is found in nature they are surely the same, my stonemasonry friends make a rough distinction once the work begins. Rocks, they say, are unemployed stones. Call me a purist, but in a work so otherwise articulate, I would have preferred a similar distinction here.

In chapter one, the author discusses *wawqi*, including an especially important sugarloaf-shaped sun-stone once in the plaza at Cuzco but since lost. In fact a similarly carved stone still exists at Calancha’s Sun Temple of Chuquipalta, near Pachacuti’s Vilcabamba estate at Vitcos. I have worked there for years. It is a region rich with pristine examples of many of the concepts Dean discusses. In particular, there are numerous boulders almost certainly carved for shadow casting and other forms of astronomical observation, subjects altogether absent from her analysis. It is unfortunate that more Vilcabamba material was not included in the book.

Curiously, in chapter two, the author introduces the term “nibbling” to describe the pecking process used to work hard stone throughout the pre-ferrous world and long referred to by that name by virtually everyone. She correctly notes that the coursed ashlar pattern in some Inka walls is illusory, since like the polygonal stones found elsewhere, the squared blocks are not actually rectangular, thus not truly ashlar, but custom fitted to a single place in the wall. Since the work is often equally fine in both patterns, more discussion of the difference

would have been interesting. I agree with Dean’s skepticism in chapter four regarding the images some claim to see in the polygonal walls, although it was surprising to find no mention of the *llama* terraces recently discovered at Choquequirao, where such images are explicit and unambiguous.

The suggestion that Inka construction methods were somehow unique is also misleading. They are very similar to those of the Egyptians and others millennia earlier. Finally, the discussion of architecture in chapter three leaves the impression that the essence of Inka buildings was in their masonry alone, although it is clear in the chronicles that Inka thatchwork was equally impressive to Europeans and highly valued by Inka builders. Acknowledgement of this would have detracted little from the author’s thesis. Nevertheless, despite such omissions Dean has made a strong contribution to the field of Andean studies, one well presented and worth reading.

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KATHRYN BURNS. *Into the Archive: Writing and Power in Colonial Peru*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2010. Pp. xv, 247. Cloth \$79.95, paper \$22.95.

Kathryn Burns’s book is about notaries and their often overlooked role in producing archives, particularly those of colonial Cuzco. Through this focus, Burns asks how writing related to power and agency. The study begins on a largely Foucauldian note, but it quickly dismisses the absolutist pretensions of colonial law and, by the end, challenges power/knowledge arguments as much as it supports them.

Notaries were licensed by the state but essentially independent of it. A fixed number of positions existed in every town, and they were bought and sold as investments to be amortized on a fee-for-service basis. Notaries shuttled back and forth between parties to legal disputes, took depositions and “improved” them for clarity and respectability, shepherded the cases through court, coaching and acting for both litigants and judges along the way, and kept the documentary results in their own archives of bound records (*protocolos*). Customary shortcuts and divisions of labor within the notarial workshop significantly departed from the letter of the law. Some were relatively innocent, such as when assistants took depositions for the notary to certify later. Others were less so, such as when, during the drafting of a document, notaries asked their clients to sign blank folios and later filled in the contents around the signature. Through such practices, notaries merged the voices of their clients into legal templates and procedures that confound any attempt to reconstruct litigants as discrete agents somehow unaffected by the documentary processes that made them historically visible.

What concerned clients at the time, however, was not questions of voice and agency but corruption. Notaries routinely engaged in off-the-record negotiations with all parties to a case, during which they thoroughly in-

termixed public and private interests. Not surprisingly, their mediating role, their intimate knowledge of clients' personal business, and the fact that they were privately paid combined to put their probity permanently into question despite thorough legal reforms in 1503 and subsequent "best practice" manuals. Yet in the context of a weakly institutionalized state, they could not do their job effectively without developing the same personal relations with elites that endlessly raised suspicions of corruption. Thus, the anxieties notaries aroused were those of a patrimonial rather than a panoptic bureaucracy.

Despite this Weberian point of arrival, Burns continues to press the question of how writing related to power, with a clear (but largely thwarted) constitutive expectation. To be sure, legal documents routinely established binding and authoritative truths irrespective of their actual accuracy. Yet the omnipresent anxious awareness of this reality and the demonstrable chicanery from which it derived jointly indexed off-stage power relations that drove the documentation process while mostly remaining hidden within it. In this fundamental way, writing and notarial practice did not constitute colonial power but instead adapted to it as a largely exogenous and superordinate phenomenon. Burns tellingly recounts the inspection (*residencia*) of an outgoing notary who fell prey to the illusion that his micro-practices could trump extradocumentary relations of complicity with local elites, and who paid a heavy price for so doing. Thus, the book's findings significantly undermine the power/writing premise on which it is based. One might fault the author for not settling accounts more thoroughly between expectations and findings in her argument, but such a move might well offend the book's theoretical constituency, and the implications are clear enough in any case.

The book's other major argument—that historians can benefit from paying closer attention to the construction of the archives from which they draw their data—meets a less conflicted but equally productive end. Burns develops this proposition in two different but largely complementary ways. Initially, she advocates making the archive and its underlying documentary processes into an object of study in its own right. This reflective impulse figures prominently in the recommendation that historians re-engage with legal scholarship, but is embodied above all in the basic decision to frame the study around notaries as mediating figures. By the end of the book, however, Burns acknowledges that such methodological progress requires continued attention to the broader social relations in which document production took place, which suggests that methodological and topical inquiry require an ongoing pragmatic reconciliation. She further notes that notarial practice varied at least somewhat by geographical and legal jurisdiction (*fuero*) and therefore cannot be fully abstracted from the different matters to which it pertained. Unfortunately, the author does not develop this insight systematically by analyzing the differences between the secular civil documents she primarily dis-

cusses and those produced in other jurisdictions, but the overall result is still instructive. It remains to be seen how many historians will choose to study notaries in the future, but this study convincingly shows that all will benefit from taking them more fully into account.

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PAULO DRINOT. *The Allure of Labor: Workers, Race, and the Making of the Peruvian State*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 310. Cloth \$89.95, paper \$24.95.

Peru's early twentieth-century elites, associating industrialization with progress and indigeneity with backwardness, were convinced that the creation of an industrialized labor force would lead to the disappearance of Indians. Government officials thus introduced a bevy of legislation to support urban laborers in what was still an overwhelmingly rural country. This conviction, and hope, that industrialization would effectively de-Indianize Peru, transforming rural, indigenous peasants into urban laborers with mestizo identities is what Paulo Drinot deems the "allure of labor." Paying particular attention to the 1920s and 1930s, Drinot shows that Peru's labor-centric nation-building efforts were inherently racialized.

Centering his study on four state agencies and initiatives—the Labor Section of the Ministry of Development, the creation of worker housing districts (*barrios obreros*), the establishment of state-funded eateries, and the 1936 worker social insurance law—Drinot shows how Peruvian government officials and bureaucrats prioritized laborers as the key to a remade Peruvian nation-state. The Labor Section served to recognize unions and mediate workplace conflicts, while the *barrios obreros* sought to provide affordable, respectable housing for laborers. The state-funded restaurants offered workers cheap, nutritious food served in clean and orderly environments, while the social insurance law promised them medical attention, free hospitalization, and even pensions. Drinot convincingly argues that these government efforts were more than attempts to co-opt laborers and thereby undercut left-wing challenges from the Peruvian Communist Party and the populist APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) Party. They were also integral components of a national project that regarded a healthy, moral, and robust urban working class as the solution to Peru's racial woes.

Because Drinot pays as much attention to the public reception of state efforts as he does to the government rhetoric surrounding them, the book ends up being much more than a study of institutions and policies. Instead, we see how a broad range of Peruvians engaged with the programs and thereby actively participated in the work of nation building. For example, Drinot shows how workers initially embraced the Labor Section despite the heated opposition of anarchists and communists but grew disillusioned once the agency proved un-

able to overcome steadfast resistance from employers. In the chapter on public eateries, Drinot demonstrates that these restaurants thrived in large part because of sharp anti-Asian racism: government officials and workers alike eagerly supported affordable alternatives to Chinese and Japanese restaurants. Worker housing, by contrast, was largely a failure. While laborers were eager to leave squalid tenements and single-room dwellings, the government-built homes were simply too costly for any but the wealthiest of workers to afford. Although Drinot's focus is on race and class, he also pays needed attention to gender, noting elites' desires to transform male laborers into "decent" family men, changing attitudes toward female domestic servants, and even a labor queen beauty contest.

Drinot's inclusion of a broad variety of perspectives is one of the real strengths of this book. We hear from bureaucrats, public intellectuals, lawyers, presidents, communists, APRA activists, anarchists, employers, and workers themselves. The range of workers considered is likewise diverse: bakers and printers, carpenters and sugar workers, telephone operators and oil workers all appear in the book. To present these diverse voices, Drinot utilizes prefectural reports, letters, contracts, memoirs, government reports, speeches, and a broad range of periodicals. Although most of Drinot's examples and sources come from Lima, the book is about all of Peru. Drinot argues persuasively that government officials concentrated their attention on the capital precisely because of their anxieties about the overwhelmingly indigenous and rural sierra. Peruvian elites, in effect, hoped to remake Peru from Lima outward.

There are, of course, areas where this excellent book could be stronger. The chapter on social insurance is less effective than others in showing workers' responses to the reform. The book also pays relatively little attention to the issue of education. Because members of the APRA made the "popular universities" (night schools for workers) central to their engagement with laborers, the state's action or inaction on worker education warrants further exploration. And while Drinot shows that workers saw themselves as active participants in the construction of a labor state, it is not clear whether workers shared the elite's view of industrialization as the key to de-Indianization. These minor weaknesses do not, however, detract from the work's overall importance. This is a valuable book for Latin Americanist historians of labor and race, and a crucial read for historians of Peru.

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MARK HARRIS. *Rebellion on the Amazon: The Cabanagem, Race, and Popular Culture in the North of Brazil, 1798–1840*. (Cambridge Latin American Studies, number 95.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. xv, 331. \$95.00.

Brazil's Cabanagem rebellion, because of its diverse racial composition and the dramatic aims of the insur-

gency, is often considered the most radical of the uprisings that occurred during the Regency period (1831–1840). Most studies of the Cabanagem rebellion focus on race and the tensions between poor mixed-blood *mestiços* and Indians and wealthier whites. Mark Harris's work presents a much more complex history of this event. He shows that the insurgency itself varied in size and composition over time and that insurgents included mixed-blood *mestiços*, Indians, blacks, and also a significant number of white people who were not from the lower class.

Harris extends the rebellion's chronology, going back to the Amazon river basin's development in the early eighteenth century. He posits the 1750s as a turning point in the history of the Grão-Pará captaincy. After the expulsion of the Jesuits from Portugal and overseas dominions in 1757, new legislation regarding the secular governance of indigenous communities, the *Diretório dos Índios* (Directorate), was imposed. Although Harris traces the roots of the rebellion to earlier events, he does not depict a linear and progressive succession of events. Far from that, the book describes a very complex, multifaceted, and frequently contradictory local history. The Directorate and subsequent laws aimed to foster the region's development and, at times, attempted to protect the Indian population from exploitation by slave hunters, patrons, and colonial administrators. The results of these laws were frequently the opposite of their intended aims, and they often aggravated the dissatisfaction of the lower classes they sought to protect.

Additionally, the region's unique development and reliance on the exploitation of forests and rivers, rather than the plantation, were key factors in the rebellion. Local populations and economies were vitally connected to the ecologic system of this fluvial space. A network of small agricultural units, rather than large estates, developed along the rivers, creating a peasant economy similar to that found in much of Spanish America. Harris notes these similarities and creatively uses a comparative method to argue for Cabanagem as a peasant insurgency rather than a race war.

By the end of this book it becomes clear that the Cabanagem rebellion had many different aims, periods, and geographical areas. In chapter five, Harris analyzes the resistance in the small city of Ecuipiranga in the lower Amazon basin, which allows the author to avoid a traditional Belém-centered analysis and to show that the rebel army was like a many-headed hydra, with several leaders. Harris also makes a great contribution to our understanding of the rebellion when he shows that the idea that Cabanagem was a race war came from outside the region and was strengthened and legitimated through the severe repression of rebels after 1837. Thus, Harris shows that propaganda during and after the war has continued to influence the historiography of Cabanagem, shaping the way we have understood the movement until now.

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APARECIDA VILAÇA. *Strange Enemies: Indigenous Agency and Scenes of Encounters in Amazonia*. Translated by DAVID RODGERS. (The Cultures and Practice of Violence.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2010. Pp. xv, 370. Cloth \$89.95, paper \$24.95.

History is often a mixed blessing for anthropology. A vital relation is universally accepted, but working the seam between the West and the rest raises deep concerns. The staggering scale of disruption and terror, only recently comprehended in places like the Amazon, is graphic testimony of how much was lost *and* how badly non-Western peoples are generally represented in written history. Images of "primitive" tropical societies are so deeply rooted in the Western imagination as to seem given, or even natural. Still, solid accounts of initial encounters are rare, particularly those that reflect indigenous perspectives and agency. In this book, Aparecida Vilaça presents a meticulous ethnography of indigenous practices and conceptions of social and cultural difference of the Wari' people and shows how these relate to broader historical forces in Brazil's western frontier. This work has profound and far-reaching implications for anthropologists and historians who examine the frontiers of colonialism and globalization.

The Wari' are fairly typical of recent indigenous societies in Amazonia: small, fairly mobile hunter-horticulturalists renowned for their exotic customs, such as aggressive warfare and cannibalism. They are a far cry, however, from the timeless or "traditional" societies that many believe are typical of tropical forests. Sustained contact with "whites" was initiated in the mid-1900s, during Brazil's "Little Rubber Boom," but the Wari' were no strangers to change. They had experienced earlier colonial encounters, including seventeenth-century expeditions, eighteenth-century missions and the Brazilian "gold rush," and the nineteenth-century (big) Rubber Boom in southern Amazonia. Like so many groups in the peripheral "tribal zone," they have a very deep history of resistance.

For many scholars, tradition is largely about identity expressed in sociality, politics, technology, or ideology. Vilaça, however, argues that "tradition is bodily substance," which is internalized "not as a belief, as an attribute of the spirit, but as food, as body fluids, and as clothing that, along with affects and memory, constitute the body" (p. 317). The focus shifts from sociological form, institutions as entities, to the actual practicing bodies that compose and decompose them. The Wari' incorporate the outside through co-habitation and substantiality, a process of familiarization that turns enemies, *wijam*, into friends and potential affines. The narrative structure of the book's first section mirrors indigenous conceptions of otherness and analyzes key indigenous categories of difference, notably, *wari'* (human/person), *tatirim* (foreigners), *wijam* (enemies), and *karawa* (prey). Thus, the author shows how one becomes, metaphorically and literally, the other. The second section analyzes four myths to show how they reveal critical social relations with foreigners, the dead,

and in-laws. Part three further probes the actual scenes of encounters during various stages in the "pacification" of the Wari' and outlines changes in their relations with larger Brazilian society.

The "shock effect" of colonial encounters and globalization did not overwhelm local difference nor diminish the agency and resiliency of "others," even in areas, such as western Brazil, where chronic violence characterized frontier relations. True to the series, the book adeptly explores how violence takes form and is apprehended differently according to cultural logics and values. What stands out in the Wari' case is the way warfare and cannibalism are constructive of personal identities, relations between genders and social groups, and indigenous agency in the extended social and political field of the southwestern frontier. This work underscores the remarkable resilience of core elements of indigenous cultures, not as impersonal or disembodied forces, but through the construction of subjectivity allowing for essential difference and the incorporation of others.

This is contemporary ethnography at its best, skillfully weaving together nuanced theoretical arguments, rich prose and storytelling, and insights that can only be gained by immersion in local settings. It reveals basic features of the Wari' culture and how they structured encounters with whites. Its true power, like most good ethnography, lies in its capacity, or agency, to promote dialogue with "others." The layered narrative is punctuated by conversations with Wari', other Brazilians on the frontier, and academics in Brazil, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Through its detailed descriptions of specific places, people, and interactions, multiple perspectives are voiced. Vilaça's remarkable depiction of the coherence and resilience of native Amazonian peoples even in the face of catastrophic change is a must read for anyone interested in colonialism, globalization, and the place of indigenous peoples in the modern world.

MICHAEL HECKENBERGER
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OLIVER J. DINIUS. *Brazil's Steel City: Developmentalism, Strategic Power, and Industrial Relations in Volta Redonda, 1941–1964*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2011. Pp. xxi, 325. \$65.00.

Histories of the labor movement in Brazil tend to focus either on the role workers played in development policy and state capitalism in the post-World War II period (i.e., the *desenvolvimentista* view) or on the evolution of the government's social welfare programs and laws (i.e., *trabalhismo*). In this book, Oliver J. Dinius offers a synthesis of both views through a historical narrative of labor and business history in the largest steel mill of Brazil, the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN), and the most important industrial city, Volta Redonda.

The author tries to shy away from the politically charged views of the labor movement as either anticapitalist or as a compliant follower of the interests of the

state and Brazilian elites. Thus, one of the most important insights of the book is that the role of the labor movement is more complex and more fundamental to economic policy than what these simple views would assume. In post-World War II Brazil, workers were central to government policy, both as beneficiaries and as agents of change.

Some of the author's findings, however, are specific to CSN and cannot be generalized to other factories. As the central axis of the Brazilian government's industrial policy, CSN was the largest integrated steel mill in Latin America, and its workers enjoyed a special status. In fact, the book shows how CSN was used as an experimental laboratory to test new managerial techniques and to expand labor rights (or to repress unions).

The book is divided into seven chapters, an introduction, and a conclusion. Chapter one is a good, succinct history of early industrialization in Brazil and of the creation of CSN. Chapter two is where Dinius displays the most interesting and original archival research, as he describes how the town of Volta Redonda developed as an industrial city. In this chapter the author provides a particularly interesting description of factory life and the problems CSN had with worker turnover and out-migration. Chapter three is a history of industrial relations in Volta Redonda and at the national level. It describes state paternalism (in discourse and action) and the engineering of a new society in which rural workers migrated to larger towns to work in factories and were then rewarded with a series of welfare benefits. Without acknowledging it, the book evokes the late John D. Wirth's characterization of the CSN's paternalism. Chapter four is a history of management approaches at CSN in its early years, including mechanisms to discipline workers. Chapter five contains a brief history of labor laws and labor repression in Brazil and describes in detail how police were used to control the communist threat in Volta Redonda. Chapter six focuses on the division of labor within CSN and explains why its union had such strong bargaining power. Chapter seven looks at the political history of labor relations in Brazil and analyzes different government attempts to tame unions. Here the author places the union of CSN workers in context, showing some of the progress it made to get concessions and higher wages for its workers.

Finally, chapter eight describes how the development model that CSN embodied, which seems to have been relatively successful from the developmentalist and *trabalhista* points of view, rapidly eroded toward the end of the 1950s and early 1960s. This decline in the development model, the author argues, led to labor conflict and to the breakdown of the system as a whole. In fact, after the military coup d'état in 1964, the Brazilian government repressed labor more aggressively and management ultimately got the upper hand over labor. Members of the military elite then became managers of state-owned companies such as CSN. This was, the book argues explicitly, the defeat of *trabalhismo* and, implicitly, the decline of developmentalism as well.

This book dives deep into a brief period of Brazilian history and leaves the reader with a feeling the story is incomplete. If 1964 was the end of *trabalhismo*, how does the labor movement before 1964 compare to that of Lula da Silva in the 1970s and 1980s? Was developmentalism dead after 1964? What about the relative success of state capitalism and industrial policy during the "Brazilian miracle" of the 1970s? Still, Dinius has written an original business and labor history of Brazil's largest factory and most emblematic state project of the twentieth century. Aside from the dense introduction, the narrative is elegant and easy to follow, making it a great reading for courses on labor history or modern Latin America.

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EUROPE: ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL

LESLIE KURKE. *Aesopic Conversations: Popular Tradition, Cultural Dialogue, and the Invention of Greek Prose*. (Martin Classical Lectures.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2011. Pp. xxi, 495. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$29.95.

For me as a boy it was Arthur Rackham's edition, with its beautiful colored plates, that first opened up the world of Aesop. And for many of us Aesop and his animal fables are associated with childhood and bedtime stories. This association is one reason, Leslie Kurke suggests, that classicists have traditionally not treated Aesopic fables as an object of "serious" scholarship: their wisdom is homespun, the moralizing commonplace, the language plain. Surely Aesop could not stand in the canon next to a Homer, Herodotus, or Plato?

This prejudice Kurke sets out to overturn in her impressive new book. For all its 431 pages and twenty-nine page bibliography, and its philological precision and theoretical sophistication, in the end the book tells a simple tale: Aesop's stories represent an occluded popular voice in Greek literature, and the Aesopic more generally lies at the root of some early Greek prose. Taking as her foci the *Vita G* (the fullest extant life of Aesop), select Platonic dialogues, and Herodotus's *Histories*, Kurke proposes to read these disparate texts together to uncover an important Aesopic presence behind them all.

The book is divided into two related parts. Part one on "Competitive Wisdom and Popular Culture" follows the trajectory of Aesop's life, interpreting its episodes as the crystallization of populist critiques of elites (e.g., Delphic priests, eastern potentates, Seven Sages) perhaps stretching back to the late archaic period. Aesop here becomes a pre-Platonic sage who over a lifetime manifests all varieties of wisdom, from political insight to prophecy and union with the divine. At the same time, the slave Aesop becomes a figure of resistance, whose cunningly enjoyable stories outwit seeming superiors like a Solon or his own master, Xanthus. Thus for Kurke the fable and Aesopic discourse generally be-

come tools “endlessly available and adaptable for all kinds of resistance, parody, and critique from below” (p. 13).

This was especially true from the mid-fifth century B.C. and so part two on “Aesop and the Invention of Greek Prose” seeks to find “a significant Aesopic strand twisting through the beginnings of narrative or mimetic prose” (p. 15). After arguing for fables’ importance in the educational programs of Prodicus, Antiphon, and Protagoras, Kurke moves on to excavate Aesopic elements in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* and several Platonic dialogues. Her many interesting suggestions include the following. In the *Symposium*, Alcibiades tacitly depicts Socrates as an Athenian Aesop—ugly, poor, and rather indecorous in his use of rough analogies to tanners and asses. More generally, the Socratic *elenchos* parallels Aesop’s ability to “deftly manipulate the will and self-conception of a more powerful interlocutor to compel him to ‘bear witness against himself’ in a form of self-incrimination” (p. 341), while Socrates’s use of analogies to invite inductive generalization corresponds to Aesop’s skill in sketching a scenario, from which the hearers themselves draw the desired inference. So for Kurke, Plato tacitly uses “Aesop” to resist and contest the accepted wisdom of poets and Sophists alike: “Aesopic conversations” become crucial for the “invention” of philosophy itself.

Like Plato, Herodotus was an exceptionally plurivocal prose-writer. His *Histories* mingle Homeric grandeur, tragic pathos, and exact “science” (*historie*)—and, Kurke argues, the cheekier voice of an Aesopic advisor and *logopoios*: both hailed from Asia Minor, spent time in Samos, traveled widely “performing [their] *sophia*” (p. 430), and gave coded warnings against the excesses of power. For Kurke, the dialogue between Croesus and an unnamed advisor in Hdt 1.27 prefigures similar encounters later (e.g., Demaratus-Xerxes) and is programmatic for the entire work: “This small fable strategically placed early in Book I encourages us to understand Herodotus’ entire text as bouletic fable writ large . . . proffering tales of the past indirectly to advise audiences in his present” (p. 429). The “moral” that an Aesopic Herodotus “teaches his readers” (p. 426), in particular contemporary Athenians and Spartans, is that one should avoid the temptations of tyranny. On this note the book ends—like the *Histories*, rather abruptly.

Impressive in its collation of disparate material, imaginative in its juxtaposition of texts and genres, and ingenious in its philological argument, this is an original work on which scholars of many subdisciplines will need to ruminate, for it contains much food for thought. If anything, it contains too much. This may stem partly from its generous understanding of “fable” in the classical period as a “very loose category, which comprehended jokes, witty comebacks, and comic anecdotes as well as what are now considered ‘fables’ more narrowly defined” (p. 268). Under this broad outlook, Prodicus’s “Choice of Heracles” becomes “clearly an allegorical fable” (p. 272), as do the myths of Plato’s Protagoras,

Aristophanes, and Diotima, Herodotus’s story of the dancing Hippocleides, and much else besides—all assimilated for various reasons to “Aesop” whose name, one wonders at times, may become too convenient a placeholder.

Nevertheless, the book recognizes the dangers of overexaggeration and its readings are ever intelligent and informed. I recommend it wholeheartedly.

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M. A. ROBB. *Beyond Populares and Optimates: Political Language in the Late Republic*. (Historia Einzelschriften, number 213.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. 2010. Pp. 225. €56.00.

What do we know about politics in the late Roman Republic? A wealth of contemporary evidence survives in the writings of key participants: Julius Caesar, Sallust, and above all Marcus Tullius Cicero. Senators all three, they reflect in their works senators’ concerns, as do the more synthetic accounts of later historians and biographers such as Plutarch. The result is that fundamental questions sometimes can only be answered vaguely. How often, for example, did citizens living outside Rome journey in for the popular assemblies that alone could pass laws? What did ordinary Romans think of the political process and of the senators, in whose control it lay? Even knowing what most senators themselves thought is difficult, so much does Ciceronian evidence predominate: of the thousands of speeches given to the Senate and the people, his alone survive.

It was reliance on some famous remarks of Cicero (from his speech *Pro Sestio*) that divided Roman politicians into two categories, *optimates* and *populares*, along with several passages of Sallust that describe the breakdown of consensus between Senate and people in the late Republic, that led historians, following the lead of Theodor Mommsen in his epic *History of Rome* (1854–1856), to explain the period’s politics as a struggle between two parties, a senatorial party (the *optimates*) and a popular party (the *populares*). While major aspects of Mommsen’s view were challenged, including even the very existence of anything like “parties,” it was influentially revived by Lily Ross Taylor in the 1940s, and again acutely criticized. Still, many scholars in the last two generations have fixated on an ideological clash between upholders of senatorial authority, on the one hand, and the rights of the people, on the other; exact definitions, along with ancient usage, continued to be debated, but *optimates* and *populares* remain today familiar terms in ancient history textbooks and classrooms to describe these two groups of politicians.

M. A. Robb’s new book will make the textbook writers and teachers think twice about totalizing explanations based on this paradigm. After a helpful survey of previous scholarship (chapter one), it proceeds through a close analysis of the use of the words *populares* (singular *popularis*) and *optimates* (singular *optimas*) in the

writings of Cicero, Sallust, and others. Chapter two argues that the deployment of the categories *populares* and *optimates* in the crucial passage of *Pro Sestio* is highly contingent, part of a strategy to alienate Cicero's great foe Publius Clodius by branding him a false demagogue, while suggesting that virtually everyone else in Rome is part of a redefined group of *optimates*, "all the best men." Robb suggests that Cicero's primary goal here is to "rally personal support" rather than present a "political manifesto" (p. 66), but one might question how easily the two can be separated: throughout his career, Cicero tried to forge consensus through similar strategies of redefinition and demonization.

Chapters three and four turn to *popularis* and *optimas* elsewhere in Cicero's writings, showing that the former has a range of meanings, sometimes quite positive by Roman aristocratic standards (e.g., "acting in the interests of the people"), while *optimas* refers to the Senate, the aristocracy within the Senate, and (more subjectively) those who share Cicero's views; the words do not typically refer to mutually opposed groups of politicians. The other authors examined in chapter five mostly use *popularis* similarly, and for them *optimates* usually means "aristocrats."

In chapter six, the book's most interesting, Robb concludes that there is no strong evidence for a widely recognized "*popularis*" ideology of attacking the senatorial establishment on behalf of the Roman people (though *popularis* can sometimes refer to one who breaks with the senatorial majority). The old aristocratic ideal was precisely to serve the people, and consensus and cooperation within the Senate were valued. Undeniably, though, certain senators in outright defiance of their peers went to the people's assemblies to pass laws; such men, Robb argues, were termed not *populares* but rather *seditioni*. Sallust, it is argued somewhat partially in the book's concluding chapter, in his sketches of political developments criticizes politicians individually (rather than groups) for exploiting widening divisions in society.

The underlying reasons for direct appeals to the people are not explored here, nor is there any guessing at perspectives on the *seditioni* other than those of senators: surely some of the urban *plebs*, not to mention Rome's old Italian allies, would not have called them that. Robb's focus is, in essence, on (some) senators' bitter recriminations against one another, and through this detailed study, one understands better their values and the language that encoded them. In the background remain the people themselves cheering at the games or massing in protest in Rome's streets, the bitter memories of Lucius Cornelius Sulla in the Italian countryside, commanders in conclave, and armies on the march.

JOSIAH OSGOOD
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DEBORAH MAUSKOPF DELIYANNIS. *Ravenna in Late Antiquity*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. xix, 444. \$95.00.

Deborah Mauskopf Deliyannis has provided an up-to-date, comprehensive, synthetic study of Ravenna, one of the most important cities of late antique and early medieval Europe. Ravenna rose to prominence in the fifth century as the residence of western emperors, Gothic kings, and Byzantine governors in Italy. It is justly famous for its surviving monuments and intricately wrought mosaics in churches like Saint Apollinare Nuovo and S. Vitale. Part of the importance of this study is the light the author sheds on a city that has preserved the Gothic and Byzantine presence in Italy in ways no longer visible in Rome or in other late antique cities.

The history of late antique Ravenna has been strangely overlooked by scholarship in English. The status of this city in the fourth through the sixth centuries has contributed in part to the lacuna, for though Ravenna became the *sedes imperii*, the seat of the emperor and his administration, Rome remained the *caput orbis* or "head of the world." As Deliyannis observes: "Even the Romans who worked for the Ostrogothic king Theoderic praised Rome's monumental past far more than Ravenna's glittering present" (p. 4). Nor was Ravenna's rise smooth and fast, following directly on the decision to govern from Ravenna made by Stilicho, Honorius, and Galla Placidia. Rather, as Andrew Gillett has shown, emperors returned to Rome through the middle of the fifth century. Not until the late fifth century, and especially during the reign of King Theoderic (493–526), can we clearly see Ravenna as a capital city. This helps explain why we are missing contemporary textual histories of the city; for this we must wait until the early ninth century when the priest Agnellus wrote his *Book of Pontiffs of the Church of Ravenna* (*Liber pontificalis ecclesiae Ravennatis*). This work is fundamental to the historiography of Ravenna, ancient and modern, yet it provides us with a ninth-century view of the city, and one intended to rival the alternative history of Italy that centered on the pope of Rome, the *Book of Pontiffs* (*Liber pontificalis*).

Given these source problems, historians have understandably turned to archaeology. Indeed, one of the strengths of this book is Deliyannis's careful, deep command of a mass of archaeological evidence, which she uses to shed new light on the city, and not just its most famous monuments. So, for instance, Deliyannis's discussion of an area in the northeast part of the old *opidum* is both informative and historically grounded: "in the late fifth or early sixth century the street was blocked off by a room that served as a monumental entrance to a new, grander house built to the north of the street . . . The main rooms on both the north and south side were covered with elaborate mosaic and opus sectile floors. These buildings must have housed members of Theoderic's court of the Ravennate upper classes; and the modification for the imperial-era street network indicates new urban priorities at work" (p. 117).

The book is organized chronologically, with major divisions accorded to political changes from the Roman through the Byzantine and into the Carolingian period.

Deliyannis provides historical overviews of each period that are essential, though I did not always agree with her generalizations. For example, her claim that Rome was the “city of the pope, whose status as the head of the entire Church might be contested, but whose authority in Italy and the west was not doubted” (p. 3) is misleading. There were popes, like the early fifth-century Zosimus, whose authority was not only challenged but seriously questioned by strong North African bishops in the Pelagian controversy.

One major contribution of the book lies in Deliyannis’s intelligent and highly informed discussions of Ravenna’s built environment. So, for instance, she lays out the pros and cons for the elements of Theoderic’s mausoleum that have been seen as Roman or Gothic in detail before arguing sensibly that some of these elements were intended rather to be unique and mysterious (pp. 124–136). This reader wished for a stronger statement of her own views up front with less back and forth in the text. That, however, is not the approach adopted here or in the book as a whole. Nor is there really a single overarching argument that unifies the book. Rather, Deliyannis has chosen to offer a detailed and vivid panorama of Ravenna’s rise and decline. The book jacket is exactly right when it concludes that the volume “provides an English-language entry point for the study of this fascinating city.” But it should add that Deliyannis has also provided a book that is fascinating and essential reading for scholars and students eager to pursue any one of the many hotly contested issues she raises.

MICHELE RENEE SALZMAN

University of California,

Riverside [All reviewers of books by Indiana

University history department faculty are selected with the advice of the Board of Editors.]

D. L. d’AVRAY. *Medieval Religious Rationalities: A Weberian Analysis*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. x, 198. Cloth \$85.00, paper \$29.99.

D. L. d’Avray excels at inquiring into networks of conviction. His first example in a book that is full of arresting illustrations from the Middle Ages of rationalities of different kinds makes the point compellingly. Rudolf von Schlettstadt’s collection of *Memorable Stories*, compiled around 1300, includes an account of a Jew stabbing a consecrated host to the point where blood poured out and it began to cry like a young boy—the boy Jesus. A mob gathered. They did not find either a host or a child, but it was neither irrational to believe that Jews murdered small boys and desecrated hosts nor irrational to condemn them for murder given the screaming people thought they had heard and given that it was thought to be common knowledge that Jews did such things.

This book is a companion volume to d’Avray’s more comparative and theoretical *Rationalities in History: A Weberian Essay in Comparison* (2010), but the two books may be read independently of each other. In the

book under review d’Avray seeks to “discover how values and instrumental calculation affect each other and to illustrate these relations in detail with medieval examples” (p. 164). Max Weber’s four types of rationality are used to guide an investigation of the history of medieval convictions. The four types form two pairs: value or conviction rationality (world views and systems) and instrumental rationality (calculation and adjustment of the consequences); formal rationality (rules made for a sector) and substantive rationality (suspension of these rules for particular reasons). D’Avray has special expertise in the study of preaching, scholastic thought, the papacy, and marriage in the late Middle Ages, and many of his very well-chosen illustrations reflect this. A chapter on “Structures” brings out the interconnectedness of medieval religious values with discussions, based on historical sources, of, for example, memory, miracles, and the canonization of saints. The following chapter on “Dynamics” illustrates how values were built up (gains) or declined (losses), the retreat from conciliarism back to papal monarchy during the fifteenth century being a particularly good illustration of this. The chapter embraces other types of change as well: the thirteenth-century “synthesis” of Aristotle and Christianity (dynamic equilibrium), Saint Francis of Assisi (charismatic leadership), Anglo-Saxon England (religious conversion), and Joachimism (crisis and recovery), among others. The interface of values and of instruments of control takes the reader more deeply in the next chapter into questions about the propagation and reception of values with discussion in particular of a “spiral process” whereby conviction rationality produces techniques that recreate the convictions, which in turn foster an instrumental technology that then protects them. Revivalist preaching in the fifteenth century illustrates this. The interplay between precept and dispensation is another theme and there is a particularly good focus on questions about property and poverty to illustrate how the calculation of what is appropriate for each was often in fierce conflict with adherence to absolute values.

A fourth chapter titled “Formal Rationality and Medieval Religious Law” illustrates decision making within sets of rules with reference to the delivery of papal judgments and papal grants in the absence of a bureaucracy. A final chapter takes a further look at the interface of formal and substantive rationality (rules and their suspension) with particular focus on the workings of the papal penitentiary and grants of dispensation from the rules attached to marriage. In all the chapters, the chosen illustrations are numerous, striking, and thought provoking, many being taken from unpublished manuscripts or early printed books, with the original Latin given in full following a careful English translation, and with ample references to a wide range of excellent secondary studies, many written in German and Italian, with which many anglophone scholars may not be as familiar as d’Avray is.

While the book is a rich mine of information about medieval mentalities and procedures, it is not a tradi-

tional history and certainly not a history of an upward curve of reason in the manner of (to take just one example) R. W. Southern's brilliant two-volume study, *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe* (1995, 2001). D'Avray offers historical sociology, and he does so at a time when historical studies and the social sciences seem to have grown apart. Some readers may find the Weberian terminology too rich, especially when "ordinary language" (e.g., rules, exceptions) is more familiar than the more technical formal rationality and substantive rationality. But without the discipline provided by concepts, and reduced to a work of empirical history, this book would run the risk of losing more or less completely its structure and its dynamic.

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MAX LIEBERMAN. *The Medieval March of Wales: The Creation and Perception of a Frontier, 1066–1283*. (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, number 4:78.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. xv, 292. \$95.00.

This monograph comprises a detailed study of Shropshire in the period from the Norman conquest of England to the Edwardian conquest of Wales a little over two hundred years later. That the title does not, perhaps, reflect the content is the result of Max Lieberman's view, explained in the introduction, that "the first 'March of Wales' seems to have been the Welsh border of the county of Shropshire" (p. xi). Thus a book about Shropshire might become a book about the making of the March—at least if the author's claims hold water. Unfortunately, while this proposition is used intermittently to give the book direction, it is almost immediately thrown into doubt by the author's acknowledgment that the Domesday Book refers to the March of Wales in its account for Herefordshire (p. 5). It might also be added that in the 1130s the Anglo-Norman chronicler Orderic Vitalis was content to describe Robert of Rhuddlan—whose campaigns against the Welsh led him to "Snowdon's high mountain" and "Conwy's rapid river"—as a "marcher lord" (*bellicosus marchio*), although Lieberman does not do so.

Overall, the arguments advanced to demonstrate that Shropshire was the original March are unconvincing. One problem is identified by the author himself: "the usage of the phrase *Marchia Wallie* between the late eleventh and the early fourteenth centuries suggests that the medieval concept of the Welsh March was a malleable one" (p. 5). Lieberman's discussion of the terms *marcha* and *machia* is too superficial and clumsy to define the concept. Insufficient consideration is given to how those living in England and Normandy in the eleventh and twelfth centuries might have used the term before they brought it to the English border with Wales, and although there are some superficial references to Carolingian usage, no effort is made to demonstrate that this influenced terminology in England or Normandy. Nowhere is it noted that Normans might

acknowledge themselves ruled by a *marchio* (as well as a count, duke, or *princeps*). Nowhere is Orderic Vitalis's use of the words *marcha*/*marchio*/*marchisus* (on thirty-eight occasions according to Marjorie Chibnall's helpful glossary) digested.

If the unwise attempt to pin down the origin of the idea of a March of Wales is overlooked, however, then the book can be taken for what it is: a detailed analysis of Shropshire in the period under consideration. The book begins, in *Annales* style, with a discussion of the landscape of Shropshire, its communications and demographics, agricultural practices, and place names. Some of this is done to establish whether the area west of the Severn valley was likely to be open to English settlement in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. This sets the scene, but the book is really concerned with the marcher lordships that were established by the first Norman earl of Shrewsbury, Roger of Montgomery, and their relationships with each other, the Welsh of Powys, their tenants, and the crown. Lieberman goes about this conventional business in more or less conventional ways, but it is here that the book is strongest. Generally speaking, where the discussion is about the internal workings of the lordships, their geography, or castles, the discussion is solid, useful, and original.

But the tunnel vision induced by the focus on Shropshire means that parts of the bigger picture are missed. The whole of the March of Wales is never encompassed. The world beyond Shropshire is noticed only in fits and starts. This is problematic when looking at the border aristocracy, who were lords elsewhere too, as Lieberman acknowledges, even if he does not then always consider how the wider interests of the Mortimers—here treated as honorary Salopians, despite the fact that their seat was at Wigmore in Herefordshire—and Fitz Alans affected their role and activities in Shropshire. Similarly, although some mention is made of Roger of Montgomery's estates in the Hiémois and Bellême, the experience he gained in pushing Norman authority forward on the duchy's southern frontier is not used to understand his actions in Shropshire, despite the fact that Gérard Louise's book on the *seigneurie* of Bellême has been consulted. Aside from these and other issues of interpretation, there are some surprising omissions from the bibliography. There is no sign of William of Malmesbury's *Gesta Regum Anglorum*, for example, and more recent articles by Huw Pryce and Sean Duffy, relating to Henry II's campaign of 1165 and his relations with the Welsh generally, are also absent.

Lieberman has written a useful and focused account of the border lordships of Shropshire in the two centuries and more after the Norman Conquest. The book will provide historians of the families studied, or of Shropshire, or the March as a whole with much detail and much material to use for comparisons with the situation pertaining in Glamorgan, Herefordshire, Cheshire, or elsewhere along the border. As such, although the book itself ultimately fails to provide an understanding of "the creation and perception of a frontier" in terms of the medieval March of Wales as a

whole, it is nonetheless a stepping stone toward the achievement of that goal.

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C. J. ZUIJDERDIJN. *Medieval Capital Markets: Markets for renten, State Formation and Private Investment in Holland (1300–1550)*. (Global Economic History Series, number 2.) Boston: Brill. 2009. Pp. xii, 316. \$147.00.

A generation ago James D. Tracy established the prevailing orthodoxy that the organization of funded debt by the Dutch state largely originated in or shortly before the sixteenth century. The States of Holland met the rulers' demands for money by selling what would now be called bonds, thereby creating a countywide system of public debt, for which their subjects were responsible collectively, secured on future tax revenues. C. J. Zijderdijn, however, argues persuasively that this system was "the final step in a slow evolutionary process that started in the 13th century" (p. 73). The basic device was the *rente*, which Zijderdijn leaves untranslated but is often rendered as "annuity." The market for *renten* originated in private debt then spread to the public sector. The borrower secured an annual payment, either for his or her own lifetime (*lijfrente*) or in perpetuity (*losrente*) in return for a lump sum of money. *Losrenten* were often transferable and payable until the initial purchase price was repaid by the seller. The *rente* originated in northern France then spread to the Low Countries. It was also used by city governments in the Holy Roman Empire but not in England. Zijderdijn is less persuasive, in my opinion, in arguing that the *rente* was unlike the *monti* shares sold by the Italian cities.

The *rente* resembled the modern mortgage when secured on real estate in the case of private capital, or on the entire assets of the state or specific incomes in the case of public borrowing. It involved risk for both lender and borrower and thus circumvented the church's prohibition of open interest. The development of a "secondary capital market" (p. 290) for *renten*, in which one person secured a *rente* on a piece of property, then sold the *rente* to a third party, existed by 1301. As early as 1318, *rente* contracts could be made out to "bearer." The growth of a market for *renten* was also fostered by the decline of interest rates from the late fourteenth century in Holland as elsewhere, which brought capital into Holland at precisely the time when its exports were expanding and made funded debt much more attractive than loans from financiers. Like their contemporaries, the thirteenth-century counts borrowed from Lombards, but William III (1304–1337) and his successors rarely did. City governments were slower than the counts to sell *renten* in a free market, although most were doing it by 1400 and thereby establishing what amounted to a public debt. Unfortunately, by the late fifteenth century regional and city governments became seriously overburdened by the de-

mands of the central government. By 1514 all cities "used a considerable part of their ordinary revenues for *rente* payments" (p. 169), ranging from 58.8 percent for Gouda to 118 percent for Delft. The central institutions of Holland used written forms of evidence and gave legal security of contract to creditors, thereby lowering transaction costs. By the fifteenth century some local authorities were requiring registration of mortgage and/or *rente* contracts for validity. The institutional mechanisms of the credit market and the protection of creditors' property rights by the state contributed significantly to the economic strength displayed by the Netherlands during the seventeenth century, the "golden age" of the Dutch Republic.

This is a clearly written and meticulously documented work that joins other recent studies in demolishing whatever is left of the idea that late medieval credit mechanisms and state finance were unsophisticated.

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KIMBERLY A. RIVERS. *Preaching the Memory of Virtue and Vice: Memory, Images, and Preaching in the Late Middle Ages*. (Sermo: Studies on Patristic, Medieval, and Reformation Sermons and Preaching, number 4.) Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols. 2010. Pp. xvii, 377. €70.00.

In this book, Kimberly A. Rivers provides a thorough analysis of the place of memory in medieval preaching. The author begins with a detailed outline of the history of mnemonic theories, most notably those found in classical works such as the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Cicero's *De inventione*, and medieval works like Hugh of St Victor's *Didascalicon*. The study goes on to trace aspects of mnemonic theory employed by medieval preachers such as the Franciscan Guibert of Tournai. In his thirteenth-century treatise *De modo addiscendi*, Guibert considered the Augustinian power of memory's ability to transcend the corporeal and ascend to God through purification and illumination. He also appropriated aspects of Hugh of St Victor's teachings on memory. This, Rivers argues, is evident in how Guibert emphasized the use of rubrics and subheadings in his text to assist in ordering ideas so that the reader could remember them just as they appeared on parchment. Rivers then examines another Franciscan's view of memory, that of the master of novices at Regensburg, David of Augsburg (d. 1272). His pedagogical treatise *De exterioris et interioris hominis compositione* aimed to lead students to perfection through the reformation of memory—that is, the meditation on nothing but God, especially the Passion. It was believed that emotive meditation on Christ's suffering created a picture house of virtues, while erasing all memory of vices.

Rivers next examines the *Ars praedicandi populo* by the Franciscan Francesc Eiximenis (d. 1409) because it contains explicit discussion of how the memory should be used in the preaching of sermons. The mnemonic

learning presented in this work embraces the thirteenth-century scholastic desire for classification (mainly the four Aristotelian causes: final, efficient, formal, and material), a hierarchy of authorities (e.g. biblical, hagiographical, historical), and thematic order. Regarding this last point of order, Eiximenis encouraged the preacher to organize sermons around a diagram that contains concentric circles of the Ten Commandments, the articles of faith, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the eight Beatitudes, the five corporeal senses, the seven works of mercy, and the seven virtues and vices. The significance of such organization was twofold: to allow the preacher to remember his sermon, and to enable the audience to take memorable soundbites of moral and theological learning home with them after the preaching had ended. The concern to imprint the moral importance of the sermon on the memories of audiences helps explain the rise of *exempla*, short and often entertaining tales of edification.

Rivers next considers how images served the preacher in remembering sermon themes. The pastoral works of two fourteenth-century mendicants who were contemporaries at Oxford are examined: the Franciscan John Ridevall and the Dominican Robert Holcot. These mendicants used *picturae*, which are “verbal pictures in rhyming jingles” (p. 212), to serve as mnemonic devices for preachers composing their own sermons. In addition to this function, *picturae* were aimed at the laity to enable them to develop meditative techniques that would train their minds to concentrate on major devotional concerns such as prayer, penitence, and death. *Picturae* were also found in the works of French and German preachers. French *picturae* in the works of the Benedictine Pierre Bersuire and the Hospitaller Jean de Hesin demonstrate how preachers used classical images, such as pagan gods, to assist in the memorization of religiously didactic themes for pastoral discussion. Germany holds an informative but overlooked (until now) fifteenth-century example of the use of images in preaching with John of Werden’s *Dormi Secure* sermon collection. These sermons are known mainly because of their popularity in the Middle Ages as prepared homilies that many preachers used as ready-made sermons. Rivers, however, brings to our attention their mnemonic worth in regard to how these sermons employ *picturae* and *exempla* to teach moral lessons. Rivers concludes her study with Italian examples of mnemonics used in preaching. In the fourteenth century, John of San Gimignano in his *Summa de exemplis et rerum* provided a way to memorize sermons by suggesting how various *exempla* could be arranged so they would stick in the memories of those constructing sermons as well as those hearing them. In the fifteenth century, Bernardino of Siena explicitly referred to memory techniques in his sermons to teach the laity to remember prayers and moral lessons.

There are some minor flaws with the book: Rivers is perhaps too gracious in her tendency to ensure that scholars with whom she is in dialogue have their say in the flow of her text, and her voice sometimes gets over-

shadowed while their opinions dominate. In those chapters in which text and image are the main focus of discussion, more illustrations would have been helpful (there are only four in the entire book) in understanding the relationship between mnemonics and iconography. But these points should not distract us from the worth of Rivers’s undertaking. This is a comprehensive and ambitious study. Rivers has broken new ground in both the fields of sermon studies and the history of memory.

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STEPHEN A. MITCHELL. *Witchcraft and Magic in the Nordic Middle Ages*. (The Middle Ages Series.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 368. \$49.95.

Stephen A. Mitchell’s book fills a major lacuna. Much scholarship has focused on early modern witchcraft and witch trials in Nordic lands, and valuable work has also been done on magic in the Viking era (Mitchell points to recent books by François-Xavier Dillmann, Neil S. Price, and Catherine Raudvere). Yet the intervening period, roughly 1100–1500, has remained understudied. In addressing this period, Mitchell’s central questions are: “What happened in Catholic Scandinavia as Christian ideology, with its own developing views of witchcraft and demonic magic, encountered and merged with native Nordic traditions of sorcery? How did these cultural categories meld and evolve in the four centuries before the Reformation?” (p. 201). Yet this is not a chronologically organized book. The sources are too scattered and their accounts often too ahistorical to allow that sort of structure. Instead, Mitchell proceeds topically, examining the relationship between magic and the past in Nordic culture, the role of magic in everyday life, common conceptions and “mythologies” linked to magic, and magic’s relation to law and to gender.

The most impressive aspect of Mitchell’s excellent study is his deft use of the full array of sources available for medieval Scandinavian magic—above all the spectacular examples of saga literature, but also law codes and trial records, sermons and ecclesiastical accounts, visual art and archeology. Each comes with its own problems, which he nimbly negotiates while weaving together an effective overall analysis. Particular methodological attention must be given to the sagas. Previous scholars have used this literature, written mainly in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, to plumb the distant Viking past that it describes, relying on various frameworks to do so. Mitchell, however, turns on its head the entire problem of trying to sift “authentic” traces of pagan culture from later Christian accounts by using the sagas instead to discern what they in fact directly illustrate: how later medieval Nordic culture addressed and employed the remembered magic of its pagan past. Eschewing any simple notion of Christian opposition to magic, he argues that magic provided an

arena of discourse that proved essential for the long, gradual process of conversion. Christian authorities opposed pagan sorcery, of course, but it also offered them avenues to accommodate and even incorporate the traditional heritage of their region into the structures of the new faith.

Mitchell sees magic as serving almost as a synecdoche for paganism and the pre-Christian era in later accounts. He argues specifically that authors typically depicted magic more expansively in tales set in the very distant past, whereas in accounts of more recent periods, they presented magic as still existent but more tempered, and generally no longer as the driving force of their story. His analysis here focuses on saga and other imaginative literature of a particularly Nordic variety, but the tendency he perceives was more widespread. A ready parallel exists in many Christian authors' historical accounts of their own religion, with early periods (the biblical or patristic eras, or the heroic early age of conversion) described as an "age of miracles" that has since given way to the more humdrum present. Since Mitchell largely effaces (usefully, for his purposes) the standard medieval distinction between magic and miracle, the comparison is stark.

Many of Mitchell's conclusions about magic and witchcraft in the Nordic context cohere with broader trends. He stresses, for example, that magic was widely used at all levels of society, from farmers in their fields to priests and monks, and the general usages he identifies—healing, divination, love magic—were typical across Europe, although of course specifically Scandinavian nuances are evident. Regarding the historical trajectory of magic, he sees a steady growth of concern and increased severity of prosecution and punishment, especially after the fourteenth century. Here connections to the rest of Europe are blatant, as the Scandinavian clergy partook of the developing demonology of this period. Regarding "mythologies" of witchcraft, Mitchell provides a convincing reading of how native beliefs in journeys to fairy lands and legends of Blåkulla merged with continental ideas of witches' night flight and heretical sabbaths. Always complex interaction rather than simply imposition of new ideas is the watchword. Likewise with matters of gender, he traces how deeply rooted Nordic conceptions of "evil women" merged with Christian concerns about female morality and especially sexuality to result finally in a gendered image of witchcraft akin to that found elsewhere in Europe.

Ultimately, this important book accomplishes several major goals. It illuminates a previously little-examined aspect of Scandinavian history, namely magic in the post-Viking but pre-Reformation centuries. It advances some valuable and broadly applicable methodologies for studying conversion and Christianization. And it successfully integrates Nordic developments into the overall history of magic and witchcraft in medieval Eu-

rope even as it highlights uniquely Scandinavian components of that history.

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EUROPE: EARLY MODERN AND MODERN

LAURENT BOURQUIN and PHILIPPE HAMON, editors. *La politisation: Conflits et construction du politique depuis le Moyen âge*. (Histoire.) Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes. 2010. Pp. 192. €15.00.

In the past quarter-century, political history has returned to prominence, exchanging a narrow view of politics centered on monarchs, ministers, and government institutions for a more expansive and multi-faceted understanding of politics as something that took place not only in the halls of power, but also in the actions of crowds, in rituals and ceremonies, and even within the worlds of work and family. Yet such an expansive view of politics raises further questions. How did Europeans become politicized? What determined the scope and forms of political debate and action? How did boundaries between the political and the apolitical evolve over time? How are we to move, in other words, from a broad social and cultural history of politics to a history of European politicization?

The nine essays in this volume edited by Laurent Bourquin and Philippe Hamon address these questions from a variety of methodological, chronological, and geographical perspectives. The product of two workshops at the University of Rennes in 2007 and 2008, the book explores how conflicts shaped the process of politicization from the late Middle Ages into the nineteenth century. To what extent, Bourquin and Hamon ask, do conflicts favor the gradual emergence of an "autonomous political sphere"? To what extent do various types of dispute—religious, economic, and social, among others—find political solutions?

The essays by historians included in this volume cover a wide range of topics, from Golden Age Spain, to late medieval Italy and Restoration France. These are complemented with essays by political scientists and sociologists, who offer theoretical models of conflict and politicization. Focusing on three principal forms of action—taking up arms, contests of words (oral and written), and ritual and ceremonial behavior—the volume's essays arrive at three provisional conclusions: politicization accelerates during moments of intense conflict, it takes a wide range of forms depending on the specific historical context, and, finally, politicization is not a linear process, but rather occurs in tandem with periods of depoliticization.

Bourquin and Hamon divide their volume into two main parts. In the first, "Global Approaches," five essays by historians, political scientists, and sociologists offer theoretical examinations of the relationship between conflict and politicization. Pierre Savy's analysis of the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries sets the tone. Focusing on northern Italian communes and the

Hundred Years War, Savy highlights themes common to several essays—the generalization of conflict, the transformation of private interests into public affairs and factional rivalries into political contests, and the ways wars and propaganda draw larger segments of the population into the political arena. The next two essays, by José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez and Michel Biard, are historiographical in nature. Ruiz Ibáñez traces the revival of political history among historians of sixteenth and seventeenth-century Spain. Biard, meanwhile, highlights the renewed interest among historians of the French Revolution in using social and economic conflicts to explain why large segments of the French populace took up arms and/or participated in elections.

The two remaining essays are conceptual, rather than historical. Political scientists Christine Guionnet and Christian Le Bart use recent French electoral campaigns to analyze how politicians and parties seek to delineate the political and apolitical to strengthen their positions while undercutting their opponents. This strategy of “depoliticization,” they argue, also provides new actors with a point of entry into the political realm. By criticizing partisanship and promising to “*faire la politique autrement*,” outsiders can turn their marginal status to their advantage—but only to a point and only at the cost of weakening the legitimacy of representative democracy. Sociologist Francis Chateaurayaud, meanwhile, looks at forms of political mobilization in recent disputes over genetically-modified organisms in France to better understand the relationship between force and principle in determining political outcomes.

The second section, “Studies,” consists of four historical essays on moments in French history from the Hundred Years War to the early nineteenth century. Nicolas Offenstadt shows how Armagnacs and Bourguignons used visual symbols, rumor, and texts to compete for the support of urban populations in the early fifteenth century. If there was no “public opinion,” Offenstadt writes, there were still publics who were becoming increasingly aware of their own concerns and interests, and whose backing needed to be won through negotiation, manipulation, and force. Jean-Marie Constant’s analysis of noble opposition to Cardinal Richelieu, by contrast, highlights the fact that politicization could contract as well as expand. While a circle opposed to Richelieu’s version of absolutism coalesced around Louis XIII’s younger brother, Gaston d’Orléans, it never became more than a collection of individuals engaged in a series of personal rivalries, despite a shared vision of a monarchy tempered by the parlements and other authorities.

Anne de Mathan’s study of politicization in Brittany during the uprisings of 1793 builds on Biard’s earlier essay and further illustrates Bourquin and Hamon’s insistence that the French Revolution was not the birth of politicization, but rather a moment in a larger history. Anti-Jacobin uprisings, she argues, were ultimately the product of a relatively small elite of fiscal and judicial notables. This group, which “claimed to defend the sovereignty of the people while remaining sus-

picious of the latter” (p. 162) ultimately proved unable to mobilize ordinary Bretons despite their mistrust of the Parisian sans-culottes. Emmanuel Fureix’s study of ritual protest during the first half of the nineteenth century further interrogates the complex interplay between elites and masses in political contestation. Excluded from political life under the Bourbon restoration, France’s popular classes saw their rituals and festivities urbanized, politicized, and nationalized by government opponents who co-opted *charivari*, masquerades, and the carnivalesque to circumvent limits on political opposition. In turn, however, the popular classes gave these “notabilized” rituals a more democratic spin, thereby reaffirming popular sovereignty despite their political disenfranchisement.

On the whole, this is an interesting and thought-provoking collection. Despite the diverse range of subjects and methodologies, the articles cohere relatively well. Savy’s opening essay is echoed nicely by Offenstadt’s study of the Armagnacs and Bourguignons. Biard’s and De Mathan’s studies of the French Revolution, meanwhile, provide a nice counterweight, giving the volume two chronological centers of gravity. Raul Ibáñez’s, Constant’s, and Fureix’s pieces all call our attention to the equally important phenomenon of depoliticization, whether under the Old Regime, during the nineteenth century, or in recent historiography, and illustrate the theoretical perspectives put forward by Guionnet, Le Bart, and Chateaurayaud.

Nevertheless, like many collections of this nature, *La politisation* sacrifices a certain amount of cohesion for the sake of breadth and diversity. Bourquin and Hamon’s introduction provides a useful framework for organizing the essays that follow, but a brief epilogue or afterward would have been welcome. Similarly, despite the editors’ best efforts, the two theoretical articles based on modern conflicts could have been better integrated, either by being placed earlier in the volume or more explicitly referenced by the other articles. Finally, it is surprising that the volume devotes almost no attention to an especially common form of conflict and conduit of politicization—litigation. These reservations aside, historians interested in the emergence of an autonomous political sphere in Europe will find this a thought-provoking and interesting book.

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JAN LUITEN VAN ZANDEN. *The Long Road to the Industrial Revolution: The European Economy in a Global Perspective, 1000–1800*. (Global Economic History Series, number 1.) Boston: Brill. 2009. Pp. xiii, 342. \$147.00.

General books about the origins of the industrial revolution, or the emergence of Western Europe as the world economic leader around 1800, have been appearing in a regular procession in recent years, but few are as wide-ranging, learned, and readable as this book.

Jan Luiten van Zanden seeks to understand the long-term background to the economic advances in Europe

in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The story begins in the ninth century, and van Zanden dwells on formative stages in the later Middle Ages and the early modern period. He defines in a novel sequence of arguments the "modern" economy, which emerged well before 1600 and was capable of further growth. Its characteristics included relatively low interest rates (in the vicinity of five percent) and high levels of non-agricultural production. There was much investment in human capital, meaning widespread training and education, that led to the accumulation of knowledge. Van Zanden is especially influenced by the new institutional economics, which means that he sees the state as providing an important framework for economic activity by protecting property rights and creating the stable conditions that gave traders the confidence to expect that they would be paid. This environment encouraged buying and selling. Using this approach, it can be argued that the preconditions for industrial growth were present long before the steam engine, the coal-fuelled economy, and the factory system. The author highlights as the precursors of industrialization the great expansion in trade and agriculture in the period 900–1300 and the remarkable ability of England and the Netherlands to survive the crisis of the later Middle Ages and even sustain some growth. The "European Marriage Pattern" emerged in the fourteenth century and contributed much to productive capacity and the fostering of enterprise in the early modern period.

Van Zanden is a good teacher who gently presses home his argument by reiterating the main points, which some readers may find unnecessary, but the repetition has the good effect of leaving no one in doubt as to the central message. He makes the main themes enjoyable to read by using colorful phrases and taking the reader on excursions into social and cultural history. One chapter deals with "girl power," presenting the argument that late marriage of women made a beneficial addition to the labor force. Another chapter investigates book production in Europe, which began in the early Middle Ages, and argues that these volumes made a significant contribution to the "knowledge base." Van Zanden also deals deftly with some of the objections to his arguments. For example, if emphasis is placed on the creative role of the state, how can it be that economic growth was accommodated in the fragmentary petty states that were characteristic of Western Europe? The author's response is to shift emphasis to the building of institutions from the "bottom up" in guilds, cities, and rural communities, and he recognizes the economic contribution of the church, monasteries, and feudal institutions. He also has the problem of making broad brush comparisons between Europe and Asia in order to explain their divergence after the economies of the two continents had once attained similar levels of development. For van Zanden the key factor was the inability of the states in Asia to protect property rights, and therefore to foster the enterprises that delivered economic growth and industrialization in the West.

This book is about the "gloomy science" of econom-

ics, but van Zanden takes a positive view of manufacture and exchange. He is sometimes excessively optimistic in his judgments. For example, his idea that book production created wealth by spreading knowledge does not take sufficient account of the impractical contents of books, many of which before the sixteenth century were concerned with religion, chivalric fiction, high-minded philosophy, and the law. His benign view of labor makes little allowance for the drudgery in which many people were engaged, and one would not know from this book about the squalor of living conditions and the pollution associated with industrial processes. Following the style of the British Whig historians, he sees government in Britain as limited in its capacity for oppression. He notes correctly the failure of the English lords to assert their powers after the Black Death of 1349, but he does not make enough of the struggles and conflicts that produced these political conditions. There is much to admire in this book, but the author should not have swept under the carpet the dirt, misery, and violence that were associated with economic growth.

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STEPHEN E. HANSON. *Post-Imperial Democracies: Ideology and Party Formation in Third Republic France, Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia*. (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. xxvi, 274. Cloth \$90.00, paper \$26.99.

Stephen E. Hanson seeks to explain divergent party and regime outcomes in contested political situations. His targets are his fellow political scientists, the advocates of Marxism, modernization, and rational choice theory in particular. Despite their methodological rigor, he argues, they have consistently failed to provide convincing explanations. Their omission lies especially in their denigration of ideology to a subordinate, functionalist role in political outcomes. The key to resolving longstanding insufficiencies in the literature, Hanson argues, is to give ideology an independent, causative role in party formation and hence in regime stabilization. In contrast, where parties fail to develop coherent and compelling ideologies in the wake of major transformative events, the regimes that follow will suffer from instability. To substantiate his approach, Hanson first develops a rigorous theoretical model based on Max Weber and then draws on the work of historians to develop three case studies.

In constructing his analysis, Hanson takes up the time-honored free-rider problem, or, more generally, the unit of analysis problem. Are collectives or individuals the basis of social action? Hanson comes down resolutely on the side of methodological individualism. For social science explanation, collectives are abstractions. Drawing on Weber, Hanson argues that what must be explained is subjective individual motivation, and the generation of that motivation into action. Why

should any individual join a political party? Party membership entails risks, and if there are benefits to be had, they may accrue to an individual regardless of whether one is a party member. Ideology holds the key, according to Hanson. When social uncertainty is high, political entrepreneurs, who might otherwise go unheard, find their clear visions of the future attractive to individuals who might otherwise stay home and ignore the political arena. Individuals' "time horizons" (p. xix) are elongated, such that sacrifices in the present become meaningful and worthwhile.

The chapters on Weber are idiosyncratic but also the most interesting and compelling sections of the book. Weber is Hanson's intellectual lodestar because he combined attentiveness to ideology with a rigorous methodological individualism. Weber, to be sure, parsed the bases of social action into instrumental rationality, value rationality, affect, and habit, but in his elaboration on each form he retained his commitment to individual decision making as the ultimate source of social action and hence the ultimate problem for social science. Hanson goes on to connect Weber's quartet of social action with his analysis of the forms of legitimation: namely, traditional, rational-legal, and charismatic.

Weber's intellectual achievement, Hanson claims, is far superior to the analyses of social action proffered by Marxism, modernization theory, or rational choice theory. Despite the mutual hostility among the partisans of each approach, Hanson uncovers a fundamental unity among them: their diminution of ideology and their ultimately functionalist understanding of social action (yes, that holds even for rational choice theorists). Into the rings steps Hanson with the claim that methodological individualism plus ideology resolves all the theoretical insufficiencies of the other approaches, at least in regard to party formation and regime stability.

As interesting and thought provoking as all this is, I am left somewhat baffled by Hanson's conception of ideology, which he defines as "proposals made by individuals to define clear and consistent criteria for membership in a proposed polity" (p. xix). The definition has the benefit of conciseness, but is it sufficient? Hanson glides much too easily over the complex symbolic and cultural meanings embedded in ideology. He works the vein of interpretive social science, but the interpretation of ideology seems not to figure in his analysis of social action.

The three case studies that Hanson examines are quite diverse. The only commonality is that Third Republic France, Weimar Germany, and post-Soviet Russia were founded in the wake of dramatic and unsettling events—the Franco-Prussian War, World War I, and the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War. Political entrepreneurs entered into these situations of acute social and political uncertainty. Some were successful, some not. Léon Gambetta articulated a coherent political ideology that attracted followers; the party he forged became the focal point for the stability of the Third Republic. Only the parties on the

radical fringe of the Weimar political system ventured coherent ideologies. Those in the center failed to do so, leaving the field open for the ultimate system-destroying party, the Nazis. Post-Soviet Russia comes in for the most comprehensive analysis, with the tilts and turns of its political order resulting finally in the presidential regime of Vladimir Putin.

Historians of France may wonder at the depiction of Gambetta as such a clear-headed ideologist. German specialists might question whether Weimar failed because liberals proved unable to project a clear ideology, or because liberalism proved unable to master the manifold crises of the republic. In both cases, the social historical mechanisms by which parties mobilize their supporters is largely ignored. The Russian case sits uneasily with the other two because the most ideological parties failed and the result was a presidential, not a party, system (p. 229).

Hanson's book is definitely interesting. But it seems that we are left with the argument that sometimes ideology works, and sometimes it does not.

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PATRICK WALSH. *The Making of the Irish Protestant Ascendancy: The Life of William Conolly, 1662–1729*. (Irish Historical Monographs, number 7.) Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press. 2010. Pp. ix, 229. \$125.00.

William Conolly was not only "the most remarkable case of social mobility in eighteenth century Ireland" (p. 61), but he also served as "*de facto* prime minister of Ireland" (p. 1) in the early eighteenth century. By the time of his death in 1729, he was speaker of the Irish House of Commons, a lord justice, a revenue commissioner, and, moreover, the first great "undertaker" in Irish politics. It is therefore surprising that Patrick Walsh's excellent study is the first major attempt to tell his story and place it in its various contexts. Walsh suggests that the imbalance in eighteenth-century Irish history writing toward the action-packed later period has resulted in the neglect of figures like Conolly. While there is clearly much truth in this, in Conolly's case the technical and sometimes scattered nature of the surviving archival evidence offered a further barrier. Indeed, one of the obvious strengths of Walsh's biography lies in his marshaling of an impressively wide range of manuscript and printed sources.

The book recognizes the historiographical influence of A. P. W. Malcomson's work on the lives of leading members of the ruling Protestant elite, but it is also clearly indebted to the scholarship of David Hayton (one of the editors of the series in which this book appears). Unlike those of Malcomson's major biographical subjects—John Foster, Charles Agar, and Nathaniel Clements—Conolly's life was directly shaped by the events of 1688–1691. As S. J. Connolly has noted, post-revolutionary Ireland saw the emergence of a large number of self-made men in both politics and society. Walsh goes further than any previous historian in ex-

plaining Conolly's remarkable social mobility. He shows that Conolly's rise did not begin from the lowly position sometimes ascribed to him. His family may not have been especially significant, but they were prominent locally in County Donegal. Conolly's legal career (he was an attorney by profession), his attainder by the Irish parliament of 1689, his role among Irish Protestant exiles in London at this time, and his advantageous marriage to Katherine Conyngham in 1694 all indicate a more elevated social rank than has sometimes been imagined. While Walsh argues that family connections, his successful legal practice, and his early political career (he was first elected an Irish MP in 1692) contributed to Conolly's success, his book also demonstrates that the accumulation of a huge landed interest was at the heart of the matter. Walsh shows that between 1691 and 1703, Conolly obtained 48,000 acres of forfeited Jacobite estates. From this substantial base, his estates expanded to cover 150,000 acres across Ireland by the time of his death in 1729.

Contemporaries and later commentators wondered about the nature of Conolly's land acquisition, particularly in relation to lands that formed part of the Williamite confiscation. Walsh brings readers closer than ever before to the truth by marshaling the available evidence with considerable skill. He shows that Conolly was accused not only of undervaluing land for personal gain but also of forging documents and even threatening other patrons at auctions. The temptation is to conclude that Conolly was corrupt (by contemporary as well as modern standards), but Walsh judiciously notes the inconclusive nature of the evidence, carefully placing it in context. The impression he leaves is not positive, but neither is it clear-cut.

In many respects, Walsh shows that Conolly made the most of the opportunities that came his way. Exile in London during 1689 ensured contacts with men who would become leading figures in Irish politics after 1691. While his role in the parliaments of the 1690s was moderate, after 1703 he emerged as a leading Irish Whig with a strong parliamentary interest (concentrated, as Walsh demonstrates, in Donegal). Conolly endured the party rivalry of the subsequent decade to earn his political reward from the Hanoverian Succession in 1714. Walsh illustrates that Conolly combined ideological steadfastness to the Whig cause with a pragmatic streak that made him an ideal "undertaker" of government business in the Irish parliament. This combination, as well as an appetite for hard work and clear ability (illustrated especially by his activities as a revenue commissioner), ensured that Conolly navigated successfully the challenges of the later 1710s and 1720s. Walsh highlights his positive relationships with successive viceroys and his handling of the major Irish political crisis of the period, the dispute over Wood's halfpence. The book ends with an interesting analysis of Conolly's great architectural monument, Castletown House, arguing that its construction was not only a reflection of his power but a deliberate model of economic patriotism.

This is the work of a skilled historian. The book draws together an impressive range of source materials, compensating as much as possible for deficiencies in the Conolly archive. While the sources lack a personal dimension, something of Conolly's character emerges: he was able, driven, pragmatic, and, one suspects, unscrupulous. Walsh crafts a "thematic biography" and succeeds not only in providing a detailed, even-handed account of Conolly's life but also in showing how it contributed to the emergence of a ruling Protestant elite in the generation after the Glorious Revolution. He draws together a multifarious career in the law, politics, and administration to illustrate, for example, how Conolly managed a complex system of patronage. Ultimately, Walsh demonstrates that Conolly was more than a "speaker" and an "undertaker." Indeed, this biography is a reminder that we still know relatively little about many of his contemporaries (Alan Brodrick, in particular), and it provides a scholarly model for those who would take up that challenge.

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TILLMAN W. NECHTMAN. *Nabobs: Empire and Identity in Eighteenth-Century Britain*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. xiii, 266. \$99.00.

Historians have long been fascinated by the whiff of scandal surrounding nabobs, the derogatory term applied in eighteenth-century Britain to wealthy servants of the English East India Company (EIC). The nabob as *nouveau riche* buffoon became a figure of fun in the British press, caricatured by well-known artists such as James Gillray. At the same time, as Tillman W. Nechtman emphasizes in his new study, nabobs were frequently portrayed as threats to the proper functioning of British society, polluting the pure streams of British virtue with eastern luxury and despotic habits. Returning nabobs were blamed for all manner of social ills, from corruption in parliament and the decline in ethical standards to inflation of prices for land and goods.

Nechtman's book is packed full with imputations against nabobs drawn from eighteenth-century newspapers, popular prints, and social commentary, notably the letters of that most vituperative hater of nabobs Horace Walpole. Nechtman covers some well-trodden ground, for example the public controversies surrounding the nabobs-in-chief Robert Clive and Warren Hastings; he also explores less well-known aspects of nabobery, including the sudden public prominence of Indian diamonds, the penchant among nabobs for erecting Indian-style buildings in the English countryside, and the importation of numerous Indian animals, including elephants, hyenas, and yaks. Perhaps the most original chapter of the book looks at the widespread criticisms of nabobinas, elite European women returned from India, as overdressed and sexually suspect.

Nechtman shows that returning EIC servants were painfully conscious of the public clamor against them,

particularly in the 1770s and 1780s. A friend of Paul Benfield, a notorious profiteer based in Madras, advised him simply not to come home because of the danger of attracting public opprobrium; if he did come, the friend counseled him “to disarm enmity and malevolence, by a quiet, unassuming entry” (p. 154). Domestic criticism of nabobs may have pushed the British in India to cultivate a more austere version of Britishness, more racially exclusive and often strongly flavored by evangelicalism. The fear of being labeled a nabob may therefore have been an important stimulus to the rebranding of British India in the era of Lord Cornwallis (governor-general from 1786 to 1793).

Situating his book within the new imperial history, Nechtman explains the public hysteria over nabobs as an insular reaction to the dawning realization that British society, and British national identity, were becoming thoroughly mixed up with imperialism. Nabobs with their huge diamonds and strange pets were troubling because they represented material evidence of the inseparable connections between home and overseas and between nation and empire. Nabobs appear here as forerunners of new imperial historians themselves, in that they “exposed the fluid dynamics that moved between empire and nation” and “suggested that British history and British imperial history could not be distinguished one from the other” (p. 238). The pillorying of nabobs was therefore part of a process whereby British public discourse established fictive boundaries between Britain and its overseas colonies, sustaining an image of British national difference and superiority on which empire itself depended.

Nechtman’s thorough study will be a valuable resource for historians, though his general argument is provocative rather than wholly persuasive. The book relies on an overdrawn contrast between imperial Britons (including nabobs) who embraced empire and the mass of domestic Britons who wanted to defend the nation from empire’s polluting effects. Nechtman tends to see the nabob controversy only in terms of a domestic repulsion from imperial otherness; but the domestic fascination with nabobs also reflected the attractions of the Indian empire, with its vast stocks of wealth and beautiful textiles, its exotic glamor, and its stories of military valor. Walpole’s invective needs to be set alongside the monuments to British Indian soldiers and statesmen rising up in St. Paul’s Cathedral or Westminster Abbey. Even Hastings, the arch-nabob, eventually became an object of sympathy as much as scandal and was lauded as a national hero by the end of his life. On the penultimate page of the book, Nechtman hints at the complexity of British attitudes, noting that not all domestic representations of nabobs were negative, but this point is left largely undeveloped.

A chapter on “enlightenment and empire” uses selections from contemporary journals and letters to argue that eighteenth-century Britons tended to see Indians as lacking “any sort of agency,” and India as a “degraded place” where life was “nasty, brutish and short” (pp. 58–59). This reading of British attitudes to-

ward India as monochrome and highly negative helps to explain domestic attacks on Indianized British nabobs but makes it hard to see why nabobs themselves were attracted to Indian styles of art, architecture, or culture, and it runs counter to recent scholarship suggesting the fluidity of “enlightened” attitudes to India. Nechtman’s book nonetheless highlights the deep material and cultural imprint of imperial expansion on eighteenth-century British society.

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ROBERT SAUNDERS. *Democracy and the Vote in British Politics, 1848–1867: The Making of the Second Reform Act*. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2011. Pp. viii, 302. \$124.95.

This is an excellent book, thoroughly researched, elegantly written, and well organized. Beginning his analysis in the era of the 1848 revolutions and the fading of Chartism, Robert Saunders examines the impact of these phenomena upon constitutional reform. He details the manner in which reform came to be linked with other questions (especially free trade) and prompted both a repositioning of politicians and a clarification of ideas about representation, democracy, class, the national character, and other contemporary concerns. For many Liberals, notably Lord John Russell, reform was not about attracting radical support but protecting the constitution from radicals. Conservatives Edward Smith-Stanley, earl of Derby, and Benjamin Disraeli aimed to block a Liberal reform that might damage their party. When their political opponents in the Aberdeen coalition quarreled over the lowering of the borough qualification in 1854, the prospect of a party realignment seemed like a godsend (division on the Liberal side was a constant feature of this period). In the spring of 1857, Disraeli described the Conservative Party as a “corpse” and suggested that reform was the issue on which to rebuild it. Derby eventually agreed; reform offered a means to strengthen the Conservatives and hinder Liberal reunion, and 1859–1860 saw the most significant debates on reform since 1830–1832. William Ewart Gladstone’s populist turn helped to ensure that the debates would go on, but Gladstone’s principles were not shared by many in the Liberal Party, and he suffered a reversal in 1866. The “Adullamites” who resisted him wished to protect middle-class influence, while he “saw the enfranchisement of all who were duly qualified as part of the process by which class was dissolved” and parliament could represent the whole community (p. 266). Finally, the debates on reform in 1866–1867, the tactical maneuvering, the struggles to control the future of both the Liberal and Conservative parties, and the combined pressure for a settlement in parliament and out of doors produced the 1867 Reform Act. Ironically, a selective reform ushered in the age of mass politics, and all parties claimed credit for a measure of which none of them wholly approved.

Saunders argues that ideas really mattered in the re-

form debates of the 1850s and 1860s, and that most disagreements related to the specific details in reform proposals rather than to the principle of reform itself. He argues, further, that one of the key questions—about the character of the working man and his fitness for the vote—was really about incorporating new elements in the constitution without disturbing the old. That is, most commentators considered it essential to retain the variety of representation and to forestall democracy. Fitness to vote therefore could not be separated from a consideration of the number to be enfranchised. Democracy had negative connotations even for convinced reformers. In an interesting chapter on the international context, Saunders shows that the democracy seen in France and America was not wanted in Britain. Democracy's "operation upon a European society" gave birth to Napoleon III's dictatorship and the end of constitutional government in France; America, "of interest for its Anglo-Saxon culture and as an example of democracy in a large and opulent state," descended into sectional division and civil war (p. 131).

Saunders focuses on parliamentary politics, though with some appreciation of the most significant extraparliamentary developments. It was parliament that had to deliberate and decide on reform proposals. "Agitation might compel legislators to act, but it could not set the terms of legislation" (p. 23). Therefore, the violent demonstrations in the summer of 1866 should be regarded as important, but not as the primary cause behind the final act: "Rioting was hardly unknown in Victorian society, and the government only decided to legislate several months later" (p. 227).

Saunders demonstrates real command of his sources and the relevant historiography. In the years after 1867 a consensus held that popular pressure had forced the hand of party leaders at Westminster, but this was disputed by later historians and, Saunders thinks, for good reason. The most important works on the 1867 Reform Act date from the 1960s: articles by Royden Harrison and Gertrude Himmelfarb and books by F. B. Smith and Maurice Cowling. Saunders offers useful comments on these works throughout his own book (he is particularly complimentary about Cowling, but rejects the latter's claims that ideas were unimportant and that extraparliamentary agitation played no role at all in the passing of the 1867 act). Saunders has added a great deal to this body of scholarship. It is a pity that his book is not more reasonably priced.

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FORREST CAPIE. *The Bank of England: 1950s to 1979*. (Studies in Macroeconomic History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. xxviii, 890. \$150.00.

Forrest Capie's history of the Bank of England joins the other official histories of the Bank—those of J. H. Clapham (for 1694–1914), R. S. Sayers (1891–1944), and John Fforde (1941–1958)—and brings the story up to the defeat of the Labour government and the elec-

tion of Margaret Thatcher in 1979. It is a story that covers two very distinct periods in British history: the so-called "Golden Age" of economic growth, with low rates of inflation, full employment, growing international trade, and capital flows, and the much more turbulent 1970s, with the collapse of the international monetary system, the oil shock, and stagflation. These two periods also included the establishment of sterling's convertibility, the crisis that preceded the devaluation of 1967, and the secondary banking crisis of 1973–1974.

Given Capie's expertise as a banking and monetary historian, it comes as no surprise that much of the book focuses on the Bank's attempts at making sense of what monetary policy was and how it should respond to change and crises. That said, overall the book offers a very lengthy and detailed "record of what the Bank did, how it did it, and . . . an explanation as to why it did it in the way it did" (p. xix). Context is also important, and the reader will learn much about the institutional history of the Bank, the growth of regulation, and about London as a financial center.

Capie was given complete access to the Bank's archives and to its current and former personnel. Nevertheless, some gaps remain, as many of the Bank's records have been destroyed (for example those pertaining to the secondary banking crisis) together with the "Books" recording the morning meetings of the governor.

The book starts with a very useful overview of the British economy and its monetary background. This chapter is followed by fourteen more in a loose chronological order, starting with the Bank in the 1950s, its structure, personnel, objectives, and functions. This is followed by analysis of the establishment of the Committee on the Working of the Monetary System (the Radcliffe Committee, from the name of its chairman), its findings and recommendations, and the responses it provoked. The chapters that follow cover considerable ground in much detail: the move to convertibility, the establishment of the euromarkets, the sterling crises and devaluation, and the introduction of credit controls, as well as the secondary banking crisis of the mid-1970s and the exchange rate policy that followed, including the end of sterling balances. Throughout, Capie does not forget the changes that took place in the Bank's personnel, most notably its governors, and the wider institutional environment, both in terms of international monetary reform and banking supervision. The rather relentless narrative is broken up by some very engaging and interesting vignettes, including the rescue of Burmah Oil in the mid-1970s.

Official histories can often be uncritical and overburdened by detail. Capie has achieved the remarkable feat of producing a long book that is neither of these things. His prose is lucid, and his grasp of the complexities of monetary policy is masterly; he does not shy away from showing his frustration at the Bank's shortcomings in grappling with policy. A brief review cannot do justice to a book of such gigantic scale and scope. Suffice to say

that in it banking and monetary historians will find much food for thought.

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SID LOWE. *Catholicism, War and the Foundation of Francoism: The Juventud de Acción Popular in Spain, 1931–1939*. (Cañada Blanch/Sussex Academic Studies on Contemporary Spain.) Brighton, England: Sussex Academic Press. 2010. Pp. xviii, 332. \$74.95.

This is a fine and well-written political history of the Catholic youth movement during the Spanish Second Republic and Civil War. Sid Lowe provides a needed analysis of the ideological and social composition of the Juventud de Acción Popular (JAP), the youth movement associated with the clerical Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA), the largest party in Spanish political history. Lowe argues that JAP became increasingly influenced by a variety of European authoritarian models and underwent a “profound process of fascistisation” (p. 69). Many Spaniards, especially those on the Left, “understandably” (p. 7) considered it indistinguishable from fascism itself. Its leadership cult, nationalist populism, paligenetic faith, and youthfulness repeated or copied essential features of its European fascist counterparts. Lowe argues that the Falange, the recognized standard bearer of Spanish fascism, was weak because JAP was sufficiently fascist to absorb the Falange’s potential supporters. At the same time, the author admits that JAP’s devout Catholicism, lack of a dynamic imperial project, and relative reluctance to engage in violence distinguished it from the German National Socialists and Italian Fascists.

One of Lowe’s most significant contributions is to show why and when JAP members flocked to the more radical and violent Falange in 1936 and especially during the civil war. Many previous accounts have argued that the switch occurred following CEDA’s defeat in the February 1936 general elections. Although the flight from the JAP to the Falange was significant in the early spring of 1936, the author demonstrates that only in July with the eruption of civil war did the *japistas* massively join the fascist party. This shows, as Stathis N. Kalyvas has emphasized, that what causes civil wars is not necessarily what sustains them. Traumatic events encourage ideological flexibility and opportunism.

Despite these solid findings, the author may inflate the importance of his subject by arguing that the JAP provided the social basis of the Franco regime (p. 7). JAP was certainly part of the neo-traditionalist coalition of Francoism, but the social basis of the latter was broader than any particular political movement. Furthermore, JAP was largely urban; whereas early Francoism was more rooted in the countryside. Given Lowe’s political perspective, he may also overestimate the importance of anticlericalism as the Republic’s “greatest mistake” (p. 2). Likewise, his political determinism attributes the military coup of July to CEDA’s long-term reactionary influence and its electoral defeat

in 1936. The author is certainly correct that religious issues were extremely divisive, and that CEDA’s electoral failure gave ammunition to the authoritarian Right. However, the Republic’s inability or unwillingness to protect the lives and possessions of property owners and political opponents in the spring of 1936 was even more damaging to its survival than its previous political errors or CEDA’s anti-Republican propaganda. Like much of both old and new literature, Lowe’s volume favors political (or cultural) over social history. Thus, he argues that a “growing perception of disorder” (p. 121) was much more important than social unrest itself.

My own opinion is that Spanish historiography has inherited from a vulgar Marxism an overly narrow and often politicized conception of class struggle. Thus, it has ignored or downplayed hard-to-quantify petty thefts, attacks on property, and resistance to wage labor that individuals or small groups of workers initiated after the Left took power in the spring of 1936. No doubt the right-wing media attempted to manipulate property owners, but the latter were inclined to believe that “disorder” and “unrest” were significant because of their own experiences with an intense and multifaceted class struggle. In other words, “public order” was not merely the “pretext for the [military] rising” (p. 155) but rather its context.

The victory of the Francoists in the civil war cannot be explained by the Right’s greater “respect for authority” (p. 195). Once again, political and cultural explanations need to be harnessed to their social and economic context. A more global perspective demonstrates that in both the Russian and Chinese civil wars authoritarian military leadership did not guarantee the victory of the Right. Like the Russian and Chinese Communists, the fascistic Nationalists won not only because of a forced political and cultural unity but also because they mobilized their population and resources more effectively than their incompetent enemies.

Despite these criticisms, Lowe’s history of the JAP is a significant contribution to the study of politics and political culture of the Spanish Second Republic and Civil War.

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MICHEL DE WAELE. *Réconcilier les français: Henri IV et la fin des troubles de religion 1589–1598*. (Les collections de la République des Lettres.) Montreal: Les Presses de l’Université Laval. 2010. Pp. x, 285. \$32.95.

Over the past decade, Michel De Waele has become a leading expert on the French Wars of Religion, so it is only fitting that he undertake to synthesize a past generation of scholarship and break new conceptual ground for the next in his new study of these complex conflicts and their aftermath. De Waele eschews the “long Wars of Religion” posited in Mack P. Holt’s 1995 seminal synthesis that extended them up to the 1629

siege of La Rochelle. Organized in three parts, De Waele's book traces these wars up to what he considers the decisive year 1589, the heated struggle thereafter over the conversion of Henri IV, and the new forms of comity that ensued between the king and his people after his conversion in 1593. In the process, the majesty of the king, the supreme authority of the royal state, and its preternatural Catholic character became reaffirmed as the touchstones of France's identity for the next two centuries. This vision of France as defined by one faith, one law, one king is essentially *parlementaire*, which should come as no surprise given all of De Waele's earlier splendid work on the judges.

In chapter one, De Waele disputes the unitary nature of the period 1561–1598 so long established in the historiography. A fundamental difference existed, he argues, between the wars fought in the 1560s and 1570s, which were principally noble revolts over influence at court, and the struggle over the Bourbon succession in the late 1580s and 1590s, which was a civil war because of the ideological stakes implicit in the possibility of a Protestant king ruling over a Catholic majority. While De Waele does not exactly “take religion out of the Wars of Religion,” he does construe matters of belief largely in terms of *la religion royale* of incipient French national identity. The greater lexical, if not legalistic precision that De Waele calls for when characterizing these conflicts, although certainly very useful, may hide the possibility that contemporary confusion about these conflicts actually vouchsafed their transformational character. Chapters two through four present the various factors—social, institutional, and religious—that conspired to plunge France into crisis after 1560. De Waele adds valuable nuance to the long familiar narrative of these years with insights gleaned from his reading of contemporary pamphlets and archives, principally in Beaune. Over time, what began as noble factions gradually morphed into political parties with the Monarchomachs of the 1570s and the rise of the Catholic Holy League in the 1580s. Part two builds on his own as well as others' work, including my own, on the struggle surrounding the succession and conversion of Henri IV. Unable to conquer his kingdom by force, Henri set about to subdue his rebellious Catholic subjects with kindness after his conversion at St. Denis, re-establishing bonds of *amitié* and consigning the contentious past to oblivion by royal fiat. Clemency rather than harshness marked the pacification process, as joyous entries, Te Deums, and paeans about peace and prosperity came to the war weary kingdom.

De Waele stresses the contractual nature of the renewed relationship between the Catholic king and his people, devoting particular attention to the peace agreements reached between Henri IV and Leaguer cities after 1594. Far from the *Politique* triumph touted since Voltaire, the resulting accord was a victory above all for moderate Leaguer Catholics, who had staunchly insisted they would only obey a Catholic king. With rare exception, Henri kept nearly all Leaguer officials in place and accepted the legitimacy of their past rulings,

including fiscal policy; he also restored properties and privileges to the Roman Catholic Church, as well as affirmed new proscriptions against the Huguenots. Accepting this continuity of Catholic governance was vital as Henri lobbied for his own acceptance. The eruption of popular revolts in the Croquant peasant uprisings further encouraged the realignment of Catholic elite support behind him, as did his astute decision in 1595 to declare war on the League's erstwhile sponsor, Habsburg Spain. Left on the margins of this return to the new normal were, of course, the Huguenots, many of whom after his conversion militated against him; but for the soothing admonitions of men like Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, confessional strife might have quickly resumed. The failure of Huguenots to rally to the king's side after the Spanish surprise of Amiens in 1597 signaled how low relations had sunk. Yet in spring 1598, Henri brought both these conflicts—one hot, one cold—to an end in the Treaty of Vervins with Spain and the Edict of Nantes for the Huguenots. Neither accord fully settled the points of difference between them and the French monarchy, as war with each eventually resumed after Henri's assassination in 1610. Yet this time around, cleavages among French Catholic elites remained muted and more manageable, even in the Fronde. The pacification achieved under Henri thus proved a resilient basis for the monarchy's servants to build its authority and their shared vision of France upon.

De Waele's important new book is essential reading for scholars and advanced students interested in early modern France as he presents a compelling picture of France's transformation under Henri IV. If he privileges the perspective of the lawyers, he does so for good reason, because the future of France, as we all know, essentially belonged to them.

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BRIAN SANDBERG. *Warrior Pursuits: Noble Culture and Civil Conflict in Early Modern France*. (Studies in Historical and Political Science, number 3.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2010. Pp. xxx, 393. \$60.00.

About twenty years ago Arlette Jouanna, one of the leading historians of the French nobility, published *Le Devoir de révolte* (1989), in which she examined the relationship between the French nobility (in particular the *noblesse d'épée*) and the French state between 1559 and 1661. In many ways Brian Sandberg's book takes a closer look at the same phenomenon for a more limited period of time, essentially the first third of the seventeenth century. He wants to explore the marked propensity of French nobles, both powerful princes and simple provincial gentlemen, to engage in armed revolts or sometimes just local feuds. The area he examines is southern France, in particular the province of Languedoc. For Sandberg violence and civil conflict were not just a legacy of the Wars of Religion; they were

also an expression of a particular noble culture whose virtues—such as a specific kind of heroic manliness—could only find expression on the field of battle, possibly in warfare abroad but just as well in civil war at home. As opposed to older accounts that have seen large sections of the nobility as undergoing a process of demilitarization in the early seventeenth century, Sandberg demonstrates that a culture of violence remained central to noble social identity.

In southern France the civil wars of the late sixteenth century never really came to an end and continued in an admittedly more muted form for decades, fueled not least by ties of patronage, kinship, and friendship that made it easy to raise private or semi-private armies. Religious division played an important part in these conflicts but so did family feuds and the resentment of powerful aristocrats who had been defeated in their quest for grants, status, and offices at court by their enemies. It was all too easy for nobles to raise armies in the king's name using their position as royal governors of fortified towns and castles or just relying on blank commissions that the king had issued earlier so that nobles could recruit soldiers for his army—which in practice, however, was dominated as much by local warlords and powerful nobles as by the king himself, as Sandberg shows. Even the Huguenots fought their wars in the 1620s in the name of the king and his edicts, relying in particular on the privileges granted to them in 1598 (p. 205).

All of this is well argued and illustrated by a wealth of fascinating details, but the reader nevertheless feels irritated at times by Sandberg's tendency to oversimplify problems. Not every historian will cherish the sentence that, armed with five subordinate clauses, carefully keeps the meaning in suspense, but for Sandberg almost everything seems to be clear cut and unambiguous. He prefers the dry short sentences that the military men whose actions he examines probably used in war, if they spoke at all. This creates a tendency either to simplify issues unduly or at least to use expressions that are conceptually and stylistically problematic. Thus Sandberg states "for warrior nobles, intense personal belief was dedicated to promoting religious causes" (p. 273). Would it not be more correct to say that intense faith motivated nobles to dedicate their lives to religious causes? Equally Sandberg speaks in a rather strange way of "sanctity" as an element of personal honor when he really means godliness, piety, and religious zeal. Did Louis XIII really raise the head of the Lauzières family in order "to confirm the family's enhanced sanctity" (members of the family had died in the fight against the Huguenots), or can crusades be described as "sanctity performances" (pp. 156–157)?

At a deeper level Sandberg's explanation for the decline of violent conflicts after 1635, although in itself plausible enough, fails to satisfy completely. Undoubtedly the end of religious war in 1629—the Huguenots no longer had the capacity to raise armed forces after this date—was in part responsible for the pacification of southern France, and the fact that nobles could now

serve in a "real" war against foreign powers (war had been declared against Spain in 1635) certainly also helped, as Sandberg argues. One misses, however, the subtle analysis that Stuart Carroll, for example, provides in his *Blood and Violence in Early Modern France* (2006) for the change in noble manners in the mid-seventeenth century and, in an even more pronounced way, during the later decades of the *âge classique*. Overall Sandberg presents a great deal of new and fascinating research on an important topic, but he has only partially succeeded in transforming a doctoral thesis into a polished and rounded monograph.

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JEFFREY D. BURSON. *The Rise and Fall of Theological Enlightenment: Jean-Martin de Prades and Ideological Polarization in Eighteenth-Century France*. Foreword by DALE VAN KLEY. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. 2010. Pp. xxiv, 494. \$55.00.

On November 18, 1751, the bachelor in license Jean-Martin de Prades appeared before a committee of the University of Paris Faculty of Theology (the Sorbonne) to defend his doctoral dissertation. Like many a doctoral thesis defense before and since, there was nothing in the event itself to suggest anything extraordinary. Doctoral degrees in theology also served for many in eighteenth-century France as the terminal degree that launched aspiring state officials upon administrative careers—the royal intendant and Controller General Jacques Turgot, for example, completed his formal education by taking a doctorate from the Sorbonne—and from this perspective there was nothing in Prades's profile going in that suggested that his examination would even generate much theological heat. The defense itself was also uneventful. Prades followed the dissertator's tried and true path of suggesting modest revisions to the consensus views of his professors, and after successfully answering a challenge raised by one of his examiners against his understanding of miracles, he was duly confirmed as a doctor of theology.

Yet within days of the event controversies about the thesis and its defense began to swirl. Over the next three months these questions exploded into a full-blown international scandal. By March 1752 Prades was at the court of Frederick the Great in Berlin, fleeing French arrest warrants, while a fierce public battle was unfolding in Paris and the wider Republic of Letters. The battle divided the Sorbonne faculty, which retracted its approval for Prades's thesis in January 1752, against itself and pitted each of its factions against a host of external critics that included clerics and officials of the Gallican Church, royal administrators engaged in ecclesiastical politics, Jansenist clerics and magistrates, the Society of Jesus, and the broader public of eighteenth-century readers who accessed the scandal through the vibrant print culture of the period. Especially important among the latter were the as yet still isolated *gens des lettres* who would soon come to be called the "Encyclope-

dists." The monumental *Encyclopédie* of Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert began to appear, and to be vehemently criticized, in the same year as Prades's defense, and while Prades was not the only Sorbonne alumnus to agree to provide the *Encyclopédie* editors with articles (Turgot, for example, was an "Encyclopedist," as was the Sorbonne doctor Abbé Claude Yvon), only Prades became the center of a scandal that linked his thesis, and the Sorbonne's approval of it, with the wider reception of the *Encyclopédie* and Enlightenment *philosophie* more generally.

Many a historian, including this reviewer, thinks that the broader scandal activated by the "Prades Affair" was one of the central, if not the central, events in the opening of the French Enlightenment writ large, and what Jeffrey D. Burson asks in this meticulously researched and carefully argued book is why Prades, of all people, became the flashpoint for this monumental upheaval. What transpired, Burson inquires, to turn an ordinary doctoral candidate with a seemingly run of the mill doctoral dissertation into a singularly significant catalyst of the emerging French Enlightenment?

No one before Burson has asked these questions in quite this historically contingent and nuanced way, and the great virtue of this book, despite the sometimes problematic ways that it attempts to resolve its inquiries, is the way that it subjects the wider historical context surrounding the "Prades Affair" to a rigorous reevaluation. Especially constructive is Burson's urge to question the musty explanatory framework, recently dusted off by Jonathan Israel, that explains the affair as the overdetermined result of an imagined eighteenth-century war between secular scientific rationalism and materialism on the one hand and religious philosophy, scriptural authority, and traditional church teachings on the other. The book's title articulates Burson's different approach, for what he aspires to show is the presence of a mid-eighteenth-century French intellectual and institutional culture wherein Christian theology and Enlightenment critical philosophy could cohabitate without necessarily generating a war between them—what Burson calls the "Theological Enlightenment."

When Burson is documenting the porous walls that allowed Christian theology to intermingle with secular philosophies of all sorts, and clerics and ecclesiastical officials to critically debate and socialize with *gens de lettres* and aspiring *philosophes* in the wider public sphere, his book excels. Drawing on the work of R. R. Palmer and, more recently, Dale Van Kley (who contributes a foreword to the book) on the complex ties between Catholicism and Enlightenment in France, but also adding an astonishing quantity of his own original archival research, Burson contributes greatly to our understanding of the intellectual relationships and social networks that tied church with state, ecclesiastical politics with royal politics, and religion with secular philosophy in the making of French Enlightenment culture.

Unfortunately, Burson also tries to pin a story about the changing character of Enlightenment philosophy to

the contingent account of institutional and political change that is the book's core, and here the argument suffers. Burson follows Israel in these sections by viewing the eighteenth century as a battleground where Radical Enlightenment (basically philosophical materialism as Burson uses the term) fought to assert itself against various opponents, both moderate and conservative. But he also tries to complicate Israel's story by arguing for what he calls "the Jesuit Synthesis of Malebranche and Locke," a moment of rapprochement operative between roughly 1720–1750 that prepared the ground for the real moment of philosophical rupture, the "Prades Affair." This argument simply does not work. The evidence offered for the "Jesuit Synthesis" is a rather loose reading of only one or two Jesuit texts, and Burson's argument as a whole deploys names (Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Nicolas de Malebranche, Claude-Adrian Helvétius) together with generalizing labels (Newtonianism, materialism, Jesuit, Jansenist) in a highly reductive way that produces an abstract narrative of alleged philosophical development detached from the complex texts and intellectual debates that these terms reference.

As an intellectual history of the French Enlightenment, therefore, *The Rise and Fall of Theological Enlightenment* cannot be recommended. But as a copiously researched institutional and political history of the contingent events that shaped the characteristic relationship between church and state, and religion and *philosophie*, in Enlightenment France, it is required reading for any serious student of the topic.

J. B. SHANK

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RALPH ASHBY. *Napoleon against Great Odds: The Emperor and the Defenders of France, 1814*. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger. 2010. Pp. xiii, 230. \$44.95.

At the end of 1813 large Allied armies, commanded by the Prussian Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher and the Austrian Prince Karl Philipp zu Schwarzenberg, were on the verge of invading Napoleonic France. The 1814 *campagne de France* lasted for only three months until the fall of Paris on March 31. Napoleon abdicated on April 6 and was soon sent to Elba.

Ralph Ashby's goal is to "focus on Napoleon's army in 1814 as well as on partisans and other civilians who defended France" (p. 1). The book presents important topics, many of them well known, that explain the characteristics and conditions of the French recruits in 1814: conscription, desertion, and draft dodging; the structure and size of the Napoleonic army; the training or lack thereof; the soldiers' social origins and ages; and their weapons, uniforms, military actions, and casualties. Following a chapter about Napoleon Bonaparte's creation of the army, Ashby devotes five chapters to examining the organization and conditions of various branches in 1814: infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineers, Imperial Guard, and National Guard. He then explores the various battles (chapters nine and eleven),

civilian resistance (chapter ten), the fall of Paris (chapter twelve), and French casualties (chapter thirteen). The book provides useful statistical data and contains several helpful maps and many pictures of battles and prominent figures of the period.

Not surprisingly, most of the French infantry came from the lower classes. Many men were insufficiently trained and equipped. Some infantry had no muskets. Acute shortages of horses resulted in a much smaller cavalry than the enemy's. Scarcity of horses and insufficient training also hurt the artillery and the Imperial Guard. Overall, the Napoleonic army of 1814 was greatly outnumbered by the Allied armies (only 120,000 Frenchmen were conscripted), was inadequately equipped and clothed, and was often not well fed, with many of the troops virtually untrained or lacking experience (p. 175). Leadership quality varied and morale fluctuated. Yet, despite those limitations many French soldiers fought bravely to defend their homeland, and they were able to inflict several defeats on the invading armies in the battles of Champaubert, Montmirail, and Vauchamps, among others.

Aside from discussing the Napoleonic army, Ashby makes two main arguments: first, that Napoleon's main difficulty in preparing a bigger and better army was lack of time. The Allies invaded France in the early winter of 1814 instead of the spring, as the emperor had hoped, thereby denying him the necessary time to conscript more soldiers and train them sufficiently. This might have been the case, but would Napoleon have prevailed if he had had three more months to prepare? It is unlikely in light of numerous other problems the emperor faced. Second, Ashby challenges the interpretation that "war weariness" in 1814 France was the main reason for the French defeat. He insists that "war weariness" played a role in the loss, "just not the primary one" (p. 189). However, earlier he states that "war weariness" is a "vague expression" and "is impossible to qualify or quantify" (p. 31). If so, how does one decide with any certainty how important it was in causing French defeat in 1814? It seems to me that the author underestimates the importance of "war weariness." Factors that Ashby mentions elsewhere, such as difficulties of mobilization, widespread desertion and draft evasion, financial disarray, and a demoralized and ineffective bureaucracy were clear signs of an exhausted France that, after twenty years of fighting and great casualties, yearned for peace rather than continued struggle. The author is also unconvincing in stressing the important role civilian resistance played against the Allies. He provides scarce evidence in the form of specific examples of partisan opposition to adequately prove any strong French resistance, which never measured up to the widespread anti-Napoleonic revolts in Spain, southern Italy, and Tyrol.

Ashby places most of the responsibility of the collapse of France on Napoleon. Indeed, while the emperor showed much energy and succeeded in leading the army to several victories, he was unrealistic in thinking that, after the fiascos in Russia and Germany, he

could defeat the much larger and improved Allied armies. Ashby states correctly that in 1814 "France was ultimately overwhelmed by a superior combination of enemy forces" (p. 10). None of the Napoleonic 1814 victories was decisive or could halt the steady advance of the Allies toward Paris. The invasion of France in 1814 was different from that of 1792. Napoleon could have saved his throne but refused an Allied offer to stay in power within the 1792 borders of France. He did not believe that he would survive in power without beating the enemy decisively. Although not uniformly persuasive, Ashby's book contains useful information about the French troops and contributes to a better understanding of Napoleon's final campaign.

ALEXANDER GRAB
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MARK TRAUGOTT. *The Insurgent Barricade*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2010. Pp. xviii, 436. \$39.95.

Mark Traugott has written an intriguing book that highlights both the possibilities and pitfalls of a social-science approach to historical phenomena. It takes as its subject the literal appearance of that which is so often a synecdoche for insurgent action—the barricade, and particularly its history as focused on the Parisian streets in the revolutionary years of 1830–1848. The author's contention is that the "barricade phenomenon" is a "routine of collective action" (p. xi) that as part of a "repertoire of collective action" (p. xiii) must be properly decoded to understand and appreciate popular culture and consciousness of the era. Following closely the methodological lead of Charles Tilly, this is a work that valorizes popular contention and resistance, and seeks to embed the particular forms that became famous in the mid-nineteenth century into a longer history of popular assertion and autonomy.

Beginning as it does by delving into "barricade" episodes from 1588 and 1648 and offering largely uncritical narratives of these events, the text foregrounds what seems to be a predetermined commitment to a positive view of barricading the streets. It is thus able to pass over the practical problems of the very shaky and uneven record of success that this strategy had. Glorious popular triumph in the July Days of 1830 was counterpointed, as every reader or viewer of *Les Misérables* knows, with futile and fatal revolt in 1832, 1834, and 1839. Success in February 1848 was followed by even more bloody repression in June. Truly monumental barricade-building in 1871 could not stave off the repression of *La semaine sanglante*. Meanwhile, as the barricade example spread, early successes in Belgium in 1830 led to widespread European adoption in 1848—but as in Paris, those revolutions all failed.

One has the sense that Traugott knows all this—there can be no disputing his scholarship, or the energy he has put into gathering a database of "barricade events"—but prefers to see things differently. His conclusions are noteworthy for their frank admission that

the “essential purpose” of early modern barricading practices was the defense of established neighborhoods against external threats that were not necessarily political in nature, and that this “pragmatic” function was displaced by more “sociological and symbolic” ones even as the “revolutionary tradition” reappropriated the practice in the early nineteenth century. The barricade had “versatility, longevity and vitality” because it was “a symbol that could serve as proxy for the desire to effect radical political change” (pp. 240–241)—which is all very well, but when it gets people killed without actually achieving any such change, does it deserve quite the retrospective admiration it receives here?

In addition, given the emphasis that Traugott wishes to place on the culture of those who built the barricades and presumably passed on the sense of these practices down the generations, it is striking how infrequently he is able to approach direct testimony on this subject. Commentators of both left and right tell us what they think workers were doing making barricades, but page after page passes before we hear from captured insurgents or memoirists. The section on the way barricades functioned to “foster an appropriate level of insurgent organisation,” for example, opens with the proclamations of educated revolutionists and goes on to witnesses who saw either conspiracy or complete spontaneity. Only one out of four of those quoted was a “worker,” and he was writing retrospectively. Going on to consider the development of a “division of labor” in barricade-building, Traugott plunges into artistic representations, insisting that despite their “distortions” they might “be useful in suggesting the diversity” of insurgents (pp. 196–200, citation p. 199). Several pages later we get to direct, individual examples of barricade-builders, to learn that they were masons who brought their practical skills to bear, but not to discover why they did so (p. 204).

What Traugott is able to show us, quite dramatically, is that barricading practices emerged as a striking escalation of something previously far from unknown but infrequent, at a time when the notion of urban neighborhood autonomy was being definitively challenged by the intrusion of ideological politics and deracinating economic development. Barricades as actually used in the mid-nineteenth century, reading through the hype both contemporary and retrospective, were a response fatally bounded by their reactive qualities. Their disruption of the emergent space of urban modernity could be profound but was always short-lived, and too frequently the backdrop to massacre by increasingly well-organized and ruthless military repression. Traugott clearly believes that we should give three hearty cheers to “barricade consciousness,” but it remains unclear from this study what that spirit actually was, or why it was not, in the end, a mistake.

DAVID ANDRESS
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RACHEL CHRASTIL. *Organizing for War: France 1870–1914*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 2010. Pp. xii, 226. \$45.00.

Rachel Chrastil studies civil society’s response to the Franco-Prussian war in three French departments: Meurthe-et-Moselle, Sarthe, and Hérault. She examines associations that sprang up after the war, beginning with efforts to organize burial and monuments for the fallen, to pay off the indemnity, and to aid widows, orphans, and Alsatians moving to France. These beginnings gave way in the 1880s, Chrastil argues, to commemorative events. A particularly interesting case study concerns the frontier village of Mars-le-Tour (Meurthe-et-Moselle), where “a brief prayer service” commemorating battles there became in the 1880s a “day long ritualized event” (p. 81), a national “patriotic festivity” (p. 110) that the state apparently supported. Abbé Faller, who was responsible for this development, cooperated with the state even during the separation (pp. 84–85), and was granted the Legion of Honor (p. 107).

Commemoration led in turn, Chrastil suggests, to active preparation for the next war. She presents a case study of the *Souvenir français*, founded in 1887 “to preserve the tombs of French soldiers, transmit their memory . . . and promote a glorious France” (p. 100). By the twentieth century, this Catholic if not reactionary organization (Chrastil wavers on this) played a significant role, at least in the Meurthe-et-Moselle (pp. 100–105), again with the apparent tolerance of the state. From here Chrastil shifts to associations less directly related to the Franco-Prussian War: the various gymnastic and shooting societies, the *Fête Fédérale Française*, and the Red Cross (whose growth, if not origins, resulted from the war).

Chrastil offers many suggestions for our understanding of this period. Her close analysis of war-related organizations is often valuable and insightful. She makes a significant contribution to the study of early Third Republic associative life pioneered by Carol Harrison, Philip Nord, and others, confirming that Third Republic civil society was richer than often thought (pp. 69, 100–101), certainly more than Alexis de Tocqueville’s dire predictions would suggest (pp. 7–11). Chrastil notes suggestively that “civil society was more concerned with shaping the state’s action . . . than with securing freedom from the state” (p. 154), opening at least the possibility that the Third Republic’s anticlericalism was less ferocious (or perhaps more focused on the admittedly numerous reactionary elements of the Roman Catholic Church) than often portrayed. Abbé Faller is only the most striking example of cooperation between church and state.

Some of these ideas could be developed further. Others require more evidence. “The link between the Franco-Prussian War and the Great War is not *revanche*. It is that the first war fostered the belief that the citizens of a nation could and should prepare for a future conflict” (p. 156). Chrastil rightly deplores mind-

less deployment of *revanche* to explain the lead-up to the Great War (p. 162, n. 24), but she throws the baby out with the bathwater. She overemphasizes the monarchist argument that “the GDN continued a fruitless, destructive war” and thus concludes that republican patriotism was unpopular (p. 39; cf. pp. 26, 43). Rural voters in the 1870s, to be sure, feared the resumption of war, but they still shared the widespread desire to regain the “lost provinces”; *revanche* was only the tip of the patriotic iceberg. Chrastil does mention that General Chanzy was popular because he had “saved the honor of France” (p. 95) but overlooks the significance of his popularity as she overlooks that of Gambetta, which derived from the same cause.

Chrastil navigates skilfully between politics and associative life at the regional level, but less effectively at the national level. Paul Déroulède, she notes, refused to attend the inauguration of the Chanzy monument at Le Mans because “he had not been invited to speak” (p. 97), but she fails to explain further. The monument was inaugurated in 1885, just as the split between republican and authoritarian nationalists in the Ligue des Patriotes was becoming public. We need to know how events like the inauguration played out in relation to national struggles.

Chrastil concludes that “these organizations fostered the ‘self-persuasion’ that played a key role in the cultural mobilization of France” during World War I, that “civil society’s claim to shape the nation’s preparation for war sustained France’s ability to hold on” (p. 157) and “helped the French consent to and prolong” the war. France would have been better off to “renounce war” (pp. 157–158). Her study is, understandably, limited to three departments and to organizations that originated in response to the Franco-Prussian War; it excludes political groups and organizations that existed before that war. Her broad conclusions, however, require a study of civil society as a whole. She herself suggests that civil society includes “charitable, political, and religious organizations” (p. 7). Would it not therefore include the Ligue des Patriotes, the Roman Catholic Church, the Masonic Lodges, and even the many republican local committees?

That said, Chrastil has given us a rich and insightful work, particularly in its emphasis on the extent of Third Republic associative life before the 1901 Law on Associations. Let us hope that she will turn to a broader canvas with the same flair for research and the same lucid insight she brought to this valuable study.

CHARLES SOWERWINE
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NICOLAS MARIOT and CLAIRE ZALC. *Face à la persécution: 991 Juifs dans la guerre*. Paris: Odile Jacob. 2010. Pp. 302. €23.90.

We learn that the “991 Jews in the war” of the book’s subtitle formed an immigrant community in Lens, a small mining town in the Pas de Calais that, during

World War II, was in the “Forbidden Zone” of northern France, an area administered by the Germans from headquarters in Belgium. The fact that almost half of the Jews from Lens perished in the Holocaust (versus twenty-five percent for France as a whole) reflects in part this unique occupation status with persecution coming from three different power centers: Paris, Vichy, and Brussels.

Nicolas Mariot and Claire Zalc trace the experiences of the 991, many of whom had been driven to seek refuge from a rising tide of antisemitism in Poland and elsewhere in central Europe, and had arrived in France in the late 1920s or the 1930s. Different itineraries brought them to Lens, but the fact that more than two-thirds of the immigrants came from Poland and most spoke Polish in addition to Yiddish meant that an earlier massive immigration of Catholic Poles to the mining fields of northern France provided a natural environment for these immigrant Jews. Already familiar with the Polish miners’ favorite clothing and other products, the newcomers used their language facility in selling textiles and other consumer goods in the mining communities that surrounded Lens. When World War II began, a significant number of the Jewish immigrants volunteered for service in the French army, and, joining the general exodus from northern France at the time of the German invasion of May 1940, between twenty-one and forty-four percent of the Jews of Lens left the area forever, many of them establishing residence in southern France. This did not lead to permanent safety for all of them, as some would be trapped in later roundups and deportations, but the chances of survival were much greater for those who made it to the original Vichy zone.

The Jews who stayed in or returned to Lens were soon confronted with an ever-growing list of discriminatory measures. Mariot and Zalc do an excellent job of describing the process the authorities used to identify, isolate, reduce to misery, and ultimately arrest and send to their deaths at Auschwitz-Birkenau half of the Jews who were living in Lens before the German invasion. Their general conclusions are compatible with most of the best writing on these issues, but their presentation is original in several respects that help the reader to understand in precise detail the impact of the Holocaust. For example, detailed lists of all of the carrots, beets, potatoes, and leeks taken from the gardens of Jews who had been arrested and deported, and lists of all of the goods taken from their apartments, starkly demonstrate the extent to which persecution had reduced most of Lens’s Jews to destitution. The authors’ intent is to explain how the social circumstances of the 991 Jews of Lens weighed on the individual choices they made in response to persecution. They demonstrate that those with larger families were less likely to leave Lens to seek safety in the south of France or in Switzerland. The wealthy and those with family connections elsewhere were more likely to survive than those with fewer resources.

The authors demonstrate clearly that all of the an-

tisemitic measures were enforced vigorously by the authorities at Lens. Leading police officials were aggressive and thorough in carrying out censuses of the Jewish population, enforcing economic and financial discrimination, imposing the yellow star, and rounding up and arresting Jews for deportation. Moreover, there was virtually no evidence of Jews finding sympathy or support from the non-Jewish population of Lens, possibly because they were seen as foreigners and economic rivals. The book's final two sections are particularly noteworthy in describing what happened to Lens Jews from their arrival at Auschwitz until their deaths there, and the experiences of those of the 991 who were lucky enough to survive and attempt to resume their lives in Lens after the war. As we were reminded some years ago by Michel Deville's poignant film, *Almost Peaceful* (2002), the Jews of Lens found that the French Provisional Government's pronouncing all Vichy antisemitic legislation null and void did not mean that everything would return to normal. Some found it difficult to have their property returned, or, in applying for naturalization, found their path delayed by the same French police officials who had arrested and deported them. Mariot and Zalc have written a fine book that makes an important contribution to the growing literature on the Holocaust in France.

JOHN F. SWEETS
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CRAIG D. ATWOOD. *The Theology of the Czech Brethren from Hus to Comenius*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 2009. Pp. xix, 457. \$80.00.

Craig D. Atwood's substantial study defines itself as both a work of historical theology and a cultural history. It is also in part the social history of a community that sought peace as well as justice in times of passionate partisan religious feeling, warfare, and persecution. Part one begins by describing the "Czech Reformation," with an emphasis on its late medieval roots and the respects in which it was distinctive rather than simply an early manifestation of the Reformation of the sixteenth century. Part two is concerned with the early history of the Brethren themselves, while part three focuses on "the Brethren among the Protestants": the history of the Brethren during the wider European Reformation and their later development.

Who were the Brethren or Moravians? They were believers who settled at the Anabaptist end of the reforming spectrum. They had a complicated heritage. They emphasized community in their Latin name: *unitas fratrum*. They had common cause and shared ideals with some of the lay brotherhoods and sisterhoods that emerged around the year 1200, such as the Beghards and Beguines. But because they were heirs of Hussite controversies about the ministry and communion in both kinds, they had their own focus. Some of them warmed to the idea of the *perfecti* that had come down from Manichaeism to the Cathars and Bogomils. They were also heirs of the popular preachers of the later

Middle Ages and the older Waldensian tradition. They were focused on Scripture, but did not go so far as Martin Luther's cry of *sola scriptura*. They tended to hold strong views on such matters as avoiding oaths. They sympathized with millennial ideas. Their prophetic preachers warned that the age of the Antichrist was coming to an end, the end of the world was at hand, and it was urgent to reform in preparation to meet the returning Christ. Mount Tabor, where some said the Transfiguration of Christ took place, became both a holy place and a fortress for the Brethren. They were characterized by a strong strand of asceticism and a conception of the apostolic life that called believers to live as Jesus taught his apostles to do, simply and without possessions, trusting in the hospitality of the people they encountered on their travels.

What held this hotchpotch together as a movement? Atwood suggests that it was partly the experience of communal living that held the Brethren together. They might have said that "love," in the communal sense that they used the term, bound them together. But it was also in part the consequence of the influence of notable individuals such as Petr Chelčický and Luke of Prague. Although they stressed unity, the Brethren proved as fissiparous as reforming and dissident movements commonly did.

With the coming of the Reformation the Brethren ceased to be quite so definitively Czech and encountered Lutherans, Calvinists, and a new intellectual humanist style. The movement maintained a good deal of its vigor into the seventeenth century, but in places it ended with the Thirty Years' War. The last bishop of the Moravians, and perhaps the outstanding figure of the movement, was John Amos Comenius. His pansophy and his work as an educator and theologian were influential far beyond his Brethren community, as many of his ideas were disseminated throughout Europe.

Atwood's important study contributes a great deal to our understanding of the complex Brethren community. It helps to disentangle the important elements of transmission across the line that notionally divides the medieval from the Reformation era. It characterizes the thought of what was in many respects a non-intellectual movement, giving the influence of Marsilius of Padua its proper place. The Brethren were in the vanguard of the discussion of the difference between essentials and adiaphora. Though they had a Taborite confession, the Brethren were in a sense non-confessional, even arguably ecumenical in their approach to the Christian life. And it was the Christian life that mattered to them, with orthopraxis as well as orthodox faith important. All this is set out in Atwood's balanced, readable, and scholarly treatment.

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HOWARD LOUTHAN. *Converting Bohemia: Force and Persuasion in the Catholic Reformation*. (New Studies in European History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2009. Pp. xiii, 351. \$120.00.

Bohemia is a fascinating region for historians of early modern Europe. It was the scene of great historical drama: the Hussite Revolution in the fifteenth century, the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, and the Habsburg suppression of Bohemian liberties in the seventeenth century. Most of us, however, have to rely on scholarship written in Western European languages, given the lamentable fact that Czech is not one of the working languages in most scholars' toolkit. The publication of Howard Louthan's book, therefore, will be greeted with enthusiasm by scholars in the field, as it represents a cogently argued and well-documented synthesis of the Catholic Reformation in Bohemia after the Battle of White Mountain, a work that is based on a good command of archival and published sources in Czech, and the scholarship of the Counter-Reformation in the relevant languages. This is a revisionist work. Louthan argues against the grain of Czech nationalist scholarship, formulated in the nineteenth century and still influential today, and its thesis of Habsburg-German suppression of Czech liberties after the triumph of Emperor Ferdinand II. In this nationalist interpretation, Jan Hus, the Utraquists, and the Protestant Reformation represented the spirit of the Czech nation, while the Habsburg dynasty, Catholic arms, and the Jesuits embodied the alien repressive forces that turned back the progress of history. While admitting the importance of coercion in the seventeenth-century restoration of Catholicism—the alienation of Protestant noblemen's property, threat of quartering troops, and dismissal of Protestant councilors—Louthan reminds the reader that persuasion played an equally if not more important role in the long run. Whereas some ninety percent of the Bohemian population professed one of the Protestant creeds on the eve of the Thirty Years' War, Bohemia became solidly Catholic by the mid-eighteenth century, unlike other regions in Central Europe, such as Salzburg, where sizeable pockets of clandestine Protestants continued to exist. If scholars ignore the splendors of Catholic culture in the Baroque, Louthan argues, they will miss a vital element in the history of Bohemia between White Mountain and the Patent of Toleration promulgated by Emperor Joseph II.

Framed by an introduction and a conclusion, this book is divided into nine chapters. Louthan is less interested in telling a political narrative of Habsburg rule than in describing, with rich illustrative material, the cultural richness of the Catholic revival. After analyzing the Catholic identity of the ruling Habsburg dynasty and the conversion of the Bohemian nobility to Catholicism, a process accelerated by a highly effective carrot-and-stick policy, Louthan turns his attention to agents of the Counter-Reformation, the Catholic clergy, and in particular the Society of Jesus. He devotes considerable attention to Baroque historical scholarship, which constructed a bridge from the Baroque back to an antique, Catholic past, thus offering an alternative Bohemian identity to the displaced Protestant one. He is skillful in choosing and analyzing visual and architectural examples to demonstrate the cultural persua-

sion provided by a resurgent Catholicism. He examines at length, in chapters six through eight, the manifestations of Catholicism: confraternities, rural religion, sermons, songs, Catholic tracts, pilgrimage, and popular piety. Much of the popular literature, Louthan points out, was written in Czech, thus challenging older scholarship that held that the Habsburgs almost completely suppressed the Czech language. The last chapter offers interesting insights in its comparison of the making of Christian saints and Jewish martyrs.

Louthan's book refocuses the scholarly debate on early modern Czech history in the direction of the larger Catholic world of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while paying close attention to Czech sources and local circumstances. It is this combination of the particular and the general, the attention to details alongside a wider perspective, that makes the work an important read for all historians of early modern Europe.

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JESSE SPOHNHOLZ. *The Tactics of Toleration: A Refugee Community in the Age of Religious Wars*. Newark: University of Delaware Press, with Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group, Lanham, Md. 2011. Pp. 334. \$80.00.

This book is a very welcome addition to the growing literature on the existence of religious pluralism or of practical toleration in an age generally noted for violence and religious extremism. By focusing on the largely Dutch Calvinist refugee community in the northwestern German town of Wesel in the Duchy of Cleves, Jesse Spohnholz outlines significant qualifications not only to our understanding of religious pluralism in the post-Reformation era, but also of the nature of confessionalism itself. The author has purposely chosen a difficult case to make his argument: if a foreign Calvinist refugee community could live more or less peacefully in a Lutheran town subject to a Roman Catholic duke, clearly our standard view of religious intolerance in the age of religious wars requires some serious rethinking.

Indeed, it was not only the large Calvinist contingent (at one point they made up half of the town's population) that found toleration, but also smaller communities of Mennonites and Roman Catholics. The toleration that emerged in Wesel was the lesser of evils and was made up not of grand pronouncements of high ideals, but rather of the cumulative impact of thousands of individual decisions on an everyday basis over a period of years. In all of this the attitude and policies of the civic government were crucial. After an earlier attempt to enforce Lutheran confessional unity on the refugees had produced substantial tension, the city council adopted a more flexible stance. Indeed, this may be the most unusual feature of Wesel's experience: in most places, once religious tension and conflict had set in, it tended to intensify rather than abate. The city fathers were no doubt nudged toward this flexibility by the ir-

regular nature of their own reformation. As a territorial city subject to the Roman Catholic Duke of Cleves, they were explicitly denied the religious freedom granted to imperial cities in the Peace of Augsburg. Nevertheless, this was in reality a Lutheran town, and preserving their reformation made them extraordinarily sensitive to any commotion that might attract outside attention.

Weselers, magistrates and residents alike, engaged in a series of very delicate balancing acts: how to maintain "peace and good order" (the phrase recurs again and again) in a community where large numbers of people disagreed on some of the most fundamental questions of the day? How to maintain the ideal of the sacral community, on which "peace and good order" rested, through worship and the Eucharist when Calvinist refugees in theory took great exception to Lutheran liturgical practices and the real presence of Christ in the bread and the wine? On a more practical level, how to accommodate a substantial body of foreigners without causing undue resentment among natives?

These difficulties were handled in a variety of ways, some deliberate, others serendipitous. A technically illegal yet openly tolerated consistory supervised the morals of the refugees. In addition, the Calvinist community established its own parallel institutions for education and charity thereby mitigating any potential resentment that they were a drain on the city's resources. The city's two churches frequently offered a variety of liturgical and sacramental practices. Most of all, the majority of residents seemed content to live with half a loaf, given the difficulties of attaining purity of doctrine and practice. In short, there was just enough flexibility to allow people to display a confessional allegiance, and just enough uniformity to maintain the desired ideal of the sacral community. Indeed, this flexibility and uniformity existed in a precarious yet essential symbiosis: "individuals resolved the tension between their town community and their conscience, between religious unity and confessional identity, by maintaining confessionally-oriented practices in certain areas, while abandoning them in others" (p. 218).

This finely textured book reminds us once again that in the sixteenth century, confessional categories were largely the devices of clergymen and governments, who have bequeathed them to historians. In reality, their boundaries were much more permeable than often supposed, and people were freer than we sometimes think to pick and choose and to assemble their own version of Christianity. Beneath confessional strictures, Spohnholz discerns a common Christian piety that allowed people who thought differently about some very important things not only to live and work side by side, but to worship together as well. Given the complexity of the research and the nature of the sources, it would perhaps be unfair to expect this book to address more explicitly the nature of this supraconfessional Christianity, but that is indeed the next frontier in understanding the

religious lives of laypeople in post-Reformation Europe.

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MICHAEL LAURENCE MILLER. *Rabbis and Revolution: The Jews of Moravia in the Age of Emancipation*. (Stanford Studies in Jewish History and Culture.) Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2011. Pp. xv, 464. \$60.00.

Unlike neighboring Bohemia, Moravia remains a minimally researched Habsburg crownland whose Jewish population has been almost completely ignored until recently. Michael Laurence Miller helps to rescue Moravian Jewry from virtual oblivion with this outstanding analytical study of Moravian Jewish communities in the nineteenth century, thereby situating the region within the historical context of other Central European Jewish communities of that era.

Miller's carefully researched, well-organized, and lucidly written monograph traces the religious, socioeconomic, and political history of the fifty-two small-town Jewish communities in Moravia from the Familiants Laws of 1726–1727, which limited Jewish marriage in the region, through the revolutionary era of 1848 and the emancipation of Habsburg Jewry in 1867, to the early years of the twentieth century. The author painstakingly explains the negative impact of marriage restrictions, residential segregation, and economic barriers on the growth of the Jewish population within this territory. As a result, Moravia, which had no large urban center comparable to Prague, Vienna, or Budapest, exported many of its native sons and daughters first to Hungary and later to Vienna. After emancipation, many of the small-town communities went into decline and could no longer support their own synagogues, schools, ritual baths, or religious functionaries, while new communities without a religious infrastructure began to develop in royal cities that had previously been off limits to Jews. Moravia thus became a region better known for those Jews who left, like Sigmund Freud, Stefan Zweig, and Robert Stricker, than for those who remained behind.

By detailing the lives and careers of leading Moravian rabbis, including the chief rabbis who resided in Nikolsburg (Mikulov), Miller brings to life both the internal and the external struggles facing the province's religious leadership. Conflicts among the rabbis of Nikolsburg and Prossnitz (Prostějov), the two largest communities, and the religious leaders of smaller communities reflect the tensions between traditional (or more Orthodox) scholars and their more modern Reform-oriented counterparts. Competition for appointment to the position of chief rabbi was fierce, and disputes raged over defining his sphere of authority. The author focuses on three major nineteenth-century religious figures: Mordecai Benet, who was strongly influenced by the German Haskalah (or Jewish Enlightenment); Nehemias Trebitsch, a traditionalist who opposed secular education and the use of German; and Samson Raphael

Hirsch, who was later to become the founder of Neo-Orthodoxy in Germany. Hirsch, who served as chief rabbi during the fateful 1848 Revolution, strove unsuccessfully to unify Moravian Jewry and achieve emancipation for Jews as individuals without sacrificing traditional Jewish practices within strong autonomous communities.

Miller admirably achieves the ambitious goals that he sets out in his introduction. Instead of writing a local Jewish communal history, he takes “a comparative approach to Moravian Jewry, examining its distinctiveness in an effort to shed light on a range of religious, ideological, and socioeconomic challenges that transformed Central European Jewry” (p. 8). Adopting the felicitous rubric of “geographical Judaism,” he explains why Moravian Jews tended to follow a middle-of-the-road path, more traditional than Bohemian or German Jewry but more liberal than most Galician or Hungarian Jews. Located between East and West, Slovakia and Bohemia, Moravian Jewry proved that throughout the nineteenth century there could still be communities where traditional *yeshivot* and modern German-Jewish schools could coexist. While their Bohemian counterparts chose to identify as either Czechs or Germans, both politically and linguistically, Moravian Jews, although they continued to speak German and retained local German-Jewish schools, often asserted a Jewish nationalist (or Zionist) identity.

This book greatly enhances our understanding of how Jewish communities, especially those in smaller towns or cities, operated not only in Central Europe but elsewhere in Europe and the Western world both before and after emancipation. By combining a regional and comparative approach, Miller demonstrates how Jews and their communities are shaped by their environments, their neighbors, and the legal systems within which they function. Each local community is distinctive in certain respects, but all confront common issues, including maintaining communal institutions, hiring rabbis, dealing with residential mobility and migration, and raising funds to cover communal needs, as well as responding to antisemitism and representing members and their grievances before governing bodies. By analyzing the evolution of Moravian Jewry and its nineteenth-century rabbinical leadership so persuasively, Miller helps us comprehend the stresses and strains that Jews in small-town communities have experienced as they responded to modernity.

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CORDULA GREWE. *Painting the Sacred in the Age of Romanticism*. (Histories of Vision.) Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2009. Pp. xvii, 418. \$99.95.

In 1809 six young German painters, led by Johann Friedrich Overbeck and Franz Pferr, banded together in Vienna to swear their allegiance to each other and to their belief in art's divine mission. The *Lukasbrüder*

(Brotherhood of St. Luke) soon attracted, among others, Peter von Cornelius, Friedrich Wilhelm Schadow, and Philipp Veit. Moving to Rome, they lived and worked collectively in a monastery. The locals dubbed these long-haired, earnest, and mystical Germans *I Nazareni* (The Nazarenes). By 1820 most had returned to Germany to assume academic positions, though Overbeck remained in Rome until 1869, where his studio became a popular pilgrimage site.

The Nazarenes' proselytizing Christian work swam against the stream of nineteenth-century painting's progression toward secularism, aestheticism, and art-for-art's sake that formed the basis of twentieth-century modernist abstraction. Or did it? This is a central question posed by Cordula Grewe's deeply researched, richly nuanced, and readable re-evaluation of the course and the content of Nazarene art and its relation to its context and to what was to come. She argues that Nazarene art developed innovative aesthetic strategies and represents an important and too little recognized strand within the faith-based roots of nineteenth and twentieth-century modernism. Like the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, the *Lukasbrüder* set a precedent for the French *Nabis* (Prophets) and other Symbolists. While the Nazarenes eschewed abstraction, Grewe argues convincingly that they shared the modern commitment to art itself as a sacred calling, often casting themselves in the role of observer in the sacred scenes they portrayed. Grewe argues against the modernism-equals-secularization thesis, as do David Morgan (*The Sacred Gaze: Religious Visual Culture in Theory and Practice* [2005]) and Sally M. Promey (*Painting Religion in Public: John Singer Sargent's "Triumph of Religion" at the Boston Public Library* [1999]), as well as scholars such as Ziva Amishai-Maisels, Matthew Baigell, and Samantha Baskind, who explore the persistent presence of Jewish belief and culture in twentieth-century art.

Grewe claims that the Nazarenes developed a theory and practice of the image as legible, sacred script—a semiotic approach—that was modern and forward-looking even as it looked back to the Bible for subject matter, and to the Renaissance for pictorial and iconographic inspiration. According to Grewe, the Nazarenes rejected the humanist theory of *ut pictura poesis* in favor of *ut hieroglyphica pictura*, understanding the hieroglyph as a form of sacred image-writing that provided an alternative to neo-classical expressive gestures and narrative clarity. In their early years they constructed complex “indirect narratives,” word and image rebuses that Grewe brilliantly decodes in a chronologically ordered series of extended, complex, and lynx-eyed readings of key works such as Pferr's programmatic *Sulamith and Maria* (chapter two), in which multiple identifications—the typological (Old to New Testament), personal (Pferr and Overbeck), national (Italy and Germany), and semiological (word and image)—are layered into a complex web of intersecting and inherently multiple meanings. In response to growing social and political factors, such as the revolts of 1848 and the long and reactionary papacy of Pius IX,

Nazarene images became more clearly legible and polemical. For Grewe, this later, less “polysemic,” Nazarenism has clouded perceptions of the group’s contribution to a “modern” way of constructing and viewing symbolic images.

The Nazarenes’ “vexed place in the history of nineteenth-century art” (p. 320) encompasses derogatory depictions of Jews in several of their works. Veit’s lithographic *Caricature against the Emancipation of the Jews* of 1848 (figure 6.15) features hook and snout-nosed “Jews” sniffing a roast pig—implying that the primary motivation behind *haskalah* was relaxation of kosher proscriptions. Vexed indeed: Veit was the son of Brendel (Dorothea) Mendelssohn, daughter of Moses Mendelssohn. After divorcing Simon Veit and marrying writer Karl Wilhelm Friedrich von Schlegel, Dorothea converted first to Lutheranism and then to Catholicism, which Philipp, born Feibisch, fervently embraced. For Grewe, the acceptance of Veit into the Brotherhood is evidence that it was not antisemitic in the modern, racist sense but anti-Judaic, considering Jewishness a condition, like Lutheranism, that could be “cured” through the conversion to which their art was dedicated.

The author focuses in each of six chapters on one or two paradigmatic works related to a common theme. Some consist of multiple images in a variety of media, such as Overbeck’s *The Seven Sacraments* (chapter four) and Julius Schnorr von Carolsfeld’s wildly successful *The Bible in Pictures* (chapter five), a series of prints that achieved mass circulation in Germany and internationally through up-to-date means of promotion and promulgation. The great achievement of Grewe’s groundbreaking study is to reread Nazarene art in relationship to rather than distinction from modernization and modernism, revealing with verve its complex individual images and overall narrative arc, replete with modernity’s vexing tensions and confounding contradictions.

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JOE PERRY. *Christmas in Germany: A Cultural History*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2010. Pp. xiii, 399. \$49.95.

“In 1815,” Joe Perry reports in his splendid account of Christmas’s German career, “Caroline von Humboldt, wife of Wilhelm von Humboldt, the enlightened educator, philosopher, and Prussian diplomat, set up Christmas trees in her parlor on Unter den Linden” (p. 13). Caroline wrote a delightful account of the family’s joyful Christmas celebration to the absent Wilhelm. One might assume that Caroline was recounting a timeless, or at least ancient, enormously popular, and emotionally charged family festival. In fact, she was recording a profound moment of dramatic cultural change. Christmas in Germany is actually a very new arrival, and it is thick with multiple and contradictory messages. Perry’s book is not an accumulation of folkloric curi-

osities. It is, instead, a careful investigation from below of nineteenth and twentieth-century cultural history, using Christmas as a portal to an array of densely entangled and often bitterly contested cultural issues. As Perry remarks, “German Christmas remains overdetermined, laden just below the surface with the violent ruptures and radical political experimentations of Germany’s ‘shattered’ twentieth century” (p. 287).

Between an introduction and conclusion, Perry structures his investigation into six chapters. The first, “Scripting a National Holiday,” describes the invention of Christmas in Germany in the early nineteenth century; the second, “Contradictions in the Christmas Mood,” recounts some of the arguments that swirled around this new holiday. Perry reports that “between 1910 and 1950, Germans celebrated one out of every five Christmases while the nation was a war” (p. 95), and his third chapter outlines the peculiar experience of “Christmas in Enemy Territory,” especially during World War I. Christmas hedonism is no recent phenomenon; Perry’s fourth chapter, “Under the Sign of ‘Kauf lust,’” considers the “lust-to-buy” that quickly marked the Christmas holidays and expanded rapidly during the Weimar Republic. In chapter five, “Christmas in the Third Reich,” Perry examines the Nazis’ effort to capture Christmas. Finally, in chapter six, “Ghosts of Christmas Past,” Perry discusses the efforts of West and East German cold warriors to shape ideologically correct Christmas celebrations.

This study grows from and contributes to a rich historical literature. Perry’s focus on Christmas permits him to explore the invention of tradition, the evolution of the bourgeois family, the sentimentalization of bourgeois sensibility, the feminization of family life and religion, the displacement of the sacred by the secular, the commercialization of desire, the rapid expansion of consumer culture, the militarization of daily life, and the colonization of popular culture by competing ideologies. He skillfully deploys a diverse set of sources, ranging from Friedrich Schleiermacher’s theology to E. T. A. Hoffmann’s fables to popular magazines, private letters, and diaries.

Especially striking is the “performative” turn Perry gives to cultural history. What matters to Perry is what people actually *do* in the process of cultural construction and expression. He notes that “Christmas is a surprisingly open construct, used by Germans to support competing articulations of Volk and fatherland” (p. 284). *Christmas in Germany* demonstrates that this hugely popular holiday is actually quite young, and carefully traces its often contested genealogy. Seemingly trivial controversies—should people celebrate with a Christmas tree or a Christmas crèche?—reveal deeply rooted antagonisms between Protestant Prussians (who favored the tree) and Catholic southern Germans (who favored the crèche). Perry’s skillful use of Chaplain Jakob Ebner’s World War I diary shows how the celebration of the birth of the Prince of Peace was used to buttress a “war theology.” Nazis, communists, and cold warriors all struggled to shape the emo-

tion-laden holiday. Nazis tried to turn Christmas into a "Germanic" folk festival; East German communists would later turn it into an atheist "*Jolkafest*," modeled after a similar festival celebrated in the Soviet Union; West Germans carefully tied the holiday to West Germany's economic and political rehabilitation. Even those Germans uninterested in Christmas, Jews and Social Democrats for example, were nevertheless shaped by Christmas's customs and controversies. Social Democrats tried to create a "proletarian Christmas," partly by rewriting Christmas carols. While Orthodox Jews eschewed the holiday entirely, Reform Jews either celebrated Christmas as a national, not Christian, holiday, or expanded Hanukkah as a substitute (and during World War I, Jewish Germans developed their own Hanukkah-related "war theology" that paralleled the Christmas-related "war theology").

This book will be of immediate interest to German scholars. As an example of an unusually insightful, inventive, and rigorous cultural history, it deserves a wider audience. Compellingly written, jargon-free, and thoroughly researched—Perry notes that in 1996 he was one of 500 Father Christmases organized by Berlin's Technical University—*Christmas in Germany* is a fascinating contribution to modern German and contemporary cultural history.

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SEBASTIAN CONRAD. *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany*. Translated by SORCHA O'HAGAN. (New Studies in European History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. vii, 497. Cloth \$90.00, paper \$36.99.

First published in German in 2006, this study was well received by German scholars interested in the burgeoning field of transnational history. It did, however, meet with some measured skepticism from historians who were not sure that the new transnational approach to history adequately replaced the prevailing national paradigm. Such criticisms are misguided, given that this is not what Sebastian Conrad has set out to do, as the book's title clearly suggests. Transnational history does not seek to dissolve the history of the nation but rather to contextualize it more broadly so as to pose and answer a new set of research questions that are quite often still related to the histories of nationalist projects and the nations they engender. As Conrad reminds us, "using the perspective of global history . . . does not imply abandoning the category of the nation completely for analysing modern history" (p. 402).

Conrad's monograph is an excellent example of how transnational history might be written. Without sacrificing any of the requisite understanding of the finer grain of German history, he illustrates precisely how Wilhelmine Germany was enmeshed in the series of international exchanges of commodities, ideas, and populations that characterized globalization prior to World War I. This global engagement, both in concert and in

competition with other large powers, affected not only German foreign policy but also crucial domestic decisions regarding protectionism, population mobility, and the definition of the citizen. Conrad argues that German traders, politicians, and commentators constructed a German nationalism from materials largely drawn from their interactions with the extra-European world, from attempts to transplant German work discipline to East Africa, Brazil, and Poland to anxieties (shared with North America and Australia) about the ostensible "yellow peril" posed by the mobility and wage-competitiveness of Chinese workers.

Conrad focuses on work and on the nationalist assertion that there were particularly German forms of labor that needed to be both supported at home and exported around the globe, and this leads him to some key insights. Although German nationalists were not the only nationalists to proclaim that their people had a distinctive and superior mode of work, the assertion enabled social engineers within Germany to posit concrete links between their attempts to discipline the German lower orders and their attempts to reshape the conditions of existence of the populations inhabiting colonial spaces. Whether the recalibration of labor relations within Germany was actually the same as the epistemic and physical violence practiced in the colonies is not Conrad's research question. Rather, he argues, the fact that the two were perceived as twin parts of a broader process by those undertaking domestic and colonial reforms suggests something important regarding the translocation of European social and economic struggles to colonial spaces.

His understanding of how broader global trends shaped and formed German colonial ambitions and projects is similarly important. Indeed, the book illustrates exactly how much the history of globalization and new imperial histories have in common, both in terms of approach and research preoccupations. Yet globalization and imperialism are not precise synonyms, and the book often reads better as a contribution to the history of imperialism than the history of globalization. For example, while the Germanization of Prussia's Polish territories might be read profitably as having occurred within a colonial space (as Kristin Kopp has argued), the struggle along this inner frontier might not be integral to the history of globalization, except in the weak sense that it took place "in a world deeply structured—albeit unevenly—by imperialism" (p. 184).

One other question worth entertaining is whether the process of delineating the nation through external trade and imperial agitation and action in the 1890s (and thereafter) might not be antedated. Recently, for example, Bradley Naranch has posited that German nationalism was at least partially "made in China" prior to 1871, while Hans Fenske wrote twenty years ago of Germans beginning to engage in globalizing imperial endeavors as early as 1814. Certainly the efforts at colonizing Brazil that Conrad discusses were well underway by 1850. It seems uncontroversial to say that the emergence of a "global consciousness," which Conrad

dates to around 1900, actually emerged far earlier (p. 2). Some have even argued (although this reviewer is not among their number) that the turn to protectionism prior to 1900 demonstrated that the zenith of prewar globalization had been reached far earlier and that by the turn of the century there was a gradual retreat from globalization.

Yet, in offering a detailed picture of Germany's globalizing and imperial endeavors during the Wilhelmine era, as well as of the domestic stresses and possibilities they produced, Conrad's work is invaluable. It brings together numerous strands of both national and transnational historiography to offer a cogent and compelling narrative of Germans' attempts to consolidate the position and identity of their nation-state in an era of globalization.

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TROY R. E. PADDOCK. *Creating the Russian Peril: Education, the Public Sphere, and National Identity in Imperial Germany, 1890–1914*. Rochester, N.Y.: Camden House. 2010. Pp. x, 263. \$75.00.

Given the violent clashes with Russia that rocked twentieth-century Germany, one might expect that Germans were obsessed with the eastern behemoth before World War I. In fact, as Troy R. E. Paddock argues, Germans knew and cared little about their Russian neighbor until 1905. They took a little more interest following the revolution in that year and grew somewhat concerned with the rise of pan-Slavism and the outbreak of the Balkan Wars after 1911. But very few Germans saw Russia as a real threat until March 1914. Furthermore, the little knowledge in Germany about Russia stemmed from a handful of self-professed "experts." Few of these historians and journalists had ever visited Russia, and their knowledge of Russian politics and society was superficial at best. They accordingly spread a fuzzy set of negative stereotypes that reflected their own right-wing views about German superiority. Paddock demonstrates that newspapers and school textbooks relied almost exclusively on such accounts and were remarkably consistent across time and political leanings. Thus, with some exceptions, from 1890 to 1918 almost all Germans read in monographs, magazines, newspapers, and school textbooks that Russians were primitive, corrupt, inflexible, uncultivated, hungry, illiterate, impolite, non-Western, nationally disunited, economically backward, and regularly drunk.

Until the Balkan Wars, such an incapable people was hardly seen as a danger. According to so-called liberal imperialists like Hans Delbrück, Friedrich Meinecke, and Max Lenz, the Russian nation was weakened by its corrupt bureaucracy, undisciplined military, and multiple dissenting ethnic groups—traits that contrasted with Germany's supposed ethnic unity and alleged competence in civil and military matters. Combined with the weak character of its people, these traits meant that only a repressive tsar and autocratic Orthodox Church

could hold the state together. The liberal imperialists thought that Russia could not withstand a major war, a judgment confirmed by its loss to Japan in 1905 and the subsequent implosion of its government during the revolution. The far-right Baltic German émigrés Theodor Schiemann and Paul Rohrbach wrote of a future spiritual and metaphysical conflict between Germandom and Slavdom. But even they believed that, given Germany's moral and cultural superiority, Germandom would prevail. Until 1905 the press emphasized that Russia was a natural ally, not an enemy.

The German press took more interest in Russia after the 1905 Russian revolution. German Social Democrats cheered the temporary end to autocratic rule, but Prussian aristocrats, the kaiser, and their domestic allies feared that the revolution might inspire socialists to topple the monarchy at home as well. Furthermore, the editors of the right-wing *Kreuzzeitung* were distressed by ethnic Russian revolutionaries' attack on the special privileges of the Baltic Germans. Subsequently, the *Kreuzzeitung* regularly wrote that while pan-Slavism posed a threat to Germany, the Russian state, which supported the Baltic Germans and aristocratic privilege, did not. By 1911, all non-socialist newspapers in Germany were following this interpretation.

The book's most important contribution is the ten-page section on the alarm and controversy unleashed by an article in the well-respected *Kölnische Zeitung* in March 1914. The article arguably crystallized "the Russian peril" through its shocking claims: by 1917 Russia would fully recover financially and militarily from its loss to Japan. Furthermore, it had since improved the morale, organization, and equipment of its army enormously. Above all, anti-German sentiments were proliferating in Russia, and Russia was in fact arming itself for war against Germany. Left-liberal and socialist newspapers challenged this incendiary account, and facing anger from Russian diplomats, the German government severed its ties with the *Kölnische Zeitung*. But the article nonetheless convulsed Germany and was to a large extent responsible for stirring up widespread Russophobia. Incredibly, in the historiography on the origins of World War I this story has been all but ignored.

The book's main argument—that the image of Russia created by German historians and journalists was largely a foil for their own concerns about Germany, their reflection in a panoptic mirror—is sharp and illuminating. It is commendable that, rather than writing a purely intellectual history, Paddock traces the transmission of this image from experts to school textbooks and the press. But given that most Germans did not sense any real Russian peril until six months before the outbreak of World War I, let alone care or even know something about Russia at all, reading a full-length monograph on the German image of Russia from 1890 to 1914 will be a task mostly for specialists in diplomatic and intellectual history.

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ANNEMARIE H. SAMMARTINO. *The Impossible Border: Germany and the East, 1914–1922*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2010. Pp. xiv, 232. \$39.95.

This book makes an impressive contribution to the often tangled fields of German and Eastern European history, borderland history, and the history of migration and citizenship. Additionally, it contributes some of the most original and creative work on Weimar Germany to have appeared in a long time. Annemarie H. Sammartino draws mainly on government sources—from the local, state, and national level—as well as on writings from across the political spectrum, to analyze how Germans and the German state treated border issues from 1914 through the mid-1920s. On one level the book offers a cultural analysis of the many changing anxieties and utopian visions that Germans projected onto the idea of Germany's borders. At another level it analyzes the constraints that German governments faced in regulating borders and refugee populations. On a third level, the book examines changing public attitudes toward different groups of migrants, demonstrating effectively that situational factors influenced popular opinion far more than did essentialist beliefs about specific groups.

Germany's wartime advance deep into Russian territory made it possible to imagine a vast new German state that could accommodate ethnic Germans from all over Russia, even if that meant expelling locals to make room for them. When the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (to which Sammartino laudably devotes considerable attention) was undone by Germany's defeat in the West, border questions produced new sets of anxieties along with radical new utopian dreams. The logic of popular national self-determination that legitimated both the victors' new map of Europe and the revisionist protests of the defeated encouraged many Germans to see their borders as fetters that would eventually have to be breached in order to house ethnic Germans who had been unfairly excluded from Germany. At the same time, revolutionary instability, inflation, and poverty provoked fears that Germany's borders could not keep out starving, diseased refugees or subversive carriers of Bolshevism.

The book is most effective in its radical deployment of the very concept of "border" to several unexpected sites in the immediate postwar period. For example, one chapter offers a brilliant analysis of Freikorps conceptions of a moving national frontier in the Baltic. Here, radical nationalists abandoned what they perceived to be a decadent German state in order to establish a purer German national community in Latvia. Another fascinating chapter recounts how in 1920 German communist activists reconceived the border by establishing German workers' settlements in the Soviet Union, east of Moscow. In her examination of former German citizens caught in Poland and ethnic Germans who sought to migrate to Germany after the war, Sammartino expertly analyzes the synergy that developed between a politically moderate government beset

by financial constraint, and radical nationalist demands for aggressive territorial expansion in the near future. Who should be admitted into Germany and on what basis? Should Polish-speaking former German citizens have the same rights as German-speaking former citizens to public assistance if they settled in Germany? Unable to support the potential financial claims that thousands of former citizens might make on the state, successive governments eventually encouraged them to stay in Poland, justifying this policy in nationalist terms as a way to maintain Germany's territorial claims there.

In a chapter on popular attitudes toward different groups that sought asylum in Germany, the author argues that postwar migration politics did not simply produce a hardening of essentialist fears about Russians, Poles, or Jews. Instead, public anxieties about specific groups of migrants developed situationally, often changing as rapidly as did the political situation. Moreover, it was often specific local concerns that determined how controversial citizenship cases were decided, and not the overriding popularity of an ethnic concept of citizenship. Sammartino argues convincingly that the border policing regimes developed by Germany during the early years of the Weimar Republic did not constitute a first step down a slippery slope toward fascism, as Hannah Arendt had argued in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951). While ultimately agreeing with Arendt about how their "rightless" condition shaped the fates of many stateless people, Sammartino nevertheless lays to rest the argument that a concept of ethnic nationhood somehow trumped legality or due process in the 1920s. She also disputes Arendt's claim that because an incapacitated Weimar state turned the problem of stateless refugees over to the police to handle, it moved Germany away from legality and toward totalitarian measures. The Weimar regime typically dealt with refugees, naturalization practices, and border policing by referring to the practices of the Wilhelmine era. Moreover, in those cases where the state did leave the refugee problem to local police to solve, it in no way produced a move toward totalitarianism. To the contrary, local police dealt with refugees based on considerations that differed from place to place. Those who faced deportation in one community often removed themselves to another locality where police were more lenient. Here, as elsewhere in her book, Sammartino emphasizes not simply the central state's lack of resources but also Germany's federal structure, a point too few historians recognize in discussions of Weimar nationalism and border policy. Ultimately she argues that Nazi thinking about citizenship and migration weakened Germany's borders by privileging racial community over state sovereignty. In this sense, her work confirms that Germany's development in the 1920s was hardly exceptional by European standards.

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S. JONATHAN WIESEN. *Creating the Nazi Marketplace: Commerce and Consumption in the Third Reich*. New

York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 277. Cloth \$85.00, paper \$26.99.

At its core, S. Jonathan Wiesen's impressively researched and thoughtful book is about the evolution of modern marketing in Germany, a development that overlapped during the bulk of its formative years with the catastrophic rule of Nazism. The central components of modern, "scientific" marketing were systematic advertising and market research. The book's key chapters thus deal with developments in these areas, and particularly with the rise of experts and projects in market research. This is where the book will be an indispensable resource for scholars of advertising and consumerism.

This focus means that Wiesen is not primarily interested in Nazi economic policy, business collaboration, or even consumption in the Third Reich, but looks at business leaders' thoughts and discussions about modern consumer society, its needs and opportunities, and the most effective and ultimately profitable ways to meet them. This explains the at first sight curious combination of the first three (of four) main chapters, which deal with advertising, the German Rotary Clubs (which endured only until 1937), and consumer research.

It is not surprising that all three groups sought to adapt their views and their language increasingly to Nazi ideas. This was most obvious in their adoption of nationalist, racist, and *völkisch* verbiage. Other fashionable demands at the depth of the Depression, like the call for *Bedarfwirtschaft*, an economic order based on actual human needs rather than profit, had been current since World War I and would once again dominate the post-World War II years. Oddly, it was the Rotarians, animated by the highest respect among businessmen for the ideals of the German *Bildungsbürgertum*, who identified most closely with the Nazi calls for an economy not based on profit but on service. The arguments that were put forth by the club's speakers were logical enough and in all probability noble. Rotarians are traditionally committed to social engagement as expressed in their slogan "service above self," and the club's meetings are to enrich the members intellectually and culturally through lectures and discussion. Yet, given the reality of the brutal setting of Nazi Germany, of which readers are reminded regularly, this brings to mind the disturbing sense of morality in the Third Reich that Claudia Koonz details in *The Nazi Conscience* (2003).

Despite the Nazi condemnation of commercial advertising as wasteful and un-German, the industry flourished and foreign influence increased in the promotion of consumer goods. Typically, the Nazis chose limited control through a central organization, primarily in order to guard the party's monopoly over political propaganda. Wiesen writes that "any attempt to exploit Nazi ideology for marketing purposes would be confronted head-on" (p. 99). Still the giant Henkel and Bayer companies, on whose archives chapter two is primarily based, adapted skillfully to the political environ-

ment, even with their considerable international marketing. Corporate support for public events and causes only had to be translated and funneled into the Strength Through Joy coffers.

The chapters on the Society for Consumer Research (Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung, or GfK) are the most powerful and intriguing. The intellectual origins, debates, and preparations for such an institution go back well before the creation of a "Nazi marketplace" and were influenced by similar initiatives in America. The concept may well go back to French positivists working for Napoleon III. The GfK's founding was quite unrelated to Nazi economic policy. It was established to "serve private economic interests," although it obviously had implications for the "Nazi marketplace" because, in Wiesen's words, "it was also a part of a larger national project to understand the mass public" (p. 163). From its inception, however, the GfK did not share the *völkisch* views of the Nazis, but held to a modern pluralist conception of a mass society of consumers. Not surprisingly, the Nazi secret police mistrusted the GfK interviewers who talked with consumers in shops and markets.

The book's primary focus is not on the second half of the Nazi dictatorship—the years of the war and Holocaust. The last chapter, however, deals with those years, and here Wiesen shows that even the GfK was pressed into conducting surveys for the government and undertaking investigative missions in occupied areas, primarily in the Balkans. He ends with the famous story of Ludwig Erhard—the former GfK director who would later become minister of economics and chancellor in West Germany—who resigned his official position in the GfK because he refused to join the Nazi Party, sharing around his analysis and recommendations for post-war German reconstruction.

DIETHELM PROWE
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STEPHEN D. BOWD. *Venice's Most Loyal City: Civic Identity in Renaissance Brescia*. (I Tatti Studies in Italian Renaissance History.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2010. Pp. xii, 359. \$39.95.

During the course of the fifteenth century, the city of Venice established a vast territorial empire that stretched from its lagoon across much of northern Italy. Venice occupied Brescia, among many other cities, in 1426. Though Brescia was two hundred miles and several days' travel away from Venice itself, it was among the richest, most populous, and most strategically important of Venice's subject cities. Through a variety of lenses and historical episodes, Stephen D. Bowd's study examines how Brescians negotiated issues of authority and identity during the first hundred years of Venetian rule.

In the period when Venice governed Brescia, the Venetian state sent a *podestà*, a *capitano*, and their respective staffs to oversee political life, justice, finance, diplomacy, and defense in the city. These authorities

presided over Brescian council meetings and generally mediated between Venice and Brescia, but Venetian officials were always limited in terms of how much they could interfere in Brescian deliberations. Brescians could easily have clandestine political meetings, and it was important for Venetian rectors to remain above the local fray and local factionalism in order to be politically effective. In this way, Bowd demonstrates how Brescian politics were always marked by a plurality of voices that expressed and negotiated local, territorial, and Venetian concerns. Considering chronicles and panegyrics, Bowd illuminates how Brescians presented themselves as the loyal sons and daughters of Venice while simultaneously maintaining a sense of local pride and independence, as seen for example in humanistic discussions of the ancient origins of the city that predated Venetian rule.

Especially after the mid-fifteenth century, one of the principal ways that the Brescian patriciate asserted its autonomy was by slowly concentrating political power in the hands of the oldest and wealthiest Brescian clans. For instance, the Brescian elite slowly changed the criteria for eligibility for admission to its main legislative body—the Brescian communal council—by restricting admission to those who had served the city during wartime, for instance, and by preventing shopkeepers, merchants, and manual workers from political participation. Beyond the criteria that made one eligible for political participation, including a demonstration of Brescian lineage, residence, and citizenship, membership in the Brescian council was progressively reserved for those who demonstrated a “noble” lifestyle in their public self-presentation: namely, in their increasingly opulent clothing, homes, and artistic commissions. This aristocratization of Brescian politics aroused no opposition from Venetian authorities, and Bowd reads this political contraction as an expression of Brescian autonomy.

Other persistent assertions of Brescian identity existed in rituals, civic space, and religious culture. In a variety of topical chapters on such subjects, Bowd demonstrates how Brescians consistently mediated Venetian demands with their own local needs and desires. The Brescian oligarchy employed images of local saints and martyrs to promote and consolidate their rule. Brescian rulings about sumptuary law and funerary practice served a similar function, employed to mark clearly the privileges of the Brescian elite. Brescians used pomp and excess to defend their aristocratic ideology and identity and maintain a degree of regional autonomy in the shadow of Venice. In addition, an examination of the “other” in early modern Brescia, namely Jews and witches, illuminates both conflict and cooperation between the two cities. For instance, Venetian authorities called into question Brescian trials of witches, objecting to the confiscation of laypeople’s property by Brescian ecclesiastics. Brescians asserted their independence and authority, in short, through the persecution of local witches, and arriving at an acceptable level of toleration in Brescia often involved a com-

plex mix of submitting to Venetian jurisdiction while attempting to assert Brescian priorities.

Bowd sums up by noting that “the strength and continuity of Brescian identity during this first century of Venetian rule is striking” (p. 232). Bowd’s erudite work is faultlessly documented. Any question about his study lays rather in the significance of his findings. It seems in some ways to be expected that regional states forced to submit to foreign rule would naturally seek to balance the directives of the metropole with local initiatives. It is in no way surprising that while Venice ruled Brescia, Brescians clung to a native and local identity and culture to shore up their sense of power and agency. Though Bowd’s sources and lenses of investigation do differ from those of previous studies, his conclusions often echo those of other scholars. Joanne M. Ferraro’s *Family and Public Life in Brescia, 1580–1650: The Foundations of Power in the Venetian State* (1993) similarly describes the aristocratization of Brescian leadership and the ways that leading Brescian families sought to preserve their political autonomy and local culture in relation to the larger, dominant Venetian state. It is as if, in reading Bowd’s book, we learn primarily what we might expect to be true. In the end, this is a text that proves a somewhat modest argument, nevertheless through learned and impeccable scholarship.

ELIZABETH HORODOWICH
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ELENA FASANO GUARINI. *Repubbliche e principi: Istituzioni e pratiche di potere nella Toscana granducale del '500–'600*. (Ricerca.) Bologna: Il Mulino. 2010. Pp. 291. €26.00.

In this valuable collection of six major essays, some published in out-of-the-way volumes and one not previously seen, Elena Fasano Guarini brings together some of her finest writing to date about the transition from republic to principate that occurred in Florentine Tuscany in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Throughout her career as a historian Fasano Guarini has worked hard to find anticipations in earlier decades of developments once believed to be watersheds and to describe continuities where others claimed to have found striking changes. The essays in this volume are no exception. The most important of them, on “Machiavelli and the Crisis of the Italian Republics,” was originally published in English, in a 1990 volume on Niccolò Machiavelli edited by Gisela Bok, Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli. Here it appears in the original Italian. Previous historians had tended to study Machiavelli’s republicanism either with a view to its place in great power diplomacy or by comparing it with the ideals of the classical *polis* and *res publica*. In this essay Fasano Guarini argues for investigating Machiavelli’s political thought in the context of the crisis of the Italian republics of his own day, each of which was placed under enormous stress by the Italian Wars. Critical to her analysis is the relationship between the capital city and its subject territory. Better than most contemporaries

Machiavelli understood the weakness that resulted when a republic refused to allow the inhabitants of its subject cities and towns a role in the larger state that administered them. Even in a republican work like the *Discourses on Livy*, Machiavelli stands out among contemporary republican writers and historians for his perception of the advantages accruing to a large monarchy whose territory comprised many cities governed on comparatively equal footing. As Fasano Guarini restates the argument elsewhere in this volume, it was the development of a positive conception of the extensive state that constituted Machiavelli's "most important breach" (p. 45) with traditional republican ideology.

Whether a sixteenth-century writer understood the territorial state as a coherent entity, existing under a single administration, consisting of inhabitants accustomed to a single set of normative structures, becomes, in the volume's other chapters, the litmus test that Fasano Guarini applies to a series of well-known republican theorists and historians of Florence. There are thus useful, up-to-date pages on the idea of the state as present (or not) in the works of Francesco Guicciardini, Francesco Vettori, Donato Giannotti, Jacopo Nardi, Filippo de' Nerli, Benedetto Varchi, Giovan Battista Adriani, and Scipione Ammirato, in addition to Machiavelli. This is well-trodden ground, but Fasano Guarini correctly notes that her predecessors, notably Rudolf von Albertini and Felix Gilbert, were more concerned with regime change at Florence than with state administration in Tuscany. She also draws often and usefully on Eric Cochrane's work on Renaissance historiography, which, in her view, Italian scholars have too often ignored.

Sometimes the subtitle of a book reveals more of its contents than the title, but in this case the reverse is true. "Institutions and Practices of Power in Grand Ducal Tuscany in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" (my translation) misses the mark so widely (with respect to both the material and time period) that one suspects a publisher's error. In this book about ideology and historiography, "institutions and practices" creep in only rarely: for instance, in a description of Machiavelli's chancery experience and in a fine revisionist essay on Guicciardini's relations with Cosimo I de' Medici. And while the seventeenth century barely exists here, there happens to be much good material on the 1400s—especially in a chapter on conspiracies.

The dramatic, violent scenes of this period of Tuscan history exist only as background in these pages. Fasano Guarini offers nothing that helps explain Girolamo Savonarola's execution, the sack of Prato, the siege of Florence, the assassination of Duke Alessandro de' Medici, the beheading of the Florentine republican exiles after their capture at Montemurlo, or the death of Filippo Strozzi. Yet that, in a way, is the point. With great insight the author treats instead the writers who happen to have described those memorable events, showing their reservations, hesitations, and changes in direction. The aim is to measure the extent to which these writers perceived (too often dimly if at all) the

other developments that today draw the attention of historians of early modern Europe.

WILLIAM J. CONNELL
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REBECCA MESSBARGER. *The Lady Anatomist: The Life and Work of Anna Morandi Manzolini*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, with the Getty Foundation, Los Angeles. 2010. Pp. xiii, 234. \$35.00.

Anatomical models made of wax are intriguing artifacts and arguably form an important subject for historians of medicine. The many uses of wax are also of considerable interest to historians of art, religion, and material culture. The subject of Rebecca Messbarger's book, Anna Morandi (1714–1774), was an exceptional exponent of the art of making anatomical models in wax. Messbarger is keen to expound Morandi's virtues, skills, and talents by documenting "her expert knowledge and pivotal research in the field of anatomical science" (p. 3) and showing her works, which are indeed stunning. She explores the implications of Morandi's sex for her reputation and status. The city of Bologna, where Morandi spent most of her life, its institutions, and its leading lights play significant roles in the story. The conflicts, jealousies, and rivalries in which Morandi was caught up run through the book. Messbarger discusses the anatomical models and the ways in which they were made and received and examines Morandi's surviving writings. The "lady anatomist" was a part of public culture. Messbarger's book documents the complex interplay between public and private, the elaborate intertwining of "science," art, and medicine in eighteenth-century Bologna, as well as patronage networks that included the papacy.

Chicago University Press is widely respected for the magnificent books it produces in the history of science: some, like this one, are published with the support of the Getty Foundation. The volume is full of high-quality illustrations that make a great difference to readers' ability to appreciate exactly what makes wax models so fascinating, both in the eighteenth century and now. More close analysis of their features would certainly be worthwhile. One way of doing this is through extensive comparisons with other two- and three-dimensional artifacts. Messbarger sometimes does this, for example, when she compares a wax forearm by Morandi with the painted arm of Adam in the Sistine Chapel (p. 63). The hands are in distinct poses, however, and it would be helpful to learn a little more about how the comparison works in such a case, especially given, as she points out, the profound significance of hands. The striking arrangements, colors, and uses of drapery in Morandi's waxes invite just such close attention.

Messbarger's enthusiasm for Morandi and her achievements is evident, and her prose is exuberant, although some of the vocabulary is distinctly unusual. Examples include using "sect" as a verb (p. 22); the phrase "Morandi's story is puzzled together" (p. 12); "clambered" (p. 37) instead, I assume, of "clamored"; and

references to a “project proposal” in the eighteenth century. More robust editing might have been helpful. At a more abstract level, I would have liked more discussion of the concept of “design,” given its powerful and complex resonances in Morandi’s time for both art practice and natural theology, as well as some explanation of Messbarger’s use of concepts such as “science,” “ideal,” “neoclassical,” and “archetype.”

The Lady Anatomist will certainly bring the life and work of Morandi to new audiences. By piecing together visual, verbal, and material sources, Messbarger has made a useful contribution to the field. The book needs to be read critically, however. I am not sure, for example, how much analytical bite Messbarger’s treatment of misogyny has. Nor am I convinced that invoking the idea of pseudoscience is helpful (e.g., p. 119). It is unfortunate that the language sometimes appears to have escaped authorial control. A good example is this description of Morandi’s remarkable self-portrait: “her hands prepare to penetrate the human brain mushrooming from the hair-covered skull before her” (p. 99). In fact, the brain stays neatly contained within the skull as we see in the color plates on pages 100 and 102. There is no doubt of Morandi’s historical interest, or of Messbarger’s passionate commitment to telling her story as fully as the sources permit. There is much fascinating material here: for example, Morandi’s work on the senses and on the reproductive systems of both men and women is discussed in detail. However, I am sure I am not alone in being surprised to find the comment “this is a paraphrase” in a footnote to a direct quotation (p. 188, n. 77). I checked the original text and both this note and the previous one are inaccurate. We all make slips, and reviewers should be forgiving. But the significant number of problems suggests that the publisher would have served its author better had it provided her with more editorial feedback. Nonetheless, Morandi is a figure who deserves scholarly attention and Messbarger makes a forceful case for her.

LUDMILLA JORDANOVA
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BRIAN HOROWITZ. *Jewish Philanthropy and Enlightenment in Late-Tsarist Russia*. (A Samuel and Althea Stroum Book.) Seattle: University of Washington Press. 2009. Pp. ix, 342. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$35.00.

Readers unfamiliar with the emergence of a russified, politically astute, elite coterie of engaged journalists, novelists, poets, lawyers, educators, physicians, and merchant princes in Jewish public life in the last half-century of tsarist rule will find Brian Horowitz’s book an excellent guide to the subject.

Early in the period of reforms initiated by Alexander II, a group of Jewish notables, living in Saint Petersburg, sought to formalize their program of progressive reform for their brethren by organizing an educational association that they called the Society for the Promotion of Enlightenment among the Jews of Russia (known by its Russian acronym OPE). The initiative

and funding for the OPE came from the family of Evzel Gintsburg and his son Horace, as well as other wealthy Jewish sponsors (among them A. M. Brodsky and S. Poliakov). The organization promoted a philanthropic program of civic betterment for the Jews of Russia through elementary and secondary educational reform and the dissemination of Jewish high culture in the Russian language. They continued to do this—despite disappointments and setbacks amid the repressive, often violent atmosphere that plagued Russian Jewish existence from the 1870s on—right to the end of the tsarist regime.

Far from pursuing a pipe dream of a tolerant civil society in the face of stark realities, Horowitz argues that the leaders and cultural workers who took part in the project of wholesale cultural uplift were complex individuals who stood athwart the ideological quandaries of their time. Arguing among themselves—for and against russification, Jewish nationalism, evolutionary change, legal emancipation, and political activism—few could be fairly characterized as the complacent, socially conservative, timid, and “assimilationist” apologists for the regime that, to the mind of many of their more radical adversaries, their organization seemed to embody. Horowitz surveys the fortunes of the OPE as it encountered a sullen bureaucracy, state policies aimed at keeping minorities quiescent, antisemitic high officials and intellectual opinion, the growing enthusiasm for self-expression and national consciousness in the Jewish intelligentsia, and the revolutionary fervor of 1905.

As the first full-length history of the OPE to be written in any language, this work provides for a broader understanding of Jewish social and cultural ferment in late nineteenth-century Russia. It makes clear that Jewish public life was not exhausted or exclusively dominated by pogroms, mass emigration to America, socialist agitation against the autocracy, or Zionism. These issues, indeed, were central, but they overlapped and intertwined with less celebrated currents of opinion and programs of action. Educational philanthropy was, arguably, less coherent in ideological terms than some of the alternatives, but it remained a mainstay of pre-1917 Jewish activity.

Horowitz’s book joins other recent scholarly publications on Jews in the civil order of late tsarist Russia, such as the political and civic analysis of Russian Jewish liberalism written by Benjamin Nathans (*Beyond the Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia* [2002]) and the cultural innovation in Jewish arts and letters inspired by the drive toward a new Russia, described by Kenneth B. Moss (*Jewish Renaissance in the Russian Revolution* [2009]). Like his interlocutors in the field, Horowitz is interested in challenging some of the fustier myths shrouding the “Fiddler on the Roof” version of Russian Jewish life. He does so with authority, having mined a voluminous amount of source material in Russian and Hebrew.

I have a few caveats. The chapter dealing with the school wars, detailing the policy debates in the Jewish intelligentsia over the merits and demerits of the tra-

ditional folk school (*kheyder*), might have benefited from accessing contemporary writing in Yiddish from that period. Likewise, the overall impact of the OPE, given a Jewish population of five million, the majority of whom remained both culturally and religiously traditional and impoverished, is not entirely clear. Horowitz pulls his punches somewhat, stating that school reform “spread far beyond the main cities into the far-flung recesses of the Pale of Settlement,” but admitting that “the number of students in OPE-sponsored schools never reached that of students in state Jewish schools [themselves only a minority of school-age Jewish youngsters]” and that “the number of people directly involved in OPE activities was never extremely high” (p. 227).

Nevertheless, this study fills a lacuna in the field of Russian and modern Jewish history and will no doubt furnish readers and students with a new understanding of Jewish progressivism under duress.

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PAUL DU QUENOY. *Stage Fright: Politics and the Performing Arts in Late Imperial Russia*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 2009. Pp. xiii, 290. \$65.00.

During the Soviet era, the standard Marxist interpretation of Russia's Silver Age culture held that it was characterized by escapism: effete intellectual and artistic elites, unable to face massive and growing social inequality and injustice, had devoted themselves to the pursuit of recondite subjects perfectly irrelevant to the public good. At the point in the Cold War when the West engaged on a cultural front with arts-subsidizing Soviets dedicated to general improvement through public consumption of edifying art, American academics took very seriously the originality of late imperial Russian culture. According to these scholars, European aesthetic preoccupations such as symbolism, decadence, and naturalism found ingenious employment in, for example, enduring works produced by Anton Chekhov, Fyodor Sologub, and Maxim Gorky.

More recently Western scholarship, influenced by Jürgen Habermas, has regarded late imperial Russia as a modernizing polity with a transformed public sphere. Paul du Quenoy sets himself the task of analyzing the performing arts in this light to determine whether they raised political consciousness. Could the burgeoning “theater industry” in Russia, estimated to have employed 10,000 people by 1900, somehow have functioned as a sounding board of reason?

The subsidized imperial theaters are shown here to have adapted to attract non-elite customers and performed new works with little if any regard to political correctness. Du Quenoy demolishes Soviet arguments about the pervasive influence of censors, concluding that “Russian theatrical censorship outdid its western counterparts in permissiveness” (p. 245). Administrators showed more concern with lapses in taste than pre-

sumably dangerous political implications in texts, as Vaslav Nijinskii's 1911 dismissal for appearing in a revealing pair of tights suggests. (The Dowager Empress denied having been offended and asked a mutual friend to convey her regrets about the matter to the dancer.)

The author corrects Soviet contentions that certain “conscious” progressive prerevolutionary artists had secretly worked to advance the revolution's cause *avant la lettre*. Vera Komissarzhevskaja is a case in point. The actress, who had formed her own company, donated concert proceeds that helped the Bolsheviks purchase a clandestine printing press and receipts from a performance to help St. Petersburg Social Democrats organize a “cultural enlightenment center” to front for underground political activities. But her philanthropic generosity had no political focus or agenda. She told Gorky that she never could have imagined that Leonid Krasin, the polished electrical engineer who solicited funds for the press on behalf of the Bolshevik Central Committee, was a revolutionary.

In chapters examining the actors of the imperial and private theater companies, du Quenoy confirms the vast majority's indifference to politics. Their extra-artistic energies went into improving their working conditions and economic status through professionalization. Though the 1905 revolution presented an opportunity to point audiences toward political engagement, very few actors evinced the slightest desire to do so. Frightened theatergoers stayed away, or, mistaking the mob scene in Gorky's “Children of the Sun” for an invasion from the street, fled the theater. Audiences did not go to the theater to have their nerves shattered.

By 1906, with urban order reestablished and civil rights significantly expanded, the Russian theater industry functioned effectively as a market, with consumers pursuing entertainment and eschewing uplift. Classical Greek drama, so beloved by pioneering directors like Savva Mamontov, simply could not attract an audience. Plays by Sophocles and Euripides were mounted, but inevitably flopped. Modern symbolist dramas, like those of Maurice Maeterlinck, fared little better. Nikolai Evreinov's “Ancient Theater,” aspiring to create a new polis, a genuine community, lasted but one season.

Expanding audiences evinced not just indifference, but contempt for the prestigious art intelligentsia types had hoped would prove transformative. Beginning in January 1909, the Crooked Mirror cabaret performed “Vampuka, African Bride,” which parodied grand operas of Giuseppe Verdi and Giacomo Meyerbeer, over three hundred times. At the Suvorin Theater, as plays by Friedrich Schiller failed, a second cast had to be trained to meet the demand for an adaptation of Sherlock Holmes mysteries. But the avant-garde remained free to reimagine dramatic expression and stagecraft. “Nothing in my research,” notes du Quenoy, “has led me to doubt the sincerity of Alexandr Benua's description of it as ‘a time of all sorts of enterprises and every kind of bliss’” (p. 253).

If the salient feature of late imperial theater was its

audiences' resistance to radical messages presented from the stage, then it might have been instructive to ask why these audiences were so doggedly apolitical, especially in view of the fact that after the Soviet interlude Russians apparently remain doggedly apolitical. Other civilizations that have embraced theatrical entertainments have relished critiques of existing political and social arrangements.

The author may have suggested an answer when he explained that modern audiences "craved staged depictions of moral challenges, open sexuality and other sources of shock" (p. 208). Everyman, connected by cell phone, may simply have no use for the kind of bliss afforded by contraptions like "Uncle Vanya," "The Inspector General," and "The Misfortune of Being Clever."

GARY THURSTON
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JOHN W. STEINBERG. *All the Tsar's Men: Russia's General Staff and the Fate of the Empire, 1898–1914*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center. 2010. Pp. xvii, 383. \$60.00.

This study of the education, training, and performance of late imperial Russia's most elite coterie of officers begins with an endorsement of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's claim that "only one group, the officers of the Imperial Army's General Staff, had the intellect and experience to understand the problems and challenges that Imperial Russia faced in the early twentieth century" (p. 1). Yet, as the book repeatedly notes, these enlightened modernizers were unable to cure the ills that they diagnosed so well.

John W. Steinberg's heroes are war minister Aleksei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin at the turn of the century and what he calls the "Young Turks" in the general staff between 1906 and 1914. He provides evidence that they understood some of the key problems in Russian officer education and training and sought reforms to address them. Steinberg nicely personifies the struggle between reformers and their opponents with the examples of the reformist Kuropatkin and the recalcitrant traditionalist Mikhail Ivanovich Dragomirov, who stubbornly believed in the old mantra of "bayonets over bullets"—that even in modern warfare, the most important task was to create patriotic, well-drilled soldiers who would win the day through inspired acts of courage. As head of the Nicholas Academy, Kuropatkin tried to modernize the curriculum, and as war minister, he tried to introduce more realistic war game exercises and pushed for other reforms. Kuropatkin fell out of favor due to the army's disastrous performance under his command in the war against Japan in 1904–1905. But that debacle convinced many that reform was all the more necessary, and Steinberg argues that a group of "Young Turks" within the general staff proposed and developed new educational and training ideas under the protection of war minister A. F. Rediger and Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich.

Steinberg, however, sees all this as amounting to very

little. Why did the military reformers fail so miserably? For Steinberg, the blame goes almost entirely to the vacillating last tsar, the grand dukes, and nobles who jealously fought petty battles to preserve their positions and their outmoded ideas about warfare. For example, he argues that the mere presence of the tsar at war training exercises completely undermined their value because the participants twisted the exercises to make sure the tsar's side won and catered to the every whim of "meddling grand dukes" when they unexpectedly appeared on the scene (p. 85).

The good guys and bad guys are well marked in this story. What is less clear is whether this is really a story of the reformist general staff against an incompetent tsar and court. The general staff included plenty of opponents of reform, and some of the leading reformists were not from the general staff. Noble and royal meddling in military affairs certainly was not limited to the Russian Empire; an attempt to place the Russian case in comparative context would have been helpful and would have probably made for a more qualified argument.

Steinberg presents the tenure of war minister Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov from 1908–1914 as the triumph of the conservatives in a more unambiguous way than several other accounts, and I think he underplays the extent of change during the massive military buildup and rapid modernizing drive of that period. On the spectrum of views from pessimists who see revolution as likely even if World War I had not occurred to optimists who see a society undergoing rapid change and full of possibilities for future peaceful evolution, Steinberg falls on the extreme pessimist side. The words "failure" and "dysfunctional" are among the most common in the book. I would have liked to read more about the tactical, strategic, and educational theories and ideas in contention at the Nicholas Academy and on the battlefield. If the reality was as simple as Steinberg portrays it—a handful of well-educated reformers promoting the most basic ideas of modern warfare centered on better command and control, communications, and field training continually thwarted by an incompetent tsar, anachronistic grand dukes, and nobles more interested in parade ground pageantry and their own careers than in the effectiveness of their army—then it is hard to imagine a more damning portrayal of the late imperial army and system. The book ends in 1914, but it provides a good background explanation for the decision of several of the Young Turks in the officer corps to so readily support the February 1917 overthrow of the tsar. However, it does not help us understand how that dysfunctional army and system managed to fight a total war on three fronts while under blockade for a full two and a half years before collapsing.

ERIC LOHR
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ROCHELLE GOLDBERG RUTHCHILD. *Equality and Revolution: Women's Rights in the Russian Empire, 1905–1917*.

(Pitt Series in Russian and East European Studies.) Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press. 2010. Pp. xviii, 356. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$27.95.

Rochelle Goldberg Ruthchild's account of Russian feminist movements in the period from 1905 to 1917 is well written and impressively researched. Ruthchild moves beyond conventional understandings—or misunderstandings—of feminism in late imperial Russia. She demonstrates that the boundaries between socialists and feminists were quite permeable, and many leaders as well as rank-and-file people moved between the two groups. Ruthchild also convincingly argues that historians of world feminist movements have concentrated too much on Anglo-American events and have failed to appreciate the accomplishments of feminists in the Russian Empire. Finnish women were, after all, the first women in the world to achieve full suffrage (in 1906). And the Provisional Government bowed to pressure from feminist and socialist women's groups in the summer of 1917; the victory meant that women of the Russo/Soviet state attained full suffrage five years before U.S. women and over ten years before British women. Ruthchild also notes that one of the first (perhaps the very first) women's political parties was in the Russian Empire. The pioneering physician and feminist Maria Pokrovskaja founded the short-lived Women's Progressive Party in 1905.

Ruthchild gives many examples of efforts at cross-class solidarity by feminist organizers in late imperial Russia, and she convincingly demonstrates their influence not only on bourgeois women and members of the female intelligentsia but also on women (and some men) of less privileged classes. Ruthchild notes that the *Trudoviki* (the largest peasant party) were the first to bring the issue of female suffrage to the first Duma—thereby casting doubt on Kadet Party claims that male peasants were implacably opposed to women's rights. And she stresses that it was a massive demonstration called by feminist organizations and dominated by women workers and intellectuals that finally brought down the tsarist government in 1917.

Ruthchild's monograph contains absorbing biographies of individual feminist leaders and lively chronicles of the various women's congresses, journals, and organizations that sprang up after 1905. She also details the frequent Duma debates on women's suffrage, admission to universities, issuing of independent passports, and so on. Much of this is fascinating and well explained, and it goes a long way toward dispelling the myth of feminism's isolation from other reformist and revolutionary movements in late imperial Russia.

On two points, however, I find Ruthchild less convincing. The first concerns her repetitive attempts to refute the accusations leveled against feminists by Aleksandra Kollontai, Nadezhda Krupskaja, and other socialists to the effect that the former were bourgeois in class background and goals. Ruthchild appears to consider probative her oft-repeated observation that, like most of the feminists, Kollontai and some other

socialist women came from the social elite. This fact, however, is beside the point. Ruthchild's own account contains example after example of class-based arrogance on the part of several of the most prominent feminist leaders. Overall, it seems clear that while women of all classes were attracted to women's rights agendas and could be mobilized by feminist calls to organize along gender lines, women of the working classes were often as frustrated by feminists' condescension toward them as they were by unequal relations with their male worker or peasant comrades.

My second reservation concerns Ruthchild's treatment of the final stages of the suffrage debates leading up to the attainment of full female suffrage on July 20, 1917—a treatment that raises as many questions as it answers. Why did some leading feminists suddenly scale back their demands for universal female suffrage to a more limited, property-based franchise? Why, if Kollontai's accusations were incorrect, did virtually all of the women's rights measures that feminists successfully agitated for concern privileged women? As Ruthchild admits, “[p]roposals on inheritance, on women's access to the universities, or the right to practice law were foreign to the lives of the masses of women in the factories, in domestic service, or in the fields” (pp.180–181). (The demand that did affect working women—the call for women factory inspectors that the Women's League endorsed—was one that socialists and other workers' groups had been voicing for years.) More broadly—if feminism was so integral to the movements that culminated in the October Revolution, why was it largely invisible in the turbulent, exciting, experimental 1920s?

These questions aside, Ruthchild's book is a valuable contribution to the history of world feminism and social protest movements in late imperial Russia.

ANN HIBNER KOBLITZ
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DONALD FILTZER. *The Hazards of Urban Life in Late Stalinist Russia: Health, Hygiene, and Living Standards, 1943–1953*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. xxx, 379. \$110.00.

In this first-of-its-kind book, Donald Filtzer marshals a staggering array of statistics to show that Russians' urban living standards suffered a time lag of about fifty years compared to those of Western Europe. Whereas some of Filtzer's conclusions seem logical—such as the role of rapid industrialization in destroying urban living standards—others, like abrupt decline in infant mortality without any significant improvement in sanitation and access to clean water (two of the key factors for increasing living standards in Western Europe) seem counter-intuitive. In both cases, however, Filtzer brings to bear ample evidence, clear logic, and a grasp of science and global comparisons that make this a rare and convincing book.

In five chapters, Filtzer discusses urban waste, water, hygiene, diet, and infant mortality in five key industrial regions in the Russian Federation of the Soviet Union

during the first decade after World War II. Whereas the author could have studied the cities flattened during the war, he instead chose cities away from the front lines of battle to illustrate the systemic, not war-induced, problems of daily life. In order to provide context, Filtzer shows the relationship between city and countryside, and between Russia and Western Europe. He even cites global rates for infant mortality. His study is informed by key works on urban life and health by scholars such as Anthony S. Wohl, David Barnes, Richard Evans, Jörg Vögele, and Ann-Louise Shapiro, as well as comparative data from international agencies. This book therefore will be relevant to many scholars who are not Russian specialists. The vast data sets allow for both longitudinal and comparative evidence, which is displayed in numerous tables and graphs.

Whereas some historians have used wage data to show relative progress during industrialization in various countries, Filtzer takes the position that increasing wages may not have been able to offset the gross overcrowding and pollution that came with industrialization. Moreover, wages in the Soviet Union tell us almost nothing. Increasing wages did not guarantee access to clean water, individual housing, or sufficient food. These key indicators of the standard of living were always in short supply, and one's access to them had more to do with geography and one's position within the hierarchy than wages alone.

Chapter one details the massive amounts of human waste that littered urban areas, from illegal dump sites on the fringes of cities to overflowing cesspools and out-houses just outside apartment blocks and workers' barracks. Massive urban growth in the 1930s and the eastward wartime evacuation joined an already severe underinvestment in sewer lines, bathhouses, indoor plumbing, and waste removal. Twice yearly cleanup campaigns were designed to remove much of this waste, but even when that was accomplished, the excrement quickly built up again. The lack of water and industrial pollution in waterways, detailed in chapter two, made matters even worse. Chapter three reveals that a chronic lack of sanitation prevented effective control of contagions. With almost no indoor plumbing, bathhouses often lacking fuel to heat water, and near constant shortages of soap, the diseases of poverty and overcrowding such as typhus and dysentery could hardly be controlled. With nutrition dire even outside of the famine year of 1947, the quality and quantity of food (when accessible) fell far short of what was necessary to maintain health. Of course the effects of all these conditions affected certain segments of the population differently. In the last chapter before his conclusion, Filtzer analyzes infant mortality, normally a key measure of standards of living. All the above conditions were improving to some degree, but the pace of improvement could not keep up with the rapid growth of Russia's cities. Cities in Western Europe fifty years earlier were only able to improve living standards through better housing, plumbing, food, and sewerage, but Russia did little to improve expensive infrastruc-

ture. Instead, decreased infant mortality depended on an extensive public health campaign to encourage better hygiene, the training of more doctors and health inspectors, and antibiotics (some of which were engineered from Western examples).

This very brief review cannot do justice to the positive contribution that this book makes not only to Russian studies, but also to research on public health and the effects of urbanization and industrial development in capitalist or centralized economies. Filtzer's more global conclusion about self-negating growth, "the consumption of the means of production and labor power [that] failed to translate itself into the production of a commensurate quantity of use values" (p. 347), should provoke thought about past, present, and future industrial expansion.

KARL QUALLS
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PAUL STRONSKI. *Tashkent: Forging a Soviet City, 1930–1966*. (Pitt Series in Russian and East European Studies; Central Eurasia in Context.) Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press. 2010. Pp. xv, 350. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$27.95.

Paul Stronski situates his study of Soviet Tashkent within studies of urbanism, and his analysis shows the mark of James C. Scott's critique of state visions that attempt to create modern societies and change citizens. This chronologically organized volume is rich in archive-based description of planners' attempts to transform Tashkent over three decades, but it is somewhat frustrating in both its eclecticism and lack of a defined method for weighing evidence.

The book begins with Russian colonial perceptions of Tashkent from the late nineteenth century and wends its way through Stalinist urban planning, the city during World War II, postwar Stalinism, Tashkent's role as a showplace for the Third World, and the 1966 earthquake. Throughout, Stronski examines planners' and architects' visions for a new Tashkent, their equation of modernity with Europe and backwardness with Uzbekistan, their desire to create a city of apartment buildings to replace Tashkent's mud-brick courtyard homes, and their goal of using new streets, government and cultural buildings, and housing to refashion Tashkenters as Soviet subjects.

Soviet architects, often specialists from Russia, contrasted "native" Tashkent with their own hope for the modern future, expressed in wide boulevards, large parks, "capital" buildings—meaning public buildings worthy of a capital city—and an aesthetic that did not easily apply to an arid climate. Stronski discusses the *Mosoblproekt* (Moscow oblast project) proposal of 1938 that imagined a Tashkent where old neighborhoods of mud-brick homes would be replaced with "monumental architecture and industrialized construction" based on a Moscow model (p. 56). Many obstacles emerged to the building of such a grand project: reliance on materials from Russia, lack of interest or coordination

from other Tashkent city departments, and World War II all helped derail much of it, although Navoi Street did become a new, wide boulevard with some monumental buildings.

The mass evacuation of Soviet citizens to Uzbekistan during World War II overwhelmed the city's limited infrastructure, and relocated factories led to high levels of pollution in Tashkent's water supply canals. Stronski notes that the "prewar urban plan for rational growth quickly went by the wayside" (p. 73). While most of the book focuses on city planning and urban planners' ideas about how Uzbeks ought to live in a new "cultured" Soviet space, chapter five focuses on "Central Asian" lives in Tashkent during the war. Far from the discussion of buildings and planning, this section illustrates the hardships that evacuees faced in their city of refuge. Many had imagined Tashkent as "the city of bread," and yet they faced dire conditions of hunger, starvation, and hostility from the city's residents. A much richer account of this period and the interaction between Uzbeks and evacuees can be found in Rebecca Manley's *To the Tashkent Station: Evacuation and Survival in the Soviet Union at War* (2009).

Stronski demonstrates that there were significant shifts in architectural visions after World War II: should Tashkent's new Soviet buildings look like Stalinist buildings elsewhere, or incorporate local and "Eastern" motifs? Planners dealt with Tashkent's expanding population by building large "microrayons," districts of apartment complexes on the edges of the city. Until the 1960s, lack of coordination meant that such complexes might start to be built before sewers or power lines were put in, resulting in buildings that looked modern but lacked amenities. Urban administrators complained that the city's Uzbek residents were not conforming to the state's vision by moving into urban flats; instead, the city expanded primarily through the building of privately owned family houses. Stronski does not explain how the majority of Tashkent families acquired land to build individual homes. Discussions often focused on the inappropriate design of the new apartment complexes, which used Russian urban norms and lacked adequate space for typically larger Uzbek families. In contrast with the slow pace of construction into the 1960s, reconstruction after the 1966 earthquake flattened Tashkent's center was rapid and appropriate to the arid climate.

Stronski's claim that a colonial relationship existed between non-Uzbek architects who were immigrants from European parts of the USSR and Uzbeks who rejected Soviet plans in a "foot-dragging" style seems inconsistent with his conclusion that differences between Soviet visions and the gritty realities of poor planning and a lack of concern for sewage disposal were common experiences for all Soviet citizens rather than the particular fate of mistreated colonial subjects. On this topic, Donald Filtzer's *The Hazards of Urban Life in Late Stalinist Russia: Health, Hygiene, and Living Standards, 1943–1953* (2010) provides a useful comparison.

A book about the growth of a city would be enhanced

by inclusion of maps and a chart of population growth figures. The volume includes photos of the city appropriate to the time period, but the whimsical captions frequently fail to identify the distinctive buildings that they depict. Mistakes will be noticed by experts: Shaikhantaur, not Shaikhtanur was the most prestigious mahalla of prerevolutionary Tashkent (p. 37); the famous dancer Tamara Khanum was Armenian by ethnicity, not Uzbek (p. 244); Yadgar Nasriddinova (female, not Nasriddinov) was vice-president, not president of the Uzbekistan Supreme Soviet in 1956 (p. 251).

Stronski's book won the 2011 Central Eurasian Studies Society annual book award for history, and scholars of Central Asia will find it a valuable addition to studies of Central Asia in the Soviet period.

MARIANNE KAMP
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JULIANE FÜRST. *Stalin's Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. xiv, 391. \$99.00.

Juliane Fürst's book is an important and original contribution to a growing body of historical scholarship on Soviet society during Joseph Stalin's last years and the Khrushchev Thaw. The author situates her monograph among recent works by Julie Hessler, Stephen Bittner, and Ethan Pollock that stress continuities between the two periods. Nonconformist behaviors by youth, such as imitating Western styles in clothing or criticizing local youth leaders at meetings of the Communist Youth League (Komsomol), did not begin after Stalin's death—they had precedents in the postwar Stalin years. Fürst's continuity argument is not entirely original, but her argument for a radical discontinuity between the late 1930s and the postwar years is. She contends that World War II weakened the Soviet state, and in particular the Komsomol, so much that the authorities lost much of their control over youth.

Stalin's Last Generation centers on the claim that youth coming of age in the postwar years (too young to have served during the war) were the first generation of Soviet citizens that party apparatchiks failed to incorporate into the project of building socialism. To use Ken Jowitt's terminology, the Soviet leaders were unable to find a "social combat task" that would engage postwar youth. They had been able to mobilize earlier youth cohorts for the revolution, the First Five-Year Plan, and the Great Fatherland War. Following the war, however, the relative weakness of the party/state apparatus made mobilization more difficult, while returning war veterans, whose moral and political authority could not be questioned, dominated official youth culture. The result, according to Fürst, was a postwar generation less engaged with official rituals and ideology.

These youth engaged in what Nicholas Glossop has called "the struggle for fun," organizing impromptu dance parties, pulling practical jokes, and showing off their "Western" styles along Leningrad's Nevsky Pros-

pect. Some, but not all, of this activity occurred outside the boundaries of the Komsomol. Local Komsomol organizations put on parties with “improper” dances and music; some Komsomol leaders themselves were *stiliagi*, combining Western and Soviet dress styles into new fashions that authorities stigmatized.

Like modern youth in many societies, postwar Soviet youth sought identities counter to those that adults wanted for them. This search, along with the weakness of the state, the power of veterans, and the struggle for fun, led to a progressive “hollowing out” of official Komsomol practices and language. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Komsomol, like so many other institutions, proved an empty shell.

In the end, Fürst concludes, millions of individual decisions to “opt out”—to avoid Komsomol activities or skip the class on Marxism-Leninism—proved a greater threat to the regime than the small groups of overt dissidents. Her finding is highly persuasive. It parallels Thomas Cox Wolfe’s argument that Khrushchev-era shifts in official journalism (away from politics and toward human interest) were more important than *samizdat* in the cultural shifts that contributed to the collapse of the USSR.

Fürst does a fine job of avoiding the two poles of the recent “resistance or totalitarian mind control” debate among Soviet cultural and social historians. Over the last two decades some historians have argued that there was widespread resistance to the Soviet state, from previously unknown strikes to misbehavior at parades. Others have claimed that the party/state ideology so penetrated people’s minds that they could not think outside them—a Foucauldian version of 1950s tales of communist brainwashing. Fürst describes how independent-minded youth used official practices and culture (modeling themselves, for example, on the partisan heroes of the movie *Young Guard*), but she sees them as appropriating these for themselves rather than succumbing to totalitarian mind-control. She also refuses to read “opting out” as resistance to the party/state. It was, rather, a natural search for space outside stultifying ideas and boring meetings, not a direct challenge to the authorities.

There are a few weaknesses in the monograph. Some of the phenomena Fürst claims were new in the immediate postwar years, for example youth indifference to Komsomol activities and the “struggle for fun,” were certainly present in the 1930s as well. Her contention that the Soviet state was weaker at the local level after the war than before is thought-provoking but not entirely convincing. Another shortcoming is the focus on intelligentsia/elite youth, which may be due in part to the relative paucity of sources on other sectors of society. Finally, the book needed a thorough copyeditor. Words are frequently misused, “hawking back to,” for example, when “harking back to” is meant.

But fundamentally this is an excellent work, deploying original, plausible arguments about the social and cultural history of an era that historians are only be-

ginning to explore. It will be a rewarding read for historians in general, not just Soviet specialists.

MATTHEW E. LENOE
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SERGEI I. ZHUK. *Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dnepropetrovsk, 1960–1985*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center. 2010. Pp. xvii, 440. \$65.00.

Sergei I. Zhuk’s nuanced study offers a welcome addition to the growing literature on what used to be regarded as an unvariegated era of Soviet history bracketed by the liberalizing reforms of Nikita Khrushchev and the turbulence of perestroika. Zhuk’s main purpose is to explore the connections between identity formation, ideology, and cultural consumption. His analysis offers valuable insight on the cultural and political milieu in which the post-Soviet Ukrainian leadership came of age, and on the complex and contradictory ways that Soviet ideologists lost the cultural Cold War with the youth of a strategically vital Ukrainian city.

As an important center of the Soviet military-industrial complex and the space program, Dnepropetrovsk (formerly Ekaterinoslav) was closed to foreigners in 1959 and became a magnet for a highly skilled and well-paid workforce. Although these engineers and scientists could not travel abroad, they had access to Western scientific literature and the popular press. They also travelled within the Soviet Union to Moscow and other regional centers with fewer ideological restrictions. This privileged status made them important conduits of ideologically suspect music, books, and ideas back to what Soviet people called “the closed rocket city” (p. 22).

Following analytical frameworks that highlight the transformative and creative implications of cultural consumption, Zhuk examines the complex ways that the consumption of music, books, and films, as well as ideas about religion, nationalism, and human rights from the West, helped shape the identity of Dnepropetrovsk’s youth. Limited access to Western cultural products intensified local interest in them, leading to an obsession that exaggerated their broader cultural significance. This “cultural fixation” on particular kinds of music, film, and literature fueled the Westernization of popular culture in a society with strong ideological regulation.

The book begins by charting the fallout from Beatlemania and the authorities’ struggle against the nationalist overtones of the Ukrainian literary revival in the 1960s. While this initial wave primarily involved local elites, by the end of the decade the obsession with beat music and Western (cowboy) films had spread to working-class youth as well. The massive popularity of the British band Deep Purple and the rock opera *Jesus Christ Superstar* (1971) in the 1970s intensified youths’ interest in hard rock and religion. At the same time the demand for Western adventure books (by writers such

as Thomas Mayne Reid, Arthur Conan Doyle, and Jack London) and films (such as *The Magnificent Seven* [1960] and *Mackenna's Gold* [1969]) facilitated both the Westernization of local youth and their Russification (via language, as Russian was used both for the translation of foreign literature and to dub foreign films). Détente and increased tourism opportunities for Soviet citizens supported the "disco madness" of the later 1970s. Juggling conflicting pressures from ideologists in Moscow against the demand for entertainment, the possibility for fiscal gain, and the local struggle for hearts and minds, the Communist Party and youth organizations assumed an important position in both the production and regulation of dance music. Commercializing disco and attempting to co-opt some Western cultural products in an effort to stave off others prompted the last major crackdown—this time against heavy metal and "fascist" punk rock—by the authorities in the early 1980s. In the end, restrictions on cultural consumption emanating from Moscow alienated local elites and ordinary consumers in Dnepropetrovsk. Although the democratizing influence of Western culture spread in tandem with Russification, the foundations of a post-Soviet Ukrainian identity had been laid in the closed rocket city long before the collapse of Soviet communism.

This is not a narrative of simple dichotomies. The lines between local, legal, illegal, Soviet, Western, Ukrainian, and Russian shifted and evolved throughout the period. While the appeal of Western music, film, and literature might be taken as a given, the complex routes by which this quasi-"forbidden fruit" reached the youth of Dnepropetrovsk were serpentine and often opaque. Books and music circulated on the black market, but the extensive dissemination of foreign films and literature required significant support from the state and its agencies (to translate and print Western books, and to dub and distribute films). The authorities might have wrung their hands over the excesses of Beatlemania, but fans could buy "greeting cards" featuring songs by the Beatles or the Rolling Stones at a large audio recording store on Karl Marx Avenue. And sometimes appropriating Western cultural products into the local milieu produced baffling responses, such as the campaign against the band KISS out of misplaced fear that the double "S" in its name referenced Adolf Hitler's SS.

Zhuk's narrative draws on an impressive source base that includes materials from KGB and Communist Party archives as well as diaries and more than one hundred oral histories. Students of youth culture, cultural consumption, identity, and nationalism will find much of value in this detailed and original book.

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Virginia Tech

JONATHAN HASLAM. *Russia's Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2011. Pp. xvii, 523. \$38.00.

Before the collapse of communism and the opening of East European and Soviet archives, Western historians of the Cold War were hamstrung by a lack of evidence from the other side. Too few had the linguistic skills to make use of foreign language sources anyway. Jonathan Haslam has rectified these shortcomings in his groundbreaking new book on Russia's Cold War. Few scholars could have written this book. Haslam has sorted through a dizzying array of German, Italian, French, and Russian sources to produce a fascinating new account of one of the most controversial periods in modern international history. The book is not for the novice; Haslam assumes knowledge of the basic outlines of Cold War history and a familiarity with the scholarly debates.

Haslam is right to begin his story of Russia's Cold War with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, although he spends less than a fifth of the book on Soviet policy before World War II. Like tsarist Russia, the new Soviet state sought to expand its territory and project its power abroad. Unlike imperial Russia, however, the Bolsheviks wanted to destroy the political and economic structure of the other European states through surrogate communist parties. The Cold War only abated when the Soviet Union and the West joined to fight a common enemy in World War II. The United States and the Soviet Union never signed an alliance during the war, and as Haslam expertly shows, relations were strained throughout. Haslam's thorough research also uncovers the extent to which Soviet intelligence knew about postwar U.S. foreign policy deliberations, nuclear capabilities, and economic objectives.

Haslam focuses squarely on the deliberations and decisions of Soviet leaders. He accounts for the infighting among Soviet bureaucracies, arguing that those in the foreign ministry and security agencies who, like the Soviet military and military industries were preoccupied with the United States, kept tensions high and the arms race going. But in the end this is an account of the Cold War as it played out in the higher echelons of power. Whether Soviet leaders injected more ideology or *realpolitik* into foreign policy, Haslam argues, depended on the leadership: "the revolutionary drive had since 1917 exerted its influence only through accepting minds" at the top (p. 365). The radical departure in Russia's Cold War came when Mikhail Gorbachev gave up on global "proletarian internationalism."

The book covers Soviet Russia's relations with the West and the Kremlin's struggle to gain allies in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America. For example, Haslam brings to bear new evidence on the Berlin crises, the Israeli-Arab conflict, the Vietnam War, the Cuban missile crisis, and the Sino-Soviet split. He shows that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was personally behind the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, dangerous gambits that prompted his ouster in 1964. Haslam cites Soviet leaders who rued the signing of the human rights provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Accords—the so-called Basket Three—because they turned out to be important tools for dissidents to delegitimize the

communist dictatorships. The fall of South Vietnam in 1975 emboldened the Soviets and their Cuban client to support leftist insurgencies in Nicaragua, Ethiopia, and Angola. It is doubtful, however, that Nicaragua presented Carter with "a major security problem . . . in his own backyard" (p. 318).

Haslam reveals that it was President Jimmy Carter, not Ronald Reagan, who initiated U.S. support of Afghan rebels against the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul. But did Carter's national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski really "trick Moscow into invading Afghanistan at the end of 1979" (p. 319)? Carter's startled reaction to the invasion and the perception that he had hitherto appeased the Soviet Union helped seal his defeat in the 1980 election. Haslam's claim that Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987 because of his fear of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative also does not hold up; by that time Gorbachev knew that a fail-safe missile defense system was impossible. He wanted the Pershing II and cruise missiles out of Europe. That sword of Damocles—missiles that could hit the Soviet Union within minutes—he did fear.

This book is a valuable addition to what we now know about the Cold War. Haslam's version is not the last word, however, and will provoke new historical controversies. Haslam calls *détente* a failure, but Reagan exaggerated the Soviet Union's strategic and military gains in the 1970s. The United States maintained economic and technological superiority and a strong conventional and nuclear deterrent. The Soviet Union's allies in Eastern Europe and the Third World were economic basket cases and unreliable strategic partners. Furthermore, the Kremlin's relations with Red China were at a nadir. Despite occasional friction within its alliance system, in the end the United States could count on such economic powers as West Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and South Korea.

SHELDON ANDERSON
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MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA

HIBBA ABUGIDEIRI. *Gender and the Making of Modern Medicine in Colonial Egypt*. (Empires and the Making of the Modern World, 1650–2000.) Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2010. Pp. xii, 268. \$114.95.

This book is a fascinating study of gender and medicine in colonial Egypt. Hibba Abugideiri begins with a quote from a popular Egyptian medical journal that in 1902 called on urban women to exercise and take in fresh air in order to have strong bodies and therefore healthy children. The modern woman was to use her body to build the modern nation. Egypt was then under British colonial rule, and British medical reformers had combined the existing all-male Egyptian Qasr al-Aini medical school and all-female School of Midwifery. The new medical institution thus created was hierarchical, with

the all-male medical school offering advanced medical training and the all-female medical school teaching only midwifery and nursing. Female medical practitioners became caretakers and assistants to male doctors, who under the new system had supreme medical authority that carried over into all aspects of public life. More than a few Egyptian doctors, like other Western-educated professional elites, became leaders of the secular nationalist movement. The new elite's views on proper gender roles resembled those of the premodern period, but now those views were cast in modern scientific and medical terms.

The book begins by discussing medical reforms undertaken by Muhammad Ali (r. 1805–1848), a controversial ruler who established a professional medical school, military hospitals, a school for women medical practitioners, free clinics, and sanitation and vaccination programs. The overall goal was to create a healthy army and workforce that would serve the interests of the centralized state. Abugideiri then turns to the British colonial era, during which many of Muhammad Ali's medical policies were reversed. Most importantly, the colonial authorities privatized education by instituting tuition fees at all levels. The result, as intended, was the widening of class divisions and the creation of a small Egyptian professional elite trained to serve the British administration. The British authorities reserved high-level positions for British physicians and administrators and employed Egyptian physicians, all English-speaking males, in the lower ranks of the medical hierarchy. The authorities transformed the school that had trained women medical practitioners into a school for midwives. Men's work, including modern medicine, was highly valued while women's work, midwifery, was relegated to the lowest level of prestige or even criminalized. In the wake of the Egyptian nationalist movement and nominal independence in 1922, Egyptian physicians formed the Egyptian Medical Association. They officially reserved for themselves the fields of obstetrics, gynecology, pediatrics, and reproductive health in general. Henceforth Egyptian women were to be unpaid domestic medical caretakers who ran their homes scientifically. Women had long been unpaid domestic workers, but now that role was rationalized, justified, and even glorified as part of the modern republican way of life.

Doctors extolled motherhood, the family, and domestic life and called on women to embrace their duty to the nation by becoming modern mothers. The new modern woman should be a mother, homemaker, and beauty queen. Using their medical training, male physicians argued that these roles were scientific, natural, and biologically determined. Egyptian doctors were influenced by the Victorian scientific ideas that they had acquired from teachers and texts at Qasr al-Aini medical school and during trips to London. Notions of sexual difference already familiar to them resonated with this new scientific framework. Doctors called on women, especially pregnant and nursing women, to eat healthy food—meat, eggs, fish, lentils, green and fava

beans, and other vegetables—and spend an hour a day exercising in fresh air. It is not clear where women were to find the fresh air, the money for food, or the time to enjoy either.

The Egyptian press was full of medical rhetoric that celebrated republican motherhood and called for national independence from Britain. A parallel Islamic discourse of domesticity also extolled motherhood and proclaimed that divine rule called for and governed hierarchical gender roles. The modern medical establishment, however, made these divisions part of modern scientific medicine. This largely elite discourse glorified modern upper-class homes but was equally aimed at lower-class women. The assumption was that most medical problems originated in the lower classes. Therefore, the medical and public health establishment should design affordable methods of hygiene and medical care and train lower-class women to use them. Doctors wrote popular instructional manuals and established health laws to reduce Egypt's high infant mortality rate and to prevent the spread of contagious diseases.

Women benefited in some ways from the medicalization of domesticity, but in the long run, it was a trap because it reinforced and in some ways deepened existing hierarchical gender and class relations.

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STEPHANIE STIDHAM ROGERS. *Inventing the Holy Land: American Protestant Pilgrimage to Palestine, 1865–1941*. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books. 2011. Pp. x, 163. \$60.00.

Anyone who knows American evangelicalism from the inside is familiar with the Holy Land pilgrimage. Often organized by a local pastor, the tour involves visiting holy sites in Israel—“walking where Jesus walked,” as it were. During their trip the pastor and/or other tour guides connect the sites they are visiting with the appropriate Scripture passages, the focus of the trip being the biblical past and the prophetic future (and not the contemporary political and religious situation). On their return, the happy pilgrims report on their Holy Land experiences to those who were left behind, often in a Sunday evening slide show replete with testimonials.

Of course, these pilgrimages have a history. Stephanie Stidham Rogers examines American Protestant tourism in Palestine from 1865, when travel to the Middle East from the United States began to take off, until the onset of World War II. Using thirty-five pilgrimage narratives as the basis of her study—and it would have been helpful to have a separate and annotated bibliographical section for these narratives—Rogers discusses how American Protestant visitors were troubled by the poverty and filth, dismayed by the ubiquity of Catholic and Orthodox shrines, and outraged by the role of Muslims in administering Christian holy sites. In

response these pilgrims worked “to create a Holy Land that was more biblical, or more Protestant” (p. 4). By the end of the nineteenth century this vision of biblical Palestine occupied an important place in American Protestantism, with the frequent inclusion of Holy Land maps and photographs of Palestine in Bibles (in contrast with Rogers's book, which contains neither maps nor photographs), and with the emergence of biblical archaeology as a field of study. Most remarkably, American Protestants came to understand this “invented” Holy Land as a “fifth gospel” that gave Protestants “a way to skip centuries of ecclesiastical corruption and excess . . . to return to the basic, original, and undeniable truths of the Gospel” (p. 32).

In her strongest chapter, “The Out-of-Doors Gospel in Palestine,” Rogers emphasizes how American Protestants established outdoor pilgrimage sites. These included the Jordan River, where pilgrims stood on the banks and sang hymns, and the Mount of Beatitudes, where American Protestants sat on the slopes and read the Sermon on the Mount, generally eschewing the opportunity to enter the Catholic shrine. Then there was the Garden Tomb, a rock outcropping which the British General Charles George Gordon proposed (with little in the way of evidence) as the site of Jesus's crucifixion. A very popular alternative to the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, a “site rejected [by American Protestants] for its superstitious idolatry and excessive tradition,” the Garden Tomb offered visitors the opportunity to sit on benches “under the canopy of trees and sky” and contemplate Golgotha (p. 124).

Oddly enough, while “the out-of-doors became the new altar or Protestant shrine” (p. 138), it did not seem to concern pilgrims that Gordon's outcropping may not have been the site of Golgotha, that the designated Mount of Beatitudes may not have been where Jesus preached the Sermon on the Mount, or whether they as pilgrims really were walking where Jesus walked. What mattered to these late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American Protestant pilgrims, and is probably still the case with their contemporary counterparts, was that they have a subjective spiritual experience; to quote Rogers, the real Holy Land “lay in the hearts and minds of believers rather than in a particular landscape” (p. 120).

Given the spiritualized Holy Land, it makes sense that the actual living, breathing individuals residing in Palestine were not of interest in and of themselves. Local Arabs were seen simply as “figures frozen in a miniature diorama,” providing a “vision of the ancient world” (p. 15) for the benefit of the Protestant pilgrims, who, the author notes, generally ignored the presence of Arab Christian communities. In contrast, the two-dimensional role of Jews in Palestine had to do with the future. As dispensational premillennialism—the biblical prophecy schema developed by John Nelson Darby—swept through much of American Protestantism, pilgrims came to see them as the advance guard of Jewish settlement in the Holy Land that “would has-

ten the millennium and act as a harbinger of the end times and the return of Christ" (p. 93).

Rogers's book is insightful and interesting. It is unfortunate that it is marred by writing problems. Particularly confusing is the author's practice of providing direct quotes without mentioning in the text whom she is quoting. This is problematic in a paragraph (e.g., second paragraph of p. 104) in which there are quotes from multiple sources, but no indication as to which are from primary sources and which are from scholars commenting on those sources.

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MICHELLE U. CAMPOS. *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 343. Cloth \$70.00, paper \$24.95.

In the wake of the liberal Ottoman revolution of 1908, which reinstated the constitution and parliament, Muslim, Christian, and Jewish men gathered in public squares throughout the empire to proclaim "Long live the homeland! Liberty, equality, brotherhood!" Men of different religions publicly embraced each other, proclaiming that all were united as brothers of the Ottoman family. In 1912, one of the two main Armenian political organizations promoted the shared interest of all Ottoman citizens. In 1913, an Arab congress upheld the integrity of the empire. On the eve of World War I, most Ottoman Jews viewed the Zionist program to create an exclusive Jewish state in Palestine with indifference or hostility.

Yet by 1914, few of these men promoted a reinvigorated empire, Ottoman patriotism, or interconfessional imperial union. The majority supported ethno-nationalist claims. During World War I the rulers of the empire abandoned interconfessional solidarity in favor of religious and racial unity. One result, not mentioned by the author of this book, was that in 1915 the Armenians were deported to their deaths. The Greek Orthodox were expelled from Anatolia. Arabs and Turks, once vital partners in the imperial project, viewed the other as oppressor or traitor. And in Palestine, Christians and Muslims united against Zionists, who began establishing a Jewish national home that would segregate indigenous Jews from their neighbors and their empire. Why did the discourse and practices known as Ottomanism fail to keep the empire and its citizens together?

Based on an exhaustive reading of Arabic, Hebrew, Judeo-Spanish, and Ottoman Turkish accounts, Michelle U. Campos's book is the first to focus primarily on Ottomanism from a multiconfessional perspective. Ottomanism has been depicted as mere discourse, as an official state project that had no impact on its citizens, as political opportunism by Muslim Turkish rulers driven by reason of state, or as the origin of Turkish nationalism. Campos demonstrates instead how, rather than being passive recipients of state propaganda, the

newly emergent Muslim, Christian, and Jewish urban middle and upper classes actively engaged in the task of strengthening and solidifying imperial citizenship. Placing Palestine in its Ottoman imperial context, rare for the historiography of Palestinian and Israeli history, Campos argues that the irreconcilable differences between individual and ethno-religious interests and the gap between the promises and shortcomings of "civic Ottomanism" ultimately led to conflict.

Despite sincere intentions to save the homeland by linking its citizens together regardless of religion, ethnicity, or mother tongue, severe structural constraints ensured that the project failed. The Ottoman state remained an Islamic state, which was wary of enfranchising and arming non-Muslims, and promoted Muslims and ethnic Turks above all others. Vocal Muslims declared that equality between Muslims and non-Muslims contravened Islamic law. Non-Muslim religious leaders abhorred giving up their power and privilege, and demanded proportional representation of their communities in parliament. Christian and Jewish youth found ways to avoid conscription.

The changed demographic realities ensuing from the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 made a union of Christians and Muslims a dead letter. Islamic discourse was used openly in politics thereafter, as the empire was reconceived as a union of Muslim peoples. Yet Arabs complained that they were treated as colonized peoples, not on an equal footing with their Turkish masters. An increasing number of Ottoman Jews sided with the Zionists. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 guaranteed that Britain, which began its occupation of Palestine in 1918, supported the Zionist effort to establish a state for the Jewish minority and not a shared homeland for all of its citizens.

Rather than depicting the peoples of the empire as proto-nations eager to establish separate nation-states, as is usually the case in the historiography of the late Ottoman Empire, Campos succeeds in convincing the reader that, if only between 1908 and 1913, Muslims, Christians, and Jews actively sought a common future within a reformed empire. Thus concerned mainly with giving voice to diverse Ottoman citizens from Cairo to Istanbul, the study sometimes loses its focus on events in Palestine, pays too little attention to the machinations of European imperial powers and the brutal policies of the Ottoman rulers after 1913, and does not take seriously enough the explicit aims of the Zionists. Nevertheless, Campos's book is crucial reading for all interested in imperial citizenship, Ottoman, Middle Eastern, Israeli, and Palestinian history.

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LESLIE DOSSEY. *Peasants and Empire in Christian North Africa*. (The Transformation of the Classical Heritage, number 47.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2010. Pp. xvii, 352. \$60.00.

The spread of ideas and of goods has remarkable potential to transform structures of social power. Leslie Dossey's important new study is a compelling exploration of that process in late Roman Africa (roughly the territory of modern Tunisia, Algeria, and western Libya). Her book specifically seeks to understand why the African provincial elite suddenly become anxious about peasant rebellion in the fourth century A.D., at a time when actual rural violence was both rare and easily suppressed. Dossey proposes that, in comparison to the classical period, late antiquity witnessed "a greater resemblance between rural and urban populations, both in terms of material culture and religious ideology" (p. 7), and that this "resemblance could heighten, not mollify, social tensions" (p. 8). Dossey draws both on archaeological field surveys and on a wide array of written sources. Indeed, to specialists one of the most exciting aspects of her work is sure to be her examination of over four hundred anonymous Christian sermons and other texts that have never been extensively exploited by historians but whose scriptural tradition or transmission history strongly suggests that they were composed in Africa between the fourth and sixth centuries.

A concise introduction orients readers to the parameters of the study, and the first chapter provides a short historical overview of North African history from prehistory to the Islamic conquest. The second and third chapters focus on material culture, demonstrating how, both in their production and in their consumption, a range of goods that had previously been scarce in the African countryside (fine ceramics, metal and glass objects, dyed and tailored clothing, and coins) came increasingly to suffuse the rural landscape in late antiquity. Rural populations also aspired to the benefits of civic life, including self-government and the ability to select their own leaders. The fourth and fifth chapters explore these civic desires and how they were frustrated in the political sphere, which in turn led rural communities to demand the creation of Christian bishoprics in villages and on the estates of the African countryside, where peasants could play a role in the election of their own bishops. Of course, bishops and clergy were also expected to preach, and through their sermons rustic congregations were exposed to universalizing Christian and imperial ideals, sometimes with explosive consequences. Chapters six and seven examine these processes, arguing that what rural violence we do see in fourth- and fifth-century North Africa—most notoriously that of the so-called Donatist *circumcelliones*—can be understood not as a rejection of the Roman Empire but rather as an attempt on the part of peasants to make the professed values of that empire a reality by putting an end to their own illegal exploitation at the hands of unscrupulous elites. A brief conclusion presents an excellent synthesis of the study's central findings and considers how representative Africa was of the Mediterranean world at large.

Dossey's analysis is thoughtful, sophisticated, and intelligent throughout. She has read widely and well, and she deploys both her deep, long-term understanding of

ancient North African rural society and her perceptive grasp of comparative postcolonialism to good effect. The book is magnificently written, and its conclusions are both stimulating and challenging.

It is a haunting irony of this study that one of the most important mechanisms shaping the new horizons of peasant possibilities in late antiquity was competition between Roman elites: between, on the one hand, well-heeled absentee landlords for whom a prosperous peasantry was a source both of wealth and of status and, on the other hand, local urban-based landowners desperate to signify their superiority over rustics through differential patterns of consumption; between both of these groups and a new Christian ecclesiastical hierarchy determined somehow to win social influence; between Catholic and Donatist bishops locked in a struggle for popular loyalties. Such struggles could be decisive in terms of defining legitimate parameters to rural aspiration. Thus, for example, Dossey demonstrates convincingly that, as long as the rustics found themselves on the right side of the Catholic-Donatist divide, Augustine himself could actively defend their militancy against rape, illegal enslavement, or forced conversion—despite the fact that in so doing the bishop landed himself in legal and political controversies.

Given the importance of this point, it perhaps deserves somewhat stronger emphasis than it receives here. At the end of antiquity, peasant aspirations did not just evoke anxieties among the elite; they may also have redefined for the new ruling class what it meant to be a freeborn Roman, forcing no less a figure than Augustine to rethink the profound implications of the universalism that he propounded. This book is an exceptional piece of scholarship that gives us all of that, plus over four hundred new sources to ponder.

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SAHAR BAZZAZ. *Forgotten Saints: History, Power, and Politics in the Making of Modern Morocco*. (Harvard Middle Eastern Monographs, number 41.) Cambridge: Harvard Center For Middle Eastern Studies. 2010. Pp. xvi, 180. \$19.95.

In 1909, Muhammad al-Kattānī, a leading Moroccan religious figure with popular appeal, was put to death in a most humiliating way by Sultan 'Abd al-Hafiz, who had earlier overthrown his brother with the support of al-Kattānī. Sahar Bazzaz situates this dramatic tale within the reformist policies of the pre-Protectorate period (1860–1912), arguing that it was not a simple case of two figures with socioreligious prestige vying for power. Rather, al-Kattānī's death marked the end of an era of symbiotic balance between sultan and saint, an arrangement known as *sharifism*. With the rise of a new merchant class that gave the court access to global markets, the sultan could dispense with the spiritual brotherhoods and their saintly leaders. Knowledge of Europe, not spiritual expertise, now mattered.

This is a welcome study of a significant religious fig-

ure in Moroccan history and can take its place alongside works by Dale F. Eickelman, Vincent J. Cornell, and Malika Zeghal, among others. Bazzaz combines careful historical analysis with attention to the specific concerns of the main protagonist, who saw himself in special relation to the Prophet Muhammad and thus destined to renew the moral fiber of a nation in crisis. The author does not ignore the tensions between sultan and religious elite or the encroachment of European power into Morocco but shows that the affair is not reducible to a simple logic of power. Bazzaz, rather, attempts to explain why al-Kattānī sought a new formula for Morocco's religious politics. Other saintly figures had led revivals without challenging the system. The overthrow of one sultan for another was meant to correct the imbalance that had resulted from the sultan's increased entanglement with European interests, and al-Kattānī had taken the lead in binding the sultan more closely to the supervision of the religious elite in what is known as the 1908 conditional pledge of allegiance. But the pledge did not hold. The sultan had important allies among the tribal powers of southern Morocco. The populace might have been disgruntled, but 'Abd al-Hafiz was not about to bow to the religious elite.

The author also takes up the nature of al-Kattānī's reformist efforts. Did they express early nationalist sentiment? Sudan at this time offers a parallel case of a quasi-messianic figure contributing to the framing of a national project. For this reason, Bazzaz notes, al-Kattānī's revivalism has been suppressed from the memory of a state-centered nationalist historiography in Morocco that exalts the role of the king in the drive for national independence. Postcolonial myths still reign in Morocco, calling for silence on competing narratives. Still, saintly revivalism extends the length of Morocco's history. How much nationalist coloring should be given to this case? With the sultan colluding with the infidels, al-Kattānī may have felt compelled to overstep his place, and a new era was dawning with the court increasingly beholden to its own bureaucratic centralization as much as its colonial handlers.

How novel is this story? Ibn Khaldun speaks of holy persons who revolt against unjust emirs for the sake of moral renewal, yet notes that if they do not combine their call for reform with powerful alliances, they will have only the populace to rely on and thus risk their destruction. Bazzaz argues that by seeking popular support al-Kattānī actually undermined the hierarchy of holiness on which his own authority was based. Ibn Khaldun sees this as a recurring pattern: a holy person who in his zeal for reform oversteps his traditional place to challenge the ruler fails because he relies too exclusively on the masses apart from the actual powers in society. The pattern fits not only al-Kattānī but also the well-known contemporary opposition figure in Morocco, 'Abd al-Salām Yāsīn.

Saints do not overthrow monarchs unless they have sufficiently powerful allies, notably in the military ranks but also among the religious elite, who today have turned against Yāsīn as their forebears did against al-

Kattānī. It is true that saintly figures today, including members of al-Kattānī's family, do not have the socio-political agency they once did, but we should not be too surprised when patterns of the past intrude into the present. This book will serve scholars for years to come, helping them to think more precisely about the historical significance of the mystical heritage in the politics of national coherency.

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

PETER MARK and JOSÉ DA SILVA HORTA. *The Forgotten Diaspora: Jewish Communities in West Africa and the Making of the Atlantic World*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. xv, 262. \$80.00.

Peter Mark and José da Silva Horta have written an engaging history of the emergence and fading away of Jewish communities in the Petite Côte region of Senegal. Jewish communities differentiated themselves from a larger Portuguese trading diaspora, formed by merchants who established themselves on the mainland away from major centers of Portuguese power. This diaspora contained a substantial number of New Christians (forced converts), some of whom took advantage of new conditions in the early seventeenth century to publicly embrace and reaffirm their identities as Jews. These conditions were the protection offered by African rulers to all merchants from Europe, regardless of nation or religion, and the breach of the Portuguese trading monopoly with the arrival of Dutch, English, and French merchants. While the presence of Jewish merchants has been noted by previous studies, this is the first full examination of their history and their connections with the Atlantic world. Their story appears in documents of the Portuguese Inquisition, which denounced both their religious activities and their "illegal" trade. They also figure in documents dealing with trade and in notarial records in Amsterdam, where a Sephardic Jewish community with ties to both Portugal and the Petite Côte emerged during this period of time.

Jewish communities in Senegal had strong ties with Portugal and New Christians in the Portuguese empire, but their links to the United Provinces, and particularly Amsterdam, were central to their commerce and Jewish identity. The book's first three chapters focus on questions of identity and document the relationships that stretched back and forth between West Africa and Amsterdam. The next two chapters take an excursion into wider horizons, with chapter four focusing on the blade weapons trade in seventeenth-century West Africa and chapter five on Luso-African ivories as historical sources for the weapons trade and the Jewish presence in West Africa. The trade in blade weapons was important, but instead of focusing on Senegambia, the authors argue for direct links between Jewish arms producers in Portugal and Morocco, the Moroccan

invasion of the Niger bend region in 1591, and the growth in the blade weapons trade across northern West Africa, which is described as “explosive” (p. 131). Regional arms production is downplayed, and the book’s analysis totally ignores Atlantic trade in the Gold Coast region, which had far stronger commercial ties to the Niger bend than Senegambia. The chapter on Luso-African ivories offers only a tenuous direct link with the Jewish communities of West Africa but does make connections with other themes such as blade weapons trade. The final chapter returns to questions of identity, which is the book’s main focus.

Portuguese New Christians seized the opportunity presented by Dutch trade to become middlemen for Dutch ships purchasing hides, ivory, beeswax, and other commodities, and then used their ties with the Dutch and Amsterdam to reaffirm their Jewish identity. Most dramatically, this was shown in 1612 when Jacob Peregrino journeyed from Amsterdam bringing sacred texts, his knowledge of Torah, and ritual instruments to perform circumcisions to serve the Jews of Porto D’Ale and Joal as rabbi. Before Peregrino’s arrival, New Christians had been obliged to make a journey to Amsterdam to reestablish their Jewish identities. While the communities were small, by the second decade of the seventeenth century there were at least ten adult males in Porto D’Ale and Joal, where synagogues were established, and the entire Jewish community, including African wives and servants who had converted, may have comprised more than a hundred individuals at this time.

Portuguese Jews first took advantage of a flexible “Senegambian identity model for traveling merchants” (p. 31). This allowed them to claim protection from African rulers, who refused to expel Jewish merchants when they were pressured to do so by Portuguese representatives of the Inquisition. The authors argue that the decision to embrace a public identity as Jews was evidence of “a transition of identity” (p. 59) to a fixed or more exclusive identity as Jews. The final chapter examines the growing significance of the slave trade, its place in the commerce of Jewish communities (indirect linkages primarily), and the return or migration of many prominent Jewish merchants to Amsterdam. These developments were linked to two key shifts in identity: the fading away of Jewish identity among descendants and converts who remained in West Africa, now described as “black Portuguese” who resembled their African neighbors more than they differed from them, and the growing importance of skin color and descent as determinants for inclusion in the Sephardic community in Amsterdam. While not yet fully racialized, these shifts were signs of the racial order emerging in parts of the Atlantic world. Unfortunately, the book’s discussion of identity is more nuanced for Jews than for Africans, who appear in modern terms as Wolof or Serer, Muslim or non-Muslim.

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NWANDO ACHEBE. *The Female King of Colonial Nigeria: Ahebi Ugbabe*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 305. Cloth \$80.00, paper \$29.00, e-book \$23.95.

Like Ahebi Ugbabe, the subject of this rich biography, Nwando Achebe crosses many boundaries to challenge historiographies of gender, sexuality, and colonialism in southeastern Nigeria. More than a woman who “became king,” Ugbabe linked Igbo and Igala regions as a trader, colonial intermediary, translator, and “free woman.” For her part, Achebe incorporates a range of oral, archival, and artistic sources in her attempt to bridge theories of gender and sexuality while sharing a “forgotten” piece of Igbo women’s history.

The book tells the life history of Ahebi Ugbabe against the backdrop of local politics, religious change, and British colonialism in Nigeria, while providing an alternative timeline that reframes the historical narrative. For example, for the period before colonial rule that Achebe renames *oge nwatakili*, or “during the time of (Ugbabe’s) childhood,” Achebe surmises that Ugbabe’s parents tried to marry (enslave) her to a deity (*igo mma ogo*). Achebe notes that such practices had emerged during war and slave-raiding during the nineteenth century (pp. 22, 60). Achebe eschews, perhaps to the detriment of a fuller discussion of colonial encounter, the more common British colonial chronology that emphasizes the flu epidemic of 1919 and other events removed from Ugbabe’s place of birth in Enugu-Ezike. Instead, she argues that a series of gendered performances by Ugbabe, between 1916 and 1948, as returned exile, as headman, as warrant chief, and as ruler marked the history and collective memory of the town where Ugbabe reigned.

One of the most striking and commendable features of Achebe’s book is her use of local terms and concepts to immerse the reader in the specific time, place, and worldview of the Igbo community into which Ugbabe was born and the diverse Igala community to the north where she spent her formative years in exile. Local ideologies shape titles of chapters, provide periodization, and define concepts such as “woman-to-woman marriage.” For example, in these ritualized arrangements whereby wealthy women obtained wives to bear children in their own name or for dependent men in their households, Achebe captures local notions of kinship and sexuality (pp. 145, 148–149). Achebe also explains the deep paradoxes in Ugbabe’s unexpected rise and fall largely through an examination of religious practices, beginning with her parents’ fateful attempt to marry Ugbabe to a deity. After reaching the height of her power, Ugbabe’s own doomed staging of a masquerade led to her ultimate decline. Given the origins of her ordeal, Ugbabe endures in the present day—perhaps ironically, perhaps fittingly—memorialized as a deity.

Despite the book’s focus on local knowledge, however, Achebe sometimes undercuts her own insightful analysis by insisting on terms or connections that seem

out of place. Achebe refers to Ugbabe as a “sex worker” for several pages before discussing different expressions that described women who engaged in a range of sexual liaisons in rural and urban areas during Ugbabe’s early years (pp. 78–81). In fact, Achebe reveals that the people she interviewed called Ugbabe a “free woman” during this time in her life, potentially ascribing other local meanings to Ugbabe’s actions. In an understandable effort to piece together very scattered evidence, Achebe also deploys problematic, but tempting, comparisons to explain or imagine Ugbabe’s behavior, including references to an Igala woman king and princesses from several centuries ago as well as to a modern-day prostitute. Still, Achebe’s exploration of female masculinities and gendered performance make very important contributions, even though biology lurks behind her reliance on terms coded as masculine like “king” and “husband” and qualified by the adjective “female.” Perhaps more interrogation of the interplay between femininities and masculinities would better demonstrate the idea of “female” king and other phrases such as “masculine woman,” drawn from a song performed at Ugbabe’s symbolic burial as a man (p. 192).

Having spent so many years piecing together Ugbabe’s remarkable life, Achebe herself becomes an important character in this narrative, hence the opening comparison in this review of both women’s crossing of boundaries. Achebe discusses her own changing position as researcher and “daughter” in the Enugu-Ezike community and provides glimpses into the struggle involved in collecting oral data, especially in her discussion of interviews with Ugbabe’s oldest surviving relative Barnabas Obeta (p. 161). Achebe seeks to “marr[y] the best that autobiography and personal narrative offer, revealing a text that does not have an obvious personal agenda” (p. 8). Yet, to construct this elaborate story from shards of evidence suggests deep personal and political commitment to a biography that, by its nature, seeks to rewrite history.

Achebe presents a compelling history that embodies yet transcends the local. This thorough and detailed biography will be of great use to specialists in Igbo history and to scholars of women’s and gender history more broadly. Indeed, Ahebi Ugbabe should enter the historiography not only as a singular African woman but also as a masterful leader who manipulated politics, gender relationships, and religion during a turbulent time in southeastern Nigeria and the wider world.

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ALISON LIEBHAFSKY DES FORGES. *Defeat Is the Only Bad News: Rwanda under Musinga, 1896–1931*. Foreword By ROGER V. DES FORGES. (Africa and the Diaspora: History, Politics, Culture.) Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 2011. Pp. xxxviii, 306. Paper \$26.95, e-book \$19.95.

This book represents the posthumous publication of Alison Des Forges’s 1972 Ph.D. dissertation, a political history of the reign of Yuhi Musinga, the Rwandan king who came to power at the advent of colonial rule. It is first and foremost a book about power, a topic that Des Forges knew well. At the time of her death—in a plane crash in Buffalo in February 2009—she was arguably the most well-known and well-versed authority on Rwandan politics. Her deep knowledge of Rwandan culture and language made Des Forges not only a formidable scholar but also an indefatigable champion of human rights. Her unswerving commitment to justice for all earned her a MacArthur Fellowship, but also the enmity of the Rwandan regime that had come to power in 1994, which objected to her insistence that *all* perpetrators be held accountable for their crimes.

Long before Des Forges focused the world’s attention on the genocide in Rwanda, however, she challenged two prevailing and equally specious views of African and Rwandan history. The first was that Africans had no history, and the second was that Rwanda had long been a unified kingdom under a central authority. Des Forges’s work belied both views. In her retelling, Rwandans are highly ambitious, strategic, and factionalized actors who know that “Europeans [are] not the only adversaries, and armed confrontation [is] not the only way to fight” (pp. xvii–xviii).

Des Forges focuses on an extremely crucial period in Rwandan history: the moment when Europeans first arrived in the country. Their arrival coincided with the ascension of a new *mwami* (king) named Musinga. Musinga’s father, Rwabugiri, had designated a different son as his successor but named a favorite wife, Kanjogera, as queen mother because he had killed the mother of his designated heir two years earlier. Kanjogera had a son of her own, however, and with the help of two powerful brothers, she orchestrated a palace coup and placed Musinga on the throne.

Only a few weeks after Musinga’s installation as the new *mwami*, the first German troops arrived on Rwandan soil, followed closely by the first White Father priests. Musinga learned quickly how to use German firepower to expand the court’s reach. Both the Germans and the Belgians helped Musinga to pacify regions that had long resisted court rule. But they also exacted concessions from Musinga, such as the granting of land for Catholic missions and the reorganization of local authority structures. These changes upset the delicate power dynamics and removed the flexibility that had enabled Rwabugiri, and Musinga after him, to keep rivals in check.

Throughout his reign, Musinga fought to maintain his authority. He used a variety of tactics in different situations to deal with colonial administrators and the White Fathers, often playing one set of actors against the other. He worked equally hard to extricate himself from the influence of Kanjogera and her brothers. In the end, however, it was the Belgians who threatened not only Musinga’s rule but the institution of the monarchy itself.

As his power waned, he made greater and greater concession, but refused to capitulate fully. The Belgians finally lost patience and deposed Musinga in 1931. They installed one of his sons as the new *mwami* and sent Musinga into exile, first inside Rwanda, then outside the country, where he died in 1944.

Des Forges organizes the narrative chronologically but covers multiple intrigues in detail, paying close attention to shifts in power and highlighting the dynamic alliances that characterize each episode. This makes the prose dense, but the writing is always sharp and clear.

For her sources, Des Forges uses oral histories to full advantage. She draws on interviews with over one hundred informants to examine closely the inner workings of the Rwandan court, which was riven by violent intrigue long before the first Europeans arrived in the country. She also draws on an array of documents, including diaries the White Fathers maintained at their missions. This diversity of sources provides her with multiple perspectives on court machinations and regional politics.

The book benefits greatly from David Newbury's spare and judicious editing. Newbury brings the citations up to date and resituates Des Forges's work within the current state of knowledge. He adds descriptive chapter and section headings to guide readers and maps and photos to create a visual sense of people and place.

The posthumous publication of her dissertation is fitting testimony to Des Forges's life's work. It not only stands as an important contribution to the historiography of the region, but also serves as a model for understanding the complexities of present-day politics in Rwanda, which, as before, do not lend themselves to static or simplistic analysis. Readers, in sum, will find much to learn and admire in these pages.

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ANDREW IVASKA. *Cultured States: Youth, Gender, and Modern Style in 1960s Dar es Salaam*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 276. Cloth \$84.95, paper \$23.95.

For a host of reasons, Andrew Ivaska's book may stand as a pioneering work in the historiography of postcolonial Africa. In its finely textured depictions of the distinctive cultural imaginaries fueling official and unofficial visions of nation building and citizenship in post-independence Tanzania, the book offers compelling material for broader studies in comparative nationalisms worldwide. The same can be said of its potential contributions to comparative studies of the cosmopolitan sensibilities and social movements of the global 1960s.

Reading this work is an intensely literary experience, in precise and positive senses. In a memorable section of his introduction, Ivaska distances himself from methodologies that privilege interviews and the authenticity of personal voice and memory as bases for social histories of modern Africa. Instead, he argues for sharper

recognition of the vital roles played by local print media in both documenting and shaping social experience and cultural change across the continent, particularly in its cities. Any reader's misgivings regarding Ivaska's methodological and epistemological claims will likely dissolve over the course of the four core chapters, in which extended citations from dozens of individual letters to local newspapers vividly illuminate the complex social and political heteroglossia of Dar es Salaam during the 1960s and early 1970s. Ivaska examines a range of subjectivities and social visions articulated in the letters themselves, as well as the way their viewpoints combined and clashed with one another to form dialogical fields that represented, more richly than any other communicative genre, contemporary tensions and rifts in Tanzania as an "imagined community"—or rather, a community in the midst of constant, conflicting reimaginings.

The first core chapters of the book—one concerning "National Culture and Its Others," and the other "The Age of the Minis"—combine to forge crucial interventions in understandings of the sources and trajectories of anticolonial and post-independence nationalisms in Tanzania, with potentially vital ramifications for comparative inquiry. While Ivaska's emphasis on correspondences between colonialist and elite African nationalist orientations toward the characteristics of traditional cultures and subjectivities is far from original, his documentation and explanations of such affinities are compelling and illuminating. Ivaska describes in striking detail the vehemence with which the Nyerere regime attacked urban youths who transgressed the traditional social values, as promoted through official discourse, of authentic, predominately rural national culture. The first two chapters examine official criticisms of youth culture and banning campaigns that targeted the widespread passion for African American soul music, young women's taste for miniskirts, and popular yearnings for other cosmopolitan forms deemed incongruous with socialist models of citizenship. Beyond chronicling and analyzing the efflorescence of proscriptive cultural stances and strategies in state ideology and policy across the 1960s, Ivaska illuminates the fascinating, unforeseen ramifications of such efforts to police and differentiate between desirable and undesirable manifestations of Tanzania's modernization. In the end, the pressures exerted by state cultural politics tended to sharpen, rather than dispel, young people's desires to experience and participate in global cultural currents whose modernist meanings, ideals, and pleasures altogether defied the defensive, territorializing orientations and tactics of the nationalist regime.

Depending on the reader's interests, the other two core chapters—one exploring student and faculty politics at the elite University College, Dar es Salaam, and the other public responses to new national marriage laws—may prove equally intriguing. Ivaska documents the dramatic confrontations between late colonial elites (headed by Julius Nyerere and other officials in the post-independence government) and university stu-

dents who strove to cultivate their influence and wealth within the new nation. This memorable chapter describes the university's extraordinarily vigorous socialist-internationalist intellectual and political environment during the late 1960s. Intellectual stars ranging from faculty members Walter Rodney and Giovanni Arrighi to visiting luminaries such as C. L. R. James, Stokely Carmichael, Angela Davis, and Samir Amin, alongside foreign students including future Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, contributed to the university's radical environment. The university community, which was often intensely critical of the capitalist biases of Tanzanian socioeconomic policies, met with harsh retaliation from the Nyerere regime. The last chapter,

on public responses to marriage reforms, features a productive critical engagement with the work of Achille Mbembe and examines the Cameroonian historian's emphases on postcolonial conviviality and "zombification." Although Ivaska is sympathetic to Mbembe's observations and insights, he insists that radical dynamisms and openness characterized the public culture of postcolonial Dar es Salaam. Thus, Dar es Salaam emerges not as a mere "postcolony" but as an ever-changing, cosmopolitan city unfolding and expanding across other horizons.

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Collected Essays

These volumes, recently received in the *AHR* office, do not lend themselves readily to unified reviews; the contents are therefore listed.

METHODS/THEORY

SUSAN A. MILLER and JAMES RIDING IN, editors. *Native Historians Write Back: Decolonizing American Indian History*. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press. 2011. Pp. ix, 280. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$45.00.

SUSAN A. MILLER, *Native America Writes Back: The Origin of the Indigenous Paradigm in Historiography*. SUSAN A. MILLER, *Native Historians Write Back: The Indigenous Paradigm in American Indian Historiography*. ELIZABETH COOK-LYNN, *The Lewis and Clark Story, the Captive Narrative, and the Pitfalls of Indian History*. LOMAYUMTEWA C. ISHII, *Hopi Culture and a Matter of Representation*. VINE DELORIA, JR., *The United States Has No Jurisdiction in Sioux Territory*. MATTHEW L. JONES, *Wahtohtana héda Nyút ^ achi Mahín Xánje Akípa: The Year the Otoe and Missouri Meet the Americans*. WINONA STEVERSON, *Calling Badger and the Symbols of the Spirit Language: The Cree Origins of the Syllabic System*. LEANNE SIMPSON, *Looking after Gdoo-naaganinaa: Precolonial Nishnaabeg Diplomatic and Treaty Relationships*. DONNA L. AKERS, *Removing the Heart of the Choctaw People: Indian Removal from a Native Perspective*. WAZIYATAWIN ANGELA WILSON, *Decolonizing the 1862 Death Marches*. JAMES RIDING IN, *The United States v. Yellow Sun et al. (the Pawnee People): A Case Study of Institutional and Societal Racism and U.S. Justice in Nebraska from the 1850s to the 1870s*. STEVEN J. CRUM, *The Ruby Valley Indian Reservation of Northeastern Nevada: "Six Miles Square."* JENNIFER NEZ DENETDALE, *Chairmen, Presidents, and Princesses: The Navajo Nation, Gender, and the Politics of Tradition*. SUSAN A. MILLER, *Seminole and Africans under Seminole Law: Sources and Discourses of Tribal Sovereignty and "Black Indian" Entitlement*. MYLA VICENTI CARPIO, *Countering Colonization: The Albuquerque Laguna Colony*. JAMES RIDING IN, *Six Pawnee Crania: Historical and Contemporary Issues Associated with the Massacre and Decapitation of Pawnee Indians in 1869*.

COMPARATIVE/WORLD

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ERIK MUEGGLER, *The Eyes of Others: Race, "Gaping," and Companionship in the Scientific Exploration of Southwest China*. DENISE M. GLOVER, *At Home in Two Worlds: Ernest Henry Wilson as Natural Historian*. TAMARA WYSS, *Searching for the "Lolos": Tracking Fritz and Hedwig Weiss's Trip to the Liangshan Region in 1913*. ALVIN YOSHINAGA et al., *Classifying Joseph Rock: Metamorphic, Conglomerate, and Sedimentary*. MARGARET B. SWAIN, *Franco-Catholic Modernizer Paul Vial: His Legacy amongst the Sani Yi*. CHARLES F. MCKHANN and ALAN WAXMAN, *David Crockett Graham: American Missionary and Scientist in Sichuan, 1911–1948*. JEFF KYONG-McCLAIN and GENG JING, *David Crockett Graham in Chinese Intellectual History: Foreigner as Nation Builder*. MAGNUS FISKESJÖ,

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MICHAEL DEGRUCCIO, Letting the War Slip through Our Hands: Material Culture and the Weakness of Words in the Civil War Era. MEGAN KATE NELSON, The Pleasures of Civil War Ruins. RODNEY J. STEWARD, Confederate Menace: Sequestration on the North Carolina Home Front. LEEANN WHITES, The Tale of Three Kates: Outlaw Women, Loyalty, and Missouri's Long Civil War. ANYA JABOUR, "Days of Lightly-won and Lightly-held Hearts": Courtship and Coquetry in the Southern Confederacy. STEVEN E. NASH, Love Is a Battlefield: Lizzie Alsop's Flirtation with the Confederacy. BARTON A. MYERS, Dissecting the Torture of Mrs. Owens: The Story of a Civil War Atrocity. JOAN E. CASHIN, Hungry People in the Wartime South: Civilians, Armies, and the Food Supply. STEPHEN BERRY, The Historian as Death Investigator. AMY MURRELL TAYLOR, How a Cold Snap in Kentucky Led to Freedom for Thousands: An Environmental Story of Emancipation. PAUL CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON, Rituals of Horsemanship: A Speculation on the Ring Tournament and the Origins of the Ku Klux Klan. ANDREW L. SLAP, The Loyal Deserters: African American Soldiers and Community in Civil War Memphis. KENNETH W. NOE, The Arrest and Court-Martial of Captain George Dobson. PETER S. CARMICHAEL, Soldier-Speak. DANIEL E. SUTHERLAND, The Civil War Career of General James Abbott Whistler. BRIAN CRAIG MILLER, Confederate Amputees and the Women Who Loved (or Tried to Love) Them. DIANE MILLER SOMMERVILLE, "Will They Ever Be Able to Forget?" Confederate Soldiers and Mental Illness in the Defeated South. LESLEY J. GORDON, Ira Forbes's War.

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DIARMAID MACCULLOCH, Calvin: Fifth Latin Doctor of the Church? HARRO M. HÖPFL, The Ideal of *Aristocratia Politiae Vicina* in the Calvinist Political Tradition. MAX ENGAMMARE, Calvin the Workaholic. OLIVIER MILLET, Calvin's Self-Awareness as Author. WILLIAM NAPHY, Calvin's Church in Geneva: Constructed or Gathered? Local or Foreign? French or Swiss? EMIDIO CAMPI, Calvin, the Swiss Reformed Churches, and the European Reformation. HERMAN SELDERHUIS, Calvin, 1509–2009. HEINZ SCHILLING, Calvinism as an Actor in the Early Modern State System around 1600: Struggle for Alliances, Patterns of Eschatological Interpretation, Symbolic Representation. RICHARD A. MULLER, Reception and Response: Referencing and Understanding Calvin in Seventeenth-Century Calvinism. ERNESTINE VAN DER WALL, The Dutch Enlightenment and the Distant Calvin. ANDRÉ ENCREVÉ, Lost, then Found: Calvin in French Protestantism, 1830–1940. FRIEDRICH WILHELM GRAF, Calvin in the Plural: The Diversity of Modern Interpretations of Calvinism, Especially in Germany and the English-Speaking World. CORNELIS VAN DER KOOL, Calvin, Modern Calvinism, and Civil Society: The Appropriation of a Heritage, with Particular Reference to the Low Countries. DAVID BEBBINGTON, Calvin and British Evangelicalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. JOHN W. DE GRUCHY, Calvin(ism) and Apartheid in South Africa in the Twentieth Century: The Making and Unmaking of a Racial Ideology.

MARTIN DINGES and ROBERT JÜTTE, editors. *The Transmission of Health Practices (c. 1500 to 2000)*. (Medizin, Gesellschaft und Geschichte.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. 2011. Pp. 190. €36.00.

ANGELA DAVIS, "When I Was Young You Just Went and Asked Your Mother": The Changing Role of Friends and Kin in the Transmission of Knowledge about Maternity in Post-1945 Brit-

ain. WILLEMIJN RUBERG, "Mother Knows Best": The Transmission of Knowledge of the Female Body and Venereal Diseases in Nineteenth-Century Dutch Rape Cases. SUSANNE HOFFMANN, Dental Care as Daily Routine: Popularization and Practice of Prophylactic Dental hygiene in the German-Speaking World, c. 1890–1930. GEMMA BLOK, The Politics of Intoxication: Dutch Junkie Unions Fight against the Ideal of a Drug-Free Society, 1975–1990. CARMEN M. MANGION, "Give Them Practical Lessons": Catholic Women Religious and the Transmission of Nursing Knowledge in Late Nineteenth-Century England. KAREN NOLTE, "Local Missionaries": Community Deaconesses in Early Nineteenth-Century Health Care. ANDREAS WEIGL, The Rise and Fall of the *Fürsorgerin* (Female Welfare Worker) in Austrian Public Health Policies: Theory and Practice of a Professional Link within a Changing Social and Epidemiological Framework. JOHN STEWART, The Medical Mission of British Child Guidance 1918–1950: Theory and Practice. ANDREAS GOLOB, Socratic Stories as Vehicles of Health Education: The Case of Johann Jakob Gabriel's "Von den Mitteln die Gesundheit zu erhalten." HARRY OOSTERHUIS, "Not Very Happy and Mixed with a Lot of Nervousness": The Priest as Therapist in Catholic Mental Health Care.

LEWIS H. SIEGELBAUM, editor. *The Socialist Car: Automobility in the Eastern Bloc*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2011. Pp. vii, 242. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$24.95.

VALENTINA FAVA, The Elusive People's Car: Imagined Automobility and Productive Practices along the "Czechoslovak Road to Socialism" (1945–1968). MARIUSZ JASTRZĄB, Cars as Favors in People's Poland. GYÖRGY PÉTERI, Alternative Modernity? Everyday Practices of Elite Mobility in Communist Hungary, 1956–1980. ELKE BEYER, Planning for Mobility: Designing City Centers and New Towns in the USSR and the GDR in the 1960s. BRIGITTE LE NORMAND, Automobility in Yugoslavia between Urban Planner, Market, and Motorist: The Case of Belgrade, 1945–1972. ESTHER MEIER, On the Streets of a Truck-Building City: Naberezhnye Chelny in the Brezhnev Era. ELI RUBIN, Understanding a Car in the Context of a System: Trabants, Marzahn, and East German Socialism. LUMINITA GATEJEL, The Common Heritage of the Socialist Car Culture. KURT MÖSER, *Autobasteln*: Modifying, Maintaining, and Repairing Private Cars in the GDR, 1970–1990. LEWIS H. SIEGELBAUM, "Little Tsars of the Road": Soviet Truck Drivers and Automobility, 1920s–1980s. CORINNA KUHR-KOROLEV, Women and Cars in Soviet and Russian Society.

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CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

- BOWERS, WILLIAM T., and JOHN T. GREENWOOD, editors. *Passing the Test: Combat in Korea, April–June 1951*. (Battles and Campaigns.) Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. 2011. Pp. xxi, 447. \$40.00.
- BURTON, MYRA F., and EDWARD C. KEEFER, editors. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976. Volume XXVIII: Southern Africa*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 2011. Pp. xxxvii, 751. \$70.00.
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- HOOVER, HERBERT. *Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover's Secret History of the Second World War and Its Aftermath*. Edited by GEORGE H. NASH. (Hoover Institution Press Publication, number 598.) Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. 2011. Pp. cxx, 957. \$49.95.
- HOWLAND, NINA, CRAIG DAIGLE, and EDWARD C. KEEFER, editors. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976. Volume XXV: Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973*. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 2011. Pp. xxxiii, 1244. \$78.00.
- MORRIS, GOUVERNEUR. *The Diaries of Gouverneur Morris: European Travels, 1794–1798*. Edited by MELANIE RANDOLPH MILLER, HENDRINA KROL, and ELIZABETH HINES. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. 2011. Pp. xl, 736. \$99.50.
- PALLITTO, ROBERT M., editor. *Torture and State Violence in the United States: A Short Documentary History*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2011. Pp. xvi, 272. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$25.00.
- SCHWENINGER, LEE, editor. *The First We Can Remember: Colorado Pioneer Women Tell Their Stories*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2011. Pp. xliii, 363. \$35.00.

CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA

- GRANDIN, GREG, DEBORAH T. LEVENSON, and ELIZABETH OGLESBY, editors. *The Guatemala Reader: History, Culture,*

Politics. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2011. Pp. xxii, 663. Cloth \$99.95, paper \$29.95.

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EUROPE: ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL

- The Deeds of the Franks and Other Jerusalem-Bound Pilgrims: The Earliest Chronicle of the First Crusades*. Edited and translated by NIRMAL DASS. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. 2011. Pp. vi, 154. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$24.95, e-book \$23.99.
- The Proceedings against the Templars in the British Isles: Volume 2, The Translation*. Translated by HELEN J. NICHOLSON. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2011. Pp. lx, 653. \$154.95.
- SÄNGER, PATRICK. *Veteranen unter den Severern und frühen Soldatenkaisern: Die Dokumentensammlungen der Veteranen Aelius Sarapammon und Aelius Syron*. (Heidelberger Althistorische Beiträge und Epigraphische Studien, number 48.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. 2011. Pp. 413. €59.00.

EUROPE: EARLY MODERN AND MODERN

- DE MUN, ALBERT, and HUBERT LYAUTEY. *Correspondence 1891–1914*. Edited by PHILIPPE LEVILLAIN and GILLES FERRAGU. Paris: Société de l'histoire de France, distributed by Librairie Droz. 2011. Pp. xxxiv, 284. €60.00.
- LEDYARD, JOHN. *John Ledyard's Journey through Russia and Siberia, 1787–1788: The Journal and Selected Letters*. Edited by STEPHEN D. WATROUS. Reprint. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 293. \$29.95.

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA

- BALLOBAR, CONDE DE. *Jerusalem in World War II: The Palestine Diary of a European Diplomat*. Edited by EDUARDO MANZANO MORENO and ROBERTO MAZZA. Foreword by ROBERTO MAZZA. New York: I. B. Tauris. 2011. Pp. xvi, 283. £59.50.

Other Books Received

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METHODS/THEORY

- DIACU, FLORIN. *The Lost Millennium: History's Timetables under Siege*. 2d ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 237. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$25.00.
- PIERENKEMPER, TONI, editor. *Unternehmensgeschichte*. (Basistexte Geschichte, number 7.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. 2011. Pp. 265. €24.00.
- ROTH, MICHAEL S. *Memory, Trauma, and History: Essays on Living with the Past*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2012. Pp. xxxv, 293. Cloth \$84.50, paper \$27.50, e-book \$21.99.

COMPARATIVE/WORLD

- BENNETT, BRETT M., and JOSEPH M. HODGE, editors. *Science and Empire: Knowledge and Networks of Science across the British Empire, 1800-1970*. (Britain and the World.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. Pp. xvii, 346. \$95.00.
- CASEY, STEVEN, and JONATHAN WRIGHT, editors. *Mental Maps in the Early Cold War Era, 1945-68*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. Pp. xi, 314. \$85.00.
- DONALD, GRAEME. *Loose Cannons: 101 Myths, Mishaps, and Misadventures of Military History*. Paperback edition. Guilford, Conn.: Lyons Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 260. \$13.95.
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- MCCLOSKEY, DEIRDRE N. *Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can't Explain the Modern World*. Paperback edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2011. Pp. xvi, 571. \$22.50.
- PURDUE, A. W. *The Second World War*. (European History in Perspective.) 2d ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. Pp. xviii, 216. Cloth \$100.00, paper \$32.00.
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REVIEWS

TO THE EDITORS:

Although I was pleased that Eric Ehrenreich, someone familiar with Nazi racial practices, has reviewed my book, *The Nazi Symbiosis: Human Genetics and Politics in the Third Reich* (AHR, December 2011, 1587–1588), I am disappointed by several of the questions he raised, which seem less pertinent to my study than to issues he has articulated in his own publications.

Ehrenreich suggests that I have “not thoroughly address[ed] the role geneticists played in supporting Nazi racism.” He also contends that I did not include a discussion of the “unscientific” nature of Fischer’s and especially von Verschuer’s pronouncements on the “Jewish question” in my book. Moreover, he faults me for not analyzing their racial certificates to demonstrate how nefarious their ostensible pseudo-scientific pronouncements were for subjects forced to offer proof (or lack thereof) of their Aryan ancestry—something which, at least after 1941, could spell death for the individual in question.

There is a simple answer to his last concern: While I was writing my book, I had access to only two racial certificates from von Verschuer, including the one in Ehrenreich’s study, *The Nazi Ancestral Proof: Genealogy, Racial Science, and the Final Solution* (2007). I did not believe then, and I do not think now, that two *Rassegutachten* tell us anything significant. Fortunately, I have subsequently located and analyzed over 120 such racial certificates from von Verschuer’s Frankfurt Institute, one-third written by his doctoral student Josef

Mengele. The conclusions, forthcoming in *Central European History* next year, demonstrate, among other things, that von Verschuer and his assistants more often than not used the very ambiguity regarding “Jewish character traits” to the benefit of the subject in question—a fact as surprising to me as it will be to others.

The reviewer’s other criticisms are relevant to his last. Ehrenreich appears to be one of the few scholars who still insist on using the term “pseudo-science” in describing von Verschuer and other biomedical professionals’ pronouncements on “race” during the Third Reich. The idea of “pseudo-science” might make rhetorical sense in jurisprudence, but neither I nor most mainstream historians or sociologists of science share Ehrenreich’s supposition that the human sciences are value-free. According to Ehrenreich’s definition of science, much of early-twentieth-century anthropology, and not just German anthropology, would be unscientific. I submit that it is far more illuminating to recognize that there is a symbiosis between science and politics under all forms of government and that my book’s story emerges as a devastating illustration of this phenomenon under admittedly unique historical circumstances. Science, I can only rejoin, is what is accepted as science by its practitioners, appears in peer-reviewed journals, and is funded by scientific agencies and governments.

Yet these differences of opinion between me and Ehrenreich did not result in my failure to point out that the geneticists in question used their prestige in the cause of Nazi antisemitism. For example, I analyzed Fischer’s virulent antisemitic speech in occupied Paris (pp. 215–216). Moreover, I established not only that both Fischer and von Verschuer gave talks supporting antisemitism at the infamous Reich Institute for the New Germany (p. 103), but showed how they supported the racism of the regime in their national and international professional talks (chap. 4). These are but a few examples.

But the real reason that I did not take up the issues for which Ehrenreich indicts me is that they are not germane to the purpose of my work. The volume is not exclusively focused on Nazi racial antisemitism. Since Ehrenreich neither addressed what is meant by the title of my book nor stated or discussed its thesis—something one might expect of a reviewer—let me do so briefly. Based on four case studies of the interface of

human genetics and politics under the swastika, two dealing with the production of human genetic knowledge and two dealing with its dissemination, I sought to demonstrate *how* and *why* human heredity and Nazi racial policy became “mutually beneficial resources for each other” (Mitchell Ash)—in other words, how they became symbiotic. And there is a reason for this inquiry. I wanted to provide an answer to the following question: What, if anything, was uniquely “Nazi” about human genetics during the Third Reich? There were, after all, eugenics movements and racial science in other countries. My thesis: “the symbiosis that ensued between human heredity and the broad political context of Nazism served to radicalize them both.” This was particularly evident during Germany’s “racial war” in the East “when the symbiosis turned deadly.” Finally, I sought to clarify that this symbiosis was the product of historical contingency—“the coming together of a dictatorial regime for which race and heredity serves as an ideological cornerstone and a mature eugenics movement for which race and heredity functioned as its epistemological categories” (p. 306). It is my hope that my thesis will become the subject of future historical debates surrounding the human and moral tragedy of this “Nazi symbiosis.” In any case, the last thing I wish my audience to take away from my book is that the road that led some German biomedical professionals to the gates of Auschwitz was their intentional decision to pursue a “pseudo-scientific” agenda for political purposes.

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ERIC EHRENREICH RESPONDS:

In her response, Sheila Weiss avers that my review ignores the central thesis of her book: “the symbiosis that ensued between human heredity and the broad political context of Nazism served to radicalize them both.” I disagree. The first paragraph of my review directly quotes Weiss to this effect. Indeed, my own work on Nazi racism supports this conclusion.

However, the last sentence of Weiss’s response actually undergirds my central critique of her book. There, she states: “the last thing I wish my audience to take away from my book is that the road that led some German biomedical professionals to the gates of Auschwitz was their intentional decision to pursue a ‘pseudo-scientific’ agenda for political purposes.” A major problem with Weiss’s book is that it ignores evidence, and avoids analytical perspectives, that might support just such a view.

The first chapter of my book *The Nazi Ancestral Proof* demonstrates that during the Third Reich, as before, virtually all prominent hereditary scientists in Germany were in accord as to what constituted valid scientific methodology: carefully gathered data, logically interpreted, and subject to experimental verification. My book also demonstrates that these scientists did not use this methodology in their “racial scientific” work. Ver-

schuer was a primary example. His work on the heritability of tuberculosis clearly complied with the foregoing methodology. His work on Jewish racial characteristics, essentially a series of unproven assertions swathed in scientific verbiage, clearly did not. In other words, his latter work was “pseudo-scientific.”

That Weiss had access to only two racial investigations by Verschuer during her research in no way undermines my critique. Verschuer’s 1938 article “Racial Biology of the Jews,” which Weiss mentions nowhere in her work, provides a particularly blatant example of pseudo-scientific reasoning. And *The Nazi Ancestral Proof* also demonstrates that Verschuer was only one of many German biomedical scientists who engaged in this double standard in service of Nazi racial policy. That Weiss’s subsequent research indicates that Verschuer used this incoherent methodology to benefit certain individuals is also irrelevant to the question of whether this “racial scientific” work was in fact pseudo-scientific.

Taking issue with my use of the term “pseudo-scientific,” Weiss writes: “neither I nor most mainstream historians or sociologists of science share Ehrenreich’s supposition that the human sciences are value-free.” Here, Weiss imputes an argument to me that I do not make. Nowhere do I claim that “scientific” equals “value-free.” Rather, I argue that allegedly scientific conclusions that were not derived through use of a widely agreed-upon scientific method in the 1930s and 1940s constituted “pseudo-science,” even in the context of that time. That Weiss’s book fails to make this distinction, or even to acknowledge that such a distinction might be made, is, in my opinion, a serious flaw in a work that seeks to analyze the *how* and *why* of the symbiotic relationship between the Nazi regime and German biomedical scientists. It in fact goes to the heart of the question of whether German biomedical professionals were willing to pursue a “pseudo-scientific” agenda for political purposes.

Essentially, Weiss’s book leaves the impression that, although the results of the German hereditary scientists’ racial scientific work were often regrettable, they were nevertheless the result of a good-faith application of their scientific training. Any resulting horror was due to their use of the scientific method unfettered by moral constraints. My work shows something quite different. In the field of “racial science,” these scientists demonstrably abandoned the widely accepted scientific method of their time in order to reach predetermined conclusions about “racial characteristics,” while all the while insisting on their strict adherence to the most rigorous scientific standards. And this, I argue, constituted the Nazi regime’s most important source of ideological support. This was also the key to the symbiotic relationship between the scientists and the regime. Weiss may disagree. But simply ignoring alternative explanations and evidence does not make for compelling scholarship.

ERIC EHRENREICH
Washington, D.C.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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



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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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

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

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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In This Issue

The April issue contains five articles on subjects that range chronologically from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century and topically from medieval scholasticism and disputes over property in eighteenth-century North America to U.S. politics after the Civil War, the slave trade in the nineteenth-century Mediterranean, and African art in interwar Paris. There are also three featured reviews, followed by our usual extensive book review section. "In Back Issues" draws attention to articles and features in the *AHR* from one hundred, seventy-five, and fifty years ago.

Articles

In "Toward a Cultural History of Scholastic Disputation," **Alex J. Novikoff** tackles one of the most fundamental and characteristic features of medieval learning, arguing that it had large implications for the cultural history of the period. He begins by examining how scholastic disputation has traditionally been examined, its relation to the form of the dialogue, and how the two might be examined together in light of disputation's far-reaching effect on medieval society. Deploying an array of source material from the eleventh to the thirteenth century, the article distinguishes five elements of a medieval culture of disputation, ranging from the monastic environment of Anselm and his followers to polyphonic music, debate poetry, and Jewish-Christian disputations. In examining how dialogue escaped its literary origin and passed from an idea among few to a cultural practice among many, Novikoff offers a mode of cultural history based on the passage of ideas into practices.

In "Commons and Enclosure in the Colonization of North America," **Allan Greer** highlights the importance of common property for Spanish, English, and French settlers of colonial North America, as well as for the indigenous peoples they displaced. Whereas many historians, following the lead of John Locke, tend to equate colonization with the privatization of an open commons, evoking something resembling an overseas extension of the enclosure movement, Greer argues that a colonial commons in various guises played a central role in wresting control of land from the possession of natives. In New Spain, New England, the Chesapeake, and to a much lesser degree New France, livestock ranged freely, much to the detriment of Indian property and Indian subsistence. The confrontation of the indigenous commons and the colonial commons typically resulted in the triumph of the latter, thus clearing

the way for a later stage of enclosure and settler private property in land. While Greer focuses on the early modern period, he also suggests that a similar pattern of clashing commons can be discerned in the nineteenth-century histories of South Africa, Australia, and the western plains of North America.

In "The Mexicanization of American Politics: The United States' Transnational Path from Civil War to Stabilization," **Gregory P. Downs** treats post-bellum history not as a time of reconciliation and stability but rather as a period haunted by fears that the end of the Civil War might lead only to more civil conflict. This concern was expressed in a now-forgotten but then-common discourse evoking the historical example of Mexico as a harbinger of permanent instability as the result of civil war. Recasting the contested 1876 U.S. presidential election as a process of stabilization, Downs recovers the prevalence of the Mexican example, which served both to give voice to popular anxiety and to coax politicians toward a peaceful resolution of the crisis. By evoking contemporary fears of the possibility of state collapse, he provides an image of a strangely vulnerable nineteenth-century United States. He also critiques conventional nationalistic accounts that paradoxically have made the Civil War proof of the impossibility of future U.S. civil wars. Finally, the article suggests the relevance of transnational history to the study of domestic politics.

In "The Children of the Desert and the Laws of the Sea: Austria, Great Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and the Mediterranean Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century," **Alison Frank** shows that Austrian ships were used by slave traders to transport enslaved Africans from Alexandria and other African ports to Constantinople and other Ottoman cities on the Mediterranean from the 1840s through the 1870s. Although Ottomanists and Africanists have long known that the Mediterranean was rife with slaving throughout the nineteenth century, its history has been largely overshadowed by the story of the Atlantic slave trade, on the one hand, and nineteenth-century abolitionism, on the other. Frank thus suggests a shift in the timeline of slavery and antislavery to the very long period of ongoing slaving after the so-called abolition of the Atlantic slave trade in the first decade of the nineteenth century. Her article shows how the politics of abolition and the logic of free trade forced Austria to confront the limitations of its legal theories of freedom and liberal understandings of self-interest. Austria's conviction that it was not implicated in the slave trade left it ill-equipped to handle the complexities of slavery once its involvement was exposed.

In "Surface Tensions: Empire, Parisian Modernism, and 'Authenticity' in African Sculpture, 1917–1939," **John Warne Monroe** looks closely at the reception of African sculpture in the interwar period in order to reassess what has been a thorny theoretical problem among cultural anthropologists and art historians: the complex and vexed capacity to appreciate so-called "traditional" objects from Africa, Oceania, and the Americas as art in the Western sense. He notes that what can seem from one angle to be a condescending emphasis on the Western connoisseur's "eye" in judging the value of exotic objects can seem from another to be a powerful means of celebrating the creative achievements of peoples and cultures previously written

off in racist terms. Rather than taking sides on this question, his article builds on the insights of the new colonial history to show how the coexistence of these two points of view can be seen as a legacy of the historical situation in which the idea of primitive art first emerged. This ambivalent aesthetic category, he argues, was shaped by the unique conditions of interwar France, a society distinguished both by its paradoxical attempt to function as an imperial republic and by the global influence its avant-garde exerted in cultural matters. Considered from this perspective, the emergence of the idea of primitive art suggests a new way of thinking about aesthetic modernism, its spread across geographic and cultural borders, and its relation to empire.

The June issue will contain an article on vaccine testing in interwar Algiers and an *AHR* Forum on "Historiographical 'Turns' in Critical Perspective."

In Back Issues

In the hope of encouraging readers to dip into the long history of scholarship contained in the pages of the *American Historical Review* (now in the 117th year of its publishing history), and to take advantage of the digital availability of this archive to most readers, the *AHR* editors offer a look back at issues from one hundred, seventy-five, and fifty years ago. What follows is not a comprehensive survey of the contents of those issues, but rather a glance at some of the articles and other features that might be of interest, or even of use, today.

Volume 17, Number 3 (April 1912)

The five articles in the April 1912 issue remain within the orbit of North American-British history, and are largely confined to the chronological limits of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. Certainly the most lively, though also the most narrow in scope, is "The Trent Affair," by Charles Francis Adams, president of the American Historical Association in 1901 and the direct descendant of two U.S. presidents. His brother was the well-known historian and author Henry Adams. From 1884 to 1890, Charles Francis Adams led the Union Pacific Company and thereby, as Richard White documents in his 2011 book *Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America*, played a central role in the creation of a transcontinental railroad system. "The Trent Affair" recounts an episode from the first year of the Civil War, which saw a Union warship intercept a British vessel, the *Trent*, carrying two Southern envoys in transit to London to lobby for the interests of the Confederacy. Adams's article is a rather pedestrian, blow-by-blow narrative of the story, focusing mostly on the communications and commentary, both public and private, voiced by American and British officials and observers over the legitimacy, legality, and wisdom of the U.S. captain's actions. If his account is less than insightful or novel, it is personal and judgmental, given to broad characterizations and critical pronouncements. One passage immediately leaps off the page, at least for a twenty-first-century reader: Adams recalls his first exposure to the affair as news of the *Trent*'s capture reached Boston several weeks after it happened. (He was a twenty-six-year-old lawyer working for Richard Henry Dana, Jr., the expert in maritime law best known as the author of *Two Years before the Mast*.) Throughout the account, he indulges in the sort of psychological commentaries that most present-day historians find suspect, if not downright inappropriate. Interestingly, most redound

to the discredit of the Unionists. Noting the public pronouncements in the press, he writes, "they are more suggestive of the incoherences [*sic*] of the inmates of an insane asylum than of any well-considered expression of the organs of a sober and policed community." When news of the ship's capture became known, "the United States went crazy," he writes. To be sure, he expresses relief that "popular effervescence" has finally waned, noting with axiomatic (self)-assurance, "An Anglo-Saxon community rarely goes daft permanently." But if his article is marked by a superiority and condescension with regard to the collective passions provoked by this affair—which it certainly is—he also implicates himself, at least retrospectively. Adams's father was ambassador to the Court of St. James during the Civil War. With a laconic lack of precision that only sharpens the irony, he writes, "two of the sons of Mr. Adams[,] in private correspondence, foamed at the mouth, swearing inextinguishable hatred of Great Britain and asseverating an unalterable determination to bide their time for revenge on that arrogant and overbearing nationality." Adams's article is thus a brief for politics guided by reason and interests, not passion or enthusiasm—statecraft "worthy of a Cavour or a Bismarck," he notes tellingly. But it also reflects his generation's own reassessment of the passionate commitments and certitudes that guided their youth.

Volume 42, Number 3 (April 1937)

Probably the most interesting article in the April 1937 issue is an essay on historical thinking co-authored by the renowned historian (and president of the AHA in 1933) Charles A. Beard and the German exile scholar Alfred Vagts (who was also Beard's son-in-law). "Currents of Thought in Historiography" begins with a long retrospective look at the demise of Rankean historicism, continues with an even longer consideration of the new "historism" of Friedrich Meinecke based on his just-published book *Die Entstehung des Historismus* (1936), and then concludes with a challenge to American historians to embrace a more sophisticated and reflective understanding of the theory and practice of history. Their analysis of Meinecke's work is erudite and informed, providing readers of the journal with an appreciative interpretation of the German scholar's approach to historiography, which, in this book, at least, emphasizes its deep historical roots. Their patient exposition, which acknowledges the contribution of other historians, especially Benedetto Croce, seems to be guided by the implicit assumption that U.S. historians remain largely ignorant of European developments in historiography, because of either their limited linguistic capabilities or a willful ignorance based on intellectual provincialism. Indeed, their condescension is ill-disguised. While acknowledging "that widening circles of European historical criticism and constructive efforts will reach these shores," they also posit a significant time lag, suggesting with some exasperation that "the problems that disturbed Croce about 1912 may become insistent in the United States about 1950." But they are far from advising a slavish adoption of European thinking, however much they lament the desire among U.S. scholars "to escape . . . the imputation that they themselves have some philosophy or scheme of controlling values when they cry out that they have none." They insistently reject biological or other scientific vocabulary

and concepts in historical thinking, declaring, "if historiography is to get at the realities of its subject matter, it must firmly discard such words and employ a terminology appropriate to, corresponding to, its own subject matter." The overriding theme of the essay, however, seems to be a sophisticated defense of the relativistic nature of historical inquiry, here understood as simply rooted in the individuality of every historian. "Each historian does have his 'scheme of reference,' or his operating conception of values, truth, and importance . . . no matter how vehemently he denies its existence." But they firmly discount the dispiriting assumption that relativism leads to skepticism, intellectual chaos, or worse, offering the interesting argument that "there are not available as many distinct schemes of reference as there are historians . . . both the number and character of the frames of reference are knowable." Moreover, these schemes, they insist, possess "common features" and are "open to practical testing in the movement of history as time unfolds." And, lest one suspect that relativism somehow implies a weakening of professional practice, they declare, "Knowledge is still to be obtained by the methods of bibliography, scrutiny, authentication, and verification." Finally, Beard and Vagts project an optimistic vision of historical practice, which they say "has been widened until it reaches toward the very borders of culture in all its manifestations." The result, they conclude, bodes well for the contemporary relevance of history; for these Progressive historians, this is indeed axiomatic. If the histories produced "are full, accurate, comprehensive, systematic—the fruits of tireless industry and a bold conception of historical obligations—so much the better for grand public policy."

Volume 67, Number 3 (April 1962)

There are two articles in the April 1962 issue that are notable in broaching large topics of general concern. In "Distinctive Traits of Western Civilization: Through the Eyes of Western Historians," Gerhard Masur, a German-educated historian of Europe and Latin America, offers a learned though also somewhat brisk survey of works of universal history from Bossuet and Voltaire to Weber and Toynbee, with stops along the way to acknowledge those thinkers—Hegel, Marx, Tocqueville, Burckhardt, Croce, Spengler, and others—who, while they did not all write history in this mode, nevertheless contributed to the conception of the history of the West as synonymous with history *tout court*. This indeed seems to be his point: that, owing in part to the legacy of Christianity, the history of the Christian West has been understood as describing the history of all of humanity. His conclusion, however, suggests the possibility of a departure from this restrictive understanding, a possibility that could be realized only "by a generation of historians for whom the unity of the historical world had become an experienced and acknowledged destiny." That possibility was now: "There can be little doubt that such an experience is, if not yet an established fact, at least in the making." Masur, then, is a prophet of world history—a global account of the past, moreover, that would discard "the Christian pattern of the oneness of history which it has consciously or unconsciously applied for so long." And his prognosis comes with a warning against ethnocentrism: "We would fail utterly in our efforts at comprehension were we to project once again our own stan-

dards on cultural entities that have followed a different rhythm and different ethical and human standards.”

Like Masur's article, John Higham's essay, "Beyond Consensus: The Historian as Moral Critic," is an argument for a new understanding of historical practice, in this case a reasoned plea for historians to recover the politically engaged and morally relevant stance that characterized the Progressive historians of the earlier part of the twentieth century. A well-regarded U.S. historian who focused mostly on immigration, Higham clearly has little respect for the school of consensus history, which he sees as currently dominant in the profession; for him, not only is it characterized by an innate conservatism, but it has failed to produce "any master works of great strength and enduring significance." "Now that the progressive impulse is subsiding," he laments, "scholarship is threatened with a moral vacuum." But Higham harbors few illusions as to either the desirability or the practicality of recovering the spirit of progressivism among historians of his day. Rather, he urges a turn toward "moral history," as distinguished from "causal history." Moral history does not judge, but neither does it coolly and dispassionately analyze. Instead, it strives to capture the subjective reality of historical actors, the "moral tone" of an era, the conflicting values in play, and the ethical dimensions of choice at crucial moments. If his prescription strikes one as imprecise, this impression is only compounded by his suggestion that historians look for inspiration not primarily to scholars of history, but to contemporary literary critics such as F. O. Matthiessen, Lionel Trilling, and Henry Levin. His models are indeed exalted: "the moral critic must learn from the great dramatists, like Shakespeare, from novelists, like Tolstoy, and from the matchless example of Thucydides." Higham's vision for a new kind of history was certainly ambitious—an attempt to recover not merely the politically and socially engaged history of his admired forebears, the Progressives, but history as all-encompassing and engaging as art: "an intensive, concrete reflection upon life, freed from academic primness, and offering itself as one of the noblest, if also one of the most difficult and imperfect, of the arts."



FIGURE 1: A disputation between Saint Augustine and Faustus the Manichean. School of Mont St. Michel (Normandy). Early thirteenth century. Bibliothèque municipale, Avranches, MS 90, fol. 1. Erich Lessing / Art Resource, N.Y.

Toward a Cultural History of Scholastic Disputation

ALEX J. NOVIKOFF

THE SCHOLASTIC DEBATES OF MEDIEVAL AUTHORS have not fared well among historians. As a subject, they are treated seriously by philosophers and theologians interested in particular points of logic or doctrine, selectively by specialists of medieval learning who focus on particular authors or key ideas, and hardly at all by historians concerned with the wider cultural fabric of medieval society. Popular images of scholastic argumentation have only isolated the field further. From Renaissance humanists and luminaries in the age of reason to general assumptions today, these debates have routinely been condemned as medieval vestiges of an anti-intellectual world: pedantic at best, pointless at worst.¹ Faced on the one hand with the pejorative connotations of “scholastic” and “quodlibet,” we are on the other hand endlessly entreated these days to enter into “dialogue” with others, a discourse that both reflects and presupposes a post-Enlightenment (perhaps even postmodern) engagement with the world.² Marginalized and misunderstood, the history of medieval dialogue and debate is in need of a fresh assessment.

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¹ Many authors of the Middle Ages criticized or satirized the logic of the schools and universities, but it was the humanists of the Italian Renaissance who were among the first to associate scholasticism with a distinctly medieval and backward-looking outlook, a view that has persisted ever since. The image passed down in the English-speaking world is well summed up by John Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), bk. III, chap. 10, para. 9: “For, notwithstanding these learned disputants, these all-knowing doctors, it was to the unscholastic statesman that the governments of the world owed their peace, defence, and liberties . . . Nevertheless, this artificial ignorance, and learned gibberish, prevailed mightily in these last ages, by the interest and artifice of those who found no easier way to that pitch of authority and dominion they have attained, than by amusing the men of business, and ignorant, with hard words, or employing the ingenious and idle in intricate disputes about unintelligible terms, and holding them perpetually entangled in that endless labyrinth.” The parody of scholastic debate finds its most familiar caricature in the proverbial question of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, a satire on medieval angelology (and scholasticism in general) that likewise seems to be early modern in origin.

² “Dialogue” and “dialogic” are buzzwords in many corners of modern political and intellectual discourse. In his influential, and difficult to characterize, collection of essays *The Dialogic Imagination*,

Serious challenges remain to understanding the place of scholasticism in the broader culture of the High Middle Ages. A particular challenge is posed by the origins and development of disputation, the formalized debate techniques of the medieval university, whose existence is always assumed but whose impact beyond the academic environment has not been adequately explored. As a leading scholar of medieval rhetoric has put it, “the scholastic emphasis upon thesis, counterthesis, and listing of arguments must have had its effects on all kinds of discourse. It would be difficult to name a more pervasive influence with so little study given to its effect.”³ An especially vexed question is the relationship between the dialogue genre, a popular literary form in the twelfth century, and the dialectical methods of scholastic disputation. Giles Constable has stated the problem thus: “Dialogue and dialectic—the science of doubt as it has been called—played a fundamental part in the thought processes of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. It underlay the discipline of disputation that developed in the schools and was applied to almost every branch of intellectual inquiry.”⁴ Curiously, no scholar has yet pursued the history of dialogue and disputation along these other branches—what we might call their cultural history. The centrality of scholastic disputation to medieval learning has never been doubted; the problem in charting its history is where to begin and in what direction to proceed. To date, the topic has more commonly been treated as a subsidiary and finite category of medieval logic in connection with individual authors or schools.

Identifying disputation as a historical problem raises a fundamental question: Can the scholastic argumentation embodied in these dialogues and disputations (real or literary) shed light on deeper cultural mutations within medieval civilization? The answer, it seems, is yes. Scholastic disputation arose in the late eleventh century in connection with new developments in monastic learning, and over the course of the next two centuries, it developed systematically and centrifugally from France and Italy to become a formative practice in the scholastic culture of medieval Europe, eventually transcending the frontier between private and public spheres and extending to multiple levels of society. Not only was the triumph of disputation one of the signal achievements of the medieval university curriculum, but its evolution and application beyond the confines of strictly academic circles (in debate poems and polyphonic music, and more particularly in the Christian confrontation with Jews and Judaism) suggests that the rise of medieval disputation can offer historians an instructive model of cultural history: specifically, it illustrates how dialogue escaped its literary origin and passed from an idea among few to a cultural practice among many.

The term “cultural history” is as elusive as it is seductive. Frequently invoked but rarely defined, cultural history in the early modern period is often identified with a combination of anthropological and historical approaches to understanding popular

trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin, Tex., 1981), literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin saw an important linguistic and semiotic shift in the rise of the “dialogical” novel of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which he contrasted with the ancient epic. For recent reflections on the opposition between medieval and modern, see Carol Symes, “When We Talk about Modernity,” *American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (June 2011): 715–726.

³ James J. Murphy, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from St. Augustine to the Renaissance* (Berkeley, Calif., 1974), 102 n. 47. I am grateful to the author for bringing this passage to my attention.

⁴ Giles Constable, *The Reformation of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge, 1996), 130.

cultural traditions using a variety of narrative texts or nonverbal forms of communication (public rituals, material texts, the body, and the like).⁵ Among French historians, the study of medieval “mentalities” that flourished in the last third of the twentieth century was an attempt to access the shared ideas and worldviews of the medieval mind by investigating its cultural matrix, described by one cultural historian as a “historical anthropology of ideas.”⁶ Previous attempts at medieval cultural history have therefore often consisted of dissecting a single author or concept in order to get at the larger surrounding culture. What has not been pursued in any great detail is the evolution and diffusion of that most scholastic method itself—disputation—especially its extension into other, related spheres of cultural activity that did not immediately depend on the schools in which it first developed. An important exception is Erwin Panofsky’s short but provocative *Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism* (1951), which attempted to correlate the ordered and harmonious spaces of thirteenth-century cathedrals to the organizational structure of scholastic thought.⁷ A comparative model of a different sort led another scholar to suggest that elements of the scholastic method of the twelfth century were influenced by earlier Islamic colleges, which also gave prominence to a *pro* and *contra* form of argumentation.⁸ Evoking loose parallels between thought and architecture or between two different cultural traditions is one thing; tracing the organic evolution of an essential mode of analysis in a single culture is quite another. A new approach to scholastic learning is needed.

Studies of the medieval mind or the medieval “imagination” have been undertaken before, and in their most successful forms they have greatly enriched our understanding of medieval society by expanding intellectual and theological concepts into more culturally relevant categories.⁹ In the case of disputation, however, one

⁵ As just one example of the plurality of definitions offered, see Peter Burke, *Varieties of Cultural History* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1997). For an attempt at a cultural history of medieval France, see Michel Sot, Jean-Patrice Boudet, and Anita Guerreau-Jalabert, *Le Moyen âge* (Paris, 1997), where disputation is mentioned in passing (e.g., 127, 145, 176) but not discussed at any length.

⁶ See Peter Burke, “Strengths and Weaknesses of the History of Mentalities,” in Burke, *Varieties of Cultural History*, 162–182, here 163. The textbook of sorts for the history-of-mentalities approach is Hervé Martin, *Mentalités médiévales, XI^e–XV^e siècle* (Paris, 1996). For critique and analysis of the French approach, see Roger Chartier, “Intellectual History or Sociocultural History? The French Trajectories,” trans. Jane P. Kaplan, in Dominick LaCapra and Steven L. Kaplan, eds., *Modern European Intellectual History: Reappraisals and New Perspectives* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1982), 13–46. More recently, see Philippe Poirier, *Les enjeux de l’histoire culturelle* (Paris, 2004).

⁷ Erwin Panofsky, *Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism* (Latrobe, Pa., 1951). Panofsky’s now-famous insight was slightly anticipated in a review article by Lucien Febvre, “Histoire des idées, histoire des sociétés: Une question de climat,” *Annales ESC*, no. 2 (1946): 158–161, here 161: “We must not underestimate the role of ideas in history . . . We must show that a Gothic cathedral, the marketplace of Ypres and one of those great cathedrals of ideas such as those Etienne Gilson describes to us in his book are daughters of a single epoch, sisters reared in the same household.”

⁸ George Makdisi, “The Scholastic Method in Medieval Education: An Inquiry into Its Origins in Law and Theology,” *Speculum* 49, no. 4 (1974): 640–661. Most scholars have not been convinced by the argument for an Islamic root to the Western legal tradition, but see more recently John A. Makdisi, “The Islamic Origins of the Common Law,” *North Carolina Law Review* 77, no. i5 (June 1999): 1635–1739.

⁹ Above all, one thinks of the influential studies by Jacques Le Goff, *The Birth of Purgatory*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago, 1986); *The Medieval Imagination*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago, 1992); and *Intellectuals in the Middle Ages*, trans. Teresa Lavender Fagan (London, 1993). For a discussion of Le Goff’s methodology, see Aaron Gurevich, “Popular and Scholarly Medieval Cultural Traditions: Notes in the Margins of Jacques Le Goff’s Book,” *Journal of Medieval History* 9 (1983): 71–90. The extraordinary scholarship of Caroline Walker Bynum might also be said to move in the cultural-historical direction, and she has on several occasions emphasized the need to go beyond what she calls

of the stumbling blocks to appreciating its cultural dimension is the tendency to freeze it in a moment in time rather than observe its evolution. Individual practitioners and instances of disputation have been studied, but rarely has there been a sustained consideration of the practice itself.¹⁰ In order to uncover the formation of this essential habit of medieval culture, a more profitable approach will be to trace the development of disputation on the frontiers between private and public spheres and between learned and popular audiences. The crossing of these frontiers can best be observed when disciplinary boundaries are blurred and disputation is examined longitudinally across both time and place—the *longue durée*, to borrow a term from the economic historians of the Annales school. Our goal, therefore, is to illustrate how an idea and a literary form originally limited to small intellectual circles in the late eleventh century evolved through multiple stages to become a cultural practice within the larger public sphere in the thirteenth.¹¹ It is in this sense that the study of scholastic disputation, long confined to technical discussions among specialists, offers historians a useful paradigm of cultural history.

“old-style intellectual history.” See Bynum, *The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200–1336* (New York, 1995), xvi, and *Wonderful Blood: Theology and Practice in Late Medieval Northern Germany and Beyond* (Philadelphia, 2007), xv–xviii. More recently, see the exemplary study by Daniel Hobbins, *Authorship and Publicity before Print: Jean Gerson and the Transformation of Late Medieval Learning* (Philadelphia, 2009). A sociological approach to medieval thought is D. L. D’Avray, *Medieval Religious Rationalities: A Weberian Analysis* (Cambridge, 2010).

¹⁰ When disputation is singled out for study, it is almost always in the context of the university curriculum, and with scant regard for pre-university or extra-university manifestations. Cf. Olga Weijers, *La “Disputatio” à la Faculté des arts de Paris (1200–1350 environ): Esquisse d’une typologie* (Turnhout, 1995); and Bernardo C. Bazán, John W. Wippel, Gérard Fransen, and Danielle Jacquart, eds., *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit, et de médecine* (Turnhout, 1985). For the use of disputation among individual scholastic authors, see the learned studies by Marcia L. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1994); and John W. Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants: The Social Views of Peter the Chanter and His Circle*, 2 vols. (Princeton, N.J., 1970). For case studies of individual poets and philosophers of the later Middle Ages, see Georgiana Donavin, Carol Poster, and Richard Utz, eds., *Medieval Forms of Argument: Disputation and Debate* (Eugene, Ore., 2002). A detailed analysis of a famous thirteenth-century Jewish-Christian disputation is Robert Chazan, *Barcelona and Beyond: The Disputation of 1263 and Its Aftermath* (Berkeley, Calif., 1992).

¹¹ The term “public sphere” is admittedly something of a hornet’s nest in modern historiography. Jürgen Habermas noted that his concept of a “bourgeois public sphere” in the eighteenth century did not apply to medieval Europe; Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, Mass., 1989; original German ed. 1962), 5–12. Medievalists, however, have rightly challenged the presumption that no public sphere at all existed in the Middle Ages. In fact, Habermas’s public sphere was largely based on a caricature of the Middle Ages, not unlike the caricatures of scholastic debates cited above. Recent discussions of premodern publicity range widely, from the symbolic rituals of early medieval assembly politics to late medieval marketplaces, public intellectuals, and legal culture. I employ the term “public sphere” to point to a division between the more cloistered and literary world of monastic learning in the eleventh century and the more public, and indeed performative, sphere of university and extra-university debates in the thirteenth century, as will become clear below. On the semantic difficulties involved in discussing the concepts of “private” and “public” in the Middle Ages, see Peter von Moos, *“Öffentlich” und “privat” im Mittelalter: Zu einem Problem historischer Begriffsbildung* (Heidelberg, 2004); and Shannon McSheffrey, “Place, Space, and Situation: Public and Private in the Making of Marriage in Late-Medieval London,” *Speculum* 79, no. 4 (2004): 960–990. For another attempt at locating a public sphere in the thirteenth century, see the remarkable study by Carol Symes, *A Common Stage: Theater and Public Life in Medieval Arras* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2007). A more radical application of Habermas’s concept is Leidulf Melve, *Inventing the Public Sphere: The Public Debate during the Investiture Conflict (c. 1030–1122)*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 2007), who advances the curious argument that a public sphere existed in the predominantly textual context of the eleventh-century controversy over Investiture but that it then did not reappear until after the Middle Ages.

DEBATE AND ARGUMENTATION ARE as ancient as civilization itself, and perhaps innate to the human mind.¹² Plato knew well that a skillfully crafted dialogue could express what mere lecture notes could not.¹³ Aristotle devoted his *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations* to the art of forming questions and responses, pioneered the discipline of logic, and was himself the author of several dialogues that are no longer extant. In the legal courts of late Republican Rome, Cicero perfected an art of discourse *in utramque partem* (on both sides of the issue) that became a basic element in classical rhetoric. In his dialogues, Cicero introduced Romans to the chief schools of Greek philosophy and created a Latin philosophical vocabulary that allowed him to follow the Socratic method by raising doubts about the plausibility of some of the most important ideas of the day.¹⁴ Both before and immediately after the rise of Christianity as a state religion, the social competition of public disputation formed an integral part of Roman culture.¹⁵ Early Christians adopted the rhetoric of debate for their own purposes. The New Testament describes Jesus disputing with the elders (Luke 2: 46–47) and Paul disputing with the Jews (Acts 17–18), motifs that would become especially popular in later medieval and Renaissance iconography. In late antiquity, the merging of classical learning and Christianity produced another cultural turn in dialogue and disputation: Augustine introduced in his *Soliloquia* and other writings a meditative inner dialogue with himself, while continuing to dispute publicly with heretics, and Boethius provided in his celebrated dialogue *Consolation of Philosophy* and other theological works a point of departure for the medieval harmony between faith and philosophy.¹⁶ In the centuries after the fall of Rome,

¹² The roles of reason and debate are currently being rethought from the perspective of the cognitive sciences. A recent, and controversial, theory holds that human reason evolved for the purpose of winning arguments in the debating arena. See the positions for and against this theory in *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 34, no. 2 (April 2011): 57–111. For a précis of this theory, see Patricia Cohen, “Reason Seen More as Weapon Than Path to Truth,” *New York Times*, June 14, 2011. For ancient models of literary debate, see G. J. Reinink and H. L. J. Vanstiphout, eds., *Dispute Poems and Dialogue in the Ancient and Mediaeval Near East: Forms and Types of Literary Debates in Semitic and Related Literatures* (Leuven, 1991).

¹³ On Plato’s use of dialogue, see Charles H. Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form* (Cambridge, 1996); and Kenneth M. Sayre, *Plato’s Literary Garden: How to Read a Platonic Dialogue* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1995). For a convergence of philosophical ideas and music similar to what is attempted in this article, see J. B. Kennedy, *The Musical Structure of Plato’s Dialogues* (Durham, N.C., 2011).

¹⁴ See Robert Gorman, *The Socratic Method in the Dialogues of Cicero* (Wiesbaden, 2005). Cicero’s dialogues, in particular, circulated widely because the early Church declared him a “virtuous pagan,” and consequently many of his works were deemed worthy of preservation. Indeed, more works survived in the Middle Ages by Cicero than by any other Latin author. See John C. Rolfe, *Cicero and His Influence* (London, 1923); and Ettore Paratore, “Cicerone attraverso i secoli,” in Luigi Alfonsi et al., *Marco Tullio Cicerone* (Florence, 1961), 237–244, for indications of their medieval manuscript tradition. Cicero’s moral philosophy proved especially influential in the twelfth century. See, for instance, the following studies by Philippe Delhaye: “La place de l’éthique parmi les disciplines scientifiques au XII^e siècle,” in *Miscellanea moralia in honorem eximii domini Arthur Janssen, universitatis catholicae in oppido lovaniensi professoris*, 2 vols. (Louvain, 1948), 1: 29–44; “L’enseignement de la philosophie morale au XII^e siècle,” *Medieval Studies* 11 (1949): 77–99; and “Une adaptation du ‘De officiis’ au XII^e siècle: Le ‘Moralium dogma philosophorum,’” *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 16 (1949): 227–258, 17 (1950): 5–28.

¹⁵ Richard Lim, *Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley, Calif., 1995).

¹⁶ See the learned remarks about Augustine’s dialogues in Brian Stock, *Augustine the Reader: Meditation, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethics of Interpretation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), 130–137. Dialectic was of paramount importance to Augustine throughout his works, and in *De doctrina Christiana* 2.31.48–

where scholars have begun to highlight the role of Christianity in this so-called “end of dialogue,” Augustine and Boethius served as models for the medieval continuity of dialogue in a monastic and contemplative setting.¹⁷ This master narrative of the decline of literary dialogue and public disputation has been especially attractive to scholars of the Renaissance, who have repeatedly minimized the role of both during the Middle Ages, all while accentuating the “culture of dialogue” or “culture of debate” that humanism allegedly rediscovered.¹⁸ Like the abusive stereotypes of scholastic thought, this assumption correspondingly calls for revision.

2.35.48 he explicitly acknowledges the usefulness of dialectic (*disputandi disciplina*) for all the kinds of problems that must be investigated and resolved in sacred scripture. In *Soliloquia* 2.7.14 he never uses the word “dialectic,” but he does refer to the discipline in one of its meanings when he writes that there is no better way of searching for truth than by questioning and answering. He then raises the question whether the art of disputation (*ars disputandi*) is true or false, and he answers that it is true. On Boethius, see especially Seth Lerer, *Boethius and Dialogue: Literary Method in the “Consolation of Philosophy”* (Princeton, N.J., 1985). For the medieval reception of this classic work, see Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen and Lodi Nauta, eds., *Boethius in the Middle Ages: Latin and Vernacular Traditions of the “Consolatio Philosophiae”* (Leiden, 1997); and, most recently, Noel Harold Kaylor, Jr., and Philip Edward Phillips, eds., *A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages* (Leiden, 2010). The importance of Boethius’s logic and the complexity of the *Consolation of Philosophy* are expertly treated in John Marenbon, *Boethius* (Oxford, 2003).

¹⁷ Simon Goldhill, ed., *The End of Dialogue in Antiquity* (Cambridge, 2008). On the medieval continuity of ancient models, see K. J. Wilson, “The Continuity of the Post-Classical Dialogue,” *Cithara* 21, no. 1 (1981): 23–44; Jacques Fontaine, “Le genre littéraire du dialogue monastique dans l’Occident latin des V^e et VI^e siècles,” in Marek Starowieyski, ed., *The Spirituality of Ancient Monasticism: Acts of the International Colloquium Held in Cracow-Tyniec, 16–19th November 1994* (Cracow, 1994), 228–250; and M. L. W. Laistner, *Thought and Letters in Western Europe, A.D. 500 to 900* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1957), chap. 8, for the use of dialogue among the Carolingians. Important insights into the dialogue form during the twelfth century and after, and on which I seek to build the connection to scholastic disputation, are provided by Peter von Moos, “Le dialogue latin au Moyen âge: L’exemple d’Evrard d’Ypres,” *Annales ESC*, no. 4 (1989): 993–1028; von Moos, “Literatur- und bildungsgeschichtliche Aspekte der Dialogform im lateinischen Mittelalter: Der *Dialogus Ratii* des Eberhard von Ypern zwischen theologischer *disputatio* und Scholaren-Komödie,” in Günter Bernt, Fidel Rädle, and Gabriel Silagi, eds., *Tradition und Wertung: Festschrift für Franz Brunhölzl zum 65. Geburtstag* (Sigmaringen, 1989), 165–209; von Moos, “Gespräch, Dialogform und Dialog nach älterer Theorie,” in Barbara Frank, Thomas Haye, and Doris Tophinke, eds., *Gattungen mittelalterlicher Schriftlichkeit* (Tübingen, 1997), 235–260; E. C. Ronquist, “Learning and Teaching in Twelfth-Century Dialogues,” *Res publica litterarum* 13 (1990): 239–256; and Roger Friedlein, *Der Dialog bei Ramon Llull: Literarische Gestaltung als apologetische Strategie* (Tübingen, 2004).

¹⁸ For a modest sampling of English-language works on this topic, see David Marsh, *The Quattrocento Dialogue: Classical Tradition and Humanist Innovation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1980); Jon R. Snyder, *Writing the Scene of Speaking: Theories of Dialogue in the Late Italian Renaissance* (Stanford, Calif., 1989); Virginia Cox, *The Renaissance Dialogue: Literary Dialogue in Its Social and Political Contexts, Castiglione to Galileo* (Cambridge, 1992); Colette H. Winn, ed., *The Dialogue in Early Modern France, 1547–1630: Art and Argument* (Washington, D.C., 1993); and Dorothea Heitsch and Jean-François Vallée, eds., *Printed Voices: The Renaissance Culture of Dialogue* (Toronto, 2004). More pointedly, see David Marsh, “Dialogue and Discussion in the Renaissance,” in Glyn P. Norton, ed., *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism*, vol. 3: *The Renaissance* (Cambridge, 1999), 265–270, here 265, who says that “the Humanist dialogue arose in Italy around 1400 . . . [and] reflects the new philosophical freedom and eclecticism which were fostered by the rise of mercantile communes and by the weakening of papal authority through schism”; Stephen A. Tyler, “Ode to Dialog on the Occasion of the Un-for-seen,” in Tullio Maranhão, ed., *The Interpretation of Dialogue* (Chicago, 1990), 292–300, here 293, who describes the dialogue as “a literary genre emerging out of the Renaissance reinvention of the mood of the classical discourses of Plato”; and Christopher S. Celenza, *The Lost Italian Renaissance: Humanists, Historians, and Latin’s Legacy* (Baltimore, 2004), 87, 100, who says that “many humanists participated in this culture of the *disputatio*” and that “the verbally centered culture of the disputation was intimately allied to the progress of Humanism.” No mention is made in any of these works of the medieval tradition of dialogue or of scholastic disputation.

THE TURN OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY has long been identified with new beginnings in the intellectual and cultural landscape of Europe.¹⁹ The growth of cities and centers of learning, the migration of students into France, a renewed interest in dialectic, and the recovery of ancient law texts are all familiar components of what is commonly referred to as the “twelfth-century renaissance.”²⁰ The Italian-born monk Anselm of Bec (1033–1109) occupies a central place on this new horizon of learning. Best known for his ontological proof of the existence of God, Anselm experimented early in his career with a more pedagogically engaging method of instruction at his monastery in Normandy (Bec). It was his pioneering use of dialogue and disputation in the company of his students that initiated the emergence of a culture of disputation.²¹

Anselm’s first substantial work, the *Monologion* (ca. 1077), reflects a close reading of Augustine’s *De trinitate*.²² Anselm described his work as a *meditatio* on the divine being, but by “meditation” he specifically meant the inner dialogue and deliberation that was characteristic of Augustine’s spirituality. Some of Anselm’s brothers persisted in asking him to give them an example of meditation, “by writing down some thoughts on the divine essence and other related matters, which I have communicated to them in my regular discussions [*colloquia*].” The discussions must have been fairly open engagements, for it was the leading questions that drew out of Anselm a new approach to teaching and learning. “They asked that whatever conclusion was reached in the course of each investigation should be expressed in plain language with intelligible arguments and simple disputation [*simplicique disputatione*], so that the necessary conclusions and clear truth of the matter would be clearly expressed.”²³ These opening words in the prologue to the *Monologion* point to what would quickly become a recurring feature of Anselm’s method of inquiry: dialogue and disputation.

¹⁹ For recent assessments, see Thomas F. X. Noble and John Van Engen, eds., *European Transformations: The Long Twelfth Century* (Notre Dame, Ind., 2012).

²⁰ The phrase “renaissance of the twelfth century” owes its popular success, but not its initial conception, to Charles Homer Haskins’s 1927 book of the same title. For the pre-Haskins origins of the term and the development of the concept, see Alex J. Novikoff, “The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century before Haskins,” *Haskins Society Journal* 16 (2005): 104–116. On developments since Haskins’s influential book, see Marcia L. Colish, “Haskins’ Renaissance Seventy Years Later: Beyond Anti-Burckhardtianism,” *Haskins Society Journal* 11 (2003): 1–15. The applicability of the term has long been questioned. For a recent critique, see C. Stephen Jaeger, “Pessimism in the Twelfth-Century ‘Renaissance,’” *Speculum* 78, no. 4 (October 2003): 1151–1183.

²¹ I explore this element of the culture of disputation in detail in Alex J. Novikoff, “Anselm, Dialogue, and the Rise of Scholastic Disputation,” *Speculum* 86, no. 2 (2011): 387–418. The paragraphs that follow recapitulate those arguments in order to set up the later cultural history of disputation that constitutes the focus of this article. For insights into other elements of monastic learning in the age of Anselm, see Sally N. Vaughn and Jay Rubenstein, eds., *Teaching and Learning in Northern Europe, 1000–1200* (Turnhout, 2006); and most recently, Steven Vanderputten, ed., *Understanding Monastic Practices of Oral Communication: Western Europe, Tenth–Thirteenth Centuries* (Turnhout, 2011). The *locus classicus* for a sweeping historical assessment of Anselm remains R. W. Southern, *Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape* (Cambridge, 1990). A diverse appraisal of Anselm’s significance for the modern world is offered in Coloman Viola and Frederick Van Fleteren, eds., *Saint Anselm, a Thinker for Yesterday and Today: Anselm’s Thought Viewed by Our Contemporaries* (Lewiston, N.Y., 2002). Still very useful because of the range of historical themes touched upon are the proceedings from the 1982 Anselm conference held at Bec: Raymonde Foreville, ed., *Les mutations socio-culturelles au tournant des XI^e–XII^e siècles* (Paris, 1984).

²² The various stages that Anselm went through to “publish” his works have been addressed in a meticulous study by Richard Sharpe, “Anselm as Author: Publishing in the Late Eleventh Century,” *Journal of Medieval Latin* 19 (2009): 1–87.

²³ Anselm of Canterbury, *Monologion*, in *S. Anselmi opera omnia*, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, 6 vols. (Rome, 1938–1961), 1: 7. All translations are my own unless otherwise stated.

This path to knowledge, along with an unprecedented commitment to demonstrating Christian truth by reason alone (*sola ratione*), was the critical element in his pedagogical innovations at his school at Bec.²⁴ He later explained his simultaneous reliance upon, and departure from, Augustine along similar lines in a letter to his mentor Lanfranc: "it was my intention throughout the whole of this disputation [*disputationem*] to assert nothing that could not be immediately defended either from canonical writers or from the words of St. Augustine."²⁵ Even a work cast in the form of a meditation was, for Anselm as it was for Augustine, a dialogue with oneself. All reflections on the matter of the divine being, even if originally stimulated by a reading of Augustine, were the result of an inner dialogue. In much the same way that he was committed to proving Christian doctrine *sola ratione*, without recourse to scripture, Anselm was venturing to demonstrate most of his propositions by means of inner disputation alone.

Anselm's method of teaching, as far as it can be reconstructed from his writings and those who knew him, was to hold a Socratic form of debate with the monks, in which the participants argued out the issues. Clues to his pedagogy come from his theological and philosophical works that are cast in the form of a dialogue between master and pupil.²⁶ To be sure, the dialogue genre extends back to antiquity, and it was effectively used by Lanfranc and others, but over his career, Anselm went on to write more dialogues than any other Latin Christian author since Augustine.²⁷ No fewer than seven of his works take the literary form of a dialogue, and there are several others that are attributed to him but are of dubious authenticity. *De grammatico* is likely the earliest of these dialogues and concerns not grammar in the sense that the title implies, but paronymy (the semantics involved when the same noun signifies more than one thing) and the section in Aristotle's *Categories* that deals with substance.²⁸ Like his later works, *De grammatico* is not overtly confrontational. The discussion about Aristotle's syllogisms comes to a close when the teacher in the dialogue applauds the student's progress but warns him against the power wielded

²⁴ The novelty of Anselm's reliance on reason as an aid to faith has been much commented upon by historians, theologians, and philosophers alike. For a fresh assessment, see Marilyn McCord Adams, "Anselm on Faith and Reason," in Brian Davies and Brian Leftow, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Anselm* (Cambridge, 2004), 32–60. See also Eileen C. Sweeney, "Rewriting the Narrative of Scripture: 12th-Century Debates over Reason and Theological Form," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 3 (1993): 1–34.

²⁵ Anselm, *Epistola* 77, in *Opera omnia*, 3: 199–200.

²⁶ This point has been observed before, but never truly explored. See the remarks by Richard Campbell, "The Systematic Character of Anselm's Thought," in Foreville, *Les mutations socio-culturelles au tournant des XI^e–XII^e siècles*, 549–560, here 553–554: "What I find striking about Anselm's arguments, whether in the more philosophical works or in the more theological, is the way they always proceed within the context of *what someone says* . . . In the dialogue form adopted in many of the later works all of the statements are, of course, owned by one or [an]other of the participants . . . Anselm is not indulging in idle speculation or intellectual games; he will only consider propositions which are 'owned' by one speaker."

²⁷ The foundational study of the dialogue genre is Rudolf Hirzel, *Der Dialog: Ein literarhistorischer Versuch*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1895). A recent compendium of medieval Latin dialogues has highlighted the genre's popularity for later centuries, but curiously ignores its resurgence in the twelfth century: Carmen Cardelle de Hartmann, *Lateinische Dialoge, 1200–1400: Literaturhistorische Studie und Repertorium* (Leiden, 2007). See also the studies of individual authors in Klaus Jacobi, ed., *Gespräche lesen: Philosophische Dialoge im Mittelalter* (Tübingen, 1999), with an essay devoted to Anselm by Eileen Sweeney, 101–124.

²⁸ The authoritative commentary on this early work is Desmond Paul Henry, *Commentary on "De grammatico": The Historical-Logical Dimensions of a Dialogue of St. Anselm's* (Dordrecht, 1974). The dating of this dialogue is a matter of some conjecture. The dates proposed are as early as 1060–1063 (after R. W. Southern, which I prefer) and as late as 1080–1085. See the discussion by Sharpe, "Anselm as Author," 22, who favors a dating of around 1080 "or a little later."



FIGURE 2: Anselm in conversation with fellow monks, giving them books. Upper half: Anselm, as archbishop of Canterbury 1093–1109, presenting books to Countess Matilda of Tuscany. Twelfth century. Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Auct. D.2.6, fol. 185v. Used by permission.

by other dialecticians. Even if the aspiring student should be outdone by weightier arguments, “you would not deny that at least our disputing [*disputandi nobis*] has benefited us in the practice of argumentation.”²⁹ The very framing of the work indicates that Anselm’s dialogues, in their form as well as their content, served as a window onto the current issues that engaged him in discussions with his students. The effects of this learning on the intellectual atmosphere at Bec so impressed the ecclesiastical historian Orderic Vitalis that he described with amazement Anselm’s ability to produce a climate of learning in which the monks were “so eager to solve theological problems and compose edifying treatises, that almost all of them seem to be philosophers.”³⁰ Both Orderic and Anselm’s biographer Eadmer stressed the diversity of the students, clerics, and laymen who came to sit at the feet of the renowned teacher.³¹ Thus the dialogical procedure that characterizes Anselm’s school not only reflects the pedagogical activities that took shape at Bec, it is what attracted them there in the first place.

In the corpus of his writings, Anselm uses the verb *disputare* and its accompanying noun forms on more than forty separate occasions.³² While the meaning of this term

²⁹ Anselm, *De grammatico*, in *Opera omnia*, 1: 168.

³⁰ Orderic Vitalis, *The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis*, 6 vols., ed. and trans. Marjorie Chibnall (Oxford, 1969–1980), 2: 297.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 2: 294–295; Eadmer, *The Life of St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury (Vita Anselmi)*, ed. R. W. Southern (Oxford, 1962), xxii, 39–40.

³² For these figures I rely on *A Concordance to the Works of Anselm*, 4 vols., ed. G. R. Evans (Millwood, N.Y., 1984), s.v. “disputabo” to “disputet.”

might vary from a simple “discussion” or “conversation” to a more intense “dispute” or “debate,” there is a clear parallel between the form of his writings and the vocabulary he employs. From his earliest meditation to his last letters, with several real debates in between, he consistently refers to his rational investigations and dialectical argumentation in terms of a *disputatio*, and his dialogues bear the imprint of this approach.

From the circle of Anselm and his students, the dialogue rapidly emerged as a literary, pedagogical, and indeed polemical genre of choice for authors of the twelfth century. Fewer than ten dialogues can be counted in the century prior to Anselm’s writings at Bec (the 1060s), but more than eighty exist from his time to the close of the twelfth century. The authors of these dialogues and disputations are among the most important writers and thinkers of the twelfth century: Odo of Tournai, Rupert of Deutz, Hugh of St. Victor, Anselm of Havelberg, Aelred of Rievaulx, Adelard of Bath, Peter Alfonsi, Peter Abelard, Walter of Châtillon, Andreas Capellanus, and many others, including several anonymous authors and known students of Anselm. The sheer quantity of dialogues written in the generations following Anselm and his circle reflects the success of new methods of writing and argumentation—the scholastic method, so called because of its association with the schools of the late eleventh and the twelfth century.³³ In one sense these figures are hardly surprising, since alongside the resurgence in dialogues there can, and should, be placed a concomitant growth in a number of other literary enterprises, such as the writing of letters, poetry, commentaries and glosses, sentences, and even history.³⁴ Yet in contrast to these other genres, whose purposes and audience are often more explicit or apparent, there is no immediate explanation for the sudden popularity of the dialogue form in the last quarter of the eleventh century and throughout the twelfth.³⁵ No *ars dialogi* as such existed in the Middle Ages comparable to the *ars dictaminis* or the *ars poetica*.³⁶ Most of Plato’s dialogues remained untranslated until the fifteenth century.

³³ The foundational study of the scholastic method is Martin Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode: Nach den gedruckten und ungedruckten Quellen dargestellt*, 2 vols. (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1909–1911), who adopts the broadest possible scope and examines authors from late antiquity until the beginning of the thirteenth century. Important themes related to scholastic thought are discussed in the various essays in Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, eds., *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100–1600* (Cambridge, 1982). Many philosophical and theological elements of early scholasticism are explored in an excellent recent collection of essays by leading scholars in the field: Irène Rosier-Catach, ed., *Arts du langage et théologie aux confins des XI^e–XII^e siècles: Textes, maîtres, débats* (Turnhout, 2011).

³⁴ Brian Stock, in discussing the cosmological interests of twelfth-century authors, writes that “a great many literary forms from the classical and, in particular, the late Latin world were revived for the purpose: the dialogue, the *satura* (or *prosimetrum*), the encyclopedia, the commentary, and, more rarely, the epic and the myth itself. The forms were utilized in ways that often emphasized their distance from antiquity and their relation to literary fashions in their own day.” Stock, *Myth and Science in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Bernard Silvester* (Princeton, N.J., 1972), 30.

³⁵ Cf. Constable, *The Reformation of the Twelfth Century*, 128: “one of the most striking examples of the influence of rhetoric on the forms of religious literature in the eleventh and twelfth centuries was the popularity of debates, dialogues, and disputes, or, as they were sometimes called, the *altercatio* or *conflictus*.”

³⁶ But see von Moos, “Literatur- und bildungsgeschichtliche Aspekte der Dialogform im lateinischen Mittelalter,” who says that “a new culture of problematizing dialogue” tended to replace the commentary in the late twelfth century (199). In his investigation of Everard of Ypres (“Le dialogue latin au Moyen âge”), von Moos takes up the question of the *ars dialogica*, but it still stands that there was no formalized manner for writing dialogues. Ronquist, “Learning and Teaching in Twelfth-Century

What did develop and was eventually formalized in the schools of the twelfth century was the practice, and later theory, of disputation.³⁷ In the generation following Anselm, the medieval *disputatio* would be taken up in Italy and northern France and become central to the new scholastic milieu.

IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE twelfth century, theologians, scientists, and lawyers all turned to the dialogue for effective instruction. While certain patterns in the form and function of the dialogue genre remained, new developments in the practice of debate also emerged.

The theological nature of the dialogues of Anselm and his followers can readily be seen in the spiritual dialogues of Aelred of Rievaulx or the instructional dialogue of Conrad of Hirsau (ca. 1070–ca. 1150). In Conrad's *Dialogus super auctores*, a teacher instructs an inquisitive pupil on how to approach and understand the works of twenty-one classical authors, among them Prudentius, Horace, Ovid, Homer, and Virgil.³⁸ This student-teacher dialogue (an early contribution to the scholastic *accessus ad auctores* genre) echoes in its opening paragraph the didactic program encountered in Anselm's dialogues, only here it is the student who opens the conversation, saying that the discourse must be carefully controlled; in this way, "the teacher is better able to exercise his goodwill, while . . . the slower partner, that is the learner, who is in dire need, is helped."³⁹

The inquisitive student in search of answers can also be found in the dialogues of Adelard of Bath, whose *De eodem et diverso* and *Questiones naturales* offer detailed descriptions of the science and philosophy that he acquired on his travels to eastern lands.⁴⁰ In both of these works, Adelard presents himself in conversation with his nephew-pupil, whose criticism of and curiosity about his uncle's travels form the

Dialogues," 242, 245, stresses the equality of interlocutors and their "spirit of tolerance and open inquiry." The medieval dialogue is the subject of increasing attention, notably by scholars in France and Germany. A conference in Paris in June 2010, inspired by the work of Peter von Moos, was devoted to the topic of the dialogue form in the *exempla* literature of the Middle Ages. I am grateful to Jean-Claude Schmitt for sharing with me his contribution to the conference proceedings ahead of publication.

³⁷ For general remarks about the history of disputation, see Brian Lawn, *The Rise and Decline of the Scholastic "Quaestio Disputata": With Special Emphasis on Its Use in the Teaching of Medicine and Science* (Leiden, 1993), chaps. 1–3. See also P. Delhaye, "L'organisation scolaire au XII^e siècle," *Traditio* 5 (1947): 211–268; and the concise overview of the origins of disputation by Anthony Kenny in Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg, *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, 24–29. See also R. N. Swanson, *The Twelfth-Century Renaissance* (Manchester, 1999), 35: "The quaestio was a format mainly for the masters; students had their own oral academic exercises. In the twelfth century (but perhaps emerging from older roots) the disputation became their characteristic academic exercise."

³⁸ For an extended discussion of this work, see Leslie G. Whitbread, "Conrad of Hirsau as Literary Critic," *Speculum* 47, no. 2 (1972): 234–245.

³⁹ The Latin text is published in R. B. C. Huygens, ed., *Accessus ad auctores: Bernard d'Utrecht; Conrad d'Hirsau—Dialogus super auctores* (Leiden, 1970). Extracts are translated in "Dialogue on the Authors," in A. J. Minnis and A. B. Scott, eds., *Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism, c. 1100–c. 1375: The Commentary-Tradition*, rev. ed. (Oxford, 1988), 39–64, here 39.

⁴⁰ An edition and translation of both these works and a third, *De avibus tractatus* (also in dialogue form), has been made available in Charles Burnett, ed., *Adelard of Bath, Conversations with His Nephew: "On the Same and the Different," "Questions on Natural Science," and "On Birds"* (Cambridge, 1998). Winthrop Wetherbee describes Adelard as anticipating in important ways the Platonism of the school of Chartres; Wetherbee, *Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century: The Literary Influence of the School of Chartres* (Princeton, N.J., 1972), 20–22.

pretext for the discussions. Adelard refers to the discussion in *Questiones naturales* as a “disputatio” and ends *De eodem et diverso* by asking his nephew to “judge for yourself whether I have disputed rightly (*utrum recte disputaverim*).”⁴¹ The tone of these works does not rise beyond that of a friendly and affectionate conversation, but Adelard’s dialogical approach is consistent with a new generation of dialecticians. He begins *Questiones naturales* by reminding his nephew that seven years earlier, he sent him and other students to study in French schools (*in Gallicis studiis*) at Laon, a major center of learning in the early twelfth century.⁴² The dialogue form that Adelard cultivated very likely reflected the dialectical procedures of such “French schools,” just as his emphasis on reason (*ratio*) surely reflected the new currents in early-twelfth-century thought.⁴³

A transitional figure in the emergence of disputation out of dialogue is the Benedictine abbot Rupert of Deutz (ca. 1075–1129), the twelfth century’s most prolific author and a staunch defender of traditional monasticism.⁴⁴ In his effort to controvert what he saw as the intrusion of dialectic into the sphere of theological study, Rupert engaged in public disputes at Liège, Laon, and Châlons-sur-Marnes.⁴⁵ The topics of debate differed from one disputation to the next, but Rupert did not shrink from opportunities to face off with his adversaries, who dismissed him on account of his ignorance of dialectics. He proudly recounted his combative position several years later in his apologetically written commentary on the Benedictine rule (ca. 1125). He went to France, he says, in order to engage in a mighty battle of disputation (*praelium disputationis*) with those famous masters whose authority was always held over and against him.⁴⁶ Portraying himself as seated on a paltry ass, with only a servant boy to accompany him, Rupert combines the imagery of a lone protector of the faith with the vocabulary of feudal combat as he describes his expedition to join battle (*ad conflictum*) in distant cities in France, where a large band of masters and students met him in order to hear his arguments and defeat them. Rupert’s use of such colorful imagery is more than just rhetorical flourish. Peter Abelard employed much the same language in his own autobiographical apology: “I preferred the weapons of dialectic to all the other teachings of philosophy, and armed with these I chose the conflicts of disputation [*conflictus pretuli disputationem*] instead of the trophies

⁴¹ Burnett, *Adelard of Bath*, 91, 73.

⁴² The existence and importance of the school of Laon has been a topic of considerable debate among scholars. Most recently, see the study by Cédric Giraud, *Per verba magistri: Anselme de Laon et son école au XII^e siècle* (Turnhout, 2010); and supplemented by Giraud, “L’école de Laon entre arts du langage et théologie,” in Rosier-Catach, *Arts du langage et théologie aux confins des XI^e–XII^e siècles*, 351–371. On the study of dialectic and its connection to twelfth-century theology, see Joseph de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique du XII^e siècle* (Brussels, 1948); Marie-Dominique Chenu, *La théologie au douzième siècle* (Paris, 1957); and more recently Toivo J. Holopainen, *Dialectic and Theology in the Eleventh Century* (Leiden, 1996).

⁴³ Cf. Andreas Speer, “Ratione duce: Die naturphilosophischen Dialoge des Adelard von Bath und des Wilhelm von Conches,” in Jacobi, *Gespräche Lesen*, 199–230.

⁴⁴ See Maria Lodovica Arduini, *Rupert von Deutz (1076–1129) und der “status Christianitatis” seiner Zeit: Symbolisch-prophetische Deutung der Geschichte* (Stuttgart, 1985).

⁴⁵ Cf. John Van Engen, *Rupert of Deutz* (Berkeley, Calif., 1983), 200–215.

⁴⁶ Rupert of Deutz, *Super quaedam capitula regulae divi benedicti abbatis*, in J.-P. Migne, ed., *Patrologiae cursus completus: Series latina*, 221 vols. (Paris, 1844–1864) [hereafter *PL*], 170: cols. 482–483. See the eloquent reconstruction of this episode in Van Engen, *Rupert of Deutz*, 211–212. This passage has recently been examined in a slightly different twelfth-century context: Ian P. Wei, “From Twelfth-Century Schools to Thirteenth-Century Universities: The Disappearance of Biographical and Autobiographical Representations of Scholars,” *Speculum* 86, no. 1 (2011): 42–78, here 51–53.

of war.”⁴⁷ Abelard, of course, actually did come from a knightly background, and in Paris he strove to use the tools of logic and the methods of dialectic in precisely the manner to which Rupert objected, throughout his works defending the virtues of questioning and the value of disputation.⁴⁸ A comparable description of disputation is given, but with a different purpose, by Herman of Cologne (d. 1181), the Rhineland Jew turned Premonstratensian canon whose *Opusculum de conversione sua* is a rare (and still controversial) specimen of a medieval autobiographical conversion narrative.⁴⁹ In the second chapter of the *Opusculum*, Herman states that it was the intense conversations that he heard among clerics that compelled him to inquire into the sacraments of the Church. Listening in on these conversations led him to challenge the leading cleric of the day, Rupert of Deutz, to a public disputation (*ad disputationis invito conflictum*).⁵⁰ It would ultimately take the prayers of two pious women to bring about Herman’s conversion, but disputation remained a theme of his progression toward Christianity until finally he took on the role of disputing his former coreligionists, but as a representative of Christianity. Thus, within a fifteen-year period (1120–1135), three separate accounts describe the conflicts of disputation (two of them involving Rupert) and the centrality that public dispute had come to assume in intellectual life. It is not that these texts are necessarily interrelated or that one author was echoing another; rather, these years represent a transitional moment in the rise of disputation as a cultural practice. From an art historical perspective, increasingly frequent images of debate, and especially of Paul disputing with Jews, are notable features in the development of twelfth-century iconography.⁵¹

A crucial parallel to the use of debate in theological circles is the renewed study of Roman law, first in northern Italy and eventually in France as well. The systematic study of canon law often centered upon the use of a question-and-answer format for

⁴⁷ Peter Abelard, *Historia calamitatum: Texte critique, avec une introduction*, ed. J. Monfrin (Paris, 1959), 63–64. For a discussion of this passage, see Jacques Le Goff, “Quelle conscience l’université médiévale a-t-elle eu d’elle-même?” in Paul Wilpert, ed., *Beiträge zum Berufsbewusstsein des mittelalterlichen Menschen* (Berlin, 1964), 16–19.

⁴⁸ Abelard’s disputationary career is the stuff of legend, although this has somewhat clouded what his contribution to the scholastic method actually was. I have here deliberately focused on other, equally instructive examples from his generation, as my point about the rise of disputation is more about the culture as a whole than about any single individual. For analysis of Abelard’s own anti-Jewish dialogue in the context of the Jewish-Christian debate, see Alex J. Novikoff, “Reason and Natural Law in the Disputational Writings of Peter Alfonsi, Peter Abelard, and Yehuda Halevi,” in Michael Frassetto, ed., *Christian Attitudes toward the Jews in the Middle Ages: A Casebook* (London, 2007), 109–136.

⁴⁹ The historiographical debate over the “authenticity” of this account is fully reviewed in Jean-Claude Schmitt, *The Conversion of Herman the Jew: Autobiography, History, and Fiction in the Twelfth Century*, trans. Alex J. Novikoff (Philadelphia, 2010), esp. chap. 1, “Fiction and Truth.” Schmitt himself adopts a somewhat nuanced position, suggesting that a real Jew named Herman may indeed lie behind the account, but that the *Opusculum* as the text exists is the product of a community of Premonstratensian canons whose main ambition was to augment the new order’s prestige by embellishing a foundation legend.

⁵⁰ *Hermannus quondam Judaeus: Opusculum de conversione sua*, ed. Gerlinde Niemeyer (Weimar, 1963), 76. A slightly different translation from mine is given in Karl F. Morrison, *Conversion and Text: The Cases of Augustine of Hippo, Herman-Judah, and Constantine Tsatsos* (Charlottesville, Va., 1992), 81.

⁵¹ The iconography of debate in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries merits greater attention, particularly within the larger culture of disputation that this article seeks to describe. I am grateful to Colum Hourihane, director of the Index of Christian Art at Princeton University, for sharing his expertise with me on images of Paul disputing with Jews. See also my discussion of Jewish-Christian disputations below.



FIGURE 3: Paul disputing with Jews (bearded in the foreground) and Gentiles. One of the figures in front holds an inscription, *revincebat Iudaeos*, in reference to the passage from the Latin Vulgate (Acts 18:28): “For he vigorously refuted the Jews in public debate.” An inscription with the words *disputabat cum Graecis* is issuing from Paul’s left hand. Enamel plate, ca. 1170. Victoria and Albert Museum, London. Erich Lessing / Art Resource, N.Y.

legal disputes and the harmonizing of conflicting interpretations.⁵² In time, the *quaestiones disputatae* of the glossators (or commentators) of the law would become an established genre within the legal literature.⁵³ There is much that remains hazy in this early history of medieval law, but it is also clear that the recovery of the juristic learning embodied in Justinian’s Digest came as an especially powerful, “almost intoxicating” revelation to Western scholars in the late eleventh century.⁵⁴ Much as the recovery of Aristotle’s New Logic would ultimately transform medieval logic, the intricacy and ingenuity of the legal reasoning in Justinian’s Digest attracted and transformed the minds of those familiar with legal problems. From the significant portions of the Digest that were made available, medieval jurists learned how to frame sophisticated legal arguments, how to manipulate legal categories, how to analyze problems, and how to find solutions to apparently contradictory opinions.⁵⁵

⁵² Stephan Kuttner employed the very phraseology of the twelfth-century theologians, with a nod to the development of Parisian polyphony as well, in the title of his now-famous essay on the topic, *Harmony from Dissonance: An Interpretation of Medieval Canon Law* (Latrobe, Pa., 1960). Twenty-six years later, Charles Donahue, Jr., lamented the meager advances that had been made in interpreting the legal texts that survive: *Why the History of Canon Law Is Not Written* (London, 1986).

⁵³ Like scholastic university disputations, scholarship on the legal uses of disputation has focused heavily on the later periods. See, for example, Manlio Bellomo, ed., *Die Kunst der Disputation: Probleme der Rechtsauslegung und Rechtsanwendung im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1997).

⁵⁴ James A. Brundage, *The Medieval Origins of the Legal Profession: Canonists, Civilians, and Courts* (Chicago, 2008), 77.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 77–78. For a reconstruction of the gradual recovery of Justinian’s Digest, see Wolfgang P.

A significant figure in promoting the new methods for reconciling conflicting texts was Bishop Ivo of Chartres (d. 1115), whose treatise on legal interpretation and whose collection of church law, the *Panormia*, were once hailed for having anticipated the methods of scholasticism, in part because he explicitly acknowledged the problem of contradictory texts.⁵⁶ Modern scholarship on Ivo has modified this portrait: his authorship of the *Panormia* is no longer certain, and his method of handling contradictory texts is now being examined in a more theological and more local—less judicial and less papal—context.⁵⁷ Ivo is reported to have been a former student of Lanfranc at the Norman abbey of Bec, and if the twelfth-century source for this tradition is to be trusted, his application of dialectics to the legal tradition would owe something to the same pioneering circle that included Anselm. Ivo's continuators, and especially the "Four Doctors" associated with Bologna, further developed the method of probing contrasting opinions and "initiated a culture of juristic debate that was to become an integral part of medieval learning."⁵⁸ From simple antinomies in the sources to hypothetical cases, from real difficulties in interpreting a legal term to the didactic device of formulating statements as questions, the *quaestiones* of the glossators offer a broad example of the application of dialectic in the field of law.⁵⁹ They were sometimes clad in the dress of a Socratic dialogue, like the dialogues of Rogerius; sometimes presented as a more elementary question-and-answer catechism; and sometimes made into the structural elements of a *summa*, like the frequently copied *Summa decretalium quaestionum* by Honorius of Richmond (late 1100s).

The most famous canonical collection of the twelfth century, by an elusive master known to us simply as Gratian (ca. 1140), displays the centrality of this approach in the very title he gave his work: *Concordia discordantium canonum* (*Harmony of Discordant Canons*).⁶⁰ The structural resemblance to Peter Abelard's *Sic et non*, in which seemingly conflicting statements of the church fathers are placed side by side, has long intrigued scholars, even if the precise relationship between the two authors remains uncertain.⁶¹ The presumption had initially been that theological argumentation preceded legal argumentation, and that Gratian derived his knowledge of the scholastic method from Abelard. In the early twentieth century, legal historians were hard-pressed to place the influence in the direction from law to theology.⁶² The latest

Müller, "The Recovery of Justinian's Digest in the Middle Ages," *Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law* 20 (1990): 1–29.

⁵⁶ Paul Fournier and Gabriel le Bras, *Histoire des collections canoniques en Occident depuis les Fausses décrétales jusqu'au Décret de Gratian*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1931–1932), 2: 55–114, summarizing work originally published between 1896 and 1898.

⁵⁷ Building on the manuscript collations of Martin Brett, see Christof Rolker, *Canon Law and the Letters of Ivo of Chartres* (Cambridge, 2010), with a discussion of Fournier's thesis at 41–49, and Ivo's education at 89–91.

⁵⁸ Peter Landau, "The Development of Law," in David Luscombe and Jonathan Riley-Smith, eds., *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 4: c. 1025–c. 1198, Part I (Cambridge, 2004), 113–147, here 125.

⁵⁹ Stephan Kuttner, "The Revival of Jurisprudence," in Robert L. Benson and Giles Constable, eds., *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), 299–323, here 314.

⁶⁰ A powerfully argued and technically convincing revisionist interpretation of this work that demonstrates multiple stages of authorship is Anders Winroth, *The Making of Gratian's "Decretum"* (Cambridge, 2000).

⁶¹ As but one example, see D. E. Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard: The Influence of Abelard's Thought in the Early Scholastic Period* (Cambridge, 1969), chap. 9, "Abelard and the *Decretum* of Gratian," 214–223.

⁶² See Hermann Kantorowicz's pioneering article "The *Quaestiones disputatae* of the Glossators,"

manuscript analysis once again argues the reverse, and theological texts other than Abelard have been suggested as sources of Gratian's method of argumentation.⁶³ The causal influence may never be solved, nor need it be, for what is at issue is the very spread of a culture of disputation that was not restricted to a single area of inquiry but rather pervaded the ideas, texts, and culture of the entire period. As Stephan Kuttner rightly cautioned, "It was a mistaken question, based on a search for 'influences' where the reality was that of an intellectual climate which became apparent at the same time but in different ways north, west, and south, wherever the need for organizing knowledge in a comprehensive, rational manner was felt."⁶⁴ This intellectual climate, an emerging culture of disputation, blossomed when a wave of translations broke on the shore of twelfth-century Europe in the form of Aristotle's New Logic.

THE RISE OF SCHOLASTIC DISPUTATION out of dialogue within legal and theological circles might have remained a minor byproduct of the new schools and scholars of the twelfth century had it not been for the recovery of Aristotle's *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations*, works that dealt directly with the dialectical process of forming and refuting arguments.⁶⁵ The translation and transmission of this "New Logic" in the middle of the twelfth century had a profound impact on the direction that scholastic disputation would take, lending authority and guidance to the practice most characteristic of the medieval schoolmen.

An early witness to the importance of Aristotle for medieval disputation was Adam of Balsham. His logical treatise *Ars disserendi* of about 1132 (perhaps best translated as the *Art of Discourse*) survives incomplete and exists in two recensions, the second one appearing with important changes under the title *Dialectica Alexandri*, probably out of association with Adam's most illustrious follower in the second half of the twelfth century, Alexander Neckham.⁶⁶ Little is known about Adam's life, but over his career he circulated among the most prominent teachers and clerics in

Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 16 (1939): 1–67, here 52: "Even in French theology which was, of course, much more closely connected with Aristotle than with Italian jurisprudence, disputations did not become a feature of the curriculum until well after the middle of the twelfth century, and it must therefore have been jurisprudence which influenced theology, Bologna which influences Paris, not *vice versa*." Cf. John W. Baldwin, *The Scholastic Culture of the Middle Ages, 1000–1300* (Prospect Heights, Ill., 1971), 75: "Originating from the contentious nature of legal science, the disputation passed from the Roman lawyers of Bologna to the canonists and the theologians."

⁶³ See the relevant conclusions reached by John Wei, "Gratian and the School of Laon," *Traditio* 64 (2009): 279–322, here 320: "Gratian must have learned the scholastic method for reconciling contradictory authorities from a contemporary theologian or contemporary theological work." Cf. Landau, "The Development of Law," 122, discussing Ivo of Chartres: "As regards procedural law, his attitudes towards the ordeal (*judicium Dei*) betray an incipient rationalisation, doubtless under the influence of early scholasticism."

⁶⁴ Kuttner, "The Revival of Jurisprudence," 310.

⁶⁵ Cf. Sten Ebbesen, "Ancient Scholastic Logic as a Source of Medieval Scholastic Logic," in Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg, *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, 101–127; and Ebbesen, "The Way Fallacies Were Treated in Scholastic Logic," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-âge Grec et Latin* 55 (1987): 107–134.

⁶⁶ *Ars disserendi* has also been rendered as *Art of Reasoning* (for example, by Daniel D. McGarry in *The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury: A Twelfth-Century Defense of the Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium*, trans. McGarry [1955; repr., Berkeley, Calif., 1962]).

Paris. A younger contemporary, John of Salisbury, met Adam probably between 1136 and 1138 in Paris and recorded his gratitude at having learned “a great deal from his explanations,” although he also said of Adam’s writing that he got so involved in verbal intricacies that his exposition was of very little use.⁶⁷ Indeed, it is probably the highly technical nature of the treatise that has caused it to be so often ignored in modern scholarship, even though it represents, as its modern editor states, the first time that “Aristotle’s *Topics* and *Sophistici Elenchi* were put into contribution [*sic*] in an original treatise by a Latin writing author.”⁶⁸

Adam thought that the language of the textbooks was antiquated and that the present revival of dialectic would change the understanding and practice of debate. With fresh translations of Aristotle in hand, and a considerable reliance on Boethian logic as well, he undertook to produce a handbook containing all that was essential for mastering logic. He mentioned the currency of disputes and the lack of any formal rules governing their procedure as one of his reasons for writing the treatise: “There was not yet the custom of disputing, for then there was only the beginning, not as yet an art of disputing, for one ought to dispute before an art can be made of it.”⁶⁹ Accordingly, his focus was on discourse in the form of questions and answers, for he believed that it was from *enuntio* and *interrogatio* that the principles of discourse were to be found. In underscoring the principles of debate, Adam illustrates the nexus between contemporary scholastic discourse and Aristotelian argumentation.

John of Salisbury, writing a generation later, offers an even more conspicuous example of Aristotle’s impact on the emerging practice of scholastic disputation. His celebrated *Metalogicon* (1159), dedicated to Thomas Becket, is a defense of the verbal and logical arts of the *trivium* against the charges of the pseudonymous Cornificius and his fellow opponents of a liberal arts education. In particular, the *Meta-logicon* reveals the growing divide among scholars over the nature of education, and especially what role should be played by the newly translated texts of Aristotle.⁷⁰ John wished that classroom disputation would rid itself of unnecessary verbiage and return to the systematic logic it aimed to uphold.⁷¹ Logic, as he defined it, was the science of argumentative reasoning.⁷² It was precisely on the subject of logic that he saw scholastic disputation and Aristotle merging, the latter benefiting the former.⁷³

John ranges widely in the *Metalogicon*. He addresses the question of genera and species and the philosophical issue of universals, and he offers precious and insightful commentary on the education and personalities of other masters of his day. Yet

⁶⁷ *Ioannis Saresberiensis Metalogicon*, ed. J. B. Hall (Turnhout, 1991), II.10, IV.3.

⁶⁸ Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, “The *Ars Disserendi* of Adam of Balsham,” *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* 3 (1954): 116–169, here 116–117.

⁶⁹ Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, ed., *Twelfth Century Logic: Texts and Studies*, 2 vols. (Rome, 1956, 1958), 1: 4: “*Nondum igitur disserendi usus, nam adhuc tunc initium, nondum disserendi ars, prius enim disseri oportuit quam de hoc ars fieret, prius enim de quo ars quam ipsa.*”

⁷⁰ Cf. K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, “John of Salisbury and Education in Twelfth-Century Paris from the Account of His *Metalogicon*,” *History of Universities* 6 (1986–1987): 1–46.

⁷¹ A similar plea was invoked later in the twelfth century by the satirist Walter of Châtillon, who complained in one of his poems that “scholars have become idle and unfruitful; they learn only in order to say ‘I have disputed.’” See Walter of Châtillon, *Felix Erat Studium*, in *Moralisch-satirische Gedichte Walters von Châtillon*, ed. Karl Strecker (Heidelberg, 1929), no. 11, 113–115.

⁷² *Ioannis Saresberiensis Metalogicon*, ed. Hall, 56: “*logica est ratio disserendi.*” Note that *disserendi* is the same word employed by Adam of Balsham.

⁷³ *Ioannis Saresberiensis Metalogicon*, ed. Hall, II.18, 84; *Metalogicon*, trans. McGarry, 117.

time and again he returns to Aristotle's work, citing its relevance to contemporary dialectic and especially the practical matter of disputation. Chapter 10 in Book III of the *Metalogicon* is expressly devoted to the "usefulness" (*utilitate*) of Book VIII of Aristotle's *Topics*, which addresses the methods of verbal reasoning. Seizing on the now-familiar metaphor of disputation as a form of verbal combat, John explains how Aristotle can best prepare the young scholastic:

[Aristotle], the drill-master of those who profess to be logicians, has in the foregoing books, as it were, provided the means of disputation [*instrumenta disputandi*], and stacked in the arena arms for the use of his students. This he has done by explaining the meanings of uncombined words and clarifying the nature of propositions and topics. His next step is to show his disciples how they may use these instruments, and somehow to teach them the art of engaging in [argumentative] combat.⁷⁴

John's explication of Aristotle was clearly meant to guide students (and perhaps masters, too) in the art of disputation as well as in its proper application. Others of his generation who were opposed to dialectic might well have found cause to disagree with his assessment, but there is no mistaking its relevance for contemporary masters; the return of Aristotle was catalyzing the practice most characteristic of the schools of his day, and the one most problematic for upholders of the monastic attitude toward learning: disputation.

The recovery of Aristotle's *Topics* in the mid-twelfth century marks a significant moment in the formative development of scholastic disputation. While knowledge of the later, and better-documented, university *disputatio* is necessary for a full appreciation of this contribution, John of Salisbury himself makes note in the *Metalogicon* of the dramatic changes brought about by the Aristotelian impact. "If what [Book VIII] teaches is both borne in mind and correctly observed," he remarks, "it contributes more to the science of argumentative reasoning than practically all the works on dialectic that our modern predecessors were accustomed to teach in the schools."⁷⁵ He then proceeds to examine point by point the ways in which Book VIII of the *Topics* can, and should, serve as a textbook for scholars involved in dialectic and the practice of disputation.⁷⁶ This aspect of logic constitutes the centerpiece of John's defense of the *trivium* as a whole, and it is well worth noting that his focus on the practical rules of disputation as outlined in Book VIII of Aristotle's *Topics* constitutes the second-lengthiest chapter in the entire *Metalogicon*.

What John of Salisbury needed to explain, defend, and correct, Peter the Chanter of Notre Dame (d. 1197), writing a generation later, plainly assumed: "The training of Holy Scripture consists of three exercises: reading (*lectio*), disputing (*disputatio*) and preaching (*predicatio*)."⁷⁷ As the choirmaster and second-ranking dignitary of

⁷⁴ *Ioannis Saresberiensis Metalogicon*, ed. Hall, III.10, 130; *Metalogicon*, trans. McGarry, 189.

⁷⁵ *Ioannis Saresberiensis Metalogicon*, ed. Hall, III.10, 130–131; *Metalogicon*, trans. McGarry, 190.

⁷⁶ John, in the same chapter, defines dialectic as consisting "entirely in a discussion carried on between questioner and answerer" (*inter opponentem et respondentem*).

⁷⁷ *Petrus Cantoris Parisiensis Verbum abbreviatum*, ed. Monique Boutry (Turnhout, 2004), I.1, 9. A short version of the *Verbum* is printed in PL 205: 1–554. For a discussion about the differences between the short and long versions of the *Verbum*, see the introduction by Boutry. See also the review of Boutry's edition by John W. Baldwin, "An Edition of the Long Version of Peter the Chanter's *Verbum abbreviatum*," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 57, no. 1 (2006): 78–85.

the cathedral chapter of Notre Dame, Peter was at the center of a circle of scholars with wide-ranging views on contemporary society, and so his inclusion of disputation as one of the three cornerstone functions of a theologian is particularly revealing.⁷⁸ Without any sense that an apology might be necessary, Peter places disputation squarely within the duties of theological study. He likens the master of theology to the architect of a building, with reading providing the basement, disputation the structural walls, and preaching the roof.⁷⁹ To avoid the dangers associated with useless questioning (*inutilitate questionum*), he urges his fellow theologians to fashion their debates not into altercations (*altercationes*) but into more productive conversations (*collationes*), which will yield a common inquiry after truth.⁸⁰ Calm deliberation should be the order of the day, not theatrical debates.⁸¹ The pedagogical art of disputation that had been anticipated by Adam of Balsham and defended by John of Salisbury was now, for the first time, explicitly incorporated into the cultural practices of Parisian education.

Among the many issues during the twelfth century that would come to divide monastic theologians from scholastic theologians was this very practice of disputation, a concept that was still loosely defined but was increasingly central in the day-to-day activities of a liberal arts training. During the several generations from Anselm to Peter the Chanter, there was an unmistakable evolution in the meaning and use of *disputatio*, from the simpler spiritual conversation or investigation to the more intense debate—debates about new questions, debates about old questions, indeed debates about the very usefulness of debating. What is more, disputation and dialogue became a common currency for scholars and clerics in their struggle to define what constituted theology and what constituted education. Over the course of the twelfth century, the terms and methods of analysis gained greater meaning as well as greater precision. As Henri de Lubac pointedly remarked about this intellectual shift, “while monastic ‘lectio’ tended . . . toward meditation and prayer, scholastic ‘lectio’ tends towards the question and the disputation. It is directed toward a kind of disputation which, although it is not absolutely new, monopolizes the meaning of this word more and more. What we have here again is a fact of language that can serve as an emblem of the evolution which is in progress.”⁸² This cultural evolution took a decisive turn in the early thirteenth century with the institutionalization of disputation as a central component of university education.

⁷⁸ For a more recent and revisionist assessment of the Chanter’s contributions to logic and theology, but with attention focused on a different text, see Luisa Valente, *Phantasia contrarietatis: Contraddizioni scritturali, discorso teologico e arti del linguaggio nel “De tropis loquendi” di Pietro Cantore (d. 1197)* (Florence, 1997). For the Chanter’s contribution to preaching, see Nicole Bériou, *L’avènement des maîtres de la Parole: La prédication à Paris au XIII^e siècle*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1998), 1: 30–48.

⁷⁹ The architectural analogy of foundation, walls, and roof was a common device, often employed to describe the various senses of scripture. For a discussion of the examples of Hugh of St. Victor and Peter Comestor, see Beryl Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages*, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 1983), 87, 242.

⁸⁰ Another theological work of Peter’s consists entirely of *questiones*: *Summa de sacramentis et animae consiliis*, ed. Jean-Albert Dugauquier (Louvain, 1954).

⁸¹ In part this reflects the more general twelfth-century transition of biblical exegesis from a synthesis of patristic wisdom to a separation of different schools of interpretation.

⁸² Henri de Lubac, *Medieval Exegesis*, vol. 1: *The Four Senses of Scripture*, trans. Mark Sebanc (1959; repr., Edinburgh, 1998), 52.



FIGURE 4: Two Paris masters of the late twelfth century: Alain of Lille (d. 1202) in dialogue with Peter the Chanter. Manuscript from the Abbey of Ottoburne (1228–1246). British Library, MS Cod. Addit. 19767. Used by permission.

THE ABSORPTION OF DISPUTATION within the curriculum of the medieval university marked the formal integration of contrapuntal debate at the intellectual level while also illustrating its turn toward a cultural practice. Having originated in scholastic circles, university disputation has been a hallmark of the Western intellectual tradition from the Middle Ages down to the modern *viva voce* dissertation defense.⁸³

Among the earliest examples of disputations held for the benefit of bachelors and students are the *Quaestiones disputatae* of Simon of Tournai, a master in Paris from ca. 1165 to 1201 who in his youth had attended the classes (and disputations) on law in Bologna.⁸⁴ Dating from the last decade of the twelfth century, on the eve of the formal recognition of the University of Paris, Simon's *Quaestiones* consist of 102 disputations containing 371 individual questions dealing with a wide, but standard, array of topics relating to Christian theology, including the Trinity, Christological problems, original sin, the morality of human actions, virtues and vices, and the sacraments.⁸⁵ Details about the conduct of these disputations are generally few, but some sense of the events can nevertheless be discerned.⁸⁶ Master Simon, seated in his chair (*Symon sedet*), directed each discussion by introducing the question of the day, supplying the necessary authorities (*auctoritates*), responding to objections, and finally offering the solution. The number of questions to be disputed varied from one day to the next, and sometimes Simon had to remind his audience that a certain topic had already been discussed (*alibi discussum est*). At other times he interrupted the disputation to postpone further discussion until another day.⁸⁷ His popularity as a debater is confirmed by the testimony of the English chronicler Matthew Paris (d. 1259), who pauses in his wide-ranging *Chronica majora* to tell us that even the largest lecture hall could scarcely contain the crowds of students who flocked to hear Simon. For if Simon lectured well, Matthew writes, he disputed even better.⁸⁸ Other figures of note in the Paris of King Philip II Augustus (r. 1179–1223) confirm this reputation: Henry of Brussels, Gerald of Wales, and Thomas of Cantimpré each remarked on how many students Simon seemed to attract with his disputations, speaking scornfully of his inordinate pride.⁸⁹ Not since the days of Peter Abelard had the disputations of a lecturer in theology provoked such sentiments of admiration, contempt, and even jealousy.

Scholars are in agreement that the University of Paris was not founded, but rather grew.⁹⁰ Many of the intellectual and even structural components of what would be-

⁸³ For general remarks, see the learned study by William Clark, *Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University* (Chicago, 2006), esp. chap. 3. See also Ku-ming (Kevin) Chang, "From Oral Disputation to Written Text: The Transformation of the Dissertation in Early Modern Europe," *History of Universities* 19, no. 2 (2004): 129–187.

⁸⁴ Joseph Warichez, *Étienne de Tournai et son temps, 1128–1203* (Paris, 1937), 17–22.

⁸⁵ Seven manuscripts of Simon's *Disputationes* are preserved. The standard critical edition of these texts is Joseph Warichez, ed., *Les Disputationes de Simon de Tournai* (Louvain, 1932). Subsequent notes refer to the individual disputations and page numbers contained in this edition.

⁸⁶ We learn, for example, that the audience consisted of not only students, but the entire teaching personnel as well.

⁸⁷ Warichez, *Les Disputationes de Simon de Tournai*, *Disputatio* LIX, 168; *Disputatio* LIII, 154; *Disputatio* XXX, 92.

⁸⁸ Cited *ibid.*, xliii: "*legit igitur subtiliter valde et subtilius disputavit.*"

⁸⁹ Cited in Charles J. Liebman, *The Old French Psalter Commentary: Contribution to a Critical Study of the Text Attributed to Simon of Tournai* (Canandaigua, N.Y., 1982), 76–77.

⁹⁰ Cf. Stephen C. Ferruolo, "The Paris Statutes of 1215 Reconsidered," *History of Universities* 5 (1985): 1–14, here 1.

come the university were already firmly in place by the end of the twelfth century, including a lively controversy over the place of disputation in the lecture halls.⁹¹ The statutes of 1215 that gave recognition to the corporation of masters and students (*universitas magistrorum et scholarium*) also laid down teaching programs and procedures (including appropriate days and times for lecturing and disputing), regulated academic custom at official gatherings and clothing and occasions for mourning, confirmed the rules for examinations, set the minimum age for lecturing in the arts at twenty-one and for lecturing in theology at thirty-five, and repeated that masters should exercise jurisdiction over scholars.⁹² Over the next several centuries, the *disputatio* flourished in its new institutional home and became an essential ingredient in the basic organization of academic learning.⁹³

The formalized practice of disputation in Paris took root in the faculty of arts as well as in the faculties of advanced learning: theology, medicine, and canon law.⁹⁴ Several different forms of university disputations developed in the period following 1215.⁹⁵ The *disputatio ordinaria* was held at regular intervals, usually in the morning, for the benefit of bachelors and students.⁹⁶ It was presided over by a master, who announced beforehand the question that would be asked. One bachelor, the *opponents*, supplied arguments against the thesis, while another, the *respondens*, attempted to answer the objections that were raised and to demonstrate their weakness.⁹⁷ The master typically gave a summing-up or *determinatio* at the end, but not in all cases,

⁹¹ On the social context of the early history of the University of Paris, see Jacques Verger, "A propos de la naissance de l'Université de Paris: Contexte social, enjeu politique, portée intellectuelle," in Johannes Fried, ed., *Schulen und Studium im sozialen Wandel des hohen und späten Mittelalters* (Sigmaringen, 1986), 69–96. Important discussions are also to be found in Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, new ed., ed. F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1936), vol. 1; and Stephen C. Ferruolo, *The Origins of the University: The Schools of Paris and Their Critics, 1100–1215* (Stanford, Calif., 1984).

⁹² Henricus Denifle and Aemilio Châtelain, eds., *Chartularium Universitatis parisiensis*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1889–1897), 1: 78–79.

⁹³ An indispensable guide to the study of the medieval university is H. de Ridder-Symeons, ed., *Universities in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1992), vol. 1 in the four-volume *History of the University in Europe*, ed. Walter Rüegg, published under the auspices of the Standing Conference of Rectors, Presidents, and Vice-Chancellors of the European Universities (CRE). An early and still very valuable guide to the basic patterns of learning is Charles Thurot, *De l'organisation de l'enseignement dans l'Université de Paris au Moyen-âge* (Paris, 1850). See also Olga Weijers, *Terminologie des universités au XIII^e siècle* (Rome, 1987), esp. pt. 3. Fresh perspectives on the subject can be found in John Van Engen, ed., *Learning Institutionalized: Teaching in the Medieval University* (Notre Dame, Ind., 2000).

⁹⁴ For the faculty of arts, see especially Weijers, *La "Disputatio."* For the development of the *disputatio* in the faculties of theology, medicine, and law, see Bazàn et al., *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques*.

⁹⁵ The basic structure and procedures of the university disputations are outlined in Bernardo C. Bazàn, "Les questions disputées, principalement dans les facultés de théologie," in Bazàn et al., *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques*, 21–49. Further information on the definition of the genre can be found in the chapters by Wippel, Fransen, and Jacquart. At the Italian universities and at Oxford and Cambridge, which began as offshoots of the University of Paris in the early thirteenth century, the documentation concerning academic practices is plentiful only from about the middle of the thirteenth century. See A. G. Little and F. Pelster, *Oxford Theology and Theologians, c. A.D. 1282–1302* (Oxford, 1934), 29–30.

⁹⁶ This basic form of disputation is also variously called a *disputatio solemn* or *disputatio publica*. In addition to *disputatio quodlibetalis*, these quodlibets could also be called *disputatio communis* and *disputatio generalis*.

⁹⁷ For a technical discussion of the art, see Ignacio Angelelli, "The Techniques of Disputation in the History of Logic," *Journal of Philosophy* 67, no. 20 (1970): 800–815.

and sometimes not at the time of the disputation, but rather at a later date.⁹⁸ The questions dealt with during any one disputation were usually all related to the same problem or type of problem, and the exercise was public in the sense that it was open to bachelors from different schools, in contrast to the *disputatio privata*, which the presiding master held in his own school and only for his own pupils.⁹⁹

A second kind of disputation, the *disputatio de quolibet*, soon gained currency in the university.¹⁰⁰ Once thought to owe its genesis to Thomas Aquinas, the quodlibet made its appearance sometime in the second quarter of the thirteenth century.¹⁰¹ In contrast to the ordinary disputation, which focused on specific topics announced beforehand and which was held for the benefit of students and faculty only, questions posed at these disputations were offered *de quolibet* ("about anything at all") and could cover any number of subjects, ranging across theology, metaphysics, canon law, and medicine. In addition, the initiative for the subjects debated lay with the audience, and the disputing master never knew beforehand what questions would be asked. Less frequent than the private disputations, these quodlibetical disputations generally took place in the Latin Quarter's rue du Fouarre (*vicus straminis*), and only during Advent and Lent. Most especially, they were open to the general public and attracted a diverse, even "international," audience.¹⁰² Masters and scholars from other schools might attend. All kinds of ecclesiastics and prelates, and even civil authorities, might have been present—indeed, all the "intellectuals" of the time who were attracted by skirmishes of this kind, and all of whom had a desire to ask questions and oppose arguments.¹⁰³ So great was the popularity of disputing that by the later thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the art and practice of debate evolved into newer forms, such as the *disputationibus de sophismatibus* and the *ars obligatoria*.¹⁰⁴

It is the early history of quodlibetal disputations that is most interesting from a cultural historical perspective. In addition to the fact that they quickly became a staple of the university calendar and spread beyond the faculty of theology in Paris where they began, there are other reasons why these ritualized spectacles should have been so popular. It has rightly been observed that the public gatherings at quodlibetical disputations recall the performance of drama, which was flourishing in

⁹⁸ There is some uncertainty as to exactly how long after the disputation the determination took place. Palémon Glorieux maintained that it occurred on the first reading day following the disputation. See Glorieux, "L'enseignement au Moyen âge: Techniques et méthodes en usage à la Faculté de théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen âge* 35 (1968): 65–186, here 126. But see also Little and Pelster, *Oxford Theology and Theologians*, 229, who are less certain about how soon after the disputation the determination might have been given. Bazàn, "Les espèces du genre," in Bazàn et al., *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques*, 61–62, has nothing further to contribute toward a solution.

⁹⁹ The *disputatio privata* is less well documented than the other types of university disputations. See Bazàn, "Les espèces du genre," 62.

¹⁰⁰ The most comprehensive treatment of this literature, even if it was intended only as a "first orientational study," remains Palémon Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320*, 2 vols. (Le Saulchoir, Kain, 1925–1935).

¹⁰¹ The quodlibetical disputation (and its twentieth-century historiography) is explained in detail in the chapters by John Wippel in Bazàn et al., *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques*, 153–222.

¹⁰² Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320*, 2: 10.

¹⁰³ Lawn, *The Rise and Decline of the Scholastic "Quaestio disputata"*, 16.

¹⁰⁴ These later forms of argumentation flourished especially in England. For context, see William J. Courtenay's important study *Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England* (Princeton, N.J., 1987).



FIGURE 5: University masters engage in scholastic disputation over the Aristotelian definition of happiness. Note the presence and participation of students. Mid-thirteenth-century Parisian copy of a commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* by Eustratius (ca. 1120), the Greek bishop of Nicea. National Library of Sweden, MS Va 3, fol. 205v. Used by permission. For further discussion, see Mia Åkestam and Erika Kihlman, "Lire, comprendre et mémoriser l'Éthique à Nicomaque: Le rapport texte-image dans ms. Stockholm, Kungl. Bibl., Va 3," in Olle Ferm and Per Förmegård, eds., *Regards sur la France du Moyen âge* (Stockholm, 2009), 110–153.

France in the thirteenth century, and which also tended to efface distinctions between actor and audience, spectacle and daily life, ritual and representation.¹⁰⁵ The theatricality and indeed the entertainment value of these university events would not have been lost on a bustling Parisian audience that was witness to novelties in dramatic performance, innovations in polyphonic music, much of it emanating from the school of Notre Dame, and the growing popularity of a new genre of debate poems that featured human or anthropomorphic characters disputing on a multitude of topics.¹⁰⁶

THE PRACTICE OF DISPUTATION CAN be said to have entered the public sphere when it transcended the academic circles where it first developed and reached audiences who were not trained in the methods of schools and universities. The flowering of polyphonic composition offers an especially intriguing cultural manifestation of scholastic disputation because it emanates not only from the same time and place (late-twelfth-century Paris), but from the same circle of scholars and teachers.¹⁰⁷ As the eminent musicologist Richard Taruskin has noted, “the burgeoning of polyphonic composition followed the exact same trajectory [as scholastic education] . . . it reached its first great, transfiguring culmination in the cathedral schools of Paris, and in a new form it radiated from the cosmopolitan center throughout Western Christendom, receiving a special ancillary cultivation in the universities.”¹⁰⁸ We might go further. In cultural terms, polyphony is one of a group of tactics deployed

¹⁰⁵ Jody Enders, “The Theater of Scholastic Erudition,” *Comparative Drama* 27, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 341–363, here 344. On the general importance of audience participation, see Henri Rey-Flaud, *Pour une dramaturgie du Moyen âge* (Paris, 1980), 15–22.

¹⁰⁶ On medieval drama, see Richard Axton, *European Drama of the Early Middle Ages* (London, 1974); O. B. Hardison, Jr., *Christian Rite and Christian Drama in the Middle Ages: Essays in the Origin and Early History of Modern Drama* (Baltimore, 1965), who located the origins of drama in sacramental rituals of the Catholic Church; and Jody Enders, *Rhetoric and the Origins of Medieval Drama* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1992), who examines the interplay between legal rhetoric and dramatic practice in a broad array of sources from antiquity to the Renaissance and cites the university quodlibet as participating in what she calls the “aestheticization of rhetoric” (164). More recently, Carol Symes, *A Common Stage*, has undertaken a culturally oriented and methodologically sophisticated analysis of theatrical activity in northern France, positing the existence of a public and political sphere in which theater served as a site for the exchange of information and ideas and a medium for debate, deliberation, and dispute. For a discussion about the development of vernacular debate poetry, see the introduction in the anthology by Michel-André Bossy, ed., *Medieval Debate Poetry: Vernacular Works* (New York, 1987), xi–xxiv.

¹⁰⁷ The cultural-historical dimensions of medieval music are a topic of current scholarly attention. See, for example, Andrew Kirkman, *The Cultural Life of the Early Polyphonic Mass: Medieval Context to Modern Revival* (Cambridge, 2010); and Olivier Cullin, ed., *La place de la musique dans la culture médiévale* (Turnhout, 2007).

¹⁰⁸ Richard Taruskin, *Music from the Earliest Notation to the Sixteenth Century* (Oxford, 2005), 149. For a comprehensive study of the musical culture of Notre Dame within the context of the cathedral and the city, see Craig Wright, *Music and Ceremony at Notre Dame of Paris, 500–1550* (Cambridge, 1989), esp. chaps. 7–8. For the more embellished forms of Notre Dame polyphony (*tripla* and *quadrupla*), see Guillaume Gross, *Chanter en polyphonie à Notre Dame de Paris aux 12^e et 13^e siècles* (Turnhout, 2007). An up-to-date overview of what is known about the school and composers of Notre Dame by a leading authority in the field is Edward H. Roesner, “Notre Dame,” chap. 30 in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Music*, forthcoming. See also Janet Knapp, “Polyphony at Notre Dame of Paris,” in Richard Crocker and David Hiley, eds., *The Early Middle Ages to 1300* (Oxford, 1990), 557–635. On the university context for early polyphony, see Marion S. Gushee, “The Polyphonic Music of the Medieval Monastery, Cathedral and University,” in James McKinnon, ed., *Antiquity and the Middle Ages: From Ancient Greece to the 15th Century* (London, 1990), 143–169.

to enhance the delivery of liturgical song, the song being an enhanced reading of a ritual text, and hence it is an enhancement of the ritual act itself. Polyphony served to bring to the fore the *harmonia*—the *consonantia* implicit in the song—and thus to highlight the text that the song embellished. Since most polyphony from the twelfth century onward entailed responsorial chants either directly or indirectly, it threw into relief the relationship of the Mass (the gradual, the alleluia, etc.) with the scripture on which the chant commented, hence emphasizing the overall *harmonia* inherent in the body of scripture. Harmony, in simple terms, is counterpoint slowed down; counterpoint, like *disputatio*, is a cultural expression of dialectic and rhetoric. Broadly speaking, the principles that Abelard applied to theology and that Gratian applied to law, polyphony applied to music.

Closely affiliated with the early history of the University of Paris is another musical innovation that is even more explicitly a dialogue of voices: the motet. Simply defined as a piece of music in several parts with words (from the Old French, *mot*), it first appeared in connection with Parisian scholastic circles, and in particular with the career of Philip the Chancellor of Notre Dame, head of the University of Paris from 1218 until his death in 1236.¹⁰⁹ Very early on, the capacity of the motet to carry arguments *pro* and *contra*, to engage in dialectic and irony, began to be systematically exploited and used in increasingly sophisticated ways, so that by 1300, the motet (like the quodlibet) deployed these tactics in virtuoso fashion.¹¹⁰ Recently described as the least-studied major figure of thirteenth-century thought, Philip the Chancellor exemplifies the cultural fabric that braided music, poetry, and university administration.¹¹¹ His poem *Beata viscera* (“O Blessed womb”), in honor of the Virgin, was set to music by one of the most celebrated composers of Parisian polyphony, Perotin.¹¹² Philip is also credited with two well-known debates that are found in several manuscripts with their melodies: *Disputatio membrorum* is a debate between various parts of the body, and the even better known *Quisquis cordis et oculi* is an *altercatio* between heart and eye.¹¹³ Close examination of other elements of his monophonic

¹⁰⁹ See especially Thomas B. Payne, “Aurelianus civitas: Student Unrest in Medieval France and a Conductus by Philip the Chancellor,” *Speculum* 75, no. 3 (2000): 589–614; and Payne, “Philip the Chancellor and the Conductus Prosula: ‘Motetish’ Works from the School of Notre Dame,” in Terence Bailey and Alma Santosuosso, eds., *Music in Medieval Europe: Studies in Honour of Bryan Gillingham* (Aldershot, 2007), 220–238. A wealth of additional material can be found in Payne, “Poetry, Politics, and Polyphony: Philip the Chancellor’s Contribution to the Music of the Notre Dame School,” 5 vols. (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1991).

¹¹⁰ For a comprehensive overview of the motet, see E. H. Sanders, “The Medieval Motet,” in Wulf Arlt, Ernst Lichtenhahn, and Hans W. Oesch, eds., *Gattungen der Musik in Einzeldarstellungen: Gedenkschrift Leo Schrade, erst Folge* (Berne, 1973), 497–573. For a more recent and succinct overview of the motet literature, especially in comparison with other musical forms of the thirteenth century, see Mark Everist, “The Thirteenth Century,” in Everist, ed., *Cambridge Companion to Medieval Music* (Cambridge, 2011), 67–86, esp. 77–85.

¹¹¹ R. E. Houser, trans., *The Cardinal Virtues: Aquinas, Albert, and Philip the Chancellor* (Toronto, 2004), 42 n. 87. For Philip’s general influence on thirteenth-century thought, see Odon Lottin, “L’influence littéraire du chancelier Philippe,” in Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, 6 vols. (Paris, 1942–1960), 6: 149–169.

¹¹² The source for this information is the thirteenth-century musical treatise *De mensuris et discantu*, written by an unnamed Englishman and known to posterity as *Anonymous IV*. The story of the misnomer and of its contents is nicely summarized by Taruskin, *Music from the Earliest Notation to the Sixteenth Century*, 173–174. See also Gushee, “The Polyphonic Music of the Medieval Monastery, Cathedral and University,” 157–163.

¹¹³ John Stevens, “Medieval Song,” in Crocker and Hiley, *The Early Middle Ages to 1300*, 418. For discussion of the manuscripts, see L21 and K52 in Gordon A. Anderson, “Notre-Dame and Related

conductus repertoire reveals a composer who was highly attentive to vocabulary, logic, and the preaching power of the word.¹¹⁴ In a newly published edition of Philip's motets, Thomas B. Payne has observed that the correspondence of at least three attributable multi-texted polyphonic works operates explicitly as a debate, thus presenting the listener with a situation analogous to a scholastic disputation, particularly since the subject matter is the praise and criticism of the clergy.¹¹⁵ "Just as the two poems in the motetus and triplum contend, each taking sides in a disputation on the morality and corruption of the clergy, so do all the voices spar rhythmically."¹¹⁶ Not only are there simultaneous utterances on both sides of the debate, but in some instances there is the additional offering of a judgment by a third party, thus imitating the final determination that concludes a scholastic disputation.¹¹⁷ Philip the Chancellor well illustrates the penetration of scholastic ideas into multiple cultural spheres, and it is no minor coincidence that his innovations in song, poetry, and polemic coincided with a remarkable output in debate poems (in vernacular languages as well as Latin) during the early thirteenth century.¹¹⁸

Debate poems and polyphonic music offer tantalizing possibilities for extra-university manifestations of scholastic disputation. An even more illustrative example of the practice or application of disputation in the thirteenth century is the Church's confrontation with Judaism and Jews, longtime targets of ecclesiastical polemic, and often in works cast in the dialogue form.¹¹⁹ To be sure, there existed a long tradition of polemics *adversus Iudaeos* ("against the Jews") going back to the church fathers,

Conductus: A Catalogue Raisonné," *Miscellanea Musicologica* 6 (1972): 153–229, 7 (1975): 1–81. See as well the overview of Philip the Chancellor's poetry by Peter Dronke, "The Lyrical Compositions of Philip the Chancellor," *Studi medievali*, ser. 3, 28 (1987): 563–592.

¹¹⁴ Anne-Zoé Rillon, "Convaincre et émouvoir: Les conduits monodiques de Philippe le Chancelier, un médium pour la prédication?" in Cullin, *La place de la musique dans la culture médiévale*, 99–113. For further connections between scholastic life and music, see Jacques Verger, "La musique et le son chez Vincent de Beauvais et les encyclopédistes du XIII^e siècle," *ibid.*, 71–85.

¹¹⁵ *Ypocrite pseudopontifices / Velut stelle fimamenti / Et gaudebit; Anima iuge lacrima; and O quam necessarium / Venditores labiorum / Domino [or Eius]*. See Philip the Chancellor, *Motets and Prosulas*, ed. Thomas B. Payne (Middleton, Wis., 2011). Philip at the time was at odds with the bishop of Paris, William of Auvergne. Perotin sided with Philip and supplied the musical (and rhythmically oppositional) elements for the double motet *Ypocrite pseudopontifices*.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, xxv.

¹¹⁷ According to Payne, *ibid.*, xix, the motets "adopt opposite stances in each of the upper voices, with the motetus dispensing an opinion on one side of the disputation, and the triplum taking the other. In each of these cases the disagreement between the texts is borne out ingeniously by their musical settings as double motets: each position is disclaimed simultaneously with the other, resulting in a verbal discord that, ironically, is offset by the harmonious musical setting that combines them."

¹¹⁸ Debate in one form or another was a staple of courtly and clerical entertainment even before the thirteenth century. There are debates between Wine and Water and Winter and Summer, as well as many love dialogues, including *De Ganymede and Helena* and, most popular of all, the Knight versus the Clerk, a debate about who is the better lover. Beginning in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, there are debate poems in many of the vernacular languages. In Provençal they are called *joc-partit*, *partimen*, and *tenso*; in German, *Wechsel*; and in Old French, *jeux-partis* (or *partures*), in which some two hundred survive, many of them with their music attached. For a discussion of Philip the Chancellor's debate poems in this larger context, see Michel-André Bossy, "Medieval Debates of Body and Soul," *Comparative Literature* 28, no. 2 (1976): 144–163. On the use of dialectics among the Troubadours, see Michelle Bolduc, "Troubadours in Debate: The *Breviari d'Amor*," *Romance Quarterly* 57, no. 1 (2010): 63–76.

¹¹⁹ Music and anti-Judaism have traditionally been treated as entirely separate fields. An original and wide-ranging examination of the Christian musical attack upon Jews, opposing harmonious musicality to Jewish noise, is Ruth HaCohen, *The Music Libel against the Jews* (New Haven, Conn., 2011), who discusses the medieval period in chap. 1.

the development of which can be traced in the writings of medieval Christian authors.¹²⁰ A catalogue of these anti-Jewish polemics points to a typology in which an older style that paid particular attention to interpretations of the biblical text, such as Justin Martyr's *Dialogue with Trypho* (second century) and Augustine's *Adversus Judaeos* (fifth century), was distinguished from newer forms of argumentation in the twelfth century that were characterized by a focus on "reason" (*ratio*) and that targeted the Talmud and post-biblical Jewish literature.¹²¹ A sustained body of scholarship since the 1980s has illuminated the complex conceptions that underpin the medieval intellectual encounter with Jews and Judaism, what Jeremy Cohen famously dubbed "the hermeneutical Jew."¹²² Absent from this important field of historical analysis is an explanation of one of the most basic and fundamental features of this encounter: the fact that it was a dialogue, both metaphorically and literally a disputation.

While it may seem logical that Jewish-Christian encounters would have been given a new thrust by the formalization of disputation in scholastic circles and universities, there is in fact a paradox: throughout the thirteenth century, the Church was perpetually concerned with regulating interactions between Christians and Jews. The introduction of the "Jewish Badge" at Lateran IV in 1215 is the most obvious example of an attempt to maintain segregation between Christian and Jewish communities, but many other edicts of Church councils and missives of the popes specifically sought to forbid religious disputations of the sort mentioned in the dialogues of the twelfth century.¹²³ Thus in an addendum to the synodical rules issued around

¹²⁰ Cf. Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100–600)* (Chicago, 1971), 15: "virtually every major Christian writer of the first five centuries either composed a treatise in opposition to Judaism or made this issue the dominant theme in a treatise devoted to some other subject." The two best treatments of the medieval Christian intellectual engagement with Jews and Judaism are Gilbert Dahan, *Les intellectuels chrétiens et les juifs au Moyen âge* (Paris, 1990); and Jeremy Cohen, *Living Letters of the Law: Ideas of the Jew in Medieval Christianity* (Berkeley, Calif., 1999). See also the important studies by Anna Sapir Abulafia, *Christians and Jews in the Twelfth-Century Renaissance* (London, 1995) and *Christians and Jews in Dispute: Disputational Literature and the Rise of Anti-Judaism in the West (c. 1000–1150)* (Aldershot, 1998).

¹²¹ Heinz Schreckenberg, *Die christlichen Adversus-Judaeos-Texte (11.–13. Jh.)* (Frankfurt, 1991). A leading advocate in arguing for a connection between the rational developments of the twelfth-century renaissance and the negative impact on the Jewish-Christian debate is Anna Sapir Abulafia (see fn. 120). The foundational brick in this line of inquiry was laid by Amos Funkenstein, "Changes in the Patterns of Christian Anti-Jewish Polemic in the Twelfth Century" (in Hebrew), *Zion*, n.s., 33 (1968): 125–144. An abbreviated and slightly reoriented version of the essay subsequently appeared in English as "Basic Types of Christian Anti-Jewish Polemics in the Later Middle Ages," *Viator* 2 (1971): 373–382.

¹²² Cohen, *Living Letters of the Law*, 2–3 n. 3. Cf. the expression "theological Jew" as described by Dahan, *Les intellectuels chrétiens et les juifs au Moyen âge*, 585. The importance of anti-Jewish sentiment in medieval Europe has not always been recognized. A landmark survey of historical writings that neglect the place and importance of Jews in medieval Western Europe is Gavin I. Langmuir, "Majority Historians and Post-Biblical Jews," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 27 (1966): 343–364, reprinted in Langmuir, *Toward a Definition of Antisemitism* (Berkeley, Calif., 1990), 21–41. For a recent summary of the subject and its historiography, see Alex J. Novikoff, "The Middle Ages," in Albert S. Lindemann and Richard S. Levy, eds., *Antisemitism: A History* (Oxford, 2010), 63–78. For the iconography of anti-Judaism in the Middle Ages, see especially Heinz Schreckenberg, *The Jews in Christian Art: An Illustrated History* (New York, 1996), esp. 222–235 for images of dialogue and debate; and Sara Lipton, *Images of Intolerance: The Representation of Jews and Judaism in the Bible Moralisée* (Berkeley, Calif., 1999), 3–4, who wisely cautions against direct causation between visual representations and contemporary events.

¹²³ The "veracity" of these Jewish-Christian dialogues that purport to be based on actual encounters has long exercised the minds of scholars interested in Jewish-Christian intellectual relations. In my opinion, the emphasis is at least partially misplaced, for it is a common literary device, and separating truth from fiction is highly problematic (cf. Schmitt, *The Conversion of Herman the Jew*, chap. 1). What



FIGURE 6: Jews disputing with bishops at the feet of enthroned Ecclesia, who personifies the Church and the Virgin Mary and possibly also Queen Blanche of Castile. The figure on the left points to a Torah scroll, while the crowned female figure looks approvingly in the direction of the bishops. Miniature in the *Bible moralisée*, Paris, ca. 1240. Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS Lat. 11560, fol. 87v. Image from Paul Weber, *Geistliches Schauspiel und Kirchliche Kunst* (Stuttgart, 1894), 113.

1200 by Odo of Sully, the archbishop of Paris (1197–1208), it is stated that “laymen shall, under pain of excommunication, be forbidden ever to dare to dispute with Jews about the articles of the Christian faith.”¹²⁴ The Council of Treves in March 1227 repeated the injunction that “ignorant clergymen shall not dispute with Jews in the presence of laity.”¹²⁵ Rising to yet higher levels of authority, Pope Gregory IX in March 1233 wrote to the archbishops and bishops and the other prelates of the Church in Germany to prohibit them “most stringently” from “at any time dar[ing] to dispute with Jews about their faith or their rites, lest under pretext of such dis-

is culturally interesting is the emphasis placed on giving the dialogue or disputation an air of realism, for by the early thirteenth century this became a matter of ecclesiastical and royal concern, not merely the personal preoccupation of a singular polemicist. For disputations involving merchants rather than clerics, see Ora Limor, ed., *Die Disputationen zu Ceuta (1179) und Mallorca (1286): Zwei antijüdische Schriften aus dem mittelalterlichen Genua* (Munich, 1994). For an iconoclastic interpretation of thirteenth-century disputations, see H. Kraus, “Christian-Jewish Disputation in a 13th Century Lancet at the Cathedral of Troyes,” *La gazette des beaux-arts* 72 (1968): 151–158, who argues for a “cordiality of relationship” and friendly intellectual discourse on the basis of the visual depiction of disputation. A more judicious appraisal of the iconography of debate is offered in Debra Higgs Strickland, *Saracens, Demons, and Jews: Making Monsters in Medieval Art* (Princeton, N.J., 2003), 101–104.

¹²⁴ Solomon Grayzel, ed., *The Church and the Jews in the XIIIth Century: A Study of Their Relations during the Years 1198–1254, Based on the Papal Letters and the Conciliar Decrees of the Period*, rev. ed., 2 vols. (New York, 1966), 1: 300–301.

¹²⁵ *The Church and the Jews* 19 (March 1, 1227): 318–319.

putation (*sub pretextu disputationis*) the simple-minded slide into a snare of error, which God forbid."¹²⁶ The concern to regulate debates stemmed at least in part from complaints about their outcomes. In the 1190s, the prolific man of letters Peter of Blois warned that "as a result of illicit and careless debates, a virulent crop of heresies runs wild."¹²⁷

Ecclesiastical decrees explicitly limiting both open and private exchanges between Christians and Jews represent one aspect of the papal monarchy's consolidation of power. The circumstances that led to the Paris disputation in 1240 represent another: the Church's sanctioning of properly controlled public disputations. Just as the Dominican Order's preaching activities demonstrated the importance of disputation as a weapon for combating heretics and non-believers, so too did the Paris disputation, or the "Talmud trial," as it is often termed, demonstrate the Church's attempt to manipulate disputation on an unprecedented scale.¹²⁸

The immediate cause for the events of 1240–1242 was a series of condemnatory bulls issued by Pope Gregory IX in 1239 ordering the rulers and prelates in Europe to impound the Talmud and other Jewish writings on the first Sabbath during Lent in 1240.¹²⁹ Gregory's call was a delayed reaction to a plea he had received in 1236 from an evidently embittered Jewish apostate named Nicholas Donin, who presented the pope with thirty-five accusations against the Talmud and its Jewish exponents.¹³⁰ There is little that can be said with certainty about Donin's Jewish background, or for that matter his motives.¹³¹ At least a dozen of the thirty-five articles condemned the Talmud for its perceived absurd homilies, in much the same way that Peter Alfonsi and Peter the Venerable had done a century earlier.¹³² Donin's accusations, however, were uniquely transformed into a staged event when King Louis IX (r.

¹²⁶ *The Church and the Jews* 69 (March 5, 1233): 200–201.

¹²⁷ *Contra perfidiam Judaeorum*, PL 207: 825. See John D. Cotts, *The Clerical Dilemma: Peter of Blois and Literate Culture in the Twelfth Century* (Washington, D.C., 2009), 237.

¹²⁸ On the role of disputation in Dominican education, see M. Michèle Mulchahey, "First the Bow Is Bent in Study": *Dominican Education before 1350* (Toronto, 1998), 167–175. For reasons of space, I do not here engage the use of disputation in the anti-heretical campaigns and the closely affiliated rise of the Inquisition, both of which present relevant avenues for further research on the culture of disputation.

¹²⁹ Nicholas Donin's original accusations about the alleged blasphemies contained in the Talmud were submitted to Yehiel ben Joseph, who was then forced to respond. According to the Christian account of the disputation, the discussion begins with Donin's announcement that he intends to question Yehiel about the Talmud, which he states is four hundred year old, and ends with a so-called "confession" in which Yehiel ben Joseph and Judah ben David admit that the Talmud passages were correctly quoted, but resolutely deny that they contained any blasphemies against Christ or Christians. See Isidore Loeb, *La controverse sur le Talmud sous Saint Louis* (Paris, 1881), 21–54; Joel E. Rembaum, "The Talmud and the Popes: Reflections on the Talmud Trials of the 1240's," *Viator* 13 (1982): 202–223; Robert Chazan, "The Condemnation of the Talmud Reconsidered (1239–1248)," *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research* 55 (1988): 11–30; Hyam Maccoby, *Judaism on Trial: Jewish-Christian Public Disputations in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1982), 19–38; Gilbert Dahan, ed., *Le brûlement du Talmud à Paris, 1242–1244* (Paris, 1999); and Cohen, *Living Letters of the Law*, 317–325.

¹³⁰ For considerations about Donin's background and motives, see Jeremy Cohen, "The Mentality of the Medieval Jewish Apostate: Peter Alfonsi, Hermann of Cologne, and Pablo Christiani," in Todd M. Endelman, ed., *Jewish Apostasy in the Modern World* (New York, 1987), 20–47, esp. 35–41.

¹³¹ But see Jeremy Cohen's attempt to reconstruct the motives of three other apostates of the High Middle Ages, *ibid.*

¹³² It seems reasonable to assume that Nicholas was familiar with these earlier works, or at any rate with the arguments contained therein. But whereas the works of Alfonsi and Peter the Venerable remained words on the page (or, in Alfonsi's case, an imaginary and autobiographical dialogue with his former self), here the dispute has become "public" by virtue of its live hearing.

1226–1270) responded to the pope's bulls by confiscating rabbinic texts and summoning leading French rabbis to his court in order to defend the charges.

Donin's decision to take his complaint directly to the pope may reveal a greater determination on his part than had been exhibited by earlier Jewish converts, but there is a larger cultural context that needs to be appreciated. Donin's move also reflects the new concerns of the papacy, whose authority was far greater in the thirteenth century than it had been in the twelfth. The same can be said of the French monarchy, which had grown measurably since the reign of Philip II Augustus.¹³³ Thus it was not the critique of Judaism and its texts that was new in 1240, or even the part played by a Jewish convert in launching the attack. Rather, it was that the institutional establishments were markedly more competent in handling (or presuming that they could handle) a public disputation with the most knowledgeable Jews of the day.¹³⁴ The overall appearance of the encounter as a "show trial" belies the efforts of the monarchy to present (we might even say to perform) the event in such a manner as to give the impression of a contrapuntal, scholastic debate that would reveal a deeper truth.¹³⁵ Most important of all, Paris in the mid-thirteenth century had become the epicenter of a culture of debate and disputation, one that King Louis IX himself actively promoted. In an intriguing passage in Joinville's *Life of Saint Louis* (completed in 1309), a story is told of "a great debate" between clerics and Jews at the monastery of Cluny.¹³⁶ The abbot reprimands the knight for reacting with violence, while the knight, in turn, chides the abbot for organizing such a debate in the first place. The moral of the story, the king explains to his biographer in language that echoes contemporary Church councils, is "that no man, unless he is a skilled theologian, should debate with Jews." In another passage in the panegyric, Louis presides at supper over a debate between Joinville and Master Robert de Sorbon (Louis's chaplain and the founder of the Collège de Sorbonne) on the respective merits of laymen and friars, pronouncing his judgment (or, in scholastic terms, determination) following the discussion.¹³⁷ In life and in legend, King Louis IX was a patron of the schools and a champion of organized and controlled disputation.

Some scholars have posited that the disputation of 1240 was in fact only an inquisitorial proceeding and involved no actual debate per se.¹³⁸ Careful analysis of

¹³³ For historical context, see William Chester Jordan, *The French Monarchy and the Jews: From Philip Augustus to the Last Capetians* (Philadelphia, 1989), who discusses the Talmud trial at 137–139.

¹³⁴ The inclusion of learned Jews as opposition has precedent. For example, both Gilbert Crispin (late eleventh century) and Walter of Châtillon (mid-twelfth century) claimed that their disputations were held with learned authorities of the Jewish community.

¹³⁵ See the astute comments of Karl F. Morrison, *Understanding Conversion* (Charlottesville, Va., 1992), 132, concerning public debates between Jews and Christians: "Insofar as they could be regarded as instruments of conversion, they belonged to a repertory of play that included theatrical performances, the spectacle of liturgy, and the visual arts." For a similar reading of dialogue as performance in the polemical writings of early-thirteenth-century Spain, see Lucy K. Pick, *Conflict and Coexistence: Archbishop Rodrigo and the Muslims and Jews of Medieval Spain* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2004), esp. chap. 5.

¹³⁶ Jean de Joinville, *Vie de Saint Louis*, ed. Jacques Monfrin (Paris, 1995), §§51–53. For a recent English translation, see Joinville and Villehardouin, *Chronicles of the Crusades*, trans. Caroline Smith (New York, 2008), 155.

¹³⁷ Joinville, *Vie de Saint Louis*, §§31–32; Joinville and Villehardouin, *Chronicles of the Crusades*, 150.

¹³⁸ A precise chronology of the events that took place in Paris in 1240 is desirable but unfortunately is hampered by the limited and occasionally contradictory information contained in the Christian and Hebrew accounts.

Latin manuscript 16558 in the Bibliothèque nationale has established that the proceedings were in fact divided into two stages: the disputation between Donin and the French rabbis, principally Yehiel ben Joseph, and the more formal ecclesiastical inquiry that eventually led to the burning of the Talmud in 1242.¹³⁹ Thus the Talmud trial of 1240 bears witness to the confluence of two major and related developments: the formal public disputation as a method for demonstrating truth, and the inquisitorial trial as a method for legally proving that truth and convicting the guilty parties.¹⁴⁰ The principal Christian clerics who served as witnesses during the inquest were Archbishop Walter of Sens, William of Auvergne (bishop of Paris), Geoffrey of Belleville (chaplain to King Louis IX), Adam of Chambly, and Eudes of Châteauroux (chancellor of the University of Paris). Although the meeting took place on the king's direct orders, Louis IX did not personally preside over the disputation. That task was left to his mother, Queen Blanche of Castile, well known for her patronage of arts and letters. In addition to Yehiel ben Joseph, three other rabbis are known to have taken some part in the trial—"Jews who were regarded among themselves as experts," according to the Christian account.¹⁴¹ Excepting Gerald of Wales's dubious account of Abelard's debate with a Jew in the presence of King Philip I, the disputation of 1240 marks the first recorded instance of a Jewish-Christian disputation in the presence of royalty, the first instance of a Jewish-Christian disputation that was presided over by a university official, and the first recorded instance of university officials' pursuit of the characteristically academic *disputatio* in a non-academic context. As a result of the proceeding, the books of the Talmud were found guilty as charged, and an estimated twenty to twenty-four wagonloads of manuscripts—perhaps ten to twelve thousand volumes, according to Jeremy Cohen—were burned in the Place de Grève over the course of one and a half days in 1242.¹⁴²

The burning of the Talmud that resulted from the disputation and trial in 1240 proved to be the first in a series of large-scale attacks on rabbinic Judaism that emanated from the papal court and were carried out on the orders of the French monarchy and the Dominican friars.¹⁴³ Cohen has argued that the Dominican involvement with this event constituted a new thrust in the Christian confrontation

¹³⁹ Chen-Melech Merchavia, *The Church versus Talmudic and Midrashic Literature, 500–1248* (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem, 1970), 240ff., as cited in Cohen, *Living Letters of the Law*, 323.

¹⁴⁰ Dominican involvement in thirteenth-century inquisition is an area of lively current research. For a deft handling of these features in the context of the battle against heresy, see Christine Caldwell Ames, *Righteous Persecution: Inquisition, Dominicans, and Christianity in the Middle Ages* (Philadelphia, 2009).

¹⁴¹ See Maccoby, *Judaism on Trial*, 164. The three other Jewish witnesses summoned to the gathering were Judah ben David of Melun, Samuel ben Solomon of Château Thierry, and Moses of Coucy, whose *Sefer Mitzvot Gadol* (*Great Book of Commandments*) is one of the earliest codifications of Jewish law (*Halakhah*).

¹⁴² Jeremy Cohen, *The Friars and the Jews: The Evolution of Medieval Anti-Judaism* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1982), 63.

¹⁴³ In May 1244, Pope Innocent IV renewed Gregory's original injunctions and asked Louis IX to burn any copies of the Talmud that were found to have survived the first burning. When the Jews this time appealed the sentence to Rome, complaining that they could not practice their religion without the Talmud, the pope commissioned a legatine tribunal to reopen the inquiry. The person chosen to head that inquiry was Eudes of Châteauroux (now cardinal-bishop of Tusculum), and the verdict was upheld, this time with a list of more than forty illustrious signatories from the academic and clerical communities of Paris.



FIGURE 7: Christians and Jews in dispute. The gestures and finger-pointing recall the scholastic method of point and counterpoint. Woodcut by Johann von Armsheim (1483).

with Judaism, one that went beyond the earlier theological basis of a limited tolerance by attacking Judaism on the grounds of being heresy. As much as the events of 1240 testified to a new, and chiefly Dominican, engagement with Judaism, the trial also bore witness to the evolution of scholastic disputation as a cultural practice. For while the king's role in convoking the event and the setting for the disputation at the royal court were novel for the period, the presence of Eudes of Châteauroux, the chancellor of the University of Paris, strongly suggests that the disputation was conceived in accordance with academic principles, and in any case under academic scrutiny and approval. The two-part disputation and inquisitorial trial, followed by the official verdict, evokes the now-established pattern of the university *disputatio* and final determination. Furthermore, the dating of the Talmud trial is contemporary with the first appearance of the *disputatio de quolibet*, and while the topic of the disputation at the royal court was no surprise to the participants, the manner in which it has come down to us does present notable similarities to Paris's "agonistic" environment, and it is fully consistent with Joinville's memorialization of the king. In sum, the disputation of 1240 represents the confluence between the institutionalization of scholastic disputation in Paris and the age-old Christian polemic against Judaism.

IN FIVE DISCERNIBLE STAGES, disputation emerged from pedagogy in a monastic setting to become one of the defining features of medieval intellectual life, with formative cultural manifestations at multiple levels of society. First, Anselm and his circle pioneered a more dynamic and persuasive approach to articulating the tenets of faith, one that relied heavily on the dual power of reason and dialogue; second, the rise of new schools in Italy and northern France and the transference of dialogical writing and learning to these circles allowed disputation to be absorbed into a new “scholastic” milieu; third, the recovery of Aristotle’s New Logic helped to catalyze this new and controversial use of disputation by providing models of dialectic argumentation; fourth, the institutionalization of the university *disputatio* gave disputation a formal academic context that it would retain for centuries to come; and fifth, the application of disputation in the intensifying confrontation with Jews brought academic methods into the age-old Jewish-Christian debate and made public disputation a fixture of late medieval culture. The proliferation of dialogues, debate poems, recorded disputations, visual images of debate, and polyphonic music over the same decades points clearly in the direction of disputation’s evolution into a cultural practice. By the thirteenth century, a “culture of disputation” had taken root, centered chiefly in Paris, transcending the monastic origins from which it sprang, and extending to many facets of elite and non-elite society.

A cultural logic of disputation now emerges. Taking place on the frontier between learned and popular culture, between public and private spheres, between polemic and poetry, and between tragedy and comedy, the rise of disputation out of dialogue represents a cultural mutation in medieval society that can be fully understood only with a broad and interdisciplinary approach to cultural history, one that adequately accounts for the evolution of ideas into practices, and across both time and place. The acknowledged centrality of disputation in the Late Middle Ages and well into the early modern period, where dialogues and disputations abound, suggests that there are more areas to be explored and more connections to be found. A complete understanding of the history of disputation demands further analysis using an inclusive, not exclusive, approach to medieval culture.

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Commons and Enclosure in the Colonization of North America

ALLAN GREER

WHAT WERE THE BROAD PROCESSES by which settlers of European stock created new forms of tenure and wrested control of lands from indigenous peoples, first in the Americas and later across wide stretches of Africa and Oceania? Anyone interested in this basic question about colonization and dispossession in an Atlantic world setting may be tempted to think in terms of a great "enclosure movement" that took shape first in England and Western Europe and then extended overseas to the New World, bringing survey lines, fences, and legal rules fostering exclusive access and transferability. More than one historian has pointed in the direction of such an extended conception of enclosure, although none has so far made the case in detail. "When the English took possession of lands overseas, they did so by building fences and hedges, the markers of enclosure and private property," write Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker.¹ In relation to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, E. P. Thompson has also pointed to a connection between enclosure within England and the imposition of private property across the overseas British Empire, notably in India, where the Permanent Settlement of Bengal (1793) represented a particularly brutal and doctrinaire attempt to establish unitary proprietorship over land. Thompson's argument about enclosure and colonization appeared in an essay published late in his life, and it touches on North America, New Zealand, and Africa as well as India.² Richly suggestive, it remains schematic and preliminary, pointing to a long-

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¹ Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston, 2000), 44. Similar views of enclosure and colonization can be found in the following works: Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1975), 82–83; Thomas Flanagan, "The Agricultural Argument and Original Appropriation: Indian Lands and Political Philosophy," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 22 (1989): 589–602; Gary B. Nash, *Red, White, and Black: The Peoples of Early North America*, 4th ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J., 2000), 23; Patricia Seed, *American Pentimento: The Invention of Indians and the Pursuit of Riches* (Minneapolis, 2001), 32–34; Nancy Shoemaker, *A Strange Likeness: Becoming Red and White in Eighteenth-Century North America* (New York, 2004), 20–22; Stuart Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005), 37–39, 258–259; Ben Maddison, "Radical Commons Discourse and the Challenges of Colonialism," *Radical History Review*, no. 108 (2010): 29–48.

² E. P. Thompson, "Custom, Law and Common Right," in Thompson, *Customs in Common* (New

term global movement to privatize the commons that emanated outward from the British Isles. Certainly, there is an intriguing, if rough, coincidence of peak periods of enclosure in England—the Tudor period and the late eighteenth century—with times of imperial expansion and reinvigoration.³

Settlers did frequently erect fences, since “enclosure” in that mundane sense of the term played an important part in separating ruminants and crops, the two elements whose coexistence typified European agriculture. It is also true that commodified, individualized forms of property usually followed in the wake of colonization, although the transition may not have been as rapid as some imagine. While the long-run tendency may indeed have been in the direction of an enclosed private property regime that largely excluded natives, colonization was also accompanied by the establishment of commons. Evidence from seventeenth-century New Spain, New France, and New England can shed light on the interplay of enclosure and commons in the formation of colonial property regimes in North America.⁴ It shows that common property was a central feature of both native and settler forms of land tenure in the early colonial period and that dispossession came about largely through the clash of an indigenous commons and a colonial commons.

The contrary view, that enclosure rather than commons acted as the driving force in colonial dispossession, has been sustained partly through the lingering influence of John Locke, proponent of both enclosure and colonizing and preeminent philosopher of property in land. In the fifth chapter of his *Second Treatise of Civil Government*, a brief but powerfully argued essay titled “Of Property,” Locke has much to say about commons, enclosure, and, at least by implication, colonization.⁵ If the world and nature’s bounty were created for all of humanity, he asks, how can anyone claim exclusive rights to a specific portion of the earth? His answer is that labor provides the ultimate basis for legitimate property rights. Thus, the “wild Indian” who shoots a deer somewhere in “America” has a perfect right, by virtue of his hunting skill and efforts, to enjoy the meat and leather that its carcass provides, but he has no particular claim on other deer in the forest, much less on the forest itself. Property in land also derives from labor: in the state of nature, acorns are mine when

York, 1991), 164–175. See also Ranajit Guha, *A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement* (Durham, N.C., 1996).

³ On English enclosure, see R. H. Tawney, *The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth Century* (London, 1912); Joan Thirsk, ed., *The Agrarian History of England and Wales*, vol. 4: 1500–1640 (Cambridge, 1967), chap. 4; J. A. Yelling, *Common Field and Enclosure in England, 1450–1850* (London, 1977); J. M. Neeson, *Commoners: Common Right, Enclosure and Social Change in England, 1700–1820* (Cambridge, 1993).

⁴ Admittedly, the language of “enclosure” has a parochially English ring to it, but even though contemporaries rarely spoke of an “enclosure movement” in the context of continental Europe, historians find considerable evidence of developments not unlike the changes that transformed the English countryside in the early modern period. Marc Bloch, *French Rural History: An Essay on Its Basic Characteristics*, trans. Janet Sondheimer (Berkeley, Calif., 1966), chap. 6; Gérard Béaur, *Histoire agraire de la France au XVIII^e siècle: Inerties et changements dans les campagnes françaises entre 1715 et 1815* (Paris, 2000), 64–83, 300–302; Martina de Moor, Leigh Shaw-Taylor, and Paul Warde, “Comparing the Historical Commons of North West Europe: An Introduction,” in de Moor, Shaw-Taylor, and Warde, eds., *The Management of Common Land in North West Europe, c. 1500–1850* (Turnhout, Belgium, 2002), 15–31; Jesús García Fernández, “Champs ouverts et champs clôturés en Vieille-Castille,” *Annales: Économies, sociétés, civilisations* 20, no. 4 (1965): 692–718; Juan Diego Pérez Cebada and Felipa Sánchez Salazar, “Destroying the Commons: The Enclosure of Lands in Spain in the ‘Ancien Régime’” (paper presented to the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Brescia, Italy, 2006).

⁵ John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, 1960), 133–146.

I take the trouble to collect them, and similarly land is mine when I clear, cultivate, and fence it. Once government and laws make their appearance, property rights and the distribution of property are subject to contractual agreements, but the original appropriation of the universal commons took place through the operation of labor.

Modern commentators note that this chapter of the *Second Treatise* was about property generally and not specifically *private* property, insisting that Locke's logic applies equally to collective and individual property.⁶ However, if we consider "Of Property" in terms of its rhetoric, the author's preference for enclosure and private property is abundantly clear. There are repeated references to the poverty of "commoners" and to the superiority of enclosures; the question is whether the productivity of one exceeds that of the other by a factor of ten or a hundred. "For I ask whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waste of America, left to nature, without any improvement, tillage, or husbandry, a thousand acres yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniences of life as ten acres of equally fertile land do in Devonshire, where they are well cultivated." A few pages later, an acre producing twenty bushels of wheat in England is compared to an acre of equally good American land; the former produces revenues of five pounds, the latter hardly a penny, "if all the profit an Indian received from it were to be valued and sold here." Quite apart from Locke's reasoning about original appropriation in the state of nature, the association of words gives his chapter a definite pro-enclosure rhetorical thrust. Linked together in consistently negative contexts are the words "commons," "waste," "commoner," "Indian," "America," and "poverty."

By referring to Indians as "commoners" living off the unenclosed bounty of the New World, Locke seems to assimilate them, as far as issues of productivity are concerned, to the cottagers and smallholders of the Old World. "The fruit or venison which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure and is still a tenant in common, must be his . . . before it can do him any good for the support of his life."⁷ An impression is created: "improvement" is equally at odds with common fields in England and uncleared forests in America. Later pro-enclosure propagandists would take up this same equation, comparing poor fen-dwellers in East Anglia with American Indians who foraged for a living from land that ought ideally to be converted to private property.⁸ However, while he emphasizes similarity in the economic implications of commons and enclosure on the two sides of the Atlantic, Locke introduces a radical distinction between the village commons of the Old World and the open lands of the New when he turns to questions of justice and rights.

"Land that is common in England or any other country where there is plenty of people under government who have money and commerce" is perfectly legitimate,

⁶ James Tully, *A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries* (Cambridge, 1980); Tully, "Differences in the Interpretation of Locke on Property," in Tully, *An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts* (Cambridge, 1993), 118–136. Tully's argument challenges C. B. Macpherson's view of Locke as the philosopher of capitalist property relations. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford, 1962), chap. 5; Macpherson, "Capitalism and the Changing Concept of Property," in Eugene Kamenka and R. S. Neale, eds., *Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond* (London, 1975), 105–124.

⁷ Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, 134.

⁸ "Forests and great Commons make the Poor that are upon them too much like the *Indians*," wrote John Bellers in 1714 (quoted in Thompson, "Custom, Law and Common Right," 165). See also Neeson, *Commoners*, 30.

collectively owned property, according to Locke. In this setting, unlike the state of nature, "no one can enclose or appropriate any part without the consent of all his fellow-commoners; because this is left common by compact, *i.e.*, by the law of the land, which is not to be violated. And though it be common in respect of some men, it is not so to all mankind, but is the joint property of this country or this parish."⁹ America represents a different sort of commons, wide open and available to all: not collective property, but rather the antithesis of property. Enclosure at home and enclosure overseas may be equally desirable ends, but they have to come about by very different means according to Locke. In England, voluntary agreement (and presumably compensation) is a must, whereas enclosure in America requires no one's permission.¹⁰ This procedural divergence over enclosure, critical to Locke's implied theory of colonial property formation, rests on the elision of two different criteria. Legitimate common property is local/particular, and it is instituted in law, whereas pre-colonial America knows no law, and its lands constitute a commons of universal scope: it corresponds to nature itself.

Scholars interested in the commons, both those who focus on the history of the agricultural commons and those who examine "the commons" in today's world (air, oceans, fisheries, the Internet, etc.), would agree with Locke on the need to distinguish particular commons from what they term "open-access resources." The former, specialists tell us, are jointly owned and, in most cases, collectively managed; the latter are portions of the environment that are not property. Yet there would be little empirical support for Locke's notion that particular commons somehow require the prior existence of "government," "law," and "money" in forms that would be recognizable as such by a European observer. Contemporary research on the commons has shown that common property does not necessarily depend on legal formalities, but is more typically an organic aspect of fishing, hunting, grazing, or wood-cutting communities.¹¹ That common property of this sort might be found in pre-Columbian North America, might even have been the norm, is a possibility that Locke never entertained. His reasoning rests too heavily on a basic ontological division between civil societies and their antithesis, natural humanity: on one side were civilized communities where land could be owned individually or communally, on the other uncivilized communities where land was open to all. In erasing the distinction, where American natives were concerned, between particular commons and open-access resources, Locke effectively disqualified them as proprietors.¹²

Common property was, in fact, a fundamental feature of landholding in both the New World and the Old in the early modern centuries. The commons came in myriad

⁹ Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, 137.

¹⁰ Locke's insistence on the right of unilateral appropriation in the state of nature, appropriation requiring no one's consent, is a feature that, according to Barbara Arneil, distinguishes his theory of property from that of Hugo Grotius. Arneil, *John Locke and America: The Defence of English Colonialism* (Oxford, 1996), 61–62.

¹¹ Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* (New York, 1990), chap. 3; David Feeny, Fikret Berkes, Bonnie J. McCay, and James M. Acheson, "The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-Two Years Later," *Human Ecology* 18, no. 1 (1990): 1–19; Bonnie J. McCay and Svein Jentoft, "Market or Community Failure? Critical Perspectives on Common Property Research," *Human Organization* 57, no. 1 (1998): 21–29.

¹² James Tully, "Rediscovering America: The Two Treatises and Aboriginal Rights," in Tully, *An Approach to Political Philosophy*, 137–176.

forms, varying from one environmental setting and subsistence regime to the next, shaped in some areas by legal codes and customs, shaped in their particulars also by the factors cited by Locke: population density, government, and commerce. Although the commons is perhaps best apprehended in its local specificity, we might still venture some general observations. In Europe, where agriculture typically involved the raising of livestock and the growing of crops in close proximity, “open-field” practices developed in many (by no means all) regions, whereby land was held individually but managed collectively, and where the cattle and other animals of a given community grazed either in a special pasture or on portions of the arable land that were not currently bearing crops.¹³ The commons might be thought of both as a place—the village pasture—and as a set of access rights, such as gleaning and stubble grazing. This portion of the commons located in the tillage zone of a given community might be designated the “inner commons.” “Outer commons” can then be used to refer to collectively owned resources in the surrounding area beyond local croplands. This was called “the waste” in England: the zone of moor, mountain, marsh, or forest that rural folk used as rough pasture for their livestock as well as for cutting wood or peat for fuel, gathering herbs, taking rushes for basketry or thatching, felling timber for construction, and so on. A variety of rules and customs, some of them local, others regional or national, governed access to these common resources. In Spain, where the medieval law code, the *Siete Partidas*, had given particular attention to common property, outer commons were very extensive; elsewhere in Europe, they varied greatly in size and significance.¹⁴

WHILE OUR LANGUAGE OF COMMONS derives from European settings and practices, versions of common property, both the “inner commons” and the “outer commons,” were present right across indigenous North America as well. There was, of course, agriculture in the pre-Columbian New World—indeed, the majority of the hemisphere’s population subsisted primarily through cultivating the soil, although Locke’s “Of Property” gives a contrary impression—but it was purely crop-based: potatoes, maize, beans, squash, and other cultigens were grown without a significant component of animal husbandry.¹⁵ Because crops did not share space with domestic animals, fences and hedges were largely unnecessary, and in that literal sense, the land was not enclosed. However, individual families or lineages did have particular plots of their own, subject to varying degrees of community control. Around the great cities of Mesoamerica lay villages and hamlets with intensively cultivated fields, some of the latter belonging to particular households, others owned by temples, local chiefs, or urban nobles and worked by the community. Plots were carefully measured, marked, and recorded; tenure displayed some characteristics associated with “en-

¹³ Joan Thirsk, “The Common Fields,” *Past & Present*, no. 29 (December 1964): 3–25. For an excellent description (in a colonial American context in this case) of the collective management of livestock as an accompaniment to grain-growing, see Brian Donahue, *The Great Meadow: Farmers and the Land in Colonial Concord* (New Haven, Conn., 2004).

¹⁴ Robert I. Burns, ed., *Las Siete Partidas*, 5 vols., vol. 3: *Medieval Law: Lawyers and Their Work* (Philadelphia, 2001), 820–822.

¹⁵ Vicki Hsueh, “Cultivating and Challenging the Common: Lockean Property, Indigenous Traditionalisms, and the Problem of Exclusion,” *Contemporary Political Theory* 5, no. 2 (2006): 193–214.

closed" areas of England and some characteristics of what Locke would call legal, particular commons. Thus this can be viewed as a zone of enclosure and "inner commons."

Beyond the villages and cornfields lay a different kind of commons: the forest or mountains or desert terrain where local people went for firewood, wild herbs and berries, game, and other resources. Scholars have found little specific information on this Mesoamerican "outer commons" in the surviving sources, but in general terms they have no doubts as to its existence.¹⁶ For the most part, this was not the universal commons, but rather territory and resources that belonged to a particular person, lineage, or community. In that respect, the situation was roughly similar to the moors, mountains, and forests of Europe: common property, but neither unregulated nor open to the entire human race.¹⁷

North of Mexico lay a vast continent occupied by peoples who subsisted on various combinations of hunting, fishing, foraging, and agriculture. With the partial exception of the Pacific Northwest, where chiefs, and through them particular lineages, enjoyed a strong sense of exclusive control over sites and resources, especially aquatic resources, most land was held as a kind of commons.¹⁸ Maize cultivators of the northeast, including Iroquoians as well as the various Algonquian nations such as the Delaware and Narragansett, typically planted fields surrounding a village, relocating and clearing new lands every ten or twenty years. Tilled fields typically belonged to the women of a given family, although agricultural work and the distribution of the fruits of the harvest also had a strongly collectivist character (inner commons).¹⁹ Outside these small islands of cultivation, however, lay terrain that provided vital supplies of game, fish, fruit, and other useful resources to those who knew how to harvest them (outer commons). Modern historians sometimes describe such practices in terms of "usufruct," as opposed to genuine ownership.²⁰ The sev-

¹⁶ Rebecca Horn, personal communication, March 4, 2009.

¹⁷ On land tenure and agriculture among the Nahua peoples of central Mexico, see Charles Gibson, *The Aztecs under Spanish Rule: A History of the Indians of the Valley of Mexico, 1519–1810* (Stanford, Calif., 1964), chap. 10; H. R. Harvey, "Aspects of Land Tenure in Ancient Mexico," in H. R. Harvey and Hanns J. Prem, eds., *Explorations in Ethnohistory: Indians of Central Mexico in the Sixteenth Century* (Albuquerque, N.M., 1984), 83–102; S. L. Cline, *Colonial Culhuacan, 1580–1600: A Social History of an Aztec Town* (Albuquerque, N.M., 1986), chap. 8; James Lockhart, *The Nahuas after the Conquest: A Social and Cultural History of the Indians of Central Mexico, Sixteenth through Eighteenth Centuries* (Stanford, Calif., 1992), chap. 5; Elizabeth Boone, "Glorious Imperium: Understanding Land and Community in Moctezuma's Mexico," in David Carrasco and Eduardo Matos Moctezuma, eds., *Moctezuma's Mexico: Visions of the Aztec World* (Niwt, Colo., 1992), 159–173; Rebecca Horn, *Postconquest Coyoacan: Nahua-Spanish Relations in Central Mexico, 1519–1650* (Stanford, Calif., 1997), chap. 5.

¹⁸ On the concept of an indigenous commons in the Arkansas Valley, see Kathleen DuVal, *The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent* (Philadelphia, 2006), 7–9. On the prevalence of particular claims to resources in the Pacific Northwest, see Wayne Suttles, ed., *Northwest Coast* (Washington, D.C., 1990); Richard Daly, *Our Box Was Full: An Ethnography for the Delgamuukw Plaintiffs* (Vancouver, B.C., 2005); Douglas C. Harris, *Landing Native Fisheries: Indian Reserves and Fishing Rights in British Columbia, 1849–1925* (Vancouver, B.C., 2008).

¹⁹ Conrad Heidenreich, *Huronian: A History and Geography of the Huron Indians, 1600–1650* (Toronto, 1971), 168–171; Bruce G. Trigger, *The Children of Aataentsic: A History of the Huron People to 1660* (Montreal, 1976), 34–40; Anthony F. C. Wallace, "Woman, Land, and Society: Three Aspects of Aboriginal Delaware Life," *Pennsylvania Archeologist* 17, no. 1–4 (1947): 1–35; Kathleen J. Bragdon, *Native People of Southern New England, 1500–1650* (Norman, Okla., 1996); Dean R. Snow, *The Iroquois* (Oxford, 1994).

²⁰ William Cronon, *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England* (New York, 1983), 60–68. Creek land, says Claudio Saunt, "was not owned as much as used." Saunt, *A New*

enteenth-century missionary Gabriel Sagard, however, had no hesitation in drawing on the language of common property when he referred to Huron claims to land and resources:

It is their custom for every family to live on its fishing, hunting, and planting, since they have as much land as they need; for all the forests, meadows, and uncleared land are common property, and anyone is allowed to clear and sow as much as he will and can, and according to his needs; and this cleared land remains in his possession for as many years as he continues to cultivate and make use of it. After it is altogether abandoned by its owner, then anyone who wishes uses it, but not otherwise.²¹

Generally, North American territory was claimed and controlled by specific human societies (usually in cooperation with animal and spiritual entities), and these societies determined how they would be managed. Even non-agricultural hunting-gathering societies held land as a kind of outer commons without any inner commons. Writing of the Mi'kmaq of eastern Canada, the French Récollet friar Chrestien Le Clercq was emphatic:

It is the right of the head of the nation, according to the customs of the country, which serve as laws and regulations to the Gaspesians [i.e., Mi'kmaq], to distribute the places of hunting to each individual. It is not permitted to any Indian to overstep the bounds and limits of the region which shall have been assigned him in the assemblies of the elders. These are held in autumn and spring expressly to make this assignment.²²

Although he grasped a basic truth about hunting grounds—they were allocated to particular individuals (and their families)—Le Clercq describes Mi'kmaq tenure norms in European terms, exaggerating the authority of the “head of the nation” and implying that space was defined by outer “bounds and limits.” On the whole, hunter-gatherer tenure has to do with specific functions, such as hunting, fishing, and berrying; moreover, land was not necessarily defined by clear-cut outer boundaries, space being more commonly delineated in terms of central places, lines, and waterways.²³ Consequently, different groups sometimes lay claim to overlapping areas for distinct foraging purposes. On the Great Plains of North America, where wide-ranging bison herds were the land's most important resource, interpenetrating territories were common.²⁴ Overlapping was less likely in the eastern woodlands, but it was certainly not uncommon for people of different nations to share hunting grounds; however, outsiders who hunted without authorization risked violent sanctions.²⁵ Moreover, hunters and fishers have never been passive recipients of nature's

Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733–1816 (New York, 1999), 40–42.

²¹ Gabriel Sagard, *The Long Journey to the Country of the Hurons*, ed. George M. Wrong, trans. H. H. Langton (Toronto, 1939), 103.

²² Chrestien Le Clercq, *New Relation of Gaspesia, with the Customs and Religion of the Gaspesian Indians*, trans. and ed. William F. Ganong (Toronto, 1910), 237.

²³ See Tim Ingold, *The Appropriation of Nature: Essays on Human Ecology and Social Relations* (Manchester, 1986), chap. 6.

²⁴ Patricia Albers and Jeanne Kay, “Sharing the Land: A Study in American Indian Territoriality,” in Thomas E. Ross and Tyrel G. Moore, eds., *A Cultural Geography of North American Indians* (Boulder, Colo., 1987), 47–91; Theodore Binnema, *Common and Contested Ground: A Human and Environmental History of the Northwestern Plains* (Norman, Okla., 2001); DuVal, *The Native Ground*, 9, 203.

²⁵ There is a rich literature, most of it the work of anthropologists, on the northern Algonquian

bounty; as environmental historians have shown, they managed forests and waterways, burning underbrush, diverting streams, and generally altering the environment.²⁶

We can, then, speak of an “indigenous commons,” recognizing the wide variety of arrangements by which terrain and resources belonged to specific human collectivities in the real America where Europeans came to establish their colonies. Apart from cultivated areas, America was a quilt of native commons, each governed by the land-use rules of a specific human society. The notion of a universal commons completely open to all—Locke’s “America”—existed mainly in the imperial imagination.

To this pre-owned continent came Spanish, English, and French colonists, occupying space, appropriating resources, and developing tenure practices to suit their purposes. Cleared, plowed, and enclosed farms were a part of that process of appropriation, but so were varieties of what we can call the “colonial commons.” A settler version of the “outer commons” would prove most threatening to the existing indigenous commons, because of its expansive tendencies, but the pioneers of New Spain, New France, and New England also instituted “inner commons.” When the Spanish established cities in Mexico and elsewhere, these were always surrounded by extensive pastures and other common lands. Though townsmen received individual urban lots (*solares*) and could apply for grants of agricultural land in the vicinity, most surrounding territory, extending far into the countryside, constituted the *ejido*, or municipal commons. The *ejido* was the corporate property of the town, and each Spanish *vecino* (municipal citizen) was entitled to share its benefits.²⁷ Positive legislation in the form of a royal ordinance of 1573 on the founding of new settlements reinforced communal traditions; it required that any new town established on conquered territory must be provided with an *ejido* as well as ample *dehesas* (common pastures) for the grazing of residents’ livestock.²⁸

Agriculture at Jamestown, Virginia, began as a fully communal enterprise, although the experiment was admittedly short-lived, and individual lots quickly be-

hunting territories, both in the distant past and in more recent times. Highlights include Frank G. Speck, “Mistassini Hunting Territories in the Labrador Peninsula,” *American Anthropologist* 25, no. 4 (1923): 452–457; Eleanor Burke Leacock, *The Montagnais “Hunting Territory” and the Fur Trade* (Menasha, Wis., 1954); Toby Morantz, “Historical Perspectives on Family Hunting Territories in Eastern James Bay,” *Anthropologica*, n.s., 28, no. 1–2 (1986): 64–91; Adrian Tanner, “The Significance of Hunting Territories Today,” in Bruce Alden Cox, ed., *Native People, Native Lands: Canadian Indians, Inuit and Metis* (Ottawa, 1987), 60–74; Harvey Feit, “Les territoires de chasse algonquiens avant leur ‘découverte’? Études et histoires sur la tenure, les incendies de forêt et la sociabilité de la chasse,” *Recherches amérindiennes au Québec* 34, no. 3 (2004): 5–22; Colin Scott, “Property, Practice and Aboriginal Rights among Quebec Cree Hunters,” in Tim Ingold, David Riches, and James Woodburn, eds., *Hunters and Gatherers*, vol. 2: *Property, Power and Ideology* (Oxford, 1988), 35–51.

²⁶ Cronon, *Changes in the Land*, 48–53.

²⁷ Richard M. Morse, “Some Characteristics of Latin American Urban History,” *American Historical Review* 67, no. 2 (January 1962): 327.

²⁸ “Ordenanzas hechas para los descubrimientos, nuevas poblaciones y pacificaciones,” July 13, 1573, in Francisco de Solano, ed., *Cedulario de tierras: Compilación de legislación agraria colonial, 1497–1820* (Mexico City, 1991), 220–221. See also Gilbert R. Cruz, *Let There Be Towns: Spanish Municipal Origins in the American Southwest, 1610–1810* (College Station, Tex., 1988), 112–113; David J. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven, Conn., 1992), 320.

came the norm in the colonial Chesapeake.²⁹ In New England, on the other hand, commons formed an integral part of most early settlements. For practical reasons, as well as through a commitment to Christian solidarity, many townships, including Watertown, Massachusetts, began the process of clearing the forest and tilling the soil collectively.³⁰ Truly collective agriculture, without particular claims to territory or produce, did not last long, but communal pastures and open-field tillage, systems combining individual ownership with collective management, became an established fact in many towns. Sudbury, an offshoot of Watertown, apportioned individual strips of arable land within two great "general fields," fenced along the perimeter but without obstructions between each man's holdings. Here, as in Andover and many other early Massachusetts towns, people were housed in a compact village, often a long walk from their plowlands.³¹ Nucleated villages and open fields were by no means universal, even during the initial stages of New England settlements. David Grayson Allen proposes a differentiated analysis of Massachusetts towns, one that recognizes both open-field communities and fully enclosed, individuated landholdings (such as Newbury), as well as mixed townships with elements of both systems (such as Hingham). Allen attributes these variations to the influence of English regional customs by way of immigrants who settled a given locality and who hailed from either enclosed or open-field areas of rural England.³² While the incidence of open-field tillage varied across early New England, common pastures were closer to universal. Within a given township, cattle generally grazed together, as did sheep in a different enclosure, all under the watchful gaze of the local herdsman. The fact that they were collective, however, does not mean that common pastures were sites of universal access and economic equality. Access to the commons could be tightly controlled, as in Rowley, Massachusetts, where "gates" or "stints" determined the number of animals allowed to each resident; and since grazing rights could be bought and sold, the commons sometimes came to be dominated by wealthy livestock entrepreneurs.³³

Although common pastures proved quite durable in New England, open-field tillage and concentrated village communities tended to erode over the course of the seventeenth century as farmers bought, sold, and traded dispersed fragments of arable land to form consolidated holdings. At the same time, families showed an increasing inclination to build homes on their own farms, forming self-contained units of residence and production, even as nuclear settlements declined. In his study of Dedham, Massachusetts, Kenneth Lockridge found that the process was complete by 1686: "the common-field system was gone, taking with it the common decisions and the frequent encounters of every farmer with his fellows which it entailed."³⁴ Over the long run, even the common pastures came under pressure, leading even-

²⁹ Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York, 1975), 81–82.

³⁰ Sumner Chilton Powell, *Puritan Village: The Formation of a New England Town* (Middletown, Conn., 1963), 92.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 104; Philip J. Greven, *Four Generations: Population, Land, and Family in Colonial Andover, Massachusetts* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1970), 42.

³² David Grayson Allen, *In English Ways: The Movement of Societies and the Transfer of English Local Law and Custom to Massachusetts Bay in the Seventeenth Century* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1981).

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Kenneth A. Lockridge, *A New England Town: The First Hundred Years, Dedham, Massachusetts, 1636–1736* (New York, 1970), 82.

tually to a full or partial division of the land among stakeholders. However, Brian Donahue argues that village herds and common pastures remained a feature of agriculture in Concord, Massachusetts, until the time of the American Revolution.³⁵

Commons were also a feature of early settlement in New France. After early experiments in communal agriculture on the part of the Counter-Reformation idealists who founded Montreal in the 1640s, and in defiance of government policies favoring nucleated villages with outlying fields, the French settlers of the St. Lawrence Valley quickly established a pattern of "agricultural individualism," with each farm constituting a largely self-contained block of land with fields, a house, a barn, and a woodlot. Within each seigneurie, the lots were long and narrow, so they are sometimes referred to as "strips," but these were nothing like the small, scattered strips of arable land within the great fields of an open-field village in Europe; instead, each was a consolidated holding that combined both the residence and the agricultural enterprise of a rural household. Open-field agriculture never really took hold here. The movement to basically self-contained family farmsteads ran parallel to, but proceeded more rapidly than, a similar shift in early New England.

Yet, if this development recalls an aspect of Old World enclosure, fences and hedges seem to have been rather rare in the emergent countryside of seventeenth-century Canada. Here, as in New England, cattle, pigs, sheep, and goats shared the land with grain crops, although in the absence of any substantial market for livestock products, herds were never large. Custom consecrated by colonial "police" regulations required only that hay meadows be fenced. Otherwise, it was up to the owners of livestock to keep their animals supervised and confined to common pastures during the growing season.³⁶ After the crops were harvested, the custom of *vaine pâture* prevailed, meaning that animals could roam across the fields, grazing on the stubble and dropping their manure. Fences were incompatible with *vaine pâture*. The season of open grazing was short, however, as the onset of deep snow usually forced the habitants to resort to stall feeding through most of the winter. Then, with the coming of the spring thaw, plowing and sowing became urgent priorities, and animals were officially banned from the fields. In some localities, it was the seigneur who announced the dates on which animals could be turned loose in the harvested fields and when they needed to be confined. After the grain had been sown in the spring, however, it was up to the owners of livestock to keep their animals under control and out of the planted fields.³⁷

While French Canada generally parted company with the British colonies in requiring the owners of livestock to control their beasts rather than placing the onus on farmers to protect their fields with fences, there was some ambiguity in practice. Even though they had the right to impound marauding cattle and shoot pigs on their property, farmers began erecting fences across the fronts of their narrow farms to prevent incursions from the roadway. In 1725, the colonial administration called for

³⁵ Donahue, *The Great Meadow*, 117–127.

³⁶ "Reglements de police," May 11, 1676, in Pierre Georges Roy, ed., *Ordonnances, commissions, etc., etc., des gouverneurs et intendants de la Nouvelle-France, 1639–1706*, 2 vols. (Beauceville, Quebec, 1924), 1: 197. Similar arrangements prevailed across much of *ancien régime* France; Bloch, *French Rural History*, 46–47.

³⁷ Louise Dechêne, *Habitants and Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Montreal* (Montreal, 1992), 175–177.

habitants to fence their fields, although livestock owners remained liable for damages even on unenclosed lands.³⁸ More and more fields were fenced, but many lands remained unenclosed at the time of the British conquest of Canada.³⁹

Common pastures were a basic feature of stock-raising in many areas of New France. Commons were typically located in the marshy, low-lying areas adjacent to the river or on the many islands that dotted the St. Lawrence; the latter were particularly convenient, as the water helped keep the animals confined and safe from predators. Commons in Canada operated somewhat like those of colonial New England, except that here they were subject to seigneurial controls and exactions. Access was always limited, and sometimes it was contested. Ordinarily, a riverfront commons was available only to the owners of adjacent properties, not to more distant habitants, and it was usually inseparable from landownership (thus grazing rights could not be sold or leased to outsiders, as was the case in some New England towns). In some cases, the seigneur laid out the commons in advance of settlement and then charged censitaires an annual fee or *corvée* (labor service) for grazing rights; in other cases, the local settlers seem to have taken the initiative in establishing a common pasture.⁴⁰ Commoning rights proved to be a bone of contention among habitants, and they were also a focus of conflict between peasants and their landlords, as seigneurs struggled to impose their authority and extract revenue from the community pastures.⁴¹

If we can generalize about enclosures and the inner commons in the early stages of the European occupation of North America, it would be fair to say that settlers laid claim to land sometimes as individual families cultivating self-contained farms, sometimes as a community sharing a given space and its resources. Typically, there was a combination of "private property" and collective management. It is worth taking stock of settler commoning, if only to challenge the Lockean and neo-Lockean tendency to equate colonization, enclosure, and privatization. At the same time, it must be recognized that from the point of view of native dispossession, the balance of fully enclosed versus inner commons may not be of overriding significance. Where land was cleared and bounded for settler use, natives were generally excluded, open-field or no.

Still, the territorial extent of colonial assarts was actually quite limited during the early phases of colonization, and given the terrible depopulation occasioned by the spread of Old World diseases, they did not always cause great dislocation in and of themselves. In many places, natives welcomed settlers. "They doe generally professe to like well of our coming and planting here," wrote the New England Puritan Francis Higginson, "partly because there is abundance of ground that they cannot possess nor make use of, and partly because our being here will be a meanes both of reliefe to them when they want, and also a defence from their Enemies, wherewith (I say)

³⁸ "Ordinance of Superior Council," August 13, 1725, in Pierre Georges Roy, ed., *Inventaire des jugements et délibérations du conseil supérieur de la Nouvelle-France de 1717 à 1760*, 7 vols. (Beauceville, Quebec, 1932), 1: 261.

³⁹ Dechêne, *Habitants and Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Montreal*, 177.

⁴⁰ Allan Greer, *Peasant, Lord, and Merchant: Rural Society in Three Quebec Parishes, 1740–1840* (Toronto, 1985), 11–12; Colin M. Coates, *The Metamorphoses of Landscape and Community in Early Quebec* (Montreal, 2000), 35.

⁴¹ See "Ordonnance de Jean Talon," June 20, 1680, in Roy, *Ordonnances, commissions, etc., etc.*, 1: 266–275.

before this Plantation begun, they were often indangered.”⁴² This was not entirely imperialist wishful thinking; it was also a reflection of the fact that “plantations” could be integrated, at least in theory, into an existing indigenous commons as part of an extensive network of places and resources governed by recognized rules of access. Obviously, the “improvement” of the land tended to undermine native subsistence in the long run as settler populations grew and as the environment was progressively transformed. But running ahead of the enclosed *ecumene* in many parts of the New World was a colonial outer commons: an area of settler hunting, timbering, foraging, and above all grazing that was arguably a more significant agent of dispossession than the fields and fences commonly associated with colonial settlement.

WHAT USED TO BE KNOWN in the United States as “the frontier” can be redefined as the zone of conflict between the indigenous commons and the colonial (outer) commons. These two commons were not different places, but rather contending customs and rules regulating the use of a given space and its resources. Over wide areas of New Spain, the intrusion of a new colonial commons into, alongside, and over the preexisting indigenous commons was central to the dispossession of Indian peoples in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. Initially, the Spanish conquest of Mexico left the native peasantry in possession of their lands under tenures that preserved many of their pre-Columbian characteristics. A *cédula real* of 1532 is categorical: “The Indians shall continue to possess their lands, both arable tracts and grazing lands, so that they do not lack what is necessary.”⁴³ The conquerors gravitated to the new Spanish cities, drawing produce, revenue, and labor from the native countryside through the operation of systems of tribute and labor service derived from the customs of both the Iberian Peninsula and Mesoamerica. The expansion of colonial property out into what had been the indigenous countryside began in earnest only a generation or two after the conquest, with the steep decline of native numbers and the burgeoning demand for agricultural products that accompanied the growth of silver mining. In these circumstances, it became very profitable to raise cattle, sheep, horses, and mules, leading enterprising Spaniards to invest in large ranching operations and to turn their attention to potential grazing lands far from the centers of colonial settlement.

Peninsular Spain provided a model of stock-raising practices to this American colony. In a country that, like Mexico, contained extensive zones of rough, dry terrain, much of it conquered from the Moors and consequently still part of the royal domain, cattle ranching and sheep-raising tended to rely on open ranges and transhumance. Not only was much of the country classified as open-access *montes* (mountainous and “wasteland” areas), but the charter of privileges granted to the *Mesta* (a kind of ranchers’ syndicate) “guaranteed the right to use ‘deserted and uncultivated lands’ without distinguishing between privately owned and public lands.”

⁴² Francis Higginson, *New-Englands Plantation* (1630; repr., New York, 1970), 4.

⁴³ *Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias*, 3 vols. (Madrid, 1681), 2: 103, libro 4, título 12, ley v, April 4, 1532, as quoted and translated in William B. Taylor, *Landlord and Peasant in Colonial Oaxaca* (Stanford, Calif., 1972), 67.

Around the time of the colonization of New Spain, the Habsburg monarchs were encouraging stock-raisers in the mother country with privileges allowing them almost unlimited access to water and pasture along transhumance routes. Spanish farmers complained constantly of the damage done by migrating herds.⁴⁴

Authorities in New Spain found it perfectly normal that sheep and cattle would range across the grasslands and mountain slopes of the colony, as long as they did not impinge on the planted fields of natives or colonists. Accordingly, they began granting broad tracts of ranchland, called *estancias*, lying within notionally unoccupied zones. These could be large—an *estancia de ganado mayor* (cattle or horses) was supposed to measure over 4,000 acres, while an *estancia de ganado menor* (sheep or goats) was about 2,000 acres—but they did not at first imply anything resembling “full” ownership of the soil.⁴⁵ For example, the Jesuit hacienda of Santa Lucia, a collection of several sheep *estancias*, was described in 1576 as comprising grass, springs, ponds, and watering holes scattered over 70 square kilometers. However, neighboring Indian pueblos, which had long used these areas to gather roots, grasses, and salt and to hunt wild ducks and geese, retained control over these particular resources.⁴⁶ Elsewhere, some pastures were granted as *agostaderos*, meaning that they could be used only between December and May, when natives living in the area supposedly were not growing crops.⁴⁷ The grant of an *estancia* thus gave little more than grazing rights, and only for a specific class of livestock; these property rights were exclusive only insofar as they kept out other ranchers. And even these restricted rights could be difficult to enforce, since *estancias* lacked clearly designated boundaries. “Mercedes [grants] invariably specified a place and stipulated a size. Borders, even in the rare event that recipients limited themselves to the terms of the grant, were often the painful result of the *practice* of occupation, the equilibrium point between two forces pushing in opposite directions. When the state formally conveyed a merced, the focus was on the site named in the document, where symbolic possession was given of land at best only vaguely delimited.”⁴⁸

Estancia grants were therefore more in the nature of licenses to make particular use of portions of the commons. And given the absence of fences and the expansive tendencies of grazing herds, the tracts granted by colonial officials served as a central base for ranching that depended on a broader commons. Writes William Taylor: “The Spanish custom of moving livestock between mountain and lowland pastures, and the principle of common pasturage, whereby unoccupied lands were open for all private cattle, meant that Spanish holdings were fluid and without specific boundaries. Often they were not confirmed in writing for a number of years.”⁴⁹ A Spanish version of the commons, one based primarily on ranging livestock, was being superimposed upon a preexisting native commons.

New Spain legislation on grazing and land grants always took the interests of

⁴⁴ David E. Vassberg, *Land and Society in Golden Age Castile* (Cambridge, 1984), 11, 36, 79–83.

⁴⁵ Gibson, *The Aztecs under Spanish Rule*, 275–279. Since rocky and swampy land was not counted toward the total, *estancias* generally covered much larger areas than what the law specified.

⁴⁶ Herman W. Konrad, *A Jesuit Hacienda in Colonial Mexico: Santa Lucia, 1576–1767* (Stanford, Calif., 1980), 28–34.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 62, 85; Jonathan D. Amith, *The Möbius Strip: A Spatial History of Colonial Society in Guerrero, Mexico* (Stanford, Calif., 2005), 164.

⁴⁸ Amith, *The Möbius Strip*, 186, 188.

⁴⁹ Taylor, *Landlord and Peasant in Colonial Oaxaca*, 117.

native peoples into account. From the earliest years of colonial rule, Indians were guaranteed not only their cultivated fields but also an equal right, along with Spaniards, to the resources of the mountains, waters, and forests that constituted the common wasteland of Mexico.⁵⁰ Again and again over the course of the colonial centuries, laws and orders came down calling on ranchers to ensure that their stock did not undermine native livelihoods and threatening to revoke grants that infringed on Indian lands.⁵¹ These regulations were not a dead letter—cases arose in which natives successfully pursued legal redress—but neither did they form a barrier sufficient to prevent wholesale dispossession of the indigenous population. Colonization created conditions favorable to the ambitions of ruthless ranchers who were determined to expand their enterprises at the Indians' expense. Attacked by successive waves of epidemic disease, native numbers fell dramatically over the course of the sixteenth century. To make matters worse, great herds of feral cattle and horses spread northward in advance of human conquerors, undermining the fragile ecology, and thus Indian subsistence, in northern New Spain.⁵² There was massive dislocation for the survivors, battered by the economic demands of tribute and forced, in some cases, to relocate in concentrated settlements called *congregaciones*, the better to administer and christianize them.⁵³ As a result, colonizers could plausibly claim that great tracts of land, until recently held by native communities, were now unoccupied and abandoned. Where Indians did remain, subjugation and poverty made it difficult (though by no means impossible) for them to resist the powerful. Furthermore, their very subsistence was undermined in some areas by the environmental effects of overgrazing.

With unlimited forage always available beyond the horizon, and with few predators to control their numbers, the cattle, sheep, and goats introduced by Spanish ranchers thrived and reproduced at an astonishing rate. Elinor Melville refers to the explosion of herbivores in such virgin environments as an “ungulate irruption,” and in a study of sheep-raising in the Valle del Mezquital, she charts the thoroughgoing ecological effects of this rapid ovine takeover of the landscape. The “before and after” contrast she depicts could not be more striking. “When Europeans first entered these wide, flat valleys and plains they saw a landscape that had been shaped by centuries of human occupation. It was a fertile, densely populated, and complex agricultural mosaic composed of extensive croplands, woodlands, and native grasslands; of irrigation canals, dams, terraces, and limestone quarries. Oak and pine forests covered the hills, and springs and streams supplied extensive irrigation systems.” Once *ganado menor* were admitted, the fragile flora was quickly decimated, the ground eroded, and the region was transformed into a semi-desert of cactus and mesquite, barely supporting a handful of destitute natives, “eaters of beetles, bugs, and the fruit of the nopal cactus.”⁵⁴ In other regions, the environmental effects of

⁵⁰ *Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias*, 2: 113.

⁵¹ See, for example, Solano, *Cedulario de tierras*, 173, 177, 198.

⁵² Chantal Cramaussel, *Poblar la frontera: La provincia de Santa Bárbara en Nueva Vizcaya durante los siglos XVI y XVII* (Zamora, Mexico, 2006), 309–310.

⁵³ Gibson, *The Aztecs under Spanish Rule*, 281–285.

⁵⁴ Elinor G. K. Melville, *A Plague of Sheep: Environmental Consequences of the Conquest of Mexico* (Cambridge, 1994), 31, 115.

grazing were less dramatic, but everywhere cattle and sheep wandered, the landscape changed and Indian livelihoods were affected.

Across the dry grasslands, and in some tropical forest regions as well, a colonial commons was taking form, and its spatial extent kept growing.⁵⁵ This commons was shaped by colonial legislation and land-granting practices, as well as by the effects of ecological change and demographic shifts. The wasteland commons was not supposed to be for the use of Spaniards alone: the law was explicit as to natives' right to the resources of the mountains and the *tierras baldías* (public lands). Of course, these areas beyond the intensely cultivated valley lands were already part of the commons of one indigenous community or another, the use of their timber, water, game, and medicinal plants and roots governed by local rules of access. The colonial commons did not necessarily nullify the indigenous commons, but it could undermine it very severely, not least because of the way it revolved around the open-range grazing of herbivores. Melville nicely sums up the crux of the conflict: "Then as today, common grazing only works when all parties agree to the rules governing the use of specified areas of land; but the Spaniards regarded all land not sown with crops as potential grazing lands, and, as conquerors, Spanish pastoralists could afford to ignore their own laws and customs when it suited them."⁵⁶ As Indians fought to protect their crops and their access to the dwindling resources of the rough lands, they were, in effect, engaged in an unequal struggle to preserve their indigenous commons against the aggressive expansion of the colonial commons.

In the wake of this unequal clash of commons came a process of private property formation that bore some resemblance to enclosure. This is the story of the rise and consolidation of the Mexican hacienda. The term "hacienda" originally had a financial meaning, and in sixteenth-century Mexico it came to be attached to commercial livestock-raising enterprises. Insofar as "hacienda" had a concrete object, it designated not a tract of land—ranching at the time being a matter of grazing rights and open ranges—but rather a herd of cattle or sheep. As stock-raising on a large scale became increasingly profitable, and as the grazing lands in a given region began to fill to capacity, ranchers took steps to assert control over portions of the colonial commons, by both legal and extralegal means, and frequently at the expense of local Indian communities. Crucial to the process of hacienda formation was the intensification of property rights and the progressive removal of land from the colonial commons. It was not simply a matter of accumulating land, but of transforming what had started out as little more than a collection of licenses to graze into something more like private property. At one level, hacendados' grip over the land seems to have tightened through a thousand and one small usurpations, most of them invisible to the historical record, that kept other ranchers at bay and infringed upon the established customs of Indian communities. For example, natives were supposed, by explicit decree of the government, to have the right to gather firewood from rough lands (*montes*) whether or not these were privately owned; however, numerous court cases attest to the fact that hacienda owners tried to bar access to this resource or

⁵⁵ Andrew Sluyter, "The Ecological Origins and Consequences of Cattle Ranching in Sixteenth-Century New Spain," *Geographical Review* 86, no. 2 (1996): 161–177; Miguel Aguilar-Robledo, "Formation of the Miraflores Hacienda: Lands, Indians, and Livestock in Eastern New Spain at the End of the Sixteenth Century," *Journal of Latin American Geography* 2, no. 1 (2003): 87–110.

⁵⁶ Melville, *A Plague of Sheep*, 154.

to charge Indians a fee to cut wood.⁵⁷ It was a classic case of the rich prevailing, regardless of formal regulations, over the poor, the weak, and the racially stigmatized. Reinforcing and legitimating such informal techniques of dispossession was a legal procedure instituted by a financially strapped Spanish crown.

Finding his finances in crisis in the dying years of the sixteenth century, and with reports indicating that land policy in New Spain was in disarray, Philip II decreed a judicial procedure, *composición*, that, for a fee, would legitimize current practice, regularize titles, and set boundaries. Over the course of the seventeenth century, *composiciones* were accordingly granted to applicants who had some claim to notionally crown-owned land, by virtue of actual occupation of the terrain, whether or not that occupation had been formally authorized. Given the importance of revenue in the whole process, magistrates could be quite broad-minded in accepting flagrantly illegal claims; and notwithstanding reiterated royal instructions to protect Indian property, *composiciones* were often issued for Indian lands that had been occupied by haciendas.⁵⁸ To complete the process of *composición*, the lands had to be formally demarcated by a magistrate through an on-the-spot survey (*vista de ojos*) that involved the planting of markers, the measuring of distances with a long cord, and the creation of a plan and deed. The upshot, according to François Chevalier, was to erase the distinction between different types of land grants that had prescribed particular purposes for the component elements of a great estate. "True property rights had taken the place of the original usufruct rights, as the latter had been exemplified in the early estancia grants."⁵⁹ At the same time, the requirement of the *vista de ojos* was a crucial step in establishing boundaries on the land and recording title. The vast dimensions of the larger haciendas precluded fencing in most cases, but in important respects, this was a process of enclosure of the commons.

Indigenous peoples were not passive victims in this process. They could and in some cases did obtain *composiciones* for their lands, and when a *composición* infringed on their commons, communities frequently resorted to direct action to defend their lands.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, the configurations of power were such that haciendas tended to prevail in many regions; entire native settlements were sometimes gobbled up, along with their fields and commons. As with classic enclosure in England, the creation of more exclusive claims to land undermined the subsistence of the poor (Indians in the present case) and hastened the emergence of a class of low-wage agricultural laborers. In Mexico, ranching latifundia both depended on and contributed to the creation of a workforce of dispossessed native peasants.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Eric Van Young, *Hacienda and Market in Eighteenth-Century Mexico: The Rural Economy of the Guadalajara Region, 1675–1820* (Berkeley, Calif., 1981), 332–333; *Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias*, 2: 113v, libro IV, título XVII, "Que los indios puedan cortar madera de los montes para su aprovechamiento," October 7, 1559.

⁵⁸ Amith, *The Möbius Strip*, 95–98; *Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias*, 2: 104v, law of June 30, 1646.

⁵⁹ François Chevalier, *Land and Society in Colonial Mexico: The Great Hacienda*, trans. Alvin Eustis (Berkeley, Calif., 1963), 276. Subsequent research in the field suggests that Chevalier simplified this process somewhat, overlooking regions that did not fit the pattern he described. Eric Van Young, "Mexican Rural History since Chevalier: The Historiography of the Colonial Hacienda," *Latin American Research Review* 18, no. 3 (1983): 5–61.

⁶⁰ Taylor, *Landlord and Peasant in Colonial Oaxaca*, 84–85.

⁶¹ In a late borderland variant on the New Spain pattern of dispossession through the instrumentality of the colonial commons, native populations of Alta California were driven, in the late eighteenth and

COLONIZATION PROCEEDED VERY DIFFERENTLY in the more northerly portions of North America, but here, too, a clash of commons was central to the dispossession of native populations. Extensive, market-oriented ranching was not economical in the wooded terrain of eastern North America, but forest foraging could still support enough domestic animals—hogs above all, but also cattle—to contribute significantly to colonial subsistence. Faced with the heavy demands of land-clearing and house-building, settlers tended to let their animals wander off and fend for themselves, trusting that they could round up those that survived when they were needed. Inevitably, some animals reproduced in the wild and went feral. Such practices were particularly widespread in the Chesapeake region, where the forests were comparatively open, the climate was mild, and the rewards for cultivating tobacco discouraged careful husbandry; however, New England settlers also allowed animals to roam.

As habits of open-range husbandry took root, the new colonies quickly passed legislation that overthrew a longstanding English legal tradition governing liability for crop damage due to livestock depredation. Since Western European agriculture was based on grain-growing and stock-raising in close proximity, its viability depended upon ensuring that the farm fauna did not destroy the flora. Human herders and village pastures were among the devices used to control grazing beasts, but if a cow did get loose in a cornfield, English law held that liability lay with the cow's owner. The latter was responsible for keeping his animals confined, failing which he could be sued for damages. In 1643, the Virginia House of Burgesses decreed that henceforth it would be up to the owners of croplands to erect fences to keep out marauding ruminants, effectively taking the onus off stock-raisers for keeping their animals fenced in. Similar legislation was passed in the New England colonies.⁶² This inversion of the Old World legal norms constraining stock naturally tended to encourage free-range husbandry, and by that means to transform the commons.

Whereas English observers of the time deplored as a kind of partial reversion to nature the American tendency to allow animals to wander while concentrating efforts on developing the arable land, Virginia Anderson demonstrates that this practice played a significant part in dispossessing natives along the edges of English North America.⁶³ Depending on the numbers of Old World animals at large, the effects on Indian subsistence could range from the merely annoying to the utterly devastating. Cattle sometimes ate standing crops; hogs stole stored food or dug up clam beds along the beaches. As in Mexico, trampling hooves and excessive grazing could bring about environmental changes that affected deer and other game populations, while spreading weeds and contributing to soil erosion; to make matters worse, livestock acted as a vector to spread Old World diseases among humans and other animals.⁶⁴

the early nineteenth century, to accept baptism and the Franciscan mission regime after ranging Spanish livestock had undermined their subsistence. Steven W. Hackel, *Children of Coyote, Missionaries of Saint Francis: Indian-Spanish Relations in Colonial California, 1769–1850* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2005), 67–80.

⁶² Virginia DeJohn Anderson, *Creatures of Empire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early America* (New York, 2004), 114; Richard Brandon Morris, *Studies in the History of American Law, with Special Reference to the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, 1959), 208–210; David Thomas Konig, *Law and Society in Puritan Massachusetts: Essex County, 1629–1692* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1979), 118.

⁶³ Anderson, *Creatures of Empire*.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 185–190; Cronon, *Changes in the Land*, 141–150.

Natives complained bitterly of the injuries they suffered through casual settler husbandry. In New England, efforts were made in the early decades to assist Indians in fencing their fields, and courts sometimes awarded compensation for crop damage; although the effects of these measures may have been slight, they did imply a sense of settler responsibility, something that was almost entirely absent in the southern colonies.⁶⁵ Moreover, with the passage of time and the rise of native-colonist tensions in New England and the Chesapeake, settler regimes grew less and less concerned about the effects of their animals on native livelihoods, to the point where some actually directed their horses and cows toward Indian fields in a deliberate effort to drive natives away and take over their lands.⁶⁶

Allowing cattle and hogs to forage in the forest was clearly more than just a transaction between a settler and the natural environment. Crucial to the viability of this unsystematic system was the assumption that a cow or pig remained property wherever it might roam. In practice, identification of specific beasts could be uncertain, and theft was rife, in spite of the severe penalties prescribed by colonial laws; moreover, many animals went completely feral, creating uncertainty about the boundary between wild game and chattels. But these anomalies only made settlers all the more insistent on livestock's status as property, Virginia Anderson observes; she notes further that open grazing represented a claim to the land itself: "Colonists in effect appropriated Indian common lands to serve as their own commons."⁶⁷

This point deserves to be underlined. Colonists were claiming more than just the livestock that they themselves had introduced to this region. The territory where their animals ranged was already a commons of sorts; in an intricate geography that we catch only obscure glimpses of through European sources, indigenous families, bands, and tribes maintained access rights to the resources of this region. When settlers proclaimed, in effect, that the Indians' deer, fish, and timber were open to all, colonists included, yet the hogs and cattle roaming these same woods remained private property, they were indeed attempting a wholesale appropriation. Beyond the limited clearings that were occupied and farmed by the English, they were asserting control over a larger zone that would correspond to the "wasteland" of rural Europe. Indians were allowed to live here and to support themselves as best they could, but the rules governing access to resources would be those of the colonists. In practice, the margin of subsistence could shrink to the vanishing point for Indians living on the colonial commons. In Maryland, a native leader named Mattagund addressed authorities in these terms: "Your cattle and hogs injure us you come too near to us to live and drive us from place to place. We can fly no further let us know where to live and how to be secured for the future from the hogs and cattle."⁶⁸ Here, as in New Spain, the commons functioned as a prime instrument of dispossession.

One crucial difference distinguishing Europe's common "waste" of mountains and marshes from the colonial commons of America was the basic stability of the former and the relentlessly expansionist dynamic of the latter. Mattagund's sense of

⁶⁵ *The General Laws and Liberties of the Massachusetts Colony* (Cambridge, Mass., 1672), 76–77.

⁶⁶ David J. Silverman, *Faith and Boundaries: Colonists, Christianity, and Community among the Wampanoag Indians of Martha's Vineyard, 1600–1871* (New York, 2005), 149.

⁶⁷ Anderson, *Creatures of Empire*, 139–140, 171.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 221. See also James D. Rice, *Nature and History in the Potomac Country: From Hunter-Gatherers to the Age of Jefferson* (Baltimore, 2009), chap. 6.

being pursued was no illusion. Over the centuries, indigenous peoples over a broad and ever-moving front would feel the effects of the advent of four-legged invaders even before the two-legged variety became a settled presence. The process is familiar in its broad outlines—waves of immigrants, accompanied by their livestock, seeking more and more lands to settle—but Anderson points out that, quite apart from the demographic explosion, the foraging of the animals itself produced expansionist tendencies as the environmental damage inseparable from overgrazing induced them to range further and further afield in search of succulent herbage. A multi-species assault on the native commons really was under way as the colonial commons advanced across the face of the continent, bringing in its wake a colonial enclosure movement that left virtually no room for Indian people.

Needless to say, natives did not give up their commons without a fight. There is no way of knowing how often stray pigs and cows were killed, either for their meat or in retaliation for damaging crops or food caches. Indians made efforts to negotiate shared use of the land, but when colonists refused to cooperate and when local tensions rose, domestic animals were often targeted for destruction. The most dramatic and best-documented instances occurred in times of colonial wars, when natives slaughtered livestock with a zest that suggested accumulated resentment. During the Powhatan resistance of 1622, natives “fell upon the poultry, Hoggs, Cowes, Goats and Horses whereof they killed great numbers.” King Philip’s War broke out in New England in 1675 partly because of native grievances over livestock; as in the earlier conflict on the Chesapeake, domestic beasts became a prime target for Indian attacks.⁶⁹

If New Spain and the English colonies present parallel histories of an expansive outer commons that facilitated later enclosure by undermining native subsistence, New France stands as a contrasting case. Here, climate, terrain, and demographic realities combined to ensure that the colonial outer commons remained a rather insignificant factor. During the long, cold winters that conditioned life and agriculture in the St. Lawrence Valley, livestock had to be stall-fed. This constraint, combined with the low population and the correspondingly limited market for meat and dairy products, tended to keep herds comparatively small, rarely more than a few head of cattle, pigs, and horses—enough to supply the modest needs of a habitant family.⁷⁰ Animals could graze on the arable land for a short time between harvest and snowfall, and in summer there were common pastures, typically along the river bank or on islands. Insofar as these pasture resources proved insufficient, the thick coniferous forest outside the cultivated zones offered little to attract domestic herbivores. Moreover, leaving animals to fend for themselves year-round would have been out of the question in this northern climate. Consequently, one searches in vain through the New France records for indications of settler commoning that affected indigenous subsistence. Complaints, such as there are, come not from Indians but from settlers, protesting that the natives’ dogs are slaughtering their sheep.⁷¹ To the various explanations that have been advanced in the past for the comparatively

⁶⁹ Anderson, *Creatures of Empire*, 179, 224–240; Virginia DeJohn Anderson, “King Philip’s Herds: Indians, Colonists, and the Problem of Livestock in Early New England,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 51, no. 4 (October 1994): 601–624.

⁷⁰ Greer, *Peasant, Lord, and Merchant*, 40–42.

⁷¹ Denys Delâge, “Microbes, animaux et eau en Nouvelle-France,” *Globe: Revue internationale*

peaceful relationship between natives and settlers in New France (such as the fur trade, low populations, and the Catholic approach to cultural diversity), we might add one additional consideration: the absence of an aggressive colonial commons.

DISPOSSESSION THROUGH COLONIAL COMMONS was not limited to seventeenth-century colonial North America; similar processes extended across broad sections of the globe in later centuries.⁷² Dutch pastoralists, starting out from the Cape of Good Hope, moved their herds ever further into the South African interior, wresting control of vast grasslands from Khoikhoi herders without significant recourse to enclosure, improvement, or legally instituted property. Instead, they relied on firearms, horses, and government licenses ("loan farms") to gain control of vital water sources; natives moved away or accepted subordinate positions as employees on white-controlled ranches.⁷³ A similar pattern developed across Australia in the nineteenth century, where sheep-raisers drove their herds onto what was regarded as a great interior common pasture, regardless of the prior claims of aboriginal foragers. As in Mexico, the ovine population explosion altered the landscape in ways that frequently undermined native subsistence; and as in South Africa, white pastoralists often monopolized precious water supplies. Surviving aboriginals then had to move away or accept a dependent position on the margins of settler society, subsisting on wage work and charity.⁷⁴

The high plains of the western United States constitute an interesting variant on a nineteenth-century global pattern. Here, the key ecological development that undermined the subsistence, and therefore the strength, of indigenous populations was the disappearance of the bison herds; faced with starvation, natives could not resist dispossession and confinement to reservations. Many causes contributed to the destruction of the bison. The expansion from the east of open-range cattle ranching played a part, especially by blocking access to the moister zones where bison would otherwise have found sustenance in times of drought. Native equestrianism was also a factor. Having domesticated for their own use the first Old World herbivore to appear in their midst, the horse, plains peoples initially flourished as their bison hunt became more efficient; in the long run, however, their overhunting, not to mention the pressure that their growing herds of horses placed on grass resources, contributed to the decline of the bison. The U.S. Army helped the process along, strategically slaughtering bison in order to weaken Indian resistance. Far more animals

d'études québécoises 9, no. 1 (2006): 126; Library and Archives Canada, MG8, A6, Ordonnances des intendants de la Nouvelle-France, May 29, 1751.

⁷² For a good sense of the extent and variety of that process in the United States and the British dominions, one that emphasizes the property-making aspect of colonial expansion much more than the dispossession of natives, see John C. Weaver, *The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650–1900* (Montreal, 2003), 264–308.

⁷³ Leonard Guelke and Robert Shell, "Landscape of Conquest: Frontier Water Alienation and Khoikhoi Strategies of Survival, 1652–1780," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 4 (1992): 803–824.

⁷⁴ Henry Reynolds, *Dispossession: Black Australians and White Invaders* (St. Leonards, N.S.W., 1989), chap. 3; Robert Foster, "Coexistence and Colonization on Pastoral Leaseholds in South Australia, 1851–99," in John McLaren, A. R. Buck, and Nancy E. Wright, eds., *Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler Societies* (Vancouver, B.C., 2005), 248–265.

were killed by Euro-American hunters supplying the buffalo robe industry of the 1870s and early 1880s. These well-equipped hunters apportioned the open prairie among themselves and harvested skins by the thousands. According to Colonel Richard Dodge, "there are unwritten regulations recognized as laws, giving to each hunter certain rights of discovery and occupancy." The industrial hunters and the ranchers extended their respective versions of the colonial commons across the wide western plains, making major contributions to the annihilation of the bison and the destruction of the native commons.⁷⁵

In the real world of colonial North America, the destruction of indigenous property forms and the establishment of new, colonial property regimes did not follow the pattern that John Locke and countless other theorists suggest. America (not to mention Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand) did not greet Europeans as an open-access universal commons, and settlers did not initially establish control of the land through procedures resembling enclosure. In the long run, of course, fences, surveys, registry offices, and other developments associated with private property made their appearance and stabilized new property regimes from which native peoples were largely excluded. But privatization of land was not the main mechanism by which indigenous territory came into the possession of colonizers; by the time that sort of enclosure occurred in many places, dispossession was already an accomplished fact, thanks in large measure to the intrusions of the colonial commons.

John Locke's misdescription of colonial property formation as the enclosure of a great universal commons was anything but an innocent mistake. It served both to erase native property in land at the outset and to assimilate colonial appropriation with "improvement," to be understood both in its specialized agricultural sense and in its more general meaning. Placing the focus on the pioneer, with his log cabin, his ax, and his plow, rather than on the cattle, hogs, and sheep he sent roaming across native common lands, has the effect of obscuring the central business of colonizing "new" lands, which is to say the dispossession of indigenous peoples and the imposition of new property regimes. Far more was involved, of course, than the intrusions of foreign animal species: the growing colonial commons required an imbalance of power, the product, in turn, of such familiar developments as commercial dependence, disease and depopulation, and violence or the threat of violence.⁷⁶ Property formation and state formation therefore proceeded in tandem; they were, in important respects, different aspects of the same process.

The notion that pre-Columbian America formed a universal commons and that colonization took the form of a massive program of enclosure, establishing property in land where no such thing had been known before, has had a long life.⁷⁷ A pro-

⁷⁵ On Indians, horses, and bison, see Pekka Hämäläinen, "The Rise and Fall of Plains Indian Horse Cultures," *Journal of American History* 90, no. 3 (December 2003): 833–862. On Euro-American hunting and ranching, see Andrew C. Isenberg, *The Destruction of the Bison: An Environmental History, 1750–1920* (New York, 2000), 130–143, Dodge quotation from 133. For an analysis of the colonization of the Canadian prairies in terms of successive forms of commons, see Irene Spry, "The Great Transformation: The Disappearance of the Commons in Western Canada," in Richard Allen, ed., *Man and Nature on the Prairies* (Regina, Sask., 1976), 21–45.

⁷⁶ This point is sometimes overlooked in environmental approaches to history that slight the role of human agency. See, for example, Alfred W. Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900* (New York, 1986).

⁷⁷ To cite one example from a recent reference work, see Paul C. Rosier, "Land Tenure," in Shepard

colonialist, pro-enclosure variant can be traced from Locke and his predecessors through the Scottish Enlightenment, where the idea took root that private property was the very hallmark of civilization (and the justification for European rule over “rude” societies lacking that institution), to the modern notion that “property rights,” in the sense of strong and exclusive individual claims to land, are essential to economic development.⁷⁸ Many writers on the left are just as inclined to subscribe to Locke’s view of colonization-as-enclosure, though in this case the valences of commons and enclosure are reversed. The association of “commons” with the poor in England and the Indians in America, not to mention its overtones of sharing and cooperation, can lead to a romantic view that emphasizes the *collective* aspects of commoning to the neglect of the *exclusive* nature of most commons known to history. Thus the political thrust of Locke’s essay “Of Property” is inverted as the commons and unenclosed “America” are idealized rather than denigrated, but the basic understanding of colonization is still traceable to Locke.⁷⁹ A clearer sense of colonial property formation, purged of colonialist ideology, requires us to jettison the concept of the universal open commons and to explore the ways in which different property systems, each with its particular practices of commoning, confronted one another in an unequal struggle.

Krech, John Robert McNeill, and Carolyn Merchant, eds., *Encyclopedia of World Environmental History* (New York, 2004), 751–752.

⁷⁸ Robert A. Williams, *Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty Visions of Law and Peace, 1600–1800* (New York, 1997), 146; Adam Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* (Edinburgh, 1767), 112–164. For the modern property rights argument, see Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, *The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History* (Cambridge, 1973); Hernando de Soto, *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else* (New York, 2000).

⁷⁹ See, for example, Peter Linebaugh, *The Magna Carta Manifesto: Liberties and Commons for All* (Berkeley, Calif., 2008).

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The Mexicanization of American Politics: The United States' Transnational Path from Civil War to Stabilization

GREGORY P. DOWNS

WHILE HISTORIANS TYPICALLY INTERPRET the disputed 1876 U.S. presidential election in terms of its impact upon postwar Reconstruction or its allegedly fraudulent outcome, many contemporaries instead saw the crisis as proof of the nation's fundamental fragility. They worried that the line between violence and politics—obscured by the Civil War—might evaporate completely in the heat of a contested presidency. With the disintegration of democratic institutions and habits, the U.S. might fall into a spiral of civil wars. One anxious army general feared that the country might soon collapse like “Mexico and the Central American countries” unless party leaders tamped down the conflict. This turn to Mexican analogies to both describe anxieties about civil war and chart a path to stabilization was not an anomaly but part of a widespread, mostly forgotten discourse in the 1870s United States. The shorthand terms “Mexicanization” and “Mexicanized,” born during overlapping 1860s wars, spread rapidly after the disputed 1876 election, appearing in many hundreds of newspaper articles, in private correspondence, and on the floor of Congress. Soon-to-be president Rutherford B. Hayes grimly disavowed the possibility of Mexicanization, a *Harper's Weekly* cartoon mocked the “Scarecrow” of “Mexicanism,” and *The Nation* made a solemn observation: “we hear every day strong expressions of a desire, and also of a determination, that this government shall not be ‘Mexicanized.’” Legal scholar John Codman Hurd, in his 1881 political handbook, defined a “Mexicanization of institutions” in which “all party contests have the character of civil war”: “The same thing would occur in this country,” he wrote, “if a party, on the theory of a ‘war of ideas,’ should attempt to retain the control of the general Government against the popular vote.”¹

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¹ N. H. Davis to George B. McClellan, January 18, 1877, Reel 38, George Brinton McClellan Sr. Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. [hereafter LoC]; Thomas Nast, “A ‘Mexican’ Scarecrow,” *Harper's Weekly*, January 13, 1877, 24, <http://elections.harperweek.com/1876/cartoon-1876-large.asp?UniqueID=32&Year=1876>; “What Is ‘Mexicanization’?” *The Nation*, December 21, 1876, 365–366; John

On first glance, this discourse makes little sense. Not just U.S. narratives but much of modern history rests upon presumptions of a United States that was stable, analogous to Europe, and predatory toward Latin America. A discourse that used open-ended analogies to Mexico to explore the nation's fragility fits none of these frameworks. Furthermore, the U.S. did not, of course, sink into a cycle of civil wars in the 1870s. Examining the Mexicanization discourse need not, however, invite attempts at counter-history; instead, analyzing the analogy makes aspects of the postwar U.S. newly visible. By reading the period through the lens of Mexicanization, historians can denaturalize the United States' process of stabilization and consider new ways of thinking about state fragility, stability, and the practice of transnational history. While U.S. historians have written voluminously about the postwar period, they have rarely focused on the country's path toward stabilization. The failure to ask why the end of the Civil War meant the end of all civil wars in the United States stems in part from the much-lamented, dissipating tendency of U.S. historians to work within exceptionalist frameworks, in part from the undeniable significance of emancipation, Reconstruction, and sectional reconciliation in shaping the view of the postwar era.

But a tendency to discount stabilization extends beyond historians of the United States. Many scholars emphasize crisis and conflict even in periods of relative stability, driven by the narrative power of rupture, the association of stability with ahistorical stasis, and the negative example of triumphant national histories. While the binary of stability and instability can indeed produce flat, decontextualized analysis, stabilization—the dynamic, manmade process by which states emerge from crises—“is as challenging a historical problem as revolution,” argued Charles S. Maier.² Nowhere are these opportunities more evident than in the famed debate about stability after the English Civil War. Provoked by J. H. Plumb's argument that stability was important, rare, and deliberately fashioned, generations of scholars explored the brevity of most crises, the dynamic nature of stability, and the roles of state structure, popular nationalism, political statecraft, and institutional fragility in fostering stability or instability.³ For the twentieth century, Maier argued crucially for separating

Codman Hurd, *The Theory of Our National Existence, as Shown by the Action of the Government of the United States since 1861* (Boston, 1881), 525–526.

² Charles S. Maier, “The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe,” *American Historical Review* 86, no. 2 (April 1981): 327–352.

³ J. H. Plumb, *The Origins of Political Stability in England, 1675–1725* (Boston, 1967); Plumb, *Sir Robert Walpole: The Making of a Statesman* (Boston, 1956); Plumb, *Sir Robert Walpole: The King's Minister* (Boston, 1961); Theodore K. Rabb, *The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe* (New York, 1976); Paul D. Halliday, *Dismembering the Body Politic: Partisan Politics in England's Towns, 1650–1730* (New York, 1998); John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688–1783* (Cambridge, Mass., 1990); Jonathan Scott, *England's Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context* (New York, 2000); Jon Kukla, “Order and Chaos in Early America: Political and Social Stability in Pre-Restoration Virginia,” *American Historical Review* 90, no. 2 (April 1985): 275–298; Jack P. Greene, “The Growth of Political Stability: An Interpretation of Political Development in the Anglo-American Colonies, 1660–1760,” in John Parker and Carol Urness, eds., *The American Revolution: A Heritage of Change* (Minneapolis, 1975), 25–52. For competing views of an emerging popular national identity as a source of stability or of conflict, see Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven, Conn., 1992), and Kathleen Wilson, *The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture, and Imperialism in England, 1715–1785* (New York, 1995). A recent overview of these debates is Richard Connors, “The Nature of Stability in the Augustan Age,” *Parliamentary History* 28, no. 1 (February 2009): 27–40. A fine analysis of the relationship between Plumb's work and contemporary arguments about

the “process” of stabilization from the condition of stability. Maier, with Andrew Port and others, asked not why the Cold War era ended but why it lasted so long.⁴ Most recently, José Javier Ruiz Ibañez and Gaetano Sabatini’s examination of stabilization in the early modern Spanish monarchy explored the performative role of stabilization, as rulers, after conquest, constructed a seeming continuity between past and present, masking the role of the state by locating stability in society and culture.⁵

While historians underplayed the importance of stability, scholars in political science, international studies, and area studies developed a vast, if often problematic, literature on state instability. Spurred first by the end of Cold War support for tottering governments, then by dubious but commonplace associations between state failure and terrorism, international institutions and Western governments devoted considerable resources to the problem of stabilizing weak states.⁶ As flattened, decontextualized lists of failed states piled up, critical scholars within those fields shifted away from the successful/failed state binary to an open-ended analysis of the continuum of state fragility, recognizing the dynamic coexistence of stability and instability.⁷ In other respects, however, the recent social science literature has produced more heat than light. It remains largely ahistorical, expressly premised upon the questionable assertion that state instability is a new product of decolonization and the end of the Cold War. Absent engagement with the processes by which fragile states stabilized or analysis of the problem of over-stabilized or dictatorial states, scholars cannot construct useful theories of stabilization. Nor can they explain the

politics and the practice of history is Guy Ortolano, “Human Science or a Human Face? Social History and the ‘Two Cultures’ Controversy,” *Journal of British Studies* 43, no. 4 (October 2004): 482–505.

⁴ Charles S. Maier, *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy* (New York, 1987), 263–264; Maier, “The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability”; Andrew I. Port, *Conflict and Stability in the German Democratic Republic* (New York, 2007).

⁵ José Javier Ruiz Ibañez and Gaetano Sabatini, “Monarchy as Conquest: Violence, Social Opportunity, and Political Stability in the Establishment of the Hispanic Monarchy,” *Journal of Modern History* 81, no. 3 (September 2009): 501–536.

⁶ Much of the recent work has grown out of older social scientific investigations of state formation, including Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992* (Malden, Mass., 1992); Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics* (New York, 1994); Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another* (New York, 2001); Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 2: *The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914* (New York, 1993); Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn., 1968).

In the vast literature on state failure, see particularly Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” *Foreign Policy* 89 (Winter 1992–1993): 3–20; Robert H. Dorff, “Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge of Ungovernability,” *Parameters* 26, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 17–31; Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton, N.J., 2000); Stuart Eizenstat and Robert I. Rotberg, “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair,” in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton, N.J., 2004), 1–50; Stuart E. Eizenstat, John Edward Porter, and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Rebuilding Weak States,” *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1 (January/February 2005): 134–146; Seth D. Kaplan, *Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development* (Westport, Conn., 2008); Marla C. Haims, David C. Gompert, Gregory F. Treverton, and Brooke K. Stearns, *Breaking the Failed-State Cycle* (Santa Monica, Calif., 2008).

⁷ See sharp criticisms from, among others, Jonathan Hill, “Beyond the Other? A Postcolonial Critique of the Failed State Thesis,” *African Identities* 3, no. 2 (October 2005): 139–154; Morten Bøås and Kathleen M. Jennings, “‘Failed States’ and ‘State Failure’: Threats or Opportunities,” *Globalizations* 4, no. 4 (December 2007): 475–485; Charles T. Call, “The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State,’” *Third World Quarterly* 29, no. 8 (December 2008): 1491–1507.

irony that models of state stability—especially England and the United States—are themselves products of periods of deep, if past, violent instability.⁸

Given the worrisome interconnections between state instability studies and the needs of the international organizations that sponsor them, it is surely tempting for historians to ignore the field altogether. This would, however, be a missed opportunity. Processes of state stabilization exerted an enormous influence over the field's scholarly tools, and also, of course, over the people who lived through those moments. Despite globalization, states remain hugely influential in people's lives, and not solely as instruments to discipline, punish, and exterminate. If, as E. P. Thompson warned in the 1950s, stability has "its own kind of Terror," the body counts of ethnic massacres and humanitarian disasters stand as a stark reminder that state retreat can produce not just Terror but outright Horror. After a generation of scholarship that located mass violence in state action, Mark Mazower has placed state retreat and state failure—not state tyranny—at the center of twentieth-century mass violence. Even James C. Scott, a leading critic of the high modern state, calls it "the vexed institution that is the ground of both our freedoms and our unfreedoms."⁹ At the level of analysis, the stabilization of the United States and a few other countries drives a great deal of social and political theory about why some nations avoided revolution, communism, and fascism, as well as the so-called Anglo model for democratic stability. A United States enmeshed in decades of ongoing civil wars would have meant not simply a different nation but a different set of concepts about revolution, crisis, democracy, and capitalism.¹⁰

Even though U.S. stabilization is crucial to many theories, to the construction of the twentieth-century international order, and to the country's own history, we know precious little about it. Why didn't the United States succumb to a cycle of civil wars, as many contemporary observers predicted or feared? Scholars have failed to answer that question because they have largely failed to ask it. The North's decisive Civil War victory and the country's twentieth-century power made its stability seem in-

⁸ Most models of instability emphasize the Eastern Hemisphere. For models of democratic stability in Latin America, see Mitchell A. Seligson, "Toward a Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America," *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2 (July–December 2000): 5–29; Miguel Angel Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America* (University Park, Pa., 2002); Josep M. Colomer, "Taming the Tiger: Voting Rights and Political Instability in Latin America," *Latin American Politics and Society* 46, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 29–58; J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Making Sense of Suffrage Expansion and Electoral Institutions in Latin America: A Comment on Colomer's 'Tiger,'" *ibid.*, 59–67.

⁹ E. P. Thompson, *Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act* (New York, 1975), 258; Mark Mazower, "Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century," *American Historical Review* 107, no. 4 (October 2002): 1158–1178; James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, Conn., 1998), 6.

¹⁰ In the middle of the twentieth century, the question of the United States' stability was a central one for historians. As a way to discuss why communism and fascism failed in the country, the issue sparked powerful efforts to capture a distinct U.S. cultural consensus that served as the counter-model to state instability elsewhere. Werner Sombart, *Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?*, trans. Patricia M. Hocking and C. T. Husbands (New York, 1976); Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks, *It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States* (New York, 2000); Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution* (New York, 1955); George M. Fredrickson, *The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union* (New York, 1965); Daniel T. Rodgers, "Exceptionalism," in Anthony Molho and Gordon S. Wood, eds., *Imagined Histories: American Historians Interpret the Past* (Princeton, N.J., 1998), 21–40; Michael Kammen, "The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration," *American Quarterly* 45, no. 1 (March 1993): 1–43.

evitable, even uninteresting. Within Civil War studies, the triumph of the fundamentalist interpretation of the causal role of slavery also oddly displaced the question.¹¹ In portraying the Civil War as the resolution of the contradiction of slavery, historians inadvertently suggest that another civil war could not have occurred. In the process, they forget that civil wars often pile atop one another, fragility spawning new fragilities. After the American South learned the hard lesson of its military weakness, the Civil War surely would not have been repeated, but contemporaries worried instead about a different type of civil war, one that “would not be sectional and Southern, but internecine and Northern.”¹² Working through the Civil War’s lens of defeated regionalism, scholars treat southern, western, and urban crises as distinct problems, not as aspects of what Charles Maier called nineteenth-century states’ central concern with internal territorial control.¹³ Historians have spent more energy analyzing the later-developing reconciliationist memory of the Civil War than the institutional and political events that made such cultural developments possible.¹⁴

Although other moments reveal the nation’s postwar fragility—including Congress’s 1865 refusal to seat southern delegations, the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson, the public outcry against the growth of the Ku Klux Klan, and the violent 1870s overthrow of southern governments—the 1876 electoral crisis is particularly important because it contained the potential for national strife. The decade-long rapprochement between northern Democratic Unionists and southern Confederates raised the possibility of a northern-led armed resistance, and inspired potentially destabilizing national paramilitary organizations led by General George B. McClellan. Additionally, this crisis presented the chance for actual institutional breakdown in the possibility that both Democrat Samuel J. Tilden and Republican Rutherford B. Hayes would claim title to the White House on the basis of conflicting acts of the Senate and House of Representatives. In turn, the crisis reveals the role of democratic retrenchment in manmade processes of stabilization and suggests the complex way that stabilization is made institutionally, then remade rhetorically. Instead, however, too often the 1876 election becomes in the historiography a site of fraud that outrages and also reinforces the centrality of electoral democracy to the nation’s story instead of prompting deeper examination of the central role of violence in broadly defining what politics is.¹⁵ This narrow vision also causes scholars

¹¹ Building upon interpretations by early postwar northern writers, the fundamentalist interpretation of slavery’s central role in causing the Civil War triumphed over revisionism in 1950s and 1960s works such as Kenneth M. Stampp, *And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis* (Baton Rouge, La., 1950), and John Hope Franklin, *The Militant South, 1800–1861* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956). The crowning fundamentalist achievement may be James M. McPherson’s still-definitive *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York, 1988). For an ambitious rethinking of the periodization of Civil War scholarship based upon paradigmatic research agendas, not historiographical arguments, see Frank Towers, “Partisans, New History, and Modernization: The Historiography of the Civil War’s Causes, 1861–2011,” *Journal of the Civil War Era* 1, no. 2 (June 2011): 237–264.

¹² “Quarterly Book-Table,” *Methodist Quarterly Review* 53 (April 1871): 329–335.

¹³ Charles S. Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era,” *American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (June 2000): 807–831.

¹⁴ A sophisticated analysis of politicized national memories of the Civil War is David W. Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (New York, 2002).

¹⁵ Like much of American political history, the vast literature on the 1876 campaign is deeply researched, vividly written, and also at times trapped within assumptions about the United States’ distinctive politics that artificially narrow the literature’s questions and impact. Rarely have historians

to overlook the provocative, if ephemeral, vision at play in Mexicanization discourse, a portrayal of a hemispheric age of republican crisis, in which the Americas stood together as the final defenders of republics against an increasingly conservative, monarchical Europe.

Because “state fragility” and “state stabilization” are inherently relational terms, meaningless without external referents, their historical study has also been limited by the historical practice of transnationalism. Questions of fragility and stabilization are at once transnational, comparative, and domestically political. Then and now, discussions about the interconnection between countries’ crises circulated transnationally through networks of political observers, prompted comparative analyses of state instability, and figured in domestic political debates about stabilization. But the practice of transnationalism, born in binary opposition to comparative history, too often forecloses the very possibilities that it should raise. In seeking circulatory networks for ideas, capital, and people, transnational scholars invariably find them. Although they have developed nuanced methods to deal with power imbalances and national contexts, the circulation remains the story, producing an often-repetitive, predictable literature that argues against the straw man of self-contained nationhood. But circulatory networks are only one in a series of interconnected structures that affect history.¹⁶ Dividing internal politics from transnational movement fails not only to capture the potential of political history but even to describe the world that contemporaries experienced. Although further studies of the circulation of Mexi-

moved beyond the controversial outcome of the election to the broader questions the crisis raised. For more than 125 years, scholars have argued, without resolution, whether Tilden or Hayes actually deserved victory, an irresolvable debate that ends up treating the election as an exception to the flow of democracy, rather than as an analytic window into what democracy is. Another, related body of literature has emphasized the election’s central role in limiting national political support for Reconstruction of the South, analyzing the role of railroad lobbyists, southern Democrats, and Hayes’s emissaries in negotiating the Compromise of 1877 to put an end to congressional delays. Michael F. Holt, *By One Vote: The Disputed Presidential Election of 1876* (Lawrence, Kans., 2008); C. Vann Woodward, *Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction* (Boston, 1951); Allan Peskin, “Was There a Compromise of 1877?” *Journal of American History* 60, no. 1 (June 1973): 63–75; C. Vann Woodward, “Yes, There Was a Compromise of 1877,” *ibid.*, 215–223; Michael Les Benedict, “Southern Democrats in the Crisis of 1876–1877: A Reconsideration of *Reunion and Reaction*,” *Journal of Southern History* 46, no. 4 (November 1980): 489–524; Keith Ian Polakoff, *The Politics of Inertia: The Election of 1876 and the End of Reconstruction* (Baton Rouge, La., 1973); Roy Morris Jr., *Fraud of the Century: Rutherford B. Hayes, Samuel Tilden, and the Stolen Election of 1876* (New York, 2003).

¹⁶ Frederick Cooper, “What Is the Concept of Globalization Good For? An African Historian’s Perspective,” *African Affairs* 100, no. 399 (April 2001): 189–213, here 189–190; David Thelen, “The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History,” *Journal of American History* 86, no. 3 (December 1999): 965–975, here 965; Michael McGerr, “The Price of the ‘New Transnational History,’” *American Historical Review* 96, no. 4 (October 1991): 1056–1067, here 1067; Ian Tyrrell, “Reflections on the Transnational Turn in United States History: Theory and Practice,” *Journal of Global History* 4, no. 3 (2009): 453–474; Tyrrell, “Making Nations/Making States: American Historians in the Context of Empire,” *Journal of American History* 86, no. 3 (December 1999): 1015–1044; Tyrrell, *Transnational Nation: United States History in Global Perspective since 1789* (New York, 2007), 3; Thomas Bender, “Historians, the Nation, and the Plenitude of Narratives,” in Bender, ed., *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley, Calif., 2002), 1–22. Recent, particularly nuanced efforts at nineteenth-century transnational U.S. history include Ian Tyrrell, *Reforming the World: The Creation of America’s Moral Empire* (Princeton, N.J., 2010); Sven Beckert, “Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American Civil War,” *American Historical Review* 109, no. 5 (December 2004): 1405–1438; Matthew Pratt Guterl, *American Mediterranean: Southern Slaveholders in the Age of Emancipation* (Cambridge, Mass., 2008); Timothy Mason Roberts, *Distant Revolutions: 1848 and the Challenge to American Exceptionalism* (Charlottesville, Va., 2009).

canization discourse back into Mexican politics and culture in the 1880s and 1890s will likely prove fruitful, pausing to survey their impact upon the domestic politics of the United States in the 1870s allows us to see the strangely vulnerable nation's reconstruction in new ways.

WHILE THE DISCOURSE OF MEXICANIZATION settled into domestic U.S. politics in the 1870s, it emerged in the 1860s through a transnational circulation that began in Mexico.¹⁷ For most of their histories, the two countries had defined themselves in opposition to each other. Although there were flurries of analogizing about sister republics during Latin American independence movements, those openings seemed long forgotten by the 1830s as U.S. expatriates instigated the secession of Texas from Mexico. When the United States launched a devastating war of territorial acquisition in 1845, even U.S. critics of the Mexican-American War saw their neighbor nation as simultaneously prone to both anarchy and dictatorship, too little order or too much.¹⁸ During the late 1850s, however, the emergence of parallel political parties, the Liberals in Mexico and the Republicans in the U.S., opened up new room for comparisons. In concurrent 1861 crises—as Europeans occupied Veracruz and the Confederacy seceded—Abraham Lincoln, northern capitalists, and journalists made Mexico both an analogue and a warning, what the United States might but must not become. Anticipating the doubled use of the analogy, one university president invoked Mexico to demonstrate the United States' vulnerability to the “laws, analogies, and outgrowths of the historical and political life of our race.” At the same time, the analogy was a warning meant to inspire young men to fight against its fruition, the possibility that “the disgraceful history of Mexico” would be planted on “our soil.”¹⁹ U.S. Secretary of State William Seward tied European support for the Confederacy

¹⁷ Mark Wahlgren Summers is the only scholar to examine the discourse of Mexicanization during this era. His nearly unsurpassed knowledge of the period gives his work depth and verve. By treating Mexicanization and other fears as inherently baseless, however, Summers assumes away the very question he could have asked. Instead, his work begins with the presumption that these hysterics cannot tell us much about the structural basis of U.S. politics, much less reveal any parallels between Mexico and the United States. Summers, *A Dangerous Stir? Fear, Paranoia, and the Making of Reconstruction* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2009); Summers, *Party Games: Getting, Keeping, and Using Power in Gilded Age Politics* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2004), 55, 116, 123; Summers, “Party Games: The Art of Stealing Elections in the Late-Nineteenth-Century United States,” *Journal of American History* 88, no. 2 (September 2001): 424–435.

¹⁸ Francisco Valdés-Ugalde, “Janus and the Northern Colossus: Perceptions of the United States in the Building of the Mexican Nation,” *Journal of American History* 86, no. 2 (September 1999): 568–600; David Thelen, “Rethinking History and the Nation-State: Mexico and the United States,” *ibid.*, 438–452; Rodrigo Lazo, “‘La Famosa Filadelfia’: The Hemispheric American City and Constitutional Debates,” in Caroline F. Levander and Robert S. Levine, eds., *Hemispheric American Studies* (New Brunswick, N.J., 2008), 57–74; Rafe Blaufarb, “The Western Question: The Geopolitics of Latin American Independence,” *American Historical Review* 112, no. 3 (June 2007): 712–741; Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic* (Princeton, N.J., 2006); Andrew R. L. Cayton, “Continental Politics: Liberalism, Nationalism, and the Appeal of Texas in the 1820s,” in Jeffrey L. Pasley, Andrew W. Robertson, and David Waldstreicher, eds., *Beyond the Founders: New Approaches to the Political History of the Early American Republic* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2004), 303–327.

¹⁹ “Remarks Concerning Secession, c. January 19–21, 1861,” in *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, ed. Roy P. Basler, vol. 4: 1860–1861 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1953), 175–176; John William Draper, *History of the American Civil War*, vol. 2: *Containing the Events from the Inauguration of President Lincoln to the Proclamation of Emancipation of the Slaves* (New York, 1868), 47; William C. Morey, ed., *Papers and Addresses of Martin B. Anderson, LL.D.*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1895), 1: 130–138; Thomas David Schoonover, *Dollars over Dominion: The Triumph of Liberalism in Mexican–United States Relations, 1861–1867* (Baton Rouge, La., 1978), 114–118.

to French backing of Mexico's newly installed Emperor Maximilian as twin assaults on an American "republican system."²⁰ Together, they constituted what one U.S. diplomat termed monarchists' effort to "destroy the dragon of democracy" in the American hemisphere and preserve what Belgium's King Leopold I called "the monarchical-aristocratic principle."²¹ Conditions on the ground seemed to verify these fears. Spain reestablished control over the Dominican Republic; Guatemala, Ecuador, and Bolivia considered joining either the Mexican or the French Empire; and Guatemala's dictator, Rafael Carrera, overthrew El Salvador's Liberal president, Gerardo Barrios. In response, the U.S. broadcast Liberal propaganda across the hemisphere. One such cartoon depicted Liberal president Benito Juárez and Lincoln as "white knights" preserving "the freedom of the Americas" and "the existence of all American republics."²²

At the center of this circulation of ideas stood Mexican Liberals, especially the young diplomat Matías Romero. Serving as minister of finance and then envoy to the United States, Romero seems to have both believed in the sentiment of sister republics and manipulated the idea to gain support. From the beginning, he tried to convince Lincoln, with limited success, that "the fate of the nations of America are bound together."²³ Although Romero's goals were commonplace for diplomats, his effectiveness at public relations set him apart. At numerous dinners, banquets, and lectures, he hosted influential officials—including fifty congressmen at sixteen banquets in January 1864 alone—to convince them, in the words of Congressman James G. Blaine, that the French-backed Mexican Empire "was at war with all our institutions and our habits of political life."²⁴ When the conclusion of the U.S. Civil War threatened to decouple the nations' woes, Romero kicked off a new frenzy of public meetings and banquets in 1865 and 1866 to celebrate "the general American brotherhood" against a "grand conspiracy of the upholders of absolutism in Europe." The discourse was not flat, the rhetoric not merely celebratory. Discussions of the "continental" struggle between "monarchy and republicanism" frequently led to criticisms that the United States had, in the words of a Chilean minister, "never done us that justice of comparison according to history and truth."²⁵ The effort was in many ways effective; Romero confidant General Ulysses S. Grant "did not consider

²⁰ *Message of the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress, at the Commencement of the Second Session of the Thirty-Seventh Congress* (Washington, D.C., 1861), 65–70.

²¹ George William Curtis, ed., *The Correspondence of John Lothrop Motley*, 2 vols. (New York, 1900), 2: 347–348; Thomas Schoonover, "Napoleon Is Coming! Maximilian Is Coming? The International History of the Civil War in the Caribbean Basin," in Robert E. May, ed., *The Union, the Confederacy, and the Atlantic Rim* (West Lafayette, Ind., 1995), 101–130; James M. McPherson, "The Whole Family of Man: Lincoln and the Last Best Hope Abroad," *ibid.*, 131–158; David M. Potter, "The Civil War in the History of the Modern World: A Comparative View," in Potter, ed., *The South and the Sectional Conflict* (Baton Rouge, La., 1968), 287–299.

²² Alfred Jackson Hanna and Kathryn Abbey Hanna, *Napoleon III and Mexico: American Triumph over Monarchy* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1971), 185–197; Schoonover, *Dollars over Dominion*, 114–118; Lester D. Langley, *Struggle for the American Mediterranean: United States–European Rivalry in the Gulf-Caribbean, 1776–1904* (Athens, Ga., 1976), 125–129, 142.

²³ *Message of the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress, at the Commencement of the First Session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1863), 2: 1246–1248.

²⁴ Schoonover, *Dollars over Dominion*, 180–182.

²⁵ *Message of the President of the United States, of March 20, 1866, Relating to the Condition of Affairs in Mexico in Answer to a Resolution of the House of December 11, 1865* (Washington, D.C., 1866), 198, 607, 650–654.

the Civil War completely terminated while the French remained in Mexico,” and congressional Radicals pressed the administration to support Mexico’s Liberals more aggressively.²⁶ These analogies necessarily simplified the historical record by exaggerating Mexican instability, flattening differences between Mexican Liberals and U.S. Republicans, domesticating Mexico’s wars, and internationalizing the United States’ conflict.

The discourse survived because it diagnosed the U.S. government’s ongoing failure to exert territorial control.²⁷ In particular, Mexicanization suggested the absence of a central authority strong enough to restrain violence in politics or control the country’s peripheries. The term also tied together a series of stability crises, which might be called a “two governments problem.”²⁸ In Alabama, Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas, paramilitary organizations and federal troop interventions led to dual governors or legislatures that ran competing governments between 1870 and 1874. “Two governors are becoming too familiar in our practice,” General William T. Sherman complained.²⁹ Fights between competing local governments led to outright massacres in New Orleans and Grant Parish, Louisiana, and private armies of Ku Klux Klan, White Line, and White League members ruled large sections of the eastern Piedmont and the Mississippi River Valley. Republicans looked south and farther south for explanations, calling southern warlordism an “armed revolution,” in the words of Indiana senator Oliver P. Morton, “a little less sudden than those revolutions which have distinguished the states of Mexico and the countries of South America.”³⁰ If southern society continued to tip toward anarchy, a North Carolina judge told a Senate investigating committee, “we shall become, as they say, Mexicanized.”³¹ By the mid-1870s, the United States seemed broadly, not just regionally, fragile. Looking west, the Lakota Sioux victory over federal troops at Little Big Horn and Comanche control over parts of the U.S.-Mexican border raised questions about the nation’s sovereignty over its own territory in a period that Elliott West has termed the country’s “Greater Reconstruction.”³² In working-class uprisings and ongoing mobbing, the nation’s cities did not look much more pacified. In early 1876, Chicago politics dissolved when two men claimed the mayor’s office, seated themselves sep-

²⁶ Matías Romero, *Mexican Lobby: Matías Romero in Washington, 1861–1867*, ed. and trans. Thomas David Schoonover (Lexington, Ky., 1986), 2–3, 64–65.

²⁷ Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History.”

²⁸ I use the phrase “two governments problem” to capture the basic crisis of authority in the postbellum United States. Although it is easily lost among the myriad tales of political violence, the ongoing problem of resolving disputed elections posed a particularly severe test of a republic’s resiliency. Recently many historians have emphasized postwar southern political violence. Steven Hahn portrayed this violence as central to, not ■ failure of, a mid-century political style that he calls paramilitary. Hahn, *A Nation under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South, from Slavery to the Great Migrations* (New York, 2003), chap. 6. See also Carole T. Emberton, “The Politics of Protection: Violence and the Political Culture of Reconstruction” (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 2006).

²⁹ William T. Sherman to John Sherman, January 19, 1877, Reel 23, William T. Sherman Papers, LoC.

³⁰ *Speech of Hon. O. P. Morton, Delivered in the United States Senate, January 19, 1876, on the Mississippi Election* (Washington, D.C., 1876), 3.

³¹ *Report on the Alleged Outrages in the Southern States by the Select Committee of the Senate* (Washington, D.C., 1871), 91.

³² Summers, *A Dangerous Stir?*, 261–264; Elliott West, *The Last Indian War: The Nez Perce Story* (New York, 2009), xx–xxi; Pekka Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire* (New Haven, Conn., 2008), chap. 8, Conclusion; Brian DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War* (New Haven, Conn., 2008).

arately in City Hall, and roused armed crowds with talk of revolution. Although business leaders, spooked by the impact on the city's credit, forced a legal resolution, the outcome seemed very much in doubt for weeks. Together these crises raised doubts about the possibility of drawing any semblance of a line between violence and normal politics in the postwar United States.³³

Like any discourse, Mexicanization was open-ended enough to offer contradictory readings of the complexity of Mexican history. Pointing to the famous seizures of power by Antonio López de Santa Anna, Democrats after 1868 developed a counterdiscourse of Mexicanization as military dictatorship. They decried the abundance, not absence, of central authority, analogizing President Ulysses S. Grant to Santa Anna to warn that "the Mexican disposition to look to force as the means for settling political disputes is becoming more influential in the United States."³⁴ Continued federal occupation would lead to "the Mexicanizing of our great country, with continually recurring civil wars."³⁵ More broadly, for much of the 1870s, Americans doubted and debated the old sense of the nation's providential history, once rooted in faith in republics or in Puritan belief in a divinely chartered city on a hill. While many prominent Americans—including Wesleyan University president Cyrus Foss—used the 1876 Centennial to revive a Christian exceptionalism that "has guided all our progress" and made the Civil War proof of the nation's essential stability, others wondered whether the Civil War foretold more disruptions to come.³⁶

THE 1876 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION raised the prospect that regional fragility would spread to the center, creating a two governments problem in Washington, D.C. The fears were neither historically nor analytically thin. The United States' long-term stability masks the institutional fragility of presidential democracy; absent effective power-sharing, the prospect of a plurality- or even minority-elected president frequently prompts violence in other single-executive democracies. Sherman, in fact, worried that he and the army would "be put into a position to choose between two presidents" in the electoral crisis.³⁷ At first this seemed unlikely. After the Panic of 1873 destroyed confidence in the Republicans, Democrats swept the 1874 midterms, reduced the size of the military, delayed appropriations for military pay, promised an end to federal oversight of the Reconstruction South, and were favored to win the White House. On election night, Tilden won a popular majority and appeared to have prevailed narrowly in the Electoral College, thanks in part to Democratic

³³ *Chicago Tribune*, April 9, 1876, 1, 12; *Chicago Inter Ocean*, April 10, 1876, 6–7; April 12, 1876, 1, 8; May 13, 1876, 8; May 23, 1876, 5; May 26, 1876, 8; Richard Schneirov, *Labor and Urban Politics: Class Conflict and the Origins of Modern Liberalism in Chicago, 1864–97* (Urbana, Ill., 1998), chap. 2.

³⁴ *Baltimore Sun*, August 6, 1867, 2.

³⁵ Samuel Smith Nicholas, *Conservative Essays, Legal and Political*, vol. 3: *Reconstruction, Georgia & Mississippi Cases, Civil Rights Act, Cotton Tax, &c.* (Louisville, 1867), 115, 186.

³⁶ Middletown, Conn., *Daily Constitution*, June 26, 1876, 2; Frederick Saunders, ed., *Our National Centennial Jubilee: Orations, Addresses and Poems Delivered on the Fourth of July, 1876—In the Several States of the Union* (New York, 1877), 17–18, 49–51; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 1, 1876, 2; Susan-Mary Grant, "Americans Forging a New Nation, 1860–1916," in Don H. Doyle and Marco Antonio Pamplona, eds., *Nationalism in the New World* (Athens, Ga., 2006), 80–98; Edward J. Blum, *Reforging the White Republic: Race, Religion, and American Nationalism, 1865–1898* (Baton Rouge, La., 2005); Nicholas Guyatt, *Providence and the Invention of the United States, 1607–1876* (New York, 2007).

³⁷ William T. Sherman to John Sherman, January 19, 1877, Reel 23, William T. Sherman Papers, LoC.

intimidation of black southern Republicans. Encouraged by Republican observers, however, officials in Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida used evidence of Democratic fraud to discount enough votes to tilt their states—and the White House—to Hayes.³⁸

The nation's fragility had its roots not just in ephemeral losses of legitimacy or popular recourse to violence but, like many state stability crises, in basic institutional breakdown. The Constitution seemed to offer too few or too many recourses for a disputed election. With the Senate still heavily Republican, the House of Representatives Democratic, both parties could plausibly chart a course to the White House. When Louisiana, South Carolina, Florida, and Oregon sent competing electoral returns to Washington, Republicans argued that the president of the Senate's power to count the electoral votes gave him the right to determine which votes counted. Democrats claimed that the House of Representatives' constitutional authority to settle unresolved elections empowered that body to determine whether an election had been resolved. Throughout November, December, and January, the prospect that each house might name a different president raised real fears of a partisan civil war, a concern expressed largely through the term "Mexicanization."

Once again, a particular actor played a key role in tying together available, but not inevitable, strands of discourse. At a celebrated pre-election address in October 1876, Cincinnati *Commercial* editor Murat "Field Marshal" Halstead made the presidential campaign a test of Mexicanization. Having been cut from the party's innermost circles for disloyalty in 1872, Halstead now leapt at the chance to rally the wavering Republican base at a mass meeting at New York's Cooper Institute. There, in a line that was reprinted and distributed across the country, he warned that a close result could "reduce the American Republic to the grade of Mexico." The lesson of the Civil War "that should never depart from us is, that the American people have no exemption from the ordinary fate of humanity." Halstead explored the interrelationship between institutional, social, and financial fragility. Institutional breakdown threatened financial confidence, thus prompting further institutional breakdown and even more popular alienation. At first his hyperbolic claim that Tilden would bankrupt the United States through Confederate war claims created the most controversy. Both Hayes's and Tilden's closest advisers considered that argument the campaign's *pièce de résistance*. After the election, however, attention turned to Halstead's other prediction, that a civil war would result from a "strangely overlooked" institutional failing: the lack of a mechanism to resolve presidential succession crises. For several months, the crisis suggested the power of Halstead's warning that a "disputed Presidential election would Mexicanize us."³⁹

³⁸ In Oregon, Democrats contested one Republican elector who they argued was disqualified on technical grounds.

³⁹ Murat Halstead, *The War Claims of the South: The New Southern Confederacy, with the Democratic Party as Its Claim Agency, Demanding Indemnity for Conquest, and Threatening a Disputed Presidential Election—The Candidacy of Hayes and the Relief of the Republic from Danger* (Cincinnati, 1876), 3, 5, 9, 36, 37; Rutherford Hayes to Murat Halstead, October 14, 1876, Box 1, Folder 7, Cincinnati History Library and Archives, Cincinnati Museum Center, Cincinnati, Ohio; Halstead to Hayes, September 19, 1876, Rutherford B. Hayes Papers, Rutherford B. Hayes Presidential Center [hereafter RBHPC], Fremont, Ohio; Charles A. Boynton to William Henry Smith, October 22, 1876, Box 3, Folder 4, William Henry Smith Papers, Manuscript Collections, MSS 2, Ohio Historical Society Archives/Library, Columbus, Ohio; Richard Jacobs Haldeman to August Belmont, October 31, 1876, Box 7, Catalogued

Halstead's metaphor provoked a complex, divided response that placed the problem of fragility at the center of public discussion. In the first weeks of the crisis, he repeatedly charged Democrats with "Mexican statesmanship," and fellow newspapers in the Western Associated Press—including the *Chicago Tribune* and the *Louisville Courier-Journal*—advanced, mocked, refuted, and analyzed his analogy.⁴⁰ His Democratic interlocutors, led by the Indianapolis *Sentinel*, turned the charge back upon the Republicans, especially the allegedly dictatorial President Grant, the man best "calculated to Mexicanize the government." Only a Tilden victory would "rescue the country from being still further Mexicanized."⁴¹ As the discourse circulated, journalists worried that a "pronunciamento" from Tilden's Gramercy Park mansion would drive the country "deep in civil war," and businessmen complained that "a Mexicanized administration means the disorder and thriftlessness of Mexico."⁴² The discourse was simultaneously reductive and open-ended, both arrogantly insulting and also revealingly vulnerable. U.S. writers rarely used Mexicanization to signify positive attributes, but they did deploy it to suggest common, unflattering characteristics. Mexico was distinct but accessible, what the United States might be but could not permit itself to become. The more contemplative *Nation*, foreshadowing the work of later interpreters, turned from institutional to social explanations, defining Mexicanization as a "particular state of mind," the absence of a popular culture of constitutionalism or republicanism. Only good "habits of legality" could prevent instability. Southern violence, in turn, threatened exactly those habits. "We have not cured the South, we have ourselves caught the contagion." During this period, rigid, biological racism rarely overtook the discourse. Even when critics dismissed the comparison between the United States and Mexico, they usually distinguished between the countries on the basis of environmental, cultural, religious, and historical traits, not race.⁴³

The discourse remained pervious to outside events; rather than a linguistic hall of mirrors, it was a chamber that diffused and altered, but did not exclude, external light. When Mexican general Porfirio Díaz overthrew President Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada in the middle of the United States' electoral crisis, U.S. writers immediately extended the analogies. Although Díaz's victory actually created stabilization—the nearly forty-year dictatorship known as the Porfiriato—U.S. journalists initially seized upon the overthrow as a reminder of Mexican instability. With a nod to the discourse's description of a political status, not an inherent condition, the Philadelphia *Inquirer* described the turmoil in a peculiar way. "Mexico has been Mexicanized," the newspaper wrote when Lerdo de Tejada fled Mexico City.⁴⁴ In January

Correspondence, Belmont Family Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, New York City; "A Change to Democratic Rule: What It Means—Hints and Facts for Independent Voters," Pamphlet Collection, Patricia D. Klingenstein Library, New-York Historical Society, New York City, 4; Entry, November 11, 1876, vol. 50, John Bigelow Papers, New York Public Library, Manuscripts and Archives Division [hereafter NYPL]; Donald W. Curl, *Murat Halstead and the Cincinnati Commercial* (Boca Raton, Fla., 1980).

⁴⁰ *Cincinnati Commercial*, December 4, 1876, 4.

⁴¹ *Indianapolis Sentinel*, November 21, 1876, 4.

⁴² *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, November 24, 1876, 4; Wheeling, W.Va., *Daily Register*, December 29, 1876, 1.

⁴³ "What Is 'Mexicanization'?" *The Nation*, December 21, 1876, 365–366.

⁴⁴ *Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 9, 1876, 4.

1877, when Lerdo de Tejada arrived in the United States, the *Baltimore Sun* suggested that he give lectures on Mexicanization to “show our people, in his own person, the inevitable result of trifling with constitutions and laws, and permitting the military to override the civil power.”⁴⁵

While it is important not to overstate the meaning of overheated political rhetoric, the discourse was not mere hysterics. That these predictions turned out to be wrong does not prove that they were foolish. Those widespread misjudgments, as Jonathan Scott wrote about similar English fears, were “themselves historical phenomena requiring explanation.”⁴⁶ In the United States, worries that “the air is full of coming trouble” were legion, held not just by the conspiratorially minded but by many leading politicians.⁴⁷ One of Hayes’s strongest supporters, former senator Carl Schurz, privately warned him against pressing his case too firmly for fear of instigating “the Mexicanization of our government!”⁴⁸ On Tilden’s side, his confidant John Bigelow, former consul to France, wrote in his diary that “another civil war may be the consequence of this state of things and we may enter upon the next century under a diff. Form of govt. from that of which for nearly a century we have been boasting.”⁴⁹ More widely, a southern Democrat worried about a “bloody revolution”; a West Point commander dreaded “anarchy”; a former attorney general feared that “the days of our republic are numbered”; a Texan pledged to recruit “hundreds + thousands” of fellow Union veterans to defend Hayes’s title; a Tilden supporter promised that if the Republicans wanted “‘blood-letting,’ we will oblige”; a Virginia woman lived “in a lamentable state of uncertainty” as “war of the most deadly kind, is inevitable”; and Missouri’s governor dispatched two prominent men to tell Tilden that the state would “fight” to defend his inauguration.⁵⁰ Against these possibilities, President Grant called several companies of troops to garrison Washington, D.C., ordered naval batteries to protect the capital’s bridges, and reopened Civil War forts.⁵¹ These contemporary judgments lend weight to participants’ retrospective views that, as one congressman wrote, “perhaps the greatest peril that the Republic had encountered was not that of the Civil War” but the crisis of 1876.⁵² Only careful maneuvering prevented “anarchy and open war,” a senator later claimed.⁵³ James

⁴⁵ *Baltimore Sun*, January 11, 1877, 2.

⁴⁶ Scott, *England’s Troubles*, 2–3.

⁴⁷ W. Dennison to Bristow, January 9, 1877, Box 7, Benjamin H. Bristow Papers, LoC.

⁴⁸ Carl Schurz to Hayes, January 12, 1877, Hayes Papers, RBHPC.

⁴⁹ Entry, November 11, 1876, vol. 50, Bigelow Papers, NYPL.

⁵⁰ Gideon J. Pillow to Tilden, November 14, 1876, Box 20, Folder 26, Samuel J. Tilden Papers, NYPL; John Schofield to William T. Sherman, December 26, 1876, Reel 25, William T. Sherman Papers, LoC; R. E. Goodell to Tilden, January 13, 1877, Box 12, Folder 34, Tilden Papers, NYPL; W. A. Crafts to William E. Chandler, January 17, 1877, Container 43, William E. Chandler Papers, LoC; Henry L. Fish to Tilden, February 24, 1877, Box 11, Folder 60, Tilden Papers, NYPL; James M. Scovel to Tilden, November 14, 1876, February 26, 1877, Box 22, Folder 19, Tilden Papers, NYPL; Mother to Dear Frank, November 13, 1876, Box 2, Noland Family Papers, 2718-d, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Va.; C. H. Hardin to Tilden, December 13, 1876, Box 13, Folder 32, Tilden Papers, NYPL.

⁵¹ W. T. Sherman to Col. J. C. Audenreid, November 18, 1876, William T. Sherman Collection, RBHPC; Morris, *Fraud of the Century*, 173–174.

⁵² James Monroe, “The Hayes-Tilden Electoral Commission,” *Atlantic Monthly*, October 1893, 523, 524, 537.

⁵³ George F. Edmunds, “Another View of ‘The Hayes-Tilden Contest’: A Reply to Colonel Waterson in the May ‘Century’ by Ex-Senator George F. Edmunds, the Sole Surviving Member of the Electoral Commission,” *The Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine*, May 1913, 195–200.

Ford Rhodes, an industrialist who would later become a historian, believed that “any one, who lived through the days in an observing and reflective mood, or any one, who will now make a careful study of the contemporary evidence, cannot avoid the conviction that the country was on the verge of civil war.”⁵⁴

When viewed as a moment of state fragility, the election’s aftermath looks different. Historians have discounted these anxieties by emphasizing two periods in which there were harsh words but little institutional drive for armed conflict—the early weeks when the southern states were recounting the ballots and the last weeks after the commission began to meet. During the two-month interim between those events, however, there was no obvious path to compromise. Fear shattered the unitary vision of the nation and produced a series of fantastic but not wholly unrealistic doubled images, visions of dual presidents, dual capitals, and dual armies. One of the most provocative rumors was that Tilden planned to stage a counter-inauguration in New York City. Backed by a line of Democratic state militias from Connecticut to Virginia, he would seize the federal Treasury Building in New York, fund his government through customs collections in the harbor, and force Hayes from the capital to his own shadow republic in the Midwest.⁵⁵ These fantastic notions played upon older fragilities in the nation’s territorial control, especially longstanding tensions between its financial and political capitals; early in the 1861 secession crisis, New York mayor Fernando Wood had urged the city to declare its independence from the United States. Of course, this view of dual capitals was fanciful. If Tilden gained title from the House of Representatives, he did indeed plan to risk court-martial or execution by staging a counter-inauguration; he would have made the attempt, however, in Washington, not New York.⁵⁶ Although he did not intend to launch a first strike, privately Tilden began to prepare two intertwined cases that would box Republicans into a corner. First he defended the House’s right to name him president, a necessary prelude to any claim he could make on the office. Next he asserted a state’s right to forcefully resist a usurper’s inauguration. While Congress would elude Tilden’s control, he had better luck close to home. New York governor Lucius Robinson’s January inaugural included a Tilden-drafted section promising state resistance to the “revolutionary” overthrow of “the time-consecrated methods of constitutional government.”⁵⁷

The fractured vision of dual presidents and dual capitals also produced, in both imagination and reality, a counter-military led by George B. McClellan.⁵⁸ The leading Union general for much of the first two years of the Civil War, and an 1864 presidential candidate who lost to Lincoln, McClellan campaigned for his longtime

⁵⁴ James Ford Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the McKinley-Bryan Campaign of 1896*, vol. 7: 1872–1877 (New York, 1920), 243, 284.

⁵⁵ L. C. Weir to Hayes, February 7, 1877, Hayes Papers, RBHPC; John Bigelow, ed., *Letters and Literary Memorials of Samuel J. Tilden*, 2 vols. (New York, 1908), 2: 491.

⁵⁶ John Bigelow, *The Life of Samuel J. Tilden*, 2 vols. (New York, 1895), 2: 115.

⁵⁷ *Annual Message of the Governor of the State of New York, Transmitted to the Legislature, January 2, 1877* (Albany, 1877), 37–39; Entry, January 4, 1877, vol. 50, Bigelow Papers, NYPL.

⁵⁸ Although McClellan’s letters at the Library of Congress are frequently read by Civil War historians, no scholar of the 1876–1877 electoral crisis has utilized them, precisely because the questions that lead to his papers are not relevant within national political frameworks of the betrayal of democracy. While McClellan’s biographer noted some of McClellan’s actions, political historians have barely noticed his presence during the crisis. Stephen W. Sears, *George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon* (New York, 1988), 393–396.

ally Tilden across the Northeast and Midwest in 1876, urging his “fellow-citizens and fellow-soldiers” to resist any Republican effort to block Tilden’s inauguration.⁵⁹ Privately he warned his mother that any effort to deny Tilden the office “must be forcible + revolutionary + must be met by force.”⁶⁰ Although fighting words are common, McClellan’s history raises interesting questions about the boundaries between politics and the military. Fifteen years earlier, during the Civil War, many people had called on McClellan, in his telling, to “save the nation, alluding to the presidency, dictatorship, etc.” But for his love for his wife, he wrote, he might “cheerfully take the dictatorship and agree to lay down my life when the country is saved.”⁶¹ After the 1876 election, Tilden asked Governor Robinson to name McClellan the state adjutant general “in view of possible contingencies.” Following Robinson from Tilden’s mansion, Bigelow urged the governor to wait, as McClellan’s command of the state militia “would be a red rag to Republicans.” But Bigelow’s response was strategic. Rather than denying McClellan, he convinced the governor to “reserve” the selection until it would have more impact. Bigelow’s response to the event is telling. “The fact that we have to contemplate such emergencies, is a melancholy commentary upon the anniversary we have been celebrating,” he wrote. “The chances are by no means inconsiderable that our form of govt. may not survive another 4 of July without serious modifications, the results of a perhaps bloody strife.”⁶²

As institutional processes for resolving politics broke down, new openings emerged for counter-mobilization. McClellan began to construct what appears to have been a paramilitary organization. Because he did not save his outgoing correspondence during this period, his actions must be deciphered by reading between the lines of his incoming letters. Some are evocative but not reliable, full of vague bragging that “a little bit of war to inaugurate Mr. Tilden would do us no harm . . . speak the word, and you will have a hundred thousand ‘boys in blue’ and in everything else, armed, at Washington by Sunday.”⁶³ Far-flung soldiers promised that they were willing to “fight and die” under McClellan’s banner.⁶⁴ More revealing, however, are letters from men working with him to organize such a resistance, including former Confederate general Dabney Maury, one of McClellan’s West Point instructors. Maury urged McClellan to produce “a pose of moral and physical power too great to dare,” discussed strategic allocations of divisions, brigades, and regiments, and warned McClellan to hold units in reserve for later combat.⁶⁵ In Massachusetts, former Union brigadier general John M. Tobin gathered an estimated 5,000 veterans into a Conservative Soldiers and Sailors Association. Tobin made tantalizing references to unnamed “potent considerations set forth” in a lost letter from McClellan. “The few who have seen it open their eyes wide, and it nerves them on . . . Any movement to which you may lend your name . . . would be the signal for arousing

⁵⁹ *Speeches of Gen. George B. McClellan during the Presidential Campaign of 1876* (Philadelphia, 1877), 58–59.

⁶⁰ McClellan to My Dearest Mother, November 1876, Reel 56, McClellan Papers, LoC.

⁶¹ George B. McClellan, *McClellan’s Own Story: The War for the Union, the Soldiers Who Fought It, the Civilians Who Directed It, and His Relations to It and to Them*, ed. W. C. Prime (New York, 1887), 82–85.

⁶² Entry, November 22, 1876, vol. 50, Bigelow Papers, NYPL.

⁶³ E Pluribus Unum to McClellan, February 27, 1877, Reel 38, McClellan Papers, LoC.

⁶⁴ Henry C. de Alma to McClellan, November 29, 1876, February 6, 1877, *ibid.*

⁶⁵ Dabney H. Maury to McClellan, November 3, 1876, January 22, 1877, *ibid.*

en masse here all the conservative soldiers and sailors.”⁶⁶ Although these letters give shape to rumors of paramilitary mobilization across the country, McClellan’s intent is impossible to define precisely. His New York office complained of a shortage of funds, a constant problem for people who worked with the legendarily cheap (and personally wealthy) Tilden. “As far as I can see I am personally stuck for the office room,” the general in charge of the New York office wrote. “To do a thing of this kind without money is quite absurd.”⁶⁷

For U.S. historians, the story of a Tilden-McClellan paramilitary organization demonstrates that stabilization was contingent upon the candidates’ behavior. Here Tilden’s aggressive actions conflict with contemporary and historical portrayals of his caution. Had Tilden claimed the position immediately, “his election would have been a matter of course,” Bigelow wrote. “But it was impossible. A man who must have a man rub him every morning & evening for an hour or so, who must take a clyster every morning to get a passage . . . how could such a man be expected to [demand the presidency] and wind up perhaps at the last in a prison?” Hyperbolic Democratic editor Henry Watterson said that he had been willing to “provide the physical means” of “seating [Tilden] in office,” but Tilden was hamstrung by his “confidence in the powers and forms of law.”⁶⁸ The candidate’s public silence frustrated financier August Belmont, who urged “radical boldness and recklessness” and “a revolutionary . . . fight.” With a careful eye to sequence, it is possible to reconcile the evidence for both Tilden’s caution and his boldness. Tilden’s reticence was calculated to increase pressure at a different moment, after the Democratic House of Representatives named him president.⁶⁹ By refusing to threaten civil war in December, he was increasing the possibility that it might eventually come later, once two presidents had title. When Democratic congressmen threatened to derail his plan by considering a compromise, his passivity evaporated. “No need of hot haste but much danger in it,” he wrote in a midnight draft memo. The Republicans had “no way out but by usurpation.”⁷⁰ Tilden lobbied congressional Democrats to simply count him the winner. When Democratic chairman Abram Hewitt told Tilden that House Democrats in fact planned to accede to an electoral commission to resolve the dispute, Tilden asked incredulously, “Why surrender now? Why surrender before the battle, for fear you may have to surrender after the battle is over?”⁷¹

As Congress compromised on a fifteen-man electoral commission to count the disputed votes, the crisis pivoted from fragility to stabilization. “Overpressed by exaggerated fears” of Mexicanization and civil war, Tilden fumed, Congress moved toward an institutional solution.⁷² Thinking about Congress’s fears means looking

⁶⁶ John M. Tobin to McClellan, December 15, 1876, January 8, 1877, *ibid.*

⁶⁷ William F. Smith to McClellan, December 30, 1876, *ibid.*

⁶⁸ Entry, April 1, 1877, vol. 50, Bigelow Papers, NYPL.

⁶⁹ Irving Katz, *August Belmont: A Political Biography* (New York, 1968), 225, 228, 231.

⁷⁰ Drafts and original of telegram to William Pelton, January 17, 1877, Box 1, Folder 8, Tilden Papers, NYPL.

⁷¹ Henry Watterson, “The Hayes-Tilden Contest for the Presidency: Inside History of a Great Political Crisis,” *The Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine*, May 1913, 14–20; Joseph Medill to William Henry Smith, January 3, 1877, Box 12, Folder WAP Letters (Signed by Medill), Joseph Medill Papers, Series III-9, Tribune Company Archives, Colonel Robert R. McCormick Research Center, First Division Museum at Cantigny, Wheaton, Ill.

⁷² Bigelow, *The Life of Samuel J. Tilden*, 2: 79–80.

past hermetically sealed histories of the important but not fully determinative efforts of railroad lobbyists and southern Democrats in fashioning the compromise. Congressmen were motivated not just by horse-trading but by a climate of fear. Although both Hayes and Tilden lobbied for brinksmanship, congressmen were not so sure, especially as their actions were tied publicly to Mexicanization. Halstead again led the charge, denouncing Democratic talk of a House declaration as “Mexican statesmanship,” a claim repeated by Republican newspapers across the country.⁷³ Some Democrats, in turn, advanced the discourse by using Mexicanization to scare stalwart Republicans from naming Hayes through the Senate. At January indignation meetings, Democratic orators compared Grant and Hayes to “the military chieftains of Mexico,” and asked, “Who is Mexicanized? Who is sending armies into the South?”⁷⁴

The process of stabilization turned in the United States, as it had in England, on the exclusion of some conflicts from politics. “All our papers and public men declare there must be no war,” Democrats complained, and were therefore creating the “illusion” that compromise was “the only alternative to civil war.”⁷⁵ The charges, they said, narrowed their choices to “violence” and “submission to a wrong.”⁷⁶ Democratic congressmen acknowledged that they believed in Tilden’s case but turned to compromise because they were “not prepared” to heighten the “existing debasement of political sentiment” by risking “armed power.”⁷⁷ “Civil war would have probably been the result,” a New York congressman wrote.⁷⁸ Party leader Abram Hewitt, whom Tilden blamed for his defeat, lobbied for acquiescence during the crisis “because four years of civil war would, in my opinion, utterly destroy constitutional government for this generation at least.”⁷⁹ Mexicanization had at once raised and then foreclosed the possibility of dissolution. “The question was whether the American Republic should be Mexicanized; and the establishment of the Commission answered the question in the negative,” Halstead celebrated.⁸⁰ After an unexpected switch in personnel, the electoral commission, by a one-vote margin, granted every contested electoral vote to Hayes, thus giving him the White House. This raised a second potential crisis, as some House Democrats threatened to filibuster beyond Inauguration Day to “force a new election,” but Hewitt, other leaders, and lobbyists urged Democrats to surrender.⁸¹ The management of the crisis proved not the impossibility of violence but the institutional capacity to lessen tension by delay. With stabilization at the top came the end of the two governments problem in the South, as Republican state governments in Louisiana and South Carolina soon dissolved, leaving Democratic challengers in office.

The successful resolution of the crisis led U.S. editors and politicians to both

⁷³ Cincinnati *Commercial*, December 4, 1876, 4.

⁷⁴ Cincinnati *Commercial*, January 9, 1877, 1–2, 4, 8.

⁷⁵ William P. Chambliss to McClellan, January 15, 1877, Reel 38, McClellan Papers, LoC; Bigelow, *The Life of Samuel J. Tilden*, 2: 77.

⁷⁶ Cincinnati *Commercial*, December 21, 1876, 1–2.

⁷⁷ Hiester Clymer to McClellan, January 23, 1877, Reel 56, McClellan Papers, LoC.

⁷⁸ Francis Kernan to Tilden, March 12, 1877, Box 15, Folder 53, Tilden Papers, NYPL.

⁷⁹ Bigelow, *Letters and Literary Memorials of Samuel J. Tilden*, 550–552, 562–565.

⁸⁰ Cincinnati *Commercial*, February 6, 1877, 4.

⁸¹ Alphonso Taft to Hayes, February 14, 1877, Hayes Papers, RBHPC; Carter Harrison III to Carter Harrison IV, February 24, 1877, Carter H. Harrison III, Outgoing Correspondence, Box 21, Folder 1068, Series 17, Carter H. Harrison IV Papers, Midwest Manuscript Collection, The Newberry Library, Chicago.

naturalize and mystify stabilization by tying it to the continuity of social norms. Like early modern Spanish monarchs, these stabilizers buried discontinuity in portrayals of continuity, diminishing the impact of their institutional efforts by making open-ended claims of an inherent social stability that the government enjoyed but did not create. Many now saw the discourse of Mexicanization as both available and inconceivable, an un-American path the United States had once threatened to walk. By engaging with Mexican analogies, they created an anti-exceptionalist basis for reconstructing U.S. distinctiveness, moving from an exceptionalism of the Americas back to an American exceptionalism. Although evangelical revivalism, the consolidation of national markets, cultural productions of Americanness, and an expansive foreign policy also contributed, the resolution of the electoral crisis played a key role in spurring this return of exceptionalist claims. To Hayes and many other Republicans, it was “the first example in history” of a nation that was able to peaceably resolve “conflicting claims to the Presidency” through “the forms of law.”⁸² “In nearly every other country,” historian Rhodes wrote, the conflict “must inevitably have led to civil war.”⁸³ The “self-control exhibited by the nation under the great excitement” proved that “an impassable gulf separates our methods and policies from those of the Spanish States of this continent,” a congressman claimed.⁸⁴ Democrats, however, were less sanguine about both the outcome and U.S. exceptionalism. To them, Hayes had “not only Mexicanized the United States but has more than Mexicanized it.” The Indianapolis *Sentinel* pondered and then discounted racist views of Mexicans. “Their inferiority does not appear in the matter of tolerating a fraud for a ruler—in this regard the United States stands considerably in advance of any country, nation, or tribe, from hottentot to the most advanced nation on earth.”⁸⁵

AS MEXICAN ANALOGIES SPREAD widely through the United States, many Mexican politicians seem to have turned away from the comparison. Throughout the 1860s, Mexican Liberals made use of the analogy they had fashioned. When U.S. editors and politicians derided Juárez’s suspension of elections and civil rights, Mexican journalists pointed toward Grant’s own suspension of *habeas corpus*. The two nations were fighting common fragilities, undergoing correspondingly fraught stabilization processes.⁸⁶ This contested but two-sided analogizing continued into the 1870s. When New Orleans merchants attributed Mexican fragility to cultural failings, a U.S. consul responded with a thorough historical examination of the role of European powers, the Catholic Church, and landed interests in undermining the Mexican state. *Diario Oficial* in turn praised the consul’s “historical exactness.”⁸⁷ During the fraught debates in Mexico’s congress about railroad concessions in January 1874, Deputy

⁸² Cincinnati *Commercial*, March 6, 1877, 4.

⁸³ Rhodes, *History of the United States*, 7: 243, 284.

⁸⁴ Monroe, “The Hayes-Tilden Electoral Commission,” 523, 524, 537.

⁸⁵ Indianapolis *Sentinel*, March 27, 1877, 4.

⁸⁶ *Executive Documents Printed by Order of the House of Representatives, during the Second Session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1866–’67*, 16 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1867), 1: 393–400.

⁸⁷ *Executive Documents Printed by Order of the House of Representatives, 1873–’74*, 17 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1874), 1: 649–653; Richard N. Sinkin, *The Mexican Reform, 1855–1876: A Study in Liberal*

Estanislao Cañedo claimed that the two nations now had common interests based on shared liberal “principles.” Opponents of the United States were drawing upon outdated analogies, “which can exist only in the minds of those who do not remember the laborious transformation which has taken place in both nations during the past thirty years.”⁸⁸ But 1877 border conflicts threatened the nations’ relations and the potential for open-ended analogizing. The unfounded fear that Díaz might disrupt railroad concessions and Texans’ complaints about border insecurity prompted Hayes to authorize soldiers to cross unilaterally into Mexican territory. In turn, political opinion in Mexico turned sharply against the United States, as editors and intellectuals shelved the more optimistic language of the 1860s and early 1870s, complaining that the U.S. treated them “as savages, as Kaffirs of Africa.”⁸⁹ As rumors swirled about U.S. expansionism, and as the threat of external European intervention declined, nuanced comparisons largely gave way to suspicion, even as Díaz’s government pursued economic ties to the United States.

Historians of the United States often use another significant post-election event, the Great Strike of the summer of 1877, to look eastward toward Europe for models of class conflict, but some contemporaries saw those strikes as a continuation of domestic fragility, not a Europeanization of the country.⁹⁰ Starting in Martinsburg, West Virginia, when crowds blocked police from arresting railroad workers, the strikes spread along rail lines to Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Chicago, San Francisco, and other cities. In Chicago, recently organized Union veterans killed thirty strikers before soldiers called back from the Sioux War restored order. While some editors explicitly blamed European immigrants for carrying the contagion of anarchy westward, others, including Halstead, located the roots of the violence not in economic transformation but in the “disturbing tendencies” of the Civil War, “which disorganized and changed us more than we apprehended while about it. When the armies were disbanded and marched home, there were senses in which the war was not over.”⁹¹ Instead of treating the Great Strike as a new phenomenon demanding external explanation, Halstead incorporated the strikes into struggles over sovereignty, governance, and the role of violence in politics. He no doubt underplayed the role of industrial class conflict in the Great Strike, but he also anticipated recent schol-

Nation-Building (Austin, Tex., 1979); Charles A. Hale, *The Transformation of Liberalism in Late Nineteenth-Century Mexico* (Princeton, N.J., 1989), 37–46.

⁸⁸ *Executive Documents Printed by Order of the House of Representatives, 1874–’75*, 18 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1875), 1: 724–725.

⁸⁹ *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, with the Annual Message of the President, December 3, 1877* (Washington, D.C., 1877), xvi–xvii, 409–413; James Morton Callahan, *American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations* (1932; repr., New York, 1967), 343–351; Robert D. Gregg, *The Influence of Border Troubles on Relations between the United States and Mexico, 1876–1910* (New York, 1970), 18–33, 93; Daniel Cosío Villegas, *The United States versus Porfirio Díaz*, trans. Nettie Lee Benson (Lincoln, Neb., 1963), 56–57; John Mason Hart, *Empire and Revolution: The Americans in Mexico since the Civil War* (Berkeley, Calif., 2002), chaps. 1–4; Samuel Truett, *Fugitive Landscapes: The Forgotten History of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands* (New Haven, Conn., 2006); Rachel St. John, *Line in the Sand: A History of the Western U.S.-Mexico Border* (Princeton, N.J., 2011).

⁹⁰ Nell Irvin Painter, *Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877–1919* (New York, 1987), 18–24; Sven Beckert, *The Monied Metropolis: New York City and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850–1896* (New York, 2001), 180; Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877* (New York, 1988), 585.

⁹¹ *Cincinnati Commercial*, July 24, 1877, 4.

arship that places the uprising within long-term traditions of local mobbing. While European models partly explain the strikes, the uprisings also demonstrate the ongoing American challenge of restraining public violence in the postwar era, or—in Halstead's terms—correcting the “disturbing tendencies” of the Civil War.⁹²

If statecraft started the process of stabilization, a new set of crises in 1878 demonstrated that statecraft could also reverse it. Seeking an issue for the November midterms, New York Democratic congressman Clarkson Potter created a special committee to investigate fraud in the 1876 presidential election. Halstead and other frightened Republicans immediately tried to restrain the committee of “revolutionary” “MEXICANS” by ridiculing “Don Santa Anna Pottero” and denouncing his “Mexican method.”⁹³ Writers located fragility in the same social realm they had recently celebrated. Against readers who wondered “What Mexicanized Means,” the *Chicago Daily Tribune* warned that “a single departure from this rule will throw the country into all the confusion, anarchy, civil war, and instability characteristic of Mexican Government.” Although the editorial included an offhand sneer at “greasers,” it explicitly discounted the idea that the United States would be saved by its innate racial superiority.⁹⁴ *The Nation* again looked for deeper causes of Mexicanization in “a state of mind, a way of looking at political affairs, which makes civil war always possible.” Too much talk of Mexicanization, it warned, could create the condition; only the habit of silence—the narrowing of political dispute—could prevent it.⁹⁵ Again Democrats decried Republicans as Mexicanizers, and, more rigorously, they attacked the analogy by inverting it, making the “mixed” and “half breed” Mexicans exemplars of bravery for hunting down Maximilian, while the cowardly United States acceded to Hayes's usurpation.⁹⁶ When leading figures such as Charles Francis Adams and Alexander Stephens used the discourse to publicly discipline congressional Democrats away from “the Mexicanization of our Federal Republic” and “the pronunciamientos and chronic anarchy which have made the Mexican Republic a byword among the nations,” the pressure once again worked.⁹⁷ The committee blinked, affirming “the irrefragability of Hayes' title.” Instead the committee investigated coded telegrams suggesting that Tilden's nephew had clumsily tried to bribe southern politicians. Democrats had been “bulldozed by the thieves' howl of ‘Revolution’ and ‘Mexicanization,’” what one newspaper called “a cover . . . to scare weak-kneed and lukewarm Democrats.”⁹⁸ The following year, Mexicanization helped explain competing governors and militias in Maine. While the New York

⁹² “The Insurrection among the Railway Employees of the United States, and the Losses in Pittsburgh Resulting Therefrom, in July, 1877: Memorial of the Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce, to the Pennsylvania Legislature” (Pittsburgh, 1877), Pamphlet Collection, Patricia D. Klingenstein Library, New-York Historical Society, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14; Richard Schneirov, “Chicago's Great Upheaval of 1877: Class Polarization and Democratic Politics,” in David O. Stowell, ed., *The Great Strikes of 1877* (Urbana, Ill., 2008), 80, 85, 87, 90, 97; Michael Kazin, “The July Days in San Francisco, 1877: Prelude to Kearneyism,” *ibid.*, 136–163.

⁹³ *Cincinnati Commercial*, May 17, 1878, 4; May 20, 1878, 4; May 23, 1878, 6; *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, May 24, 1878, 4; *Chicago Inter Ocean*, May 29, 1878, 1; *New York Herald*, April 17, 1878, 6; May 18, 1878, 6.

⁹⁴ *Chicago Daily Tribune*, May 23, 1878, 4; May 25, 1878, 4.

⁹⁵ *The Nation*, June 13, 1878, 382–385.

⁹⁶ *Indianapolis Sentinel*, May 25, 1878, 4; May 27, 1878, 4.

⁹⁷ *New York Herald*, April 27, 1878, 6.

⁹⁸ *Washington Post*, June 20, 1878, 2; *Georgia Weekly Telegraph*, June 4, 1878, 4.

Commercial Advertiser remained confident because “the Maine people are Americans, not Mexicans,” the *Worcester Gazette* worried that a disruption in “an old New England state like Maine” foreshadowed “the Mexicanizing of the country and the ruin of the republic.”⁹⁹ The 1881 assassination of President James Garfield initially prompted speculation “that this nation is becoming Mexicanized,” but the ensuing unity quickly proved that “we are not a Mexicanized people.”¹⁰⁰ By fashioning continuity amid discontinuous political circumstances, these stabilizers located American exceptionalism in the country’s stability, and its stability in its social norms.

Ironies about Mexicanization abound. The discourse flourished during what in retrospect was a period of dual stabilization. In diagnosing the potential for collapse, Mexicanization served to foreclose that possibility. The two nations followed different, but related, paths toward stabilization. In both countries, stabilization was tied to the retraction of democracy, in Mexico through the creation of a one-party dictatorship in the Porfiriato, in the United States through violent Democratic domination of southern freedpeople and, eventually, widespread disfranchisement. The transformation of Mexico altered the terms of comparison, sometimes even prompting open-ended lists of aspects “in which we could stand Mexicanizing.”¹⁰¹ U.S. journalist C. Edwards Lester wrote a lengthy sociological examination, *The Mexican Republic*, to promote “An Universal Zollverein for the American Hemisphere.”¹⁰² By the 1880s, Mexicanization suggested the strength and stability of “every Spanish-American or Portuguese-American state” to minister and soldier Thomas Wentworth Higginson.¹⁰³ The bitter 1890s currency debates, however, unleashed sharper visions of racial and cultural superiority as Republicans charged Populists and Silver Democrats with “Mexicanizing” the money standard.¹⁰⁴ By the end of the century, the Spanish-American War, fears of immigration, and hardening biological racism prompted widespread, now-familiar racist visions of “the sluggish, indolent Mexican type.”¹⁰⁵ For one final moment, an aged Henry Watterson revitalized the old discourse in the early 1900s by comparing Theodore Roosevelt’s allegedly dictatorial ambitions to Díaz’s. When he was met with mockery, Watterson in turn derided the belief that “‘We’ are an exception to all experience and all rule.”¹⁰⁶ By 1913, Mexicanization was played for laughs in a Gridiron Club skit, in which a dictator modeled after Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan oversaw a “Mexicanized administration.”¹⁰⁷

⁹⁹ Quoted in *Boston Globe*, December 25, 1879, 1; Lowell, Mass., *Daily Citizen*, December 20, 1879, 2; Edward Nelson Dingley, *The Life and Times of Nelson Dingley, Jr.* (Kalamazoo, Mich., 1902), 149–167.

¹⁰⁰ *Wheeling Register*, July 8, 1881, 2; *Washington Post*, July 11, 1881, 4.

¹⁰¹ Austin, Tex., *Texas Siftings*, June 2, 1883, 8.

¹⁰² C. Edwards Lester, *The Mexican Republic: An Historic Study* (New York, 1878), 4, 6, 90–97, 104.

¹⁰³ Thomas Wentworth Higginson, “The School of Jingo,” *The Chap-Book: Semi-Monthly*, April 15, 1896, 505–507.

¹⁰⁴ *Atlanta Constitution*, September 27, 1896, 2; July 18, 1897, 18; Michael O’Malley, “Specie and Species: Race and the Money Question in Nineteenth-Century America,” *American Historical Review* 99, no. 2 (April 1994): 369–395; Nell Irvin Painter, “Thinking about the Languages of Money and Race: A Response to Michael O’Malley, ‘Specie and Species,’” *ibid.*, 396–404; O’Malley, “Free Silver and the Constitution of Man,” *Common-Place* 6, no. 3 (April 2006), <http://www.common-place.org/vol-06/no-03/omalley/>; Daniel S. Margolies, *Henry Watterson and the New South: The Politics of Empire, Free Trade, and Globalization* (Lexington, Ky., 2006), 75.

¹⁰⁵ *New Orleans Daily Picayune*, July 21, 1891, 9.

¹⁰⁶ Quoted in *Washington Post*, May 27, 1902, 5.

¹⁰⁷ *Atlanta Constitution*, December 14, 1913, 1.

THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY UNITED STATES in fact proved exceptionally stable as it navigated fascism, communism, and political strains such as the 2000 Bush-Gore election. This image of a mighty nation casts an enormous shadow upon the nineteenth century. By looking at the late nineteenth century as something other than a prelude to the twentieth, it becomes possible to see the fragility that led people to fear another civil war alongside the forces that prevented such a conflict, and to observe the fluidity of views of Mexican politics, culture, religion, and history alongside the more rigid, biologically based racial ideologies of the next century. Mexicanization drew upon a broader, fragmentary idea of an age of republican crisis in which the American republics might stand together against a monarchical Europe that seemed no longer a model but rather a warning after the failed revolutions of 1848 and 1871. Still focused upon the centrality of political institutions, not class relations, many Americans looked not east but south for models, guides, and analytic openings. There were limits, of course, to this hemispheric vision. It did not include many nations, especially monarchical Brazil; it could be paternalistic and arrogant; and it did not survive the nineteenth century. Too often, however, transnationally inclined U.S. historians look to Europe for the circulation of ideas, and to Latin America for the movement of people and raw commodities.¹⁰⁸ Latin Americanists practicing hemispheric history in turn overemphasize divergence between Anglo and Spanish America in a nineteenth century sometimes overlooked in the rush from an intertwined eighteenth-century Atlantic world to twentieth-century U.S. dominance. Despite its limitations, the notion of a hemispheric circulation of republican ideas suggests the utility of chronologically extending Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra's project of "Iberianizing the Atlantic" to upset "the most cherished national narratives of the United States."¹⁰⁹

If the age of republican crisis proved transitory, the utility of Mexicanization for the study of state fragility and stabilization is more enduring. By denaturalizing the United States' path to stability, scholars can build more useful analyses of how, when, and why states become fragile and then stabilize. Making a now-powerful state an exemplar of fragility can rescue failed state theory from its Western triumphalism and provide historical models for the interaction of institutions, public confidence, and social norms in processes of stabilization. Institutional solutions, particularly the electoral commission, were central to the process of stabilization. Although it is easy

¹⁰⁸ Thomas Bender begins his chapter on the Civil War era with the impact of the Mexican War, and includes a comparison with Argentine territorial consolidation, although his chapter then emphasizes the war's relationship to "Euro-American liberal and nationalist movements" in European revolutions of 1848 and 1871. The other two transnational syntheses of the United States in this era similarly gesture to but do not fully develop the nation's relationship to the hemisphere. In U.S. history, the Paris Commune is frequently used as a pivot to shift the narrative of Reconstruction from the problem of racial slavery to the problem of European-style class conflict. Bender, *A Nation among Nations: America's Place in World History* (New York, 2006), chap. 3; Tyrrell, *Transnational Nation*; Eric Rauchway, *Blessed among Nations: How the World Made America* (New York, 2006).

¹⁰⁹ Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, "Entangled Histories: Borderland Historiographies in New Clothes?" *American Historical Review* 112, no. 3 (June 2007): 787–799; Cañizares-Esguerra, *Puritan Conquistadors: Iberianizing the Atlantic, 1550–1700* (Stanford, Calif., 2006), 9, 31; Felipe Fernández-Armesto, *The Americas: A Hemispheric History* (New York, 2005); Caroline F. Levander and Robert S. Levine, "Introduction: Essays beyond the Nation," in Levander and Levine, *Hemispheric American Studies*, 1–17; Jesse Alemán, "The Other Country: Mexico, the United States, and the Gothic History of Conquest," *ibid.*, 75–95; Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando López-Alves, "Introduction," in Centeno and López-Alves, eds., *The Other Mirror: Grand Theory through the Lens of Latin America* (Princeton, N.J., 2001), 3–24.

to emphasize the importance of popular legitimacy, the resolution of the crisis reinforces modern political scientists' observation that low levels of popular legitimacy are a relatively poor predictor of state collapse.¹¹⁰ During the crisis, the location of popular legitimacy was ever-shifting in political discourse, all too absent at moments of breakdown, and omnipresent after stabilization. Instead, the attribution of stability to social norms followed stabilization, a mask of continuity over discontinuous situations. By later locating stability in society, not the state, stabilizers tried to naturalize the process of stabilization into a depoliticized state of nature. This project made the path to stabilization inaccessible not only to contemporaries but also to historians.

Additionally, the discourse of Mexicanization demonstrates the fluidity and irony of transnational thinking. The lesson of Mexicanization was to think through national comparisons as a way of building a government strong enough to prevent those analogies from bearing fruit. During this period, then, historians may be able to fully understand domestic politics only through the lens of transnationalism, and the ironies of transnationalism only through domestic politics. Although Sven Beckert, surely one of the most careful and gifted transnational historians, calls transnationalism "a way of seeing," it might make more sense to think of it as a way of looking.¹¹¹ Treating transnationalism as a way of looking, not of seeing, reminds scholars that transnationalism is a method, not an outcome. We ought to be less confident about where it will lead us. A powerful U.S. exceptionalism arose in the stabilization of the 1880s not from blind breast-beating but, among many factors, from meaningful engagement with anti-exceptionalist analogies advanced in transnational circulations. Just as transnationalism produced surprising outcomes in the historical past, so too should its practice now be open to nuance, contradiction, and even the affirmation of the importance of national political histories, albeit stranger and more surprising ones.

¹¹⁰ John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations* (New York, 2009); Bruce Gilley, *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy* (New York, 2009); Chiyuki Aoi, *Legitimacy and the Use of Armed Force: Stability Missions in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York, 2010).

¹¹¹ "AHR Conversation: On Transnational History," *American Historical Review* 111, no. 5 (December 2006): 1441–1464, here 1454.

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The Children of the Desert and the Laws of the Sea: Austria, Great Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and the Mediterranean Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century

ALISON FRANK

MATTEO DRUSCOVICH WAS A SHIP'S CAPTAIN in the Austrian merchant marine, not a lawyer, but he knew something about Austrian law. "There can be no slaves on an Austrian ship," he declared, referring to §95 of the 1852 penal code, which stated that anyone who set foot on Austrian soil or on board an Austrian ship would become instantly free.¹ The occasion for his statement was a proposed search of his steamship, the *Mars*, on June 3, 1870, while it was docked at Smyrna (today's Izmir) en route from Alexandria to Constantinople.² Druscovich attempted to forestall the search, which would have been conducted by representatives of the British consulate in Smyrna looking for slaves on board, "in order," he explained, "to protect the rights and honor of our [Austrian] flag."³ In due course, the British were allowed to search the ship in the presence of the Austro-Hungarian consul. What they found showed that more than Druscovich's personal honor or even Austria's sovereignty over its own ships was at risk. The search of the *Mars*, like countless other such searches that

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¹ "Neither slavery nor the exercise of power pertaining to it is permitted in the Austrian Empire, and . . . every slave becomes free in the very moment when he sets foot on imperial Austrian soil or even only on board an Austrian ship." *Strafgesetz über Verbrechen, Vergehen und Uebertretungen* (May 27, 1852), Neuntes Hauptstück, Von öffentlichen Gewaltthätigkeit, §95, durch Behandlung eines Menschen als Sklaven. The 1811 *Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch* (Austrian Civil Code) prohibited "slavery or serfdom" in the hereditary lands (significantly, excluding Galicia). Amendments decreed in 1826 already stated that any slave became free the instant he or she set foot on Austrian soil or an Austrian ship, or was sold to a subject of the Austrian monarch. *Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch* (1811), Erster Theil, Erstes Hauptstück, §16; 19ter Hofdecret vom 19. August 1826, Beylage, §1.

² For the purposes of consistency with sources used and quoted, this article will use the conventional nineteenth-century English equivalents of town names such as Constantinople, Vienna, Trieste, Smyrna, and Alexandria. It will also refer to the "Austrian Empire" and "Habsburg Monarchy" without regard to the transition from Austria to Austria-Hungary in 1867 in contexts in which both the pre-*Ausgleich* and post-*Ausgleich* state are meant.

³ Gödel-Lannoy, President of the Maritime Administration in Trieste [Seebehörde or Governo Marittimo], to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna [Ministerium des Äußern], July 16, 1870, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv [hereafter HHStA], Ministerium des Äußern [hereafter MdA], Administrative Registratur [hereafter AR], Fach 34, Sonderreihe 90, Handelspolitische Akten Rubrik 48: Sklavenhandel [hereafter F34SR90], Z. 2482/HP.

occurred in the Mediterranean between the 1840s and the 1870s, exposed the fundamental misalignment of Austria's imperial and commercial interests, European ideologies of civilization and freedom notwithstanding.

The architects of Austria's maritime expansion eschewed traditional colonialism—both voluntarily and because the nominal empire's few attempts at overseas conquest ended in failure.⁴ The insistence that Austria's maritime trade was benevolent did not, however, prevent Austria from encountering the same complicated moral, legal, and commercial paradoxes that affected any Europeans who claimed to bring civilization, in the form of commerce, to slave societies. The diplomatic scuffle over the presence of slaves on the *Mars* in 1870 exposed this larger tangle of imperial and commercial interests, for behind the zealous British consul in Smyrna, who was determined to end slaving in and through "his" port, and the Austrian captain, who was determined to protect the honor of "his" flag, stood the administration of the Austrian Lloyd, the empire's largest shipping company, and diplomats and politicians representing Britain, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire. At stake was not only Austria's dominance of Eastern Mediterranean trade routes, but the project of abolishing the slave trade and the nature of its connection to "free" commerce. Was Austria-Hungary meeting the standards of European civilization and its treaty obligations to Britain? Or was it turning a blind eye to—or, more than that, actually enabling—the most despicable aspect of so-called oriental despotism: the enslavement of African women, children, and men in the waning decades of the nineteenth century?

The answer to both questions, as it turned out, was yes. To say so is not to single out Austria for special blame. There is no evidence that the Austrian state knowingly profited from slaving, or that Austrian diplomats' abhorrence of the Atlantic slave trade, or slavery in Africa, was any less sincere than anyone else's. Austria did fulfill its treaty obligations to Britain (which explicitly excluded the Mediterranean); neither Austrian nor British diplomats considered trade with a slaveholding society to be compromising in and of itself. On the contrary, both believed that consuls, missionaries, and tradesmen—and in the British case, colonial administrators—were natural allies in the project to replace slavery with what they considered to be civ-

⁴ Austria's experience of maritime trade in the nineteenth century is the subject of my current book project, *Invisible Empire: A New Global History of Austria*, which will be published by Princeton University Press. Pieter Judson has asked whether Austria-Hungary was an empire in the formal sense. The question was framed, as the historiographical debate that inspired it demanded, in the context of the Habsburg domestic sphere: Did certain allegedly dominant "nations" hegemonically rule over other, allegedly subordinate "nations" within a fundamentally imperial, if geographically European, system? Judson's conclusion, with which I agree, is that the constitutional rights and legal institutions available to Habsburg subjects created a political culture dominated by institutionalized pluralism, not national hegemony; the emergence of putative nation-states from the ashes of the empire in 1918 is not comparable to the decolonization of Britain or France. Judson, "L'Autriche-Hongrie était-elle un empire?" *Annales: Histoire, Sciences sociales* 63, no. 3 (2008): 563–596. The relevance of the concept of "empire" to this article is different—it presupposes that Austria hoped to benefit from an asymmetric power relationship with the Ottoman Empire and its North African dependencies in order to provide basic services (such as passenger and freight transportation and mail service) that would prove lucrative to its own commercial interests. It neither requires nor asserts that Austria was a colonial power in the sense of the British or French empires. Within this context, what matters is that the Habsburgs chose to call their dominions an empire, and that Austrians thought of their empire as a Great Power and aspired to belong to the club of imperial powers that exported their goods, their culture, and their civilization to the rest of the world.

ilization. But if contemporary European wisdom held that civilization spread inevitably, it also expected it to proceed gradually, not all in a piece. And so Robert Cumberbatch, the British consul in Smyrna whose whistle-blowing caused Austria so much trouble, was scolded, not commended, by his superiors in the Foreign Service for trying to rescue slaves. His Austrian counterparts were embarrassed by the incident, but they could not imagine what “reasonable” (to their minds) steps could be taken to prevent its recurrence. With a few notable exceptions (including consuls such as Cumberbatch), European diplomats chose to ignore the problem of Ottoman domestic slavery because they felt powerless to solve it.⁵ Even after anti-slave trade conventions were signed in the 1880s, the practice of slaveholding within the Ottoman realm continued until the very end of the empire in 1918 and Turkey’s subsequent repudiation of all Islamic law, including those laws that underpinned slavery.

There are some surprises here. That Austrian ships played any role in the transportation of African slaves is largely unknown. Austria’s pivotal role in expanding maritime traffic in the Eastern Mediterranean in the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century is usually forgotten. The glaring exclusion of the entire Mediterranean from diplomatic agreements to eradicate the slave trade elsewhere has made it easy to imagine that human trafficking had largely been eliminated from European experience by mid-century; indeed, the abolition of the slave trade in the northern Atlantic is conventionally viewed as a core event of the Age of Revolution. But the purpose of this investigation is not to surprise—it is to connect. Thinking about how slaves were transported by European powers that were formally (and by conviction) against slavery helps reveal how difficult abolition was and further exposes the linkages between smuggling, the semi-official slave trade, and the domestic institution of slavery. To appreciate the significance of the discovery that slaves were being smuggled on Austrian ships requires a reexamination of the history of Austria’s role in Mediterranean commerce; the evolution of European diplomatic agreements aimed at ending the slave trade; the alleged distinctiveness, whether real or imagined, of Ottoman slavery; the permeability of the legal and conceptual boundaries that were supposed to separate the slave trade as a matter of international law from the domestic institution of slavery; and the complex history of slavery and abolitionism in Britain and Austria. Ultimately, it reveals that it was impossible for imperial commercial interests to be truly aligned with the emergent ideologies of civilization and freedom, despite the Great Powers’ claim that they were mutually reinforcing.⁶ As case after case of slave transportation by the Austrian Lloyd was brought to light, the Austrian government was forced to acknowledge that the only way to guarantee that its ships would not be used by slave traders would be to refuse to maintain its Ottoman routes and repudiate its commercial ambitions in the region.

⁵ Madeline Zilfi has suggested that the predominance of female slaves in the Ottoman Empire and of the imperial harem in the Ottoman imagination of slavery made the empire’s particular form of “mild” slavery less offensive to even those diplomats who were committed in principle to ending slavery: “In nineteenth-century male relationships, the idea of men’s having a master was shedding its positive connotations. Where women were concerned, however, the staying power of female slavery and the patriarchal household argued for the normalcy of women’s being mastered.” Zilfi, *Women and Slavery in the Late Ottoman Empire: The Design of Difference* (Cambridge, 2010), 231.

⁶ I am particularly indebted to the *AHR*’s anonymous “Reader 1” for suggesting this particular breakdown of the thematic elements in this article.

When it came to servicing the Eastern Mediterranean maritime trade, some slaving, officials feared, was the price of admission.

The story of the Mediterranean slave trade—and Austria's involvement in it—forces an extension of the chronology of abolition to include the late nineteenth century, a reorientation of the geography of slaving from the Atlantic and Indian Oceans to include the Mediterranean, and a broadening of the profiles of slavers and complicit powers to include non-colonial states. It also provides a missing link between the historiographies of slavery in the Ottoman Empire, slavery in Africa, and European abolitionism in the nineteenth century. While historians have long looked skeptically at claims that African slavery called for European colonialism on the continent—a colonialism conveniently justified in part by the stated need to abolish the slave trade at its source—Austria's predicament suggests that there was more to Europe's involvement in the slave trade than either humanitarian abolitionism or the imperialist expansion it was used to defend. The very structures that made international trade generally safe and profitable facilitated the continuation of slaving across the Mediterranean long after the project of abolition began—no matter the intentions of any number of lawmakers, diplomats, mercantile capitalists, or ships' captains.

THE HABSBURG MONARCHY FACED considerable obstacles to developing and exercising an interventionist anti-slavery policy—obstacles that had less to do with Austria's public “morality” than with the particular form of slaving that its commerce unwittingly facilitated. Austria was forced to confront the intertwining of commerce and slaving in the Mediterranean, where the slave trade crossed the frontiers of the private and the public, where the border between freedom and coercion was often unclear, and where power often operated along indirect channels and took hidden forms.⁷ Scholars of the Mediterranean have long known that from antiquity through the Renaissance, the “connectivity” of the “corrupting sea” made slavery “a structural feature of Mediterranean society.”⁸ One scholar has estimated that between 4.5 and 9 million slaves—Christian and Muslim, European, Arab, Berber, Turkic,

⁷ It is no longer necessary to include the formerly omnipresent apology for the paucity of literature on slavery under Islam or in the Ottoman Empire or in Africa. There are references to excellent scholarship on every page of this article. Ehud Toledano claimed in 2009 that “we have covered the traffic from Africa and the Caucasus, described the main routes, determined the types of slaves, their prices, the customs duties levied on them, the jobs they performed, and the social roles they played. Scholars have explained the project of the Tanzimat reforms, the impact of foreign pressures, the mechanisms of homegrown manumission, the attitudes towards slavery, and the problems of suppression and abolition.” Toledano, “Bringing the Slaves Back In,” in Behnaz A. Mirzai, Ismael Musah Montana, and Paul E. Lovejoy, eds., *Slavery, Islam and Diaspora* (Trenton, N.J., 2009), 7. While much remains to be done, it is important to recognize how very much has been accomplished since the inaugural issue of *Slavery and Abolition*, in which Alan Fisher complained that “Scholars have not only avoided investigating slavery in [the Ottoman Empire], the largest of all Islamic states in [the early modern and modern] periods, they have not admitted its existence.” Fisher, “Chattel Slavery in the Ottoman Empire,” *Slavery and Abolition* 1 (1980): 25.

■ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, 2 vols. (New York, 1973), 2: 755; Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* (Malden, Mass., 2000), 388. On Mediterranean slaving in the Carolingian period (once thought to mark a caesura between ancient and Renaissance slaving), see Michael McCormick, “New Light on the ‘Dark Ages’: How the Slave Trade Fuelled the Carolingian Economy,” *Past and Present*

and African—were kept on the Mediterranean littoral between 1450 and 1850.⁹ In the nineteenth century, human trafficking had become inseparable from the most modern forms of Mediterranean exchange, facilitated by the newest technologies (steamships), and intrinsically connected to “legitimate” commerce.¹⁰ It affected even those European powers—including Austria—whose commerce was largely continental, whose borders were mostly inland, and whose attitude toward the slave trade combined professions of innocence with practiced indifference.

At the center of this story were thousands of African children and young women (and less frequently men) who were purchased in the slave markets of Cairo and East Africa—many of them after a forced march across the Sahara—and taken by slave traders to the port city of Alexandria, where they embarked on steamships headed for Constantinople.¹¹ If the slave traders could pass their human wares off as their own children, wives, paid servants, or personal slaves, rather than as newly acquired slaves bound for resale in Constantinople, they could travel unmolested to the capital of the Ottoman Empire, where slavery remained legal even after the piecemeal abolition of the slave trade had been accepted as an ideal. There, as one American traveler observed, “Black slaves are sold freely and white Circassian girls can be had by all who are able to purchase them.”¹² At the same time, the slave dealers knew that their trade was under attack and that their dearly purchased property was likely to be seized by any signatories to the various treaties to that effect (including Great

177 (2002): 47–49, here 53: “In some not unimportant measure, Europe financed the early growth of its commercial economy by selling Europeans as slaves to the Arab world.”

⁹ “Personalmente ho ‘osato’ affermare che se consideriamo le diverse componenti della schiavitù mediterranea: cristiano-europei schiavi nel mondo islamico, musulmani (arabo-berberi, turchi, slavi ed altri) nel mondo europeo, negri africani e altri da una parte e dall’altra, e se facciamo un calcolo per l’intero periodo 1450–1850 ‘si arriva, con verosimile sorpresa e probabile incredulità di molti, a un totale da 4 milioni e mezzo a nove milioni di individui coinvolti.’” Salvatore Bono, “La schiavitù nel mediterraneo moderno: Storia di una storia,” *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* 65 (2002), <http://cdlm.revues.org/index28.html>.

¹⁰ Paul Lovejoy eschews the phrase “legitimate trade,” used to distinguish between slaving and other trades (in, for example, ivory, palm oil, or ostrich feathers). “Many of the ‘legitimate goods’ destined for world markets were grown or transported by slaves, for slavery had become an integral part of the African economy . . . The transition from exporting slaves to exporting other commodities resulted in the increased use of slaves in Africa.” Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 2000), 141; Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, “From Slaves to Palm Oil: Afro-European Commercial Relations in the Bight of Biafra, 1741–1841,” in David Killingray, Margarette Lincoln, and Nigel Rigby, eds., *Maritime Empires: British Imperial Maritime Trade in the Nineteenth Century* (Boydell, 2004), 14.

¹¹ “Slaves exported [from the Central Sudan] to the Orient were marched an average of some 600 kilometers to the desert edge, and then made the long trek across the Sahara.” Patrick Manning, *Slavery and African Life: Occidental, Oriental, and African Slave Trades* (Cambridge, 1990), 75. Suzanne Miers listed some of the many origins of slaves destined for the Mediterranean-world: “From the western and central Sudan they crossed the Sahara on the great caravan routes to Northern Africa, and many were sent on to the markets of the Ottoman Empire and beyond. From the Sudan and Ethiopia, they came northwards, overland or down the Nile to the North African littoral or were shipped eastwards, as were Somalis, to Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and India. From eastern Africa even beyond the great lakes they were carried away to Persian and Arabian markets. Many were dispersed through the Muslim world by pilgrims going to or returning from Mecca and their destinies were as varied as their origins.” Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade* (New York, 1975), 56.

¹² Nathaniel Clark Burt, *The Far East; or, Letters from Egypt, Palestine, and Other Lands of the Orient* (Cincinnati, 1868), 197. This particular letter was written from on board the *Arciduchessa Carlotta*, an Austrian Lloyd steamer accused of transporting slaves in 1871, bound from Alexandria to Jaffa and Beirut.

Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and France) if their commercial intentions were discovered. They also knew that there was a greater likelihood of discovery on board steamships, which drew more attention from consulates and customs agencies, than on sailing ships. Yet the comforts and convenience of steamship travel were so great as to convince many slave traders to take the risk. And on the waters of the Mediterranean, no steamship service was more reliable, more comfortable, more regular, and more reasonably priced than the service provided by the Austrian Lloyd, the largest steamship company in the Habsburg monarchy.¹³

The Lloyd had been founded by a group of merchants and investors in the empire's largest port city, Trieste, in 1833. It was supposed to encourage the blossoming of the empire's maritime commerce by speeding up the movement of goods—and, just as importantly, the information about goods upon which insurers desperately relied. The Austrian Lloyd, its founders hoped, would reorient Austrian trade toward the seas: "If we escape from the narrow circles into which Austrian traffic is now banished," wrote the Triestine merchant-philanthropist Pasquale Revoltella in 1863, "a wide, boundless horizon opens up—a world lies before us which until now has only been known in Austrian schoolrooms and scholars' studies—a world full of the liveliest activity, the playground of all other civilized peoples—where the spirit of commerce daily celebrates unheard-of triumphs."¹⁴ The Lloyd's very first steamer, the *Arciduca Lodovico*, departed on its maiden voyage on May 16, 1837, leaving Trieste for its most important destination, Constantinople.¹⁵ The Levant proved so central to the company's profits that the Lloyd soon developed two main routes that serviced Ottoman ports without including any Austrian ports at all: one that went directly from Alexandria to Constantinople, with stops only at Smyrna and a few intermediate islands, and a second that went from Alexandria to Constantinople via the Levantine coastal cities. In 1851, Austrian Lloyd steamers transported 222,000 passengers, 522,000 letters, and 280 packages, "nearly all of them engaged in carrying on a commerce with various ports of Turkey," according to the *New York Times*. The Lloyd's income for 1851 was \$1.4 million, of which \$900,000, or fully 64 percent, derived from the "Turkish trade."¹⁶ By 1869, the Ottoman Empire was Austria-Hungary's second most important trade partner, after Germany—followed only at a great

¹³ In 1870, there were seventy-four steamers registered in Austria; seventy of them belonged to the Austrian Lloyd. Frederick Martin, ed., *The Statesman's Year-Book*, 7th ed. (London, 1870), 25–26. In 1872, the French steamer service Messageries Maritimes and the Russian Steam and Navigation and Commercial Company each plied the Alexandria-Constantinople route fortnightly; the Peninsular & Oriental (Britain) and Rubattino (Italy) did not cover the route; the Austrian Lloyd sent ships from Alexandria to Constantinople weekly (alternating between a direct route and a route via Syria); the Egyptian Khedivial Mail Line sent steamers weekly. But whereas the Messageries Maritimes charged 182 French francs for a third-class ticket from Alexandria to Constantinople, the Lloyd charged 50 francs for the same trip on its direct route, and 95 for the trip via Syria. Routes and tariffs taken from an excerpt from François Leverney, *Guide et annuaire d'Egypte* (1872), as printed in Robert Ilbert and Ilios Yannakakis, eds., *Alexandria, 1860–1960: The Brief Life of a Cosmopolitan Community*, trans. Colin Clement (Alexandria, 1997), 211–218.

¹⁴ Pasquale Revoltella, *Oesterreich's Betheiligung am Welthandel: Betrachtungen und Vorschläge* (Trieste, 1864), 13.

¹⁵ Dieter Winkler and Georg Pawlik, *Die Dampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft Österreichischer Lloyd, 1836–1918* (Graz, 1986), 13.

¹⁶ "Correspondence: The Levant," *New York Times*, October 11, 1852, 2.

distance by Italy and Russia.¹⁷ There was no doubt that Austria stood to profit tremendously from its maritime commerce.

But the “playground of civilized peoples,” it turned out, was also a thriving slave market. From the 1830s, when the Austrian Lloyd was founded, until at least the 1870s, when the documentary evidence (but not the slave trade itself) ceased, the Lloyd’s “modern” steamships were chosen by dozens (or possibly hundreds) of slave traders to transport thousands (or possibly tens of thousands) of slaves to the Ottoman Empire.¹⁸ The exact scale of Austrian participation is difficult to establish—as is the exact number of slaves transported from Africa across the Mediterranean to the territories of the Ottoman Empire. Ehud Toledano, using data compiled by Ralph Austen and others, has estimated that between 16,000 and 18,000 slaves were imported into the Ottoman Empire every year for the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century—which would have produced a total of 1.1 to 1.3 million enslaved people between 1800 and 1870 (a forced migration on an epochal scale)—with the nineteenth-century trade peaking between 1850 and 1875.¹⁹

That a slave trade on this scale (or any other) persisted into the 1860s and 1870s requires an adjustment of the traditional chronology of abolition in the Atlantic-centered historiography of European slave-trading. When Captain Druscovich’s ship was stopped at Smyrna, more than six decades had passed since the declared end of the British and American slave trades, in 1807 and 1808, respectively.²⁰ Nearly sixty

¹⁷ Frederick Martin, ed., *The Statesman’s Year-Book*, 6th ed. (London, 1869), 25.

¹⁸ The slave trade did not stop in the 1870s, but a few developments made it substantially smaller. The Anglo-Egyptian anti-slave trade convention of 1877 “marked the start of a more determined effort to prevent the import of slaves.” Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade*, 81. The British occupation of Egypt, starting in 1882, gave the British more control over embarkation procedures. The Berlin Conference of 1885 and the Brussels Conference of 1889 both involved the Ottoman Empire in international agreements prohibiting the slave trade.

¹⁹ Ehud R. Toledano, *Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East* (Seattle, 1998), 8. Ralph Austen has estimated that 312,000 Africans were moved from sub-Saharan Africa to the Arab and Turkic lands surrounding the Mediterranean between 1830 and 1900—100,000 of them in the 1860s alone. Austen, “The Mediterranean Islamic Slave Trade out of Africa: A Tentative Census,” in Elizabeth Savage, ed., *The Human Commodity: Perspectives on the Trans-Saharan Slave Trade* (London, 1992), 219.

²⁰ The British act was the Abolition Act, 47, Geo. III, Cap. 3, March 1807; the U.S. act was the Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves into Any Port or Place within the Jurisdiction of the United States, from and after the First Day of January, in the Year of Our Lord 1808, signed into law March 3, 1808. The United States outlawed the slave trade in 1808, but did not grant Great Britain the right to search American vessels at sea independently until the treaty carried out by an act of Congress on July 11, 1862; only that concession led to a more meaningful end to the northern Atlantic slave trade. W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, *The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade to the United States of America, 1638–1870* (New York, 1896), 192. Boyd Hilton has described the ambivalence of British celebrations of the March 2007 bicentenary of the act that outlawed Britain’s “central role in [the slave trade’s] Atlantic triangle.” Hilton, “1807 and All That: Why Britain Outlawed Her Slave Trade,” in Derek R. Peterson, ed., *Abolitionism and Imperialism in Britain, Africa, and the Atlantic* (Athens, Ohio, 2010), 63–65. Paul Lovejoy, echoing Eric Williams, argues that Europeans claim more credit for abolition than they are due: “If there was a passive agent in the history of slavery during the nineteenth century, it was Europe, not Africa. Africa struggled to reform slavery in a changing context. Europe did its best to avoid its commitment to abolition, reluctantly pursuing the fight whenever compromise proved impossible. Abolition was eventually achieved not so much because of the desire of one party to end slavery but because the modern industrial system and a slave-based social formation were incompatible . . . The demise of slavery was inevitable in the context of absorption into a capitalist world-economy.” Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery*, 252–253. For Eric Williams’s original argument that economic interest, rather than selfless humanitarian impulse, motivated abolition at a time when industrial capitalism was making plantation slavery less profitable, see Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1944). After a spirited debate between David Brion Davis, John Ashworth, and Thomas Haskell in the *American Historical Review*, reprinted in Thomas Bender, ed., *The Antislavery Debate: Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Prob-*

years had passed since the first ban on slavery in the Austrian lands in 1811. Over fifty years had passed since the participants at the Congress of Vienna had proclaimed the slave trade “repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal morality” and pledged to force its gradual abolition.²¹ Thirty years had passed since Austria had signed the Quadripartite Treaty with Britain, Prussia, and Russia in December 1841, which granted the mutual right of inspection of one another’s vessels at sea.²² Nearly twenty years had passed since the reigning penal code outlawing slavery within Austria had come into effect in 1852.

The Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted its correspondence with statesmen and diplomats representing Britain, the Sublime Porte, and France throughout the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century according to the letter of these laws, and with all the good conscience of a power that had nothing to hide. At the Congress of Vienna, Metternich said that as a “noncolonial” power, Austria was “sincerely opposed to the trade in slaves.”²³ From Britain’s perspective, the lack of direct involvement or interest in the slave trade on the part of Prussia, Russia, and Austria made them the most logical partners for cooperation—hence the 1841 treaty.²⁴ According to the traditional measure of willing compliance, Britain was correct: Austria was eager to cooperate. The archives of the Austrian Foreign Ministry are full of warrants granting Britain permission to search Austrian ships in the waters off the West Coast of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, the West Indies, and the Brazil Station, with confidence that no slaves would be found.²⁵ If Austria was involved in the Atlantic slave trade, no evidence of that involvement has ever been uncovered.

But Austria’s lack of direct complicity in or profit from the Atlantic slave trade

lem in *Historical Interpretation* (Berkeley, Calif., 1992), 107–311, Christopher Brown provided a synthesis of both positions in *Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2006).

²¹ “Declaration of the Eight Powers, Relative to the Universal Abolition of the Slave Trade, February 8, 1815,” as quoted in Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade*, 11. The plenipotentiaries proclaimed “their wish of putting an end to a scourge which has so long desolated Africa, degraded Europe, and afflicted humanity.” Jerome Reich, “The Slave Trade at the Congress of Vienna: A Study in English Public Opinion,” *Journal of Negro History* 53, no. 2 (April 1968): 139–140. The imperfections of the Vienna declaration were many: slaving was not declared illegal, nor was any time limit set for its eventual abolition; there was no commitment to take action against it or punish those who practiced it; and no mechanism was established for international cooperation to restrict it. Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade*, 11.

²² The negotiations over the treaty continued from 1834 to 1841, and can be found in the folder “Verhandlungen wegen Abschluss eines gemeinschaftlichen Tractates wegen Abschaffung des Handels mit Negersclaven,” HHStA Fach 39/1, Sklavenhandel, Piraterie, etc., 1834–1847 [hereafter F39/1]. The entire treaty and its annexes are available in English in Lewis Hertslet, ed., *A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions, and Reciprocal Regulations, at Present Subsisting between Great Britain and Foreign Powers*, vol. 6 (London, 1845), 3–20.

²³ Reich, “The Slave Trade at the Congress of Vienna,” 140.

²⁴ The three powers “had no direct interest in the slave trade” according to Jerome Reich and “were not directly interested in the trade” according to Suzanne Miers. Reich, “The Slave Trade at the Congress of Vienna,” 132; Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade*, 10. The original overture to Prussia, Russia, and Austria was made by Viscount Castlereagh on May 31, 1814, and is reprinted in *British and Foreign State Papers, 1815–1816*, vol. 3 (London, 1838), 887. See also Du Bois, *The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade to the United States of America*, 134.

²⁵ A typical request for warrants, listing ships and captains organized into groups by the waters in which they patrolled, can be found in From His Britannic Majesty Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary to Prince Metternich Chancellor of Court and State, pras. 13/10 1843 p 1131 HHStA F39/1.

was only as relevant to the project of abolition as the slave trade was limited to the Atlantic. The proliferation of bilateral and multilateral treaties of which Britain was so proud—treaties that banned the trade, provided for joint cruising, granted the right of search of ships at sea, and in some cases defined slaving as piracy—shared a common omission: the Mediterranean.²⁶ The Atlantic search zone defined by the Quadripartite Treaty was explicitly limited not only by delineating exactly what portions of the ocean were included, but also by excluding the Middle Sea entirely: “the said mutual right of search shall not be exercised within the Mediterranean Sea.”²⁷ But the West Coast of Africa was not where Austrian ships were likely to board slaves; 40 percent of the sub-Saharan Africans who were forced into external slavery in the nineteenth century were not taken across the Atlantic. According to Paul Lovejoy, approximately 2,134,000 Africans were transported into slavery across the Sahara, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean in the nineteenth century. Of those, 56 percent, or 1.2 million, were taken to slaveholding territories around the Mediterranean.²⁸

The Ottoman Empire had not been party to the agreements signed at the Congress of Vienna, and had long refused to enter into any kind of treaty banning the slave trade.²⁹ Even when the British finally convinced the Ottomans to sign a convention for the suppression of the slave trade in 1880, Britain acquired the right to search Ottoman vessels “on the high seas, in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf”—but not in the Mediterranean.³⁰ This exclusion

²⁶ The Quadripartite Treaty described slaving as piracy but did not spell out the legal ramifications of such a definition. Britain tried, in 1864, to introduce an international act that would explicitly proclaim slave traders to be pirates and obligate signatories to pass laws allowing their subjects/citizens to be prosecuted in courts set up to combat piracy—that is, courts outside the jurisdiction of the “pirates’” home state. Austria responded by reiterating its many regulations banning the slave trade (“Austria has in this regard neglected nothing and has in no measure fallen behind”) and noting that the result of the proposed act would be to place subjects of the signatory powers “under the power of courts recognized to prosecute piracy in the states whose cruisers secured the ship [accused of slaving]”—an abrogation of state sovereignty and duty toward subjects/citizens that Austria could not permit. The reference to piracy in the 1841 treaty had been made “with the goal of emphasizing the criminal nature and grave criminal liability of the enterprise using an expression that is both popular and generally perceived as infamous,” nothing more. Austria was willing to have British cruisers search its merchant vessels (again, outside the Mediterranean)—but was not willing to have British courts try its subjects. Justice Ministry to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, January 23, 1865, JM 238 1123/J pr 23/1/1865, HHStA MdA AR Fach 39/3 Sklavenhandel, Piraterie, etc., 1857–1866.

²⁷ The Atlantic search zone would be bounded “on the north, by the 32nd parallel of north latitude, on the west, by the eastern coast of America, . . . on the south, by the 45th parallel of south latitude, from the point where that parallel strikes the eastern coast of America to the 80th degree of longitude east from the meridian of Greenwich; on the east, by the same degree of longitude, from the point where it is intersected by the 45th parallel of south latitude up to the coast of India.” Hertslet, *A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions*, 4–5. On arguments about trying pirates in their states of origin as a way of circumventing the punishment of slavers altogether, see Du Bois, *The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade to the United States of America*, especially 165, 184.

²⁸ Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery*, 142. John Wright has asserted that “after they had crossed the Sahara, nearly all the black slaves exported from North Africa were sent by sea, on a Mediterranean ‘middle passage,’ to their final points of sale.” Wright, *The Trans-Saharan Slave Trade* (London, 2007), 127.

²⁹ For an excellent account of the tension between British pressure and Ottoman internal reform, as well as the trajectory of negotiations and preliminary agreements leading up to the anti-slave trade treaty, see Y. Hakan Erdem, *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise, 1800–1909* (London, 1996), 67–88.

³⁰ Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade*, 85. The reports written by captains on board the British naval vessels that were charged with preventing the slave trade are heartrending. Many quo-

was not based solely on the intransigence of the Ottomans, however; it emerged directly from Britain's attempt to distinguish between the slave trade and slaveholding itself—and in making the distinction, to allow the latter to continue while the former was rooted out.³¹ The hope of British abolitionists was that cutting off supply would ultimately force Ottoman slavery to wither away.³² High rates of manumission made the enslaved population's reproduction over time particularly dependent upon the trade—but would a ban on the trade cause Ottoman slavery to collapse?³³ Or would ongoing demand make a mockery of a ban on the trade by forcing once-legal supply to continue, only now as criminalized smuggling? In the 1840s, the very idea of requesting the Ottoman sultan to abolish slavery in his domains was deemed so absurd that Lord Palmerston, foreign secretary at the time, rejected a draft letter to the ambassador in Constantinople suggesting that course of action: "This is all nonsense, slavery is so ingrained in the social habits of Mohammedans that no ambassador could with a grave face act upon the draft. It would have been much shorter to tell Lord Ponsonby [the ambassador] to ask the Sultan to become a Christian."³⁴ When the Austrian emperor's younger brothers, Ferdinand Maximilian and Karl Ludwig, took a tour of the Ottoman Empire in 1850, their visit to the slave market was one of the singular highlights that the court painter traveling with them chose to record. (See Figure 1.)

More consistent was Britain's conviction that pressing too hard, too fast on the

tations of their descriptions of the East African trade can be found in Bernard Edwards, *Royal Navy versus the Slave Traders: Enforcing Abolition at Sea, 1808–1898* (Barnsley, 2007), 158–183.

³¹ "Within the Ottoman Muslim elite, a general sense of moral and spiritual superiority toward Christian Europe prevailed. This feeling coexisted with the recognition of Ottoman military, technological, and economic inferiority. All this produced a clear disinclination in government circles to yield to British pressures regarding slavery and the slave trade." Toledano, *Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East*, 11.

³² Miers argues that "inadequate naval power and consular vigilance" meant that even in the 1880s, "the smuggling traffic which still brought several thousand or more Africans" to the Middle East and North Africa annually could not be stopped. Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade*, 116. In the Mediterranean, consuls seemed duly vigilant, and the use of naval power was not permitted. By pointing out that "the [Atlantic] trade in enslaved Africans was demand driven," Andrew Lambert emphasizes a fundamental flaw in the idea that ending the trade would automatically and promptly end slavery. Lambert, "Slavery, Free Trade and Naval Strategy, 1840–1860," in Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon, eds., *Slavery, Diplomacy and Empire: Britain and the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 1807–1975* (Brighton, 2009), 67. On the opening of new areas of slavery in Africa as the trades in the Atlantic and Muslim worlds declined, see Richard Roberts and Suzanne Miers, "The End of Slavery in Africa," in Miers and Roberts, eds., *The End of Slavery in Africa* (Madison, Wis., 1988), 3–59.

³³ On the origins of slaves in the late Ottoman Empire and the most common means of their enslavement, see Erdem, *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise*, 44–58.

³⁴ As quoted in A. Adu Boahen, *Britain, the Sahara, and the Western Sudan, 1788–1861* (Oxford, 1964), 146. A similar attitude prevailed thirty years later, when the British ambassador to Constantinople wrote: "Till there is a complete revolution in the social organization of the country and in public opinion, and while the sovereign of the country and most of the principal personages in it possess slaves, who must be recruited from some quarter or other, it will be, as your Lordship says, vain to think of seeing the trade in them extinguished." Sir Henry Elliot to Earl Granville, Therapia, August 16, 1870, Slave Trade no. 5, National Archives (London), Foreign Office [hereafter NAFO] 84/1324, 109. For all his wisdom, Palmerston was far from an expert on Sharia law; the internal Muslim debate about the compatibility of Islam and slavery included opinions that differed across space, across time, and across sect. William Gervase Clarence-Smith has devoted an entire monograph to parsing these differences: *Islam and the Abolition of Slavery* (Oxford, 2006). See especially his overview, pp. 16–21. Amal Ghazal's essay "Debating Slavery and Abolition in the Arab Middle East," in Mirzai, Montana, and Lovejoy, *Slavery, Islam and Diaspora*, 139–154, is particularly helpful on the continuation of these debates in the twentieth century.



FIGURE 1: Peter Johann Nepomuk Geiger, *Archduke Maximilian of Austria Visiting the Slave Market of Smyrna*. Geiger traveled with the Austrian archduke Ferdinand Maximilian during his 1850 trip to Smyrna. In this painting, he recorded the young archduke's visit to the infamous Smyrna slave market, where both enslaved Africans (front left) and Circassians (front right) were displayed for sale. His markedly orientalist version of the scene contrasted the irrepressible sexuality of Circassian women coyly peeking over their own shoulders with the listless and hopeless carriage of Africans for sale in the same market. The archdukes donned civilian attire in order to travel "incognito." Museo Storico del Castello di Miramare, Trieste, Italy. Alfredo Dagli Orti / Art Resource, N.Y.

matter of slavery would endanger the stability of the Ottoman Empire, and the fragile European peace that was under constant threat of blowing up over the so-called Eastern Question.³⁵ In the 1860s, the peculiarities of the Mediterranean slave trade were enough to stymie the British. The head of the Slave Trade Department of the Foreign Office, William H. Wylde, noted in 1869, "I would have long since proposed that we should endeavour to negotiate with Turkey a treaty for the suppression of the slave trade, had I not foreseen great difficulties in carrying out to any practical end any engagements we might make with Turkey giving us the right to act *in the*

³⁵ "Some diplomats and officials went so far as to manipulate Islamic beliefs and institutions to delay the imposition and enforcement of abolition, for they were fearful that tampering with servitude would cause rebellions and wars." William Gervase Clarence-Smith, "The British 'Official Mind' and Nineteenth-Century Islamic Debates over the Abolition of Slavery," in Hamilton and Salmon, *Slavery, Diplomacy and Empire*, 125. The Sublime Porte, in contrast, may well have viewed slow progress as its surest form: "Although no policy of abolishing slavery was ever adopted by the Ottoman government, the administrative measures it in fact resorted to ensured that the result would ultimately be to severely curtail slavery in the empire." Toledano, *Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East*, 111.

Mediterranean.”³⁶ And although Habsburg Austria was peripheral to Europe’s engagement with the New World, it was central to Europe’s engagement with the Levant. Since the eighteenth century, Austria had been one of the Ottoman Empire’s most important trading partners—a position it did not begin to cede to Britain until the middle of the nineteenth century.³⁷ As late as the early 1830s, Austria and Russia together accounted for more than 45 percent of foreign trade with the Ottoman Empire, and all of Western Europe together accounted for only 33 percent.³⁸ According to a *New York Times* correspondent, thanks to “a liberally developed system of steam communication in the Adriatic and Levantine Seas,” Austria “almost monopoliz[ed] the trade there.”³⁹ It was therefore no coincidence that Austria was also deeply, if reluctantly, involved in the transportation of slaves from North Africa to Constantinople and the Levant.

In September 1851, the British Foreign Office informed the embassy in Vienna that “Her Majesty’s government have . . . learned with much surprise and regret . . . that it is notorious that slaves are frequently conveyed on the steamers belonging to the Austrian company of Lloyd.”⁴⁰ After investigating the matter, the embassy’s secretary, Arthur Magenis, reported back. “The packets of the Austrian Lloyd’s company,” he concluded, “are in the constant habit of carrying African slaves to Constantinople from Mytilene, to which island as a depot, these slaves are brought from Africa.”⁴¹ Taking up the matter with the Austrian Foreign Ministry again in December 1851, Magenis referred to unnamed sources who had confirmed that the Lloyd had recently transported 255 slaves from Mytilene to Constantinople.⁴²

Sporadic accusations of the Austrian Lloyd’s involvement in the slave trade continued through the 1850s and 1860s—but without the sort of evidence that would have forced the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to acknowledge their merit formally. “It is notorious that the Lloyd trades in slaves”; “The Lloyd is reported to be in the constant habit of transporting slaves”—such complaints could be, and were, rebuffed with a simple “impossible.” Impossible, that is, according to the logic that said that the empire was internally consistent, that its diplomacy, its laws, and its private in-

³⁶ Quoted in Boahen, *Britain, the Sahara, and the Western Sudan*, 157.

³⁷ Austria and France were the first European powers to establish regular steamship service in the Levant. “In 1853 the French consul [in Beirut] reported that the Austrians were more punctual and had 40 ships, many brand new, whereas the French had 18, many old and not working properly.” Charles Issawi, *The Fertile Crescent, 1800–1914: A Documentary Economic History* (Oxford, 1988), 205.

³⁸ Austria accounted for 26.2 percent of Ottoman imports in 1850–1852, compared to 25.5 percent for Britain; and 28 percent of Ottoman exports, compared to 29.1 percent for Britain. Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820–1913: Trade, Investment and Production* (Cambridge, 1987), 26–27, 31, 32. At mid-century, France understood that its task in the Eastern Mediterranean was to cut into the commercial dominance of Austria and Great Britain: “En Méditerranée orientale, le commerce extérieur de la Grande Bretagne et de l’Autriche progresse plus vite que celui de la France.” Marie-Françoise Berneron-Couvenhes, *Les Messageries Maritimes: L’essor d’une grande compagnie de navigation française, 1851–1894* (Paris, 2007), 77.

³⁹ “The Position of Austria,” *New York Times*, December 11, 1870, 4.

⁴⁰ Foreign Office to Magenis, September 18, 1850, HHStA MdA AR Fach 39/2 [hereafter F39/2], Z. 11550/D.

⁴¹ Magenis to Schwarzenberg, September 12, 1851, HHStA MdA AR F39/2, Z. 11065. The Austrian Lloyd was not the only shipping company involved in bringing slaves to and from the transit station of Mytilene, of course. The British vice-consul at Mytilene reported that 283 “negresses and young negroes” were disembarked there between April 15 and June 2, 1855, this time via “Ottoman vessels.” Boahen, *Britain, the Sahara, and the Western Sudan*, 154.

⁴² Magenis to Schwarzenberg, December 7, 1851, HHStA MdA AR F39/2, Z. 14802.

dustry were aligned, that together they could be represented by the word "Austria." If Austrian statesmen agreed that the slave trade was wrong, then Austria would not trade in slaves. No investigation was necessary.

As the complaints about the Lloyd mounted, defenses became more robust, varied, and contradictory. The Austro-Hungarian consul in Constantinople, Conrad von Wassitsch, said in 1869 that accusations of slave-trading—this time, that the Lloyd ship *Oreste* had transported sixty slaves through Smyrna—"can only be the spawn of the sick imagination of some English consular functionary." The phrase "some English consular functionary" was disingenuous, for Wassitsch had a very specific functionary in mind: the British consul in Smyrna, Robert William Cumberbatch. Cumberbatch, born in Kent in 1821, had been serving in the Foreign Service for two decades—many of those years spent in the Ottoman Empire and Russia—first as secretary to his half-brother, Abraham Carlton Cumberbatch, the British consul general in Constantinople, and later as a consul himself. When Cumberbatch was still a young boy of 13, living in England, his father was reimbursed for the emancipation of 232 slaves he had held in the land of his birth, Barbados.⁴³ What impression the abolition of slavery on his father's sugar plantation in the West Indies made upon young Robert can only be imagined. What is certain is that when Cumberbatch began his appointment as consul in Smyrna in April 1864, he brought with him a marked anti-slavery zeal. It escaped no one's attention that the pace of complaints picked up dramatically once he took office. As another Lloyd captain, G. Remedelli (of the steamer *Arciduchessa Carlotta*), testified, "The English consul is well known throughout Smyrna to be a fantastical man, who is constantly dreaming up similar stories."⁴⁴

Cumberbatch's zeal was only slightly less unwelcome to his British supervisors than it was to the Austrian Lloyd. His willingness to believe Sister Charlotte Pilz's claim that as a passenger on board the Lloyd steamer *Vesta* she had seen sixty slaves stowed in the hold ("secreted in the forechains") made him a laughingstock in certain circles: "no one who knows the circumstances of slavery in Turkey would think the transport of slaves in hidden rooms would be necessary," noted the Austrian consul in Constantinople.⁴⁵ Cumberbatch's earlier unproven accusations of slave-trading were, in turn, used to cast doubt on the veracity of later reports.⁴⁶ The British am-

⁴³ "Return of the Honourable John Rycroft Best of Slaves the Property of Abram P Cumberbatch to Whom He Is Attorney: Clelands," PRO T 71/562, Barbados Slave Register 1834, vol. 10, 182–187, Clelands Plantation, St. Andrew, March 27, 1834. Made available to me by Bob Cumberbatch. Bob Cumberbatch maintains a rich and fascinating website (<http://www.Cumberbatch.org/>) about the genealogy of many branches of the Cumberbatch family, and his assistance in reconstructing Robert William Cumberbatch's biography was priceless. The little I have learned about Robert William Cumberbatch forces me to disagree, strenuously, with the website's epigraph: "The following pages contain the little which is known concerning a family of no social importance, and will consequently only be interesting to those connected with it."

⁴⁴ "Del resto e conosciuto a Smirna il Signor Console Inglese per uomo fantastico, che di spesso sogna simile novita, ed il giornale del paese stesso se ne occupato salvotta per combattere simili fantasticherie." Estratto di lettera del Comando del piroscaro Arciduchessa Carlotta diretta in dato Constantinopoli 7 Feb 1871 al Consiglio di Amministrazione, attached to letter from Lloyd to Maritime Administration, Trieste, February 16, 1871, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90.

⁴⁵ "Forechains": Bloomfield to Beust, Vienna, September 20, 1869, attached to Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Maritime Administration, Vienna, September 23, 1869, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90, Z. 2581/HP; "necessary": Wassitsch to Maritime Administration, Constantinople, December 27, 1869, no. 6241, attached to Maritime Administration to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trieste, January 9, 1870, Z. 158/HP.

⁴⁶ "Since earlier charges of a similar nature—all arising from the same source, the English Consul

bassador at Constantinople, Sir Henry Elliot, tended to agree that Cumberbatch was an alarmist and needed to be restrained.⁴⁷ Britain's public stance—the stance from which it hoped to earn “moral capital”—depended upon an always untenable distinction between slave-trading and slaveholding.⁴⁸ The instructions issued to the British Navy in 1866 (two years after Cumberbatch took office and some months after the passage of the 13th Amendment in the United States) recognized “the distinction between the export of slaves to which Great Britain is determined to put an end and the system of Domestic Slavery with which she claims no right to interfere.”⁴⁹ Cumberbatch's energetic complaints threatened to draw too much attention to the limitations of this policy—he, it seems, was opposed not only to the slave trade, but to slavery itself.⁵⁰ He also was convinced that Ottoman law prohibited both—a position that both the Ottoman general of the province in which he was stationed and his colleagues in the British Foreign Service found not only naïve, but wrong.⁵¹ In addition to spying on Austrian ships at harbor in Smyrna, he took into custody slaves who lodged complaints of cruel treatment or illegal enslavement, irritating both the Ottoman governor-general of the surrounding province and the British foreign secretary who ultimately had to deal with the governor-general's ire.

Henry Barron, secretary of the British embassy in Constantinople, cautioned Cumberbatch that Britain must not “allow the impression to gain ground that Her

Cumberbatch in Smyrna—turned out to be unfounded, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs believes it can safely let the matter rest.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Maritime Administration, Vienna, December 30, 1870, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90, Z. 3383. Sister Charlotte Pilz, German by birth, worked as a deaconess with the Lutheran Sisters of Charity in Jerusalem, which ran an orphanage, a diocesan school, an infirmary, and an evangelical hospice. The sisters had adopted an Abyssinian slave girl after purchasing her freedom. William Henry Bartlett, *Jerusalem Revisited* (London, 1863), 62; Jakob Eisler, “Charlotte Pilz (1819–1903),” in Adelheid von Hauff, ed., *Frauen gestalten Diakonie*, vol. 2: *Vom 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 2007), 252–255. According to Florence Nightingale, she spoke “English and Arabic tolerably—not correctly” and was “an educated woman.” Nightingale, *Florence Nightingale's European Travels*, ed. Lynn McDonald (Waterloo, Ont., 2004), 596.

⁴⁷ T. G. Otte, “‘A Course of Unceasing Remonstrance’: British Diplomacy and the Suppression of the Slave Trade in the East, 1852–1898,” in Hamilton and Salmon, *Slavery, Diplomacy and Empire*, 111.

⁴⁸ The reference, of course, is to Brown, *Moral Capital*.

⁴⁹ Quoted in Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade*, 118. The instructions pertained explicitly to “the slavery practiced by Africans” in West Africa, but also aptly described Britain's position vis-à-vis the Sublime Porte. The ambassador in Constantinople, Henry Elliot, was instructed by the Foreign Office in 1873 to endeavor to enter into an agreement with the Porte that would ban “the export and import of slaves,” but added, “we think that however desirable it would be to suppress domestic slavery, it would not be expedient to press the point as an indispensable condition of the agreement.” Foreign Office to Sir H. Elliot, July 11, 1873, no. 8, enciphered telegram and following note, NAFO 84/1370, 13, 14, 15.

⁵⁰ For a more nuanced discussion of the internal dissension regarding the tenability of an anti-slaving policy that did not attack Ottoman slaveholding, see Erdem, *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise*, 74–79.

⁵¹ Elliot wrote to the Foreign Office in August 1870 that he was unable to take action against slavery in the Ottoman Empire because there were no legal grounds to do so: “Sir Philip Francis' statement of the Ottoman Law in respect to slavery, forwarded in another dispatch, sufficiently shows that I should not have been justified in representing the act as illegal; and the practice which has been sanctioned by immemorial usage having nothing in it revolting to Turkish feeling, no remonstrance could have been made against it, unless by taking up a ground which would have been regarded as in the highest degree offensive. With the knowledge that not only the wife of the Grand Vizir had been a Circassian slave, but that ladies in a still more exalted position had belonged to the same class, Your Lordship will understand that I should have been guilty of a gross impropriety if I had gone to Aali Pasha and insisted upon the debasing consequences of an institution, which nobody can think more hateful than I do.” H. Elliot to Earl Granville, Therapia, August 16, 1870, Slave Trade no. 5, NAFO 84/1324, 108–109.

Majesty's Consulates are to become asylums for runaway slaves."⁵² Such an impression would unsettle the monarchy's relations with the Sublime Porte and embarrass local dignitaries and officials, whose slaves were often among those who sought asylum in the first place. Moreover, British officials believed that it could potentially cause political unrest.⁵³ Elliot saw fit to "recall" to Cumberbatch's attention the foreign secretary's orders "prescribing caution" and to restrict his attention to the slave trade.⁵⁴ Indeed, passage of Great Britain's trade-oriented Abolition Act had, from the very beginning, required that abolitionists step back from a ban on slavery as an institution; according to Boyd Hilton, abolitionists had "in many cases only managed to persuade MPs to vote for the abolition of the trade by promising they would leave the wider question alone."⁵⁵

This, then, was the state of affairs in June 1870, when Druscovich and the *Mars* hove to in the harbor of Smyrna: most Western European powers had formally agreed to cooperate to outlaw and prevent the slave trade. In the Ottoman Empire, a January 1857 *firman* had banned the trade in African slaves, but it did not carry the full weight of a law, and it was never enforced; the acting British consul general in Tripoli and the consul general who replaced him called it "a mere fiction" and "a solemn mockery," respectively.⁵⁶ Slavery itself continued without pretense of prohibition. The Austrian Lloyd had rebuffed dozens of accusations of slave-trading by pointing to a complete lack of evidence. Cumberbatch had a reputation for overdeveloped fantasy, and he had been instructed to limit his anti-slavery zeal to reporting on the slave trade, not helping enslaved persons in Smyrna file suit against their erstwhile masters.

The search of the *Mars*, to the dismay of Druscovich, revealed that there were indeed enslaved children on board. This was, as even the Austrian foreign minister had to admit, "a positive case of slave transport"—significant not for the quantity of people involved, but because it could not be denied. The first of the children was an 18-year-old boy, purchased in Egypt on behalf of a pasha in Constantinople who had sent a servant to Egypt to execute the transaction. In Alexandria, the boy had

⁵² H. Barron to F. R. Drummond-Hay, Constantinople, January 11, 1870, reprinted in *British and Foreign State Papers, 1870–1871*, vol. 61 (London, 1877), 415.

⁵³ Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade*, 70. In 1844, Cuban government officials convicted the British consul in Cuba, David Turnbull, of being a "prime mover" behind an alleged conspiracy to incite a slave revolt there—commonly known as *La Escalera*—because of his anti-slavery agitation. See Robert L. Paquette, *Sugar Is Made with Blood: The Conspiracy of La Escalera and the Conflict between Empires over Slavery in Cuba* (Middletown, Conn., 1988).

⁵⁴ H. Elliot to Earl Granville, Therapia, July 17, 1870, reprinted in *British and Foreign State Papers, 1870–1871*, 420.

⁵⁵ Hilton, "1807 and All That," 71.

⁵⁶ In an April 9, 1857, letter to Canning, Clarendon declared that "the regulations which [it contains], if carried out in good faith, are sufficient for the purpose for which they are required." They were not carried out in good faith. Quoted in Boahen, *Britain, the Sahara, and the Western Sudan*; "in good faith," 156; "a mere fiction" (July 1858) and "a solemn mockery" (November 1863), 158. The trade in "white" (i.e., Caucasian—most commonly Circassian, but also Georgian) slaves was banned temporarily during the Crimean War, from about 1854 to 1858. Toledano, *Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East*, 32. Miers notes that even "on the eve of the Berlin conference," that is, in the 1880s, "Turkish cooperation against the trade existed on paper only." Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade*, 86. Elliot complained to the Sublime Porte that "notwithstanding the many clear cases which I have brought under the notice of the Imperial Authorities on no single occasion has the Slave Dealer been dealt with as the law requires." H. Elliot to [illeg.] Pasha, Constantinople, April 14, 1873, Copy no. 51, NAFO 84/1370, 47.

been issued a *tezkere*, the internal passport that Ottoman subjects were required to obtain for domestic travel, in which his civil status was clearly marked as *kul*—one of the many designations for “slave” available in Ottoman Turkish.⁵⁷ The second was a 16-year-old Ethiopian boy, traveling without a companion, who was returning from a “cure” in Egypt. There were two small children, a brother and sister between 8 and 10 years old, traveling with a Greek merchant and his biological offspring. The merchant told the authorities that the African children had been baptized and were being raised as his own. Cumberbatch’s report additionally mentioned three young boys who had been taken violently in a raid in Abyssinia and then transported in a convoy of more than 100 children, first to Medina and then on to Egypt. Cumberbatch took all the children into custody—the youngest pair clinging tearfully to the legs of their adopted siblings until the Greek merchant himself led them to the consulate. Cumberbatch found positions for most of them in Smyrna, but was reported by the Austrian consul to have returned the littlest ones to their self-proclaimed foster father.

The discovery of the enslaved children on board the *Mars* was unwelcome to many. It was unwelcome to the Greek merchant. It was unwelcome to Captain Druscovich, who, although he hid from the shame of the search by steadfastly refusing to leave his cabin until it was complete, could not hide from the shame of the investigation that followed. It was unwelcome to the British Foreign Office, which wished that Cumberbatch had been slightly less zealous in revealing the limitations of the anti-slave trade agreements that Britain had reached with the Sublime Porte. It was unwelcome to the Austrian consul in Smyrna, the Austrian consul general and ambassador in Constantinople, and the Austrian Foreign Ministry in Vienna—all of whom had been proudly denying, despite accusations reaching all the way back to 1850, that any Austrian ship had ever transported any slave across the Mediterranean.

And the disquieting accusations continued to come: the *Jupiter*, the *Arciduchessa Carlotta*, the *Apollo*, the *Vesta*, the *Urano*, the *Diana*, the *Memphis*—within a matter of months, almost every large Lloyd steamer servicing the Alexandria-to-Constantinople route was found to be carrying slaves through Smyrna, some of them repeatedly.

Austrians were tempted to lay all the blame at the feet of Cumberbatch himself. Were his motives perhaps personal? Was he trying to “lame the powerful competition that Lloyd ships give the English merchant marine in the seaports of the Levant,” advancing the fortunes of the British Empire by cynically using the problem of slavery to undermine those with longer histories in the Mediterranean, as the Austrian maritime administration speculated?⁵⁸ Was he putting to use monies made

⁵⁷ For a listing of other words for “slave” in Turkish, Arabic, Persian, and Hebrew, see R. Brunschvig, “‘Abd,” in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed., vol. 1 (Leiden, 1960), 24.

⁵⁸ Maritime Administration to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trieste, February 24, 1871, no. 1155/SB, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90, Z. 433/HP. Other European powers frequently expressed suspicion of Britain’s true motives and fear that its “anti-slavery policy cloaked political and economic ambitions” that were advanced by Britain’s ability to “interfere with the trade of rival commercial and maritime powers by harassing their shipping.” Indeed, “it was often impossible to distinguish between a policy aimed at suppressing the slave traffic and one designed to further British commercial, strategic or political interests.” Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade*, 13, 33. Paul Lovejoy concurs that “at times it proved useful for one European country to condemn another because too little was being done to end the evil institution.” Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery*, 270.

available by “some sort of British philanthropic organization”—funds without which he could not afford to take “these sorts of precautionary measures”?⁵⁹ In either case, the Austrians argued, he was artificially creating the appearance of a crisis. “Mr. Cumberbatch,” complained the Austro-Hungarian consul general in Smyrna, Baron Baum, “appears to have made sleuthing rumored slaves and slave children the particular focus of his official duties here, which may also be the reason why this type of smuggling, which has occurred more or less secretly since time immemorial, would emerge exactly in the past few years, and only in the transit station of Smyrna.”⁶⁰ A strange defense indeed.

No longer was Cumberbatch “fantastical”—no longer could a captain aver, as had Druscovich, that “there can be no slaves on an Austrian ship.” Or could he? In the 1870s, instead of denying the presence of slaves on the ships of the Austrian Lloyd, Austrian consuls, statesmen, and representatives of the company denied the fundamental underlying premise of their enslavement: that it was involuntary. Their argument was woven together from four strands, so tightly bound to one another that they are nearly impossible to disentangle. The first strand was practical: it was not possible to tell a slave from a servant, at least not in the time allotted to the captain of a ship that sailed according to a schedule; they were distinct in neither race nor bearing nor behavior. The second was cultural: “slavery” as practiced in the Ottoman Empire bore no resemblance to the plantation or chattel slavery of the Western Hemisphere, and was generally both humane and mild. The third strand was legal (or at least legalistic): absent the demonstration of any dissatisfaction with their condition or desire to change it, slaves were not really enslaved and thus could not be freed. The fourth was existential: if taken to its logical conclusion, the Lloyd’s refusal of responsibility for the enforcement of the treaties banning the slave trade threatened to undermine the entire premise of diplomacy—that statesmen could enter into binding international agreements, and that private individuals, both citizens and corporations, would then have the responsibility of executing those agreements in practice.

Each of these contentions—we cannot stop the slave trade; it is not important that we stop this particular slave trade; we are not sure that the slaves being traded are really slaves in the true sense of the word; and it may be someone’s job to stop the slave trade, but it is not ours—rested on the basic premise that there were no socially visible markers of enslavement that could set off a chain of actions resulting in emancipation (not to mention repatriation). Captain G. Lombardini, of the *Diana*, insisted that he “could not possibly tell who is a free servant and who is a slave” aboard his ship.⁶¹ The director of the Lloyd further excused the captains’ willful ignorance with this comment: “The circumstances of traffic in the Orient are such that a steamship company that transports passengers is inevitably exposed to the possibility of boarding slaves without the knowledge of the captain or the shipping

⁵⁹ Baron Baum to Prokesch-Osten, Smyrna, July 12, 1870, no. 682/XXIII, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ “Non posso conoscere se sono liberi servi o schiavi.” Protocol of the interview of G. Lombardini by Direttore Navale Sig. A. Cav. Di Tappo, enclosed with letter #797 from Lloyd to Maritime Administration, Trieste, October 17, 1871, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90.

agent.”⁶² The slave trade, he suggested, was as much a necessary incident of the Mediterranean trade as the passage of water through the ballast tanks of boats.

IN CONTRAST TO GREAT BRITAIN, where the debate over slavery was public and spirited, and its political, economic, and cultural ramifications were great—even for those whose own liberty, security, and happiness were not at stake—the public and politicians in Austria indulged in a comfortable conviction that slavery was not particularly relevant to their domestic or foreign policy—except to the extent that their own countrymen and countrywomen were its victims. In the early modern period, Austrians’ experience with slavery had been as slaves, not slaveholders; stories of the enslavement of Christians by Muslims crossing into Austrian territory on slaving raids, as well as of Mediterranean corsairs and pirates, seemed to confirm Central Europeans’ stereotypes of Eastern despotism versus Western freedom.⁶³ To imagine Austrians as perpetrators rather than victims did not come easily, and as far as most Austrians knew, there was no occasion for it. There was no Austrian equivalent of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society.⁶⁴ After all (again, unlike Britain), Austria had neither any tradition of involvement in the Atlantic slave trade nor any tradition of domestic or colonial slavery. Serfdom was more comparable to slavery in some portions of the monarchy than in others.⁶⁵ It, however, had been eliminated

⁶² Lloyd to Maritime Administration, Trieste, July 5, 1870, no. 599, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90.

⁶³ Anton von Prokesch-Osten, the Habsburgs’ ambassador to Constantinople from 1855 to 1871, had, in the first years of his diplomatic career in the 1820s, been involved in the exchange of Greek slaves for Arab slaves, their numbers reaching into the hundreds. “Schlavenlösung in Modon 1828 u. eine Erinnerung aus 1825,” HHStA, Nachlaß Prokesch-Osten, Schachtel II, Briefwechsel mit verschiedenen Personen. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Habsburg subjects had been some of the most common targets of Ottoman slavers; by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the focus had shifted to the Caucasus. The relative predominance of African in comparison with European and Caucasian slaves in the Ottoman Empire peaked in the nineteenth century. Zilfi, *Women and Slavery in the Late Ottoman Empire*, 104. Even in the heyday of Mediterranean piracy and slaving, it was not only Muslims who seized Christians. Robert Davis has called the era from 1500 to 1800 a “three-centuries-long Christian-Muslim *jiḥād*” in which “men and women, Turks and Moors, Jews and Catholics, Protestants and Orthodox: all were potential victims, to be seized and eventually herded into the slave pens of Constantinople, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Malta, Naples, or Livorno and resold as galley oarsmen, agricultural laborers, or house slaves.” Davis, *Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500–1800* (New York, 2003), 140. Catholics—including the Knights of Malta—were among the “most fearsome pirates”; their victims could be Muslims, Jews, or even Orthodox Christians. Molly Greene, *Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants: A Maritime History of the Mediterranean* (Princeton, N.J., 2010), 2–4. On the seizure of Austrians by Muslim slave raiders, see Robert Davis, *Holy War and Human Bondage: Tales of Christian-Muslim Slavery in the Early-Modern Mediterranean* (Santa Barbara, Calif., 2009), 64, 244–246.

⁶⁴ On the Anti-Slavery Society, see Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade*, 30–33. In 1888, Maria Theresia Ledóchowska read a brochure written by the French cardinal Charles Lavigerie, calling on the “Christian women of Europe” to take up their pens and join the fight against slavery in Africa. Ledóchowska immediately wrote a play, *Zaida the Negro Girl*, and devoted her life to the cause. She resigned from her post as a lady-in-waiting, founded the Missionary Sisters of St. Peter Claver, and published a newsletter called *Echo from Africa*. According to Ledóchowska, attempts to found an anti-slavery society in the late 1880s were unsuccessful; fundraising was not sufficient to cover the costs of publishing the short-lived *Antisklaverei Revue*. The first anti-slavery congress in Austria was held in Vienna in 1900. The address given by Ledóchowska on that occasion is available on the website of the Missionsschwester vom hl. Petrus Claver, http://www.petrus-claver.ch/media//DIR_138958/1900_Wien_Die_Antisklaverei-Bewegung.pdf. Paul H. Schmidt, *Die selige Maria Theresia Ledóchowska* (Bern, 1984).

⁶⁵ Contemporary commentators were most apt to compare the lot of peasants in Hungary and Gali-

gradually (and in some cases repeatedly, thanks to the short-lived and swiftly revoked ambitions of Josephinism)—in the “core” Habsburg lands with the 1811 *Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch* (Austrian Civil Code), and everywhere else by 1848.⁶⁶

It would appear that no one knows for certain what the legal status of an enslaved African in the entourage of a traveler visiting the Habsburg lands would have been before 1811.⁶⁷ Indeed, in the eighteenth century, slavery seems to have had no acknowledged formal existence in Austrian law at all.⁶⁸ The Josephinian Code of 1787, the first formal codification of Austrian laws throughout the *Erbländer* (Hereditary Lands), elided the problem of slavery—and even serfdom, which was certainly relevant within the empire—by referring to everyone as “subjects” who were entitled to the protection of “state law” and who “enjoy, without exception, complete freedom.”⁶⁹ In a 1796 draft of a comprehensive legal code outlining citizens’ rights, the

cia, neither of which enjoyed the benefits of reforms imposed on the “Hereditary Lands,” to that of slaves—as, for example, here: “Unfortunately, however, the peasant of Hungary has scarcely any political rights, and is considered by the government much more than by the landlord, in the light of a slave.” Frederick Shoberl, *Austria: Containing a Description of the Manners, Customs, Character and Costumes of the People of That Empire* (Philadelphia, 1828), 52. Historians, too, have seen some merit in the comparison; according to Roman Rozdolski, serfs in “Poland” “could be sold without land, and at least occasionally, were sold, and from the sixteenth century enjoyed no legal protection. Even if the lord struck a serf dead, there was no penalty . . . doubtless there were elements of slavery here.” He further noted that serfs’ state of “unfreedom” was determined as much by the economic structure of their relationship to the landlord as by the presence or absence of legal rights. Roman Rosdolsky [sic], *Untertan und Staat in Galizien: Die Reformen unter Maria Theresia und Joseph II* (Mainz, 1992), 111, 117. His comparison between serfdom and slavery continues from 111 to 121. In the seventeenth century, Bohemian serfs “had to have the lord’s permission to marry, to learn a trade, to sell in the open market, or to travel outside the confines of the lord’s jurisdiction”—permission that could usually be had only in exchange for a fee. In addition, serfs could neither “bring [a] plea before the bar” nor “stand as a witness in a legal action.” All the same, serfs were not slaves: “men were not bought and sold”—nor, one presumes, were women. William E. Wright, *Serf, Seigneur, and Sovereign: Agrarian Reform in Eighteenth-Century Bohemia* (Minneapolis, 1966), 17, 20.

⁶⁶ Joseph’s first patent to emancipate the serfs, the *Leibeigenschaftsaufhebungspatent*, was issued in November of 1781, but fell short of giving “the serf unqualified freedom.” Wright, *Serf, Seigneur, and Sovereign*, 74–75.

⁶⁷ Walter Sauer has done an admirable job of reconstructing as much as possible about the origins of Africans in the Habsburg lands, their pathways to Austria, and their fates while there. Together with Andrea Wiesböck, he presented the beginnings of a prosopography of Africans in Austria in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, based on more than forty known cases. Walter Sauer and Andrea Wiesböck, “Sklaven, Freie, Fremde: Wiener ‘Mohren’ des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts,” in Sauer, ed., *Von Soliman zu Omofuma: Afrikanische Diaspora in Österreich 17. bis 20. Jahrhundert* (Innsbruck, 2007), 23–56. He has also uncovered the stories of several African girls “rescued” from slavery in order to be deposited in convents within Austria, and reports on the unhappy fates of two in Vorarlberg in “‘Mohrenmädchen’ in Bludenz, 1855–1858: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der afrikanischen Diaspora in Österreich,” *Vierteljahresschrift für Geschichte und Gegenwart Vorarlbergs* 56, no. 4 (2004): 293–300.

⁶⁸ When Jakob Haly tried to flee from his Ottoman owner during a visit to Vienna, for example, his case was determined *ad hoc* by the emperor, and revolved more around his willingness to convert to Catholicism than around any set rules about manumission. Sauer and Wiesböck, “Sklaven, Freie, Fremde,” 35. There is no mention of slavery in Carl von Hock’s authoritative *Der österreichische Staatsrath (1760–1848)* (Vienna, 1879), which has sections on the administration and legal reforms under Maria Theresa (91 pages), Leopold II (7 pages), Francis II (41 pages), and Ferdinand (13 pages), but is largely devoted to the administration under Joseph II (529 pages), and most particularly to the legal reforms carried out under his rule. Even Joseph II’s attacks on *Leibeigenschaft*, or serfdom, reveal that he understood it to be a “fundamentally different status than actual ‘slavery.’” Rosdolsky, *Untertan und Staat in Galizien*, 113. The Codex Theresianus (which never took effect) accepted the enslavement of “heathen” prisoners-of-war. Sauer and Wiesböck, “Sklaven, Freie, Fremde,” 47.

⁶⁹ *Josephinisches Gesetzbuch*, 1787, Patent vom 1. November 1786, Zweites Hauptstück §1: “Unter dem Schutze, und nach der Leitung der Landesgesetze geniessen alle Unterthanen ohne Ausnahme die vollkommene Freiheit.” I am indebted to Derek Beales for sharing this observation.

Austrian jurist Joseph von Sonnenfels declared that the “benignant Austrian government thought it worthwhile to declare, through the express provision of a law, that it does not permit humankind to be debased into slavery within its realm.”⁷⁰ This tenet, he insisted, had always existed in practice, although it had admittedly never before been expressed. But the absence of a domestic category of slavery did not prevent Africans from traveling to Austria in the retinues of their employers or owners—their status as free servants or slaves drawing so little curiosity that in the few cases in which the Africans’ own names are known, it is difficult to reconstruct exactly what that status was.⁷¹

The most famous case of an African in Austria in the eighteenth century—so famous that it nearly singlehandedly encapsulates the entire category of literature about Africans in the Habsburg Empire—was that of Angelo Soliman.⁷² (See Figure 2.) Soliman was born sometime around 1721; enslaved as a child, he was eventually acquired by a noble household in Messina, Sicily. He came to Austria after many years of service to the Sicilian imperial governor, Prince Johann Georg von Lobkowitz. After Lobkowitz’s death, he entered service in the household of Prince Joseph Wenzel von Liechtenstein, one of the wealthiest and most influential aristocrats in the Habsburg lands.⁷³ Exactly when Soliman was manumitted is unclear: he entered the Lobkowitz household as a slave and left the Liechtenstein household as a self-declared free man after Liechtenstein dismissed him for being secretly mar-

⁷⁰ As quoted in Sigmund Adler, *Die politische Gesetzgebung in ihren geschichtlichen Beziehungen zum allgemeinen bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche* (Vienna, 1911), 122. This part of Sonnenfels’s proposal was incorporated into the 1811 code.

⁷¹ By the seventeenth century, it was “fashionable” among the Viennese aristocracy (and the aristocracy throughout the Holy Roman Empire) to employ “Moors” and other Africans. The deaths of thirty-two “Africans” were reported to the Viennese magistrate between 1649 and 1798. Walter Sauer, *Das afrikanische Wien: Ein Führer zu Bieber, Malangatana, Soliman* (Vienna, 1996), 33–34. In the early modern period, Central Europeans were more accustomed to thinking of slavery in the Islamic context as involving the enslavement of Christians by Muslims. Paula Sutter Fichtner, *Terror and Toleration: The Habsburg Empire Confronts Islam, 1526–1850* (London, 2008), 42. To contrast the situation in Austria with that in pre-revolutionary France, see Sue Peabody, “There Are No Slaves in France”: *The Political Culture of Race and Slavery in the Ancien Régime* (Oxford, 1996).

⁷² The literature on Soliman is so substantial that the author of a recently published and absolutely fascinating article on the significance of his attire felt the need to justify her intervention: “there has been no sustained focus on his sartorial fashions.” Heather Morrison, “Dressing Angelo Soliman,” *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 44, no. 3 (2011): 378 n. 8. That literature reaches back to a biography compiled by Viennese author Karoline Pichler at the request of the French abolitionist Henri Grégoire in 1807. Wilhelm Bauer consulted twenty archives in his 1922 biography of Soliman, republished as *Angelo Soliman, der hochfürstliche Mohr: Ein exotisches Kapitel Alt-Wien*, ed. Monika Firla-Forkl (Berlin, 1993), 15. More recent literature on Soliman, which reflects his extraordinary prominence in Austrian-African studies, includes Monika Firla, “Angelo Soliman in der Wiener Gesellschaft vom 18. bis 20. Jahrhundert,” in Gerhard Höpp, ed., *Fremde Erfahrungen: Asiaten und Afrikaner in Deutschland, Österreich, und in der Schweiz bis 1945* (Berlin, 1996), 69–96; Monika Firla and Hermann Forkl, “Neue Details zur Biographie von Angelo Soliman (um 1721–1796),” *Etudes germano-africaines* 14 (1996): 119–136; Firla, “Bemerkungen zu zwei kontroversen Punkten in der Biographie Angelo Solimans (um 1721–1796),” *Aufklärung, Vormärz, Revolution: Mitteilungen der internationalen Forschungsgruppe “Demokratische Bewegungen in Mitteleuropa 1770–1850” an der Universität Innsbruck* 18–19 (1998–1999): 25–39; Walter Sauer, “Angelo Soliman: Mythos und Wirklichkeit,” in Sauer, *Von Soliman zu Omofuma*, 59–96. The Rollett Museum Baden had a special exhibit on Soliman featuring a plaster bust made immediately after his death: Monika Firla, ed., *Angelo Soliman: Ein Wiener Afrikaner im 18. Jahrhundert* (Baden, 2004). Sauer, *Von Soliman zu Omofuma*, contains many essays on other aspects of Africans’ experience of life in Austria. From September 2011 to January 2012, the Wien Museum in Vienna displayed an exhibit on Soliman, “Angelo Soliman: Ein Afrikaner in Wien.”

⁷³ Liechtenstein’s vast properties placed one million subjects under his princely rule. Sauer, “Angelo Soliman,” 66.



FIGURE 2: Angelo Soliman (ca. 1720–1796). Mezzotint by Johann Gottfried Haid, after a painting by Johann Nepomuk Steiner. Soliman was the most famous African to live in Vienna in the eighteenth century. He was respected as a scholar and tutor in his lifetime, but his body's galling posthumous fate as part of a museum display has overshadowed his success in securing a life of relative independence and professional success in imperial Vienna. Oesterreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, Austria. Erich Lessing / Art Resource, N.Y.

ried.⁷⁴ Soliman then supported himself and his family by working as a paid tutor in aristocratic households. He was a freemason, a dandy, a successful gambler, and an admired intellectual who spoke German, Italian, French, Czech, English, and Latin. After his death, his skin was removed, stretched over a wooden frame, fancifully dressed (in ostrich feathers), and displayed as a component of an imperial museum exhibit—a disgraceful move that disregarded his daughter's wishes and has overshadowed the respect he was shown during his lifetime as a desirable tutor who was familiar with the latest scientific discoveries.

Perhaps even more heartrending is the case of the Brazilian-born Emmanuel Rio, who was sent by the Archduchess Leopoldine as a present to her brother, the Archduke Francis, sometime around 1820. In an 1836 portrait, Rio is depicted with all the sensitivity due an individual subject; his devoted gaze at a portrait of Francis I, the imperial hymn on his lap, and the silk stockings tucked into his boots all are signs of the well-respected and grateful imperial subject. (See Figure 3.) His theoretical freedom notwithstanding, he was never able to make decisions about his own fate and was always dependent on the imperial family that came to shun him when he “acted up” in his adulthood.⁷⁵ The core elements of Angelo Soliman's and Emmanuel Rio's lives are typical of those few Africans who did come to the Habsburg lands in the eighteenth century: “capture, slavery, court service with unclear personal legal status [*in unklarer personenrechtlicher Position*].”⁷⁶ As Austria entered the nineteenth century, “unclear personal legal status” appeared to be good enough.⁷⁷

If there was any place where the personal legal status of Africans was less clear than in Vienna, it was on board the passenger ships of the Mediterranean, where the supposed isomorphism of race and slavery on the Caribbean plantation had no equivalent. One of the striking characteristics of Ottoman slavery was the comparative absence of racial markers. The expectation of relatively rapid manumission (preferably—although not necessarily—after no more than a decade, which is to say, “rapid” from the perspective of the slaveholder), the predominance of sexually vulnerable women among the enslaved, and the law that made any child born to a free slaveholder and his concubine also free meant that there was no necessary connection between skin color and status.⁷⁸ The wives and mothers of grand viziers

⁷⁴ At the time of his marriage, Soliman had to swear that he was not a slave—but that marriage was kept secret from his current employer. Sauer describes the historiographical controversy over Soliman's status *ibid.*, 67–68.

⁷⁵ Ina Markova and Walter Sauer have shared the results of their painstaking search for all available evidence about the life of Emmanuel Rio in “Waldhornblasender Gärtner: Ein schwarzer Brasilianer im vormärzlichen Österreich. Oder: Vom Wilden zum Weltbürger und wieder zurück?” *Wiener Geschichtsblätter* 66, no. 2 (2011): 95–110. For a closer analysis of the portrait, see Gloria Groom, “Portrait of a Gardener and Horn Player in the Household of the Emperor Francis I,” *Art Institute of Chicago Museum Studies* 32, no. 1 (2006): 58–59, 95.

⁷⁶ Sauer, *Das afrikanische Wien*, 37.

⁷⁷ To be fair, Austria was not alone. “The law takes no notice of the Negro [slave],” claimed an English judge in 1706. Even in France, where the “freedom principle” was supposed to render any slave who set foot on French soil instantly free, multiple restrictions and caveats made it impossible for slaves to actually secure freedom by entering France. Peabody, “*There Are No Slaves In France*,” 3–10; Ada Ferrer, “Haiti, Free Soil, and Antislavery in the Revolutionary Atlantic,” *American Historical Review* 117, no. 1 (February 2012): 48.

⁷⁸ Manumission was considered a good deed, and there is evidence that many slaveholders voluntarily set their slaves free after a period of service. Slaveholders could manumit slaves in pious celebration of a special event, such as a marriage; to acknowledge the slave's work done over a period of



FIGURE 3: Albert Schindler (1805–1861), *Ein Mohr / Waldhornbläser / Gärtner in Laxenburg bei Sr. Maj. / dem Kaiser Franz I. / gemalt von Natur* (Portrait of a Gardener and Horn Player in the Household of the Emperor Francis I, 1836). Emmanuel Rio's origins as a slave determined his complete dependence on the support of the imperial family throughout his life. Art Institute of Chicago.

and sultans were often Circassian slaves—the Circassian beauties of nineteenth-century lore—“rescued,” as the official story went, from lives of penury in the Caucasus.⁷⁹ The trade in Circassian women introduced thousands of enslaved Cau-

time; in honor of a special contract between the slave and the slaveholder agreeing to manumission after its terms were met; or in their wills. Slaveholders were not, however, required to manumit their slaves at all. John Hunwick, “Black Slaves in the Mediterranean World: Introduction to a Neglected Aspect of the African Diaspora,” in Elizabeth Savage, ed., *The Human Commodity: Perspectives on the Trans-Saharan Slave Trade* (London, 1992), 24.

⁷⁹ Elliot claimed that Circassian slaves “have long been obtained almost entirely from needy families who look upon the admission of these children into a Turkish House as an effectual way of bettering their condition, and as a step on a road which might lead them to the highest honours at which a Turkish woman can hope to arrive. These children, instead of falling, rose in the social scale receiving an education and a treatment far above what they could otherwise have obtained.” H. Elliot to Earl Granville re: “Arrival of Circassian Slaves at Smyrna,” *Slave Trade* no. 4, Constantinople, March 8, 1873, 29–30, NAFO 84/1370. A columnist for the *New York Times* commented on the relationships between the

casians into the Ottoman Empire. Dark skin was no more a guarantee of enslavement than light skin was of freedom. Indeed, the rare but prominent cases in which slaves reached positions of power, including grand vizier, also meant that there was no necessary connection between enslavement and status—a point often made by the defenders of Ottoman slavery.

The British themselves were confounded by the intricacies of Ottoman slavery; the rights they had secured, in treaty after treaty, to search Atlantic ships were considered to be without value or effect in the Mediterranean. The head of the Slave Trade Department of the Foreign Office in 1869, William H. Wylde, recommended against pursuing a treaty with the Ottomans that would allow British vessels the right to search Ottoman vessels in the Mediterranean—a measure that had been repeatedly considered (and rejected) since at least the 1850s. His argument was that “the steamers that carry slaves carry also passengers of all denominations, pilgrims of all shades of colour, free blacks who are domestic servants of some of the passengers, and free blacks travelling on their own account. How could the Commander of a cruiser discriminate between the slaves and the free blacks, when, as I hear is the case, the former are dressed up the same as their free countrymen?”⁸⁰ But despite its own admitted confusion, the British Foreign Office expected Austrian captains and shipping agents to do just what it knew to be most difficult: discriminate.

Lloyd captains pointed out that in the absence of outward signs of enslavement, determining someone’s status would necessarily involve some form of questioning. Not even the biographical information on a traveler’s *tezkere* was useful, for it was written in Turkish or Arabic, languages that Lloyd captains did not understand. Interviewing passengers, however, was dismissed as an impossibility. In sworn testimony given in Smyrna, Giovanni Felice Benich (captain of the *Urano* and accused of transporting eight slaves in July 1871) said, “it is materially and morally impossible for me to examine them—first because I do not know the Arabic or Turkish language, and second because I cannot speak with them without risking a revolution on board of their coreligionists, since the Turkish religion does not permit speaking with women.”⁸¹ The Lloyd executive committee warned that “unbidden intrusions into relations of a very delicate nature would be extremely careless and not seldom bound up with terrible and sad consequences.”⁸² The presumption was that Ottoman society demanded that a traveler—by implication male—and his entourage (containing an unknown and, the captain argued, unknowable combination of wives, concubines, servants, and legally owned slaves) be encased in a veil of privacy that no agent of a shipping company could lift without losing first that customer and then all of his

foreign minister, Fuad Pasha, the grand vizier, Aali Pasha, and their respective wives as follows: “they are the most exemplary and dutiful husbands; and . . . the beauty and charms of character of their wives, though at least one of them was bought for so many pieces of silver, originally, as a slave, are such as to insure them for a long time their affections.” “The Levant,” *New York Times* September 23, 1852, 2.

⁸⁰ Wylde’s note was written in response to a letter from Elliot to Clarendon, July 20, 1869, and is reproduced here as quoted in Boahen, *Britain, the Sahara, and the Western Sudan*, 157.

⁸¹ Protocollo assunto nella Cancelleria dell’i.R. Consolato G[enera]le d’Austria-Ungheria in Smirne li 29 Luglio 1871, transcript attached to [illeg.] to Beust, Constantinople, August 1, 1871, no. 27 AB/HP, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90.

⁸² Lloyd to Maritime Administration, Trieste, July 5, 1870, no. 599, attached to Lloyd to Maritime Administration, Trieste, February 16, 1871, attached to Maritime Administration to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trieste, February 24, 1871, no. 1155, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90, Z. 433/HP.

countrymen and coreligionists. The untenable distinction between slave-trading and slaveholding was supported here by the invocation of social distance, sexual exoticism, and cultural inscrutability.

Cumberbatch rejected the premise that slaves could not be identified on sight. "If the supercargo on board the Austrian Lloyd's steamer, or at least the agents at Alexandria, cannot perceive that they have frequently carried slaves on board their vessels, . . . their eyesight must be remarkably obscure." He went on to describe the obvious markers that the Austrian consuls and agents were willfully ignoring. "If," he wrote to the British foreign secretary, the Earl of Clarendon, "the Austrian Consular officers at Constantinople and Smyrna call African children dressed in the white flowing Nubian dress, with metal bracelets and anklets, accompanied by slave-dealers, 'servants,' or 'members of Oriental families,' they cannot declare them to be free agents: therefore, they are slaves in my estimation."⁸³ Cumberbatch insisted here on the legibility of visual evidence: the distinctive clothing and jewelry of the children marked them as Nubian, and therefore as not-yet-Ottoman. Even more remarkably, he compressed the full spectrum of bonded, hierarchical, and coercive social relations—including those between husband and wife and between father and child—into slavery. For Cumberbatch, it seems, there was no unfreedom that was not rightly called slavery.

The power of visual evidence was called upon to opposite effect by the minister of foreign affairs in Vienna. Where Cumberbatch saw slavery in every social relation, the foreign minister deduced slavery from a narrow range of telltale signs: bruises, cuts, and chains. This did not immediately let the Lloyd off the hook; in reference to the three slave boys who had reported their violent capture in Abyssinia, the minister angrily wrote: "We can hardly accept that these slave boys, on whom the traces of violence are surely to be found, were not recognizable as such at their embarkation in Alexandria, and the captain of the *Mars* is thus at the very least guilty of neglect."⁸⁴ But the emphasis on "traces of violence" as proof of enslavement did offer the Lloyd the chance to make the usual excuses: the ship's doctor had seen no signs of violence, and besides, there were 600 passengers on board, with no time for detailed inspections of their persons.

The larger question was not whether a child violently seized in a raid could be recognized as a slave, or even whether a child kept in a slave pen in North Africa for weeks, fed and tended until the signs of deprivation had been hidden in order to make a more profitable sale, could be recognized as a slave—but rather the character of Ottoman slavery and the extent of Austrian responsibility for helping it function. What, for instance, should be made of the 16-year-old Ethiopian returning to Constantinople, unaccompanied by a slaveholder or dealer, after his owner had sent him to Egypt for a cure? This was a case where the epistemology of European liberalism was incapable of imagining forms of violence and coercion that went beyond the physical, and therefore proclaimed the absence of coercion as fact. The Austro-Hungarian consul general in Constantinople thought he knew something

⁸³ Cumberbatch to the Earl of Clarendon, Smyrna, February 28, 1870 (received March 14, 1870), reprinted in *British and Foreign State Papers, 1870–1871*, 446.

⁸⁴ Draft of outgoing note from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Maritime Administration, Vienna, June 28, 1870, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90, Z. 2150/HP.

about Ottoman slavery that made the boy's return sensible. "That which Europeans understand under the term 'slavery' does not exist here," he explained. "While the mass of free people starves, the slave wallows in luxurious excess in his master's palace . . . The Circassian and the Nubian consider it a great fortune to be brought into a Constantinople harem even as unfree servants, and follow the agent who brings them here with pleasure."⁸⁵ Cumberbatch's accusations, the Lloyd insisted, revealed "a complete ignorance of those social relations peculiar to the Orient."⁸⁶ The arguments made by the Austrian Lloyd and reiterated by Austro-Hungarian consuls and high-ranking diplomats rested on the presumption that they understood something about the nature of Ottoman slavery that Cumberbatch and other interventionist British consuls in the Ottoman Empire did not: something, they asserted, that placed Ottoman slavery, slavery though it was, outside the general European consensus regarding anti-slavery.⁸⁷ This vision of Ottoman slavery fully conformed to the public image of that institution promoted by the Ottomans themselves.

There is some truth to the argument that, in the nineteenth century, slavery in the Ottoman Empire was unlike slavery in the Western Hemisphere. First, it was heavily female—the vast majority of enslaved Africans (and for that matter Circassians) brought to the Ottoman Empire were girls.⁸⁸ Second, with very few exceptions, slave labor was domestic, not agricultural.⁸⁹ Third, in the Muslim world—

⁸⁵ Wassitsch to Maritime Administration, Constantinople, December 27, 1869, no. 6241, attached to Maritime Administration to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trieste, January 9, 1870, no. 8/I, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90, Z. 158/HP. This argument was neither unusual nor novel. Ogier de Busbecq, who was the Holy Roman emperor's emissary in Constantinople from 1554 to 1562, noted (as summarized by Paula Fichtner) that freedom "meant little to people who did not have the means to enjoy it. All human beings, he said, required some authority over them." Fichtner, *Terror and Toleration*, 79; Suzanne L. Marchand, *German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship* (Cambridge, 2009), 9. Similarly, neither the notion of hierarchy nor the idea of lives of more toil than pleasure was fundamentally offensive to the nineteenth-century sensibility. Wilberforce and the other advocates of abolition in the British Parliament believed that "life was a place of moral trial, a moral obstacle course standing between each soul and heaven, and slaves were no more born to be happy than anyone else." Hilton, "1807 and All That," 75.

⁸⁶ Verwaltungsrath der Dampfschiffahrt-Gesellschaft des oesterreichischen Lloyd to Maritime Administration, no. 109, Trieste, February 4, 1872, attached to Maritime Administration to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 1285/F48/V, re: Verwaltungsrath des oesterr. Lloyd über den angeblichen Sklaven-transport am Dampfer "Apollo," Trieste, February 10, 1872, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90.

⁸⁷ Habsburg diplomats could proudly point to a long tradition of study of what they called the Orient. The Imperial Royal Academy of Oriental Languages, or Oriental Academy, was founded in 1754 and trained not only translators and interpreters but also "candidates for the higher grades of the consular and diplomatic corps" in order to prepare them to serve "the political and commercial agenda of the state." Their thorough training in Ottoman language, literature, history, custom, and constitutional law included copying out Turkish sayings such as "He who does not know how to serve does not know how to rule." Thanks to the Oriental Academy, "at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Austria . . . had a clear advantage over its rivals Prussia and Russia in dealing with the Porte." Fichtner, *Terror and Toleration*, 122, 126, 127, 129.

⁸⁸ By the early nineteenth century, "the overwhelming majority of Ottoman slaves were female, African, and domestic; males, white females, and *kul/harem* slaves were only a small minority." Toledano, *Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East*, 6–7, 12. "It must be said that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the slave of the Ottoman slave owner was a woman and that slavery itself was increasingly female." Zilfi, *Women and Slavery in the Late Ottoman Empire*, 215. See also Claire C. Robertson and Martin A. Klein, eds., *Women and Slavery in Africa* (Madison, Wis., 1983), 5.

⁸⁹ There was not always a clear distinction between "domestic," "agricultural," and "artisanal" labor. Erdem, *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise*, 62–64; Michel Fontenay, "Pour une géographie de l'esclavage méditerranéen aux temps modernes," *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* 65 (2002), <http://cdlm.revues.org/index42.html>. For a discussion of the wide array of "productive tasks" concealed by the "misleading" phrase "domestic slavery," see Clarence-Smith, *Islam and the Abolition of Slavery*, 3–4. "We

and in the Ottoman Empire specifically—slavery was conceived of as a temporary condition, and one that, though it emerged from capture and sale, was predicated upon the condition of unbelief, not that of race.⁹⁰ Manumission was lauded as a good work; the children of any sexual union between an enslaved woman and her free owner were free at birth, and their mother was to be freed immediately upon the death of her owner.⁹¹

Scholars of Ottoman slavery must tread very carefully. To judge Ottoman slavery to be milder than Western plantation slavery risks appearing apologetic. After all, in the Islamic world, a slave “could be sold, given away or inherited, and his services could be pledged or hired out—all without his consent.”⁹² In the case of female slaves, temporary sale and resale could lead to a form of enslaved prostitution.⁹³ While only non-Muslims could be enslaved, a slave’s conversion to Islam did not result in manumission—a convenient elision of the prohibition on slavery within *Dar-al-Islam* (the House of Islam).⁹⁴ Enslaved men and women could not own property, nor could they inherit it; their evidence was considered unreliable and generally unacceptable in a court of law. Slaves were not allowed to marry without their owners’ permission; if they were the victims of crime, their lives were considered less valuable than those of their free counterparts.⁹⁵

To judge slavery in the Islamic world harshly, on the other hand, can fit all too easily into orientalist tropes of Eastern barbarity lasting long beyond Western hu-

also know that the human toll of slavery, both physical and cultural, was intimately tied to the exigencies of production, notably the work regimen.” Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston, 1995), 18. Circassian refugees to the Ottoman Empire did bring their own agricultural slaves with them when they fled the Russian Empire in the 1850s and 1860s. Toledano, *Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East*, 12, 82–84.

⁹⁰ John Hunwick, “Islamic Law and Polemics over Race and Slavery in North and West Africa (16th–19th Century),” in Shaun Marmon, ed., *Slavery in the Islamic Middle East* (Princeton, N.J., 1999), 43; Bernard Lewis, *Race and Slavery in the Middle East: An Historical Enquiry* (New York, 1990), 5–8. For a discussion of the interpretations offered by British “men on the spot” of the compatibility of Islam and slavery, see Clarence-Smith, “The British ‘Official Mind’ and Nineteenth-Century Islamic Debates over the Abolition of Slavery,” 125–142.

⁹¹ A concubine who bore her master a child (even a stillborn child) attained the status of *ümm-i veled*, or mother of a child. An *ümm-i veled* “could not be sold or otherwise alienated from her master’s household, and she became free upon his death. If her master wished to marry her, he had first to manumit her. An *ümm-i veled*’s children were free and enjoyed equal legal and social status with the children of their father’s free wife.” Leslie P. Pierce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (New York, 1993), 30–31. On the many ways in which an *ümm-i veled*’s status remained vulnerable, see Zilfi, *Women and Slavery in the Late Ottoman Empire*, 109–113.

⁹² Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade*, 59.

⁹³ “The prostitution of female slaves by dealers and casual buyers was endemic in port cities all over the Mediterranean.” Zilfi, *Women and Slavery in the Late Ottoman Empire*; 199; Hunwick, “Black Slaves in the Mediterranean World,” 12–13. A Koma woman named Fadl al Saq (presumably a concubine) was sold no fewer than five times during one three-day period in 1877, for the price of 53, 66, 72, 70, and 74 *riyals*, respectively, leading Jay Spaulding to conclude, “it is difficult to believe that she would have accepted the proposition that ‘a slave in the Sudan was above all a human being, a member of a society or a family.’” Spaulding, “Slavery, Land Tenure and Social Class in the Northern Turkish Sudan,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 15, no. 1 (1982): 13. Spaulding’s internal quotation comes from Abbas Ibrahim Muhammad Ali, *The British, the Slave Trade and Slavery in the Sudan, 1820–1881* (Khartoum, 1972), 75.

⁹⁴ Hunwick, “Islamic Law and Polemics over Race and Slavery in North and West Africa,” 52; Lewis, *Race and Slavery in the Middle East*, 6–8.

⁹⁵ Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade*, 59.

manitarian abolitionism.⁹⁶ Avoiding either of these extremes, several decades of scholarship on slavery in Africa and the Ottoman Empire has shown that domestic labor and “wallowing in luxury” were not the same; that manumission was more frequently extolled than practiced; that mothers of free children were vulnerable to having their status challenged by the heirs to their owners’ estates; that the lives of most women in Constantinople harems were characterized more by the brutal hierarchy of their gendered space than by the putative privileges that came with the status of concubine.⁹⁷ And of course, as William Gervase Clarence-Smith has put it, the fortunes of even the luckiest of slaves “remained vulnerable to the whims of the free.”⁹⁸

Cumberbatch got in trouble with his superiors in part because he repeatedly took under his protection slaves in Smyrna who came to him complaining of ill-treatment. Juma fled to Cumberbatch to get away from his owner, a slave trader who had tried to murder him when he was unable to sell him after a month. Mehmet was shot through the leg when he tried to escape having his ears cut off by his owner. Hadji Mehmet served as a slave from about the age of 9 to the age of 16 and then was duly manumitted. Although he was married, as a free man, in Alexandria, he was pursued so relentlessly there by slave traders intent on re-enslaving him that he fled to the British consulate in Smyrna looking for protection.⁹⁹ Slaves in North Africa jumped over the walls of consulate compounds in an effort to reach the protection of British consuls there, who responded by having their walls built higher.¹⁰⁰ The depredations

⁹⁶ Ehud Toledano critically summarized what was then the latest scholarship on slavery in the Islamic world in the final chapter of *Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East* (135–154) and raised the issue of the “good treatment debate” again in “Bringing the Slaves Back In” (12–24). William Gervase Clarence-Smith, with characteristic brevity, noted: “intellectual paralysis springs from a contradictory desire to condemn slavery and spare Islam.” Clarence-Smith, *Islam and the Abolition of Slavery*, 1. Hakan Erdem notes that “the result of these two conflicting sets of ideas can often be paralyzing, leading to a ‘neutral’ stance which is not conducive to the study of slavery.” Erdem, *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise*, xvii. Chouki El Hamel addresses the silence regarding the fact that “Islamic countries generally harboured a benign attitude towards slavery” in “‘Race,’ Slavery and Islam in Maghribi Mediterranean Thought: The Question of the *Haratin* in Morocco,” *Journal of North African Studies* 7, no. 3 (2002): 30. John Hunwick mentions a 1983 debate between Sudanese scholar Yusuf Fadl Hasan, who said “slavery is slavery and cannot be beautified by cosmetics” in an effort to provoke “a courageous and objective” discussion of Afro-Arab relations, and the Algerian scholar who retorted that one must emphasize “the Arabs’ humane and familial treatment of their slaves compared with other slave-owning people.” Hunwick, “The Same but Different: Africans in Slavery in the Mediterranean Muslim World,” in John Hunwick and Eve Troutt Powell, *The African Diaspora in the Mediterranean Lands of Islam* (Princeton, N.J., 2002), x. T. G. Otte complains of “genuflection before current Western intellectual fads” as inhibiting spirited inquiry into the topic. Otte, “‘A Course of Unceasing Remonstrance,’” 93. Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff acknowledge a “squeamishness” that affects Western scholarship. Miers and Kopytoff, eds., *Slavery in Africa: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives* (Madison, Wis., 1977), 6.

⁹⁷ On gendered hierarchies of the harem, see Pierce, *The Imperial Harem*, ix, 6–7, 141. On the precarious claim to the rights of the *ümm-i veled*, see Zilfi, *Women and Slavery in the Late Ottoman Empire*, 109–113.

⁹⁸ Clarence-Smith, *Islam and the Abolition of Slavery*, 6.

⁹⁹ Cumberbatch to the Earl of Clarendon, Smyrna, August 28, 1869, reprinted in *British and Foreign State Papers, 1869–1870*, vol. 60 (London, 1876), 741.

¹⁰⁰ A Manumission Bureau was established in Cairo as a result of the Anglo-Egyptian Anti-Slave Trade Convention of 1877, with the task of issuing manumission papers to escaped slaves and helping them secure “gainful employment”—a plan that provided a “gradualist” alternative to an “outright ban on slavery,” which Lord Cromer believed would not be tolerated by Muslim society. Roger Owen, *Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul* (Oxford, 2004), 256. See also Erdem, *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise*, 92, 171.

of slavery, moreover, were not limited to those who had been personally enslaved. In the Ottoman Empire—where, thanks to high manumission rates, relatively few children were born into slavery—slavery was impossible to maintain without a constant supply of newly enslaved young people. Every African-born slave, however comfortably housed in Constantinople, Smyrna, or Beirut, left behind a mother, a father, siblings, and friends in Africa; every slave who survived the march across the Sahara witnessed many more die along the way.¹⁰¹

According to the terms of §95 of the 1852 penal code, captains of Austrian ships on the Mediterranean were obliged to provide slaves asylum, not to parse complicated questions about the differences among various forms of bondage and the orientalist hegemony of Anglo-Atlantic analytical categories.¹⁰² The automatic provision of asylum was, after all, the very argument that had inspired Druscovich's initial defense—not that he could not tell whether there were slaves on an Austrian ship, but that there could not be any. According to Austrian law and Austro-Hungarian policy, any passenger who approached the captain of an Austrian ship and reported himself or herself to be held in a condition of enslavement was to be immediately escorted to the nearest port and turned over to the Austro-Hungarian consulate. The consul would see that the passenger was freed, and would find him or her suitable employment in the vicinity. The director of the Lloyd used the argument that slaves asked for a captain's protection, in his words, "not infrequently," to demonstrate the captains' willingness to act whenever action was called for.¹⁰³ But according to the Austro-Hungarian consul in Constantinople, "it has not yet occurred that one of the passengers declared to be a serving girl or boy has turned to the captain in order to reclaim his freedom"—an argument the consul general used to suggest, in his words, that "the slaves have no taste for freedom."¹⁰⁴

Now Druscovich's claim that "there can be no slaves on an Austrian ship" appears in a different light. It was not a position of plain ignorance, it was a legalistic position that based its claim on an assertion of the implied consent of each and every pas-

¹⁰¹ The survival rate of slaves who were forced to march from the Sudanic belt to Cyrenaica has been estimated at one in three. There is a substantial literature on the "trail of desolation and death" that the slave trade left behind in Africa. See, in particular, Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade*, 61; Manning, *Slavery and African Life*; and Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London, 1972). This same outrage was apparent to, and bemoaned by, William Pitt in his now-famous speech of April 2, 1792, before the House of Commons: "Do you think nothing of the ruin and the miseries in which so many other individuals, still remaining in Africa, are involved in consequence of carrying off so many myriads of people? Do you think nothing of their families which are left behind? Of the connections which are broken? Of the friendships, attachments and relationships that are burst asunder? Do you think nothing of the miseries in consequence, that are felt from generation to generation? . . . What do you yet know of the internal state of Africa?" *The Speech of the Right Hon. William Pitt, in the House of Commons, on the 2d of April, 1792, on the Subject of the African Slave Trade* (Newcastle, 1824), 22–23.

¹⁰² For a field-defining analysis of those German speakers who did try to create a scholarly understanding of the Ottoman Empire, see Marchand, *German Orientalism in the Age of Empire*.

¹⁰³ Lloyd to Maritime Administration, Trieste, July 5, 1870, no. 599, attached to Lloyd to Maritime Administration, Trieste, February 16, 1871, attached to Maritime Administration to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trieste, February 24, 1871, no. 1155, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90, Z. 433/HP.

¹⁰⁴ Wassitsch to Maritime Administration, Constantinople, December 27, 1869, no. 6241, attached to Maritime Administration to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trieste, January 9, 1870, Trieste, no. 8/I, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90, Z. 158/HP. Compare this to the problem of slavery within Africa: "it is assumed that all slaves must be unhappy, since their autonomy is so severely restricted. If they do not appear unhappy, then their autonomy is either not so limited or for some reason they do not feel that it is." Miers and Kopytoff, *Slavery in Africa*, 5.

senger who did not complain. “The ships’ captains,” the consul general further explained, “see their passengers in whatever light they themselves wish to be seen.” If they wished to give the appearance that they were traveling as servants, not slaves, then so be it. In its defense of Captain G. Giurovich, who was accused of transporting slaves on board the *Apollo*, the Lloyd administration insisted that without a spontaneous declaration on the part of the slave, the captain was “neither obligated nor entitled to substitute his own initiative for that of those whose interests are most immediately at stake in order to investigate the personal circumstances of the passengers. Such an inquisitorial course of action would have dreadful consequences for the Lloyd.”¹⁰⁵ In effect, the Lloyd argued that the unbidden termination of slavery on board its ships would constitute its own form of enslavement—that is, the forced substitution of one person’s initiative for another’s. Such a position would make abolition as a humanitarian act impossible: the slave would have to bear responsibility for liberating herself—she would have to exert her own force of will in order to demand action on the part of the captain. Beneath her slavery, she would have to know that she was free.

That this argument was self-serving is self-evident. But its flaws were nevertheless pointed out by the same Austrian officials who would have preferred to argue that Austria was, ultimately, blameless. When asked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to compare Austria’s anti-slavery legislation to that of other powers, and to ascertain whether Austrian ships were particularly prone to accommodating slave traders because of loopholes in the legal system, Anton von Prokesch-Osten, the ambassador in Constantinople, determined that the laws themselves were sound. “Our laws,” he reported, “leave little to be desired. The communication of the law, however, cannot be judged favorably. Those slaves who set foot on board an Austrian ship under the designation of children, relatives, or servants of the slave driver, only seldom realize that their master no longer has the slightest power over them. It occurs to no one,” he continued, “to educate the children of the desert about their rights.”¹⁰⁶ Prokesch reiterated Druscovich’s emphasis on what both believed to be the real-life relevance of the law: the slaves were not slaves, because the law had freed them. Their masters no longer had the slightest power over them. Their passage from terrestrial slavery to maritime freedom back to terrestrial slavery might have been invisible to the slaves, and immaterial to the prospects that anything would actually be done about the Mediterranean slave trade, but it was essential to the maintenance of the enabling fiction that Austrian law was sovereign on Austrian ships.

Prokesch, unlike Druscovich, seemed to understand the paradoxical aspect of unknown rights, and his solution was literally to paper it over: to mount a tablet with the respective portions of Austrian legislation in a prominent place on each Lloyd ship. In addition, he proposed, “the ship’s officer should be assigned the duty of translating these legal passages to every individual who could possibly be a slave before departure and before disembarkation and to add that every slave who would like to be free and protected in freedom should come forward. If no one comes

¹⁰⁵ Verwaltungsrath der Dampfschiffahrt-Gesellschaft des oesterreichischen Lloyd to Maritime Administration, no. 109, Trieste, February 4, 1872, attached to Maritime Administration to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 1285/F48/V, re: Verwaltungsrath des oesterr. Lloyd über den angeblichen Sklaven-transport am Dampfer “Apollo,” Trieste, February 10, 1872, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90.

¹⁰⁶ Prokesch-Osten to Beust, Constantinople, May 10, 1870, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90, Z. 1660/HP.

forward, so the proof is delivered that all follow their leaders willingly—and therefore, in the sense of the law, are not slaves.”¹⁰⁷ The maritime administration offered a sober evaluation of this proposal: it would “not have the desired practical effect—either because of a lack of language ability on the part of the slaves or because of their fear of speaking before their ever-present owners.”¹⁰⁸ Note that it was the slaves’ lack of language ability that was blamed, and not that of the ships’ officers of the Austrian Lloyd, who were widely known to speak no languages but Italian and sometimes Croatian—not German, not French, not English, and certainly not Ottoman Turkish, Arabic, or any sub-Saharan language.¹⁰⁹

The documents left behind by Druscovich, Prokesch, the maritime administration, the minister of foreign affairs, and the Austrian corporate or public officials who commented on the intractable problem of the Mediterranean slave trade are not primarily concerned with the slaves’ true capacity for liberal, self-interested promotion of their rights in the single-minded pursuit of freedom, or the lack thereof. Aside from this one comment about the “ever-present owners,” there is no acknowledgment of the forces operating to compel people to proceed quietly from port to port, Austrian laws notwithstanding. No acknowledgment that many of these slaves were children, or that most of them were (also) female. No discussion of even the remotest possibility of returning any of them to the land of their birth or the families from whom they had been stolen. No comment on the fate of an African without any semblance of a social network left to his or her own devices in a foreign land. No recognition of the social vacuum represented by the liberal notion of “freedom” to the sensibilities of a person accustomed to thinking in terms of kinship.¹¹⁰ No plan for what to do in cases such as that of a group of women who were allegedly sequestered under a tent for the entire duration of their voyage so that no passengers

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Maritime Administration to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trieste, July 8, 1871, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90, Z. 1633/HP.

¹⁰⁹ According to the vice-consul of the consulate in Hong Kong, even Lloyd captains servicing the Trieste–Bombay and other Asian routes spoke neither German nor English, which prevented them from collecting necessary information about the ports they visited. Nikolaus Post, “Bericht über die anlässlich seiner in der Zeit vom 2. Februar bis 19. März l. J. auf Schiffen des oest. Lloyd zurückgelegten Ausreise von Triest nach Hong Kong gemachten Wahrnehmungen, den Betrieb und Dienst der vorerwähnten Schiffahrtsgesellschaft betreffend,” to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hong Kong, May 30, 1900, HHStA MdA AR Fach 68/2: Beschwerden über den öst. Lloyd.

¹¹⁰ “Most Africans belonged to a lineage, clan or other kinship group to which they owed clearly understood obligations and in which they had defined rights. This group protected them both spiritually and materially . . . To a member of such a close-knit group the European concept of the ‘free’ or autonomous individual was meaningless . . . Liberated captives generally thought the only real freedom lay in being returned to their own people.” Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade*, 119–120. “In most African societies, ‘freedom’ lay not in a withdrawal into a meaningless and dangerous autonomy but in attachment to a kin group, to a patron, to power—an attachment that occurred within a well-defined hierarchical framework . . . Here the antithesis of ‘slavery’ is not ‘freedom’ qua autonomy but rather ‘belonging.’” Miers and Kopytoff, *Slavery in Africa*, 17. On the other hand, “considering the Ottoman case, the sweeping concept of social alienation (or kinlessness), has a limited explanatory power for slavery in the Empire, since the proximity and intimacy of daily interaction between owner and slave produced what is sometimes called ‘fictive-kin’ relations that incorporated the slave—via the elite household—into the social networks (*intisap*) of Ottoman society, often effectively compensating for the lack of natural kin relations, though certainly at a psychological cost.” Ehud Toledano, “The Concept of Slavery in Ottoman and Other Muslim Societies: Dichotomy or Continuum,” in Miura Toru and John Edward Philips, eds., *Slave Elites in the Middle East and Africa: A Comparative Study* (London, 2000), 172.

(or crewmembers) could even lay eyes on them.¹¹¹ The maritime administration encouraged the adoption of Prokesch's suggestion because it would, in their words, "at least avoid the appearance of the ship's commander's complicity in any slave transports that might occur."¹¹² It could not, however, be expected to make those transports less likely.

Thus far, the interests of the Austrian Lloyd and the interests of the Foreign Ministry and consular corps appear to have been aligned. Their alignment was one of the Lloyd's key arguments: the minister of foreign affairs could not possibly ask the company to act against its own corporate interests, for the pursuit of those interests benefited all Austrians. But the final strand in the argument defending the Lloyd against the compulsion to take a more proactive stand against slavery was one that exposed a fundamental difference between the diplomatic needs of the Austrian Empire and the business needs of its largest shipping company. After twenty young African slaves were found aboard the steamer *Apollo* in October 1871, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs complained that "the ever-increasing cases of slave transports on Lloyd ships—especially larger transports—appear to lend a certain authority to the English consul in Smyrna's complaints about the lax application of regulations to suppress the slave trade in the Orient, by virtue of which the prestige and honor of the imperial flag is endangered."¹¹³ Would not the Lloyd take special measures to protect the flag that protected it?

The Lloyd administration insisted that "the Lloyd company and its organs do not have the attributes of a police authority and are not in the slightest authorized to worry about the individual affairs of the passengers—whether white or colored."¹¹⁴ Here it is not the proclaimed racial blindness of the Lloyd that was truly radical, but the brazen refusal to enforce the law. The maritime administration official who interviewed Druscovich after the *Mars* incident had to agree that "not only would the meticulous investigation of the personal relations of the passengers damage the Lloyd's commerce, it cannot possibly be the concern of a private company to play police."¹¹⁵ The conviction that passengers chose shipping lines that provided more comfort and less control was even reflected in the popular press. In response to a proposal that the Lloyd should employ navy veterans, the *Triester Zeitung* claimed that Austrian passengers, too, "prefer those ships where they find less discipline and more personal freedom."¹¹⁶ The Lloyd's duty to its shareholders, and to the Austrian tax-

¹¹¹ The Viennese traveler Ida Pfeiffer reported this case with horror in Pfeiffer, *Reise einer Wienerin in das Heilige Land: Unternommen im März bis Dezember 1842* (Vienna, 1844), 65. My thanks to Walter Sauer for directing me to this source.

¹¹² Maritime Administration to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trieste, July 8, 1871, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90, Z. 1633/HP.

¹¹³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Maritime Administration, Vienna, October 11, 1871, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90, Z. 2518/HP.

¹¹⁴ Verwaltungsrath der Dampfschiffahrt-Gesellschaft des oesterreichischen Lloyd to Maritime Administration, no. 109, Trieste, February 4, 1872, attached to Maritime Administration to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 1285/F48/V, re: Verwaltungsrath des oesterr. Lloyd über den angeblichen Sklaventransport am Dampfer "Apollo," Trieste, February 10, 1872, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90.

¹¹⁵ "Bericht der k.k. Seebehörde vom 19 Oktober 1871 Z 9127 über den neuerlich vorgekommenen Fall eines Sklaventransports auf dem Lloyd dampfer 'Diana,'" Maritime Administration to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 9127, Trieste, October 19, 1871, HHStA MdA AR F34SR90, Z. 2655/HP.

¹¹⁶ "Der Triester Lloyd und die Kriegsmarine," *Triester Zeitung*, undated clipping marked February 1869, in the Lloyd archive, Museo del Mare, Archivio Storico del Lloyd Triestino, 159v, 276 (11/510) 3609.

payers who subsidized its shipping lines, was to maintain its commercial strength in the Eastern Mediterranean, and not endanger its market share. Who in Austria would benefit if the Lloyd refused to honor legally purchased tickets, harassed its passengers, and showed no sensitivity to the precepts of Islam?

It was not the Lloyd's job to execute an anti-slave trade treaty signed by Austria according to the spirit of the law—but only to ensure that each traveling passenger had a valid ticket, was not visibly constrained in the exercise of his or her freedom of movement on board the ship, and was escorted to the nearest consulate if, and only if, he or she had explicitly requested the captain's assistance in escaping the bonds of enslavement. At stake here was the relationship of sovereignty and economy, that is, the character of empire: were private corporations bound to execute diplomatic agreements?

CUMBERBATCH DIED IN OFFICE, of causes not recorded, on March 29, 1876. With his passing, the detailed documentation of slaving through Smyrna came to an end. The slave trade, on the other hand, did not stop in the 1870s. It would be developments in the realm of international diplomacy, not individual exposures of slave-smuggling, that eroded the legal transportation of slaves across the Mediterranean. The Anglo-Egyptian anti-slave trade convention of 1877 was the first in a series of treaties that initiated what Suzanne Miers has called “a more determined effort to prevent the import of slaves” into the Ottoman Empire.¹¹⁷ The British occupation of Egypt, starting in 1882, gave the British more control over embarkation procedures in Alexandria and thus greater opportunities to prevent slaves from boarding ships. The Berlin Conference of 1885 and the Brussels Conference of 1889 both involved the Ottoman Empire in international agreements prohibiting the slave trade. The adventitious distinction between the slave trade and slavery within the empire's borders, however, continued to be upheld even as the Ottomans' official declarations that the trade in human beings would not be tolerated became more sincere and more stringently enforced. The Ottoman Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Police were responsible for the suppression of the traffic in Africans, but the deputy minister of the interior himself purchased slaves in 1893, which suggests that his principled commitment to preventing the trade was compatible with its practical continuation.¹¹⁸ The constitution of 1876 guaranteed the personal liberty of all subjects of the empire, but it was not put into practice until 1908. By then, the only slaves coming into the empire had to be smuggled in; the slave population had declined year by year.

According to Miers, “in the mind of the British public, the trader plying his busi-

¹¹⁷ Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade*, 81. According to Paul Lovejoy, Britain became especially keen to “clean up” Egypt after the opening of the Suez Canal brought more exposure to the illegal slave trade there. Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery*, 270. Lovejoy argues that Africans themselves—rather than European moral diplomacy—deserve credit for forcing the abolition of slavery: “The aim of slaves was freedom, not the modification of the conditions of slavery, and this often placed Europeans in the position of reforming the institution so that its demise would occur gradually and not in one, single revolutionary action. The colonial regimes became the defenders of slavery and the greatest single impediment to full emancipation” (253).

¹¹⁸ Toledano, *Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East*, 35.

ness, the missionary spreading the gospel and the consul watching over British interests were as much concerned in [the slave trade's] suppression as the sailor patrolling the coast."¹¹⁹ Britain's military, diplomatic, commercial, and religious-ethical interests, that is, were all imagined to be aligned. This notion, David Armitage has argued, lay at the center of Britain's own original understanding of its empire: the British Empire was "Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free."¹²⁰ But the history of Britain's interactions with Africa has long been recognized as belying this happy assertion: slavery was tolerated where a challenge to it would threaten political stability, as in Egypt, as in Zanzibar, as in the Hijaz, or, for that matter, as in Cuba.¹²¹ The persistence of the slave trade in the 1870s was an anachronism that raised inconsistent and troubling questions about the character of European civilization and the benefits of European commerce in the Mediterranean. What if thickening commercial networks and revolutionary transportation technologies, instead of bringing an end to slave traffic, actually provided mechanisms for the transportation of slaves at greater speed and with greater comfort—slaves traveling as passengers, not in the holds of ships; slaves enjoying freedom of movement within the fundamental confines of a ship at sea; slaves disembarking without the use of visible force, according to a published timetable? What if, to amend Pitt's plaintive cry before Parliament in 1792, "the perversion of [European] commerce carried misery instead of happiness to one quarter of the globe"?¹²² What if free trade and freedom were not the same? After all, the dictates of the free market meant that the Austrian Lloyd had to compete for the very passengers whom its ships could easily lose to another company if the balance between ticket prices, convenience, comfort, and privacy tipped in the direction of "too costly."¹²³

Austrian diplomats' correspondence with the Lloyd and with their British counterparts shows that not only did these disquieting contradictions emerge from Britain's self-appointment as the primary enforcer of European civilization, personal liberty, free trade, and British commercial interests around the globe, but they also plagued empires with more modest ambitions. It was not, after all, the colonial powers that were most notorious for transporting slaves across the Mediterranean in the nineteenth century, but second-order powers such as Austria, Egypt, and the Ottomans themselves. In the mid- to late nineteenth century, Austria was caught between imperial formations—servicing the residual connections between the Ottoman Empire and Africa, while simultaneously striving to participate in the emergent

¹¹⁹ Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade*, 38.

¹²⁰ David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 2000), 8.

¹²¹ On the Hijaz, see Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade*, 82. Nevertheless, in Africa, Britain allowed itself to apply a kind of pressure that, according to Robin Law, actually violated international law—actions that ultimately facilitated the "European partition of Africa." Law, "Abolition and Imperialism: International Law and the British Suppression of the Atlantic Slave Trade," in Peterson, *Abolitionism and Imperialism in Britain*, 170. In a similar vein: "The first worldwide campaign for human rights did not call upon self-determining nation-states to end slavery as much as it took part in the determination of which people were fit to govern themselves as nations and which needed to be colonized in order to fulfill the higher good of eliminating slavery." Michael Salman, *The Embarrassment of Slavery: Controversies over Bondage and Nationalism in the American Colonial Philippines* (Berkeley, Calif., 2001), 13.

¹²² *The Speech of the Right Hon. William Pitt*, 24.

¹²³ "Empires," Frederick Cooper has pointed out, "perpetrated violence because they were strong and because they were weak." Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley, Calif., 2005), 157.

abolitionism that was coming to characterize the British and other colonial powers' expansion into Africa.

Austria had promised to prevent the transport of slaves on Austrian ships; it had even authorized other powers to search its ships to see that the law was being enforced. Its public role in international congresses and conventions throughout the long nineteenth century was that of a non-colonial power; a power that refused to participate in the exploitation and enslavement of Africans; a power for whom treaties about arms control, the export of alcohol, and the spread of drug addiction were inconsequential because it was confident that it had no stake in any of those nefarious trades.¹²⁴ As a Mediterranean power, Austria was able to set some of the rules of Levantine commerce. It could ponder the Eastern Question, pressure the Ottoman Empire to modify its policy toward France during the Crimean War, and insist on the maintenance of "capitulations" (the rights to regulate the affairs of Habsburg subjects living in the Ottoman Empire according to its own laws). But Austria was also governed by the mutually accepted immutability of other, older rules of Mediterranean trade: on these waters, personal autonomy was inscrutable, family was mutable, sovereignty was endangered. Only commerce was truly free.

¹²⁴ On Austria-Hungary's lackluster involvement in discussions about the limitations of alcohol and arms imports into Africa, see Graf Tarnowski, Brussels, to Aehrenthal MdA, Vienna, November 9, 1906, re "Die am 3. I. M. in Brüssel geschlossene Convention über das Zollregime für den nach Afrika eingeführten Spiritus betreffend," HHStA MdA AR Fach 39/4 [hereafter F39/4], Z. 89320; Kereskedelemügyi m.k. [Hungarian Ministry of Commerce] to Aehrenthal, April 9, 1907, HHStA MdA AR F39/4, Z. 27633; Note to Legation Royale de Belgique note verbale with copy to Hungarian HM Vienna, November 4, 1907, HHStA MdA AR F39/4, Z. 82165/9 7400; Note from Roessler (Austrian Ministry of Commerce) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs re Revision des Zollregimes auf Waffen und Munition in Afrika bis April 1908, Vienna, January 3, 1908, HHStA MdA AR F39/4, Z. 1454.

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Surface Tensions: Empire, Parisian Modernism, and “Authenticity” in African Sculpture, 1917–1939

JOHN WARNE MONROE

THE WESTERN AESTHETIC CATEGORY of primitive art came into its own in Paris in the early decades of the twentieth century.¹ While Europeans had appreciated the decorative quality and fine workmanship of some African and Oceanic objects as early as the 1880s, it fell to a group of cutting-edge Parisian artists, collectors, and dealers to transform this admiration into a self-consciously avant-garde project.² For these advocates, a penchant for what they often called *art nègre* was not simply another manifestation of the nineteenth-century cult of the picturesque; it was a way of turning Western taste on its head, substituting a new classicism for the Greco-Roman legacy.³ To be considered worthy examples of this alternative vision of the classical, which depended on a set of assumptions about the ahistorical nature of the “primitive mind,” the objects in question had to have formal characteristics that evoked

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¹ Although the perceived “family resemblance” among objects of diverse geographical origin—from Africa to Polynesia to Alaska—that it once designated remains a part of the Western cultural landscape, “primitive art” is no longer commonly used as a blanket term. Scholars of the topic, most notably Sally Price, have seized upon the sense of alienation this obsolescence has created to justify a strategic reappropriation. I am following Price’s example here, using the term “primitive art” both because it was the current designation in the interwar period—particularly after the waning of the term *art nègre* in the mid-1920s—and because its distance from present-day usage helps draw attention to the historical contingency and constructedness of the aesthetic category it designates. Although I have chosen not to place the term within quotation marks in order to avoid a distracting proliferation of them, I use it with the critical distance such punctuation would convey. See Sally Price, *Primitive Art in Civilized Places*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 2001), 1–6; Price, *Paris Primitive: Jacques Chirac’s Museum on the Quai Branly* (Chicago, 2007), vii–viii. See also Daniel J. Sherman, “Post-Colonial Chic: Fantasies of the French Interior, 1957–62,” *Art History* 27, no. 5 (November 2004): 773–774.

² For a useful discussion of the pre-modernist aesthetic appreciation of objects from Africa, see Annie E. Coombes, *Reinventing Africa: Museums, Material Culture and Popular Imagination in Late Victorian and Edwardian England* (New Haven, Conn., 1994), esp. 7–28.

³ The conception of the distinction between nineteenth-century exoticism and the avant-garde idea of primitive art as classicism that I present here derives from Jean Laude, *La peinture française et l’art nègre* (Paris, 2006), esp. 13–43, 433–442.

the latest currents in contemporary art, while at the same time remaining perceptibly “authentic.” From the beginning, the identification of authenticity in this field was a process fraught with ambivalence. On the one hand, it advanced the cause of cultural tolerance by transforming a select group of objects, previously rejected in racist terms, into potential masterworks of world art; on the other, it perpetuated inequalities by drawing a sharp, if often illusory, line between the ancestral artists capable of producing such masterworks and the current, allegedly decadent inhabitants of the distant lands where these objects were created.

The interwar French reception of traditional African sculpture served a paradigmatic function in the constitution of primitive art as a broader category.⁴ Analyzing this transformation of taste in relation to the distinctive historical situation in which it began, therefore, provides us with a new way to think through the persistent ambivalence it entails. The idea of authenticity on which the aesthetic category of primitive art came to depend was the distinctive product of two interwar phenomena: the Indian summer of Parisian dominance of the Western art world and the attempted consolidation of French colonial power in Africa. Indeed, it emerged directly from the interaction of these historical factors, and thus provides a revealingly concrete demonstration of the complex connections between aesthetic modernism and the colonial project. Parisian connoisseurs in this period perceived, altered, and exhibited select examples of African material culture in ways that transformed them into autonomous works of art in the Western sense. Placed in their new context, these objects derived aesthetic power from the way in which they seemed simultaneously archaic and modern, enacting a mythic version of the narrative of radical innovation so crucial to the self-conception of the artistic avant-garde. This paradoxical construction had far-reaching consequences, first in the United States, then in French West Africa itself, as demonstrated by the contrasting cases of two figures who confronted the problem of authenticity in tellingly different ways: the well-known poet, thinker, and politician Léopold Sédar Senghor and the unknown artist Jean Dado.

Scholarly critiques of the idea of primitive art first emerged in the 1980s, as part of a wide-ranging reassessment of aesthetic modernism. The watershed moment in the history of this field came in 1984, with an exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in New York, *“Primitivism” in Twentieth-Century Art: Affinity of the Tribal and the Modern*. In the museum’s galleries, these “affinities” were both direct connections—specific so-called “tribal” objects that canonical twentieth-century artists saw—and formal resemblances that became visible when historically unrelated works by Western and “tribal” artists appeared side by side. Curator William Rubin’s justification for the second type of affinity was emphatically universalistic. “Like all great art,” he wrote, “the finest tribal sculptures show images of man that transcend the particular lives and times of their makers.”⁵ The formal resonances he perceived

⁴ Throughout this article, I follow standard scholarly practice in the field of African art by using the term “traditional” to refer to the kinds of African objects that early-twentieth-century connoisseurs would have perceived as potentially authentic. For a further discussion of the pitfalls of terminology in this field, see Eli Bontor, “Challenges to Rural Festivals with the Return to Democratic Rule in South-eastern Nigeria,” *African Arts* 38, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 44.

⁵ William Rubin, “Modernist Primitivism: An Introduction,” in Rubin, ed., *“Primitivism” in Twentieth-Century Art: Affinity of the Tribal and the Modern*, 2 vols. (New York, 1984), 1: 73.

between works by artists unknown to one another, operating in very different contexts, served him as proof of that transcendence. Rubin's willingness to transform objects into decontextualized formal ciphers derived quite logically from the high modernist vision that had been at the heart of MoMA's institutional mission since the days of founding director Alfred H. Barr.⁶ When applied to material that had originally been produced in cultural contexts far removed from the international art world, however, this seemingly affirmative approach to "the unpredictable potential of human creativity wherever found" raised disconcerting questions, which critics addressed in a surge of commentary that has since generated an active scholarly subfield.⁷

The earliest contributions to the debate questioned the "*Primitivism*" exhibition's underlying assumptions from the points of view of critical theory and cultural anthropology, seeing ethnocentric arrogance where the exhibition's curators saw a laudable inclusiveness. Broadly speaking, these critiques depended on a view of art not as universal, but as what James Clifford termed "a category defined and redefined in specific contexts and relations of power."⁸ From this perspective, assertions of the transcendent aesthetic appeal of primitive art had a sinister subtext. As Hal Foster put it, "no counterdiscourse was posed: the imperialist precondition of primitivism was suppressed, and 'primitivism,' a metonym of imperialism, served as its disavowal."⁹ The recognition of the Western "art-ness" of "tribal" objects, in other words, was a form of imperialism by other means; even more disturbing, it was an act of domination that denied its true nature, presenting itself as a magnanimous gesture of egalitarian acceptance. Subsequent critiques have taken these insights as a point of departure, moving from analysis of the specific circumstances of the "*Primitivism*" exhibition to broader explorations of Western ideas of the primitive, and the ways in which the consumption and reception of primitive art both reveals and perpetuates them.¹⁰ For these scholars, a rigorous skepticism of universalistic aesthetic

⁶ See Sybil Gordon Cantor, *Alfred H. Barr, Jr., and the Intellectual Origins of the Museum of Modern Art* (Boston, 2003).

⁷ For a valuable compilation of early interventions in this polemic by Thomas McEvilley, William Rubin, and Kirk Varnedoe, see Bill Beckley and David Shapiro, eds., *Uncontrollable Beauty: Toward a New Aesthetics* (New York, 1998). The quote comes from curator Kirk Varnedoe's preface in Rubin, "*Primitivism*" in *Twentieth-Century Art*, 1: x.

⁸ James Clifford, "Histories of the Tribal and the Modern," in Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art* (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), 198. This essay, a review of the "*Primitivism*" exhibition, first appeared in *Art in America* 73, no. 4 (April 1985): 164–177. For broader theoretical articulations of this conception that have become touchstones in the literature, see Jean Baudrillard, *Le système des objets* (Paris, 1968); and the work of Pierre Bourdieu, especially *L'amour de l'art: Les musées d'art européens et leur public* (Paris, 1968); *La distinction: Critique sociale du jugement* (Paris, 1979); and the essays collected in Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature*, ed. Randal Johnson (New York, 1993).

⁹ Hal Foster, "The 'Primitive' Unconscious of Modern Art," *October* 34 (Autumn 1985): 47.

¹⁰ Fred R. Myers provides a useful survey of the development of this literature. See Myers, "'Primitivism,' Anthropology, and the Category of 'Primitive Art,'" in Chris Tilley, Webb Keane, Susan Kuechler, Mike Rowlands, and Patricia Spyer, eds., *Handbook of Material Culture* (London, 2006), 267–284. For other important contributions, see Rolande Bonnain, *L'empire des masques: Les collectionneurs d'arts premiers aujourd'hui* (Paris, 2001); James Clifford, "On Collecting Art and Culture," in Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture*, 215–251; Annie E. Coombes, "The Object of Translation: Notes on 'Art' and Autonomy in a Postcolonial Context," in Fred R. Myers, ed., *The Empire of Things: Regimes of Value and Material Culture* (Oxford, 2001), 233–256; Raymond Corbey, *Tribal Art Traffic: A Chronicle of Taste, Trade and Desire in Colonial and Post-Colonial Times* (Amsterdam, 2000); Shelly Errington, *The Death of Authentic Primitive Art and Other Tales of Progress* (Berkeley, Calif., 1998); Ivan Karp and Stephen

claims is a way to reverse what Sally Price calls “the *dehumanization* of Primitive Art and its makers,” and instead to acknowledge their “cultural diversity, intellectual vitality, and aesthetic integrity.”¹¹

Although this critical literature has expanded its reach steadily over the years, reshaping whole branches of the academic study of material culture, the questions it raises remain stubbornly unresolved. As the controversy surrounding the establishment of the Musée du quai Branly in Paris revealed so strikingly, the world of connoisseurs, collectors, and dealers of what once would have been called primitive art looked in 2006 much as it had in 1984.¹² Art museums, although increasingly conscious of the historical contingency of the standards of judgment they employ, and highly attuned to a body of scholarship that studies works of traditional African and Oceanic art from the points of view of those who made them, still select and display objects from these areas on the basis of a universalizing conception of aesthetic quality.¹³ This conception is also still the mainspring of a thriving market, in which objects widely acknowledged to be masterworks can command prices of several million dollars.¹⁴ For many in this milieu, a universalizing conception of aesthetics continues to appear not as a tool of crypto-imperialist domination, but as a positive means of fostering a more inclusive worldview in the museum-going public.¹⁵

D. Lavine, eds., *Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum Display* (Washington, D.C., 1991); Sidney Littlefield Kasfir, “African Art and Authenticity: A Text with a Shadow,” *African Arts* 25, no. 2 (April 1992): 40–53, 96–97; Ruth B. Phillips and Christopher B. Steiner, eds., *Unpacking Culture: Art and Commodity in Colonial and Postcolonial Worlds* (Berkeley, Calif., 1999); Price, *Primitive Art in Civilized Places*; Christopher B. Steiner, *African Art in Transit* (Cambridge, 1994); Maruška Svašek, *Anthropology, Art and Cultural Production* (London, 2007); and Marianna Torgovnick, *Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives* (Chicago, 1990).

¹¹ Price, *Primitive Art in Civilized Places*, 5, 126, emphasis in the original.

¹² The controversy surrounding the creation of the Musée du quai Branly has already elicited a body of scholarly analysis. See Sarah Amato, “Quai Branly Museum: Representing France after Empire,” *Race & Class* 47, no. 4 (2006): 46–65; Bruno Latour, ed., *Le dialogue des cultures: Actes des rencontres inaugurales du musée du quai Branly (21 juin 2006)* (Paris, 2007); Herman Lebovics, “The Dance of the Museums,” in Lebovics, *Bringing the Empire Back Home: France in the Global Age* (Durham, N.C., 2004), 143–177; and Price, *Paris Primitive*. Price has also produced a useful overview of the increasingly voluminous commentary that has appeared in the years since the museum’s 2006 opening; see Sally Price, “Return to the Quai Branly,” *Museum Anthropology* 33, no. 1 (2010): 11–21. The French journal *Le débat* devoted an entire issue to the new museum: *Le moment du quai Branly*, Special Issue, *Le débat* 147 (November–December 2007); *Le débat* 148 (January–February 2008) contains three additional articles on the topic: Kwame Anthony Appiah, “De qui est-ce la culture?” (158–169); Jean-Marie Schaeffer, “Le musée du quai Branly entre art et esthétique” (170–178); and Sally Price, “Réflexions sur le dialogue des cultures au musée du quai Branly” (179–192). For interventions that give a sense of the competing agendas involved in this polemic, see Bernard Dupaigne, *Le scandale des arts premiers: La véritable histoire du musée du quai Branly* (Paris, 2006); and Marine Degli and Marie Mauzé, *Arts premiers: Le temps de la reconnaissance* (Paris, 2000).

¹³ For an introduction to this substantial literature in the specific field of African art, see Monica Blackmun Visona, Robin Poynor, and Herbert M. Cole, *History of Art in Africa* (New York, 2003). For examples of recent catalogues from critically engaged museum exhibitions, see Christraud M. Geary and Stéphanie Xatart, *Material Journeys: Collecting African and Oceanic Art, 1945–2000—Selections from the Geneviève McMillan Collection* (Boston, 2007); Frederick John Lamp, ed., *See the Music, Hear the Dance: Rethinking African Art at the Baltimore Museum of Art* (Munich, 2004); and Pamela McClusky, *Art from Africa: Long Steps Never Broke a Back* (Princeton, N.J., 2002).

¹⁴ The highest price fetched by a piece of primitive art at auction thus far is 5 million Euros, for a mask by a sculptor from the Fang people of Gabon sold in Paris on June 17, 2006. See the website of the Hôtel Drouot auction house, http://www.gazette-drouot.com/static/magazine_ventes_aux_encheres/enchere_collection_verite.html.

¹⁵ In a major exhibition catalogue, for example, the curator Alisa LaGamma recently proclaimed

Similarly, scholars of modernism as a transnational phenomenon have noticed that the tropes of European primitivism, when strategically appropriated by those they define as “other,” can turn the cultural tables in intriguing ways, inspiring new visions of independence and creative possibility.¹⁶

The very intractability of these questions is itself a problem that calls for explanation. The obdurate paradox of primitive art—the way it simultaneously seems to reinforce prejudices about the “savage” other and provide a means of overcoming them—expresses a fundamental ambivalence that is itself a legacy of the French colonial project. To understand this fully, it is important to remember that the idea of primitive art took shape in Paris at a time when the city was both an imperial and a cultural metropolis. Scholars have generally chosen to treat these aspects of the city’s historical existence separately, and indeed at first glance the relation between them can seem tenuous. Where imperial Paris tended to be crassly nationalistic, politically centrist, bourgeois, and disturbingly prone to the siren song of kitsch, modernist Paris was cosmopolitan, politically radical, bohemian, and rigorous in its pursuit of the aesthetic cutting edge. The problem of primitive art, however, provides a vantage point that lets us see the connections between these two worlds with unusual clarity. To a certain extent, the link is material: colonial commerce is what put African sculptures in the hands of Parisian artists, collectors, dealers, and critics in the first place. There is also a conceptual dimension that is less explicit but perhaps equally important. As Fredric Jameson has observed, “the traces of imperialism can . . . be detected in Western modernism, and are indeed constitutive of it,” but they do not manifest themselves most strongly “in the obvious places, in content and representation.” Instead, they appear as “formal symptoms” that must be “detected spatially.”¹⁷ The Paris-born aesthetic category of primitive art is itself just such a spatially detectable “formal symptom,” a seemingly transcendent, “apolitical” way of seeing particular objects that, by virtue of its very appearance of being “above it all,” recapitulates the distinctive paradoxes that characterized France’s ill-fated effort to function as an imperial republic.

This approach builds on a conception of the predicament of empire that lies at the foundation of what European historians now call “the new colonial history,” and emphasizes the crucial importance of ambivalence to an understanding of the co-

that by creating a rich, varied corpus of commemorative reliquary figures, “the peoples of equatorial Africa developed a sculptural form that would enter the pantheon of universal art”—an assertion meant to celebrate a triumphant revaluation of objects that were once dismissed as the “crude” and “hideous” work of “savages.” See LaGamma, ed., *Eternal Ancestors: The Art of the Central African Reliquary* (New York, 2007), 178. For “crude,” “hideous,” and “savage,” see R. P. Henri Trilles, *Chez les Fang; ou, Quinze années de séjour au Congo français* (Paris, 1912), 246. Critic Peter Schjeldahl, taking the praise a step further, wrote that the sculptor of one of the figures included in the show—now known as the “Black Venus”—“beggars Brancusi.” Schjeldahl, “Into Africa,” *The New Yorker*, November 5, 2007, http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/notebook/2007/11/05/071105gonb_GOAT_notebook_schjeldahl.

¹⁶ See, e.g., Simon Gikandi, “Race and the Modernist Aesthetic,” in Tim Youngs, ed., *Writing and Race* (London, 1997), 147–165; Wendy Martin, “‘Remembering the Jungle’: Josephine Baker and Modernist Parody,” in Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush, eds., *Prehistories of the Future: The Primitivist Project and the Culture of Modernism* (Stanford, Calif., 1995), 310–325; and Carole Sweeney, *From Fetish to Subject: Race, Modernism, and Primitivism, 1919–1935* (London, 2004).

¹⁷ Fredric Jameson, “Modernism and Imperialism,” in Terry Eagleton, Fredric Jameson, and Edward W. Said, *Nationalism, Colonialism, and Literature* (Minneapolis, 1990), 64.

lonial project.¹⁸ In the French case, as historians have shown, this ambivalence took a distinctive and striking form. The republican ideals on which the French polity was based created a fundamental conflict: equal citizenship for colonized peoples was an ideologically necessary promise, but one that had to be pushed into an ever-receding future in order to ensure the functioning of the colonial system.¹⁹ Frederick Cooper, drawing on the specific case of French West Africa, has developed a broader conception of empire that suggests a useful way of taking this key paradox into account. As he observes, European conquest in the age of the “new imperialism” was not simply a matter of exploitative domination, although that, of course, played a prominent role. For its advocates, empire was also a project designed to transform allegedly benighted non-European peoples into “civilized” facsimiles of their European conquerors. Those conquerors, in turn, considered themselves to be the very image of the universal modernity to which all humanity was progressing—albeit at unequal rates.²⁰ Even so, the colonial system depended on the maintenance of clear-cut boundaries demarcating “colonizer from colonized, civilized from primitive, core from periphery.” The coexistence of these two currents, inclusive and exclusionary, universalistic and particularistic, “made the space of empire into a terrain where concepts were not only imposed, but also engaged and contested.”²¹ Crucially, Cooper asserts, this ongoing contestation should not be seen in Whiggish terms, as inevitably leading to a process of decolonization culminating in the creation of independent nation-states. Instead, it should be approached in a manner that acknowledges the historically contingent range of possibilities available to participants in the debate at any given time. During the interwar years, when—as Cooper observes—the notion of empire was still broadly accepted as “an ordinary fact of political life,” the means by which “people living in colonies tried to make something of the situations they faced” could take a wide variety of forms.²² In French West Africa, for example, nationalistic discourses were only one of many tools available

¹⁸ Over the last twenty-five years, the study of Europe’s colonial past has gone from being a marginal subfield to a matter of central historiographical concern. Robert Aldrich provides a useful discussion of “the new colonial history” and its relation to European efforts to work through the colonial past in “Remembrance of Empires Past,” *Fields of Remembrance*, Special Issue, *PORTAL: Journal of Multi-disciplinary and International Studies* 7, no. 1 (January 2010): 1–18. For an influential statement of the crucial role of ambivalence in understanding empire, see Homi K. Bhabha, “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse,” in Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London, 1994), 85–92.

¹⁹ Grappling with this distinctive tension between the universal and the particular has become one of the central historiographical issues in the study of France’s empire. See, e.g., Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930* (Stanford, Calif., 1997); Elizabeth Ezra, *The Colonial Unconscious: Race and Culture in Interwar France* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2000); James E. Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence, Cultural Authenticity, and the Limitations of Mimicry in French-Ruled West Africa, 1914–1956* (New York, 2004); Herman Lebovics, *True France: The Wars over Cultural Identity, 1900–1945* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1992); and Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars* (Chicago, 2005).

²⁰ For a valuable recent discussion of this question and its implications both for scholars of Europe and for those defined as “non-modern” in Western terms, see the various contributions to the *AHR* Roundtable “Historians and the Question of ‘Modernity,’” *American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (June 2011): 631–751, of which the following are of particular relevance to the concerns of this article: Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, “Modernity: The Sphinx and the Historian” (638–652); Carol Gluck, “The End of Elsewhere: Writing Modernity Now” (676–687); and Lynn M. Thomas, “Modernity’s Failings, Political Claims, and Intermediate Concepts” (727–740).

²¹ Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley, Calif., 2005), 4.

²² *Ibid.*, 232, 231.

for arguing against the injustices of colonial power. West Africans and their critical allies in the metropole could also question, or seek to radically transform, the colonial project with visions of solidarity and difference founded on much broader bases than the national—as in Marxism or Pan-Africanism—or with other “forms of political action that depended on the overlapping idioms and interactions between colonizer and colonized.”²³

In interwar Paris and in the colonies, the concept of primitive art proved to be a notably active site for just this type of “engagement and contestation” based on “overlapping idioms and interaction.” From its inception, the notion of authenticity that underpins this aesthetic category was a product of the ongoing negotiations over inclusion and exclusion that “thinking like an empire” entailed, and as such could serve both as an instrument of domination and as a means of criticism or resistance.²⁴ The assumptions of many collectors and dealers transformed “authentic primitive art” into a restrictive category that only the Western eye had the power to know and define. Those assumptions, however, also contributed to a language of respect and admiration for otherness that could be used to make egalitarian cultural claims, even as they helped along a process of canon-building that would embed “authentic” African sculptures—and the conditions of their initial aestheticization—in a Western-style, universalizing narrative of “world art history.” The cases of Senghor and Dado show that the sea-change in Western taste brought about by the cultural triumph of modernism had tangible if contradictory consequences abroad, as a particular notion of authenticity became both a vehicle for challenging racist assumptions through assertions of diasporic black or Pan-African identity and a justification for colonial administrators to impose a limiting vision of “Africanness” on their subjects.

From the beginning, primitive art depended on an elaborate system of connoisseurship, a term that Jules Prown has defined as “formal or stylistic analysis . . . used in practice to distinguish among objects.”²⁵ Over the course of the twentieth century, as Price has shown, the wide diffusion of this system created the distinctive way of seeing that Westerners associate with the enjoyment of objects in this aesthetic category—one that blends an antiquarian appreciation for distressed surfaces, a sense of radical temporal or cultural distance, and the evocatively fragmentary with a modernist formal sensibility and conception of the vitality of the “primal.”²⁶ To a considerable extent, this set of aesthetic values owes its enduring power to the unique cultural situation of the Parisian critics and dealers who began to transform the market for traditional African sculpture in the late 1910s. Select “ethnographic specimens” became “art” in the Western sense not because their original creators intended to give them that status, but because during the 1920s and 1930s, they were enmeshed in a set of value-imparting practices rooted in the distinctive institutional structure that art historians have identified as a key factor in the rise of aesthetic modernism: the mutually reinforcing canon-building system of private galleries, crit-

²³ Ibid., 231.

²⁴ For “thinking like an empire,” see Frederick Cooper, “States, Empires, and Political Imagination,” *ibid.*, 153–203.

²⁵ Jules David Prown, “The Truth of Material Culture: History or Fiction?” in Steven Lubar and W. David Kingery, eds., *History from Things: Essays on Material Culture* (Washington, D.C., 1993), 4.

²⁶ Price, *Primitive Art in Civilized Places*, 82–99.

ical commentary, and museums.²⁷ Paris was the center of this system, but as Robert Jensen notes, its position depended on a sense of universal importance conferred by “the sustained admiring gaze of the foreign public.”²⁸ In the case of primitive art, American collectors, dealers, and museums were perhaps the most influential of these legitimating publics. American eagerness to let modernist Paris set the cultural tone reinforced an idea of primitive art as a universal aesthetic category, while at the same time associating it with progressive racial attitudes—and particularly with the Harlem Renaissance. Thus inflected, the idea of primitive art made its way back to the colonies.²⁹

ART HISTORIANS HAVE THOROUGHLY documented the earliest phase of the formation of primitive art as an aesthetic category.³⁰ Beginning in about 1905, Pablo Picasso, Henri Matisse, Maurice Vlaminck, André Derain, and other artists of the School of Paris grew increasingly enthusiastic about the aesthetic qualities of sculptures produced by “natives” in French and Belgian colonies—particularly in West and Central Africa. Where these objects had once struck Western observers as ethnographic specimens, pagan idols, or exotic curiosities, they now took on the appearance of autonomous works of art that posed a profound challenge to Western aesthetic norms. In addition, their distinctive formal qualities made them readily traceable influences in numerous works that have since become mainstays of Western art history.³¹ These encounters touched off a process of revaluation that, by the mid-1920s, transformed the commodity status of traditional African sculpture first in France, then across the continent and in the United States: colonial trophies and bohemian *bibelots* were now *objets d’art*, sought after by a growing group of collectors and dealers, who saw their admiration for these strange objects as a natural counterpart to their sympathy with the experiments of the Parisian avant-garde. In this way, it was not the modernist artists themselves, but actors within the institutional structure that ensured their livelihood—owners of galleries, critics, and patrons—who were most responsible for elaborating the idea of primitive art, providing the financial investment, and constructing the system of value that allowed a specialized market

²⁷ See Michael C. FitzGerald, *Making Modernism: Picasso and the Creation of the Market for Twentieth-Century Art* (Berkeley, Calif., 1995); and Robert Jensen, *Marketing Modernism in Fin-de-Siècle Europe* (Princeton, N.J., 1994).

²⁸ Jensen, *Marketing Modernism in Fin-de-Siècle Europe*, 7.

²⁹ The complex factors involved in this transformation of objects from elsewhere makes it a distinctive problem in the history of material culture: a form of reception that entails both a physical and a conceptual remaking of the items being perceived, carried out with little concern for the intentions and experiences of their original creators. Material and discursive acts associated with connoisseurship—mounting on custom-made bases, “restoration,” formal aesthetic analysis—imposed new meanings on African objects that then underwent their own process of metamorphosis as they circulated across the globe. On the use of material cultural analysis in history, see Leora Auslander, “Beyond Words,” *American Historical Review* 110, no. 4 (October 2005): 1015–1045.

³⁰ See Robert Goldwater, *Primitivism in Modern Art*, enlarged ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1986); Laude, *La peinture française et l’art nègre*; and Jean-Louis Paudrat, “From Africa,” in Rubin, “Primitivism” in *Twentieth-Century Art*, 1: 125–175.

³¹ See, e.g., the very different analyses presented in Patricia Leighton, “The White Peril and *L’art nègre*: Picasso, Primitivism, and Anti-Colonialism,” *Art Bulletin* 72, no. 4 (December 1990): 609–630; and Rubin, “Picasso,” in Rubin, “Primitivism” in *Twentieth Century Art*, 1: 241–340.

to appear. The dynamics of this market made the identification of “authentic” objects a central preoccupation.

Indeed, the system of connoisseurship that underpinned the Western conception of primitive art, and continues to exert its influence today, entails a fundamental assumption: in order for an object to become a candidate for designation as a masterwork, sale at a major auction, or inclusion in a museum collection, it must be “authentic.” The idea of authenticity that has generally been accepted by collectors, dealers, and museum professionals in this field depends on the way an object bears material traces of its history. An “authentic” object, as Christopher B. Steiner observes in his analysis of the late-twentieth-century African art market, is one that shows evidence of having been used in its culture of origin rather than having been made for sale to outsiders.³² Signs of “authenticity” include chips, age cracks, insect damage, uneven patination caused by extensive handling, and encrustation of multiple layers of pigment or sacrificial offerings. While many of these imperfections would diminish the value of a Western sculpture, Price notes that in this field they have traditionally been aestheticized, becoming a crucial element of the connoisseur’s emotional experience of an object.³³ Current commentary often emphasizes this conception of authenticity’s roots in an ethnographically informed acknowledgment of cultural difference.³⁴ In most traditional African societies, the notion of “art” in the Western sense—as a class of object to be contemplated in isolation, for its own sake—does not exist, or has emerged comparatively recently. Many traditional sculptural objects serve ritual functions that gradually change their appearance, for instance with encrustations of sacrificial libations, and preclude close scrutiny or open display; in more public secular and religious contexts, masks and figures often act as props in larger spectacles, where they are equal or even lesser contributors alongside music, drama, and dance.³⁵ Marks of use, therefore, become forensic evidence that an object was employed in an “authentic” cultural context. A sense of the cultural contingency of “art” as a category, however, is not the only reason why Western connoisseurs aestheticize weathered surfaces and marks of use in this field; after all, this taste for patina preceded the elaboration and wide diffusion of a detailed, fieldwork-based body of knowledge about the use and original significance of many traditional African sculptures, which did not begin in earnest until the 1930s.

Instead, the distinctively Western notion of how an “authentic primitive” object

³² Steiner, *African Art in Transit*, 100–129.

³³ Price, *Primitive Art in Civilized Places*, 37–42.

³⁴ For discussions of authenticity in this field that emphasize the value of “in-culture” use, see *Fakes, Fakers and Fakery: Authenticity in African Art*, Special Issue, *African Arts* 9, no. 3 (April 1976); Joseph Cornet, “African Art and Authenticity,” *African Arts* 9, no. 1 (October 1975): 52–55; and Henri Kamer, “De l’authenticité des sculptures africaines/The Authenticity of African Sculptures,” *Arts d’Afrique noire* 12 (December 1974): 17–40. Although the most recent of these publications is more than thirty years old, the vision of authenticity they articulate is still widely accepted among collectors and dealers.

³⁵ An awareness of the very different conceptions of “art” that exist in African and Western contexts has become an important part of the methodology used by scholars of art in Africa. For important early works on this question, see Herbert M. Cole, “Art as a Verb in Iboland,” *African Arts* 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1969): 34–41, 88; the essays by Daniel J. Crowley [1966], James W. Fernandez [1966], Roy Sieber [1959], Leon Siroto [1965], and Robert Farris Thompson [1966] reprinted in Carol F. Jopling, ed., *Art and Aesthetics in Primitive Societies* (New York, 1971); and Robert Farris Thompson, *African Art in Motion: Icon and Act in the Collection of Katherine Coryton White* (Berkeley, Calif., 1974).

should look first took shape in the late 1910s, at the same time that a market for traditional African sculpture as “art” emerged. Early collectors in this market were a cosmopolitan group—German, Russian, British, American, and Swiss, as well as French—but they were unanimous in looking toward Paris as the epicenter of *art nègre*, and they purchased the bulk of their objects there.³⁶ Not only was the French capital home to the leading dealers, it was also the place where collectors had the best odds of encountering the objects that struck them as most appealing: sculptures of the kind that Picasso, Matisse, and other artists would have seen and borrowed from a decade before, and that therefore benefited from the growing cultural prestige of the School of Paris. These objects came primarily from French and Francophone colonies—especially regions in present-day Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of Congo—a fact that is unsurprising given the restricted circuits of commerce that the new imperialism had created by the early twentieth century. When searching for material for their collections, these cosmopolitan amateurs picked and chose among the vast array of exotic objects that French colonial officials, soldiers, and businessmen brought back with them when they returned to the metropole. Over the course of the late teens and twenties, the supply of objects increased noticeably, as a result both of the expansion of French commercial activity in the colonies and of sociocultural dislocations in Africa produced by the spread of forced labor and the depredations of the draft during the First World War.³⁷ By the mid-1920s, the mark of a successful collector came to be the ability to enter a crowded curio shop or flea-market stall and distinguish the rare “authentic” object from the much more common “inauthentic” one.³⁸

Dealers and collectors from the late teens onward, following the pattern that Annie E. Coombes identifies in Britain, took it for granted that the story of African sculptural production was one of steady decline.³⁹ Where Coombes’s Victorian and Edwardian commentators ascribed this perceived decadence to biological “degeneration,” however, French art critics and dealers tended to see it as a consequence of disruptive foreign influence. “Authentic” objects, the assumption went, were necessarily pre-colonial. “Fetishes of contemporary manufacture,” the curator Henri Clouzot and the noted collector André Level wrote in 1919, were “easily recognizable” and “without interest,” aesthetically empty testament to the way “the arrival of the European has broken the chain of traditions and polluted the sources of native art.”⁴⁰ According to Paul Guillaume, the most important early dealer of this material,

³⁶ For non-French collectors who looked to Paris as a primary source for objects in this period, see Jacob Epstein, *Epstein: An Autobiography* (London, 1955); Liliane Meffre, *Carl Einstein, 1885–1940: Itinéraires d’une pensée moderne* (Paris, 2002); Mary Ann Meyers, *Art, Education, and African-American Culture: Albert Barnes and the Science of Philanthropy* (New York, 2003); the discussion of Josef Müller in Louis Perrois, *Ancestral Art of Gabon from the Collections of the Barbier-Mueller Museum* (Dallas, 1986); and Miklós Szalay, ed., *African Art from the Han Coray Collection, 1916–1928* (Munich, 1998).

³⁷ For a broadly conceived account of the sociocultural consequences of colonial domination in Equatorial Africa, see Jan Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforests: Toward a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa* (Madison, Wis., 1990); on the impact of the draft, see Gregory Mann, *Native Sons: West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century* (Durham, N.C., 2006).

³⁸ See, for example, the account of the early collecting career of Pierre Vérité, as described in the lavish catalogue prepared for the sale of his collection by Alain de Monbrison and Pierre Amrouche: *Encheres Rive Gauche, Arts primitifs: Collection Vérité* (Paris, 2006).

³⁹ Coombes, *Reinventing Africa*, 43–62.

⁴⁰ Henri Clouzot and André Level, “L’art nègre,” *La gazette des beaux-arts* 61, no. 700 (July–Sep-

by 1907 the art of sculpture “had long been dead in Africa, and only the ancestral heirlooms, centuries old and sacred, were to be desired.” Guillaume echoed Clouzot and Level in his assertion that these “heirlooms” were of superior quality because they came from pure cultures, “untouched by civilization” in the form of European incursions. As Guillaume and his co-author Thomas Munro wrote in their landmark 1926 text, *Primitive Negro Sculpture*, “The black ruled by European masters is a different being from his ancestors. The slave of the rubber plantation, lazy or rebellious, the petty thief along the water-front, the chief with eyes of solemn dignity above a parody of European clothing, the mission school-boy puzzled with Christian doctrine—these are not the makers of African art.” At best, these colonized Africans were careful custodians of the great objects their ancestors had made; at worst, they were “uninspired craftsmen, . . . chipping wood or ivory into a stiff, characterless image for foreign trade.”⁴¹ The antithesis of the “authentic” object was thus the souvenir: where pre-colonial sculptures were allegedly made for altruistic, deeply spiritual reasons, their colonial successors seemed irredeemably tainted by the venal motives of creators trapped in the sticky web of imperial commerce.⁴²

This tendency to equate antiquity with aesthetic quality led Guillaume to establish what he called “a code by which objects can be ranked according to their age and beauty”—one that involved ascribing surprising dates, derived “by deduction, and by divination as well,” to the objects he considered most admirable.⁴³ In *Primitive Negro Sculpture*, for instance, he dated works by Dan, Baule, and Fang sculptors to the thirteenth, twelfth, or even fifth century C.E.; he went even further in the magazine he edited and published, *Les arts à Paris*, asserting that “archaeologists do not hesitate to date certain ancient pieces to a period that long predates the Christian era.”⁴⁴ These dramatic claims played an important role in Guillaume’s strategy for marketing African objects as high-priced works of art rather than as curiosities or museum supplies—which is how they had previously been sold. Age and aesthetic quality, in his estimation, were closely correlated, and he did not hesitate to take a figure as eminent as Picasso to task for his advocacy of the “dangerous opinion” that “dates” were of “no importance” in the aesthetic assessment of African sculptures.⁴⁵ In Guillaume’s connoisseurship of African sculpture, as his correspondence with the American collector Albert Barnes suggests, age became the lens through which the artistic quality of an African object was perceived: he considered certain objects to

tember 1919): 313–314. Level, as organizer of the famous Peau de l’ours investment group before World War I, played a central role in the shaping of the market for modernist art as it came to exist between the wars. See FitzGerald, *Making Modernism*, 15–46.

⁴¹ Paul Guillaume and Thomas Munro, *Primitive Negro Sculpture* (New York, 1926), 2, 13, 9–10, 13. All passages quoted here appear in both the English- and French-language versions of this text. See Guillaume and Munro, *La sculpture nègre primitive*, trans. Paul Guillaume (Paris, 1929).

⁴² This equation of aesthetic power in African sculpture with the spiritual purity of the anonymous creator’s intention—an idea that echoes nineteenth-century views of medieval art—is an enduring trope that first appeared in the earliest systematic critical attempt to approach ethnographic objects as art. See Carl Einstein, *Negerplastik* (1915; repr., Munich, 1920), xiii–xvi.

⁴³ Barnes Foundation Archives, Merion, Pa., letter from Paul Guillaume to Albert Barnes, November 6, 1924.

⁴⁴ “Actualités,” *Les arts à Paris* 1 (March 15, 1918): 3.

⁴⁵ “Une esthétique nouvelle—l’art nègre,” *Les arts à Paris* 4 (May 15, 1919): 3.

be “older” because they were formally more “vital.”⁴⁶ While Guillaume’s early dates were always controversial, and while other dealers and critics frequently rejected them in favor of the norm now accepted by scholars—that the vast majority of African wood sculptures then available in Europe were made in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—his emphasis on antiquity remained a defining aspect of the primitive art aesthetic.

Even interwar French skeptics of Guillaume’s chronology shared his sense of the essential kinship between ancient sculpture and the wooden objects that were arriving from Africa in growing numbers. Generally, commentators justified this conception with arguments based on perceived formal similarities and commonly accepted notions about the ahistorical nature of African cultures.⁴⁷ Formally, the arguments depended on a resemblance between certain African and ancient Egyptian sculptures, noted as early as 1900 by the ethnographer Maurice Delafosse.⁴⁸ Clouzot and Level made this common comparison as well, but took it a step further. (See Figure 1.) Drawing on a broader conception of the nature of “the primitive mind,” they argued for the essential antiquity of even relatively recent African sculptures, provided they had been produced under conditions free from European influence:

[African sculpture] permits us to capture, in a period remarkably close to our own—a hundred-fifty or a hundred years, perhaps—the technique of a primitive art and the survival of forms doubtless diminished in force and vitality by repetition, but which, in contrast to classical forms, have not continued their evolution and have thus remained fixed in their age-old archaism.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ While Guillaume occasionally expresses opinions in his correspondence about the poor quality of other African sculpture collections—in particular, the famous one established by Stewart Culin at the Brooklyn Museum—he rarely spells out the explicit reasons for his judgments. Instead, the connection he drew between age and aesthetic quality emerges most clearly in a comparative analysis of two figures from the Lagoon region of present-day Côte d’Ivoire in *Primitive Negro Sculpture* (misidentified as “Guinea,” pp. 126–129). Christa Clarke argues convincingly that this portion of the text was written not by Guillaume but by Thomas Munro under the close guidance of Albert Barnes. At the same time, however, the date attributions on which it is premised—that one figure was made in the fourteenth century and the other in the fifteenth (p. iii)—are clearly Guillaume’s, and it is reasonable to suppose that his chronological judgment was implicitly based on an assessment of the differences in sculptural quality explicitly articulated in the text. For a few letters indicating Guillaume’s assessment of Culin’s taste, see Barnes Foundation Archives, letter from Barnes to Guillaume, October 6, 1922; letter from Guillaume to Barnes, November 6, 1922; letter from Guillaume to Barnes, February 16, 1923; and letter from Guillaume to Barnes, April 15, 1923. For Clarke’s analysis of Barnes’s and Munro’s roles in the writing of *Primitive Negro Sculpture*, see Christa J. Clarke, “Defining Taste: Albert Barnes and the Promotion of African Art in the United States during the 1920s” (PhD. diss., University of Maryland, 1998), 82–117. A more condensed presentation of the case appears in Clarke, “Defining African Art: Primitive Negro Sculpture and the Aesthetic Philosophy of Albert Barnes,” *African Arts* 36, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 40–51, 92, 93.

⁴⁷ For the formulation of this argument about the alleged historical stasis of “primitive” peoples that would have been most familiar to early connoisseurs in Paris, see Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures* (Paris, 1910). Broader overviews are provided by William B. Cohen, *The French Encounter with Africans: White Response to Blacks, 1530–1880* (Bloomington, Ind., 1980); Yves Monnier, *L’Afrique dans l’imaginaire français: Fin du XIX^e–début du XX^e siècle* (Paris, 1999); and Christopher L. Miller, *Blank Darkness: Africanist Discourse in French* (Chicago, 1985), 3–65.

⁴⁸ Maurice Delafosse, “Sur les traces probables de civilisation égyptienne et d’hommes de race blanche à la Côte d’Ivoire,” *L’Anthropologie* 11 (July–December 1900): 431–451, 543–568, 677–690;

⁴⁹ Clouzot and Level, “L’art nègre,” 315.



FIGURE 1: Illustration from Henri Clouzot and André Level, "L'art nègre," *La gazette des beaux-arts* 61, no. 700 (July–September 1919): 318, showing a figure by an unidentified Baule sculptor from Côte d'Ivoire. Clouzot and Level, in their description, noted that the face of "this figure evokes Egyptian influence, and from afar, the great sculpture of king Khafra" (318), by which they probably meant the seated figure crowned by the god Horus, excavated in 1860 and now in the collection of the Egyptian Museum, Cairo. Note the visible crack that emphasizes the figure's age, the crisp details, and the glossy, dark "telephone patina" prized by collectors in this period.

The formal archaism of African sculpture was so profound, Clouzot and Level suggested, that it might even provoke “one to go further and see the very source of the artistic genius of Egypt in the black race.”⁵⁰

From the very beginning of their career as “art objects,” therefore, African sculptures, while in fact about the same age as the modernist works they inspired, struck critics and collectors not as contemporary creations but as “antiquities.” This perception served two notable purposes, one economic and the other aesthetic. Economically, equating validity as a “true work of art” with visible signs of age established a criterion of scarcity in the face of the steadily growing supply of African objects that came to Paris during the interwar years. Cracks, weathering, and evidence of extensive handling distinguished a “true work of art” from a mere souvenir, even if both were formally quite similar, because the ostensibly older work would be easier to imagine as having come from a period before “polluting” contact with Europeans had occurred. Since the realities of colonialism rendered African sculptors anonymous by the time their works arrived in the metropole, this criterion became crucial: in the absence of a signature, aura needed to be created by other means, as it was in the fields of medieval and ancient art. Aesthetically, the equation of “authentic” African sculptures with “antiquities” took advantage of an already existing cultural paradigm for the appreciation of weathered, fragmentary, unsigned, and radically decontextualized sculptures. Collectors and critics demonstrated the power of this paradigm by mimicking the classicist’s practice of assigning sobriquets to notable objects: where connoisseurs of Hellenistic art had the “Victory of Samothrace,” for example, their Africanist counterparts had the “Pahouin Venus.”⁵¹

A head from the collection of Paul Guillaume, attributed to a Fang sculptor and photographed for one of the earliest books devoted to *art nègre*, demonstrates how the homology between African sculptures and antiquities functioned in material terms.⁵² (See Figure 2.) Even as the head shows pronounced formal similarities to what would have been, in 1923, cutting-edge modernist sculpture, it also bears signs of what would seem to a Western observer to be considerable age. The head itself appears to be a fragment of a larger figure—though in fact it was probably not—and has an extensively rubbed, chipped, and abraded surface. Taken out of context, this wear appears to be the result of purely natural processes, but the bulk of it was more likely a consequence of traditional Fang practice: either it was damage from gnawing rats, attracted by the regular libations of palm oil poured on the figure, or it was the result of ritual handling and intentional abrasion, which produced small shavings for use in medicinal potions.⁵³ What might have seemed to Guillaume, or any other

⁵⁰ Ibid., 321.

⁵¹ The “Pahouin” or “Black Venus,” a reliquary figure by a sculptor from the Fang people of present-day Gabon currently in the collection of the Musée Dapper in Paris, received its sobriquet in 1933 when it was exhibited in London by the well-known French dealer André Lefevre. See LaGamma, *Eternal Ancestors*, 178.

⁵² Henri Clouzot and André Level, *Sculptures africaines et océaniques: Colonies françaises et Congo belge* (Paris, 1923), plate XXII.

⁵³ For rats, see Susan Mullin Vogel, *African Aesthetics: The Carlo Monzino Collection* (New York, 1986), 148; for abrasion, see Louis Perrois and Marta Sierra Delage, *The Art of Equatorial Guinea: The Fang Tribes* (New York, 1990), 110. According to Perrois, this intentional abrasion was generally focused on a few key areas of the sculpture: nose, mouth, hands, and navel.



FIGURE 2: Plate XXII from Henri Clouzot and André Level, *Sculptures africaines et océaniques: Colonies françaises et Congo belge* (Paris, 1923). This object is now in the collection of the Musée d'art moderne de Troyes.

Western viewer of this photograph, to be evidence of centuries of wear, then, was actually the product of perhaps several decades of use.

As with antiquities, not all signs of age and use in African sculpture were created equal, and those that were considered most desirable changed over time. In the early 1920s, critics who admired African sculptures appreciated what one writer described as “the firmness and finish of their carving, the just appreciation of their volumes, the surface polish obtained with who knows what rudimentary instruments.”⁵⁴ Sharp details and darkly lustrous patinas (as in Figure 1) were what connoisseurs admired most. During this period, as Roy Sieber has noted, French dealers, restorers, and collectors sometimes doctored their objects in order to achieve the preferred deep, even sheen.⁵⁵ This process entailed removing traces of sacrificial offerings and repeatedly applied pigment, sometimes along with an application of stain or wax to even out and darken the color of the wood. In the case of the object illustrated in Figure 3, a twin figure from the present-day Republic of Benin photographed in 1919, a restorer has probably stripped the sculpture of the encrusted camwood paste and indigo powder that would originally have covered it, and given it a new, varnished finish.⁵⁶ After this treatment, the figure still looks as if it has seen use, but its earlier, alien-seeming surface has been replaced by the mellow, glossy, gently timeworn patina of high-end Western antique furniture. As Euro-American taste changed with the rise of surrealism in the late 1920s, the range of aesthetically acceptable surfaces broadened to include heavier encrustation and duller, more complex finishes. The African sculptures preferred by the surrealists were those that tended to strike Western viewers as extravagantly strange—evocative portals into exotic, mysterious, imaginative universes—and a complex, discomfiting surface could add powerfully to that effect.⁵⁷ (See Figure 4.)

Age—or rather, the appearance of age—was not enough to transform an African object from an ethnographic specimen into a work of art, however. Once it was determined to be authentically old and worthy of admiration for its formal qualities, an object would have to be presented in a particular way for its aesthetic value to become fully visible. Isolation was the most important aspect of this presentation: to be legible as a “sculpture,” an object needed to be singled out, mounted, and displayed in a manner designed to make the most of the formal characteristics that appealed to Western connoisseurs.⁵⁸ Previously, on the comparatively rare occasions

⁵⁴ Louis Sonolet, “L’art dans l’Afrique occidentale française,” *La gazette des beaux-arts* 65, no. 740 (September–October 1923): 232.

⁵⁵ Doran H. Ross and Roy Sieber, “Interview with Roy Sieber,” *African Arts* 25, no. 4 (October 1992): 40.

⁵⁶ See Eva L. R. Meyerowitz, “Ibeji Statuettes from Yoruba, Nigeria,” *Man* 44 (September–October 1944): 105–107. While she does not mention this particular object, Meyerowitz notes that Yoruba commemorative twin figures were frequently subject to “a vigorous cleaning process” once they were in “European hands.” In addition, she writes, “some European collectors unfortunately polish up their African carvings to such an extent as to alter their appearance completely.”

⁵⁷ The clearest indication of this aesthetic change is the African objects illustrated in the catalogue for the 1931 sale of works from the primitive art collections of André Breton and Paul Eluard. See Alphonse Bellier, Charles Ratton, and Louis Carré, *Collection André Breton et Paul Eluard: Sculptures d’Afrique, d’Amérique, d’Océanie* (Paris, 1931). For a more detailed study of the surrealist reception of primitive art, see Louise Tythacott, *Surrealism and the Exotic* (London, 2003).

⁵⁸ Susan Vogel has explored this phenomenon by playing with display conventions in a variety of provocative ways in her exhibitions of African sculpture. For the best-known example, see Vogel, *Art/Artifact: African Art in Anthropology Collections* (New York, 1988).



FIGURE 3: Illustration from Clouzot and Level, "*L'art nègre*," 316, showing a commemorative twin figure (Ere Ibeji) by an unidentified Yoruba sculptor from the present-day Republic of Benin. Though it still appears "antique," the surface of this figure was likely cleaned and refinished after its arrival in France.




FIGURE 4: Detail from Plate II in Bellier, Ratton, and Carré, *Collection André Breton et Paul Eluard*. The object is identified as a figure from Côte d'Ivoire, probably by a Baule sculptor. Note the complex, rough, and heavily encrusted patina, which is the result of accumulated sacrificial offerings.

when illustrations showing African sculptures were published, such objects had tended to appear as either parts of trophy assemblages or elements of local color. Images of this kind generally figured in travel literature—memoirs of colonial adventures, missionary travelogues, or magazines such as the popular *Tour du monde*. At the end of the 1910s, in contrast, it became increasingly common for African pieces to be photographed individually, and for hierarchical distinctions to be drawn between objects that could be perceived as “sculptures” worthy of solitary contemplation, such as the Fang head in Figure 2, and mere “everyday items” like spears or nets. Items perceptible as “sculpture” then became candidates for illustration in journals explicitly devoted to art rather than ethnography, religion, or travel.⁵⁹

In the Fang head’s novel state of splendid isolation, the contrasting surfaces of the sculpture, its neutral background, and its immaculate wooden base—the truncated-pyramid form marks it as the probable work of Guillaume’s primary *socleur*, Kichizo Inagaki, who also mounted objects for Rodin—emphasize the figure’s otherness.⁶⁰ In its new context, the object’s weathered patina testifies to its earlier existence in a distant cultural world. For dealers and collectors throughout the interwar period, and—as Steiner shows—for connoisseurs today as well, surfaces of this kind were an essential factor distinguishing works of primitive art from their “civilized” counterparts.⁶¹ Modernist conventions of display, both in photographs and in museum installations, intensified the power of the distinctive surfaces of these objects by further emphasizing contrast, setting the stark, crisp surfaces of pale walls and geometric bases against the variously patinated surfaces of the sculptures themselves. James Johnson Sweeney’s 1935 exhibition of African sculpture at MoMA, which depended on French dealers and institutions for many of the objects it included, marked a crucial juncture in the emergence of this now time-honored approach to the display of primitive art.⁶² (See Figure 5.) Sweeney’s strategy of throw-

⁵⁹ Wendy A. Grossman has done crucial work on the role of photography in the early reception of African objects as art in the United States and Europe. See Grossman, *Man Ray, African Art, and the Modernist Lens* (Washington, D.C., 2009); and Grossman, “Photography at the Crossroads: African Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in Cordula Grewe, ed., *Die Schau des Fremden: Ausstellungskonzepte zwischen Kunst, Kommerz und Wissenschaft* (Stuttgart, 2006), 317–340. For early examples of illustrations of African sculpture in art magazines in addition to the examples cited elsewhere in this essay, see, e.g., Carl Einstein, “De l’art nègre,” *L’action* 12 (April 1922): 47–56; Henri Clouzot and André Level, “La décoration des textiles au Congo Belge,” *L’amour de l’art* 4, no. 6 (June 1923): 569–572; P.V.M., “Les arts anciens de l’Afrique noire,” *L’amour de l’art* 10, no. 11 (November 1930): 462–465; images published throughout Paul Guillaume’s journal *Les arts à Paris*, 1918–1935; *L’art nègre*, Special Issue, *Cahiers d’art* 2, no. 7–8 (1927); and Arsène Alexandre, “Le blanc et le noir,” *La Renaissance de l’art français* 2, no. 8 (August 1919): 317–322.

⁶⁰ See Bénédicte Garnier, “Kichizo Inagaki, ébéniste de Rodin,” in François Blanchetière et al., eds., *Rodin: Le rêve japonais* (Paris, 2007), 86–92.

⁶¹ Steiner, *African Art in Transit*, 100–106.

⁶² The documents held in the Archives of the Museum of Modern Art gathered in the carton “Exhibition 39” provide a clear sense of the crucial role that the French dealers Charles Ratton and Louis Carré played in the 1935 MoMA exhibition—contributing not only objects but also the benefit of their knowledge and connoisseurship. See especially the list of lenders, which shows that the three primary donors to the exhibition, in terms of number of objects, were Ratton, Carré, and Paul Guillaume’s widow; and the substantial folder devoted to Ratton in “Registrar Correspondence.” See also the Joseph and Ernest Brummer Records in the Cloisters Archive Room, Metropolitan Museum of Art Libraries, New York, folder “Correspondence 1932–1937,” letter from Ernest Brummer to Joseph Brummer dated January 21, 1935, in which Ernest, reporting from Paris to his brother in New York, mentions Ratton’s departure for the United States with a substantial inventory of African objects purchased in partnership with Carré, whom Ernest calls “crazy” for making such a large financial commitment.



FIGURE 5: Installation view of the exhibition *African Negro Art*, Museum of Modern Art, New York, March 18–May 19, 1935. Museum of Modern Art, New York.

ing the works themselves into sharp relief by placing them in the proverbial “white cube,” where they were isolated against a contrasting, self-consciously minimal backdrop, remains powerfully influential, one of the most evident signs distinguishing the African and Oceanic galleries of art museums from their more ethnographically oriented counterparts in museums of natural history.⁶³

As this close connection between display practices for primitive art and contemporary art indicates, traditional African sculptures had a very different emotional impact on sympathetic Western connoisseurs than classical antiquities did, despite certain key homologies of presentation. In place of a long association with mar-moreal academic tradition, these newly imported objects evoked the edgy *frisson* of early modernism. Clouzot and Level observed that African sculpture was “disconcerting . . . the furthest perhaps from the Greek canon that humanity has ever seen.”⁶⁴ Guillaume, similarly, wrote that certain alien characteristics present in African sculptures, from the “bodily organs emphatic and not to be ignored” to the “magic clay” that covered some objects, had a power to “reawaken in civilized man disapproved and primitive impulses,” provoking “a sickening repulsion, a thrill of fear, and at the same time, perhaps, a strange and inexplicable fascination.”⁶⁵ Writ-

⁶³ The term “white cube” was coined by Brian O’Doherty in an influential series of articles critiquing modernist conventions of display published in *Artforum* in 1976, reprinted in O’Doherty, *Inside the White Cube: The Ideology of the Gallery Space* (Berkeley, Calif., 1999).

⁶⁴ Clouzot and Level, “L’art nègre,” 311.

⁶⁵ Guillaume and Munro, *Primitive Negro Sculpture*, 48–49.

ing in 1927, the critic Marcel Astruc took this idea still further in an elaborate apostrophe to a famous Fang head—now in the collection of the Metropolitan Museum—on display in Guillaume's gallery. (See Figure 6.) The visible signs of damage the sculpture showed, such as its "ravaged mouth," he wrote, only added to its power—these abrasions and cracks were proof of a "royal dignity" in the face of "the outrages of nature," and to him evoked a register of feeling far more profound than the pallid sentiments expressed by conventional Western art. Not everyone could be moved by such an object, Astruc rhapsodized,

But some love you, O Secret one! Those who are tired of the merely pretty, which is always there in the trifles that pass for our art. Nothing of the kind with you. The artisan who made you did not cheapen religious thought as ours do, in order to pay tribute to the second-rate god they call Beauty. He sought to make you not beautiful, but terrible, perhaps; it is we who give you the qualities of beauty, because now we are made in such a way that all our feelings are for the form, and are no longer able to experience the spirit.⁶⁶

In Astruc's account, the Fang head became both a work to be appreciated as a picturesquely aged, fragmentary testament to a lost culture—in the same manner as a conventional antiquity—and something else, a manifesto proclaiming a typically modernist disdain for the "merely pretty" in favor of more profound aesthetic pursuits.

Here, the impact of this head resembles the impact of the Stravinsky-Nijinsky ballet *Le sacre du printemps*, as described in 1913 by the critic Alexis Roland-Manuel, quoting the original program notes:

The most striking thing at first, is that despite its apparent complexity, this work has a robust simplicity entirely unmarred by rhetoric. Robust and clear . . . ; no deceptive whispers: the ardent mystery of spring, "the obscure and immense sensation of all things at the hour when nature renews their forms," is not evoked with a vain, coquettish stammer that conceals underlying artifice. These stammers have the courage to express themselves without affectation. To endow his work with the stern force, the enormous power of these primitive rites, which far predate those of Dionysus, to evoke "the total Panic rise of the universal sap," the musician . . . has to break the hallowed rules, must deliberately change the color of *his* music, and of music *itself*.⁶⁷

Like *Le sacre du printemps*, then, the Fang head that Astruc admired in Guillaume's gallery derived its aesthetic power from the way it evoked an early-twentieth-century Western vision of the "terrible" yet revitalizing "primitive." When juxtaposed, however, the two descriptions also differ from one another in a crucial respect: their attribution of intention. Where Roland-Manuel presented *Le sacre* as the result of a very modern artist's conscious choice to abandon "hallowed rules," Astruc saw the Fang head as a long-dead anonymous "artisan's" articulation of exactly such rules, in the form of a profound and unquestioned religious faith.

The gap between Astruc's spontaneously devout, ancient African "artisan" and Roland-Manuel's "deliberately" innovative primitivist musician reveals a historical displacement at the heart of this early appreciation of traditional African sculp-

⁶⁶ Marcel Astruc, "A une idole noire," *Vogue* 8, no. 3 (March 1, 1927): 39.

⁶⁷ Alexis Roland-Manuel, "Le sacre du printemps," *Montjoie! Organe de l'impérialisme artistique française* 1, no. 9–10 (June 14–29, 1913): 13, emphasis in the original.



FIGURE 6: Unidentified Fang sculptor, Gabon, *Reliquary Head (Nlo Bieri)*, nineteenth or twentieth century, wood, metal, palm oil, $8\frac{5}{16} \times 9\frac{3}{4} \times 6\frac{5}{8}$ in. (46.5 × 24.8 × 16.8 cm). Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. The Michael C. Rockefeller Memorial Collection, Bequest of Nelson A. Rockefeller, 1979. 1979.206.229.

ture—a displacement that did much to shape the ambivalent nature of primitive art as an aesthetic category. By insisting that the aesthetic quality of an object was tied to its antiquity and its imbrication in a set of values that contact with Europeans would inevitably destroy, early connoisseurs deprived contemporary Africans of cre-

ative agency while at the same time projecting a modernist conception of art history onto African sculptural production.⁶⁸ The best African sculptures, as these connoisseurs saw them, had a formal élan that they equated with the avant-garde. Since the ethnological understanding commonly accepted during the early decades of the twentieth century considered “primitive” cultures to be ahistorical, the notion of an African avant-garde was a contradiction in terms. As a result, it seemed necessary to account for the aesthetic vitality of certain African sculptures by imagining them to date from alternative moments of rupture: what Le Corbusier, in a short text on “so-called primitive” sculpture, termed “creative periods, when a society constructed its tools, its language, its thought, its gods.” Once these gods had been invented, he wrote, echoing Clouzot and Level, all that was left was “style.”⁶⁹ In this way, Western observers constructed traditional African sculpture as both the archaic foundation of a “classicism” and an example of the formally “modern.” The African version of the avant-garde artist, according to this understanding, became a mythical rather than an actual being, a primal genius who created the “classical” vocabulary that his culture would endlessly repeat, with steadily diminishing vigor—but that Western artists could transform into the starting point for an entirely new process of formal evolution. Thus, while the notion of authenticity in primitive art accorded a new dignity to people from colonized societies by acknowledging them as potential creators of works that could rival or even surpass the best of Western sculpture, its classicizing notion of antiquity also tended to make that dignity something always already lost.

TO UNDERSTAND THE IMPLICATIONS of the idea of primitive art for Africans and people of African descent in French colonies, we need to consider how that idea moved across national borders, carried by the cultural prestige of its initial Parisian advocates. Almost from its inception, the market for African objects as art in Paris had a strong transatlantic dimension, which depended heavily on the American willingness to acknowledge French preeminence in matters artistic. Paul Guillaume’s most famous text, *Primitive Negro Sculpture*, was a typical product of this exchange: thanks to the support of American collector Albert Barnes, it appeared first in English. Guillaume’s American co-author, Thomas Munro, an art educator in Barnes’s employ, probably did more than half of the actual writing, but he nevertheless shared billing with Guillaume, in deference to the latter’s far greater cultural prestige.⁷⁰ As

⁶⁸ For perhaps the classic statement of this conception, which envisions the history of modern art as a series of movements engaged in dialectical progress toward “geometrical” and “non-geometrical” abstraction, see the art-historical flowchart prepared by the Museum of Modern Art’s first director, Alfred H. Barr, Jr., on the original dust jacket of Barr, *Cubism and Abstract Art* (New York, 1936).

⁶⁹ Le Corbusier, “Les arts dits primitifs dans la maison d’aujourd’hui” (flyer, Paris, 1935), 2.

⁷⁰ As Christa Clarke has shown (see fn. 46), Guillaume’s role in the production of the text was less extensive than his credit as co-author would indicate. It is nevertheless possible to judge the extent to which the book reflected his opinions by comparing the English-language edition with the French translation he published in Paris three years later. Guillaume’s translation retained all the passages quoted in this article, but eliminated the final chapter of the original edition, which was devoted to a series of elaborate formal analyses of particular objects in the Barnes collection. This omission enraged Barnes, and did much to contribute to Guillaume’s final rupture with him in 1929. Guillaume and Munro, *La sculpture nègre primitive*; and Barnes Foundation Archives, letter from Barnes to Guillaume, March 1, 1929.

early as 1914, working through his contact Marius de Zayas, Guillaume sent objects to New York, where they were featured in a landmark exhibition at the photographer Alfred Stieglitz's gallery 291.⁷¹ *Statuary in Wood by African Savages: The Root of Modern Art* was perhaps the first show to present African sculptures in the modernist style that would reach its apogee in MoMA's galleries twenty years later.⁷² Similarly, as Wendy Grossman has shown, American photographers, including Charles Sheeler, Man Ray, and Walker Evans, played key roles in developing the conventions of representation that would be used in images of primitive art for decades to come.⁷³

In the American context, the modernist aesthetic approach to traditional African sculpture was closely tied to race politics, even as it recapitulated the ambivalences of the French discourse of connoisseurship: in New York, as in Paris, these objects generally were seen not as contemporary creations, but as antiquities—"ancestral" sources of an alternative classical tradition. The African American philosopher Alain Locke, for example, in his influential 1925 anthology *The New Negro*, pointed with pride to the "growing influence of African art upon European art in general." For him, traditional African sculptures were "arts of the forefathers," which had the potential to give contemporary black artists "the lesson of a classic background, the lesson of discipline, of style, of technical control pushed to the limits of technical mastery."⁷⁴ At the same time, a growing number of white collectors saw an interest in African sculpture as a natural complement to progressive racial attitudes. Barnes, for instance, served as a bridge between Guillaume and African American intellectuals; several photographs of works from his collection appeared in Locke's anthology. The numerous addresses of American primitive art collectors that Parisian dealer Louis Carré gathered during his trip to New York for the 1935 MoMA show provide further proof of the large moneyed public that was willing to embrace traditional African sculpture in the United States at the time.⁷⁵

Nevertheless, throughout this period, there was a difference in degree between American and French knowledge of these objects. Interwar Paris was in the throes of "negrophilia," a widespread fascination with things black, ranging from jazz to traditional African sculpture.⁷⁶ Jean-Louis Paudrat suggests that there were 147 private collections of African sculpture in the city by 1930, and in 1931, African objects fetched record prices in a pair of highly publicized auctions.⁷⁷ Certainly, the constant

⁷¹ See Paudrat, "From Africa," 153–154.

⁷² A photograph of the installation, designed by Edward Steichen, appeared in the 1916 issue of the journal *Camera Work*. See Grossman, *Man Ray, African Art, and the Modernist Lens*, 15.

⁷³ In addition to Grossman, "Photography at the Crossroads" and *Man Ray, African Art, and the Modernist Lens*, see Virginia-Lee Webb, *Perfect Documents: Walker Evans and African Art, 1935* (New York, 2000).

⁷⁴ Alain Locke, "The Legacy of the Ancestral Arts," in Locke, ed., *The New Negro: Voices of the Harlem Renaissance* (1925; repr., New York, 1997), 256.

⁷⁵ Archives nationales de France, fonds Louis Carré, 389 AP 29, dr. 1, "Relations avec l'amérique, secrétariat, 1935–1945," subfolder marked "Voyage New York 1935."

⁷⁶ See Petrine Archer-Straw, *Negrophilia: Avant-Garde Paris and Black Culture in the 1920s* (New York, 2000); Jody Blake, *Le Tumulte Noir: Modernist Art and Popular Entertainment in Jazz-Age Paris* (University Park, Pa., 1999).

⁷⁷ Jean-Louis Paudrat, "Primitive Arts in Paris on the Threshold of the Thirties," *Art Tribal: Bulletin de l'Association des amis du musée Barbier-Müller* (1996): 46. The two auctions were the sales of the collections of André Breton and Paul Eluard, and of Georges de Miré. See Bellier, Ratton, and Carré, *Collection André Breton et Paul Eluard*; and Alphonse Bellier, Charles Ratton, and Louis Carré, *Collection G. de Miré: Sculptures anciennes d'Afrique et d'Amérique* (Paris, 1931).

flow of businessmen, soldiers, and civil servants to and from the colonies meant that it would have been much more likely for enthusiasts of modest means to encounter African objects of a type that struck them as potentially “authentic” in the flea markets and antique shops of Paris than it would have been in the United States, where such objects appeared only as high-priced rarities in art galleries. The Paris Colonial Exposition of 1931 further intensified popular interest in African sculpture.⁷⁸ It was no accident, for example, that the French Equatorial Africa Pavilion at the 1931 Exposition included a “special vitrine devoted to *art nègre*,” which “showed the differences between authentic pieces of native art and those made *en série* for export,” presumably to prevent aspiring collectors from being duped into buying allegedly inferior objects.⁷⁹ By 1935, therefore, an appreciation of traditional African sculpture had already become a nostrum of progressive French taste. At the same time, the discipline of cultural anthropology in France underwent a profound shift, developing a new attitude toward the systematic use of data gathered through fieldwork. The key agents in this transformation were the Institut d’ethnologie, founded by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Marcel Mauss, and Paul Rivet in 1925, and the Musée ethnographique du Trocadéro, as reformed in 1928 by Rivet and Georges-Henri Rivière.⁸⁰ These institutions, as James Clifford has shown, provided training, financial support, and publicity for the work of Africanist anthropologists such as Marcel Griaule and Michel Leiris, who redefined the field in the 1930s.⁸¹ As a result of these twin developments—growing cultural acceptance and an expansion of ethnographic literature—French-language commentary on African art began to change, developing a more fine-grained sense of the original contexts in which sculptures were produced.⁸²

During the 1930s, an appreciation of the merits of primitive art grew deep enough roots in French culture to have an influence on colonial policy as well. This development occurred in the context of a broader movement that Gary Wilder has called “colonial humanism,” an effort on the part of left-leaning French colonial administrators after the First World War to foster “economic development, social welfare, and political order” in the empire through the cultivation of “an ethnological un-

⁷⁸ See Benoît de L’Estoile, *Le goût des autres: De l’exposition coloniale aux arts premiers* (Paris, 2010), 33–72; and Patricia A. Morton, *Hybrid Modernities: Architecture and Representation at the 1931 Colonial Exposition, Paris* (Cambridge, Mass., 2000).

⁷⁹ Henri Vallois, “L’Exposition coloniale de Paris et les congrès (1931),” *L’Anthropologie* 42 (1932): 57–58.

⁸⁰ For a classic analysis of this shift, see James Clifford, “On Ethnographic Surrealism,” in Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture*, 117–151. See also Alice L. Conklin, “The New ‘Ethnology’ and ‘La Situation Coloniale’ in Interwar France,” *French Politics, Culture and Society* 20, no. 2 (2002): 29–46; and Élise Dubuc, “Le futur antérieur du Musée de l’homme,” *Gradhiva* 24 (1998): 71–92.

⁸¹ As Clifford was the first to note, this generation of ethnographers had close ties to the artistic avant-garde. For a thought-provoking and useful exploration of these connections, see Julia Kelly, *Art, Ethnography, and the Life of Objects: Paris, c. 1925–35* (Manchester, 2007).

⁸² Perhaps the most influential early product of this intellectual shift was the Danish collector Carl Kjersmeier’s four-volume study of African sculpture, which organized objects taxonomically into ethnically and geographically defined “style centers.” The notion of “tribal style” that Kjersmeier’s work codified remains a powerful, if contested, theoretical lens for students of African art. See Kjersmeier, *Centres de style de la sculpture nègre africaine*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1935–1938). For assessments of Kjersmeier’s significance, see Laude, *La peinture française et l’art nègre*, 435; Grossman, *Man Ray, African Art, and the Modernist Lens*, 70–76. For a wide-ranging critique of this taxonomic approach, see Sidney Littlefield Kasfir, “One Tribe, One Style? Paradigms in the Historiography of African Art,” *History in Africa* 11 (1984): 163–193.

derstanding of indigenous society as a distinct, organic and dynamic totality.”⁸³ As this description indicates, advocates of colonial humanism took considerable inspiration from the new ethnography that began to emerge in the late 1920s. Administrators sympathetic to this approach reached the apex of their influence in the wake of the 1936 triumph of the Popular Front, a broad leftist coalition that formed in response to the rise of fascism at home and abroad. The most enduring metropolitan product of this ascendancy was the Musée de l’homme, established in 1937 under Rivet’s direction.⁸⁴

From the start, colonial humanism was hobbled by contradiction: colonial officials, after all, strove to understand indigenous cultures not just out of pure respect or admiration, but in order to be able to reshape those cultures according to a vision of “modernity” that they retained the sole authority to define and impose. While the ethnological framework on which colonial humanism was based, as embodied in the information-packed display cases of the Musée de l’homme, tended to downplay aestheticizing isolation in favor of a holistic view of a given group’s material culture, this new approach also fostered a sense among colonial administrators that various ethnic groups had artistic styles of their own, and that such distinctions should be preserved—both for the benefit of colonized peoples themselves, and to increase local production of craft goods imbued with an “authenticity” that would appeal to metropolitan consumers. Taken together, the experiences of two very different French West Africans, both also from 1937, give us a sense of the way primitive art, and the idea of authenticity that went along with it, crystallized the possibilities and paradoxes of this distinctive moment in the history of France’s empire.

In early September of that year, at the invitation of Marcel de Coppet, the new governor-general of French West Africa, thirty-year-old Léopold Sédar Senghor traveled to the colony’s capital, Dakar, to deliver a public lecture on colonial education.⁸⁵ Even at this early stage of what would become a distinguished and controversial career, Senghor’s exceptional position made him a local celebrity: an audience of more than a thousand came to hear him speak.⁸⁶ Senghor had been born in the coastal town of Joal, far from the historical centers of Franco-African power in Senegal, but he had nevertheless achieved an unprecedented degree of success in the French educational system.⁸⁷ He was the first African to receive a French gov-

⁸³ Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State*, 76.

⁸⁴ See Alice L. Conklin, “Civil Society, Science, and Empire in Late Republican France: The Foundation of Paris’s Museum of Man,” *Osiris*, 2nd ser., 17 (2002): 255–290; Dubuc, “Le futur antérieur du Musée de l’homme”; and Daniel J. Sherman, “‘Peoples Ethnographic’: Objects, Museums, and the Colonial Inheritance of French Ethnology,” *French Historical Studies* 27, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 669–703.

⁸⁵ The information presented here about the circumstances of Senghor’s speech comes from Janet G. Vaillant, *Black, French, and African: A Life of Léopold Sédar Senghor* (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), 147–165. For a useful timeline of Senghor’s life and accomplishments, see Jacques Louis Hymans, *Léopold Sédar Senghor: An Intellectual Biography* (Edinburgh, 1971), 259–262.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 151.

⁸⁷ Senegal occupied a distinctive situation among French colonies. From the 1880s, when the French extended their control over the region’s interior, Senegal was divided into two parts, the urban communes (Dakar, Gorée, Rufisque, and Saint-Louis) and the rural *protectorat*. Creoles and Africans born in the communes, known as *originaires*, enjoyed a privileged status as French citizens. Africans born outside the communes, such as Senghor, were subjects rather than citizens, and were accountable not to metropolitan French law but to the colonial legal system known as the *indigénat*. See Michael C. Lambert, “From Citizenship to Négritude: ‘Making a Difference’ in Elite Ideologies of Colonized Francophone West Africa,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35, no. 2 (April 1993): 239–262.

ernment scholarship to go to Paris for a degree in letters, and also the first to become an *agrégé de l'Université*. When he gave his speech in Dakar, he had already spent several years living in Paris and then in Tours, where he worked as a *lycée* teacher—another position that it was quite remarkable for an African to occupy. Coppet, a Popular Front appointee, saw Senghor as an important potential contributor to the new order that advocates of colonial humanism were seeking to create. The Dakar address came at the end of a government-funded research trip to Senegal, during which Senghor visited colonial schools in Dakar, Joal, Thiès, and the rural region of Sine-Saloum; he would subsequently present the results of his fieldwork both in a letter to Coppet—which the governor-general appears to have read with enthusiasm—and in an address to the 1937 International Congress on the Cultural Evolution of Colonial Peoples in Paris.⁸⁸

During his student years in Paris, in conjunction with a group of colleagues and fellow intellectuals from the West Indies—especially Aimé Césaire and Léon-Gontran Damas—Senghor had begun to develop a cultural conception of black identity that sought both to define its uniqueness and to encompass the broad geographical sweep of the African diaspora.⁸⁹ This conception was very much a product of the open, cosmopolitan atmosphere of Paris in the early 1930s, where modernist aesthetic concerns, popular negrophilia, a growing interest in ethnography, a small but visible group of African and West Indian migrants, an expatriate African American community, and an array of short-lived journals fostered a lively transatlantic engagement with the idea of “Africanness.”⁹⁰ The widespread appreciation of African sculpture, both among Parisian modernists and among figures in the Harlem Renaissance, proved a particularly important inspiration for Senghor. As he recollected in 1961, although Paris in the early 1930s might not have been “the largest museum of Negro-African art, nowhere else had *art nègre* been understood, commented on, praised, assimilated to such a degree.” This enthusiasm, “by revealing the values of my ancestral civilization to me, obliged me to adopt them and cultivate them in myself.”⁹¹ The courses Senghor took at the Institut d’ethnologie beginning in 1936 gave him an intellectual framework in which to place this aesthetic response, al-

⁸⁸ For Coppet’s attention to Senghor’s report, see the pencil notes from Coppet on its first page, Archives nationales du Sénégal [hereafter ANS], O-614 (31). Vaillant provides information about Senghor’s tour and presentation to the Paris conference; *Black, French, and African*, 155–165.

⁸⁹ These initial discussions would provide the foundation for what would later become the ideology of Négritude, which first reached a broad audience with the 1948 publication of Léopold Sédar Senghor, ed., *Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie nègre et malgache de langue française* (Paris, 1948).

⁹⁰ Perhaps the most important of these journals for the young Senghor was the *Revue du monde noir*, which grew out of the well-known salon held in the early 1930s by the Nardal sisters, Paulette, Andrée, and Jane. The Nardals, who were from the West Indies, served as a link between the Anglophone and Francophone black worlds; their *Revue* published many of the American writers associated with the Harlem Renaissance. See Hymans, *Léopold Sédar Senghor*, 33–35; and Vaillant, *Black, French, and African*, 94–97. For more on the transnational black community that took shape in Paris during this period, see Jennifer Anne Boittin, *Colonial Metropolis: The Urban Grounds of Anti-Imperialism and Feminism in Interwar Paris* (Lincoln, Neb., 2010); Brent Hayes Edwards, *The Practice of Diaspora: Literature, Translation, and the Rise of Black Internationalism* (Cambridge, Mass., 2003); Tyler Stovall, *Paris Noir: African Americans in the City of Light* (New York, 1996), esp. 25–129; and Sweeney, *From Fetish to Subject*.

⁹¹ Léopold Sédar Senghor, “Paris” [1961], in Senghor, *Liberté I: Négritude et humanisme* (Paris, 1964), 313–314.

lowing him to elaborate a conception of African civilizations as organic wholes distinct from those of Europe, but by no means inferior to them.⁹²

In his 1937 Dakar address, "The Cultural Problem in French West Africa," and the report to Coppet that followed it, Senghor sought to bring these ideas together by proposing a new cultural relationship between France and its African colonies.⁹³ The challenge facing Africans, he told his audience, was "to assimilate, not be assimilated." The future, he declared, would be "Afro-French." In practice, as he saw it, realizing this goal would involve creating a "two-headed" educational system in the colonies, which would teach students both French and African languages, history, and moral principles. Self-consciously echoing the title of Locke's landmark anthology, Senghor asserted that "bilingualism is precisely what will permit an integral expression of the new Negro [*nègre nouveau*]." To be effective, he added, this bi-cultural approach would need to be applied at all levels of the educational system, from Dakar's elite École William Ponty to the vocational training schools known as *maisons des artisans*. Indeed, for Senghor, the latter played a crucial "cultural role," since they "do not seek to train workers who execute a plan, but artisans who draw inspiration from old black techniques, which they enrich with the study of European techniques."⁹⁴ In his report to Coppet, Senghor directly linked the cultural exchange that this new educational system would promote to recent developments in European art:

French humanism . . . has a duty to enrich itself with new cultural contributions, and to seek them first in its colonies. It has a duty to investigate, to explore every corner of the French soul to reveal all of its hidden traits. And Africa, among other lands, will reveal these hidden traits by casting them in relief. French artists have not hesitated to assimilate black values and to make French works of them.

The colonial government, in turn, could push this process further by creating schools that permitted "black and white to meet," and to emerge from that meeting "richer, and with a stronger personality."⁹⁵

While Senghor's educational ideal of cultural encounter and mutual enrichment was compelling when stated in theoretical terms, realizing it proved much more complex. This difficulty emerged with particular clarity in the *maisons des artisans* that he singled out for special mention in his speech. For the officials who administered the education system in French West Africa, the mission of these institutions reflected the fundamental assumptions of French connoisseurs of *art nègre*. In practice, therefore, the goal was not Senghor's blending of African and European techniques, it was to "save" the venerable but disappearing traditions of "ancestral" African art by teaching "authentic" techniques and aesthetic principles to African sculptors, weavers, and other craftsmen who had succumbed to excessive European influence. Training "authentic" artists—or, as colonial administrators preferred to call them,

⁹² Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State*, 155. For a letter expressing Senghor's intention to study "African ethnology and linguistics" by commuting to Paris from Tours, see ANS O-718/931, letter to Albert Charton, *inspecteur général de l'enseignement*, dated August 17, 1935.

⁹³ See the typescript of the address and report in ANS O-614 (31). An abridged version of the address is collected in Senghor, *Liberté I*, 11–21.

⁹⁴ ANS O-614 (31), "Le problème culturel en AOF," 5, 4, 6, 13, 10.

⁹⁵ ANS O-614 (31), Report by Léopold Sédar Senghor to Marcel de Coppet, "L'enseignement en A.O.F.," 22.

“artisans”—on the ground, however, turned out to be considerably more difficult than transforming already existing objects into “authentic works of art.”

The case of an artist from Porto-Novo, in the present-day Republic of Benin—previously the French West African region of Dahomey—provides a revealing counterpoint to Senghor’s discovery of the culturally affirmative value of traditional African sculpture viewed in European terms. In 1931, Jean Dado, a talented young man who made a good living creating souvenirs for European visitors, received an opportunity to go to Paris and participate in the Colonial Exposition.⁹⁶ Upon his return, Coppet, then the regional governor, noticed the young man’s talent. When Coppet became governor-general, Dado was awarded a scholarship to the *Maison des artisans soudanais*, in the city of Bamako. The self-proclaimed mission of the school’s founder, the architect J. Le Gall, was to bring about “the plastic realization of the black race” by retraining Africans in the principles and values that had once inspired their own traditional sculpture. Dado quickly disappointed Le Gall. In a bitter report to the colony’s *inspecteur général de l’enseignement*, Le Gall noted that Dado, despite his self-confidence—his luggage tag proclaimed him to be an “*artiste graveur*”—“has until now made nothing but small pyro-engraved copies of drawings, on calabashes, or copies of post-cards on ostrich eggs.” Worse, Dado had proved entirely unwilling to abandon the aesthetic values that had served him so well as a maker of souvenirs: “from the point of view of his conceptions concerning native art,” Le Gall concluded, “he has totally lost the plastic sense of his race.”⁹⁷ To become “authentic,” Dado would have had to abandon his own creative impulses and follow the examples his French teacher provided, for instance by copying traditional Dahomean sculptures from photographs. Instead, pleading ill health and “serious malaises,” he chose to return to Porto-Novo after only a few months, abandoning his earlier ambition to be the sculptor who would supervise the decoration of the Dahomey Pavilion at the 1937 Paris Exposition.⁹⁸ The pavilion was eventually decorated with castings of more “authentic” earthen bas-reliefs from the palace of King Behanzin in Abomey.⁹⁹ Dado himself disappeared from the historical record after leaving Bamako. A few engraved calabashes may be sitting in the dusty shop of a French *brocanteur*, but until they are discovered, the only trace of his art that is accessible to us is the immaculate penmanship of his letters to colonial administrators.

Taken together, Senghor’s and Dado’s very different situations reveal the paradoxical nature of the idea of authenticity upon which the Western aesthetic category of primitive art depended. At root, this paradox involved a conflict between an affirmative vision of aesthetic universalism and a pluralistic awareness of cultural difference. Appreciation of these objects could foster a new kind of broader understanding, enabling proud bearers of one civilization to develop a sense of another’s subtleties and achievements; at the same time, however, the poignancy of the impact of these objects on Western viewers relied upon an implicit sense that the current descendants of their original sculptors, by virtue of having sacrificed their cultural distinctiveness to “modernity,” were forever unable to replicate the creative feats of

⁹⁶ ANS O-613 (31), dossier Jean Dado, report signed Albert Charton, January 20, 1937.

⁹⁷ Ibid., report signed J. Le Gall, March 16, 1937, 2, 1.

⁹⁸ Ibid., letter from Jean Dado, April 2, 1937.

⁹⁹ For a description of these bas-reliefs, see Michel Leiris and Jacqueline Delange, *African Art*, trans. Michael Ross (London, 1968), 191–192.

their ancestors. With this aesthetic double bind, early-twentieth-century connoisseurs of primitive art recapitulated a paradox at the heart of the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century French colonial enterprise. "Natives," in the grand tradition of French republicanism, were widely acknowledged as potential equals, but the imperatives of colonial domination meant that in practice equality was permanently deferred.¹⁰⁰ Even so, the ideal of potential equality could serve as a powerful lever for changing dominant assumptions—in Cooper's terms, as a way of renegotiating the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion that imperial power drew. In the hands of Senghor or African American intellectuals such as Locke, the "antique" sculpture of Africa could serve as a legacy on which subsequent generations of black artists could build. It promised to provide the basis for a positive sense of Pan-African identity in the same way that classical Greek and Roman sculpture did for Europeans, and as such could offer a glimpse of a new form of cultural and political solidarity.¹⁰¹

This ambivalent legacy continues to challenge scholars, who have simultaneously elaborated an incisive critique of the idea of authenticity that continues to inform connoisseurship of traditional African sculpture—as in the work of Price and Steiner—and a compelling case for the aesthetic value of what Susan Vogel has called "the classical arts of Africa," which "remain as rich and inexhaustible a subject of study as Roman art or Shakespeare."¹⁰² Rather than viewing these two lines of argument as mutually exclusive, it might be useful to consider them linked products of the historical context in which the idea of primitive art emerged: the French Third Republic, with its distinctive position as both a democracy founded on a universalistic conception of human rights and an imperial power that exerted authority through conquest. Efforts to come to grips with the ever-ramifying ways in which this political doubleness expressed itself have become central to the work of historians of colonial France; the case of primitive art suggests an additional dimension to the problem, one that allows us to sharpen our sense of the relationship between cultural and imperial power. Certainly, scholars have done much to explore the complex ways in which all empires generate categories of inclusion and exclusion, but in the case of primitive art, it is important not to lose sight of the specifically French conditions in which this particular category emerged. Artists, collectors, critics, and dealers all benefited from the remarkable influence that came from their residence in what was, at the time, the capital of the Western art world. They generally did not consider themselves propagandists for colonial expansion—many, in fact, strongly opposed it. Nevertheless, the way of seeing traditional African sculptures that they developed

¹⁰⁰ For two different perspectives on this paradox, see Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, and Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State*.

¹⁰¹ This conception of traditional African sculpture played an important role in the art history of post-independence Senegal, in part because of the influence of the Négritude-based cultural policy that Senghor developed as the country's first president. See Elizabeth Harney, *In Senghor's Shadow: Art, Politics, and the Avant-Garde in Senegal, 1960–1995* (Durham, N.C., 2004), esp. 1–104.

¹⁰² Susan Vogel, "Whither African Art? Emerging Scholarship at the End of an Age," *African Arts* 38, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 12. Sidney Littlefield Kasfir has ascribed this bifurcated approach to the position of African art scholarship, which, especially in the United States, has uneasily attempted to join the very different—and often contradictory—disciplinary concerns of anthropology and art history. See Kasfir, *African Art and the Colonial Encounter: Inventing a Global Commodity* (Bloomington, Ind., 2007), esp. ix–xi.

grew from a set of historically contingent assumptions about the nature of “primitive man” that resonated with the ideology of French colonialism. This system of connoisseurship also helped transform certain objects into “masterpieces of world art,” however, and by virtue of that act, made it possible for them to lead very different discursive lives elsewhere. In the context of colonialism, the idea of primitive art became—to borrow Benedict Anderson’s term—“modular,” susceptible to appropriation, redefinition, and use for a variety of conflicting purposes, not only in the French metropole and its colonies, but across the globe.¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, new ed. (London, 2006), 4.

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Featured Reviews

JULIA A. CLANCY-SMITH. *Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration, c. 1800–1900*. (The California World History Library, number 15.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2011. Pp. xv, 445. \$49.95.

In the past decade or so, Mediterranean history and Mediterranean studies have attracted increased attention among scholars writing in English. A number of monographs have appeared (not least Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell's monumental *Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* [2000]), journals have been established, conferences have been organized, and spirited debates have raged on the merits, limitations, and values of taking the Mediterranean as a unit of historical investigation. While this revived interest in the Mediterranean and its history has spurred valuable scholarship, the resurgence has generally tended to privilege states and empires as subjects of these histories, or has focused on specific ethnic networks and traced their members' movements and activities across the shores of the Mediterranean. In all these histories, North Africa has been, if not side-tracked, then clearly understudied and marginalized.

Julia A. Clancy-Smith's exceptional and magisterial book is thus a particularly welcome addition to the literature on Mediterranean history. First and foremost, by focusing on Tunisia, it shifts North Africa from the periphery to the center of Mediterranean history. Or, more accurately, it challenges the conception of a center-periphery and of a dichotomy between (Muslim) North Africa and (Christian) Europe by underlining the deep connections and flows that linked North Africa to other parts of the Mediterranean. Second, the book focuses on the half-decade preceding the establishment of a French protectorate in Tunisia in 1881. This is also a major contribution, since the body of historical research on the colonial period far outweighs that preceding it, and since the history of migrations around the Mediterranean has received greater attention for the later part of the nineteenth century. Third, Clancy-Smith's work familiarizes an English-reading audience with the vast and rich body of literature on North Africa produced in North African, French, and Italian universities.

An opus magnum, this book is clearly the outcome of the author's deep knowledge and decades of research in Tunisian, North African, and Mediterranean history, focusing on populations hitherto marginalized or deemed nearly invisible in previous "traditional" histories: trans-Mediterranean migrants who made their way to Tunisia (often via other parts of North Africa, such as Algeria) from various corners of the Mediterranean, particularly Malta and Sicily. As Clancy-Smith clearly states, her "objective is not merely to salvage these life stories but primarily to understand how Tunisians, defined roughly as subjects of the Husaynid dynasty, as well as other city residents viewed, lived in close proximity to, and interacted or coped with immigrants. Another aim is to trace how a borderland society came into existence and what that meant for Tunisia's history in the long term" (p. 6). Needless to say, this is a particularly ambitious and difficult task since migrants mostly left a documented trace "when they faced some difficulty—lack of housing, unpaid debts, violent conflict with neighbors—that brought into play local authorities, either Tunisian, or consular, or both" (p. 15). Clancy-Smith rises to the challenge by uncovering and using a plethora of original sources, assembling them in a creative manner, and reading them against the grain and between the lines. She adroitly weaves vignettes with large-scale structural analysis, combining the micro and the macro. The result is a lively and thought-provoking social history that raises important questions, and suggests many avenues for future research.

This remarkably wide-ranging book is organized into nine chapters in addition to an introduction and an epilogue. The first six chapters are prosopographies, while the last three trace individual life stories more fully. Chapter one presents the lay of the land and introduces the reader to the social geography of Tunis circa 1830: its various neighborhoods, markets, and places of work and worship, and the ways in which individuals and

communities demarcated their territories. Chapter two, "Detours: Migrations in a Mobile World," examines the forces behind migrations, including those governing women's displacement. The author suggests that a pattern of circular migration was emerging in the nineteenth century as a consequence of relentless population pressures in Sicily and especially Malta, which drove migrants to Tunisia. One of Clancy-Smith's most important and interesting arguments here is that the French occupation of neighboring Algeria in 1830 had a direct effect on migration to Tunisia, as it "prim[ed] the migratory pump" and turned La Goulette and smaller port towns in Tunisia into "gateways—or get-aways for deserters, escapees and criminals headed to—or out of—Algeria" (p. 97). In the course of the nineteenth century, North Africa "was transformed into a human dump for the politically turbulent or socially unwanted—in addition to representing a sort of 'new World' for people suffering from the dislocations wrought by nation-state or empire building, warfare, and industrial capitalism" (p. 94).

Chapters three, four, and five form a unit examining how migrants made a living, and how they integrated themselves into existing systems of production, distribution, and resource allocation. Chapter three, "Making a Living: Domestic Service and Other Forms of Employment," describes how household servants used existing networks to secure positions and, once employed, how they constructed new networks and recruited newcomers (p. 106). This chapter also raises interesting and salient questions on the relationship between the abolition of slavery and domestic service; communal relations between migrants and established artisans; the growing numbers of middle-class Europeans in Tunis and new opportunities and spaces for employment; and the deep anxieties about moral disorder surrounding female migrant workers. This last theme is further explored in chapter four, "Making a Living: Petty Commerce, Places of Sociability, and the Down-and-Out," which analyzes multiple cases involving migrant women deemed of uncertain virtue for selling spirits in taverns. Widows, viewed as "women without men" (p. 145), were particularly feared as agents of moral peril. More broadly, Clancy-Smith shows how migrant employment was connected to the emergence of new popular urban places such as taverns, which destabilized traditional patterns of street marking and spatial gendering. The risk of such social tremors was particularly feared when migrants fell into destitution. Clancy-Smith masterfully and painstakingly reconstructs the story of the Fassy family (originally from Marseilles) from archival sources spanning the Mediterranean—from the Catholic registry archives in the Tunis cathedral to the archives of the Chamber of Commerce in Marseilles. She sheds light on mechanisms of survival and charity that were available to indigent migrants, and that often crossed communal boundaries. The resulting picture is one of continuous motion throughout the nineteenth century, as families moved

back and forth among Tunisia, Algeria, Sicily, and Malta, struggling to find adequate work and housing.

In a particularly rich chapter (chapter five), Clancy-Smith examines people whose livelihood was connected to the sea. She shows how the near monopoly held by Maltese, Italian, and Greek sponge fishermen in the Sfax region deprived local Tunisian fishermen of their fair share, occasionally creating conflict and prompting Tunisian beys to file complaints with foreign consuls. One of Clancy-Smith's most insightful discussions here pertains to contraband. The author argues that the boundary between legal and illegal activities could be very blurred and that the growing contraband economy—in fish and gunpowder, among other commodities—that operated in the central Mediterranean corridor throughout the nineteenth century depended upon certain kinds of migrations, and specifically upon occupations tied to the sea, that were often integrated into legitimate household economies of tavern keeping and fishing. Her study of contraband yields several important findings: first, it "reveals the nature of, and complex processes leading to, greater commercial and financial entanglement with Europe and a concomitant reduction of economic ties with the Ottoman Empire" (p. 196). Second, black market operations and smuggling can be read as "globalization from below" and as "a form of resistance to the intrusions of centralizing states or imperial formations or simply business as usual" (p. 196).

Chapter six examines the increasingly tangled legal culture and the legal pluralism that regulated the lives of beylical subjects, expatriate Europeans, and other foreigners. These complex and overlapping legal arrangements often resulted in "forum shopping"—"a system through which individuals appeal to competing legal authorities to secure a more sympathetic hearing and hopefully successful outcome" (pp. 201–202). Women seem to have often employed forum shopping, including by switching religious affiliation through conversion, a practice Clancy-Smith qualifies as a kind of border crossing. The author shows that foreign protection shifted in response to internal and external forces and the meanings attached to "protégé" could be very flexible and occasionally elusive. She suggests that we read "protection not as a legal absolute but as representing a spectrum of rights and privileges with inherent plasticity interpretation" (p. 210).

The last three chapters focus on individual figures and their impact on Tunisian society. Chapter seven traces the life and work of Emilie de Vialar, who founded a religious order (the Sisters of St. Joseph de l'Apparition) that, for forty years, was the only female congregation in Tunisia. It examines the impact that this congregation, whose members were simultaneously migrants or travelers and missionaries, had on local society, and similarly, the order's relationship with Tunisian society and with the Husaynid rulers, as well as the transformations it underwent through its members' multiple displacements. As such, it is a welcome addition to the growing body of literature on missionaries,

gender, and empire. Chapter eight looks at elite households and social interactions on the seaside, where leisure and sea-bathing were combined with seaside diplomacy. Chapter nine follows the life and career of Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, an influential author, thinker, statesman, ■ member of “a Mediterranean community of thought,” and a migrant par excellence who was at various moments in his life “a Circassian, an Ottoman, an official in service to the Husaynids, and in his final days, a Tunisian” (p. 316). Finally, a remarkable epilogue that juxtaposes the past and the present not only underlines similarities between Mediterranean migrations in our century and in the preceding ones but also underscores how earlier migration flows “directly shaped subsequent south to north movements in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries” (p. 343).

This book is an embarrassment of riches, which can be somewhat overwhelming at times, as there is a great deal of information and illustrative vignettes. Also, while Clancy-Smith is keen on examining how migrants interacted with non-migrants, and how Tunisian society viewed these migrants, the voice of Muslim Tunisians, especially non-elites, is barely audible at times. This being said, the dearth of sources for the period under study makes the task extremely difficult. These minor points notwithstanding, the importance of this book

cannot be overstated. Well-written and engaging, it is extremely accessible and should be of interest to all historians. It is first and foremost about mobility and the fundamental ways migrations have shaped local societies, and it offers an inspiring (if daunting) example of how to rewrite local, national, and regional histories by reintegrating the stories of migrants. As Clancy-Smith puts it, “as a history of trans-Mediterranean displacements in a small place, Tunisia before colonialism stands in for many parts of the globe experiencing similar and in some cases interlinked processes during the long nineteenth century” (p. 16). The book speaks to key debates in history, migration studies, and gender studies and contributes to central discussions on periodization and on the relationship between the pre-colonial and the colonial period. It is profoundly relevant for understanding contemporary migrations, and for historicizing the deep connections that have existed between various shores of the Mediterranean. In sum, this is a remarkable and important volume that should have widespread appeal to historians interested in the Mediterranean and in North Africa specifically, as well as scholars concerned with migration past and present.

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ERIC AMES. *Carl Hagenbeck's Empire of Entertainments*.
Seattle: University of Washington Press. 2008. Pp. viii,
336. \$35.00.

Eric Ames ends his colorful book with the following statement: “If the name Hagenbeck no longer resonates throughout the universe, it is also more than just a memory. Even today, we are surrounded by forms of theme space and immersive environments that bear the imprint of his legacy” (p. 229). It is this enduring legacy that the author places at the center of his analysis. While most studies that explore the link between Germany’s empire and its museums and attractions tend to be concerned with connections between the metropole and imperial periphery, Ames offers a different take on empire and imperial influence. Carl Hagenbeck’s “empire” coincided with and was supported by German imperialism, yet his imperial reach went far beyond Germany’s territories in Africa and the Pacific Islands.

Hagenbeck skillfully employed his expansive connections to assemble exotic animals and ethnographic troupes, but only a handful of the animals and indigenous people originated in the German colonies. For instance, Hagenbeck was involved with close to one-third of the more than three hundred ethnographic troupes touring Germany between 1875 and 1914, yet “the vast majority of performers were recruited in territories controlled by other [non-German] colonial powers” (p. 65). His ethnographic exhibits were frequently at odds with the wishes of German dignitaries

who liked their colonial exhibits to reflect Germany’s civilizing mission, prevent racial mixing, and showcase the existence of a docile and subservient indigenous labor force. Hagenbeck’s ethnographic displays inadvertently contradicted the existing anthropological premise that “‘nature peoples’ were absolutely different from ‘cultural people’” (p. 93). Increasing interaction between ethnographic subjects and German observers did much to tear down the artificial boundaries colonial supporters had erected and sought to maintain. To make matters worse, rumored sexual encounters and infatuations (*Nubiertoll*) between observers and indigenous participants in the ethnographic exhibits led to charges that Hagenbeck was instigating and supporting moral decline among both the cultured people of Germany and the more primitive nature peoples that he and others imported there. By moving away from the focus on colonial connections and illustrating Hagenbeck’s impact on thematic space, Ames sidesteps the thorny issue of “Hitler’s shadow”—the almost obligatory analysis of how Hagenbeck’s work influenced the rise of the Nazi Party and the dark years between 1933 and 1945. It is laudable that the author dares to cast a wider net, capturing Hagenbeck’s global rather than national legacy.

Hagenbeck was a visionary who understood the Ger-

man public's needs and desires, turning such insights into a lucrative business. Writing neither a hagiography nor a damning exposé, Ames explains how Hagenbeck combined real and unreal elements to provide visitors with glimpses of a parallel universe that eschewed authenticity for tantalizing visions of the imaginary and the hyperreal. When Hagenbeck opened his Tierpark in 1907, he merged ethnographic displays with exotic animal exhibits, introduced anachronistic dinosaur displays, and added joyrides to entertain visitors. A predator ravine brought together animal species (such as tigers and lions) that did not inhabit the same geographical regions. Instead of recreating the natural habitats of the animals, Hagenbeck aimed at cheap thrills through a cleverly camouflaged trench that minimized the separation between spectators and wild animals.

Hagenbeck was also an early experimenter with cinema, using both documentaries and feature films to enhance the experience of the German people who flocked to his establishment in droves. Enabling Hagenbeck to stretch further into the realm of the imaginary, cinema also had the added benefit of eliminating dull moments while spectators were waiting for the start of another attraction. How much cinema complemented the attraction of the Tierpark becomes obvious when one considers that it produced a hefty one-third of the park's revenues. Moreover, Hagenbeck's park provided a perfect backdrop for movie sets, foreshadowing the cinematographic studio parks where many genres of movies could be filmed simultaneously.

Cinema also prevented the early closure of the Tierpark. Following Hagenbeck's death in 1913, his multifarious entertainment empire contracted due to increasing debt. The outbreak of the Great War exacerbated these problems, as the Allied blockade prevented the resupplying of ethnographic and zoological exhibits and the ensuing food shortage took a horrendous toll on the remaining exotic animals. But the movie industry thrived during the war. Renting out space in the Tierpark to cinematographic companies provided a welcome form of income. Hagenbeck's heirs even negotiated a deal with a German cinematographic company (Decla Film Company) to use the park for movie production. Decla's executives ultimately decided on another location, however, and the park had to close in 1920. Ames argues that Hagenbeck's experiments helped realize cinema's escapist potential. By moving from meticulous attempts at recreating authentic "natural" habitats for human and animal displays to a world where the imaginary reigned supreme, Hagenbeck foresaw the silver screen's effect on the public audience. Indeed, cinema was the next step in reducing pricy ethnographic and zoological displays to cinematographic moments that could be exported with considerable ease. Hagenbeck did not live through the golden age of cinema, but he certainly paved the way for its reception among the German public and beyond.

Ames is mindful of the fact that Hagenbeck's story has been told many times over, and rather than providing yet another biography, he makes his contribu-

tions in the realm of theory. In interdisciplinary fashion, he borrows from cultural and film studies as well as anthropology and history to weave his account. Hagenbeck's lasting contribution to the thematic environment, for example, rests on the all-important concept of "displacement," which deconstructs the attempt to recreate "natural" environments in culturally alien environments. Hagenbeck was one of the first to realize the futility of this approach. His involvement in the recruitment of ethnographic subjects from all over the world led him to see that most indigenous people had been thoroughly exposed to Western Christian teaching and economic models. He also became cognizant of the fact that the German public's notion of authenticity was shaped less by ethnographic texts and observation and more by popular writers and their notions of the American West. This became most noticeable in the case of the indigenous Bella Coola (Nuxalk), who were brought to Germany from the northwest coast of America. While their tour was a great success among German ethnographers, it failed to garner commercial success. The German public preferred to spend money on Buffalo Bill Cody's "Wild West" shows and their more theatrical portrayals of Native Americans.

Ames's book is organized chronologically from the extension of Hagenbeck's collection network to the demise of his Tierpark. The first three chapters center on ethnographic displays and chart Hagenbeck's ever-expanding network of collectors. The people, animals, and other items that Hagenbeck brought back and placed on display ultimately led to his abandonment of unobtainable notions of authenticity. The fourth and fifth chapters of the book explore Hagenbeck's construction of the Tierpark, which he designed and opened shortly after the turn of the century. Mixing human and animal displays with little regard to geographical or historical order set a trend that, while frowned upon by many contemporary commentators, anticipated theme parks of the twentieth century. The sixth and last chapter explores Hagenbeck's brief but fateful engagement with the new medium of cinema. While the marriage between theme park and silver screen brought Hagenbeck and his heirs few financial advantages and could not save the park, his experiments were imitated by generations of attraction owners.

Despite the astonishing array of interdisciplinary theoretical work that went into the book, it does disappoint a bit in terms of the promised original historical research. Ames effectively draws on a massive amount of printed and photographic material, but written archival material is rarely used and serves mostly to support rather than to develop his arguments. This is clearly not always Ames's fault. He was, for example, denied access to the Johan Adrian Jacobsen papers at the Hamburg Museum of Ethnology on four separate occasions. To overcome this deficiency, Ames had to depend on German-speaking historians, such as Hilke Thode-Arora, to perform primary source research. But instead of acknowledging a fruitful division of labor, Ames attributes a qualitative difference between his work and that

of the historian. In his words, this book "is driven by ideas and theoretical concerns to a degree that [the historian's] work is not" (p. 241, fn. 20). Is such a distinction between historians and theoreticians really needed, or does it exaggerate the division that his work is supposedly trying to bridge? This reviewer is put off by the notion that historians provide "first-tier" research while more theoretically oriented scholars in other disciplines advance the horizons of knowledge into new directions. A more complementary outlook might have been more fruitful.

Ames's highly theoretical approach may also run counter to the intent of the University of Washington Press. The old adage not to judge a book by its cover

certainly does not apply to this work. Its dimensions (10 x 8.5 inches) are those of a coffee table book, an appearance that is further supplemented by the vast array of illustrations, many of them in color. The press apparently hopes these features will make the book attractive to non-academic readers. But Ames's heavily theoretical approach might turn the same away. These concerns aside, this stimulating book is destined to propel German studies and the notion of empire into new directions.

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JOHN W. DOWER. *Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor/Hiroshima/9-11/Iraq*. New York: W. W. Norton, the New Press. 2010. Pp. xxxvii, 596. \$29.95.

"Whatever the locus of action, from national government down to precinct, whether in an executive body or a legislative committee, some participants are almost sure to start with favorite, long-developed schemes. Their inclination will be to ignore whatever seems not to fit and to define the problem as one calling for solutions they have handy. Their arguments will be supported, more than likely, by analogies."

Richard Neustadt and Ernest May made this observation more than twenty-five years ago in their seminal book, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* (1986; quotation from pp. 234–235). Writing in the shadow of America's agonizing war in Vietnam, Neustadt and May contended that policymakers were not ignorant of history. The problem was that figures like Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon knew a lot of history. They had lived through the rise of fascism, World War II, and the beginning of the Cold War. They had witnessed the failure of appeasement in prewar Europe and Asia, the brutal aggressiveness of undemocratic adversaries, and the postwar renewal of societies reconstructed under American tutelage. Historical references encouraged Truman, Johnson, Nixon, and most of their advisors to believe that, when confronted with communist adversaries in Southeast Asia, they had to act quickly, decisively, and militaristically. The historical analogy to the origins and aftermath of World War II was irresistible for Cold War citizens educated in this recent history.

Neustadt and May drew a valuable distinction between factual historical "knowledge" and "the kind of mental quality that readily connects discrete phenomena over time and repeatedly checks connections" (*Thinking in Time*, p. 252). The simple invocation of a past experience to guide a new challenge involved knowledge, but revealed a striking failure to understand how circumstances had changed from 1939 to 1965. Historical knowledge provided points of refer-

ence, but real historical analysis, according to Neustadt and May, required rigorous attention to similarities and differences, close examination of patterns and trends, and a cultivated capacity to imagine alternative paths. History mattered enormously for policymaking, according to the authors, but not as a source of "lessons." History offered a frame of mind, a sensitivity to change, and a check on simply fighting the last war.

No scholar of the last thirty years has done more to elucidate the value of rich historical thinking than John W. Dower. His previous books on twentieth-century Japan have demystified politics and society in this island nation, without sacrificing sophistication or subtlety. He has captured the brutality of the Japanese Empire and its profound humanity at the same time. He has shown how Japan was both perpetrator and victim in the ruthless international politics of midcentury. Most of all, Dower has offered a running account of how historical agency is diffuse, unpredictable, and often contradictory even when a very powerful society (the United States) fights and occupies a far weaker nation (Japan). Dower's work undermines all simple analogies and "lessons" about the World War II era in the Pacific. His books teach us to appreciate the countless interpersonal adjustments that, in the end, determine outcomes unseen by actors at the time.

In this sense, the main body of Dower's historical writing echoes Leo Tolstoy's emphasis on grand historical forces moved by small figures who really cannot comprehend the implications of their actions (*War and Peace* [1869]). Dower writes with a novelist's attention to intimate details and surprising personalities in both Japan and the United States. He analyzes Japan's relations with the United States through the eyes of people well beyond leaders.

For a scholar of this temperament to find his work manipulated to justify a controversial American invasion of Iraq in 2003 must have been disillusioning. Time

and again, advisers to President George W. Bush invoked the analogy of the American occupation of Japan for what they expected to accomplish in Iraq. Dower reflects on this phenomenon in his new book: "From a Japanese perspective, there was an ironic, bitter twist to watching Americans invoke the 'success' of occupied Japan to brighten the picture of what might be anticipated in postwar Iraq . . . Japan's own experience of being occupied was regarded by many as a humiliating chapter in the nation's history—more dishonorable even, some would have it, than the war years" (pp. 316–317).

Chastising the Bush administration for the very misuse of historical analogies flagged by Neustadt and May, Dower continues: "Rose-colored invocations of occupied Japan by Americans gearing up for war with Iraq thus fell in place with the other uncomfortable Japan-related images that poured out in the wake of September 11: Pearl Harbor and 'infamy'; kamikaze and terror bombing; Japan's membership alongside Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in the original 'Axis' of evil; Ground Zero as transplanted code for American rather than Japanese victimization; all-out war against an Islamist enemy as fanatical as the emperor's soldiers and sailors had been; the Stars and Stripes triumphantly raised at Iwo Jima; and so on" (p. 317).

Dower is not the first to criticize the misuse of historical analogies in the War on Terror. He tried to offer a strong corrective at the time, publishing essays in the *New York Times*, the *Boston Review*, and *The Nation* that were widely read. Many historians agreed with Dower, but few policymakers listened. The book under review is an effort by Dower to explain why the leaders who did not heed his warnings were tragically foolish and terribly consistent.

Analyzing the failures of the Bush administration, Dower effectively deconstructs the self-serving and misguided historical analogies invoked by American leaders. Describing how the president manipulated power, however, Dower draws his own jarring historical analogies that the reader might question. In this sense, the study is really two books in one: a historian's correction of false analogies in a time of war, and an angry citizen's effort to create new analogies that he can turn against the people who did not listen to him.

Dower is at his best when he writes about the details of the occupations after 1945 and 2003. The last third of the book offers a perceptive discussion of why American nation-building efforts had particular advantages in postwar Japan: "Discipline, moral legitimacy, well-defined and well-articulated objectives, a clear chain of command, tolerance and flexibility in policy formulation and implementation, confidence in the ability of the state to act constructively, the ability to operate abroad free of partisan politics back home, and the existence of a stable, resilient, sophisticated civil society on the receiving end of occupation policies—these political and civic virtues helped make it possible to move decisively during the brief window of a few years when

defeated Japan itself was in flux and most receptive to radical change" (p. 338).

Under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur, American forces worked to empower the Japanese state as an engine of production, wealth redistribution, and social management. They encouraged land reform and the growth of labor unions. They also contributed to new forms of civil society, especially those centered on consumer culture and popular entertainment. In these areas and others, Dower explains, the "visible hand" of New Deal-inspired state capitalism found fertile soil in a Japanese society that was devastated by war, but also unified and forward looking (p. 409).

Iraq in 2003 did not share any of the advantages experienced in postwar Japan, and American policies compounded the difficulties, according to Dower. Saddam Hussein had destroyed most elements of civil society, he had exacerbated religious and ethnic divisions, and he had saturated the country with weapons. American forces arrived with very questionable legitimacy, minimal support among allies, and deep divisions within the American electorate. Iraqi, American, and international conditions did not allow for anything like the coherent and effective occupation policies implemented in Japan a half century earlier.

Dower explains that the Bush administration spoke of a Japanese-style occupation, willfully denying the striking differences. This is where false historical analogies enabled the worst policy instincts: "They disregarded not only forbidding social, political, and religious conditions that were taken seriously at the time of the first Gulf War, but also incisive warnings from lower-level officials as well as non-governmental sources. Postwar Japan was not really a serious model in anyone's thinking, but rather another example of the administration's penchant for using history ideologically" (p. 340).

Instead of building a constructive Iraqi state, the Bush administration pursued a privatized vision of free market capitalism that left postwar society unregulated and ripe for rapacious behavior. Extremist groups and unscrupulous profit-seekers filled the economic void in Iraq that the regulatory power of state institutions had controlled in postwar Japan. Private contractors operated on behalf of the United States in Iraq with little oversight or accountability, unlike the American trained and managed civilian personnel who had served under the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in the Pacific. Insurgents hijacked Iraqi reconstruction because the United States left a power vacuum as it sought to implement free market reforms in a society that had neither secure freedoms nor functioning markets. "The result," Dower writes, "was a level of confusion, cronyism, non-transparency, and corruption that had no counterpart in Japan" (p. 397).

Dower's work hammers the final nails in the coffin of any attempted analogy between 1945 and 2003. Dower, however, is not content to correct misguided historical comparisons. In an effort to explain why Bush and his advisers made so many obvious mistakes, he turns their

Japan analogies upside down. Postwar Iraq was not postwar Japan, but the brutality of the United States in Iraq marked a "convergence of a sort" with Japanese war crimes in Asia, according to Dower (p. 359). The author goes a step further, arguing that America's militant democracy after September 11, 2001 resembled Japanese fascist authoritarianism in 1941: "the Japanese and U.S. cases hardly amount to sharply contrasting examples of authoritarian rule versus democratic checks and balances." Dower claims that in both Japan and the United States the legislature failed to limit executive decision making, and the public supported war as an "obedient herd" (p. 102).

The most startling moment is Dower's comparison of the American president to the Japanese emperor: "In practice, the imperial presidency under George W. Bush was in certain critical respects more absolute, inviolate, impenetrable, and arbitrary than the militaristic government that took imperial Japan to war" (p. 103). Elsewhere Dower compares Bush and his advisers to the leaders of Japan and Osama bin Laden, all of whom allegedly pursued "holy war" grounded in "faith-based thinking" rather than reason and compromise (p. 438). My personal favorite is Dower's quip that the American "security state, with its holy writ and labyrinthine complexity, amounted to a profane theocracy" (p. 440).

How can one evaluate such nonsense written by a distinguished and talented historian? How can one characterize a book that masterfully dissects false historical analogies only to create its own misguided assertions of parallels and moral equivalencies? Besides the gross

oversimplifications and factual problems with Dower's analogies, one must note the deep anger that colors their composition. Dower is clearly offended by Bush's policies, Bush's worldview, and, above all, Bush's refusal to listen to him. Throughout the book, the misguided politicians are "faith-based," and the good critics are rational and learned. The post-9/11 policymakers are practitioners of "strategic imbecilities" (p. 115), while the careful scholars offer the possibility for transcendent "cultures of peace" (p. 452). Dower never defines that last phrase, except to claim that it is the opposite of everything that Bush did in Iraq.

John Dower is probably the greatest living historian of modern Japan in the United States. Our profession is deeply indebted to him for his seminal efforts to translate Japanese society for Western audiences. This book captures his range of vision, but it also proves the seduction of bad historical analogies, even for a skilled scholar struggling, like all of us, to explain the frustrations, shortcomings, and contradictions of national policymaking.

Neustadt and May's warning about forced comparisons and ready-made explanations is worth remembering as we deconstruct the actions of our leaders and ourselves. We need to think beyond analogies, examining how policy aims and experiences evolve over time. Tracing the details of decision making in the archives is often more valuable than labeling actions after the fact.

JEREMI SURI

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Reviews of Books

METHODS/THEORY

EDMUND RUSSELL. *Evolutionary History: Uniting History and Biology to Understand Life on Earth*. (Studies in Environment and History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. xxi, 216. Cloth \$90.00, paper \$22.99.

“Evolution is ordinary, not exceptional” (p. 5). “It is ubiquitous” (p. 151). So begins and effectively ends Edmund Russell’s accessible and engagingly written, thoughtful, and thought-provoking book, the contention of which is that history is intimately intertwined with evolution. Russell believes biology and history have much to say to each other in terms of their mutual interplay.

Following a brief discussion of evolution itself, Russell sets out a number of illustrative examples of the ways that humans have shaped the evolution of other species, and how in turn such human-induced evolution has shaped our own history. For example, selective hunting of Zambian tusked elephants favored the evolutionary survival of once rare tuskless elephants in much larger than traditional percentages, while an emphasis on hunting larger Canadian bighorn sheep led to the survival of smaller animals. The role of the state, in terms either of its inability or capability to regulate hunting in such cases, also affects evolution. The fishing of cod and salmon offers similar lessons regarding population size and makeup and their implications as available food stock for humans. Bacteria and insects provide further examples of human influence on otherwise natural populations, as each proves increasingly resistant through evolutionary adaption to antibiotics and pesticides, respectively. An especially interesting chapter focuses on the role of unconscious anthropogenic selection in the evolution of dogs from wolves. When early hunter-gathers likely fed gentler wolves while eliminating those more dangerous, they unconsciously selected for tameness, a trait that appears to control for other adult behaviors in addition to fierceness, thereby leading to the emergence of what we view as separate species. Agriculture, which provides a number of interesting evolutionary examples including domesticated plant developments, also appears to have played a role in adult human lactose tolerance, or lack thereof. Russell argues that a history of dairy farming in such re-

gions as northern Europe appears to have entailed a coevolution between humans who developed genetic tolerance for lactose, a trait normally found only in infants, and milk cows—Jerseys and Guernseys—that provided them with more protein and other nutritional value. Ultimately, Russell is most intrigued by reciprocal interaction.

One particularly revealing example of how an understanding of evolutionary change can enrich our historical understanding is revealed through a reexamination of the industrial revolution. To that end, Russell devotes a chapter-length case study to cotton textiles. Russell’s contribution is to urge a focus on environmental factors rather than the heroic inventors of machines, the broader factory system, economic conditions, or labor and class, important as these things may have been. Rather, he views the Lancashire technical innovations as being a “response” (p. 105) to the arrival of New World long-fiber cotton, which due to its genetic makeup was the product of anthropogenic selection by Amerindians. Russell argues that cotton fiber is not inherently uniform, and thus not necessarily suitable for machine spinning, which required a certain level of strength combined with length. These characteristics and other positive traits—enhanced geographic growing range, better harvestability, and larger seeds more amenable to separation, mechanical or otherwise—evolved through Native American selection of certain plant variants over others, in turn yielding fibers that would ultimately prove better suited to mechanization. Finally, Russell suggests a connection to the triangular slave trade that enabled England to capitalize on “the evolutionary inheritance of the New World” and to industrialize when and where it did (pp. 104, 128). The story is, of course, more complicated than this brief summary, but suffice it to say that both in the mid-nineteenth-century British industry and in today’s marketplace almost one hundred percent of the world’s cotton crop is based on New World-derived plant species. Thus, in Russell’s view “a more balanced account would describe industrialization as a revolution in the ability to capitalize on the variation and abundance of nature” (p. 131).

These examples barely scratch the surface of this intriguingly suggestive volume. Written in a manner that will make it attractive to scholars and students alike, it

will force perceptive readers to re-examine their fields. History, and especially the histories of technology and the environment, surely benefit from the insights of biology and evolution.

STEPHEN H. CUTCLIFFE
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DOUGLASS C. NORTH, JOHN JOSEPH WALLIS, and BARRY R. WEINGAST. *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2009. Pp. xvii, 308. \$30.00.

This ambitious book by Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast seeks to provide an explanatory account of how, in the long-term historical perspective, societies devise institutional structures to solve the problem of violence. The containment of violence has been a problem for all three social orders that have existed in the course of human history: the foraging order (essentially hunter-gather societies), the natural state, and the open access order. The focus of the book is on the latter two and the mechanisms by which the natural state makes the transition to the open access order. The natural state—or the limited access order—has been the dominant social order in human history, while the open access state emerges with modernity. The open access order is characterized by the impartial rule of law and the existence of impersonal rights that all citizens possess, while the natural state has a limited civil society, more centralized government, and fewer organizations. Those societies that have made the transition have become wealthier and more peaceful. Natural states have slow-growing economies and are less adept at dealing with change. Some eighty-five per cent of the world's population still lives in natural states. Modern democratic states with free market economies, such as Canada, the United States, Australia, and the countries of the European Union, are representative of the open access order.

The book is primarily concerned less with the problem of violence, as the title suggests, than with how natural states—of which there are three types: fragile, basic, and mature—make the transition to the open access order. The authors do not assume that the transition is inevitable or that the natural state is anything like the Hobbesian state of nature, since it has been the most effective institutional framework for the control of violence in human history.

One of the book's signal contributions is its questioning of the influential Weberian theory of the state as a single actor with a monopoly of violence. The authors claim that Weber's understanding of the state is flawed, as the empirical reality of the natural state, which has been the dominant order throughout history and is still present today, is that there is not a separation of the economic and political order and, most importantly, the transition to the open access state, where it has occurred, has in fact depended on the separation of these domains. The unity of the state is an achievement only

of the modern open access state. In fact, the state only gains a monopoly over violence after a long period of dispersed violence. This is because natural states achieve order and stability only when powerful individuals are given incentives not to use violence. It is a fundamental misunderstanding of history to see the state as a single actor.

The authors focus on the role of elites and elites' pursuit of their own interests. The question is why elites would choose to create institutional orders that allow non-elites to have more power and control of resources. The authors argue that the transition to open access orders can only be explained by elite interests. The first step occurs when elites find that their interests will be furthered if non-elites are given more control. The transition is incremental, unfolding differently and at different speeds in the various spheres of society. Three critical "doorstep" conditions must be met: the rule of law for elites, long-lived organizations in the public and private spheres, and consolidated control of the military.

The upshot of this argument is important for developing countries for it suggests that the solution to the problems of the natural state lie within it and not in the open access state. This is not an insignificant conclusion since it means that natural states will not make the transition to the open access order by simply adopting the institutions of those Western countries that have made the transition. So, for example, the adoption of constitutions in nineteenth-century Latin American countries was not in itself sufficient to make the transition to the open access state. The objective should not always be to undertake the transition, for the transplanting of open access institutions into natural states cannot by itself produce development.

This is an insightful book that will be of great interest especially to historical sociologists and economic historians. It is most interesting in its account of how institutional change occurs in what they call the natural state. The approach is strongly institutional and elite-focused, and some will find this too limiting, although it offers a very challenging account of how major social change occurs. The pluralist account of the open access order is limited in scope and raises many questions. The huge scale of organized state violence and the embedded nature of the industrial war complex in the modern open access state appear to challenge some of the author's assumptions about the capacity for violence in democratic constitutional states, as does the war in Iraq led by the United States and the United Kingdom.

GERARD DELANTY
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ZACHARY M. SCHRAG. *Ethical Imperialism: Institutional Review Boards and the Social Sciences, 1965–2009*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2010. Pp. xii, 245. \$45.00.

Historians rarely experience a review of proposed research as part of the Institutional Review Board (IRB)

process. Our ethical concerns are more focused on honest representations of primary materials, diligent archival searching, appropriate reading of secondary sources, and avoidance of plagiarism. According to Zachary M. Schrag's powerful new book, we should, however, be afraid, very afraid, of the potential threat of IRBs to social science scholarship. Schrag wants us to worry about the dangerous mission creep of the ethics *uberlords*, backed by the power of the federal government and financially dependent and lawsuit wary academic administrations. At stake, he argues, is our disciplinary independence and academic freedom to do research that matters.

Schrag makes his point of view clear with the book's title. He provides evidence of IRBs that over the last forty years have wreaked havoc on innocent scholars as cowed professional associations and academic institutions gave in to federal power. His careful review of archival materials, although at times a bit tedious for the non-policy specialist, captures the hypocrisy and doublespeak of ethics bureaucrats who cannot seem to differentiate between a multisite medical research project and a lowly graduate student trying to conduct observations in a public school classroom. This is a story, Schrag reminds us, about policy expansionism, the inability of social scientists to reject protectionism that was developed for medical research, and the failure of academic leaders to protect their faculty and students. Schrag suggests that the major problem is that the federal government's pressure tactics can deny research dollars to cash-strapped universities.

Schrag is not naïve. He is aware of the mistakes made in social science research and accepts that there is a need to monitor academic behavior. Nevertheless, he downplays some of the dangers posed to subjects. Schrag does note, however, that research errors have been magnified as simplistic explanations for why ethics review should keep some social science research projects from even beginning. He sides with sociologist Howard Becker's view that "'a good study . . . will make somebody angry'" (p. 17). He also claims that "to do no harm" is, in a sense, almost impossible, and that in order to do research well the ethical standards of the social sciences, not of medical studies, ought to be followed.

With a careful review of the archival sources, he faults officials from the Public Health Service and National Institutes of Health for ignoring and bludgeoning social scientists whose work they do not understand. Schrag analyzes policy debates over several decades, taking on the commission that issued the Belmont Report in 1978 (the basis of the subsequent federal "Common Rule" for ethical research) and criticizing its emphasis on principles of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice in all research for its limitations. Schrag argues that no one on this crucial commission really understood social science research, and traces what he sees as real failures by commissioners and staffers alike to differentiate between biomedical and behavioral research. He critiques their own lack of research and

seeming indifference to the actual work or harm done by social scientists.

These criticisms, and the efforts of social scientists to demand a rethinking, in particular the struggles of political scientist Ithiel de Sola Pool, form the heart of the book. Schrag demonstrates how compromises, muddled thinking, and regulatory expansionism in the 1990s led to the growth of IRBs in the present day.

Schrag is not alone in his critiques of the IRB process, but this is the first historical account of the problems IRBs pose to the social sciences. Officials in the federal government are currently considering revisions to the decades-old Common Rule; Schrag's work has already begun to have an impact on their thinking, as evidenced by footnotes to his scholarship in their most recent report. This book ought to be required reading for those concerned about the political forces that make our work possible, and sometimes not possible at all.

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COMPARATIVE/WORLD

ANDREW PHILLIPS. *War, Religion, and Empire: The Transformation of International Orders*. (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, number 117.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 364. Cloth \$90.00, paper \$34.99.

This book primarily analyzes the constitution, transformation, and demise of two major systems of international order. It focuses first on what Andrew Phillips refers to as "Latin Christendom" during the late medieval and early modern period. It subsequently shifts attention to the "Sinosphere" as a regional system and its disintegration during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This diachronic historical comparison is followed by an interpretative account of the contemporary world order.

The case studies are framed by a theoretically oriented introduction and conclusion. In these sections, Phillips seeks to bridge the gaps between constructivist and realist approaches to the study of international orders. He complements his discussions of normative complexes and governing institutional frameworks by considering economic and other material factors underlying specific formations. In this context, Phillips does not engage in a close discussion with movements such as the re-emerging English School of International Relations or several branches of historiography, which—albeit from different angles—also combine the study of cooption and coercion, of power complexes and normative structures.

According to Phillips, pressures on international orders work through an intricate nexus of violence, interdependence, institutional decay, and ideological challenges. In the case of Latin Christendom, Phillips follows the assumption that the Reformation constituted a decisive departure from a political landscape composed by diarchical aspects (church and empire) as

well as overlapping realms of power obligations. During the following periods, the processes leading toward a new order took important interim steps—most notably the Wars of Religion and the emergence of absolutist rule, which had not been intended by the Reformation's main protagonists. While discussing the political changes in early modern Europe, the author nods to the literature addressing the "myth of 1648" but remains convinced that the emergence of the Westphalian system constituted a decisive break in European history.

Subsequent chapters portray the Sinosphere prior to the nineteenth century as a hierarchical order with the Chinese emperor at the top, which was largely based on Confucian norms. The book displays a strong tendency to describe Confucianism and imperial China in rather monolithic ways, for example by marginalizing important transformations of Confucian contents and institutions such as the rise and dominance of Neo-Confucianism from the Song dynasty onward. Phillips then describes how, during the nineteenth century, a combination of global and local changes decisively weakened the material fundamentals of imperial China. Together with other factors, the advent of Britain and other powers that were unwilling to accept Confucian normative principles eroded the patterns of political order in East Asia. Phillips generally agrees with academic literature that—despite Britain's imperial ambitions—interprets the encounter between China and England as a clash between hierarchical and egalitarian visions of international order.

Investigating the demise of the Sinosphere, Phillips likens some major crises in nineteenth- and twentieth-century China to events in Europe. For example, he interprets both the Thirty Years' War and the Warlord Period as struggles over power, not principles. Within a larger framework, he discusses the disintegration of the tribute system in East Asia. In addition to other developments, he notes that the ailing Qing dynasty was kept afloat through an untenable alliance of conservative Confucian circles and Western powers driven by fundamentally different interests. Around the turn of the twentieth century, Japan's growing international ambitions created tensions between egalitarian international principles and hegemonic claims in East Asia. Following the rise and collapse of Japanese imperial ambitions, East Asia witnessed the emergence of an order based on sovereign states that, as Phillips maintains, also displays elements of an informal hierarchy—most notably through U.S. security guarantees in the region.

While the book is largely based on comparative perspectives of Chinese and European history, the author also addresses more recent global trends, particularly the secularization of politics and the decline of empire. Discussing the current international system's prospects for long-term durability and its major challenges, Phillips mainly focuses on Jihadism and the erosion of the state's monopoly of violence. However, he does not go so far as to portray the rise of religious fundamentalism

as evidence of an imminent collapse of the current international order.

All in all, this book makes a great contribution to the study of international relations. It attempts to widen the debates on international orders by drawing on a wide variety of themes and area-specific research. As such, it will certainly be important for researchers working on political orders, no matter what their regional interests may be.

DOMINIC SACHSENMAIER
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HANS BELTING. *Florence and Baghdad: Renaissance Art and Arab Science*. Translated by DEBORAH LUCE SCHNEIDER. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. 303. \$39.95.

In this book, Hans Belting boldly argues that the fifteenth-century invention of linear perspective, a venerable trademark of Italian Renaissance pictorial art, developed in part through the efforts of a devout Muslim, Ibn al-Haithan called Alhazen or Alhacen, an eleventh-century Arab polymath. Alhacen is well known to historians of science because of his optical theory that light enters the eyes in a geometric cone composed of converging rays, each transmitting a sensible "form" to stimulate vision. However, his Arabic term for "form," *sura*, definitely did not then refer to "image" but rather to an abstract metaphor of the phenomenal world that could only be expressed in words.

How then could Alhacen's aniconic optics have aided the Florentine impresario, Filippo Brunelleschi, who, around 1425, invented linear perspective for the painting of pictures? While Belting does not clarify this link to my satisfaction, he correctly identifies the Alhacen connection. In his excitement, Belting credits himself with being the first art historian to have made the discovery. Not true. Nearly forty years ago, I discussed this matter at some length in my own book, *The Renaissance Rediscovery of Linear Perspective* (1975), also in German translation (2002), explaining the role that classical and medieval optics in general and Alhacen in particular played in the conception of linear perspective.

I am delighted that Belting is championing my then controversial hypothesis. Perhaps his oversight was due to the fact that even after I first made the case, few art historians were convinced. The prevailing opinion was that Brunelleschi deduced linear perspective from his experience as an architectural draftsman, and not from optical science, which had naught to do with the pictorial arts.

So why this sudden acceptance of the Islamic optical connection (Belting's German edition is already in its second printing)? Surely his clever binary title has attracted renewed attention. While Baghdad had little directly to do with Alhacen's optics (he lived and wrote in Cairo), its fabled name is synonymous both with the medieval "Golden Age" of Arab civilization, and its current media notoriety in the post-9/11 Middle East. By pairing it with Florence, that symbol of Western civ-

ilization's most glamorous artistic achievements, Belting wants to jar Western readers from their presumed cultural complacency and make them appreciate again the glories of that other great civilization, equal in art and once even scientifically superior to the West.

Belting has joined two German words to describe what he intends to demonstrate: *Blickwechsel*, which originally he rendered as "exchange of glances" (p. 4). He expands the term's metaphorical meaning to encompass how two cultures looked at the world through the same eyes but saw it differently, and expressed their "glances" differently in art. Unfortunately, he permits *Blick* to be translated in his English edition as "gaze," interpreted not in its true German meaning but rather as in the manner of psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and art critic Norman Bryson, who have converted it to a popular buzzword among Anglo-American postmodern critical theorists. The word has since been associated with a variety of politicized causes with little relevance to Belting's thesis. "Gaze" is now sufficiently laden with theoretical baggage such that Belting's much too repetitious use of the term, even when relevant, will seem to some readers as an overindulgence of pretentious jargon.

Nevertheless, he does present a compelling case when he describes how the medieval science of vision and light resonated in both cultures and how the architectural window literally framed their difference. In the West, viewing the real world through an open window came to be understood as like looking at a picture, while in the Islamic East, windows were deliberately closed to the outside world, permitting pure sunlight into the interior only through patterned lattices that projected arrays of luminous shapes onto the floor and walls. Even a visitor to a traditional mosque cannot help but be struck by the transcendent beauty of these varied light displays. Belting makes a nice point when he applies Erwin Panofsky's famous essay, entitled "Die Perspektive als symbolische Form," to Islamic art. If the perspective window is the "symbolic form" of Western Renaissance art, then the splendors of light infiltrating the latticed Muslim window should be considered the parallel "symbolic form" of Islamic art. His book is beautifully illustrated to bolster this comparison.

Belting is less successful when he tries to explain which of Alhacen's optical theories were applicable to Brunelleschi. By the fifteenth century, the still aniconic science henceforth known in Latin as *perspectiva communis* was a popular subject of study everywhere in Western Europe. Alhacen's notions were so imbedded in it, and so amended by medieval European scholars like the Franciscan friars Roger Bacon and John Pecham, that Brunelleschi could hardly have been aware from which source any particular idea emanated.

Belting's real hero as he tries to link Arab optics to Brunelleschi is not Alhacen but another fourteenth-century Italian philosopher, Biagio Pelacani, who also wrote a treatise on optics. This treatise actually was the subject of lectures at the University of Florence during Brunelleschi's lifetime. Pelacani taught that shapes and

colors perceived by the eyes unite in a likeness of three-dimensional space in the *sensus communis* of the brain. He also introduced a crucial new term, *figura*, as synonym for *species*, the original Latin word that Western philosophers translated from Alhacen's *sura*. *Species* had always meant "form" in the abstract, but the word slowly evolved etymologically through two centuries. The term first referred to a "likeness" but not yet a picture, and finally to "figure," fully meaning a "picture."

Belting does not explain how the idea of *figura* in Pelacani's head translated to Brunelleschi's hand as it held the paintbrush. He claims to be more interested in image theory than how artists actually make their art. Still, he goes on to discuss how the medieval philosophers including Alhacen had worked out the geometry of mirrors, even postulating that the lens in the eye reflects the visual world just like a mirror. By the early Renaissance, narcissistic artists were increasingly given to admiring themselves reflected in mirrors and so, Belting avers, the art of self-portraiture was born. Mirrors were in such vogue during the Renaissance, and their geometric catoptrics so well known, that it is surprising the author does not give them more credit in the crucial narrative of Brunelleschi's first picture using perspective. Instead, Belting contradicts all that he has argued so far about the importance of optics. He merely recites the same old theory, namely that Brunelleschi "made use of a measuring practice that had long been in use in his own field of architecture" (p. 172).

Surely it was not traditional architectural drawing that inspired Brunelleschi but the exciting possibility of painting a *figura* by the same geometric rules that cause reflection in mirrors! As Antonio Averlino (nicknamed Filarete), Brunelleschi's Florentine contemporary and perhaps eyewitness to the first perspective experiment, recalled, "I believe that Pippo discovered the rule [the horizon vanishing point] from what the mirror shows you . . . Truly I think it was by this method that Pippo discovered this perspective."

SAMUEL Y. EDGERTON
Williams College

WALTER HAWTHORNE. *From Africa to Brazil: Culture, Identity, and an Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600–1830*. (African Studies, number 113.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. xxi, 259. Cloth \$85.00, paper \$25.99.

In Pará, northern Portuguese America, sometime in the 1760s, the slave José, of Mandinka origins, was summoned to cure a Bijago slave. José prepared a concoction of plants and applied it as part of a complex curing ritual that involved both his knowledge as a master herbalist as well as his contact with the spiritual domain. Although we know practically nothing of José's personal story, this episode takes us across the Atlantic to the coastal and upland societies of Upper Guinea in West Africa. As Walter Hawthorne demonstrates in *From Africa to Brazil*, the simple fact that the slave trade between the Upper Guinea Coast and the Amazon

placed a number of witches in circulation during the eighteenth century sheds light on little known or previously unexplored aspects of Atlantic history.

A specialist in Upper Guinean history, Hawthorne focuses on the features that fashioned the historical development of an Atlantic slave economy in the Amazonian region of Grão Pará and Maranhão. Tackling multiple and complex themes, the author explores the origins and dismantling of a regional economy based on Amerindian labor, slave and free, from the early seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth century. He then proceeds to analyze the structuring of an Atlantic slave trade that gave sustenance to an enlightened reform policy that made rice cultivation the mainstay of the Maranhão economy in the late eighteenth century. Finally, he examines the full unfolding of an African slave-based agrarian economy and society in the Amazon. The new agrarian system siphoned a continuous influx of Upper Guinean slaves, forced to toil from dawn to dusk in the inclement Amazonian tropical climate, facing tasks ranging from striking down and torching the forest to the incessant weeding, harvesting, and preparation of Carolina rice for a voracious Portuguese consumer market. The author supplies rich and varied data to support his solid interpretations, making his book the most thorough study to date on the constitution of an Atlantic slave society in this tropical zone.

While Hawthorne covers myriad themes, two aspects stand out. First, the author offers a precise study of the slave trade, carefully qualifying all the information available from existing databases. Hawthorne analyzes reports on the slave trade, correspondence, postmortem inventories of slaveowners, and ecclesiastical records, among other sources. He demonstrates that the trade between the Upper Guinea Coast and the Amazon flourished from the second half of the eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century, primarily at the expense of coastal peoples. Even though the slave trade showed an appetite for both upland and coastal peoples—Mandinka, Bijago, Papel, Balanta, and others—coastal societies became more deeply entangled in the Atlantic economy, not only as a result of their demand for iron tools for local rice production but also because the social systems that produced captives, which included the capture and deportation of persons accused of witchcraft, increasingly supplied Atlantic slave traders. Subscribing to Sidney Mintz and Richard Price's well-known interpretation, the author argues that the Middle Passage played an important role in shaping a pan-regional identity, which established profound ties between slaves who shared the same cultural background, in spite of the strong distinctions that separated peoples into specific ethnic groups within the coastal Upper Guinean context.

A second, especially rich aspect of the book is the author's discussion of rice cultivation and the specific role played by Upper Guinean slaves in this productive system. Taking a stand against Judith Carney's "black rice" thesis, Hawthorne underscores important discon-

tinuities between rice cultivation in the mangrove lands on the Upper Guinea Coast, which required a substantial deployment of local knowledge, and the slash-and-burn (*coivara*) practices that characterized colonial Amazonian rice cultivation. The author suggests that the system of rice agriculture in the Amazon derived from Amerindian, Portuguese, and Upper Guinean knowledge and techniques, producing what the author calls "brown rice." While this New World system diminished and even excluded the skills and knowledge that men brought from West Africa, women from Upper Guinea played a crucial role in maintaining and transmitting culinary and other cultural practices and knowledge, which afforded the continuity of strong links between enslaved peoples in Amazonia and an Upper Guinean pan-regional identity.

In the book's final chapters, Hawthorne directs our attention to a discussion of day-to-day aspects of slave life in Maranhão. Although the author presents fresh research and suggestive analyses, this constitutes the least developed part of the book. Lacking a more productive dialogue with the current social history of slavery in Brazil, these chapters stand in contrast to the depth and density of the earlier chapters. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, Hawthorne has produced an important contribution to the existing body of literature on transatlantic cultural flows and identity formation.

MARIA HELENA P. T. MACHADO

University of São Paulo [Translated by John Monteiro]

SOPHIA ROSENFELD. *Common Sense: A Political History*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. 337. \$29.95.

Sophia Rosenfeld's subtle, iconoclastic book profoundly unsettles the way historians of the Atlantic world have traditionally thought about the relationship between "common sense" and democracy. According to the standard story, the populist language of Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* (1776) fired the political imaginations of ordinary American colonists, giving voice to the age of revolution's emergent, democratic understanding of popular sovereignty. The people, not nonsensical characters like monarchs and aristocrats, now drove history and politics forward. Paine—a leader of Pennsylvania's democratic insurgency, a critic of religious dogma, and an avid pursuer of scientific knowledge—used the language of common sense to clear away the elitist obfuscation and popular deference that had previously stifled the development of truly self-governing polities. Paine's validation of ordinary citizens' ways of knowing, their common sense, thus underwrote the ideal of democratic self-rule the modern world has inherited from the age of reason.

Rosenfeld's intellectual history of common sense—from its emergence in late seventeenth-century London through its multiple iterations in eighteenth-century Aberdeen, Amsterdam, Philadelphia, and Paris—pushes against this standard narrative in two ways.

First, she reveals how conservative thinkers and polemicists in 1760s Aberdeen and 1790s Paris deployed common sense as a way to stave off challenges to traditional political, social, and clerical authority. The popular “wisdom” valorized by Scottish popularizers like James Beattie or in French antirevolutionary catechisms was little more than reactionary, anti-intellectual group-think. For them, common sense merely demonstrated that what is (and what had been) is right.

When the scene shifts to the radical intellectual circles of 1760s Amsterdam and the streets of revolutionary Philadelphia in the mid-1770s, Rosenfeld traces a different, though just as dubiously democratic, manifestation of common sense. In both Amsterdam and Philadelphia, common sense functioned not as a description of reality but as a language of “arch-partisanship” that small groups of radicals used to further their political goals. Amsterdam’s freethinkers, for example, ridiculed the established church as nonsensical, but they were equally disdainful of the bulk of their devout contemporaries who failed to appreciate the Radical Enlightenment’s self-evident truths. Likewise, we too easily forget that Paine’s famous pamphlet spoke for the minority of Americans who in early 1776 were ready to sever ties with the British monarchy. The discourse of common sense enabled radicals in Amsterdam and Philadelphia to engage in hyperpartisan attacks while claiming to articulate ideas that were obvious and uncontroversial. By bringing to light both the conservative and partisan meanings of common sense in the eighteenth century, Rosenfeld demonstrates that this political trope did not simply liberate and authorize the political voice of the previously excluded people. Rather, common sense just as frequently functioned as a vehicle of coercion, whether that implicit in the status quo or in the deeply partisan ambitions of a self-confident and often self-righteous minority that claimed to speak for everyone.

What motivates Rosenfeld’s historical analysis is a question, provoked by Hannah Arendt, about the possibilities and limitations of a democratic politics grounded in ordinary citizens’ commonsensical understandings of the world. While the final chapter of the book—in which Rosenfeld engages Arendt, Immanuel Kant, and the history of common sense from 1800 to the present—is not as compelling as the earlier chapters, the book as a whole succeeds in its effort to detach readers from the benign, self-congratulatory narrative about common sense with which this review began. Rosenfeld’s critical history shows us how common sense frequently has been used to quash political complexity. In the hands of both radicals and reactionaries, the language of common sense articulated unrealistic and potentially dangerous fantasies of unanimity in an increasingly diverse world. Behind common sense’s inspirational and purportedly universalistic rhetoric of popular sovereignty lay a host of covert exclusions, cynical political manipulation, and populist anti-intellectualism. The contemporary implications seem clear: beware of Tea Party activists who claim the mantle of

common sense as they pass off oversimplified political solutions as the consensual will of the people.

Since the publication of this book, however, a new, progressive political movement has emerged in the United States that claims to speak for commonsensical policies that will honor the interests of ninety-nine percent of the population over those of one percent. While the conservative Tea Party uses the language of common sense to criticize the obfuscations of scientific elites and their complicated theories about climate change and evolution, the Occupy movement targets the complex financial mechanisms created by the capitalist elite that have harmed ordinary people whose interests have lacked representation within the halls of political power. Reading Rosenfeld’s book in the early days of the Occupy movement’s development, I wondered if she would be as critical of the contemporary, progressive use of common sense as she is of the conservative variant. This brought me back to her refreshingly skeptical analysis of Paine’s *Common Sense*. In that discussion she pushes against the scholarship that has emphasized the role class played in Philadelphia’s revolutionary mobilization. Instead of reading it as a text that tapped into deep-seated but previously submerged animosities, Rosenfeld sees it as a partisan attempt by the political “outs” to become the “ins.” But what if all appeals to common sense are not created equal? Is an appeal authored by a former stay maker that sells tens of thousands of copies the equivalent of reactionary catechisms written and disseminated by wealthy elites? Has the appeal to common sense ever inspired a historically significant movement that shifted social or political structures in a more democratic direction? While Rosenfeld’s book does not offer us easy or straightforward answers to such questions, there are few better places to start in our efforts to answer them.

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WILLIAM MICHAEL MORGAN. *Pacific Gibraltar: U.S.-Japanese Rivalry over the Annexation of Hawai‘i, 1885–1898*. (ADST-DACOR Diplomats and Diplomacy Series.) Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press. 2011. Pp. x, 330. \$34.95.

One hundred years after white political leaders overthrew Hawai‘i’s last monarchy, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution declaring that they would not have succeeded in denying the sovereign rights of the native populace without the participation of American officials in the conspiracy and the landing of U.S. forces. In this superb monograph, William Michael Morgan explains why “these assertions are wrong in an absolute sense but sometimes partly right in a larger sense” (p. 5). He convincingly describes the “forces and events and actions that bore directly on the 1893 revolution” and “the acquisition of what might be called America’s Pacific Gibraltar, a prized naval bastion” (p. 3). An explanation for this outcome, Morgan writes, “nestles easily into a theory of eclectic American imperialism”

(p. 238), but three factors were decisive. First was how a "revolution in naval technology and strategy" after 1880 accentuated Hawai'i's matchless strategic value (p. 4). Second was the drive of white islanders for wealth and power. Third was the "growing American rivalry with Japan" (p. 5). Meticulous use of an impressive array of primary and secondary sources fully substantiates Morgan's compelling arguments.

After briefly covering the populating of Hawai'i and early contacts with the West, the author describes how "the processes of 'civilization,' 'modernization,' and 'globalization' . . . caused the near physical extinction of the Hawaiian people" (p. 16). His account of the arrival and growth of the sugar industry reveal how "King Cane" came to "dominate the economy and distort politics and foreign relations as well" (p. 27). Planters, wanting to avoid reliance on Chinese labor, turned to Japanese immigration to supply the bulk of field workers under a treaty with Japan requiring repatriation. The "Bayonet Constitution" of 1887 barred naturalization of non-whites, but its income or property requirements for voting ignited almost six years of discord. Liliuokalani, even before she became queen in 1891, was committed to enfranchise only native Hawaiians. "Nobody was plotting" (p. 68) against her, Morgan insists, until "inept advisors" (p. 59) failed to dissuade the queen from preparing to impose a new constitution. Her gamble forced white leaders to revolt. The author labels U.S. Ambassador John L. Stevens's behavior as only "highly improper" (p. 86) in being "overbearing and rude" toward the queen (p. 61) and "hobnobbing with [her] declared enemies" (p. 64). U.S.S. *Boston* Captain Gilbert C. Wiltse, not Stevens, ordered the troop landing, exceeding "what was necessary and prudent" (p. 108). His action left royalists, "strongly predisposed to surrender," "completely paralyzed" (p. 103).

Morgan finds flaws in the Blount Report that attributed the rebel victory to U.S. collusion, explaining how the natives were not stronger militarily and the rebels would have acted without U.S. troops and triumphed because of royalist errors. He blames Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham not only for a report that Congress repudiated but for a disastrous failed attempt to restore the queen. While the Cleveland administration followed "a policy of benign neglect" (p. 138), Tokyo began pressing Hawai'i to grant voting rights to Japanese islanders, who now comprised a plurality of male residents. Equally important in pushing the United States toward annexation were Alfred Thayer Mahan's writings and recognition of "the insatiable coal hunger of battleships" (p. 158) that dictated the need for a naval base at Pearl Harbor. After a lengthy and tedious discussion of U.S. coastal fortifications, Morgan convincingly argues that the U.S. clash with Japan over Hawai'i in 1897 "was not a phony confrontation invented by Honolulu to provoke annexation" (p. 216). Japan's aggressiveness motivated U.S. leaders to submit a treaty, but the crisis in Cuba—and Congressman Thomas Reed's opposition—"scuttled" it until the Spanish-American

War acted as "a validation and a trigger" (pp. 223–227). "Annexation succeeded because it was old policy," Morgan contends in his conclusion, "formed by two decades of maturing argument, and made urgent by the U.S.-Japan clash" (p. 240).

Two good maps complement crisp and incisive prose, one of downtown Honolulu and the other demarcating distances from Hawai'i to key points along the Pacific Rim. Morgan presents splendid personal profiles of every influential actor, among them President William McKinley, who he portrays as "a reasonably good leader" (p. 183). He also skillfully assesses the findings of prior writers, including Charles S. Campbell, Merze Tate, and Thomas J. Osborne. This book corrects mistaken historical details, refuting for example the queen's claim that U.S. troops aimed their rifles at her. But Morgan errs in identifying Hawai'i, not Midway, as the first U.S. territorial acquisition "outside of North America" (p. 237). Support is exact for two of his main conclusions: "Sugar planters played no discernible role in fomenting revolution" (p. 67) and a "newspaper barrage" implicating the Harrison administration "was twaddle, and bad twaddle at that" (p. 68). The author's description of how "the events of January 14–17 show a high degree of mutual understanding and an array of simultaneous or complementary actions typical of a unified group rather than two distinct camps" undermines his case against a U.S. conspiracy (p. 84).

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ROBERT W. THURSTON. *Lynching: American Mob Murder in Global Perspective*. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2011. Pp. viii, 427. \$99.95.

Robert W. Thurston challenges the monochromatic picture of lynching often painted in popular stories, stories that remove ambiguities to simplify all whites as the mob and to depict the late nineteenth-century South as dominated by the noose. Thurston shows that lynching was fluid across time and space and that white southerners varied significantly, even erratically, in their beliefs and actions, their perceptions of crime, and their understandings of African Americans.

Thurston's most interesting contribution is to widen our angle on lynching to a global perspective by examining mobs and popular violence in Indonesia, Russia, Nigeria, India, Guatemala, and elsewhere. He concludes that mob violence tends to follow political instability and growing concern about crime and that the ritualistic and community functions of lynching, often important elsewhere, were less important in the American South.

From this global perspective the author moves to large issues of race, civilization, and sexuality. Particularly useful is his incorporation of literature and other cultural forms, ranging from Edgar Rice Burroughs's Tarzan stories to the actress Tallulah Bankhead and, most important, to the contexts of imperialism. Thur-

ston makes extensive use of popular and scholarly literature on changing images of the body in the Anglo-American world. And finally he moves to the American South, where white women by the early twentieth century were far from the delicate figures on a pedestal portrayed in some accounts. From these changing contexts came lessened white anxiety over sex generally and a decline in the obligation of white men to protect helpless women from imagined black rapists (an imagined danger never as central as often suggested, Thurston asserts). Sexuality diminished as a useful means of asserting racial boundaries, a change understood only when considered in global and especially European colonial contexts.

The last section of the book hones in on Georgia, the heartland of lynching. Here Thurston drills down to Hugh Dorsey, prosecutor in the Leo Frank trial and apologist for the lynching that followed Frank's conviction for murder. Mixing this case study with his comparative arguments for fluidity and ambiguity, Thurston shows how Dorsey's views evolved to a modest challenge to lynching and mob violence and to incorporation of the language of race and civilization. Dorsey's evolution did not go so far as to question racial segregation or the assumed inferiority of other races, but it did help make lynching less central in southern life.

All these subjects weave in and out of this impressive effort to understand the rise and decline of lynching. Thurston's linkages of global changes to the decline of lynching after 1892 raise important questions, as do other features captured by his wider geographical lens. While Thurston cites an impressive range of secondary literature, specialists in a particular area may quibble with his analysis (e.g., the Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s). And readers may need some patience because this is a massive and sprawling book about a subject most slippery. One hopes that it will encourage others toward the larger framework of lynching. Finally, by bringing the story to our times Thurston challenges simple-minded but popular notions of the ubiquitous lynch noose and the manner in which they enable some Americans to take comfort in one-dimensional stories of hate and guilt.

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MARGARET D. JACOBS. *White Mother to a Dark Race: Settler Colonialism, Maternalism, and the Removal of Indigenous Children in the American West and Australia, 1880–1940*. Paperback edition. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2011. Pp. xxxii, 557. \$30.00.

In the latter half of the twentieth century, the deep wounds of injustice, physical and emotional trauma, and other effects of colonization experienced by individuals, families, and communities of indigenous peoples in North America and Australia were given wide public exposure through research and various Commissions of Inquiry. In Canada, the final report of the

Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1996) acknowledged the deep impact of the removal policies and the residential schools system. The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission in Australia delivered its report in 1997. This landmark inquiry highlighted not only the history of removal policies and practices in Australia but, more importantly, their long-term consequences. These reports remind readers that government and government-subsidized institutions were essential to implementing removal policies in North America and Australia. They also draw attention to the colonial mentality that created these policies and institutions.

Margaret D. Jacobs's book is an important work based on extensive comparative research in Australia and the American West. Jacobs addresses the removal of indigenous children from their families in both cultural and geographical contexts and goes beyond simple descriptive narrative of policies and practices by employing maternalism as the key organizing concept. This book examines the intimacies of the colonial encounter through a feminist analysis of layers of dispossession. Ann Laura Stoler's *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (2002) has been particularly influential in shaping Jacobs's approach to the various complex roles that women have played in the colonizing project as teachers, missionaries, enforcers, and friends.

Five significant themes emerge from and shape the work: the dispossession of land, culture, and family, resulting from the total sundering of affective bonds between children and their parents; the threat that the ongoing survival of indigenous groups posed to the colonizing project; the gendered dimensions of protection and assimilation policies that implicated white women and affected "rescued" and "uplifted" indigenous women; the invasion of indigenous families and homes—a practice that created serious conflicts of interest between the maternalist ideals of some white women and the demands of the state; and the apparently excessive amount of attention that white women gave to indigenous homes and bodies, enforcing their own strongly held concepts to sever indigenous children's connections with their families and homelands or country.

The first three chapters set down the historical and conceptual groundwork for the maternalist analysis of child removal policies and practices within the Australian and U.S. contexts. Jacobs's narrative is replete with detail and examples. However, while the author's familiarity with the history of cross-cultural encounters between indigenous and whites in the American West is apparent her analysis often overlooks particular regional differences. In spite of her thorough research in Australia, Jacobs focuses less on the Northern Territory, Queensland, and Western Australia, which together have had the highest indigenous population in the country, than on longer settled southeastern Australia. For example, it is not accurate to say that Aboriginal people were no longer engaged in warfare against their colonizers in the late nineteenth century

(p. 31). On the frontiers in the three states identified above, some Aboriginal people continued to engage in guerrilla warfare against colonizers who appropriated their land and waterholes, and there are recorded instances of white settlers killing groups of Aborigines into the first quarter of the twentieth century.

Chapters five through nine effectively develop the central themes of the book: the maternalist approach, the paradoxical nature of the roles of white women in the colonizing project, and the intrusiveness of the maternalist agenda in institutionalizing indigenous children. A minority of white women challenged the status quo through their growing intimacy and friendship with indigenous women. They supported indigenous women in their opposition to the removal of their children and in their struggle for reform. In the process, some white women gained insight into their own complicity in the colonizing agenda implicit in the practice of indigenous child removal, abandoned their previously held maternalist values, and worked alongside indigenous women as equals.

Jacobs's thoroughness, breadth of comparative research, and fresh analysis of the removal of indigenous children have earned three awards for this book (2010 Bancroft Prize; 2010 Athearn Western History Association Prize; 2010 Armitage-Jameson Prize). I appreciate especially her personal approach in framing her entry into the research, making it truly feminist in content and form.

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JESSICA C. E. GIENOW-HECHT, *Sound Diplomacy: Music and Emotions in Transatlantic Relations, 1850–1920*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2009. Pp. xv, 335. \$49.00.

The cultural turn appears to have come to the history of international relations just when questions have been raised as to whether it might have gone too far in historiography as a whole. In *Culture and International History* (2003), Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht asserted that “culture affects nations and global systems as much as, if not more than, power and economic interest” (p. 6). In the present study she attempts to demonstrate that thesis by focusing on German-American musical relations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Engaging the history of emotions, a field pioneered and long explored by Peter N. Stearns, she enlists a notion in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s novel *Elective Affinities* (1809), based on the metaphor of human passions being governed or regulated by the *laws of chemical affinity*. For Gienow-Hecht, emotional elective affinity between Americans and Germans explains why Americans so heartily welcomed German classical music in the latter half of the nineteenth century and why, despite political vicissitudes between the two states, it remains the core of the classical canon in the United States.

Soft diplomacy, dubbed “emotional crossings” by the

author, enabled non-state actors on both sides of the Atlantic to promote good relations by elevating music as both a universal language and a form of national identity. Competing with Britain, which had the advantage of language, and France, which claimed superiority in art, Germany engaged in the mission of “civilizing” Americans by exporting symphonic music to the New World. The German Foreign Office sponsored private touring groups spreading German culture abroad because it served state interests without appearing to be propaganda. Americans, for their part, welcomed the professed universal language of music as a way of bridging ethnic diversity, and the new elite cherished European high culture as a means of expressing and displaying its social success. On the theme of emotional transmission, Gienow-Hecht argues that the German orchestra, with its large body of soldier-like, disciplined musicians controlled by a stern, general-like conductor, evoked a quasi-martial masculinity that allowed Victorian Americans to overcome their fears of emotion, which they had gendered as feminine.

Gienow-Hecht’s empirical work on the music industry is exhaustive and her style is winning. She vividly portrays the personalities of conductors such as Anton Seidl, Theodore Thomas, and Frederick Stock, who were drawn to the United States by money but also by musical evangelism. She brings the musical scene to life in her descriptions of the rave receptions given by towns in the Midwest to touring companies, which in turn boosted burgeoning business communities. Patrons were essential in creating symphony orchestras of some permanence in Boston, Chicago, St. Louis, and New York City. Music critics were important in celebrating the universalism and transcendence of German music, soon becoming “experts” in the new music journals and gatekeepers of the musical canon.

But who was in the audience? While acknowledging that little is known about them, Gienow-Hecht notes that subscriber lists mirrored local elites and that observers reported seeing lower-income people, including some well-off African Americans. Overall, women acted like fans, making a star cult of “sexy” conductors.

The American love affair began to wane, however, toward the turn of the century as nationalism took root on both sides of the Atlantic. American composers sought a national musical identity and local musicians began to unionize against immigrant competitors. Tensions grew in foreign policy as Germany built a navy and embarked on its *Weltpolitik* while the United States fought Spain over colonies in 1898. With the outbreak of World War I, Americans vilified everything German, including its *Kultur*. Orchestras had to play the Star Spangled Banner before every performance (although it only became the official national anthem in 1931); when the German conductor Karl Muck refused to follow suit, he was briefly interned before leaving the country. At this point, one must doubt Gienow-Hecht’s claim about culture’s superior efficacy over political and economic power in world events. Yet she maintains that the war was not, as many historians assert, the great

watershed in German-American cultural relations, because “emotional elective affinity” between the two peoples survived. The canon was upheld and elaborated in music theory and education by German émigrés from Nazism, although here again the critical reader must note that this affinity did not prevent the hostilities of World War II. Finally, the early Cold War led to the reassertion of American affinity with the Federal Republic of Germany.

Despite these contradictions to her thesis, Gienow-Hecht concludes that cultural relations develop a life of their own, apart from political realities with which they may occasionally overlap. This implies Pierre Bourdieu’s theory about fields of cultural production, according to which symbolic power is intertwined with but not reducible to economic and political power, and thus serves a legitimating function. She might have made more of this in tracing the role of classical music as a form of cultural consumption and domination that met the needs of the bourgeoisie in Germany and the United States as they aspired to consolidate their social power in the two incompletely unified nations. That analysis might better explain the supposed affinity as structural rather than emotional. Indeed, one hardly can be certain of one’s own emotions much less those of another, and even less of entire groups.

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JEREMY BLACK. *The Great War and the Making of the Modern World*. New York: Continuum. 2011. Pp. xv, 337. \$29.95.

Jeremy Black’s stated purpose is to make sense of World War I, “the most misunderstood major conflict in history” (p. 229). As he goes on to argue, a book with this aim would not have been necessary at the time or in the 1920s when, on both sides, there was clarity about why the war was fought. The “important and worthwhile issues” became obscured in the 1930s and have remained forgotten until, in recent decades, historians, if not the wider public, have reached conclusions not dissimilar from those of contemporaries. In the case of the most important belligerents of 1914, Germany quickly adopted a program of large-scale annexations and was resolutely unwilling to contemplate peace if it was not achieved. The German leadership remained committed to this until they saw defeat staring them in the face. For Great Britain, France, and even tsarist Russia, the war was one to uphold international stability and the rule of law in the wake of Austro-Hungarian determination, backed by Germany, to crush Serbia and the German invasion of Belgium after France had rejected German demands to occupy portions of French territory as a guarantee of its neutrality after Germany and Russia had gone to war. Black concedes that historians may face insurmountable difficulties in persuading the wider public that this was not hyp-

ocritical eyewash, so deep did that belief become embedded well after the war had ended.

Black rightly stresses the absence of “simple lines” (p. 255) connecting the Great War to its successor in 1939–1945. On the actualities of 1914, besides the Big Four (or Five including Vienna), Black does justice to the motives of other participants, except that he evidently confuses Portugal and Greece in stating that Britain forced the former into war in 1917. Portugal entered in 1916 after an internal debate and was under little or no British pressure, unlike Greece, which was cajoled into the war in 1917 by Britain and France. Virtually the only other detailed criticism concerns Black’s occasional lack of attention to his audience. He references the 1960s antiwar play *Oh! What A Lovely War* being played in 2010 in “nearby Plymouth” (p. 220), which readers, not least in New England, might find puzzling. The explanation is that Exeter, where Black teaches, and this Plymouth are cities in the same British county.

Political parameters are the essential framework for the military history of the war, which takes up the greater part of the book. In particular, they explain why there was a widespread determination to continue fighting after the pre-1914 assumptions about what a war would be like had been confounded. Those included an expectation that offensives would produce speedy victory on land and a consequent readiness to accept heavy casualties and, after the Japanese fleet’s victory at Tsushima, an assumption that there would be great and decisive naval battles. After the failure in 1914 of the German, Russian, and French offensives, all that remained of earlier thinking was the readiness to accept heavy casualties for the duration of the war while means were found to break the military deadlock. Black notes the stubborn persistence of assertions by generals concerning the “morale” factor, the belief that the superior morale of their own troops would make the difference. He indicates that some advances in assumptions occurred by 1917 insofar as the more hardheaded politicians found this “theory,” as one British minister called it, not merely unpersuasive but exasperating. The stalemate resulted from roughly equal capabilities and the advantage enjoyed by the defense. Black’s book is especially interesting in delineating the learning curve by which techniques were found to break the stalemate, not least by the British in their journey from the failures at Gallipoli in 1915 to triumph on the Western Front in 1918. Indeed, by the summer of 1918 German military defeat was inevitable even if the German home front had not disintegrated. If the successful Anglo-French-American operations of that summer had not been decisive, the full weight of American economic and manpower resources available in 1919 could not have failed to bring Germany to its knees.

The last two chapters are about what the war did to shape world history from 1919 to the present, covering much from female emancipation to the rise and downfall of Soviet communism. What is missing here is almost any discussion of the early postwar period. The

1930s receive mention, but the reader would look in vain for any reference to something as important as the Locarno Treaties of 1925 and the undoubted improvement in international relations around that time, recently expounded by such historians as Patrick O. Cohrs and Zara Steiner. This is a regrettable omission.

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BROOKE L. BLOWER. *Becoming Americans in Paris: Transatlantic Politics and Culture between the World Wars*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. x, 354. \$34.95.

Had this book appeared before Woody Allen made *Midnight in Paris*, he might have been able to use more than the absence of novocaine in dentists' offices to question whether life in 1920s "Gay Paree" was really as gay as it is said to be. While its author, Brooke L. Blower, admits that hundreds of thousands of frivolous tourists from Prohibition-era United States did enjoy the many pleasures on offer in Paris, she argues that the sojourners who stayed longer were often involved in more serious pursuits. She tells of how, in the aftermath of World War I, Americans arrived brimming with confidence in their country's economic and cultural superiority, and how large parts of the city, still on its economic knees, were transformed to cater to their tastes. Montmartre and the Champs-Élysées were crammed with American-style bars and night-clubs; "English-spoken" restaurants surrounded the Place de l'Opéra; American bohemians packed the terraces of Montparnasse cafés, becoming a tourist attraction in their own right.

Conflicts with the locals inevitably followed, many of which the author chronicles by combing the police archives. Parisian conservatives condemned the "hooked-nosed" "cosmopolitans" of Montparnasse, as well as the African American jazz bands blaring through the night in Montmartre. They bridled at the apparent Americanization of the capital—the garish neon signs, the ubiquitous posters advertising Hollywood movies, and the honking cars clogging streets. Leftists condemned "Fordism" for ruining workers' lives and angrily protested the death sentences meted out in Massachusetts to the anarchists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti. After their execution in August 1927, demonstrators who were thwarted from attacking the American embassy trashed Montmartre and the area around the Champs-Élysées, two of the four districts most associated with pleasure-seeking Americans in Paris. (Blower sees these protests as helping to forge transatlantic links among leftists that presaged the mid-1930s Popular Front, something that seems a bit far-fetched given the distinct lack of enthusiasm for supporting their anarchist rivals displayed by the two nations' Communist parties, the future keystones of the Popular Front.)

The rightist prefect of Paris followed the riots with an *épuration* of the city intended, he said, to turn the "cap-

ital of good humor" into the "capital of good manners" (p. 132). Blower tries to put an anti-American spin on the roundups of streetwalkers and raids on unregulated brothels, after-hours night spots, and gay bars by pointing out that they were concentrated in the districts most frequented by foreigners. But few Americans were caught in this net, and the prefect himself said that, rather than being anti-American, they were intended to prepare the city to welcome "our American friends"—the ten-thousand-odd American Legionnaires who soon descended on the city for their annual convention.

Blower's chapter on this rather loopy affair tries to read too much into it. She sees the Legion as "a new American right" and implies that it was a counterpart to the French Right, with its affinities for fascism. She criticizes other "scholars" (e.g., this reviewer) for not recognizing the convention's "significance . . . in the transatlantic political debate" (p. 175). Yet, as she points out, for the most part the convention consisted of curiously costumed, often drunk, middle-aged men indulging in "high-jinks" that turned out to be either deeply offensive or simply puzzling to many Parisians. The Legionnaires made no real connections with the French Right, and anyway, she admits, whatever their activities back home, the Legion could hardly be considered a fascist organization.

The next chapter is devoted to correcting the impression left by the famous writers who returned from France after the Great Crash chanting *mea culpas* over their lack of involvement with the problems of the world. Blower takes pains to refute Malcolm Cowley's *Exile's Return* (1934), the classic in the genre, saying that the political maelstrom of Paris in the 1920s helped turn writers such as Ernest Hemingway, e.e. cummings, John Dos Passos, William Shirer, Langston Hughes, and Martha Gellhorn into committed liberal internationalists. In the 1930s, she says, the broad perspective they had developed in 1920s Paris led them to become enthusiastic supporters of the Popular Front, active defenders of Loyalist Spain, and fierce opponents of Nazi Germany. Yet by then most had long since left Paris and were drawing their inspiration from elsewhere. (Hughes opined that Moscow had replaced Paris as "the greatest city in the world" [p. 242].) Nevertheless, Blower says, by the time the United States entered World War II, the internationalist ideals that had originated in the heated debates on Paris's Left Bank had helped convince many Americans "that people suffering and enduring elsewhere were like Americans . . . and that their lands . . . were savable" (p. 256).

Whether or not one finds this formulation convincing, practically anyone interested in Paris in the 1920s—even Woody Allen—should find this well-written and thoroughly researched view of the other side of "Gay Paree" informative and stimulating.

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SEAN SCALMER. *Gandhi in the West: The Mahatma and the Rise of Radical Protest*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. vi, 248. Cloth \$90.00, paper \$32.99.

Although there are numerous books on Gandhian-style nonviolent resistance, most describe and analyze the technique or examine particular protests. There are very few histories that observe the way in which the method evolved over time. Sean Scalmer's book provides evidence of this evolution in the United States and Britain during the period from about 1940 to 1970, using numerous contemporary sources.

Scalmer shows that Mohandas K. Gandhi was for many years poorly understood in the West. Views were constructed on the basis of racist stereotypes about "Orientals," and even those who revered the man had little real understanding of his methods. In part, this was due to colonial censorship and counter-propaganda, but Gandhi's use of Indian concepts and idioms made his beliefs opaque to audiences outside India. In particular, the term *satyagraha* was difficult to translate, and the existing terms in English for civil protest, such as "passive resistance," carried different implications. In general, it was only after the mid-1940s that Western activists began to gain an informed understanding of Gandhi's methods and ideology, with the result, according to Scalmer, that "an era of exciting political experiment opened suddenly outwards" (p. 104).

A small and isolated group of Western pacifists had employed Gandhi as a model for their own activism in the 1930s and 1940s, often in very quiescent ways. It was only in the 1940s that some African American civil rights campaigners began to try to adapt Gandhian methods to their particular cause, and in the early 1950s that anti-nuclear activists began to do the same in Britain. At first, there was little popular support for their protests. African American civil rights protestors were beaten up by white thugs while the police looked on. Rather than winning the sympathy of onlookers and opponents, as Gandhi had argued was the effect of self-imposed suffering by protestors, their efforts gained few converts to the cause. All that they had was courage and optimism, while failure stared them constantly in the face. Gradually, as they learned how to direct their attention to clearly defined targets, such as segregation on buses and at lunch counters in the American South, they began to win wider sympathy and support.

Scalmer argues that at this juncture, Western activists began to distance themselves from the Gandhian legacy. He perhaps overstates the ways in which Martin Luther King, Jr. downplayed Gandhi's influence; in 1959 King went on pilgrimage to visit Indian sites associated with the Mahatma, and in 1963—when King delivered his "I Have a Dream" speech—photos show him surrounded by people wearing Gandhi caps. Scalmer nonetheless provides strong evidence that from around 1963 onward, increasing numbers of American civil rights activists began to challenge the Gandhian legacy, asserting an American tradition of

civil protest. In Britain, anti-nuclear campaigners looked both to ancient assertions of British freedom and to more recent movements such as that of the suffragettes, in the process making audacious claims about the superior morality of their own societal traditions and the great originality of forms of protest that were, in their essential methods, derived directly from Gandhi and his Indian followers.

In time, the Gandhian method developed in new ways. King innovated the tactic of "creative tension," provoking constant confrontations in which the violence of the antagonist was revealed in its full ugliness, thus winning widespread sympathy for the cause. As more people were attracted to the civil rights cause, the strict nonviolence of the disciplined, Gandhian-style activist gave way to the more riotous behavior of the crowd. Protestors no longer dressed in respectable clothing and acted with the dignified discipline that emphasized their superior morality—the enemy, it was said, was too hardened to respond to such appeals. Instead there was confrontation, and even fighting back with staves and brickbats. As the 1960s advanced, many protestors began to associate nonviolence with timidity, and strength with masculine muscle-flexing. This indeed represented a turning-away from the Gandhian ethos. The rioting that accompanied King's assassination in 1968 marked the symbolic end of this era, with the rhetoric of Black Power and the idealization of guerrilla warfare in the cult of Che Guevara replacing King's nonviolence as the most fashionable model for resistance. That these too were soon discredited and displaced by the major nonviolent campaigns of the 1980s and beyond takes us past the period examined by Scalmer, but as he says in the conclusion to this excellent book, there are many further histories to be written.

DAVID HARDIMAN
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JOHN B. HENCH. *Books as Weapons: Propaganda, Publishing, and the Battle for Global Markets in the Era of World War II*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2010. Pp. xviii, 333. \$35.00.

Millions of books appeared during World War II bearing the logo of a fierce eagle clutching a book in its talons, a streamer trailing from its beak reading "Books are weapons in the war of ideas." Franklin D. Roosevelt, his Office of War Information (OWI), and myriad U.S. book publishers seconded this catchy slogan. World War II was not only a military struggle but also a battle of ideas, and books, it seemed, could play a vital role in the global ideological conflict. But which books? Who would choose them? And how would they be distributed?

John B. Hench analyzes how publishers and the American government tried to advance their compatible, but sometimes conflicting, interests during and immediately after the war. After the intellectual blackout that had descended on Axis countries and their con-

quests, OWI officials sensed a golden opportunity to promote positive views of U.S. government and society. It was thought that books could counter not only Joseph Goebbels's noxious propaganda but also the image of a violent, consumerist United States fed, paradoxically, by another American cultural export: Hollywood movies. Perhaps betraying their high culture bias, some OWI officials believed that impressions made by books were more profound than those received from films.

Book publishers wanted to promote sales in areas that had been off-limits during the Axis occupation and to crack the British market that had restricted American book sales in the empire. Although bureaucrats and publishers had broadly compatible interests, working through a maze of bureaucratic snarls, paper restrictions, and transportation dilemmas required prodigious energy. Hensch ably untangles the sometimes mind-numbing negotiations required to fuse public policy and private interests. His book is thoroughly researched, well written, and clearly argued.

A few weeks after D-Day, cartons of books hit the beaches of Normandy. Eventually 3.6 million books were sent to Europe in special printings known as Overseas Editions and the Transatlantic Series. Starved for reading fare, impoverished but with few outlets for entertainment, Europeans snapped up cheaply priced American volumes. Some translated titles were sold at German prisoner of war camps in the United States—truly a “captive market,” as Hensch drily notes (p. 128).

Titles had to pass through multiple sieves, and screening standards were not always clear. Hensch characterizes the choices as “middlebrow,” similar to Book-of-the-Month Club selections. The list included books by historians such as Carl Becker, Henry Steele Commager, Foster R. Dulles, Allan Nevins, and Fletcher Pratt. Edgier titles were avoided, although Alfred Kazin's *On Native Grounds: An Interpretation Of Modern American Prose Literature* (1942) met with favor. Later shipments included such authors as Charles Beard and Lincoln Steffens, though not their most challenging works. Ernest Hemingway's *For Whom the Bell Tolls* was chosen to showcase American literature, but authors such as Jack London and Walt Whitman were vetoed for unexplained reasons. Books that had been banned by the Nazis, such as Thomas Mann's *The Magic Mountain* (1924) and Erich Maria Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front* (1929), were prized exports.

The government and the publishing industry both saw wartime book distribution as beachheads for postwar literary penetration. Publishers worked with the occupation government in Germany in the difficult task of resurrecting a de-Nazified publishing industry. In Japan, where the occupation government worked through the inherited Japanese bureaucracy and where few Americans boasted linguistic skills, a publishing revival occurred more quickly. Margaret Mitchell's *Gone with the Wind* (1936) became the first translated American title to crack Japan's bestseller list in 1949. American and British firms engaged in dueling “biblioimperialisms” (p. 222) for access to foreign markets.

Although it is notoriously difficult to assess the effects of specific propaganda programs, Hensch reasonably concludes the book offensive was successful. He argues it introduced freer publishing regimes in Germany and Japan and helped make both countries “on the whole good friends and reliable allies for the ensuing cold war” (p. 256). The links between the wartime programs and the more controversial use of cultural tools by the Central Intelligence Agency and other government units merit deeper analysis. Hensch laments the declining use of books in advancing “soft power.” In an age of blogs and videos gone viral, his work, perhaps unintentionally, inspires nostalgia for a time when books seemed to be a winning cultural weapon.

CLAYTON KOPPEL
Oberlin College

CHRISTOPHER KLEMEK. *The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal: Postwar Urbanism from New York to Berlin*. (Historical Studies of Urban America.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2011. Pp. x, 315. \$40.00.

Inner-city expressways, “slum” clearance, and public housing projects are the negative icons of liberal modernist urban planning that prevailed throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Reinforcing popular resentment against this type of urban planning, historians have pointed out the adversarial social effects of such schemes, especially the tendency to aggravate racial inequalities, and the lack of public participation and acceptance. While these shortcomings arguably contributed to the virtual disappearance of wholesale urban renewal by the 1970s, Christopher Klemek is interested in how the underlying ideals of liberal modernism concurrently lost their assertiveness. The subject of the study is a set of ideas and institutions that sustained and mutually reinforced what Klemek labels the “urban renewal order” and the process of their erosion. The “urban renewal order” is presented as a bundle of aesthetic preferences, expertism, federal policy, and local power structures all tuned to the principles of modernism after World War II. Klemek goes on to show how every single one of these elements came under attack during the 1960s and how the bundle eventually unraveled in the following decades.

The first part of the book is devoted to the emergence of the modernist “urban renewal order.” The origins are traced back to interwar Europe, from which a number of architects and planners, such as Walter Gropius, migrated to the United States and became the intellectual spearhead of the “urban renewal order.” Their efforts were complemented by federal policy, mostly on housing and road building, and above all by political shifts in various local regimes. Under the banner of reform, a new generation of politicians in alliance with professional urban planners had acquired power in many U.S. cities in the early 1950s. However, Klemek asserts in the second part of the book, critique was never completely absent. He cites the British *Architectural Review* as a source of competing aesthetic ideals

and the Independent Group that called for more sensitivity to context of urban planning during the 1950s. Growing criticism resulted from sociological inquiries into urban redevelopment projects suggesting that existing communities should be preserved. While such objections were discussed within the profession, Jane Jacobs' *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961), to which Klemek devotes an entire chapter, made a wider public aware of this divergence of opinion. These disputes are scrutinized in the third part of the book. The notorious "Freeway Revolts" serve as a case in point to show how the professional critique of modernist schemes was echoed by popular resentments. By the end of the 1960s, some of the concerns had found their way into local policy, illustrated by the case of neighborhood preservation in New York City. Concurrently, grass-roots organizations had become powerful actors on the urban scene. This was possible, as portrayed in the fourth part of the book, because on the one hand activists were supported by "anti-experts" of the New Left, and on the other hand neoconservative notions among urbanists led to the questioning of the effectiveness of modernist intervention. As small-scale participatory planning flourished, the funds on which it thrived were eventually discarded altogether by the Nixon administration. Nonetheless, Klemek concludes the book on a positive note, arguing that the legacy of small-scale participatory planning did live on in other countries, foremost in Canada and West Germany.

This book provides a valuable interpretation of the transformations in postwar urban planning in the United States. Klemek convincingly concentrates on the intellectual history manifested in the professional discourse among urbanists. In doing so, Klemek is able to analyze the transformations in thinking without losing sight of the broader political context which he consistently includes through his concept of the "urban renewal order." This book is especially important because of Klemek's persuasive demonstration of the strong relationship between the evolution of ideas and the local experiences of those professionals involved. Accordingly, the sites that figure as the nodes of the book's narrative are the Joint Center for Urban Studies of MIT and Harvard, New York's West Village (the long-time home of Jacobs), and University of Pennsylvania's School of Design in conjunction with Philadelphia's South Street neighborhood. Klemek adds to this perspective considerable material from Berlin, London, and Toronto, which is sometimes used to show the significant transfer of ideas, and is at times employed as a comparative reflection. While these additions contribute to the book's comprehensiveness, they are too erratic to amount to categorizing the book as a transatlantic history of urban planning in a strict sense. Nonetheless, the extensive contextualization of the professional discourse both in breadth and in depth not only reflects a current trend in scholarship on urban planning but is done in an exemplary and productive way. This book is an important contribution to the ur-

ban history of the United States as well as a conceptually farsighted study.

SEBASTIAN HAUMANN

Technische Universität Darmstadt

SEBASTIAN HAUMANN. "*Schade, daß Beton nicht brennt . . .*": *Planung, Partizipation und Protest in Philadelphia und Köln 1940–1990*. (Beiträge zur Stadtgeschichte und Urbanisierungsforschung, number 12.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. 2011. Pp. 335. €62.00.

Twin shibboleths—already battered, and even looking somewhat like straw men now—mark the historiography of city planning after World War II on both sides of the Atlantic. The first holds that there was a watershed break roughly forty years ago (in 1960s America and 1970s Europe), caused when grass-roots opposition to urban renewal effected a wholesale rejection of planning visions and practices. The second dominant interpretative trend suggests that this rejection was all for the best. Sebastian Haumann's study, whose title invokes a German squatter slogan ("a pity that concrete doesn't burn"), raises intriguing questions about both. Famous protest episodes did occur, of course, but Haumann argues that they did not really constitute breaks with the dominant modernist planning approach. Rather, they worked out tensions inherent within the modernist conceit that progressive emancipation of citizens would occur via technocratic planning for them (p. 313).

Haumann examines two lesser-known flashpoints of community mobilization in great detail: opposition to a crosstown expressway in South Philadelphia (1967–1974) and attempts to stop the redevelopment of a chocolate factory in Cologne (1973–1981). Even within the histories of each respective city, not to speak of the larger transatlantic context, these represent single episodes unfolding over less than a decade. So for both cases, Haumann provides an introductory chapter setting the stage of urban renewal in the decades leading up to the clashes. In the American setting, a mid-century civic reform movement took up city planning as a cudgel against entrenched political machines. In Germany, postwar urban reformers were situated within an expanding welfare state, comfortably beyond such politicized contests.

The utility of this version of Haumann's project will necessarily be rather limited for urban scholars outside of German-speaking academic circles. Beyond the obvious linguistic barrier is the basic fact that the study is firmly anchored in a German scholarly conversation, and primarily interested in illuminating the history of German planning via the U.S. example, rather than vice versa, or something even more broad. It must also be noted that, in keeping with German academic practices, the published text is essentially a dissertation, which explains its heavy reliance on other scholars' theoretical frameworks. In particular, Klaus Selle's concept of "planning cultures" (*Planungskulturen*) forms the point of departure (p. 19), and Haumann fits his conclusions

into Selle's three analytical categories of images (*Leitbilder*), institutions, and implementation (pp. 313–316).

Haumann emphasizes continuities between the mid- and later twentieth centuries, and between the U.S. and German examples. He insists that there is a convergent trend, despite the divergent outcomes of civic opposition movements—the Philadelphians' freeway revolt stopped the road project, but the Cologne squatters failed to prevent demolition. For Haumann, the grass-roots opposition of the 1960s and 1970s did not reflect clashing planning cultures, but a kind of reformation within the extant one. Ultimately, he concedes, a new planning culture did emerge by the 1980s, influenced by the protest perspective and even glorifying it, though he hopes to chasten that celebration of change. Such conclusions foreground his German point of reference. According to Haumann, indications of the newest paradigm—including the emergence of the Green Party in Germany and the implementation there of a national urban policy for socio-economic stabilization of neighborhoods (*Soziale Stadt*)—imply the normalization and incorporation (borrowing Jens Ivo Engels's terms) of participatory planning. But Haumann critiques such self-satisfied triumphalism by pointing to accompanying deregulatory trends that undermine the goals of earlier neighborhood activists.

It is precisely here that the comparative discussion beckons most tantalizingly for further development. For example, Haumann notes that German planning officials defended a technocratic vision of apolitical objectivity well into the 1980s (pp. 310–311). Yet such conceptions faced forceful challenges from the early 1960s in the U.S. (viz. Paul Davidoff and advocacy planning) and fell into unfunded irrelevance with the discontinuance of major urban renewal programs a decade later. Thus, the sense of historical break—and the effects of subsequent deregulation—might be drawn much more sharply in the U.S. case. Similarly, Haumann's facility in two sets of urban archival sources raises some fascinating questions about political cultures and the nature of citizenship that could lead to bolder conclusions. He points to the broadly defined rights of citizen participation in U.S. cities, compared to the tightly circumscribed German category of *Betroffenen* (those directly "affected" by condemnations and displacement)—the latter term and concept being absent from planning vocabulary in the United States. And while the German approach seems less democratic at first glance, it also anchored the participation and consideration of neighborhood residents in durable planning institutions. While Haumann construes the relationship between the U.S. and German examples to be one of "transmission" (*Transfergeschichte*) within a context of "great structural similarities" (p. 27), his study also suggests that planning in Germany retained its own indigenous characteristics in the face of transatlantic influences.

CHRISTOPHER KLEMEK
George Washington University

JESSE HOFFNUNG-GARSKOF. *A Tale of Two Cities: Santo Domingo and New York after 1950*. Paperback edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2010. Pp. xxxi, 319. \$27.95.

The nature of Dominican racial identity has fascinated many academics who have tried to decipher Dominican history in relation to the Dominican racial imagination. Jesse Hoffnung-Garskof's book contributes to this field of inquiry. Hoffnung-Garskof describes two neighborhoods—Cristo Rey in Santo Domingo and Washington Heights in New York City illuminating the lives of Dominicans in both cities. Hoffnung-Garskof stitches together an uneven patchwork comprised of the Dominican Republic's history, flows of migration and the concepts of *cultura*, national imaginaries, and imperialism. This impressive book addresses transnational topics—especially racial identity and the politics of migration—that link the Dominican Republic to the northern reaches of the Atlantic world. Hoffnung-Garskof accomplishes this task by drawing upon both archival and ethnographic data.

Hoffnung-Garskof frames migration largely as an outcome of exclusionary racial and class-based understandings of *cultura* and progress espoused by intellectuals in the Dominican Republic. The latter define progress from a racist perspective, blaming biological factors such as skin color and undernourishment for the low status of blacks, peasants, and the poor in Dominican society. Peasants, according to Hoffnung-Garskof, first saw internal migration to cities as the means of progress, only to learn that urban integration was not the same thing as full citizenship. International migration then became more common because of the U.S. influence on Dominican culture. Hoffnung-Garskof identifies the widespread U.S. military and commercial presence in the Dominican Republic as the most effective vector for transmitting awareness of the United States and thus making it the likely destination for Dominican migrants.

The growing Dominican presence in New York City eventually led to Dominican involvement in a number of important political issues and identity movements. For example, Hoffnung-Garskof examines racism directed against Dominicans and the evolving relationship among the Dominican, Puerto Rican, and African American communities. He also shows how the ideas of blackness and *Hispanidad/Latinidad* restricted the understanding of Dominican ethnicity in the United States. Hoffnung-Garskof presents Dominicans in New York as trapped between anti-immigrant sentiments in the United States and class barriers in the Dominican Republic while simultaneously negotiating their status in both countries. Hoffnung-Garskof deftly interweaves changes occurring in Cristo Rey with the larger transformations analyzed in the book. The ethnographic detail sheds light on how Cristo Rey's residents view, practice, and perform transnationalism.

Some parts of this work, however, are more crudely constructed. For example, Hoffnung-Garskof con-

denses five centuries of Dominican history into a single, uncomplicated transparent national imaginary. I contend that Dominicans have a split imaginary. Key elements shaping Dominican identity since colonial times include bloody slave insurrections, centuries-old Maroon villages, struggles against slavery (before, during, and after independence), and peasant resistance to hierarchically organized religion. The idea of blackness is varied, complicated, complexly articulated, and completely silenced in official written narratives. The Dominican “character” cannot simply be read off these hegemonic discourses of race and personhood. Hoffnung-Garskof’s ethnography of Dominicans operating in New York City politics is superb, but his interpretations disappoint because he narrowly follows official scripts of identity. Moreover, he ignores bloody episodes of anti-imperialist resistance, and inaccurately describes several Dominican characters such as merengue singer Johnny Ventura and Freddy Beras-Goico.

Other parts of this transnational view fail to convince. Cristo Rey seems to stand in for the whole island. What is the relationship between Cristo Rey and Washington Heights? Is it migration? Early Dominican migrants were not poor people from Cristo Rey but middle-class urbanites. What was the impact of these questions of culture and progress on the latter, and what was the effect of their migration? Most poor Dominican migrants reached New York City during the 1980s in the context of an economic crisis that did not follow the logic of earlier migratory flows. Hoffnung-Garskof does not address the role of later generations of Dominicans and how they continue to negotiate identity. Hoffnung-Garskof discusses imperialism benignly and ignores the fact that early migratory flows happened in the shadow of bloody confrontation between the United States and the Balaguer regime over political repression against dissidents carried out by death squads and the Dominican state. Moreover, the author treats the Left as monolithic when it was highly fragmented, both in Santo Domingo and New York.

While readers can glean important bits of information concerning Dominican transnational practices in the twentieth century, the book’s loose ends and blind spots reduce its overall impact.

MILAGROS RICOURT
Lehman College

ASIA

TONIO ANDRADE. *Lost Colony: The Untold Story of China’s First Great Victory over the West*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2011. Pp. xv, 431. \$35.00.

The authors of China’s dynastic histories realized that the root of good history lies in telling compelling stories. Those of us who study imperial China cannot help but recall Sima Qian’s vivid account of the epic struggle between Xiang Yu and Liu Bang as recorded in the *Shiji* (*Historical Records*) or the account of the Song emissary Qin Gui turning white when he beheld the armor and

spears of the Jin cavalry glittering in the sun as recorded in the *History of the Song Dynasty* (*Song shi*). But too often nowadays academic historians seem to miss this fundamental lesson and dismiss narrative history as the province of popular historians. That is why the present volume is such a welcome contribution to the field. Tonio Andrade sets out not only to recount the fascinating history of an event largely unknown outside of China and Taiwan, but also to situate this event within the context of broader debates about modernization and the so-called “Military Revolution” in world history. The result is a delightfully engaging account that has the rare quality of being both a great read and academically rigorous enough to provoke further debate and scholarly engagement about the subjects it treats.

The book arose out of Andrade’s earlier work on the colonization of Taiwan in the seventeenth century. As all patriotic Chinese know, the formal Chinese annexation of Taiwan took place under the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) after the Ming loyalist pirate Zheng Chenggong, also known as Koxinga, had first ousted Dutch settlers in the early 1660s, only to see his descendants in turn defeated by Qing adversaries who took the island for their own. Moreover, Koxinga’s victory over the Dutch occurred despite the fact that they possessed the latest in weaponry and military fortification technology. This event therefore provides a perfect case study for historians looking to understand the processes of military expansion and modernization in the early modern world and allows them to test the viability of various theories pertaining to the relative military superiority of Europeans vis-à-vis the rest of the globe. Andrade briefly lays out some of these debates at the start of the book, identifying what he calls traditionalist and revisionist camps. The traditionalists contend that European military and technological superiority, caused by a number of interrelated factors unique to European society, were crucial to European dominance of the globe in the modern era. In addition to greater technical skill and competence, proponents of European military superiority argue that early modern European armies pioneered repetitive drilling, the use of training manuals, and tactical innovations such as volley fire. Revisionists contend that there were many dimensions of the Military Revolution present in other parts of the world, particularly China, and that the Military Revolution is a flawed concept at best. Andrade admits that when he started writing the book, he was firmly in the revisionist camp (pp. 9, 307), but over the course of his research he came to occupy a more moderate position informed by his extensive reading of the primary sources. In short, while the Dutch held no superiority in sheer firepower or discipline over the Chinese, their broadside sailing ships and “renaissance fortresses” (also known as artillery fortresses or *trace italienne*) were in fact superior to what the Chinese (and presumably most other non-Westerners) possessed at the time. Nevertheless, even these technological advantages could be negated by superior leadership and

adaptability, as was the case in seventeenth-century Taiwan (pp. 321–327).

These conclusions are important on a number of levels. First, they demonstrate to students in particular the need to follow the evidence and not let preconceived assumptions determine one's interpretations of the data. Second, they demonstrate the importance of the human factor in history. As Andrade notes, leaders and leadership mattered. Too often these days it seems that historians and social scientists want to devise grand theories that leave out the human element. Along these lines, however, it is worth noting a couple weaknesses of the book. First of all, Andrade's wholesale acceptance of Koxinga's supposedly fervent Ming loyalism is questionable. Plenty of evidence in the sources suggests that Koxinga's loyalties were first and foremost to himself and that the cause of Ming restoration was a convenient cloak, worn when it suited him. Furthermore, far from coming off as a military genius or great adaptor, as the author suggests, Koxinga appears to have been a rather incompetent hothead when it came to military command. He repeatedly ignored sound advice, killed subordinates, and made both tactical and strategic errors. The Dutch come across as equally foolish, so calling Koxinga's activities "China's First Great Victory over the West" seems a bit disingenuous. Additionally, it would have been nice if the author had occasionally pulled himself away from the narrative to offer more in the way of comparative analysis. For example, how did the tactics used in this siege compare to those used elsewhere? A more comparative angle only would have strengthened his conclusions.

These minor criticisms aside, this is one of the few monographs that I can enthusiastically recommend to general readers, undergraduates, graduate students, and specialists alike. The author has a strong grasp of the sources and the debates and does a wonderful job of bringing history to life. Books like this make history worth reading and doing.

KENNETH M. SWOPE
Ball State University

MARY BROWN BULLOCK. *The Oil Prince's Legacy: Rockefeller Philanthropy in China*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center. 2011. Pp. xv, 242. \$39.95.

The strongest tie between the United States and China was built through broad, deep, and long-lasting cultural and educational interactions. Many individuals and institutions contributed to the construction of that unique dimension in U.S.-China relations. While missionary enterprises and government programs have attracted plenty of attention from scholars, the role played by non-governmental organizations remains lightly cultivated and frequently misunderstood. Mary Brown Bullock fills the gap with her new book.

As the author of *An American Transplant: The Rockefeller Foundation and Peking Union Medical College* (1980), Bullock is anything but a stranger in the field of

U.S.-China cultural relations. However, what she does in her new book is exactly what she did not do in her first monograph: write a comprehensive and up-to-date account of the Rockefeller family's philanthropic endeavor in China using a clearly defined theoretical frame. Approaching five generations of Rockefellers from the perspective of cultural internationalism, Bullock sheds much needed light on the important and unique role played by the Rockefeller Foundation and other philanthropic institutions funded by the Rockefeller family in the making of cultural and educational relations between the United States and China.

Drawing on diaries, letters, institutional archives, and numerous interviews, Bullock argues that it was the Rockefellers themselves rather than their advisers who shaped the oil prince's legacy in China. John D. Rockefeller, Sr. not only started the family's philanthropic involvement in China by making his first donation to missionaries in 1863, but also established "enlarging the boundaries of human knowledge" as the ultimate goal for all Rockefeller philanthropies (p. 14). He set lasting examples through founding the University of Chicago in the 1890s and the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research (now the Rockefeller University) in the early 1900s. When John D. Rockefeller, Jr., the first president of the Rockefeller Foundation and the first chair for the China Medical Board, began to expand the family's involvement in China in the 1910s, he kept the focus squarely on higher education and scientific medicine by choosing the establishment of the Peking Union Medical College (PUMC) as the first major project for the family's newly institutionalized philanthropy. John D. Rockefeller III played a key role in preserving the China Medical Board in the 1950s and re-establishing cultural and educational ties with the People's Republic of China in the 1960s. His son, John D. Rockefeller IV, oversaw the Rockefeller Foundation's return to China in the 1970s, resuming the family's support for research and education in science.

It was this deep and direct involvement of several generations of Rockefellers, Bullock points out, that was largely responsible for the Rockefeller Foundation's concentration of its resources on China and its rise as a major force in the making of U.S.-China cultural and educational relations. Besides tens of millions of dollars invested in PUMC and its nursing and public health programs, the Rockefeller Foundation provided generous funding for numerous educational and research programs in natural and social sciences at dozens of key Chinese and missionary universities like the National Central and Yanjing. The foundation also offered hundreds of fellowships and scholarships for Chinese scholars and students to conduct research or pursue graduate education in the United States. By 1950, the Rockefeller Foundation had spent \$50 million in China while giving only \$10 million in grants to Great Britain, the second largest recipient in the world. By 2010, the foundation had invested close to \$800 million in China's science, medicine, and higher education, far

exceeding the amount spent by any other American player in China.

As a major player in China, the Rockefeller Foundation, Bullock reveals, conducted itself differently in many areas, adding a unique layer to U.S.-China relations. Unlike most American missionaries and government officials who tended to impose educational and cultural programs upon the Chinese as an instrument to achieve their religious or diplomatic goals, the Rockefellers and their advisers were willing to adapt their agenda to meet China's needs and conditions. Instead of devoting resources to elementary, secondary, and undergraduate education as most missionary and government programs did, the Rockefeller Foundation committed to keeping PUMC a world-class institution and supporting graduate level training for Chinese scholars and students in science. It was this sharp focus on the so-called "elite" medicine and advanced research and training that made the Rockefeller Foundation's programs more congruent with China's national priorities and thus more conducive to a professional relationship that survived wars and revolutions.

Despite the challenge from the lack of full access to Chinese archives, Bullock has succeeded in bringing the study of U.S.-China relations to a new level with her nuanced narrative and insightful analysis on the Rockefellers' philanthropic endeavors in China.

HONGSHAN LI
Kent State University

ANDREW F. JONES. *Developmental Fairy Tales: Evolutionary Thinking and Modern Chinese Culture*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. 259. \$49.95.

This book presents a study of developmental thinking in modern Chinese literature and popular culture. Developmental thinking encompasses, according to Andrew F. Jones, both a "transitive sense as purposive activity" and an "intransitive" sense as evolution (p. 15). Both types, he argues, permeate China's modern literary works from the late Qing period forward (1890s), particularly those of Lu Xun, who is the major focus of the book. These types of thought also saturate fairy tales, a genre just emerging in the early twentieth century as a pedagogical tool intended to help transform children into useful adults. The thematic focus on evolution/development lends the book a strong coherence, although Jones is sometimes at pains to maintain the argument as he pursues various discussions down rabbit holes of narrative, signification, and genre. Nevertheless, Jones' well-crafted prose, impeccable sense of language and irony, wide-ranging curiosity, and eclectic interests make for compelling reading.

The book begins with a historically situated theoretical discussion of the emerging place of evolution/development in Chinese thought and cultural production, tracing the interest in China to the late Yan Fu's translations of Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin in the nineteenth century. The oft-told tale of how Yan Fu

rendered evolution into an updated but quasi-Confucian system of the natural world transposed to human society (both within and between groups/nations) gets a new spin with Jones's account, as he pays attention to the narrative imperatives and aporiae inherent in this rendering. He focuses on one of the most enduring metaphors of Chinese modern literature (and of human animal custodianship, e.g., in zoos): the iron cage, or iron house. As most classically deployed, the iron house is Lu Xun's *cri de coeur*: what would you do, Lu Xun asks, if people are sleeping soundly in an iron house from which there is no escape, and you have the choice of awakening them before they suffocate to death or of just letting them die in their sleep no wiser to their fate? This prison of "choice"—as much an individual one as a collective social and historical vise—is a narrative trap. Jones demonstrates, in five chapters, exactly how and why "choice" is both part of the imperative and aporia of narratives of developmental thinking itself.

In the first chapter, Jones delineates and illustrates the issue by rereading, in terms of the narrative contradiction within evolutionary thinking, Wu Jianren's early twentieth-century novelistic rewriting of the *Dream of the Red Chamber*. Wu's version sends the hero, Bao-yu, famously closed into his home in the original, out into the world where he entirely emulates the modern colonial project by collecting specimens and categorizing and taxonomizing them. However, Bao-yu's adventures end up being just a dream. The dichotomies of dreaming/waking and action/inaction—indeed, the entire ambiguity of the narrative enterprise and its associated problems of novelistic character development—render *this* Bao-yu "haunted by the past, a belated bystander to a history that has yet to unfold" and bereft of "even the consolation of agency" (p. 62). Jones renders Wu's Bao-yu as an encaged figure. He is unable to sleep, unable to wake, unable to save himself or others while subject to evolution and development beyond his control. By providing similarly complex readings of everything from fairy tales to children's pedagogical writings, Jones articulates, following Miriam Hansen, "vernacularizations" of universal knowledges (p. 66). The book opens to scrutiny minor stories of wolves, foxes, fish, and toys, as well as major literary works, such as Lu Xun's stories. There is much to be learned here, not only of a historical-literary-narrative variety but also in terms of how to read and open different kinds of texts to analysis.

I have several hesitations about this book. One important modern reference to iron houses/cages could be to Max Weber. Weber's notion of modernization and rationalization as an iron cage might have given Jones a global historical vantage upon the metaphor. While most theorists—including Jones—take the iron house as a cultural-historical meditation on China, one could also understand it as registering real doubt about modernization, industrialization, and capitalist society. Lu Xun's iron house could be made to speak to that issue (even though Jones fends off this type of analysis by deflecting the problem of "second naturing"). In other

words, the problem of development is not merely a narrative imperative/aporia, but rather a deeply historical one linked to capitalist society. And a whole book about fairy tales, animals, development, children with nothing on gender (fox spirits anyone?) as an integral interpretive angle? Very strange indeed.

Despite these reservations, the book presents many pleasures and repays careful reading.

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DAVID STRAND. *An Unfinished Republic: Leading by Word and Deed in Modern China*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 387. \$65.00.

The 1911 Xinhai Revolution did not fail; it just did not succeed. In light of its lack of success, according to David Strand, a culture of politics (performing, speaking, acting out, brawling in public, speechifying) opened a political lacuna that a liberal democracy might yet fill.

Chapter one, "Slapping Song Jiaoren," figures female revolutionaries Tang Qunying, Wang Changguo, and Shen Peizhen engaging in violent, futile political acts while attempting to secure female suffrage. Chapter two, "Speaking Parts in Chinese History," asserts that earlier cohorts of public speakers prefigured political parties. Here the argument is that Qing-era speechifying meant that modern Chinese politics are by nature theatrical; political culture consists of "speech acts," whether these are efficacious politically or not; and that citizenship is measurable in terms of mass emotion. Chapter three, "A Woman's Republic," rediscovers internationalism in republican Chinese feminism. Although this has been heavily documented elsewhere, Strand contributes the interesting case of Carrie Chapman Catt, a U.S. women's rights activist who visited Chinese feminists.

Chapter four, "Seeing Like a Citizen," uses less well-known figures like Bian Baimei, a theoretician of modern banking, to argue that the act of looking must be construed as a political gesture. This least convincing chapter makes its points not empirically but with reference to political theory. "Losing a Speech," the fifth chapter, focuses on Lu Zhengxian, a major diplomat under both the Qing and the Republican governments. Lu gave a catastrophically bad speech in parliament, which Strand interprets as evidence that Republican culture is only visible in the "spectacular and unpredictable successes and stumbles of politicians, activists, and citizens" (p. 252).

In the sixth chapter, "Sun Yat-sen's Last Words," Strand casts Sun as a master rhetorician. Sun, Strand states, invented "modern Chinese political leadership as a rhetorical act and a collective exercise" and "created a public and political space that others" would occupy "through the infectious simplicity of his own formula of self-promotion and national salvation" (p. 240). This summation is consistent with Strand's general definition of republicanism as "the middle range of civic

life . . . where the meanings of citizenship, patriotism, rights, and Leninist regimes struggled to find their footing" (p. 171).

Strand invokes a mixed group of canonical and contemporary political theorists to support his argument. These include Hannah Arendt, Kenneth Burke, James M. Burns, Judith Butler, Michel de Certeau, Gilles Deleuze, Paul J. DiMaggio, Frank J. Goodnow, Félix Guattari, Jürgen Habermas, Bruce Lincoln, Georg Simmel, Walter W. Powell, and Max Weber. These disparate philosophers meet loosely around a notion of the rhetorical power of speech. Strand uses them to support his thesis that performing "middle range" civics prefigures or substitutes for state or party political activity. Since the book is not intended to be an intellectual history, European, Chinese, and Japanese political theorists active at the turn of the twentieth century do not appear as potent advocates. On the contrary, Strand appears reluctant to engage with them. This book is an interpretive cultural history. It assumes a cultural-political terrain and explains self-expression in relation to cultural context. This leaves ambiguous how thinking, political philosophy, and strategy on the ground work in relation to the innumerable ideas and social practices that Strand calls "Republicanism." Strand's work equivocates over the question of what success, failure, political culture, and citizenship mean. Teleologies of citizenship are not a universal category in social history and where invoked must be demonstrated clearly. Public culture and civil society are evocative tropes, according to Frederic Wakeman, Jr., and they cannot empirically or historically be presumed to be social institutions or to emerge out of cultural contexts.

The point that the revolution of 1911 remains not a failure but rather unfinished is not a novel claim. It emerged in U.S. historiography in the late 1960s and has been advanced over the last five decades in the work of Chang Hao, Chang Peng-yüan, Bryna Goodman, Henrietta Harrison, Joan Judge, Don Price, Lucian Pye, Mary Rankin, Brett G. Sheehan, Wen-Hsin Yeh, and their students. Interestingly, this historiographic position found considerable purchase in official centenary anniversary celebrations in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Surely the grandeur of the unfinished revolution as spelled out in Strand's presentation would depart from the denouement anticipated in PRC historiography in 2011.

Historians of the Chinese women's movement and the history of Chinese liberation theory will enjoy Strand's detailed discussion of the centrality of suffrage and women's movements in the Chinese revolutionary tradition. He contributes to an already strong body of work established over the last few decades and adds suggestive evidence that one singularity of the long Chinese revolutionary tradition may be precisely the centrality of women's liberation theory, women and men's activist liberation struggles, and party-organized political practices.

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ERIC C. RATH. *Food and Fantasy in Early Modern Japan*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2010. Pp. xiv, 242. \$49.95.

Japan is a land of food porn. Turn on a television at any time of day or night and you will find food. You may see a cooking show, but you are more likely to encounter celebrities taking delight in the smell, look, and flavor of anything from foie gras to ramen noodles. Eric C. Rath does not reference television programs in his monograph, but the books on cookery he describes gave their readers a similar opportunity to indulge vicariously in rare delicacies served at formal banquets centuries ago. Food as a source of pleasure beyond gustation has a long history in Japan.

This is not a book about foodways, restaurants, or even cooking per se. Rather, it is an exploration of the discourse of elite dining and the opportunities for fantasy it facilitated. Rath traces a progression in three broad stages in writings about food during the late medieval and early modern periods. In the fifteenth through early seventeenth centuries, works on cooking circulated only in manuscript, often in the guise of “secret transmissions” of esoteric knowledge from master to disciple. The texts focused less on actual cooking than on the ritual preparation of inedible food sculptures—fish and game birds carved to evoke sites of history or nature. By the late seventeenth century, a market had emerged for published works that introduced readers to the elaborate rules governing the preparation and consumption of lavish banquets enjoyed by the highest echelons of the samurai ruling class. Culinary writings in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries engaged in a playful discourse of food, rich with wordplay and literary references. Through all the changes, writings on cooking treated food as an object of intellectual pleasure rather than a source of nourishment or even sensory delight.

Rath frames the book around the question of how to characterize cookery before the nation-state. The literature on foodways generally treats “cuisine” as a peculiarly national—hence modern—phenomenon; sure enough, the idea of “Japanese cuisine” (*washoku*) is a product of the late nineteenth century. The book’s preoccupation with situating Japanese cooking in a timeline leading to national cuisine is odd, however, because Rath does not otherwise structure the work as a narrative of origins, or even as a critique of the tendency to nationalize cuisine. He does not invoke his texts as an expression of culinary print capitalism in the service of imagining a national community; nor does he urge us, in the spirit of Prasenjit Duara, to rescue cooking from the nation. Rather, he tells a distinctly early modern story of curious consumers tapping growing markets to indulge in aesthetic pleasures and fantasize about social climbing in a polity that offered few opportunities for mobility.

In fact, much of the book is descriptive, with detailed accounts of the contents and contexts of texts and erudite explanations of the historical and literary refer-

ences packed into the names of dishes. Rath even provides a full translation of the *Southern Barbarians’ Cookbook*, a short collection of recipes for sweet and savory dishes prepared in a mostly Iberian style. The banquets that Rath describes are from an alien world. The dishes featured ingredients, such as crane and goose, that disappeared from even the most exalted diets 150 years ago. Even the sushi and tempura on the menus bore little resemblance to their contemporary iterations. The meals were presented on a series of trays, each with a fixed number of small dishes and soups, in a style called *honzen ryōri*, which is all but extinct in Japan today. Most alien was the abundance of items that were not meant to be eaten at all. Some were obviously intended solely for the eyes, but many others appeared (and perhaps even were) completely edible, though to touch them would have been a terrible faux pas. Just showing up to a banquet required considerable knowledge and sophistication.

The most fantastic of the fantasies recounted in the book involves Endō Genkan’s (fl. 1694–1702) instructions for hosting a visitation by the shogun or other high lord. The preparations begin three years in advance with the construction of an appropriate hall and culminate in the hiring of 230 chefs, servants, doctors, fire fighters, and security guards. Yet the instructions also warn the host not to commit a gaffe like “using a chopstick as a toothbrush” (p. 139) in the midst of the banquet.

This book emphasizes fantasy over food, and in so doing it unapologetically concentrates on formal elite practice and popular imaginings of it. Rath has almost nothing to say about commoners’ diets, or for that matter, even the mundane eating habits of elites off the banquet circuit. It is a fascinating work of cultural history even if it tells us little about real people’s meals.

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PHILIP C. BROWN. *Cultivating Commons: Joint Ownership of Arable Land in Early Modern Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. 2011. Pp. xv, 268. \$52.00.

Studies of early modern Japan have hardly neglected rural life; indeed, the study of cities has lagged by comparison. But as Philip C. Brown notes, the study of agriculture has been neglected, and meanwhile a simplistic model of agrarian evolution has prevailed in the classroom. According to this, the cadastral surveys of the late sixteenth century established the class of *honbyakusho* who farmed to pay their taxes and grow cash crops. Living in self-governing villages, they traded land at will, such that new class relations including capitalist wage labor emerged over time. These changes were rooted in private property rights associated with a market-based “economic society,” and “such developments . . . transformed late-nineteenth-century Japan into a world-class economic and military power” by the early twentieth century (p. 9).

The real history is, Brown argues, rather more com-

plicated. In perhaps one-third of Japan, forms of corporate farming under “joint ownership” coexisted with private family farming (p. 96). Shares of land (both paddy and dry fields) were periodically redistributed on the basis of equal shares per family, per capita, or the level of preexisting cultivation rights. The initiative for such “land division” (*warichi*) arrangements came from the villagers themselves, or in some cases (such as Kaga and Satsuma), the domain.

Brown discusses various explanations for the persistence of *warichi* throughout the Tokugawa era and even beyond the Meiji Land Reform of 1873. These include the desire to share risk in regions where landslides frequently destroyed crops, preserve equitable tax burdens, and maintain cooperative management of cooperatively reclaimed lands. But there is no single explanation for the widespread phenomenon. Brown’s deployment of topographical maps indicates only a thin correlation between the practice of *warichi* farming and the susceptibility of a region to flooding and landslides. He concludes it “impossible” to directly compare the “geographical conditions” of “*warichi* and non-*warichi* villages” (p. 43) and “no consistent, direct relationship between redistribution intervals and natural hazard risk” (p. 144). There were myriad reasons to maintain collective lands and reassign them periodically.

While at pains to note that “the socialist principle of allocating resources . . . based on need” was never operative (p. 69), Brown writes the “study of Japan’s experience reminds us that nonmarket and nontechnological social solutions have been viable and may remain viable today” (p. 5). Although he leaves it to the reader to draw any lessons, this perspective is valuable and the entire discussion of the complexity of landholding in Tokugawa Japan is engrossing.

This is not, however, a reader-friendly book. Space prohibits even a summary of the complex arguments and descriptive material Brown presents concerning the origins and rationale of *warichi* systems, the disputes they produced, and the nature of their twentieth-century persistence. The writing style is occasionally awkward to the point of obscuring meaning. For example, “From the standpoint of *warichi*’s potential to retard economic growth or to accommodate commercial crops, how long-maturing crops with potential commercial value were treated holds potential interest” (p. 163).

The haphazard unfolding of vital chronological detail may puzzle those unfamiliar with Japanese history (among those whom Brown wants to reach). The crucial fact that “samurai were forbidden from residing in villages or owning land” is mentioned only parenthetically, after Brown has substantially outlined his argument (p. 31). The whole issue of tenancy—rising throughout the Tokugawa era—is addressed only at the end of the book, in relation to the impact of the Meiji Restoration and the new land tax system. Here we learn, for example, that a “dispute settlement” in Kawaji village in 1786 “specifically notes that tenants were to be included in the *warichi* process.” Brown tells

us that thereafter “rents were to be set villagewide” but does not explain how this happened (p. 182).

Given the many references to primary sources, one might have hoped for direct quotations to add color and depth to this work. But these are few and far between. The citation form is minimalistic, and sometimes the references are frustratingly vague. For example, when Brown adduces an example of a village official stopping a request for redistribution, he refers in a footnote to another above, cited to document peasants’ gift-giving to village officials “in many parts of Echigo.” The note refers to an archival primary source (*monjo*)—likely a cache of documents—“for sources” (p. 247). This is not very helpful.

The reader comes away from the work fully convinced that many early modern peasants embraced and preserved joint ownership systems for good reasons; that they made common lands increasingly productive and receptive to market forces; and that the *warichi* systems left a legacy that might (for example) “have made it easier to form tenant unions” in the early twentieth century (p. 187). All of this is important, and the work deserves the energy required to engage it. But one might have hoped for a clearer, more streamlined presentation.

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DENNIS J. FROST. *Seeing Stars: Sports Celebrity, Identity, and Body Culture in Modern Japan*. (Harvard East Asian Monographs, number 331.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center. 2010. Pp. xi, 337. \$39.95.

Dennis J. Frost outlines the development of “modern sports celebrity” in Japan through a “transnational history” focused largely on four “stars” from sumo, track and field, baseball, and boxing. By looking at the discourse of celebrity surrounding figures ranging across the 1910s, 1920s, wartime, and the 1970s, each chapter thus opens onto a dense and distinct socio- and cultural-historical scene, offering the possibility of a novel perspective on the global articulation of modern regimes of sports, celebrity, and commodification as they intersected with transformations in bodies, gender, discipline, mass culture, nationalism, and identity.

Frost traces the advent of sports celebrity in Japan back to the seventeenth century, rapidly narrating the advent of popular ad hoc wrestling spectacles and body exhibitions that, through patronage, regulation, and ideological investment, were transformed into the invented tradition of sumo. The “stars” of this system emerged from new ranking practices and publicity, and from intertwined “big body” exhibitions (often without any athletic component). Frost’s account passes rapidly over this history; readers wishing for a fuller understanding of Edo-period body politics and spectacle, or of this transitional process, will need to look to the cited literature (R. Kenji Tierney in particular). Frost focuses his analysis in his first two chapters upon Hitachiya Taniemon (1874–1922), locating this cham-

pion as a “transitional figure” into modern, mass cultural sports celebrity. Enhanced by the ideological cachet of his “samurai” background, and spread through new forms of mass publicity, Hitachiyama’s public image in the early twentieth century, Frost argues, both set narrative standards for the “sports star” paradigm generally and facilitated the rewriting of sumo as an exemplary, and exclusively male, “national sport.” The focus upon celebrity, however, allows Frost to consider less “star”-focused phenomena only in passing: particularly, the contemporaneous dominance of university sports, including baseball, part of the late nineteenth-century energetic promotion of physical culture and athleticism throughout Europe and America, as well as Japan.

Chapter three, on Hitomi Kinue (1907–1931), a track and field star, considers the range of contentious issues invoked by Japan’s first female Olympian. Embraced as “Japan’s first international woman,” Hitomi was simultaneously the source of gender anxiety and speculation via her international victories, androgynous appearance, economic independence, and long-term same-sex cohabitation—a legacy summarily dismissed by heteronormative biographical reimaginings in the 1980s and 1990s. While her victories and life became bound up within mass cultural debates and the fantasy of the “modern girl,” her premature death in 1931 energized ongoing contention over women’s physical education, “abnormality,” and state regulation of women’s bodies.

Chapter four treats Sawamura Eiji (1917–1944), the star pitcher, war casualty, and namesake for the eponymous pitching prize. Frost situates Sawamura’s rise at the moment of baseball’s professionalization and corporate promotion, after decades of highly popular amateur university and secondary school leagues. Sawamura’s initial fame, for three strikeouts of the visiting Babe Ruth, fits within a larger story of promotional tours between Japan and the United States instituted by the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, the newspaper sponsoring Sawamura’s team, which developed the Yomiuri Giants as Japan’s first professional baseball team. Frost explores these exchanges through contemporaneous media accounts; again, the focus upon the public as opposed to institutional level of celebrity leads away from the convergences that made such cultural exchanges feasible and profitable.

Detailing both Sawamura’s and baseball’s propaganda involvements, Frost’s account finds both sport and star fully integrated within national military commitments; Sawamura played a wartime role comparable to those of Ted Williams and Joe DiMaggio. In Sawamura’s case, his willingness to make personal sacrifices cost him first his vaunted pitching ability and finally his life. Frost identifies both the myth of a persecuted sport, and the “postwar re-remembering of baseball’s wartime past” free of militarism, as a continuation of American wartime propaganda under the supervision of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. He describes this process as part of an effort to divert blame onto “warlords” while promoting a racially pa-

ternalistic reformist political agenda. But Frost’s account of this reductive propaganda is itself all too brief: it gives scant attention, for example, to the interested self-rehabilitation of some of the same media institutions central to his narrative. Frost passes too quickly over the immediate postwar context for Sawamura’s reimagining into a generalized “postwar” context that encompasses biographies produced in the 1980s. Thus, Frost misses an opportunity to fit Sawamura’s 1947 memorialization within a broader pattern of cultural promotion by newspapers seeking to distract their readers from both recent war boosterism and postwar labor conflicts. Shōriki Matsutarō, owner of both the *Yomiuri Shimbun* and the Yomiuri Giants, who was still in Sugamo Prison as a Class-A War Crimes suspect in 1947, exemplifies this conjunction of interests.

In the final chapter, on boxing champion Gushiken Yōkō (1955–), Frost briefly describes Okinawa’s marginalization in order to give context to Okinawan expressions of pride in Gushiken’s victories and to biographical accounts of Gushiken himself. Frost notes how such expressions indexed both fraught identification with and against mainland Japan, and “dramatic differences” internal to Okinawa itself. For Frost, the figure of Gushiken helped mediate and tame such differences—and their concrete political accompaniments (military bases, inequity)—by making them consumable as a form of “spectacular difference.”

A brief epilogue considering Ichiro Suzuki (1973–), inadvertently underlines the book’s weaknesses. Frost’s examples seem too spread out, leaving obvious gaps between his rapid expositions of the topics at hand. As a consequence of Frost’s focus on the publicity aspect of celebrity, his trope of “transnational co-constitution” frequently flattens into reflective forms of positionality against either a generic “West” or the United States. We miss the coevalness inherent in, for example, Hitomi’s participation in the international expansion of women’s sports and physical education, and the inherent transnationalism of commodification and professionalization. In following the formulaic biographical narratives of the sports stars, Frost does not always provide much guidance in contextualizing the particular effectiveness of specific narrative choices in a given historical moment. While this may be the “first critical examination of the history of sports celebrity outside a Euro-American context,” Frost’s book only begins to sketch the outline of an adequate understanding of this history.

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E. TAYLOR ATKINS. *Primitive Selves: Koreana in the Japanese Colonial Gaze, 1910–1945*. (Colonialisms, number 5.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2010. Pp. xv, 262. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$24.95.

The appearance of two important books on Japan's colonial past with radically different perspectives in the same year suggests a healthy advancement in the debate over how history should view Japanese imperial activity in early twentieth-century Asia. In contrast to the negative description of Japan's actions toward its neighbors as "beastialization" and "grotesqueing" found in Mark Driscoll's *Absolute Erotic, Absolute Grotesque: The Living, Dead, and Undead in Japan's Imperialism, 1895–1945* (2010), E. Taylor Atkins uncovers a more positive, symbiotic relationship of respect developing between the Japanese and Korean peoples. It was a period characterized by Japanese "enthusiasm for quotidian Koreana, and the concomitant faith that this interest constituted a viable conduit for intercultural union" (p. 2). He challenges the view that Japan sought to obliterate Korean culture by tracing a Japanese interest in Koreana that represented a "first Korean wave," a precursor to the contemporary wave that has popularized Korean movies, K-pop music, and peninsular travel among Japanese. Additionally, Atkins's study advances two other points: that the colonial experience forced Japanese to reflect on their own historical and modern identity, and that the colonizers' gaze fundamentally transformed both Japanese and Koreans (p. 3).

Atkins offers one of the more comprehensive considerations of the Japanese administration's use of "culture" in his challenge of the widely held view that Japanese assimilation policy aimed to eliminate Korean-ness. The *bunka seiji* (culture rule) reform administration (1920–1931), introduced after the 1919 March First Movement, allowed Koreans access to their culture, for example through an indigenous press. Atkins considers whether this policy aimed to encourage Korean adoption of Japanese culture, retention of Korean culture, or creation by the two peoples of a third, hybrid culture. By maintaining ambiguity over purpose, he argues, the colonizers preserved "maximum flexibility." This approach convinced all but the hardline anti-Japanese nationalists that "they had heard and heeded the lessons of March 1919" (p. 38). Perhaps. But "Japanization" was the ultimate goal of assimilation as outlined in 1910 shortly after the Japanese annexation of Korea and periodically throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Koreans were supposed to adopt the most advanced Asian culture of the time, that of the Japanese. Many Japanese criticized this approach, or advised flexibility in its implementation. But official rhetoric emphasized the Korean people's gradual assimilation in spite of discriminatory practices that often undermined this aim.

Some Japanese, as Atkins documents, took an interest in researching Korean culture, perhaps in protest over Japan's rhetoric of assimilation. Yanagi Muneyoshi, a renowned expert on Korean ceramics, wrote frequently about this subject. Koga Masao, who came to Korea as a child, was recognized as an expert in Korean classical and folk music (p. 165). Atkins writes that "Korea [became] the earliest 'brand name' to make a major splash in imperial Japanese popular culture." Photo-

graphic collections and travel guides introducing Korea also gained popularity in the colonial homeland during this period (p. 184). The author's depiction of the Japanese *geisha* and the Korean *kisaeng* in this context presents one pertinent illustration of Japanese interest in Koreana. The perceived "rusticity" (p. 181) of the *kisaeng* suggests that Japanese collectors and connoisseurs often focused on the nostalgic quality of Korean items, emphasizing how they evoked Japan's primitive past rather than representing any unique Korean quality.

In Atkins's analysis, the Japanese imagined Koreans as their "primitive selves," as if their gaze situated Koreans "into a mirror through a time warp" (p. 57). This impulse helped justify Japan's colonial mission in two ways. The recognition of a primitive self reinforced a sense of racial kinship that made the development of Koreans along a Japanese-style trajectory seem all the more possible. Unfortunately, the same logic also justified a hierarchical colonial system that placed Japan in a dominant role. Atkins aptly displays these two impulses by examining Japanese views on traditional Korean white clothing. The garb, in the colonizers' mind, lacked creativity and efficiency; it was colorless and required daily washings to keep clean. Such clothing, according to one colonial ethnographer, reflected the cold, dull, sad, severe, and simple characteristics that defined the Korean people themselves (p. 72). Yet, the distance was temporal rather than spatial—the oddities of Korean cultural artifacts "reminded" Japanese observers of practices that they had shed centuries ago.

Though lacking in Korean-language sources, this book makes an important contribution to ongoing discussions concerning the Japanese-Korean colonial past. Atkins highlights the extent to which Japanese colonialism contributed to Korea's modern development and the development of the colonizer-colonized relationship over a thirty-five-year period. He also initiates discussion on questions regarding Japanese attitudes toward the rhetoric of colonial assimilation. To what extent did it influence their images of the Korean people? Finally, this monograph identifies a Japanese legacy present in post-liberation Korea, and underlines the need for broader consideration of its post-1945 influence on the peninsula.

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RIEKO KAGE. *Civic Engagement in Postwar Japan: The Revival of a Defeated Society*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. xv, 195. \$85.00.

Historians of twentieth-century Japan have for some time rejected the notion of August 1945 as a complete break, with history restarting on a blank slate after Japan's defeat in World War II. We now discuss the "transwar" period and the many ways that postwar developments were built on prewar and wartime experiences. Rieko Kage argues that prewar associational activities and the experience of wartime mobilization enabled

rapid growth in civic engagement in the early postwar period. Kage's argument will not surprise historians of wartime and postwar Japan, but this book makes a valuable contribution by directing this insight to an audience beyond the fields of history and Japanese studies. For example, social scientists such as Theda Skocpol have concluded that defeat in war should lead to decreased civic participation, not more. Kage's clearly written and carefully organized book aims to show that this assumption, based on studies of the United States, does not hold true for Japan or for a number of other countries.

She does this first by showing that civic engagement (meaning membership in a broad range of groups from religious to recreational) grew significantly in the decade after 1945 in Japan, and that differences between regions correlate with differences in levels of prewar civic activity and wartime mobilization. Kage then adds data on twelve countries in North America and Europe, concluding that higher levels of wartime mobilization, and not whether a nation was on the winning or losing side in the war, were associated with greater postwar increases in associational activity. One might question whether correlation proves a causal relationship, but her argument seems to make intuitive sense and deserves further study.

Next Kage offers two case studies of associational growth in early postwar Japan: the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) in the cities of Kōbe and Sapporo, and the Kōdōkan judo association in Yokohama and Fukuoka. In the case of the YMCA, she concludes that it survived longer into the war and grew much more rapidly in postwar Kōbe than in Sapporo because it had been larger and more active in the prewar period. Sapporo's YMCA grew slowly after 1945, even though the city had suffered far less damage than Kōbe, because of its prewar weakness. Judo, says Kage, illustrates the same phenomenon: where it was strong before the war (Fukuoka) it recovered quickly; where it was not (Yokohama), it lacked the legacies that would have enabled quick growth after the war.

Despite the discipline-specific jargon of a proposed "general theory" of postwar growth in civic engagement expressed in a complex mathematical model involving independent, dependent, and control variables, there is much of interest here for historians. First, Kage reconfirms the importance of continuity across the supposed divide of August 1945. Second, she looks at a period, and at types of associations, that have not often been studied by historians of postwar citizens' groups. Historians' interest in more explicitly political activism has led us to focus on protests against the renewal of the U.S.-Japan security treaty in 1960, or the Vietnam War, or the serious pollution that became a national issue in the late sixties and early seventies. Kage's extensive archival research points the way for new lines of inquiry by historians.

It is not clear that the case studies contribute much to proving Kage's argument. Kōbe, Yokohama, and Sapporo are by no means typical Japanese cities, and

despite the growth of the organizations she studies, their membership numbers were tiny in comparison to Japan's population of over 84,000,000 in 1950. Kōbe's YMCA grew from 124 members in 1945 to 472 in 1947 and kept increasing rapidly; Sapporo's counted 130 members by 1954. There were just over 8,000 judo association members nationwide by 1949. One might also question Kage's answer to the "so what?" question of why this growth in association membership was important. She hypothesizes that it enabled more rapid postwar reconstruction by efficiently generating and transmitting information regarding what needed to be done in rebuilding Japan. This may well be true, but the only data presented on information exchange is the volume of mail sent. Who sent that mail and to whom, what information it contained, and how this relates to associational activity are unknown.

This book offers a provocative challenge to received wisdom, and suggests a number of avenues for further research. The questions raised, as Kage notes, are particularly relevant in a time of debate over state-building and democratization. Given the frequent comparisons of the disasters of March 11, 2011, to Japan's wartime destruction, this book may also offer insights into the place of civic activism in the recovery process now underway.

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TIRTHANKAR ROY. *Company of Kinsmen: Enterprise and Community in South Asian History 1700–1940*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. xiii, 252. \$99.00.

While the question of economic growth has stimulated much academic and public debate in light of globalization, a simpler issue has suffered neglect in comparison: how do economies actually function? The question becomes insistent when we turn to the old, traditional economies that characterize the bulk of societies in history. An exclusive preoccupation with economic growth distorts our perspective on the past and even on the present. The terms in which the debates on growth are couched are quite unsuitable to answering the question how an economy—any economy—actually functions. Systems of economic organization that have survived a transition to the modern age demand particular attention in that respect.

Tirthankar Roy's book, a synthetic survey based mainly but not exclusively on secondary sources, is of interest as a contribution to this much neglected subject. Although he does not ignore the comparative historical reasoning behind the wealth and poverty of nations, he refuses to be entrapped within the parameters of the growth debate as outlined by development economists. Consequently, he can address the issue of how stable economies function in the long term, and how they can be explained in terms of their viability in providing for the material needs of populations across generations.

Basically, Roy is concerned with two questions: how did cooperative communities function in the earlier economic organization of Indian society, and why did these communities of material activity become unstable during the colonial period? The exploration of these issues reveals to him that material activities are both market driven and conditioned by the relationships of power and honor prevailing in society.

From the outset, Roy's analysis underscores the economic importance of lineage, caste, and community. He adds an original contribution to this list: "the endogamous guild." Such guilds were endogamous communities of kinsmen among merchants, artisans, peasants, and workers. They played a key role in the economic organization of Indian society. The professional guilds found in medieval Europe and Qing China are quite different from this type of organization because the hereditary guilds of India used marriage ties to fashion cooperative collectives in various occupations. Heredity, marriage, and occupation imparted a caste-like character to what Roy calls the endogamous guild. Certainly it was more closed and less mobile than the medieval European guild, which was a purely professional association. Roy concedes that the endogamous guild was a caste-like formation (p. 133), but despite the similarity he maintains that it was not the same as a caste (p. 21).

One reason why he persists in making the distinction is perhaps because the Jews, Syrian Christians, Parsees, Muslims, and Armenians also had the same hereditary, endogamous, professional associations, yet these communities did not have caste. The matter will become clear in the context of the Indian social formation as a whole. Society in India was shaped like a beehive, in which each cell was an endogamous unit, enjoying autonomous management of personal concerns, such as marriage, inheritance, and faith. The system incorporated Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, Jews, Syrian Christians, Parsees, and Muslims. Some of the lineages among these communities followed hereditary occupations, but not all.

Strong community bonds, backed by the authority of headmen, checked disputes within the community of merchants and artisans through arbitration and compromise. This system facilitated long-distance trade, but the European East India companies had an altogether different system of trade, and the Indo-European trade, as Roy shows, was full of friction. Danish missionaries in Malabar during the 1710s witnessed a high degree of artisanal and mercantile skill and conceded that this was an economically advanced society in no way inferior to any nation "in relation to trade, and the things of this life" (quoted on pp. 42–43). In the long run, however, as Roy points out, the gain of any exclusive and hereditary collective might carry a cost for society as a whole, especially as global trade gathered momentum. The persistence of caste-like collectives might have impeded the growth of a free market.

Roy gives us a sensible analysis of old Indian business organization, and how it coped in the modern age. But

more than that, his book contains insights about the structure of Indian society. The term endogamous guild may not be quite exact, but it does suggest how communities not included in formally caste-bound Hindu society might have been absorbed into that social formation.

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NILE GREEN. *Bombay Islam: The Religious Economy of the West Indian Ocean, 1840–1915*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. xvi, 327. \$90.00.

Nile Green's book on "Bombay Islam" is in many respects a pathbreaking work that will significantly influence scholarly interpretations of the relationship between Muslim religious thought and organization, and the new worlds of colonialism in the nineteenth century. Green's book focuses on Bombay as a rising center of communication, trade, travel, industry, and publishing in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He argues that Bombay's central position as a "modern" node of trade, production, and print dramatically influenced what he calls the "religious economy" of the entire western Indian Ocean. Drawing on a range of previously untapped nineteenth-century published works in Urdu, Persian, Arabic, and English, Green gives us a richly textured and physically grounded picture of the myriad forms of Muslim organization and ideas circulating and competing for support both among the emerging new classes of industrial Bombay and among transoceanic groups linked to Bombay, from Iran to South Africa.

One of Green's central arguments in this book is that the influence of different types of religious leaders in this context is best understood in terms of a competitive market model. The key to Green's interpretation of religious change is a model of supply and demand. Green discusses this phenomenon in complex and nuanced ways, but at root he presents competition for support among religious leaders, Sufi orders, and reforming *anjumans* as essentially a competition among what he terms, "firms," appealing to a consuming, if segmented, religious public. The success of these "firms" lay largely in the degree to which their message gained traction with different groups, driven by demand. This framework provides a structure for the establishment of Bombay's overseas influence as well, as successful religious leaders, often Sufis, used their reputations to establish multiple "franchises" at far-flung locations around the Indian Ocean. Such a model underlies one of the strengths of Green's book: his grounding of an expanding world of print and debate in the broader contexts of circulation, migration, and social change—that is, in a world of shifting consumer demand.

Green's other major contention is connected to this vision of the "religious economy." He argues strongly for the central importance in this period of an "economy of enchantment" in which miracle stories and Sufi authority expanded. He thus rejects the idea that co-

lonial modernity in Bombay encouraged a strong, internalizing, reformist Islam, as has sometimes been argued. Though reformist religious organizations were certainly present in the nineteenth century, and play some part in his story, the religious economy itself was one dominated by a custom-laden Islam that expanded rapidly in the context of the new commercial city and its publishing markets. This form of Islam expanded, in Green's argument, because it retained the broadest appeal, giving what he calls "Customary Islamic firms" (in most cases, Sufis) an advantage over their more reformist competitors.

These are important arguments, and they give Green's work a socially grounded dynamism. Green's notion of a "religious economy" driven by market competition helps him to make sense of the great diversity of competing Muslim publications, Muslim leaders, and Muslim ideas in this period. He not only provides insight into the religion of the new working class in Bombay but also suggests the importance of this milieu to the critical reformulations in Muslim religious thinking shaping a broader Indian Ocean world. Most notable in this regard is his important discussion of Bombay's centrality in the development of Sufism and Aga Khani neo-Isma'ilism in Iran. Green tells us less about what linked Bombay Islam to the larger development of Muslim thinking in India, although he does suggest the critical connections between "Bombay Islam" and both its Hyderabadi and Konkan hinterlands. He also notes the importance of Bombay's British colonial governing structure, ostensibly neutral in religious matters, in providing a framework for Bombay's "religious economy." But there is less discussion of the city's Muslim neighborhoods, or of the shifting local templates of identity associated with public observance such as Muharram, than we find, for example, in the work of Jim Masselos.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Green's work arises with respect to the relationship between his market model of religion and his emphasis on the ongoing—and even expanding—importance of customary, mediational, and patronage-based Islam. How are we to make sense of a world in which religion is defined at once by individual consumers, whose freedom of choice profoundly shapes the direction of religious ideas and religious organization within a market model, and by a mediational world in which it is not free market choice, but clientage and intercession, that is at the heart of religious attachment? Green at times hints at some of the tensions implicit in his analytical models, but we never get any sustained discussion of them. If scholars are to follow up on the exciting world that Green has opened up, and on his use of market terminology in exploring religious change, such questions will require more theorization.

DAVID GILMARTIN
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SUGATA BOSE. *His Majesty's Opponent: Subhas Chandra Bose and India's Struggle against Empire*. Cambridge:

Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 388. \$35.00.

Sugata Bose's biographical tribute to his great-uncle, the Indian nationalist politician Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945), is a gripping tale of a life of anticolonial struggle and of a quiet, religiously oriented individual who spent much of his adult life in prison or in exile, tormented by his colonial overlords, becoming a politician, a warrior, and a legend and inspiration to some after his death. The pace and tension of the book's prose at times approaches Patricia Highsmith at her best. As a trade book, it also eschews some of the scholarly paraphernalia that enable a more critical engagement with its contents. Academic circles have long had in Leonard A. Gordon's *Brothers against the Raj: A Biography of Indian Nationalists Sarat and Subhas Chandra Bose* (1990) a careful and detailed account of the lives of Subhas Bose and his elder brother Sarat. Sugata Bose's book is not likely to replace Gordon's account.

The author provides an engaging narrative of Subhas Bose as a youthful follower of the Hindu mystic Vivekananda, a student leader in Calcutta, a candidate for the Indian Civil Service examinations in Cambridge, his political apprenticeship under the Bengali lawyer and Congress leader Chittaranjan Das, his imprisonment without trial in Burmese prisons from 1924 to 1927, and his return to politics as a charismatic leader of the Indian youth movement. Sugata Bose provides good accounts of Subhas Bose as President of the Congress with the approval of Mohandas K. Gandhi, the Congress's presiding moral deity in 1938, and then without it in 1939, leading to Gandhi's campaign of non-cooperation against the elected leader of his own organization.

Biography is far less a methodology than a genre that shapes the ends of its practitioners, rough-hew them how they will. One might have wished for a more contextualized narrative; as it happens, only the book's main protagonist emerges as a personality in his own right. There are references in passing to social and political theorists that Bose read (Friedrich Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, Sigmund Freud, Oswald Spengler, V. I. Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Alexander Herzen, Henry David Thoreau). These references could have been developed to provide an intellectual history of the individual whom the author presents as a more appealing alternative for the leadership of the Indian nationalist movement than either Gandhi—too prone to mysticism and irrationality—or Nehru—too disconnected from the spirituality of his countrymen.

A large part of the book is devoted to Bose's life as an exile in Europe in the mid-1930s, and again as a voluntary émigré during World War II. A question that is never addressed head-on is to what extent Bose was an enthusiast of European fascist ideas. The fact that he considered himself a socialist, often expressed his displeasure or disagreement with aspects of the Italian or German dictatorships or with Japanese imperialism, and had Jewish friends in Germany and Austria, or that

he wrote in his autobiography of the need for a “synthesis” between socialism and fascism, is not a substitute for a more nuanced intellectual history that engages seriously with what these ideologies were. The book remains at the level of the encounters of leaders: Bose “was not the first prominent Indian visitor” to encounter Benito Mussolini and be impressed by him (p. 94). His meeting with Adolf Hitler could be compared to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s meeting with Joseph Stalin, where Roosevelt said he was glad to see the latter although he was in fact “not pleased to meet a totalitarian dictator who had presided over campaigns of mass murder” (p. 221). The comparison of Stalin and Hitler in this context is unfortunate and ill-judged.

Once World War II enters the narrative, biography gives way to adventure story (the great escape from India via Afghanistan and the Soviet Union to Germany in 1941) and then, with a pause for breath for the period of waiting in Germany, to military history, with its accounts of the submarine voyage to Japan, to the Indian National Army and its campaigns and marches. Military failures or almost-successes are contrasted with successes in integrating Hindus and Muslims into an idea of Indian nationhood that was in the process of being made irrevocably impossible in India at the time. Bose’s death, the trials in India of the Indian National Army personnel, and their unexpected contribution after the death of their leader to mass mobilization and agitation against British rule, are movingly told. The author manages, however, to narrate the passing of a King Arthur and at the same time to deflate the legend of a once and future king. He documents Bose’s death in a plane crash in Taipei on August 18, 1945, recording nonetheless a number of hopeful Netaji sightings in the period after his death by persons imagining the leader awaiting an opportune moment to lead his nation once again. Or perhaps he debunks only the legend of a physical return, for he does choose to speak of a “legacy” of Subhas Bose for the Indian nation to uphold or recover.

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OCEANIA AND PACIFIC ISLANDS

NICHOLAS THOMAS. *Islanders: The Pacific in the Age of Empire*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2010. Pp. x, 336. \$35.00.

Nicholas Thomas has done it again: written a tour de force that increases what we know of Pacific peoples and their worlds. Intentionally inverting the conventional point of departure that sees Pacific Islanders as naïve, inert casualties of European imperial designs, Thomas shows that a far more accurate perspective takes seriously their adroit abilities to adapt to unprecedented events and to utilize Europeans for designs of their own. Thomas never defends European violence or suggests that the horrific moments of European colonial ventures in the Pacific were anything but inexcusable. What he does do is make the case that Pacific

Islanders had a resilience—due, in part, to autochthonous understandings about political intrigue, conquest, warfare, power, and, yes, empire—that made them victimized without being victims in any clichéd way.

Unlike his earlier *In Oceania: Visions, Artifacts, Histories* (1997), here Thomas employs something of a punctiliar approach that uses a multitude of small, seemingly isolated historical moments to create a larger overall image of events, movements, and transitions in the Pacific from roughly 1790 to 1890. Many of the people in this history appear only for a page or two, and one is struck less by the dearth of information about these individuals than by the fact that so many lives are interwoven into the vast narrative that is this book.

The book is divided into two parts, although the transition from the end of the first to the beginning of the second is hardly noticeable. The first part, “The Bible and the Gun,” is subtitled “Contact, Commerce, Conversion,” and this alliterative description captures the essence of the first 160 pages. Part two, “The Tribe and the Army,” is given elaboration as “Labour, Land, Sovereignty,” which is as good as any other triad of words to describe the second half of the book. Each part consists of five chapters, the titles of which are snippets of quotations from individuals—European and Islander—whose tales are told within, many of which whet one’s interest and anticipation: “If King Georgy would send him a vessel”; “The smell of burning flesh is not nice”; and “Man-o’-war all same old woman!”

Thomas notes that the book is “about the ways Islanders and Europeans came to deal with each other, and put up with each other, in the kind of world we call imperial” (p. 25) with the intention of making the twin points that the “lives of the peoples of Oceania were already complex, unstable and political, before the arrival of Europeans” (p. 12), and that “[f]or as long as there had been Islanders in the Pacific, they had travelled and traded extensively. They had regularly taken great risks to seek out new lands. They had long had dealings with people who were more or less unlike themselves” (p. 13). The effort is successful in that Thomas shows over and over again, in prose that is smooth and engaging, the ways in which Pacific Island people exploited and sometimes augmented the (often violent) moments foisted upon them.

The more-than-expected number of typographical errors does little to detract from the book. What does detract, however, is the shortage of maps. It seems unlikely that most readers will have a thoroughgoing knowledge of the geography of every Pacific archipelago and atoll, and many of the accounts require detailed knowledge of locations of bays, islets, and terrain in order to gain maximum understanding. A reviewer is required to have an atlas and/or search engine close at hand; an everyday reader is unlikely to be inclined to do so, and as a result, the full potential of the book can go untapped.

Finally, the reader may wonder why, in his treatment of western Oceania in the latter parts of the book, Thomas gives the impression of approaching and then walk-

ing away from the roots of topics such as so-called “cargo cults” and the revived interest in *kastam*. He does, however, seem to promise “a succeeding book” (p. 25) that deals more narrowly with Melanesia, which will almost certainly address these, and other, phenomena. Those interested in Pacific history can only hope that that book appears sooner rather than later.

In conclusion, Thomas says about Robert Louis Stevenson’s *A Footnote in History* (1892) that Stevenson’s book “remains important as an expression that Islanders could be approached . . . because Europeans and Islanders were at least recognized as inhabitants of the same world and the same time, caught up in events that gained momentum and unraveled, that changed lives and ended them, on both sides” (pp. 283–284). I cannot speculate about whether, or to what degree, Thomas views himself and this book in the same light, but I cannot think of a more apt summation.

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College of DuPage

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

DAVID MASSELL. *Quebec Hydropolitics: The Peribonka Concessions of the Second World War*. (Studies on the History of Quebec, number 24.) Ithaca, N.Y.: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 2011. Pp. xv, 242. Cloth \$95.00, paper \$32.95.

Hydroelectricity, it seems, has powered much of twentieth-century Quebec history. Today the government-owned Hydro Quebec is the largest producer of hydroelectricity in the world; the main developer of hydropower in the region of eastern Quebec under consideration, the Aluminum Company of Canada (now Rio Tinto Alcan), is the world’s largest producer of aluminum. But the story is more than one of scale. “Hydropolitics” contributes to many of the narratives that combine to explain the province’s history. David Massell effectively explores the intersection of many of them. He focuses on opposite extremes: on one hand, the elite corporate and state actors and, on the other, those whose lives were most severely affected, the indigenous Innu (or Montagnais). Each was almost entirely ignorant of the other, a fact that only adds to the drama and significance of this story.

Massell examines the Saguenay River and North Shore watersheds north of Quebec City, a region—in the eyes of business and government—of extraordinary potential for power generation. Already in the 1920s, in a move symbolic of the Quebec Liberal government’s subservience to American business, James Duke was allowed to convert Lac Saint-Jean into a massive reservoir, flooding farmlands without notice or compensation. But it was the inexhaustible wartime demand for aluminum, the reduction of which requires vast amounts of power, that would transform a much broader landscape. Overnight, Canada, and particularly the Saguenay, became America’s prime source of aluminum ingot. This required the transformation of

the watershed as a whole as new dams were built, particularly along the Peribonka River, to create large reservoirs to ensure a steady and predictable supply of water for the new and expanded hydroelectric facilities. As well, it meant the rapid expansion in the size and power of Alcan, the Aluminum Company of Canada.

All of this touched a number of nerves. As elsewhere in North America, the monopolization and control of natural resources by large corporations raised objections and posed state action. The whole issue was particularly explosive in Quebec because these Anglo-Canadian and U.S. businesses sparked deeply rooted nationalist sentiments. In the early 1940s, the Quebec government of Adélard Godbout, generally seen as a reformist interregnum bracketed by the authoritarian and pro-business governments of Maurice Duplessis, had the difficult task of placating nationalist sentiment while seeking, at the same time, to respond to the demands of both Alcan and the war effort. Massell significantly revises our understanding of these governments, arguing that the distinctions between them were fewer than initially thought and that throughout state bureaucrats did their best to defend what they saw as the province’s long-term interests, even in the context of wartime emergency. Nonetheless, governments and bureaucrats were materially and ideologically constrained, and there was little self-reflection about the development model that Alcan represented.

This is an important study in wartime economic governance. As Massell explains, “the war didn’t simply accelerate resource development in this case; it also checked its pace and changed its nature” (p. 171). While state managers were often faced with difficult and even unpalatable options, Massell reveals the dynamics of the relationship between business and the state, and he demonstrates that there were real options on the table for governments. Governments both used, and were constrained by, the growing economic nationalism of Quebecois citizens, although Massell does not fully explore this dynamic. He argues that provincial governments were increasingly responsive to the demands of the region’s non-aboriginal population because they could vote, but there is clearly more to it than that. Support of the agrarian mission of the Quebecois, particularly in the region of agricultural colonization such as the Saguenay, spoke to an older nationalism that politicians ignored at their peril.

By contrast, aboriginal interests *could* be ignored. To governments, the seemingly vast areas affected by hydro development were only of concern because of the corporate timber rights that would be sacrificed by flooding. But disrupting the environment had dire consequences for the Innu hunter-trappers who could no longer depend on this land for their lives and livelihoods.

All of this is essential to understanding modern Quebec. Hydroelectric development encouraged the flowering of neo-nationalism in Quebec, and the continuing conflict with aboriginal peoples spurred their own sense of identity. Although huge challenges remain, the pro-

cesses described by Massell underscore the novelty and significance of the “nation to nation” agreement with the James Bay Cree as preliminary to expanded hydro development in northern Quebec in 2002.

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CHRISTOPHER H. HAMNER. *Enduring Battle: American Soldiers in Three Wars, 1776–1945*. (Modern War Studies.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2011. Pp. xi, 281. \$29.95.

“Everything in life is overrated except death,” declared a twenty-one-year-old soldier during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The surprising thing is not that a young, fit man might balk at the ugliness of a battlefield death, but that any person might imagine that it could be otherwise. War is a monstrosity: it is the most destructive activity known to humanity. Carl von Clausewitz in *Vom Kriege* (*On War*, 1832) made the point strongly, observing that when approaching the field of battle, “life begins to seem more serious than the young man had imagined. Suddenly someone you know is wounded; then a shell falls among the staff. You notice that some of the officers act a little oddly; you yourself are not as steady and collected as you were . . . The air is filled with hissing bullets that sound like a sharp crack if they pass close to one’s head. For a final shock, the sight of men being killed and mutilated moves our pounding hearts to awe and pity.” On the field of battle, there is no escaping pain, sorrow, grief.

So how does it happen that young men and women can be persuaded to step into the fray? What motivates these individuals? Has their motivation changed over the centuries? Christopher H. Hamner sets out to answer these questions in the context of three wars in which American soldiers fought: the American War of Independence, the Civil War, and World War II. The omission of World War I is strange and never justified. Hamner starts by setting up a number of “straw men.” It is simply not the case that historians employ a “one size fits all” explanation for combat motivation. The value of group cohesion has been one important explanation, but it has many critics. Hamner is also certainly not the first to point out that ideological motivations work particularly well prior to recruitment and in training, but have a tendency to crumble under fire. And any historian worthy of the title will draw attention to the significant differences between armies in the eighteenth and mid-twentieth centuries.

Nevertheless, Hamner does make some worthwhile and convincing arguments. The strength of his book lies in the careful distinctions Hamner draws between three very different military conflicts. He draws particular attention to the way that battlefield experiences became progressively more isolated, forcing individual combatants to forge much more independent ways of reassuring themselves and remaining combat effective. The chapter on military training reveals massive shifts in the way soldiers were mentally and physically prepared for

the rigors not only of combat but also of those long and often tedious periods behind the lines, when morale might be especially fragile. The management of fear and other emotions became increasingly important in training, giving rise to the military psychologist. Crucially, by World War II soldiers were being taught to think of their environment as “controllable”: they made choices and were responsible for the consequences of those choices. Mateship or comradeship had little influence in making the best choices. Indeed, it could hamper effective military action. Conspicuous displays of heroism took second place to an emphasis on technical competence. Paradoxically, Hamner notes that this meant that soldiers of later armies were more likely to be forgiven slight “lapses in stoic façade.” Emotional bonds became less important in combat motivation than a shared sense of controllability.

As Clausewitz reminds us, war “is no pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts. It is a serious means to a serious end.” Hamner successfully illustrates the dramatic influence that technology and battlefield environment made to ensuring a desired end. His book will be read not only by other historians but also by military strategists seeking to wage war more effectively. It is a pity, therefore, that he does not address the other problem related to war: how to motivate people (including politicians) to avoid it.

JOANNA BOURKE
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CHRISTINE STANSELL. *The Feminist Promise: 1792 to the Present*. New York: Modern Library. 2010. Pp. xix, 503. \$35.00.

This sweeping synthesis of feminist ideas and politics in the United States from the American Revolution to the War on Terror simultaneously illuminates and provokes. Christine Stansell skillfully weaves a progress narrative: women’s rights have advanced significantly, despite persistent inequalities among women, between women and men, and across nations. The book moves through eighteenth-century democratic revolutions; nineteenth-century moral reform, abolitionism, temperance, and suffrage; twentieth-century New Women, legal recognition, and consciousness-raising; and the possibility of reproductive rights, sexual freedom, and bodily control. Through discussions of disapproving antebellum ministers, anti-suffragists, and opponents of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), Stansell reinforces the emerging scholarly consensus that feminism developed in relation to anti-feminism. She historicizes essentialism, racism, and xenophobia but curiously skips women’s complicity with empire. Reflecting the transnational turn, she shows the interplay of feminism in the United States, Britain, and France and concludes with a perceptive analysis of a global feminism driven by non-governmental organizations that became the stage for the political engagement of liberal feminists

when the Reagan ascendancy blocked domestic influence.

In a move that some will find annoying, Stansell casts the history of feminism into a family drama in which the daughters rebelled against the mothers, though ostensibly fighting the power of the fathers, and were constantly disappointed by the brothers, who failed to reciprocate their loyalty in the anti-slavery crusade or subjected them to sexist oppression in the New Left. Black women prove the exception as they closed ranks with their men to defend a beleaguered community. The politics of the mothers sought to improve the lives of women and children without challenging the domestic norm, sexual respectability, or gender conventions; that of the daughters, where Stansell's sympathies lie, defiantly insisted on "dramatic rearrangements in marriage, motherhood, sex, and male psychology" so that women could "act in the world exactly as men do" (p. xvi). When the activism of mothers and daughters ran parallel, as with the Nineteenth Amendment and the legalization of abortion, women gained major results. Sometimes the mothers paved the way for the daughters, as with the legislative and legal victories of the 1960s and early 1970s. Stansell insists that these divisions are not strictly generational, but except where historical actors deployed kinship metaphors, this narrative device distorts: the same woman, like Jane Addams, could be both a rebellious daughter and a political mother.

Through analysis of texts, Stansell generates a deep, but limited, feminist genealogy. Present are not only standard Euro-Western shapers of feminist thought but also black feminists. However, Stansell barely mentions other women of color. Wage earners and lesbians also rarely appear, and labor feminism gets short shrift. So do feminist organizing among clerical and other pink-collar workers and the grass-roots efforts of the welfare rights movement. New York City and Washington, D.C., tend to dominate the later twentieth-century narrative. Most disappointing, the book skips over the 1930s, the New Deal, and World War II (except for Rosie the Riveter). It thus neglects Left feminism among white, Asian, Latina, and, especially, black women in the Communist Party. Stansell ignores their shaping of the concepts of the double day, triple oppression, and intersectional identity. Through omission, she replicates earlier literature that claims Eleanor Roosevelt and other New Deal women were not real feminists because they opposed the ERA.

But it is too easy to conclude that this story merely reinforces what Chicana feminist theorist Chela Sandoval has named "hegemonic feminism," the conflating of white, middle- and professional-class women with the universal so that other women enter the story only when their history intersects with that norm, rather than on their own terms. Stansell's study offers an original take on the standard trajectory. She rejects both separatist (women apart from men) and maternalist (arguments for social change on the basis of motherhood) visions of feminism. Instead she champions the

heterosexual union of women and men struggling together for "economic parity, religious tolerance, human rights, sexual expression, bodily ease and health, education, and the dignity of human attachments" (p. 395). She reserves particular scorn for rescuers, associated with radical feminists who demonize men and cast women as victims. She finds wanting temperance matrons who would save wives from drunkard husbands, anti-prostitution crusaders who would remove migrants from sex traffickers, and violence-against-women activists who reduce global "crimes against women" to sexual assault—all of whom ignore larger political, economic, and social contexts. Moreover, Stansell is highly critical of sisterhood declarations that more privileged U.S. women have deployed against male power, which have obscured their relative advantage and involvement in maintaining subordination.

Stansell passionately argues for the intertwined fate of feminism and liberal democracy. Limits aside, this survey is as bold as the women it admires, who struggled to realize the democratic promise of political equality, human dignity, economic fairness, and self-determination.

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DANIEL K. RICHTER. *Before the Revolution: America's Ancient Pasts*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 502. \$35.00.

A well-crafted scholarly synthesis is worth its weight in gold. It introduces undergraduates and non-academics to a vibrant field of study, helps graduate students prepare for exams, allows harried instructors to craft up-to-date lectures, and gives specialists a new way to conceptualize their field. Daniel K. Richter's book succeeds on all of these counts. Although its interpretive framework is not an unalloyed success, its lively narrative and astounding range of learning make it an exceedingly valuable volume.

Richter argues that colonial North American history can be understood as the accumulation of "six sequential cultural layers" laid down by groups he calls progenitors, conquistadores, traders, planters, imperialists, and Atlanteans (p. 4). The progenitors were the residents of "medieval" North America and Western Europe who established enduring patterns of trade, religion, and power. On both sides of the Atlantic after roughly 900 C.E. "strikingly parallel agricultural revolutions produced strikingly different civilizational forms" (p. 4). These developments shaped the actions of the conquistadores, the sixteenth-century Protestant and Catholic adventurers who sought glory and riches in the New World. The encounter between the conquistadores and American Indians paved the way for two very different groups of Europeans in the seventeenth century: traders, who built on Native customs of exchange and alliance, and planters, who created agricultural colonies, many of which depended on the unfree

labor of indentured servants and, later, Native and African slaves. From approximately 1660 to the middle of the eighteenth century, the imperialists sought to bring these fractious and far-flung colonies under greater metropolitan control. By their own standards they achieved a measure of success in the first half of the eighteenth century, fostering international trade that enriched the European metropolises even as that commerce increasingly relied on the immiseration of a bound African workforce. Finally, the Atlanteans were the residents of eighteenth-century North America who created a hybrid culture from the previous layers of American Indians, Europeans, and Africans. The connections among these groups were, according to Richter, forged primarily out of the eighteenth-century consumer revolution.

The section on the progenitors is the most innovative. Here Richter includes a chapter on medieval North America, focusing on Chaco Canyon and Cahokia, and one on medieval Western Europe. The comparisons and contrasts between North America and Europe are fascinating. Always attentive to differences, Richter also shows how the great cathedrals of Chartres and Salisbury were physical embodiments of spiritual power in a way not unlike Chaco Canyon's ceremonial centers. This point is reinforced in one of the three beautifully produced "photo essays" between sections, which include a total of eighty-eight illustrations. While the book's subsequent sections will be less surprising to specialists, they still make for compelling reading. Overall, Richter successfully sustains his argument about the six layers of colonial American history and the impact of each on subsequent ones.

But Richter's implicit analytical framework, a hybrid of new and old perspectives, is somewhat problematic. The book owes a great deal to recent scholarship on the Atlantic world, with its emphasis on the interplay among the peoples and products of Europe, Africa, and the Americas. Yet as its title suggests, the book is also yoked to an earlier paradigm of colonial America as the history of the proto-United States. The book starts off broadly, covering material from present-day New Mexico and France and many points in between, but gradually narrows to focus on what would become the first thirteen states of the Union. The benefit of this approach is narrative coherence: the story moves confidently toward the Seven Years' War and the imperial crisis that created the United States. But there are tradeoffs. Richter downplays the Caribbean; this might make sense looking backward from today's United States, but it is hard to justify when thinking about early modern European empires. In part because the Caribbean is slighted, slavery is not central to Richter's analysis and is instead relegated to a ten-page section in a chapter on free and unfree labor (pp. 346–355). More surprisingly, the center of the continent makes no appearance after the section on progenitors, aside from a discussion of the Pueblo Revolt. As an expert on Native North America, Richter knows that some of the field's most exciting recent books have featured the Native

peoples of the Great Plains and eastern Rocky Mountains—Comanches, Utes, Shoshones, Osages, Karankawas—as powerful actors in the colonial period and beyond. But Richter is unable to work those histories into a story of the coming of the American Revolution.

Nonetheless, Richter has refined decades of scholarship into a scintillating synthesis. Readers of all levels will profit from his effort to bring order to an ever-expanding field.

ERIK R. SEEMAN

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KEITH THOR CARLSON. *The Power of Place, the Problem of Time: Aboriginal Identity and Historical Consciousness in the Cauldron of Colonialism*. Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 2010. Pp. xix, 375. \$32.95.

A decade ago I wrote an essay for Blackwell's *A Companion to American Indian History* (2002) entitled "Wanted: More Histories of Indian Identity." I could not have wished for a response more exemplary than this history of the lower Fraser River watershed's indigenous people, now commonly known as Stó:lō. Keith Thor Carlson's sophisticated account of shifting collective Aboriginal identities not only shows that such studies can be edifying and interesting; it shows why they are essential for understanding Indian tribes or First Nations.

Carlson addresses questions he encountered during a decade of living and working as a historian among the Stó:lō. He returned to graduate school intent on explaining controversies and inconsistencies that have attended the application of the Stó:lō name to various populations and organizations. He aimed to produce scholarship meaningful for Aboriginal readers while "retaining a critical analytical gaze" (p. 10). Because he pursued this goal judiciously and followed a chief's advice to write what Stó:lōs need rather than want to hear, readers of many sorts will find the result of Carlson's labors meaningful. They will get a "fresh look at the way various factors influencing identity relate to each other" (p. 31).

The book describes a precolonial world of diverse autonomous communities with fluid memberships and abundant opportunity for "supratribal identification." Intercommunity relations ensured access to dispersed food resources. Together with a shared understanding of the spirit world, they also promoted a sense of regional collective identity (p. 68). But some group configurations changed even before European colonization due to catastrophes such as floods and epidemics. Later, indigenous narratives about those wrenching events functioned as license for comparable changes necessitated by colonization. A chapter about five specific postcolonization community migrations, amalgamations, and fissions illustrates this effectively.

Succeeding chapters examine consequences of colonial authorities' efforts to curtail aboriginal mobility and impose multiple "tribal" identities based on place.

Small community reserves, band membership lists, and the potlatch ban tended to isolate local groups and frustrate accustomed ways of fostering collective Stó:lō social identity. Meanwhile, however, off-reserve employment brought people of different bands together, and officials' failure to uphold colonial law prompted angry band leaders to take joint political action. By 1906, the date at which Carlson ends the account rather abruptly, Stó:lō identity was assuming its modern character: a principally political alliance of bands whose organizational alignments shift as "proponents of various expressions of . . . collective identity" advance "sometimes competing objectives" (p. 25).

Readers will appreciate the book's many maps and creative diagrams but may find the surprisingly numerous typographical errors distracting.

Stó:lō proximity to large urban centers makes them significant in British Columbia and Pacific Northwest history. But this study of their internal and external relations deserves attention well beyond that region. Like the Stó:lō themselves, it makes sense of group identities by telling tales of change in those identities. Historians in many fields can learn from it how to show collective identities "not only as situationally created through relationships, but also as emerging from unexpected historical events" (p. 28).

ALEXANDRA HARMON
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GAIL D. MACLEITCH. *Imperial Entanglements: Iroquois Change and Persistence on the Frontiers of Empire*. (Early American Studies.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2011. Pp. x, 330. \$45.00.

Gail D. MacLeitch attempts to put Iroquois history in the quarter century before the American Revolution into sharper focus. She insists that her work "reconceptualizes the Iroquois experience in economic and cultural terms and highlights the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) as a crucial period" (p. 3). The book describes the impact of a rising mercantile British Empire fixated on obtaining commodities, markets, and territories that hastened Iroquois incorporation into a market economy. While the English demanded Indian labor, land, and resources, Iroquois men and women found ways to adapt to these changes in imaginative ways. The author appears surprised by the adaptability of the Iroquois to change and to the stream of events, a process long described by anthropologists Anthony F. C. Wallace and William N. Fenton.

MacLeitch is best when she describes Indian-white relations in the Mohawk Valley. Her conclusions conform to those presented in excellent fashion by David L. Preston in *The Texture of Contact: European and Indian Settler Communities on the Frontiers of Iroquoia, 1667–1783* (2009). The Mohawks there had strong ties of family, trade, military alliance, and religion with their white neighbors in the valley, including Dutch, English, Palatine German, and Scots-Irish settlers prior to and during the Seven Years' War. After this conflict, things

deteriorated as a result of rapid white settlement, land sales, and the consequences of the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1768). The Mohawks adapted by acquiring livestock, becoming day laborers, selling crops to their white neighbors, and serving the British military as workmen, guides, and interpreters at forts. Although they adjusted to a cash economy, the Mohawks at the same time maintained certain traditions, including requesting and receiving wampum as payment for goods and services. Strangely, MacLeitch uses a 1794 document to evaluate the Iroquois economy of the early and mid-1770s. Despite significant archaeological evidence to confirm class distinctions, the author seems surprised about economic disparities in native societies.

Much of MacLeitch's work is not new scholarship. The only new information is in a well-written chapter on English-Iroquoian perceptions of gender in both cultures. Yet, even in this area, the author appears unfamiliar with the rich anthropological literature on Iroquoian women, which she claims is "sparse" (p. 253, n. 15). Moreover, she does not cite Kees-Jan Waterman's impressive edited work "*To Do Justice to Him and Myself*": *Evert Wendell's Account Book of the Fur Trade with Indians in Albany, New York, 1695–1726* (2008), which clearly shows that Iroquois women, including the distant Senecas, adapted to the new global economy much earlier than the Seven Years' War and successfully navigated the commercial world of Albany from at least the 1690s onward.

MacLeitch's work is too concentrated on the Mohawk Valley and reveals a lack of understanding of the people and geography of Seneca Country. The Seneca were the most populous of the Six Nations. She, as too many contemporary historians but not most anthropologists, groups all of the Six Nations as one unified cultural-political entity before the Seven Years' War. Unlike most other Iroquois—the Cayugas being the other exception—the Senecas, long before the Seven Years' War, looked westward to the Ohio Country as well as eastward toward Onondaga. Moreover, not all of the member nations of the Iroquois League united together against all opponents in the Beaver Wars, although the Senecas fought in more of these conflicts than any of the other nations. Linguistically, Seneca is far different from Mohawk and Oneida. These distinctions did not arise in the Seven Years' War. By 1763, the Senecas had a multicultural identity, with refugee nations and descendants of white captives living among them in their territory.

Unfortunately, there are other problems with this work. Map one, labeled "Iroquoia ca. 1720" (p. 30), fails to show Senecas at and beyond Lake Erie, even though they had already defeated the Wenro, Neutral, Huron, and Erie Indians and extended their territory between 1638 and 1680. Map five, labeled "The Iroquois in British North America, ca. 1770" (p. 176), indicates neither the existence of Seneca villages along the Genesee and Allegheny Rivers nor the presence of numerous Native refugee populations in Iroquoia. Even though MacLeitch makes use of the Sir William

Johnson Papers and other standard primary materials on the history of colonial New York, she is not selective enough in using secondary sources. Her treatment never adequately addresses the Senecas' strained relations with Johnson, and these Indians' key role in Pontiac's War is hastily described. We learn little about Old Smoke and nothing about Kiashuta (Guyashuta), key figures in the events of the period between 1755 and 1776. One cannot simply separate economic and cultural forces from discussions of leadership.

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PHIL BELLFY. *Three Fires Unity: The Anishnaabeg of the Lake Huron Borderlands*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2011. Pp. xxxvii, 203. \$35.00.

Phil Bellfy lightly revised his doctoral dissertation *Division and Unity, Dispersal and Permanence: The Anishnaabeg of the Lake Huron Borderlands* (1995) for publication as this book, which addresses indigenous peoples of the Lake Huron region from contact to the present. As most texts concerning the Anishinaabeg focus on experiences in one region or another of the Lake Superior borderland, the attempt to add the Lake Huron borderland to this body of literature makes a crucial contribution to the field. Bellfy sets out "to examine the cultural, social, and political aspects of the Anishinaabeg who have lived in, and continue to live in, these Lake Huron borderlands in order to determine how the imposition of the Canada-US international border running through their homeland affected them and continues to do so today" (p. xvi). He takes pains to demonstrate that for the Anishinaabeg the U.S.-Canadian border is an arbitrary division cutting through their ancestral lands; they freely crossed and recrossed it at different points for different reasons. Moreover, chiefs from both sides of this arbitrary line regularly attended treaty meetings with the United States and Canada. Bellfy also examines the process of drawing the border, as it was not completely defined for all of the islands in Lake Huron until late in the nineteenth century, making issues of land cession and occupation very interesting and illustrative for borderlands scholars.

Unfortunately, as Bellfy was not trained as a historian, historical methodologies are underutilized in this work. In particular, the text is not written from the premise that culture informs actions. Since the book devotes only a page and a half to the ethnography of the Anishinaabeg, the cultural, social, and political aspects historically integral to understanding Anishinaabeg decisions and actions are not found in this work. Native people are not represented as if they have strong political agency (except in the contemporary epilogue), but rather as a two-dimensional entity buffeted about by French, British, Canadian, and American policies. No attempt is made to define the social and political life of the people in this region independent from Euro-American actions, as Bellfy uncritically accepts the as-

sertions of mid-twentieth-century scholars that people of this region had little organization and based everything on "individual liberty" (p. 15). Historical analysis of the primary documents does not support this argument, and attention to more of the scholarship published since 1995 by U.S. and Canadian scholars such as Michael Angel, Heidi Bohaker, Jennifer S. H. Brown, Rebecca Kugel, David Andrew Nichols, Laura Peers, Daniel K. Richter, Susan Sleeper-Smith, Bruce White, and Michael Witgen, among others, could have significantly improved the author's attention to these issues related to his central thesis.

In addition to these general concerns, there are a few specific problems with this text. The Three Fires Confederacy referenced in the title is not mentioned until the conclusion and is never clearly defined. As a result, the text builds no argument concerning the continuity or disruption of any unity this confederation may have created during the historical period covered by the book. The author also assumes that individuals signing treaties for specific land cessions lived in those locations at the time of the treaty, whereas most scholarship agrees that treaty gatherings brought together leaders from across the region, including those who did not occupy the lands under discussion. As a result, his assertion that chiefs frequently moved on the basis of where they signed treaties must be taken with a grain of salt. There is no question that chiefs and peoples did move during periods of displacement, such as Indian removal, and at times even varied residence among branches of the extended family based on a variety of factors, but treaty records are not indicators of chiefly residence in a specific location. Rather they indicate the interest of regional leaders in what was perceived as their national territory regardless of where Euro-Americans drew the U.S.-Canadian border, and their collective decision making concerning territorial issues.

Despite these weaknesses, the book is still of some help to scholars of borderlands and of Great Lakes Indian history due to its numerous detailed maps and the tables it includes of both U.S. and Canadian treaties in the region. Bellfy also has analyzed the signatures on these treaties linguistically to create tables identifying which treaties each chief signed despite the lack of standardized spellings for the Anishinaabeg names. However, ignoring the practice of passing on chiefly names within hereditary lineages, Bellfy has omitted the names of chiefs "unlikely to have even been alive at the time in question" (p. 117). The conclusion, which summarizes indigenous border protests in the region over the past thirty years, may also be of use for undergraduate students. Otherwise, this text has little to offer U.S., Canadian, borderlands, or Anishinaabeg historians.

CARY MILLER
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ANTON TREUER. *The Assassination of Hole in the Day*. St. Paul, Minn.: Borealis Books. 2011. Pp. xix, 295. \$25.95.

The discourse on indigenous leadership traditions is a significant trend in American Indian studies today. Moreover, insofar as leadership is integral to reinstating traditional governance practices, both leadership and governance can be understood in the context of modern indigenous history, particularly with regard to the herculean endeavor that tribes made adjusting to a world radically different from the one in which their pre-reservation ancestors lived. Symptomatic of these changes are the leaders or “chiefs” that emerged from the conflict with American imperialism. Hole in the Day the Younger (Bagone-giizhig) was one such leader; as controversial as he was charismatic, he forged a new notion of indigenous leadership in the fires of treaty-making and warfare.

Anton Treuer’s book makes a valuable contribution to the understanding of a much-maligned leader. Too often, Hole in the Day has been dismissed as a “treaty chief” and as an aberration in an era when Indian agents and traders were conniving for Indian land, using bribes and alcohol to get their way. Because of his status as a transitional figure—who witnessed the Ojibwe go from independent sovereign nations with which the Americans drafted a variety of treaties to casualties of westward expansionism and graft—many have judged Hole in the Day as being responsible, at least in part, for hastening the decline of the Ojibwe into reservation wards, as exemplified by their removal to White Earth. Treuer portrays Hole in the Day with all his weaknesses and insecurities on display, but he appreciates the historic leader’s skills as a tribal politician, a diplomat, and an orator. Indeed, as a reflection of the times in which he lived, Hole in the Day was an immensely complicated figure: “Though not a hereditary chief, he was a traditional leader with enormous, undeniable power. He used that power on behalf of his people, but he also used it for personal gain. While much is known about Bagone-giizhig, interpreting that knowledge is a daunting task. He espoused and practiced many conflicting beliefs. He lived in two worlds, yet he was a complete and functioning individual” (p. 181).

It is debatable whether or not any Indians ever “lived in two worlds.” By and large, they remained in the isolated world of the reservation, while periodically venturing into American mainstream society, be it for work, school, or politics. American Indians have long maintained a tenuous relationship with American society; useful as symbols of a “new world,” they have also been seen as a “problem” to be solved through modernization and assimilation. Living in two worlds implies a balance between white and Indian that is probably more fantastic than realistic. Having said this, Hole in the Day was the kind of leader whom Ojibwe elders would condemn for his blatant disregard for local customs. Yet in the aftermath of his assassination, his actions may also be regarded as a product of necessity. In other words, because the Americans were bloated with their own power and self-importance, indigenous communities like the Ojibwe needed an equally impressive

leader who was not intimidated by American grandiosity.

Treuer does a commendable job organizing his discourse around the ideas and values that are meaningful to the Ojibwe community while being accessible to the general reader who may not be as well acquainted with Ojibwe culture and history. More specifically, Treuer contextualizes Hole in the Day’s innovations as a leader within the traditional leadership practices of pre-reservation Ojibwe, providing an enlightening exposition on key Ojibwe words regarding chiefs and their relationships with their communities. Treuer then turns his attention to the elder Hole in the Day (both father and son bore the same name) and the precedent he set for assuming leadership over the entire Mississippi Ojibwe community, as opposed to just a single village as was customary. Equally important is the historical analysis of Ojibwe-Dakota relations, which were far more nuanced and dramatic than what is typically signified by the phrase “traditional rivals.” While never achieving an alliance against white settlers (a possibility that was discussed over several years), as Treuer observes, the Ojibwe and Dakota often ceased hostilities on their own terms and even ostensibly comprehended as their common concern the problem of land cessions and the number of American immigrants moving into their territory. Hole in the Day’s story, however, is also about the factionalism that plagued virtually every tribe, including the acrimony that prevented these communities from ever forming a united front and instead allowed them to fall prey to the manipulations of traders and government agents. Ultimately, though, Hole in the Day’s story is the kind of tragedy that occurs when a once powerful and respected (some might say feared) leader surrenders to temptation, turning pride into arrogance. In that sense, Treuer’s book is a lesson upon which Ojibwe and non-Ojibwe alike ought to reflect.

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DAVID D. HALL. *A Reforming People: Puritanism and the Transformation of Public Life in New England*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2011. Pp. xvii, 255. \$29.95.

Anyone seeking knowledge about New England religious history soon becomes indebted to the wide-ranging scholarship of David D. Hall. Whether one is drawn to American Puritanism through the achievements of the ministry, the Antinomian Crisis, witchcraft, popular religion, or the changing history of church-state relations, Hall has written a book at some point in his career that is essential reading. This study demonstrates anew the qualities that have made his work so distinguished: thorough knowledge of English Puritan backgrounds, meticulous research into New England town records and the history of the book, a wide historical context and a long temporal perspective, careful regard for scholarship both recent and traditional, convincing ar-

gumentation, and clear, vigorous prose blessedly free of academic jargon and scholarly pretense.

The book begins with the modest lament that its first title, "Why They Mattered," might have been preferable. I doubt it. Hall is intent on avoiding two opposing traditions that consider the Puritans as hypocritical autocrats pursuing intolerance (Nathaniel Hawthorne) or forerunners of liberty and democracy (George Bancroft). Because both views require anachronisms, Hall pursues an impartial understanding of reformed Protestantism as it adapted to New World conditions during the first generations of settlement (1620–1660). He avoids familiar theological thickets (the Covenant of Grace, Preparationism, "Federal Theology," "Sanctification vs. Justification"), preferring to emphasize long-neglected but vital civic ideals: "consent," "participation," "proportionality," "godly rule," and "equity." What emerges is a portrait of late Jacobean Englishmen reforming not only the Anglican Church via the congregational way but also the very nature of a civic commonwealth. Quite apart from Enlightenment understandings of terms like "Liberty," "Republicanism," or "Democracy," New England's Puritans transferred power from property toward church membership, expanded the "liberties" (rightful powers) of people and deputies against the magistrates, while developing customs of petitioning and hand-written circulars as means of protest and change. Hall's subtitle points toward his conclusion: American Puritans transformed public life by making it more participatory for more citizens, however those changes may now be labeled.

The evasiveness of Puritan social ideals only made those ideals more desired. The term "equity," Hall observes, has not seemed important to historians of seventeenth-century New England. Hall then quotes eleven passages in which the term is crucial, including the Massachusetts Freeman's Oath and writings by William Bradford, John Davenport, and Nathaniel Ward. These passages prompt reflections on exactly what the goal of "equity" might have been. The term was clearly akin to equality, fairness, impartiality, and justice but synonymous with none of them. All men and women deserve equity, but not in equal ways, because all are not equal. "Equity" might momentarily surface in a judicial decision or governor's decree, but it was imbedded in no institution, no procedure. It was elusive and ungraspable but not chimerical, because it had biblical authority (Psalm 72) and must be sought in the spirit of Christian love (Pauline *caritas*) rather than meritocracy. To Hall, Puritan ideals gathered power not because their proponents were particularly rational, as Perry Miller concluded, but because covenants based upon those ideals so empowered them that "authority and liberty became intertwined" (p. 158).

Hall's admiration for Puritan achievements does not blind him to compromises and human failings. Nonetheless, his historical glass is rather consistently half full, not half empty. A revealing chapter on town land allotments emphasizes the determinative value of "proportionality" and "equity" in modifying property in-

equalities and curtailing gentry status. One wonders, however, whether Hall's absorbing account of land distributions in Cambridge, where land allotments of a hundred acres or more were given only to church members, was evidence of an equitable proportionality or the rule of the saints? Hall's summary of the ways the churches encouraged participation incurs a similar problem: "The Congregational Way licensed new versions of participation; the men who were members electing a minister and voting on candidates for membership; the deacons collecting gifts for purposes of charity; the elders intervening to rebuke the wayward" (p. 74). Here, to be sure, are acts of election, charity, and social equity, but they were all performed by "the men who were members," by the deacons, and by the elders. Is this "participation," the rule of the saints, or perhaps both? Once more we are returned to the unknowable statistics of church membership. What percentage of the adult townspeople were saints and therefore able to vote in colony-wide elections as well as (after 1647) for local measures and local offices? Does empowerment of a people occur when voting rights reach twenty-five, fifty, or one hundred percent? Accurate, comprehensive voting records do not exist. Nonetheless, in the wake of American cultural denigration of everything the word "Puritan" is supposed to represent, it is bracing to have this book as perhaps the best corrective to date.

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CRAIG YIRUSH. *Settlers, Liberty, and Empire: The Roots of Early American Political Theory, 1675–1775*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. ix, 277. Cloth \$90.00, paper \$25.99.

The thesis of this book is that residents of British North America for a century prior to independence understood themselves not merely as "colonists," but as "settlers." Craig Yirush believes that "The term 'settler' better captures their ambiguous status in the empire, for while they were subjected to metropolitan control, they were also agents of empire in their own right, appropriating native land and establishing local authority in a quasi-autonomous manner" (p. 4, n. 12). Whatever the particulars of governance in each colony, it is argued, all these new societies were created by persons who believed that they or their forebears had made the perilous voyage to the New World, wrested a livelihood from a strange environment, and beaten back the challenge of hostile native inhabitants, all with negligible help from the British government.

To a Rip Van Winkle like myself, returning to the field after a forty-year absence, certain things stand out. First, John Locke is back, but he is not Carl L. Becker's benign prophet of natural rights. The settler propagandists discussed in the middle chapters of the book (Jeremiah Dummer, John Bulkley, Daniel Dulany, Richard Bland) found in Locke a rationale for the acquisition of private property in a state of nature and the violent dis-

possession of previous inhabitants. Second, the settler ideology carefully depicted here puts Thomas Jefferson's important *A Summary View of the Rights of British America* (1774) in a new light. Rather than scrutinizing Jefferson's library of foreign books and the possible influence of this or that mentor, readers are encouraged to understand Jefferson to have recapitulated a well-established narrative. He ornamented it with the claim that the Anglo-Saxons who settled England, like the English who settled North America, left behind "any claim of superiority or dependence asserted over them by that mother country from which they had migrated" (*The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, edited by Julian P. Boyd et al., I [1950], p. 122).

Viewing the world from within the ideological tunnel vision of settlers brings with it some serious limitations. Commendably, this book "does not make any claims to comprehensiveness, still less to be constructing an all-encompassing explanatory paradigm for early American political thought" (p. 19). But the indifference of settlers on the ground to the claims and humanity of Native Americans and African American slaves is all too evident in the writings discussed. Yirush "takes seriously the rights of the Native Americans" (p. 18). However, his central protagonist is the frontiersman in whose eyes the Native American was an obstacle to be eliminated. A poignant chapter describes the dispossession of the Mohegan Indians from approximately 20,000 acres in northeastern Connecticut. Various entities in Great Britain from time to time stood up for the rights of the Mohegans as original possessors of the land and valuable allies against the French. Ignoring the rulings of royal officials to this effect, "the towns that had been founded on the Mohegans' land continued to expand, and none of the landholders were ejected" (p. 125). As for slaves, they do not appear in the index or the text. The wagons that carried settlers into the Southwest were often followed by African Americans in chains, but we hear nothing about them.

Finally, the particular interests of persons and communities involved in overseas commerce tend to be neglected. The British government is portrayed by this book as persistently driven by the desire to reap the commercial benefits of empire (e.g., pp. 16, 22, 84–87). Americans, by contrast, are presented as principally concerned with political practices and ideas. Once again using Jefferson's *Summary View* as an ideological litmus test, Yirush writes that Jefferson's description of the "ill effects" of British "trade regulations paled in comparison" to his condemnation of parliament's course of conduct beginning with the Stamp and Sugar Acts (p. 249). This is not quite accurate. In his *Summary View*, Jefferson described the Hat Act as "An instance of despotism to which no parallel can be produced in the most arbitrary ages of British history" (*Papers*, I, pp. 124–125). More consequentially, he asserted that "the exercise of a free trade with all parts of the world [was] possessed by the American colonists as of natural right" (*Papers*, I, p. 123). When, two years later, the Second Continental Congress acted on this proposition by

opening American ports to the world, it was a de facto declaration of independence.

The root system of the Liberty Tree extended more widely and deeply than the shared ideas of the colonists as settlers within an empire. By the 1760s they wanted to manage their entire economy for themselves.

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MICHAL JAN ROZBICKI. *Culture and Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution*. (Jeffersonian America.) Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. 2011. Pp. x, 288. \$35.00.

Modern Americans hold the founding fathers to the wrong standards. As a result, both those who celebrate them as heralding a new epoch of liberty and those who condemn them for denying liberty to so many have missed the point. Michal Jan Rozbicki's extended essay argues that by imposing a modern understanding of freedom on the founders, we have misconstrued the revolutionary generation's achievements, while consigning historians to increasingly fruitless debates about liberty's triumph or betrayal.

Rozbicki argues that eighteenth-century definitions of liberty presumed inequality. Liberty and its privileges belonged to specific groups of people in particular ways rather than being the universal property of all people. The ability to exercise liberty—to vote, to hold office, to be protected from arbitrary arrest—distinguished one class of men from another. People grouped at the top of society had the most liberty, people grouped closer to the bottom less, little, or none.

Scholars of the Enlightenment may parse Rozbicki's erudition, but what matters in the American context is that these assumptions about liberty structured the goals of those who challenged British authority and then designed new constitutional arrangements. According to Rozbicki, the founders prized stability and never intended to do anything other than protect and extend a political order in which they governed on behalf of "the people," comprised of various social and moral inferiors. Cutting off the colonial gentry from the Old World politically was the British Empire's post-1763 infringement on these provincials' prerogatives; distinguishing the colonial gentry from the Old World philosophically was their lack of attachment to inherited rank based in land and entitlement to office. Liberty allowed these men to think of themselves as a meritorious privileged class not a traditional aristocracy. Property-holding requirements for the franchise, before and after independence, also expressed this logic. One had to be qualified to enjoy greater liberty. Rozbicki thus contests the notion that the founders were hypocrites for denying liberty to slaves, women, Indians, and poor people. Such denials were consistent with the founders' notion of liberty as privilege. Similarly, Rozbicki rejects the notion of the Constitution of 1787 or the Federalist Party in the 1790s abandoning a com-

mitment to universal freedom. The founders could not betray what they did not seek.

Because some historians have insisted on the radically modern nature of the American Revolution, Rozbicki also has to explain how the “preservationist” (p. 81) impulse of the founders produced a more democratic society. Where did ordinary people get the idea that the revolution was about their own liberty? Rozbicki’s understanding of culture as a structure of language and symbols that creates meaning and explains reality is crucial to his answer. For the author, culture flows in one direction, from elite members of “the speaking class” (p. 152) to everyone else, producing “an informational spill . . . to the collective mind” (p. 190). The gentry used sweeping language to enlist those with less liberty in the fight against the British and to accept the governing structures that supplanted monarchy. The cultural language of liberty got ahead of practice, and the catching-up process changed the nation forever. A cascading list of people decided to bid for actual inclusion in the polity rather than remain content being represented by their superiors. Some founders, by promoting education, expressed expansion of liberty as a goal, but the author insists that all factions of the gentry wished to stave off universal liberty in the present.

By defining culture and describing politics almost exclusively from an elite perspective, what Rozbicki pitches as a novel formulation actually favors an established narrative of liberty’s contagious spread from the few to the many. This storyline still retains some explanatory power, but treating ordinary eighteenth-century colonists as vessels for elite ideas about liberty has significant limitations. The Great Awakening’s religious revivals prompted ordinary women and men to challenge authority, to exercise choice, and to prize their own spiritual sensations over the wisdom of established authorities. Meanwhile, the cultural forums in which ordinary colonists made sense of their personal and political lives were more influential than the author allows. In parlors and slave quarters, along docks and dirt paths, in bedrooms as well as council chambers, colonists sought power, defined liberty, and manipulated symbols and language.

The gentry had reason to fear that ordinary people—slaves running to British lines, backcountry Baptists contesting planters’ social authority, enraged New England townsmen ready to march on occupied Boston—had gotten out in front of them regarding liberty. Critiquing elite founders for their shortcomings and hypocrisy is not a mere invasion of present-minded definitions into past discourse. Caught up in the maelstrom of events, the founders’ definitions of liberty had to be far more fluid, less certain, and less unified than this intriguing study indicates. Some debates cannot be settled.

DAVID N. GELLMAN
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BENJAMIN H. IRVIN. *Clothed in Robes of Sovereignty: The Continental Congress and the People Out of Doors*. New

York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 378. \$34.95.

On July 12, 1778, the Continental Congress of the United States welcomed the French minister plenipotentiary, Conrad Alexander Gérard, with a mix of extravagant pageantry, delicate etiquette, and a nervous cognizance of American inferiority. The *Pennsylvania Packet* dutifully reported that the Almighty “hath stationed America among the powers of the earth, and clothed her in robes of Sovereignty” (p. 176). The central question that Benjamin H. Irvin ponders throughout this informative book is whether Congress had attained real authority during its revolutionary tenure or just its trappings. At the same time, he argues persuasively that the ongoing American debates about these trappings were vital to understanding the origins of the United States.

Deftly deploying a variety of scholarly methods, Irvin analyzes the emblems and rituals of the Continental and Confederation Congress from 1774 to 1783. (The book devotes more attention to the earlier years than the final years of this period.) During the American Revolution, Congress sought to cultivate civic virtue and national cohesion, foster good civil/military relations, and establish its legitimacy to a candid world. Congress hoped to create meaningful expressions of sovereignty and power via its printed currency, diplomatic overtures, holidays and commemorations, and artifacts such as medals, monuments, and ceremonial swords.

These were tall orders for Congress for several reasons. First, the only “honor culture” Americans knew was the monarchical and aristocratic culture they had inherited from Great Britain. Delegates to Congress worried, therefore, about whether it was acting in accordance with its republican ideals. At the same time, the delegates constantly fretted that their efforts at inculcating loyalty and pride were being outmatched and upstaged. Ambivalent toward pomp and celebration, Congress hosted a number of ceremonies that called for solemnity, humility, and frugality. Rhetorically this was a nod to republican virtue, but the nation’s penurious circumstances also necessitated thrift. As Irvin demonstrates, Congress was not always a pillar of eminence, unity, or even solvency. Its efforts, therefore, were sometimes haphazard and contradictory. When Congress was weak (as was often the case, given its constitutional limitations, the nation’s economic woes, and the army’s military setbacks), other parties stepped in with their own rites, symbols, and interpretations. These expressive rivals included army officers and soldiers, the general public “out of doors,” the nation’s loyalist and British opponents, and the country’s French and Indian allies.

One of Irvin’s great strengths is that he ably invokes the cultural, military, political, and social contexts that inform his findings. As a result, he is able to interpret contemporary literary and iconographic productions (the publisher was generous with images) that would

otherwise be incomprehensible to a casual reader. Irvin organizes his material well, following a roughly chronological narrative while presenting his weighty themes and evanescent symbols in a series of coherent essays. Some themes recur, such as the ways in which distinctions of race, class, and gender underpinned the ways that “members of Congress perpetuated a social hierarchy very much at odds with the democratizing impulses of the Revolution” (p. 13).

The author also asserts that the American people did not just passively accept the rites of Congress but “embraced, rejected, reworked, ridiculed, or simply ignored them as they saw fit” (p. 18). Overall Irvin’s treatment tilts more heavily toward the clucking concerns of Congress than the people out of doors, but he also proves his point about the reciprocal nature of these symbolic displays. One might quibble with Irvin’s choice to limit his observations to the congressional seat of Philadelphia, which acts as a stand-in for the American public. This focus on the wartime capital leaves the author with less to say about how these symbols and ceremonies were disseminated to the rest of the new nation.

This is a book about the Revolutionary War years that is only lightly connected to pitched battles and military concerns, and for that reason Irvin is able to build bridges between the colonial past and the national future. Readers should not expect a comprehensive overview of the political history of the Continental and Confederation Congresses during the war. Yet within Irvin’s enjoyable book, they will learn a great deal about how the leaders of a modern republic established, maintained, and fumbled the emblems of national identity.

BENJAMIN L. CARP
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SETH COTLAR. *Tom Paine’s America: The Rise and Fall of Transatlantic Radicalism in the Early Republic*. (Jeffersonian America.) Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 269. \$35.00.

Thomas Paine’s role in the making of American independence has always been contentious: to his acolytes, he belongs with Thomas Jefferson among the founding fathers and has been denied his rightful place in the pantheon chiefly because of his deism; to his detractors, he was and remains libellous (respecting George Washington), a drunkard, and a “filthy little atheist” (in Theodore Roosevelt’s words) who is rightly written out of the sacred narrative. Getting the right balance between these assessments is difficult, given the ongoing reverberations of some of the basic disagreements in perspective, especially concerning religion.

Seth Cotlar’s elegantly presented and well-researched book rightly commences with the assumption that Paine’s reputation in his lifetime hinged more upon his political than his religious opinions. Particularly after *Rights of Man* was published (1791–1792), Paine represented a new form of populist republicanism in which classical reference points—a focus on civic virtue and an aristocratical balancing of a popular con-

stitution—were seemingly swept aside in favor of what contemporaries (after 1793–1794) feared was essentially a mob-based, Jacobinical interpretation of democracy. Paine’s exile in France (1772–1802) did little to assuage fears about his association with extreme radicalism. Neither did the publication of *The Age of Reason* (1794, 1796) or his contretemps with Washington. Paine became, in Cotlar’s words, the epitome of “the foreign agitator, the atheistic anarchist” (p. 2), an image that would often re-emerge in popular perceptions of American radicalism. Eradicating Paine meant cleansing the ideal of democracy itself, particularly by shedding its French associations. The contest over Paine thus in fact masked a much larger political struggle between more and less populist variants on the ideal of democracy.

To Cotlar political ferment in the United States during the 1790s was shaped dramatically by the numerous exiles driven from Britain by William Pitt’s repressive policies. Political debate remained rooted to a substantial degree in European reference points, rather than moving swiftly into an American exceptionalism. Paineites flirted with cosmopolitan ideals and with more radical interpretations of property rights and egalitarianism than those embraced by American revolutionaries or the liberal political economists whose principles supposedly underpinned the revolution (Cotlar recognizes this as a crude misrepresentation). French, British, and Irish experience led many Americans to focus more upon active citizenship through debating societies, public meetings, and the like.

This is a persuasive portrayal of the origins of a number of anti-elitist democratic trends in the United States. Paine’s role in this process was curiously double edged in exporting “French” (but as much Nonconformist) ideas of democracy to the United States through the *Rights of Man*. Cotlar claims this sold as well as *Common Sense* (1776) there during the 1790s (50,000–100,000 copies), but other evidence suggests at least 500,000 copies of the latter were sold. Paine also used the United States as the model of a society in which government was minimized; this vision, he would soon concede, did not generally suit Europe with its vastly greater poverty. (Cotlar does not develop this theme, which certainly helps to explain Paine’s popularity in the United States). But more than anything, Paine epitomized the self-made political activist and populist statesman who had arisen from humble circumstances to become the confidant of presidents and (eventually) emperors. Paine was “a figurehead of a very different sort” (p. 39) from Washington: he could be imitated rather than merely worshipped. But enthusiasm for Paine had largely disappeared by his return from Europe. Now regarded as an electoral liability, he was shunned even by many of his former friends.

This is by far the most focused study of the reception of the *Rights of Man* in the United States. It offers a compelling portrait of attitudes toward “French principles” in the 1790s and of how, as in Britain, public opinion began to shift away from such principles with

the “anti-Jacobin” reaction of the second half of the decade. Cotlar’s account of egalitarian tendencies in the 1790s is particularly novel, though there is more to be said about the Godwinian component in this story and also about the role of literary utopianism—the Scottish emigrant John Lithgow’s “Equality: A Political Romance” (1802), which appeared in Philadelphia, fits clearly into the debate assessed here. Cotlar also explores a reluctance to embrace Smithian liberalism as wholeheartedly as many commentators today seemingly assume that most early Americans did. If such perspectives were marginalized by 1800, agrarian radicalism in this period clearly sowed the seeds of Jacksonian, Owenite, and other forms of egalitarianism from around 1820 onward. Cotlar’s fine study thus offers a much more nuanced, if contested, vision of the 1790s in the United States than has often been presented, and one much closer to European debates in the period.

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CHRISTOPHER J. LUKASIK. *Discerning Characters: The Culture of Appearance in Early America*. (Early American Studies.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 319. \$45.00.

As a fan of double entendre, I appreciated the title of Christopher J. Lukasik’s book. It nicely captures his focus on attempts to practice discernment through physiognomy, the late eighteenth-century “science” of reading faces, while highlighting the people doing the discerning. In addition, it references at least two meanings of character that are central to the book: a person’s innate qualities—which physiognomy ostensibly revealed—and a figure in a work of fiction. Lukasik is a scholar of literature, and literary works frame his thoughtful study, but many (if not all) of its arguments are not only deeply historicist but also historical, deftly charting the relationship between appearance and social hierarchy.

Following the lead of scholars who have characterized the American revolutionary era as one in which anxiety over how to “read” people accurately increased, Lukasik explores “how a variety of cultural forms imagine the visibility of distinction and the dynamics of social space” (p. 10). In a world in which consumer goods and the habits of gentility could be readily acquired, some Americans began to shift the indices of character—often read as a synecdoche for class—from bodily performances to the theoretically immutable face and its involuntary features. Such attempts to make character legible and fixed underpinned what Lukasik calls the “physiognomic fallacy,” the “false opposition between a model of character read from performance and one read from the face” (p. 21), that would trouble early American society and its literary productions.

Establishing the power of print culture, Lukasik begins with the work of Johann Kaspar Lavater, whose widely disseminated and illustrated *Essays on Physiog-*

nomy (*Physiognomische Fragmente zur Beförderung der Menschenkenntnis und Menschenliebe* [1775–1778]) provided people with guidelines for reading faces. Although physiognomy helped white Americans create racial distinctions, Lukasik argues that its reception had as much to do with establishing distinctions among white men at a time when American society had jettisoned aristocratic ideas of rank. It was not, of course, an either/or proposition; just as a lack of discussion of complexion does not mean the absence of race, neither does a focus on men indicate that gender was not an operative category in creating social distinctions, analysis that Lukasik might have developed more fully.

In fact, as the book shows persuasively, the seduction stories of the early republic were shot through with physiognomy’s potential power to “unmask” the rakish male follower of Lord Chesterfield’s cynical prescriptions for performing status. Chapters two and three detail the vexed relationship between reading books and reading men, particularly for young women who consumed novels. But did sentimental fiction make women more or less susceptible to mistaking the cultural capital of the libertine—fine clothes and pretty words—for actual socioeconomic capital? For every sensible female character who read the rake as a rake, another failed at physiognomy, as the creation of female dyads helped instruct the nation’s young women. Rich interpretations of four novels bear out Lukasik’s interpretation of physiognomy as a “counter-practice” to Chesterfieldianism, followed by a smart discussion of Charles Brockden Brown’s *Ormond; or, The Secret Witness* (1799) as a critique of physiognomic discernment. In this tale, faces deceive just as fully as any other index, and judgments of character must be communal and secured through reasoning over time, not an individual’s momentary assessment.

Disagreement over the power and (literal) place of faces in the new nation informs a chapter on visual culture as well. While some, such as Philip Freneau, thought that portraits and the galleries that displayed them commemorated undeserved access to wealth rather than republican virtue, for Hugh Henry Brackenridge they helped to exclude the socially undeserving. As Americans debated concepts of public interest and how best to serve it—as well as who should secure it—cultural forms such as portraits became tools for properly ordering the republic.

The book’s final two chapters trace the “Changing Face of the Novel” and are more expressly and narrowly literary in their arguments, as Lukasik himself acknowledges. They will likely satisfy scholars of early American fiction more than historians of the period. Yet those who know the second quarter of the nineteenth century will enjoy the learned readings of James Fenimore Cooper and Herman Melville and should be able to draw some of the contextual connections that are less evident than earlier in the book. By the antebellum period, other “sciences” of difference challenged physiognomy’s reign, but the task of reading people continued to inform the content and function of fiction.

Lukasik shows that Cooper was less concerned with discerning the absence of character than exploring the invisibility of its presence, uncovering the “invisible aristocrat.” One is reminded of the poor but lovely and virtuous servant girl of eighteenth-century sentimental fiction who turns out to be well born. And, in a final inversion and unmasking of the physiognomic fallacy, the title character of Melville’s novel *Pierre; or, The Ambiguities* (1852) is seduced by the power of a female face and its likeness to his father’s, renounces his family and inheritance to atone for his father’s sins, comes to realize that he has mistaken a look for a face, and, ultimately, dies due to his lack of judgment, all the while preserving his distinguished family’s unblemished name. Such was the fraught relationship between physiognomy and social distinction in early America, one that Lukasik outlines with the precision of silhouette.

KATE HAULMAN
American University

PETER J. KASTOR. *William Clark’s World: Describing America in the Age of Unknowns*. (Lamar Series in Western History.) New Haven: Yale University Press. 2011. Pp. 344. \$45.00.

In *William Clark’s World*, Peter J. Kastor considers the relation between representations of the North American Far West and the westward expansion of the United States. In contrast with many works about Meriwether Lewis, William Clark, and the Corps of Discovery, Kastor’s study concentrates on the aftermath of the Lewis and Clark expedition rather than the journey itself, and on the career of the underappreciated and long-lived Clark instead of the words of the poetic and doomed Lewis.

This focus on Clark and post-1806 perceptions of the Far West enables Kastor to explore the question at the heart of his insightful and intriguing book: how did the United States move from the apprehensive understanding of the regions beyond the Mississippi evident in the productions of Clark and his peers in the early decades of the nineteenth century—an understanding in which the transcontinental destiny of the republic was less than manifest—to the brash approach to far western expansion characterizing the 1830s and 1840s? Kastor grounds his response in a wide and thorough examination of explorers’ journals, geographic treatises, personal and governmental correspondence, and many well-selected and elegantly reproduced maps. He traces Clark and his contemporaries through the mazes of the nascent United States publishing industry that would make the Far West known to Anglo-Americans. He navigates with Clark around the rudimentary structures of a U.S. government that was trying to determine the best approach to North America’s western reaches.

Instead of offering a full biography of Clark, Kastor uses Clark’s life as the narrative center of a larger story of national transition. As Clark moved from western explorer to frontier administrator, the eastern republic’s tentative probes into the western unknown gave

way to the United States’ conquest of a continent. In Kastor’s subtle and perceptive rendering of events, early nineteenth-century administrations were far more concerned with the governance of territories acquired by the Louisiana Purchase than with novel imperial projects. The earthy, practical explorers working for them produced portraits of the Far West in which the region’s perils stood out as much as its promise. In part, this was because the region was filled with fearsome mountains, unforgiving deserts, imposing Indian nations, and jealous representatives of foreign powers. It was also because explorers seeking fame, fortune, and position had every interest in emphasizing the difficulties of the obstacles they had deftly and heroically overcome.

As early as the 1810s, however, advocates of western expansion could begin to use the achievements and works of Clark and his contemporaries selectively in support of a more aggressive approach to the Far West. Western enthusiasts could draw valleys and rivers from the maps and journals of western scouts while omitting the Indian communities commanding them. They could add expansive U.S. boundaries to maps that had highlighted physical features rather than political claims. As the imperatives of multiplying, franchise-wielding, land-hungry Euro-Americans displaced concerns about the difficulties of western settlement, the most zealous proponents of territorial acquisitions could simply disregard the cautions of Clark and others.

These expansionist imperatives raise the most substantial question about the western representations Kastor so knowledgeably and lucidly considers: to what extent did the way some Americans depicted the Far West affect the way other Americans acted toward it? Kastor’s book emphasizes the power of representations to shape reality by influencing behavior, but the book offers many indications that rising demands for far western lands were producing visions of the region as much as they were being generated by them. It often appears that Anglo-Americans were coming to the Far West regardless of what figures like Clark had to say about it.

This points to one limitation of Kastor’s semi-biographical approach. The great virtue of centering on Clark is that his tangible life makes accessible the often abstract topic of spatial representation. The semi-biographical structure of the book, however, often obliges Kastor to follow the trajectory of Clark’s life rather than the logic of key arguments. This pulls the book away from the kind of sustained ratiocination needed for a really conclusive statement about the connections between geographic representation and expansionist reality.

Biographical conventions also draw attention away from one of Kastor’s great achievements. Authors of biographical or semi-biographical studies are often compelled to trumpet the important or representative features of figures like Clark. But Clark’s less significant and typical qualities are in many respects more instructive. A persistent puzzle of the Lewis and Clark Expe-

dition is why it is so fun to write about but so difficult to integrate into the larger historical narrative of the United States. Kastor suggests an answer. Western accounts and images like Clark's that emphasized western dangers and the rare heroism needed to surmount them ill suited a burgeoning United States that would come to deny all barriers to the western movement of tens of thousands of ordinary people. Kastor skillfully and appropriately uses Clark as a guide through issues of western exploration, representation, and expansion. In doing so, he helps us to see that Clark was, in his relation to some of the larger trends of the nineteenth-century United States, a guide pointing to a North American past rather than the American future.

PAUL W. MAPP

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ANDREW J. LEWIS. *A Democracy of Facts: Natural History in the Early Republic*. (Early American Studies.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2011. Pp. 204. \$39.95.

Once in a while a book pulls together the scholarship of a generation, synthesizes it into a coherent and persuasive account, and thus becomes the platform from which new scholarship must necessarily launch. This is one of those books. In this survey of how Americans thought about and practiced science from the 1780s to the 1840s, Andrew J. Lewis uses archival research and perceptive analysis to deepen our understanding of science in the early American republic. To some degree, Lewis tells a familiar story. One well-known arc of change is the shift in this period from natural history as a unified investigation into all terrestrial natural phenomena to its disaggregation into modern sciences like geology and zoology. Another theme is the concern to root American identity in the natural world, a topic that has become a virtual cliché among scholars of early American science. However, this book is about much more than either of these concerns: Lewis is interested in how people think, and that makes all the difference.

In five chapters, each structured around a story, Lewis examines the tension between claims by elite men to authoritative knowledge and assertions by more ordinary men of the right to think for themselves, as well as the tension between establishing matters of fact and the processes of reasoning from those facts to causality and meaning. Chapter one recounts debates over swallow submersion, the belief that as winter approaches swallows sink into ponds and hibernate until the return of warm weather. Observations by credible witnesses of swallows seeming to plunge into water in the fall and of torpid swallows warming themselves in the spring sun were pitted against assertions that examinations of bird anatomy and experiments in which swallows plainly drowned when plunged into water made swallow submersion implausible. Here educated men's desire to lead an "empire of reason" (p. 16) was undercut by their aspiration to distance themselves from what they saw as the premature and inaccurate systematizing of Euro-

peans (epitomized by the degeneracy theory of Georges-Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon) and by more modest men's belief in their own abilities to observe natural phenomena reliably. Hence the epistemic valorization of credible eyewitness testimony, coupled with widespread hopes that the American natural world would have possibilities for knowledge undreamt of in Europe, shifted Americans toward "a democracy of facts" in which any credible man could participate. While elite men were successful in establishing formal science in college curricula, learned societies, and publishing ventures, Americans moving across the Appalachians in pursuit of economic opportunities found elites' knowledge of natural history of variable benefit as they sought to commodify natural resources. Chapter three addresses interpretations of the origins of the great mounds found in the trans-Appalachian West. The refusal of white Americans to believe that contemporary Native Americans were related to ancient mound builders has drawn many historians' attention as an example of race-making in the early republic. Lewis acknowledges this issue but here concentrates on how and why the nascent field of archeology reopened a space for speculation about phenomena, especially among non-elites. In the 1820s the development of a "theology of nature," the subject of chapter four, similarly contributed to the reopening of a space for thinking about causality, particularly in the emerging field of geology. In the final chapter, Lewis describes how educated men, now often specializing in geology, successfully obtained government patronage from states eager to locate mineral deposits and canal routes. Thus Lewis analyzes the reasons for the initial diminution of elite credibility in realms of science, the rise of widespread participation in natural "fact-making," and the slow reassertion of the claims of educated men to superior knowledge, as well as the broader movement away from system-building and causal explanation followed by their relegitimation, however "unsteady, unstable, [and] sometimes unconscious" (p. 1) these movements were.

This book should find a wide audience. Lewis builds on the work of a generation of historians of science who have shown how critical the participation of people beyond the educated elite was to the development of science, how diverse and interpenetrated the subjects of science were before the development of modern disciplinary divisions, and how thoroughly scientific inquiry was embedded in wider cultural developments. Historians of the early republic will find a jargon-free account of this aspect of their era. While they will certainly also notice the absence of attention to race and gender, this omission allows Lewis to tell a complicated story clearly. Historians of nineteenth-century science will find this an admirable case study useful for comparative work. The citations are a guide to virtually all of the important recent literature on this subject from both sides of the Atlantic, which graduate students embark-

ing on related projects will appreciate. Lewis has written a thoughtful and valuable book.

SARA S. GRONIM
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JENNIFER GRABER. *The Furnace of Affliction: Prisons and Religion in Antebellum America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 234. \$39.95.

Jennifer Graber's richly detailed study of antebellum evangelical Christianity's life behind the bars of New York state prisons feeds a longstanding scholarly appetite for stories of believers who cannot keep their cultural meddling from adulterating the faith. While secularization models abound, Graber freshens that story considerably, investing prison reform with explanatory power more commonly assigned to evangelicals pursuing broader cultural renovations such as antislavery and temperance. She finds bitter irony in the reformers' redemptive quest for inmates' souls that yielded by mid-century to a new "religiosity of citizenship" that gave moral respectability to a prison system based upon punishment, revenge, and physical deprivation (p. 177).

Graber traces an evangelical strategy that began with late eighteenth-century appeals to replace harsh physical penalties with spiritual regeneration as the fruit of criminal justice. New York prison officials initially warmed to the prospect of giving ministers access to a captive audience in exchange for regular exhortations aligned with their own priorities: obedience, rigid discipline, and hard work that could stoke the profitability of convict labor. Here Graber revitalizes the classic work of Paul E. Johnson and Mary P. Ryan in exploring the negotiations between prison officials obsessed with order and marketplace values and evangelicals seeking spiritual dividends.

Not surprisingly, Quaker initiatives begin the three-stage process of confrontation and compromise that frame her argument. Beginning in 1797, Thomas Eddy sought to make New York's Newgate prison a nurturing, restorative "garden." Spurred by Quaker confidence in an Inner Light that could regenerate even the hardest hearts, Eddy produced few conversions and even less obedience. Unimpressed with the Newgate experiment, state officials at Auburn prison turned to the heavier disciplinary hand of Elam Lynds, forcing prison clerics to accommodate a more punitive order or face irrelevance.

Under Baptist chaplain John Stanford, Eddy's garden became a "furnace of affliction," where limited suffering and deprivation could turn the guilty from sin to salvation. State officials welcomed the facade of moral respectability Stanford's ministry offered, even as they stressed "workshop profit" and "stricter forms of bodily discipline" (p. 71). Following Stanford's lead, Chaplain Louis Dwight fueled the furnace at Auburn, presiding over what Graber explains as a fundamental religious transformation. By accepting harsh discipline as a gateway to the penitent prisoner's heart, Dwight effectively turned prison order and profit into goals of Christian

outreach. For Graber, this transformation is instructive of Protestantism's democratic cultural dilemma: believers committed to historic faith principles now found themselves in a secular culture that would tolerate Christianity only on its own terms. "Claiming public space," Graber concludes, now "demanded a slow altering of the Protestant faith" (p. 101).

Graber locates the reformers' final capitulation at mid-century amid the dark corridors of Sing Sing prison and a growing political conflict over how to control a new tide of urban crime and violence. While Democrats wanted to isolate and punish law breakers, their Whig opponents demanded moral reform devoted to character and behavioral change. With spiritual aims pressed to the margins by both sides, clerics such as John Luckey came to accept the prison as a "hell on earth," where hapless inmates could only pray for deliverance from its walls (p. 158).

Graber's study is itself an open call to reform. "Americans incarcerate," her opening declarative for both introduction and epilogue, establishes a clear indictment of the nation's current prison system as the embarrassing legacy of historic failures. She lays much of the blame at evangelical Christianity's doorstep, and her work certainly affirms that prison officials and cooperating chaplains prostituted religious muscle and language to serve pragmatic material purposes. In the process, however, she delivers something less and something more than she claims at the outset. First, her argument that prison ministries were primary agents of broader secularization among evangelicals needs more visible demonstration beyond the penitentiary walls that house most of this work. Second, Graber's most powerful indictment arrives in her conclusion and does not derive from the clerical actors or compromising strategies that are center stage in most of her study. Instead she points to doctrinal impairments that shackled reformers from the start. Scholars distracted by the reformers' intentions and meliorating efforts, she argues, fail to appreciate the dark potential of Protestant theology itself, resting on principles of "redemptive suffering" and humanity's naturally "degraded status" before God (pp. 182–183). Such an assessment invites the conclusion that this embedded theological flaw assured a tragic outcome from the outset.

A passionate interpretation that will fire debate rather than dampen it, this beautifully written and deeply researched volume makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of early American prison reform and to the broader debate over evangelicalism's impact on antebellum American culture.

MARK Y. HANLEY
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JULIE WINCH. *The Clamorgans: One Family's History of Race in America*. New York: Hill and Wang. 2011. Pp. 416. \$35.00.

In this book Julie Winch presents a captivating, strictly narrative history of an interracial, multiracial, ulti-

mately transracial family. The saga begins in late eighteenth-century St. Louis, with a Frenchman named Jacques Clamorgan who fathered a number of children with African American women. The tale continues through several generations of extended, blended households, and climaxes with Jacques's grandson Cyprian Clamorgan, who, in the mid-nineteenth century, passed back and forth across the color line depending on his economic and political desires. In the early twentieth century, Louis Clamorgan, another of Jacques's descendants, made this transition every day, just by going from home to work in downtown St. Louis and back again; at his job everyone understood he was black, while his neighbors in the suburb of Maplewood saw him as white. The characters are nothing short of fascinating. Jacques was also ingenious and ruthless, willing to double-cross anyone, including Ester, mother of some of his children, and seemingly lacked a moral compass. He made—or at least alleged—a staggering fortune from land speculation and political corruption. Eventually Jacques laid claim to over 1,000,000 acres. Cyprian—who, understandably, went by a number of aliases—inherited more than a modest measure of his grandfather's character. He was a writer, entrepreneur, self-styled lawyer, halfhearted politician, and all-around cad. He was even a failed assassin: he tried to kill a political rival in New Orleans in 1868. St. Louis, and secondarily New Orleans, afforded such early American men-on-the-make ideal places for self-invention. This frontier is, in fact, a character in the book, and a complex one at that: land was paramount, death relentless, and race permeable. Winch leaves readers with a visceral feel of the streets of St. Louis and the seductive possibilities the town offered, from the shifting imperial claims of the late colonial era to the urban swirl of the late nineteenth century.

Winch brings to life a haunting example of the complexity of American families. The Clamorgan family trees are knotty. Death robbed adults of spouses and children of parents. Men and women betrayed their mates, and some rejected marital monogamy. Parents were occasionally indifferent to and even abandoned their offspring. Thankfully, other relatives stepped into the breach, behaving admirably and selflessly. Jacques's mate Ester stood up to him when he tried to defraud her of her property and then stood in for him when the children he fathered with another woman were orphaned. Members of the Clamorgan clan watched out for younger relatives, loaning one another money for business ventures and giving bequests to needy kinfolk. They also became estranged over property disputes and personal affronts. They were, in sum, an all-American family. Mostly, though, they sued—and happily so for history.

What was most unique about the Clamorgans was not how they shifted racial identities but rather the wealth of evidence they produced in the process. We must not underestimate the resolve and detective skills of Winch, who uncovered this family story by scouring the archives and newspapers, piecing together their heart-

breaks and outrages from court records, and untangling the endless intrigues made possible by (intentionally) byzantine land deeds. She was abetted by the fact that the Clamorgans were such a litigious lot. Much of her evidence comes from decades upon decades of court cases. Some cases involve criminal behavior, but most centered on the vast fortune that Jacques amassed (on paper) in the late eighteenth century and that his heirs coveted and contested for the next hundred years or so. The treasure trove of family materials also included Cyprian's book, *The Colored Aristocracy of St. Louis*, as well as a cache of long-hidden letters found in 2003 by the new owner of an old Clamorgan home.

Having done a prodigious amount of research, Winch seems determined to let the Clamorgan family story unfold on its own terms, absent claims of historiographical meaning and unadorned by historical comparisons—including, most obviously, to the now-famous Heminges of Virginia. The historical context of the Clamorgan story is only sporadically analyzed. Historiography is basically ignored, including in the footnotes; the brief bibliography of secondary sources appears to consist only of works offering specific historical information about the Clamorgans and the places and times they lived. Some readers will find this frustrating, others a missed opportunity, and others still a welcome and daring take on narrative writing—or, as did I, all three. But all should find the Clamorgans a fascinating family and this book a fine recounting of their experiences along the Mississippi River and at the crossroads of race in America.

LORRI GLOVER
Saint Louis University

DAMIAN ALAN PARGAS. *The Quarters and the Fields: Slave Families in the Non-Cotton South*. (New Perspectives on the History of the South.) Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 2010. Pp. xi, 259. \$69.95.

Comparative history presents challenges for the scholar. It is difficult for area specialists not to criticize the coverage given to their bailiwick and easy for them to overlook the new knowledge that the comparisons yield. Damian Alan Pargas, however, is likely to satisfy historians of antebellum northern Virginia, the low-country, and the sugar parishes both with his fine understanding of those discrete labor and production regimes and with the fruit born from his comparisons of these regions. Pargas's criticism of the work to date on slave family life and work experience focuses on the degree to which research has made claims of slave agency based on realities in the cotton South. This book argues for a historiographical "middle ground" because regional variation based on different agricultural staples "was the most important underlying factor in the development of slave family life—not because it dictated the experiences of slave families . . . but because it confronted them with a basic framework of *boundaries and opportunities*" (p. 4).

This conclusion is based on deep research on two

counties and one parish representing the profound variation in the antebellum South. Fairfax County, Virginia, had a shrinking population of slaves during the decades under study and was transitioning away from tobacco production in favor of grains. As a result, Fairfax County provides an example of a slave regime with tighter boundaries in part from greater isolation for the slaves, an inflexible set of expectations for labor and family life, and thus limited opportunities for "family-based internal economies" (pp. 88–89). By contrast, South Carolina's premier rice-growing county, Georgetown, was characterized by a highly developed and mostly stable slave society with dense patterns of slave residence that resulted in higher levels of family cohabitation and a task labor system that left time for internal economic production for the enslaved families. Slaves in St. James Parish, Louisiana, experienced a regime of intense labor but higher levels of family stability and economic prospects than in Virginia. However, the disproportionate number of males meant that many slaves had low prospects for family life.

Pargas's thematic organization considers labor experience, internal slave economies, family formation, stability, and contact during the day. Forced separation is treated in its own chapter, which gives this vital topic its due. Of particular note is the way the decline in a slave society such as that of Fairfax County led to higher rates of forced separation, while stable and dense ones like the lowcountry or growing sections such as St. James reduced the likelihood of family separation. This conclusion emphasizes change over time as a crucial factor in assessing forced separation for any regime or region.

One of the best chapters focuses on the spatial aspects of slaveholding and the variations among the three regimes under discussion. By examining patterns of housing, proximity of plantations, and available travel routes between slave villages, Pargas deepens our understanding of familial relationships and the material realities slaves faced in developing partnerships across plantations and from region to region. In addition, the author takes into account demographic changes over the course of the antebellum period and blends them nicely with anecdotal evidence. In the future, our understanding of spatial considerations could be made more sophisticated if Pargas or other scholars employ geographic information systems to map these regions alongside a cotton district to better account for change over time in housing and working patterns.

As fine as the book under review is, it could have been even better if illustrated with photographs and especially with maps. Maps might have reinforced the different spatial and terrain circumstances between the field and the quarters that existed in the sugar parishes and in northern Virginia. Since space is a genuine area of concern for Pargas, demonstrating the different densities of residence in each of the three regions would reinforce his arguments. Change over time in each region is given some attention, but the nature of the sources, with the exception of census data, makes it difficult to get at this. Finally, in his concluding chapter it

might have been helpful had Pargas taken the full extent of these regimes as a statistical whole and considered them in direct comparison to the entire cotton South. After so much careful work comparing Georgetown County, Fairfax County, and St. James Parish, the reader's understanding and the author's analysis might have benefited from comparing all four agricultural systems over time in the book's summation.

These shortcomings are minor ones and do little to undermine the thrust of this book. Pargas makes a strong case for linking our understanding of slave family life and work to regional agricultural regimes, whether cotton, rice, sugar, tobacco, or grains.

JAMES TUTEN
Juniata College

L. DIANE BARNES, BRIAN SCHOEN, and FRANK TOWERS, editors. *The Old South's Modern Worlds: Slavery, Religion, and Nation in the Age of Progress*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. xv, 331. \$29.95.

What was "Old" about the Old South? Remarkably little is the conclusion one draws after reading this volume of essays on the social and economic history of the antebellum American South. In fact, as editors L. Diane Barnes, Brian Schoen, and Frank Towers make clear, the Old South was not really old at all; rather it was at the van of the market revolution, its cities grew bounteously, its planters and merchants acted rationally, its railroads and manufacturing facilities proliferated, its preachers and politicians laid claim to the language and symbols of modernity, and even enslaved people hoarded cash and personal possessions. Southerners—of all races—appeared to be modern minded and globally interconnected. The region bounded forward in an age of progress, and although slavery lent a peculiar tenor to southern social relations, southern people evinced a willingness to be "up with the times," the editors contend (p. 10).

There were, of course, multiple paths to modernity across the Western world. According to the editors, the South charted its own "modern course," albeit one distinctly shaped by its regional commitment to liberal capitalism and racial slavery (p. 12). Like the antebellum boosters of old who urged slaveholding planters and merchants to invest in rail lines, marketing depots, steam-powered processing machinery, and local manufacturing, the contributors to this collection contend that modernity was as much cultural as economic. To be sure, local conditions shaped the forces of capitalism in diverse ways, but as the authors repeatedly insist, the Old South enjoyed the blessings of progress, it flourished as part of the global economic order and pulsed to the sounds of railroad whistles, cash changing hands, telegraph wires buzzing, and bankers profiting from the fruits of human capital. Replace the modes of communication (exorcize slavery) and it seems rather modern indeed.

The editors challenge Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and

Eugene Genovese's often quoted maxim that the slave South was the "bastard child of merchant capitalism and developed as a non-capitalist society" (p. 7). In a series of conceptually linked essays grouped into five subsections, contributors consider the role of the South in national and global debates on modernity, the place of slavery in a modernizing society, material and commercial progress in the antebellum South, and modern impulses within southern religion, gender relations, and Native American societies. They conclude with a synoptic review of the Old South. The usual benchmarks of nineteenth century modernity—the American North and Great Britain—are replaced in this volume by more modest transnational competitors. In one of the best essays in the collection, Towers suggests that southern cities grew in ways comparable to that of other commercialized slave societies, such as Cuba. Other direct comparisons are employed indicating that southern farmers were embedded in global commodity markets and that Asian and Latin American competition imperiled planters across the region. The editors are not alone among historians in addressing the South's global position. In 1974 Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman argued that had the South been independent in 1860, it would have been the fourth richest country in the world, the sixth largest cotton producer, and had a railroad infrastructure which surpassed Europe's. Although comparative historians have extended this debate still further, comparing the nineteenth-century South with Russia, Italy, and Prussia, this volume does not place the South in a global league table of international competitiveness. Instead, it encourages readers to chart the impact of modernity on southern society, the institution of slavery, and the processes by which modern, commercialized relations shaped local lives.

As the contributors indicate, the forces of modernity impacted practically every antebellum southerner. Peter Onuf and Matthew Mason underscore how southern nationalists argued for the compatibility of slavery with economic and social progress, while Schoen and Steven Deyle contend that planters and slave traders operated as relatively advanced capitalists who embraced innovation and modern business and banking practices. Larry Hudson draws attention to cash accumulation and sophisticated market behavior among slaves. James Huston, Towers, William Thomas, and Barnes all suggest, in various case studies, that the southern economy was evolving and that the future of slavery was by no means doomed in 1861. Middle-class entrepreneurs, these scholars argue, adapted slave labor to industry, they invested in diverse commercial ventures, and articulated an "advanced vision for [their] economic and social future" (p. 175). Charles Irons, Andrew Frank, and Craig Thompson Friend add considerable nuance to the volume by demonstrating how missionaries, Amerindians, and both homosexual and heterosexual men appropriated modern ethical, trade, and gender values to blur distinctions and complicate traditional binaries. In the final section, Marc Egnal provides a defense of

the Genoveses' "non-capitalist" thesis before Edward Ayers and Michael O'Brien contextualize the pace and place of southern modernity.

O'Brien's perceptive conclusion asks whether modern elements were "determinative or marginal" in southern society (p. 306). The collection argues for the former, but on occasion its authors overstretch their thesis. Southern planters were not always "creative risk-takers" (p. 72). In fact, many were risk averse, and they were more often price-takers than price-makers in the market. Nor did they always invest "massive capital" (p. 73) in new technologies such as sugar evaporation pans; some did, ninety-five percent did not (see *Documenting Louisiana Sugar*, www.sussex.ac.uk/louisianasugar). Despite these reservations, historians will find many of these arguments to be familiar. During the 1970s and 1980s, scholars vigorously debated the pre-capitalist nature of the antebellum South. That debate has receded and almost all scholars in the field now agree that slavery was highly adaptable, rational (including risk-averse) business practices prevailed, a bourgeois middle-class flourished, and modern impulses coexisted among premodern non-market relations. That the South exhibited modern tendencies will thus surprise few readers, but the degree to which those values determined social and economic relations remains open to conjecture. Frederick Law Olmsted, one of the most perceptive commentators on the antebellum South, agreed that there was progress in the Old South, but in contrast to the North where "there was a constant electric current of progress," in the South, he observed, "every second man was a non-conductor and broke the chain" (see Olmsted, *A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States* [1856], p. 622). Olmsted was right; to fully grasp the nature of the Old South, historians need to address the "non-conductors" and consider how they influenced and restrained southern modernity. These "non-conductors" are largely absent in the book under review but perhaps most problematic of all, the volume stops short of the Civil War when the South's economy, infrastructure, and population underwent its sternest test. Did southern modernity influence the capacity of the Confederacy to mobilize and equip its armies, and how ready were bourgeois southerners to embrace a modernizing centralized state? Was antebellum modernity, in short, fundamental to the performance of the Confederate states? Without addressing those questions, the contributors to this collection evade the acid test of whether the Old South was really modern after all.

RICHARD FOLLETT
University of Sussex

STEVEN E. WOODWORTH. *This Great Struggle: America's Civil War*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. 2011. Pp. xiii, 407. \$29.95.

Steven E. Woodworth opens this book with a chapter that briskly traces the political divisions over slavery before John Brown's raid on Harpers Ferry and then devotes the remainder of the book—save seven pages on

domestic developments and ten pages on Reconstruction—almost entirely to the war's military and political events. It is a skillfully told tale, brimming with striking prose: P. G. T. Beauregard's grandiose plans before the First Battle of Bull Run were "all moonshine and nonsense" (p. 52); Joseph E. Johnston was "the war's foremost retreator" (p. 110); William T. Sherman was the "war's master of turning movements" (p. 281). Benjamin Grierson's mounted raid had more of an impact on Ulysses S. Grant's Vicksburg operations against John C. Pemberton than did George Stoneman's comparable cavalry sortie on Joseph Hooker's Chancellorsville campaign against Robert E. Lee, explains Woodworth, because "Stoneman was not Grierson, Lee was not Pemberton, and, most of all, Hooker was not Grant" (p. 203). Woodworth also has a storyteller's gift for the interesting anecdote; this reviewer, for example, did not know that Albert Sidney Johnston, mortally wounded at Shiloh, had in his pocket the very tourniquet that could have saved his life.

Not surprisingly, given the focus of his previous scholarship, Woodworth insists that both sides devoted too much attention to affairs in Virginia. He pulls few punches when assessing military generalship, evidencing no sympathy for recent efforts to restore the reputation of George McClellan. Woodworth gives higher marks to Braxton Bragg, blaming the disappointments in the invasion of Kentucky, at Stones River, before Chickamauga, and at Chattanooga on the self-serving, conniving failures of his subordinates. In Woodworth's reckoning, Grant towered above all others, demonstrating an unusual grasp for the relationship between military and political events, overseeing an "operational masterpiece" (p. 200) at Vicksburg and grinding down Lee's Army of Northern Virginia in 1864–1865. Acknowledging that Grant could make mistakes, he attributes those errors to Grant's insistence on focusing on what he was doing, rather than worrying about the actions of his foes. "As long as he kept the momentum he was by far the most dangerous general of the war," writes Woodworth, "but when something happened to halt his momentum, whether enemy action or the orders of a superior, he became vulnerable" (p. 87).

In his forays into political matters, Woodworth takes great pains to destroy old shibboleths regarding slavery and states' rights. Consistent with the present scholarly consensus, he insists that slavery caused the war. He repeatedly points out inconsistencies in postwar southern assertions about the importance of states' rights, effectively noting the ironies of the South's determination to have a strong federal Fugitive Slave Act and willingness to use the central government to enact wartime conscription. Dismissing revisionist notions arguing that Abraham Lincoln was too slow to abolish slavery, he contends that the president "was . . . deeply committed to ending slavery as soon as he could do so in a way that would have a chance of surviving both politically and militarily" (p. 137). In so doing, he emphasizes Lincoln's fear that Roger B. Taney, the con-

servative chief justice, would overturn any premature federal action.

Woodworth has earned the right to write the book he wants to, and to deal with the subject matter he prefers to. Even so, this reviewer would have welcomed his greater engagement with recent scholarship. The text largely ignores, for example, any systematic examination of the reasons why Civil War soldiers fought, an issue which would seem to have been particularly relevant to the book's military/political bent. Discussions of the war's impact on American notions of the role of the federal government and on our collective historical memory are likewise absent. Woodworth's brief handling of the roles of women in the war harkens back several decades; while correctly pointing out that the overwhelming majority of women during the period considered soldiering to be "man's work" (p. 135), his failure to even mention debates regarding the expansion of their public roles seems striking, especially given his assertion that, in the twentieth century, "a constitutional right to privacy was to become a code word for abortion rights," just as "a constitutional right to property had in the mid-nineteenth century become a shibboleth for the defense of slavery" (p. 136).

In sum, those seeking a well-written, forcefully argued, traditional overview of military and political issues will find Woodworth's book a welcome addition to the literature. Those hoping for exposure to broader themes and the incorporation of more recent scholarship should look elsewhere.

ROBERT WOOSTER

Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi

FRANCES M. CLARKE. *War Stories: Suffering and Sacrifice in the Civil War North*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 251. \$35.00.

For more than a century, Americans have consumed realistic and bittersweet (often simply bitter) accounts of war and the effects of war. This has left many readers, including historians, unable to stomach, much less understand, the moralistic and overtly triumphal fiction and non-fiction produced during the American Civil War. In her excellent book, Frances M. Clarke offers a nuanced and moving interpretation of these sincere efforts to make sense of the carnage, sacrifice, and disappointment of war. Rather than seeing them as "mere curiosities" reflecting their "Victorian origins" (p. 3), Clarke argues that Civil War stories showed not only how northerners justified the unprecedented blood and treasure expended to preserve the Union, but also how they articulated the values that sustained them via stories of suffering and perseverance by soldiers and civilians.

But not all suffering meant the same thing, and not all sufferers were equally noble. Indeed, members of the lower classes and African Americans were largely absent from the stories Clarke analyzes. The hardships they endured elicited pity more than admiration and, as a result, were thematically useless to middle-class au-

thors and readers. And while acknowledging that Confederates also suffered, northerners believed southern society was too corrupted by slavery for its suffering to have any redemptive value.

The book's chapters work outward from the ways in which individuals took meaning from sacrifice to the methods by which Americans sought to demonstrate to the world how their sacrifices represented the best in republican virtues. Clarke shows how the notion of "idealized suffering" (p. 25) developed by antebellum reform movements and evangelical Christianity played out in several different contexts: the service and death of a single middle-class officer, as preserved in the voluminous scrapbooks compiled by his father; the shared assumptions of wounded soldiers and medical workers that pain and death were meaningful when sustained in the service of a victorious Union; the insistence by civilian volunteers that their individual and communal efforts to aid soldiers contained a moral component; the North's vigilance in confronting European—especially British—contempt by showing that the Union's reliance on sometimes amateurish and innocent volunteers represented the strengths of American democracy rather than its weaknesses; and the ways in which Yankee amputees attempted to exert their masculinity and self-reliance in the years immediately following the war. Clarke's epilogue briefly but movingly follows these themes into the Gilded Age, when several cultural trends—veterans' growing emphasis on their unique experiences, the wretched state of race relations, and the rise of social Darwinism—would make "many of the assumptions that underpinned . . . tales of suffering and benevolence" (p. 176) seem rather antique and render their optimism rather naïve. During the latter part of the century, as industrialization, sectional reconciliation, and gender and class conflict came to dominate society, "tales of exemplary Union sufferers, selfless volunteers, and unprecedented benevolence would be few and far between" (p. 177).

These brief descriptions inadequately describe the book's finely reasoned, truly useful arguments. Clarke takes the popular culture of the Civil War North at face value, although that does not mean she accepts it uncritically. She effectively acknowledges the vast literature on civilian mobilization, soldiers' lives, memory, and other crucial components of the era's historiography, challenging, among others, George M. Fredrickson's interpretation of the Sanitary Commission as a harbinger of industrial-era bureaucracy.

It would have been instructive for Clarke to have investigated a little further how these same attitudes played out in the Confederacy. Many of the ideas that formed the basis for responses to suffering were American values, rather than merely New England values. That said, expanding the book's scope to include Confederate notions of sacrifice might have disrupted the tight focus of her argument, not to mention the symmetry of the evidence. Slavery did, of course, cast a long shadow over virtually every intellectual and social facet of the South, and the vast outpouring of war-time lit-

erary examinations of sacrifice that appeared in the North were less present in the resource-strapped Confederacy. A possible entry point for Confederate sacrifice might have been the epilogue; even as northerners began to reject the seemingly simplistic patriotism of the war stories that had so moved them in the 1860s, southerners made their versions a key component of the Lost Cause.

This is a tightly argued, superbly written, and convincing interpretation of an often overlooked slice of American culture. It really is a model for grappling with the issues raised by the cultural manifestations of war in any era. As such, it is a worthy partner to Drew Gilpin Faust's *This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War* (2008), another book that looks at the meaning of the great cataclysm of the Civil War in original and intimate ways.

JAMES MARTEN
Marquette University

JAMES MARTEN. *Sing Not War: The Lives of Union and Confederate Veterans in Gilded Age America*. (Civil War America.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 339. \$39.95.

In this study of America's Civil War veterans in the Gilded Age, James Marten seeks answers to the questions "How did veterans live, and how were they seen to live?" (p. 5). The result is a sensitive, judicious, and thought-provoking book. Marten focuses on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but his conclusions raise further questions and invite comparisons to the experiences of veterans and their fellow Americans' attitudes toward them in other generations.

Marten entitles his chapter headings with phrases from Walt Whitman's 1867 poem "A Carol of Harvest," later republished as "The Return of the Heroes," a poignant treatment of the return of soldiers to their homes and their struggles in readjusting to postwar life. The chapters cover demobilization and homecoming; veterans' disabilities and the varying responses of civilians to them; the commodification of the war and of veterans' memories; "soldiers' homes" built with public funds for disabled or poor veterans; pensions and "veterans' preference" for government jobs; and finally veterans' self-identities as distinct and forever set apart from non-veterans who could never fully understand their experiences and perceptions. In each section, he describes a variety of white veterans' experiences and, even more fully, the profound ambivalence of other citizens toward the veterans themselves. In the chapter on soldiers' homes, for example, the public was torn between sympathy for the men in them and disgust for those who drank heavily and committed petty crimes. Moreover, by settling in their homes, veterans sacrificed most of their independence, "manhood," and status in a Gilded Age society that valued vigor, self-reliance, and prosperity. And while a large majority of the public and Congress often agreed that the disabled and impoverished saviors of the Union deserved pensions,

at other times civilians opposed these “handouts” and resented veterans for demanding or even applying for them. Civilians were also torn between sympathy and disgust for men who suffered from what was becoming recognized as “alcoholism,” and were just beginning to understand the symptoms of what would later be called “shell shock” or “post-traumatic stress.”

Marten admits that his study is neither comprehensive nor fully representative. First, he believes that most Civil War veterans adjusted better to postbellum life than those who receive the bulk of the coverage in his book. He helpfully suggests, however, that the experiences and struggles of the latter were almost certainly relevant to a lesser degree for those who seemed to have adjusted comparatively well. And he convincingly argues that, as in the Vietnam era, the struggles of those who were most physically or emotionally scarred profoundly affected how other citizens came to view veterans as a whole. Second, Marten’s text does not study the experiences of black Civil War veterans, and he explains that attempting to do so would add several layers of analysis and make his study unwieldy—thus pointing to another fruitful area of research.

Finally, as Marten concedes, the narrative is heavily weighted toward the experiences of northern veterans. Still, he is able to remind readers that ex-Confederates’ postwar lives were different in several ways. Southern veterans received even more respect and sympathy from fellow southerners than Union soldiers enjoyed in the North, and almost none of the suspicion and disdain. When they received government support they received far less, partially explaining why there was virtually no opposition to state pensions or soldiers’ homes in the southern states. At the same time, their efforts to prosper or even survive in the postbellum southern economy were even grimmer than those of northern veterans. And partly because they became ossified in marble in southern culture, the gap between them and their fellow citizens was just as wide as it was in the North. Veterans in both sections were anxious about their reputations and zealous to preserve their manhood and independent status. For ex-Confederates, however, their determination to do so was exacerbated by the humiliation of defeat, the region’s economic struggles, and the challenges that emancipation and Reconstruction offered to white supremacy.

This study is informed by wide-ranging primary research. Marten also benefits greatly from previous studies on postwar reconciliation, commemoration, and popular memory; Gilded Age culture; Civil War pensions and veterans’ homes; and veterans’ experiences, and he often quotes from them. However, he does not blindly follow the lead of other historians as much as he stands on their shoulders. The final virtue of this book lies in its tone and in Marten’s sensitivity. He is neither overly sentimental and fawning nor condescending in his treatment of Civil War veterans. He is clear-eyed about their struggles, successes, and faults, and fully in touch with their humanity. Thus, while Marten recognizes the chasm between veterans and civilians of their

own day, he succeeds admirably in bridging the gap between “the old soldiers” and modern readers.

ROD ANDREW JR.
Clemson University

SUSAN J. PEARSON. *The Rights of the Defenseless: Protecting Animals and Children in Gilded Age America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2011. Pp. ix, 260. \$45.00.

Scholars seeking to explain why the only late nineteenth-century organization prepared to act to protect children was the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) have been satisfied to point to humanitarianism. In this insightful, illuminating book, Susan J. Pearson probes that explanation in a lucid intellectual and cultural history of the connection between animal and child protection that explores both its rhetorical and institutional dimensions. In doing so, she resituates Gilded Age reform movements, too often lost between the fervor of activity in the antebellum and Progressive eras, as the beginning of the “long Progressive Era,” a moment of key transformations that combined sentimental and liberal language, merged older status-based views of hierarchy and dependence with a newer language of rights, and intertwined private and public power.

Pearson shows how the persistence of sentimentalism as a culturally salient and politically important force in postbellum American life lay at the heart of the vision that shaped humane societies concerned to protect both animals and children. Through this lens, animals and children appeared as similar beings, both speechless and helpless, unable to act on their own behalf, and innocent and pure. Crucially, both were capable of forming intense emotional bonds and reciprocal relations, including with each other. These close cultural associations saw animals incorporated into the emotional order of domesticity, as pets whose care aided the development of children and helped provide the “affective glue” that constituted the family. The same disciplinary regime of kindness applied to animals and children, with the character of both vulnerable to being ruined through cruelty and redeemed through kindness. While Pearson extends her analysis of the sentimental strain of humane reform in a discussion of how the similar spirit of the violence toward animals and children—the “slippery slope of passionate violence” that constituted cruelty—linked their protection, it is her deft analysis of the rise of pet keeping and location of animals at the heart of the family that is the transformative insight, one that highlights that the child-centered family channeled both sentimentalism and liberalism, and one that opens the way to recognition of how reformers merged those two apparently opposed visions and extended rights discourse.

The defenselessness of animals and children provided an obstacle to granting them rights, implying dependence at odds with the independence required of classical liberalism’s rights-bearing individual. To rec-

oncile that opposition, humane reformers articulated what Pearson labels sentimental liberalism, arguing that rights could rest on capacities such as feeling and sentience and thus be extended to the weak, dependent, and helpless. In making this argument, they not only participated in the debate about rights provoked by the end of slavery; they also imported the rhetoric and cultural symbols of abolitionists. Claims for rights centered on proving that animals felt pain and had the capacity for domestic affections, both among themselves and with humans. Humane reformers also traded on the success of first person narratives and literary representations of slavery, searching for their movement's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, a text that would draw readers into imagining themselves in the position of animals. 1890 finally saw the discovery of such a text, Anna Sewell's novel *Black Beauty*. If the novel contributed to convincing Americans that animals suffered, granting them a sentience that brought them into the circle of rights-bearing beings, Pearson notes that the focus on suffering had the drawback of reinforcing difference and dependence and precluding recognition of equality, granting rights without equality and consonant with protection. Crucially, that vision was not anachronistic, but reflected a complex world in which it was increasingly unclear how much control individuals could exercise over their own lives.

Anti-cruelty workers stood not just at a moment of transformation in liberalism, but also at a crossroads in transformations of governance. They formed hybrid organizations that pursued law enforcement, going beyond the charity tradition to create an active masculinized form of the humanitarian that saw private charities endowed with public police powers. Pearson's exploration of these changes echoes the terms of recent literature, with her real contribution being to illuminate the transitional nature of this moment: while using law, humane reformers retained many of the assumptions and much of the language of earlier activists, relying heavily on moral suasion and faith in the ameliorative effects of education and exposure to suffering. They saw law as transformative, not just punitive, and they used law enforcement to initiate a range of interventions that fell short of prosecution. Such nuanced analysis is the hallmark of this compelling book; much more than a case study of humane reform, it should be required reading for anyone seeking to understand the humanitarian sensibility and the trajectory of reform responses in modern America.

STEPHEN ROBERTSON
University of Sydney

DAVID G. SCHUSTER. *Neurasthenic Nation: America's Search for Health, Happiness, and Comfort, 1869–1920*. (Critical Issues in Health and Medicine.) New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 203. \$42.95.

Although scholarship on neurasthenia is not new, this fascinating study utilizes the diagnosis to delve into the

cultural effects of rapid “modernization” in the United States: capitalism, industrialization, and urbanization in the fifty plus years following the American Civil War. Within diverse geographies, David G. Schuster links a range of cultural production to medical definitions of nervous illness, charting changing understandings of subjectivity, the emotions, the self, alterations in definitions of masculine/feminine, conceptions of the relationship of mind and body, and turns toward spirituality and more healthful lifestyles. He explores how practitioners, from physicians to lay healers, commercializing patent medicine pushers (the predecessors of several contemporary drug companies), religiously oriented groups emerging from the “New Thought” movement, and even organizations such as the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), with its commitment to “muscular Christianity,” attempted to help people cope with this protean “dis-ease.”

Physical debility and mental anguish were not new to the nineteenth century, but the author assumes that in the past people stoically accepted such experiences as part of daily life. In contrast, an industrializing economy with new cultural entailments held out different possibilities: a transportation revolution, technological advances which increased production in agriculture and manufacturing, expectations of a steady rise in the standard of living, and the spread of education to a self-defining middle class with coherent and recognizable aspirations to social mobility, culture, and comfort. Accompanying these changes was the rise of a self-defining, increasingly hegemonic, “scientific” medical profession promoting novel psychiatric and physiological approaches to the cure of illness.

Schuster argues that the neurasthenia diagnosis thrived on the false promises of the booming economy's material progress, generating rising expectations that American lives would be filled with “happiness, peace and stability.” Faith in the market and the belief “that good health could be attained through therapeutic activities and purchases” fueled a growing intolerance of “unhappiness and discomfort” (p. 6). When anxiety, debility, exhaustion, and depression emerged as unexpected byproducts of rapid change, professionalizing physicians moving toward specialization and standardization were quick to respond by legitimating neurasthenia as an *illness* in need of medical treatment.

Then, as now, physicians diagnose but cannot always cure. What interests Schuster more than therapeutic outcomes are the ways neurasthenia shaped aspects of nineteenth and early twentieth-century American society and culture. He unearths a range of default assumptions linked to the disease's delineation. For example, Americans took pride in the class and nationalist entailments of the illness, which author George Miller Beard emphasized in his famous study, *American Nervousness: Its Causes and Consequences* (1881). An avid enthusiast of scientific research and an enemy of spiritualism, Beard's description of neurasthenia was not only racist but underscored American exceptionalism by arguing that U.S. society, unique in

history, was the most “modern” on earth. Unfortunately, he asserted, American citizens who lived their lives as active, competitive, politically aware *brain-workers* were the most susceptible to the disease.

As physicians rose to the occasion to make sense of these new and unsettling experiences of mind and body, even they were divided among alienists, psychiatrists, neurologists, and general practitioners. They never gained complete control of treatment. Several groups and lay individuals interested in the disease published popular books, while beginning in the 1870s and accelerating thereafter, the information on neurasthenia became widely available to the public, training people in self-diagnosis.

By the 1880s, journalists and writers took up the subject, and neurasthenia found its place in popular culture and literature: patent medicine companies hawked “restorative medicines” and electric belts, while sports camps and vacation sites for adults advocated various forms of exercise and “lifestyle” changes. The advertising industry also took up neurasthenia. Individuals suffering from the disease were crucial to founding three different religious/spiritual groups: New Thought, Christian Science, and the Emmanuel Movement. The YMCA also responded, adding swimming pools and sports activities to its offerings, preaching healthy minds in healthy bodies. In the decades after 1900, various prescriptions for physical exercise eventually made their way into school curricula. Reverence for the myth of the frontier along with the handicraft, physical culture, and health resort movements were all partial responses to a quest for solutions to American nervousness.

Men and women suffered equally from the disease. A wonderful chapter on gender and health documents the subjective illness accounts of several articulate and introspective individuals, both male and female. These authoritative insights into their own subjectivity found in diaries and correspondence with physicians reveal much about how much damage the rigidity of prescribed gender roles wrought among certain individuals. Many sought tools to push back against the conventional notions of masculinity and femininity that hampered their full self-realization.

By the 1920s, the neurasthenia diagnosis was in decline; psychiatrists replaced it with a new umbrella term, “anxiety neurosis.” By the 1950s, popular parlance preferred “nervous breakdown.” But although the term disappeared, “dis-ease” still haunts us. Chronic fatigue syndrome, bipolar disorder, fibromyalgia, post-traumatic stress, irritable bowel syndrome, and other depressive disorders are our contemporary equivalents. Drug companies still advertise directly to consumers, urging self-diagnosis and treatment. Meanwhile, social and economic changes—increased work hours for less pay, speedups inherent in the contemporary technological innovations of free market capitalism, and myriad forms of self-exploitation—remain unanalyzed. These latter issues are addressed only by an insightful few, while more than a century after neur-

asthenia’s heyday, capitalism’s tail still wags society’s dog.

REGINA MORANTZ-SANCHEZ
University of Michigan

LINDA V. CARLISLE. *Elizabeth Packard: A Noble Fight*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2010. Pp. xii, 259. \$40.00.

In 1860, Theophilus Packard committed his protesting wife Elizabeth to the Illinois State Hospital for the Insane in Jacksonville under the supervision of pioneering American psychiatrist Andrew McFarland. As Linda V. Carlisle notes in this book, “McFarland was about to learn what Theophilus Packard knew: Elizabeth Packard could be a troublesome woman” (p. 78). Carlisle’s biography of this “troublesome woman” provides a comprehensive study of Elizabeth’s life and her almost thirty years of work lobbying state legislatures to enact laws to protect the civil rights of the mentally ill and married women. Although Carlisle observes that Packard might be perceived as the antithesis of her contemporary, the better-known Dorothea Dix, her study suggests that Packard’s quest to protect the civil liberties of the insane derived from similar motives—to protect some of the most vulnerable in American society.

Although little known today, Elizabeth became a public figure in the 1860s after she emerged from the asylum and helped bring about the passage of Illinois’s “Packard’s Law,” which provided individuals the right to avoid commitment to an insane asylum by having a jury trial to determine their sanity. In describing how Packard became a champion for the civil rights of the mentally ill, Carlisle sets her life within the context of pre-Civil War America. At this time, the author suggests, “ideas about gender, religion, and insanity were fluid” (p. 15). In this context, Carlisle argues that Packard became a “transitional woman” (p. 5) whose actions, behaviors, and beliefs troubled notions of women’s place in society and contested orthodox religious and psychiatric practices.

Drawing on a variety of sources including Elizabeth’s books and letters, Theophilus’s diary and letters, as well as Dr. McFarland’s correspondence and reports, Carlisle tracks Packard’s life from her marriage to an older Calvinist minister, migration from Massachusetts to Ohio, then Iowa, and finally Illinois, and the birth of her children. Although in many ways a conventional spouse, Elizabeth believed in Swedenborgianism and spiritualism to the great distress of her husband. She also associated with abolitionists and women’s rights advocates in New York’s burned over district during a visit there. Fearing that his wife’s beliefs and behavior threatened their children, Theophilus committed his wife to an asylum.

Carlisle is most successful when she details Elizabeth’s life, particularly her commitment and the sensational trial to determine her sanity held after she was released from the state hospital. After the trial, she campaigned for changes in insanity laws and laws re-

lated to married women across Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, New York, and Maine. To support herself and her lobbying efforts, Packard wrote numerous books and pamphlets, including *The Prisoner's Hidden Life, or Insane Asylums Unveiled* (1868), in which she described her experiences in the Illinois State Hospital for the Insane using the language and imagery of Gothic horror and romance. Packard's writing earned enough to purchase multiple homes and support her family and her estranged spouse. Moreover, her relentless efforts to change civil commitment laws produced a number of victories as states began to require more protections for those deemed mentally ill.

While describing Packard's travails, Carlisle also introduces the reader to the practice of nineteenth-century psychiatry as she describes the growth in insane asylums and the creation of professional organizations such as the Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane. Using the story of Dr. McFarland, Carlisle shows how early practitioners of psychiatry in America worked to establish the credibility and authority of their profession.

However, Carlisle's analysis of Packard's battle to reform the law of insanity is weakest when the author relies on notions of separate spheres. While Packard herself may have drawn on the ideology of separate spheres to explain her life and struggles, this well-documented study would benefit from a more critical approach to the concept and perhaps a deeper engagement with current theoretical constructs in American women's history. Aside from these quibbles, readers will learn a great deal about Elizabeth Packard's efforts to change the laws related to sanity in the nineteenth century and why they mattered.

ELIZABETH M. SMITH-PRYOR
Kent State University

WILLIAM SERAILE. *Angels of Mercy: White Women and the History of New York's Colored Orphan Asylum*. New York: Fordham University Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 287. \$27.95.

New York City's Association for the Benefit of Colored Orphans, more commonly known as the Colored Orphan Asylum (COA), was the first orphanage in the United States dedicated to the care of African American children. In this book William Seraile carefully traces the evolution of the COA for over a century, from its founding in the antebellum era to the closure of the orphanage in Riverdale (the Bronx) in the mid-twentieth century. Relying primarily on COA annual reports and meeting minutes, Seraile sets out to demonstrate how the COA's goals, ideology, and relationship with New York City's black community changed over time.

Founded in 1836 by two Quaker women, Anna Shotwell and Mary Murray, the COA was originally located in Manhattan. Just two years earlier in 1834, a bloody anti-abolition riot had rocked the city, demonstrating the contempt that many whites felt toward blacks. Vi-

cious mobs specifically targeted black homes and churches during the melee. Within this racial climate, a group of white women decided to establish the COA to provide medical care, schooling, and racial uplift to impoverished and orphaned black children.

Like many white activists during the antebellum era, the managers of the COA routinely patronized black clients, claiming that it was the responsibility of the COA to rescue them from lives of primitive culture, vice, and immorality. This dismissive view of African Americans also spurred the managers to rely on an indenture system that placed older children in low-paying domestic jobs as servants and laborers. In spite of this paternalistic attitude, the views of the founders were complex. As Seraile documents, the majority of the founding women came from Quaker families in Manhattan. Many of them embraced abolitionism and viewed their work with the COA as an extension of their activities in assisting the African American community. Moreover, these women routinely admitted the children of fugitive slaves. In spite of this support for abolition, the female founders adopted an apolitical public stance in their views of slavery. Seraile suggests that the women hid their political views because they feared offending potential donors during their near constant fundraising campaigns.

Seraile traces the various relocations of the COA, from its first building in Greenwich Village to its final location in the Bronx. Due to the rapid growth of the orphanage in its early years, the founders raised funds to construct a new building on Fifth Avenue between 43rd Street and 44th Street in 1843. During the New York City Draft Riots in 1863, however, mobs attacked the building and set it on fire after looting it. The female managers were able to evacuate all of the 200 children. Following the riot, the orphanage was temporarily housed on Blackwell Island until it relocated to a new building in Harlem. By 1883, over 300 children resided in the Harlem house, which remained the only orphanage dedicated to the care of black children in the city. COA managers embraced an industrial education program in which children received training for domestic jobs. At the turn of the century, the orphanage moved to a larger facility in the Bronx. At this Riverdale location, the COA adopted a cottage system in which children of different ages lived together in relatively small groups with "cottage parents" on the property.

Another change that occurred in the early twentieth century was that white managers of the COA began to make a concerted effort to include African Americans in leadership positions. In 1939, the COA finally named an African American woman to the board of trustees. In 1942, New York City passed an anti-discrimination law that required all city agencies to aid residents regardless of race. As a result, the orphanage began accepting white children and changed its name to the Riverdale Children's Association. At that same time, the orphanage began to place children in foster homes rather than housing them at the Riverdale location, which ultimately led to its closing.

Seraile situates his analysis within the historiography of nineteenth-century female activists and most notably relates his work to Anne M. Boylan's *The Origins of Women's Activism: New York and Boston, 1797–1840* (2002). In particular, he emphasizes the accomplishments as well as the shortcomings of the founding women of the COA. Seraile illustrates how white women in benevolent societies drew upon their domestic experiences to take responsibility for the welfare of black children. At the same time, however, he is also quite blunt in his criticism of how white women at the COA adopted policies that reinforced the social and economic inequality facing black New Yorkers.

Seraile's book is a valuable contribution to the history of New York City and to studies of women reformers.

JANE E. DABEL
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DAVID A. ZONDERMAN. *Uneasy Allies: Working for Labor Reform in Nineteenth-Century Boston*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 312. \$28.95.

David A. Zonderman has written a rich case study on an underexplored topic—nineteenth-century labor reform in Boston—by investigating the alliances between working- and middle-class reformers. Given the many challenges in organizing, particularly across class divides, the effort is worthwhile. Zonderman's thesis is stated in his book's title: namely, it was quite challenging for working- and middle-class Bostonians who supported labor reform to come together. Arguably, it was even harder to achieve results, but the author spends less time focusing on reformers' limited successes than he does on their motivations and ideologies. The book shows how a dozen reform organizations originated, grew, and collapsed over the course of the 1800s. Thus, his monograph is a history neither of Boston's nineteenth-century working class nor of organized labor in that time and place; rather, it studies labor reform campaigns. Zonderman chose Boston because it was a "vibrant center for labor reform organizations throughout the nineteenth century" (p. 6). He makes a convincing argument that it was as typical as any large industrial city in the era; alas, he makes few overt connections to other cities, either in the text or notes, which would have enriched the book.

The text is divided into two sections: from the 1830s through the 1870s, and the final decades of the century. Of course, labor reform was among many movements that arose in the 1830s (although Zonderman does not make that point), some of which gained momentum in the mid-century; Boston's labor reformers viewed their efforts as the first step in a broader attempt to overhaul American society. After the Civil War, the eight-hour movement dominated the agenda, with numerous groups supporting this cause. Finally, at the century's end, new middle- and upper-class organizations appeared, part of the emerging Progressive movement,

that were far less willing to engage working-class Bostonians as equals. Zonderman persuasively demonstrates that these new associations "saw workers more as objects of reform than as partners in the cause of social justice" (p. 240). This strategic shift to top-down was, at least partially, due to the changing composition of Boston's working class, increasingly Catholics and Jews from Southern and Eastern Europe. The book ends around 1900, essentially with the demise of cross-class labor alliances, although they soon refreshed themselves in groups like the Women's Trade Union League.

In the introduction, Zonderman does a good job laying out his main arguments and interest in the intellectual history of labor reform activists and their organizations. However, the reader can get lost when learning about numerous short-lived organizations that promoted the eight- or ten-hour day, tenement labor regulation, labor unions, and the like. After a while, the chapters seem to run together because the issues and battles seem to repeat themselves. Since Zonderman's gaze is tightly focused, even related matters in Boston receive little attention. The reader does not learn about anarchist or other radical groups whose members were not "reformers." Zonderman does spend time discussing the intellectual origins and ideas of Christian Socialism in Boston, yet he barely mentions Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward* or the nationalist movement. While there is value in documenting the efforts of cross-class labor reformers at a level of detail that no one has attempted before, it would have been even better if the author had made more connections to similar individuals, groups, and battles in Boston and nationwide. For instance, Zonderman discusses the role of the Knights of Labor in Boston in approximately three pages. Similarly, he devotes just a few pages to the Gilded Age's best-known labor-related events, like the 1877 Great Uprising or eight-hour strikes of 1886. Zonderman's primary research is quite rich, but the book would be stronger if it was better connected and contextualized to related matters in Boston and beyond.

If someone is looking for a history of nineteenth-century Boston's working class and union history, Zonderman's text will provide helpful insights, although it is no survey of these topics. This book is also useful for social movement activists today—regardless of their focus—in terms of forming alliances with people of different class backgrounds.

PETER COLE
Western Illinois University

MARIA I. DIEDRICH. *Cornelia James Cannon and the Future American Race*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 2010. Pp. xii, 267. Cloth \$80.00, paper \$28.95.

Cornelia James Cannon (1876–1969) was a popular essayist, outspoken feminist, and Progressive reformer obsessed with the need to preserve the white race in America. She used her prolific pen in the 1920s and

1930s to clamor in popular magazines for immigration restriction, birth control, and sterilization of the unfit. Maria I. Diedrich has produced a beautifully written and wonderfully insightful biography of Cannon that skillfully situates her as a representative of that pioneering generation of white, middle-class, female reformers during the Progressive era.

The book is organized into ten chronological chapters. The first two describe Cannon's childhood in Minnesota and then her remarkably shallow education as a member of Radcliffe's class of 1899, where she was taught by condescending professors such as William James and eugenicist Charles Benedict Davenport and her classmates included Gertrude Stein (who would become her life-long nemesis). Cannon would always be a devoted supporter of Radcliffe, which in 1965 bestowed on her the "Founder Award."

Chapter three shows how Cornelia James began her career as a reformer by doing volunteer social work in the slums of Boston. She married renowned physiologist Walter B. Cannon, and the couple performed their duty to the race by producing five children (one of whom grew up to marry Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.) while maintaining friendships with such eugenicists as Robert M. Yerkes, Edward M. East, and Robert De Courcey Ward.

Chapter four shows how World War I, during which Walter Cannon served in Europe, liberated Cornelia by forcing her to make decisions independently of her spouse. She became involved in the women's suffrage movement and the effort to stamp out venereal disease. Chapter five depicts the newly empowered Cannon agitating after the war for immigration restriction and birth control as a form of negative eugenics. After the 1929 Crash, Cannon—like most eugenicists—blamed the Great Depression on biological exhaustion and opposed the "dysgenic" reforms of the New Deal that allowed the poor to survive and propagate their inferior kind.

In chapters six through nine Diedrich provides a detailed analysis of Cannon's sentimental, propagandistic, and rather mediocre novels (the most successful of which, *Red Rust*, made it onto the bestseller lists in 1928). Cannon wrote these reductively biologicistic and didactic works in order to disseminate her eugenic discourse of racial xenophobia.

The final chapter briefly covers the last thirty years of Cannon's life, when the former supporter of coercive sterilization for the unfit transformed herself after World War II into a staunch advocate of family planning in the Third World. This was a pattern typical of many eugenicists. Interestingly, in the 1950s Cannon opposed McCarthyism and guardedly supported the socialist experiment in the USSR. She died in 1969 at the age of ninety-three.

As Diedrich relates the events of Cannon's life, two pervasive (and convincing) themes continually reoccur: first, that race—"the ultimate definer and corruptor" (p. 8)—is the key to understanding the American experience; and second, that Cannon, and all of the other

members of her social world, were thoroughly unaware of how white privilege and male privilege continually prescribed their attitudes and behavior.

I am struck by the similarities between Cannon and Madison Grant (the subject of my book, *Defending the Master Race: Conservation, Eugenics, and the Legacy of Madison Grant* [2008]). Both Cannon and Grant were progressive conservatives who initiated reform in order to preserve the status of their race and class. Both evinced an all-pervasive anxiety that the white race was being submerged due to the deluge of immigrants and the tragedy of race suicide. But both possessed an almost religious faith that science would ensure the success of their reformist agenda via the massive biological engineering project known as eugenics. The main differences between the two were gender and the fact that Cannon produced volumes of letters and memoirs.

Maria Diedrich does a masterful job of providing an empathetic portrait of Cannon. We feel that we understand this ambitious, vivacious, and witty woman, even as we decry her biologicistic monocausalism. Furthermore, Diedrich perfectly balances the story of the individual with the history of her time, class, and gender. This thoughtful and perceptive book should be read by anyone interested in feminism, Progressivism, racism, eugenics, or the art of biography.

JONATHAN PETER SPIRO
Castleton State College

JENNIFER M. ROSS-NAZZAL. *Winning the West for Women: The Life of Suffragist Emma Smith DeVoe*. Seattle: University of Washington Press. 2011. Pp. xv, 256. \$26.95.

In this book, Jennifer M. Ross-Nazzal explores the life of one of the least well-known but most important leaders in the American equal suffrage movement. Not as prominent as Susan B. Anthony, Carrie Chapman Catt, or Alice Paul, Emma Smith DeVoe waged a four-decade battle to obtain the ballot for American women. Ross-Nazzal traces DeVoe's organizing efforts in several midwestern and western states ranging from Illinois and Iowa to Idaho and Washington. The author begins with DeVoe's early years in the Dakota territory promoting temperance reform. Her experience with the Woman's Christian Temperance Union both introduced her to the world of politics and steered her into her first equal suffrage campaign. Ross-Nazzal argues that DeVoe's experience in the South Dakota suffrage campaign helped convince her of the best tactics and strategies suffragists should employ. Femininity and a less confrontational style, DeVoe concluded, would be a more effective strategy to convince male voters to grant women the ballot.

Despite the failure of the South Dakota campaign, DeVoe's efforts captured the attention of national voting rights leaders, who hired her as lecturer and organizer for several state suffrage drives. Gaining national prominence meant that DeVoe crossed paths with numerous regional and national reformers. The author

provides wonderful insights into the personal and ideological conflicts that characterized the national movement. Catt and other leading members of the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), for example, butted heads with DeVoe and western suffragists over tactics and the different political culture of western communities. DeVoe criticized organizers who insisted on imposing a national strategy on western state campaigns, which, more often than not, alienated important local coordinators who supported the cause.

By the early twentieth century, Emma and her husband had moved to Washington, where she managed that state's successful 1910 campaign, spawning similar triumphs in other western states over the next few years. However, the Washington battle also involved one of the low points in DeVoe's life. In 1909 she hosted the NAWSA convention at the Seattle Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition, where a public confrontation with a competing state suffrage leader ended with DeVoe's dismissal by NAWSA officials. Following the Washington victory, DeVoe formed a new organization, the National Council of Woman Voters, which advocated for a national constitutional amendment. This led, the author argues, to DeVoe's brief alliance with Alice Paul's more radical Congressional Union. DeVoe's presence softened the image of that national organization, though Paul's continuing militancy soon made it impossible to maintain their tenuous relationship. Chalking up victories in more and more western states, the author suggests, also influenced the national debate over equal suffrage. Female voters in western locales both undermined the tired arguments espoused by anti-suffragists and also pressured their states' congressmen, who could no longer ignore newly enfranchised women.

One important contribution of Ross-Nazzari's study is that she examines the life of a leading suffragist after winning the vote. In the 1920s, DeVoe relinquished the non-partisan style she had promoted in suffrage campaigns and became involved in partisan politics. She joined Washington's Republican Party and fought a valiant effort to gain a greater voice for women within the party. DeVoe also wrote numerous newspaper columns publicly criticizing Democrats in the 1920 presidential election. This brief glimpse into post-suffrage politics suggests that the larger goal of equal voting rights may have only temporarily muted women's natural partisanship, which might help explain the lack of a women's voting bloc that many Americans expected to materialize following the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment.

Ross-Nazzari's book is an excellent complement to the literature on woman suffrage in the American West. Reminding scholars of the significance of the West to the national suffrage movement, the author provides insight into the inner workings of voting rights campaigns, including the tactics, strategies, conflicts, and even backstabbing that gave life to this movement. Moreover, she indicates the importance of regional difference in shaping state and national campaigns. Yet, as with many biographies, placing DeVoe at the center

of the story can distort her actual role in the numerous efforts with which she was involved. Nevertheless, scholars will find this volume a welcome addition to current studies of the crusade to gain political equality for women.

JOHN PUTMAN

San Diego State University

MARCELLA BENCIVENNI. *Italian Immigrant Radical Culture: The Idealism of the Sovversivi in the United States, 1890–1940*. New York: New York University Press, 2011. Pp. viii, 279. \$50.00.

Marcella Bencivenni's book rigorously documents and vividly recounts the astonishing range and productivity of two generations of radical Italian culture in the United States. With two staunch conservative Italian Americans currently sitting on the Supreme Court, most Americans might be surprised to learn that the Italians in America represented one of the most radical ethnic groups to come ashore during the mass wave of immigration between the late nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth. Long thought to be merely "amoral familists" with a myopically focused obsession with family, a deference to the Catholic Church, and insistence on clinging to the conservative values of patriarchy, nationalism, and tradition, many migrants from both the north of Italy and the *Mezzogiorno* (the south and islands of Sicily and Sardinia) instead arrived in the United States already imbued with a radical tradition rooted either in socialism or anarchism. Culturally, many had been formed by participation in agrarian leagues or the numerous *case del popolo* in Italy. Others, like the anarchist Bartolomeo Vanzetti, disembarked as apolitical immigrants, but their experience of the brutal conditions of an unbridled capitalism radicalized them.

Bencivenni has organized the seven chapters of her book into two thematic sections and what might be considered five case studies: essays on the Italian American radical press; the stage and theater; literary radicalism; and studies of Arturo Giovannitti, "the poet and prophet of labor," and radical cartoonist Fort (Fortunato) Velona. Broadening the definition of the "political" to include cultural production might not seem so innovative, but in the field of Italian American studies it is a welcome theoretical move. Bencivenni argues that "class alone cannot explain the *soversivi's* radicalism." That radicalism was "rooted in cultural as well as social experiences—shaped by their ethnic identity and immigrant experiences as well as by their internationalist credo and commitment to working-class revolution" (p. 3). Bencivenni's book demonstrates how this radicalism "embodied a complex system of traditions, institutions, and values that immigrants brought with them from Italy and adapted to new American circumstances" (p. 3).

Chapter one, "Italian American Radicalism: Old World Roots, New World Developments," reminds us that economic and social conditions for the millions of

landless peasants, day laborers, and artisans of the *Mezzogiorno* declined precipitously after the unification of Italy in the nineteenth century. Once the technologies of the telegram and steamship were available, many Italians expressed their opinion of the new nation state by emigrating. Emigration and the phenomenon of *brigandaggio* are perhaps the most eloquent indictment of the new Italy. Italians brought with them experience in the many *società di mutuo soccorso* (mutual aid societies) and *fasci dei lavoratori* (literally “bundles” of workers), labor unions, and agrarian leagues. Craftsmen could point with pride to their participation in guilds that traced their histories back to the Middle Ages.

The radical movement had its own internal contradictions and dissent that Bencivenni points out. As much as they may have argued for the emancipation of the workers, many radical leaders stubbornly retained patriarchal ideas about gender roles and relations. Politically, anarchists, socialists, communists, syndicalists, and anti-fascists were often bitter enemies, fighting among themselves almost as much as they did against fascists in America and their supporters. Chapter two, “The *Sovversivi* and Their Cultural World,” describes the rich offerings for the men and women who placed themselves against church and political authorities, capitalism, and the *prominenti* (Italians and Italian Americans who had achieved prominence in the New World, often at the expense of their fellow emigrants). They belonged to various *Circoli* or *Università Popolare*; attended political picnics, dances, theaters, and dinners; and brought with them from Italy the traditional May Day celebrations. Chapter three, “A Literary Class War,” documents the extraordinary vitality and extent of the radical press, with hundreds of newspapers printed across the country. Incendiary topics included race (support of African Americans), anti-militarism, anti-clericalism, anti-nationalism, and “the woman question.” Almost as important was the radical theater, dealt with in chapter four, since it reached an audience nearly as large as the press. Chapter five, on literary radicalism, rescues from obscurity some unjustly neglected writers (male and female), while Giovannitti merits a chapter of his own. The eighteen anti-fascist cartoons of Velona in chapter seven amply demonstrate his ability to convey a sophisticated critique of Benito Mussolini’s regime to a wide audience, often in very clever ways.

In her conclusion, Bencivenni argues that, although the *sovversivi* were always a minority, they managed to forge a critique of American culture and capitalism that was not just reactive but proactive. Sadly though, “the American environment refined those ideas, transforming, and eventually erasing, Italian radicalism” (p. 223). Hence those two conservative Italian Americans on the U.S. Supreme Court today.

STANISLAO G. PUGLIESE
Hofstra University

RACHEL SCHREIBER. *Gender and Activism in a Little Magazine: The Modern Figures of the Masses*. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2011. Pp. xi, 182. \$104.95.

Boldly conceived cartoons and drawings made the socialist monthly, *The Masses*, a uniquely modern publication. From its founding in 1911 until government suppression forced the magazine out of print in 1917, its pages featured a range of images supplied by painters of the Ashcan School, illustrators from the Arts and Crafts movement, and career cartoonists, alongside some of the most radical writers of the day. Their images fused realism with modernism to convey the impressions, aspirations, and goals of workers and the political Left. In this book Rachel Schreiber thoughtfully examines how the magazine simultaneously complicated and reinscribed the period’s gender conventions.

The Masses had a strong feminist bent, as Margaret C. Jones observed nearly two decades ago, yet Schreiber provides the first serious analysis of its gendered imagery. The first chapter explores how drawings by Robert Minor and other artists contrasted a muscular working-class manliness with the “inferior masculinity” of effete capitalists and bloated fat cats. Women rarely figured as workers in the magazine’s images, Schreiber notes; when they did, they represented the evils of the industrial workplace—typically the sweatshop—rather than workers in their own right. Given Minor’s more nuanced drawings in other publications, Schreiber suggests that *The Masses*’ editors deliberately promoted “the muscular male working class figure to heroic status to further their political aims, leaving female workers . . . to serve only as symbols for the adverse aspects of individual labor” (p. 60). The exception to this rule was the figure of the mother, the magazine’s generic marker of working-class privation. In the second chapter, Schreiber demonstrates how, in the cartoons of Art Young and others, “downtrodden mothers appeared regularly, and remained obdurate and unchanging in *The Masses* throughout the magazine’s run” (p. 69). Unlike the Gibson Girls and scientific mothers of mainstream advertising, *The Masses*’ gallery of sorrowful mothers, poor families, and (hinted) infanticide revealed the hardships of modern, industrial capitalism. It was a conception of family life that saw women as passive victims, worthy of sympathy; it did not challenge traditional views of women’s role as primarily maternal.

The Masses’ artists did challenge some characteristics of mainstream gender stereotypes, notably working-class women’s sexuality, as Schreiber shows in the third chapter. Ashcan artist John Sloan’s contributions, among others, depicted women partaking of the new sexual freedoms, offered a spirited critique of Comstockery, and showed steady support for family limitation. Where traditional iconography conflated working women’s sexuality with prostitution, *The Masses*’ artists blamed prostitution on capitalism and male greed and retained a strong sense of women’s agency in choosing

prostitution out of a range of unpalatable options. (A few of these images seem to contradict Schreiber's male/female dichotomy in the earlier chapters; this is particularly true of one striking omission, an image that appears in other works, which refigures Adam and Eve as a weak male protected by a giant Amazon.) Overall, Schreiber demonstrates that such images, by depicting women as sexual agents, offered a welcome counterpoint to white slavery hysteria in mainstream media.

Schreiber's most compelling chapter compares the impact of the European war in images in *The Masses* with those in contemporary progressive publications. In the early 1910s, suffrage artists such as Annie Lou Rogers developed an iconography of maternal pacifism that critiqued both militarism and exaggerated masculinity. Rogers' work was notably absent from *The Masses'* imaginary, however; Schreiber speculates that *The Masses'* editors saw women primarily as victims of militarism, forced to supply the war machine with either soldiers or munitions. The contrast is revealing, though short-lived. As Americans debated intervention in the European war, suffrage papers gradually adopted a pro-preparedness stance that squeezed out the older dissent; early depictions of women's maternalist pacifism declined, and suffrage images increasingly resembled conventional pro-war propaganda, depicting women in ways that anticipated the conservatism of the postwar years. Meanwhile, *The Masses'* images remained more consistently antiwar, right up to the magazine's 1917 suppression by the post office, but relied on "conventional representations of gender, even while claiming to critique the status quo" (p. 154).

The contrast points out the central irony of Schreiber's analysis: that *The Masses* challenged economic inequality in its visual culture but often resorted to traditional gender conventions to do so. In the end, she hedges, characterizing this failure to envision a new way of seeing women as social actors as "evidence of just how entrenched and resistant to change gender ideologies can be" (p. 163). This does not detract from the book, which has great value for historians (although some may quibble with the book's chronology in a few places); it raises questions that inevitably confront scholars of the visual past, particularly the ways in which seemingly "universal" symbols can reproduce the very culture they seek to change. In this sense, it is not surprising that *The Masses'* "bold" images were, in some ways, less radical than its words.

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EDWARD O. FRANTZ. *The Door of Hope: Republican Presidents and the First Southern Strategy, 1877–1933*. (New Perspectives on the History of the South.) Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 2011. Pp. xii, 295. \$69.95.

Edward O. Frantz's study is an engaging addition to recent books that have re-examined the evolution of the

Republican Party's attitude toward questions of race and section in the decades after Reconstruction. Frantz aims to shed light on how, in rhetoric and policy, the party of Abraham Lincoln became, by Ronald Reagan's time, "the party of the white South" (p. 2). Frantz focuses on a series of presidential tours through the South as key indicators of the Republicans' abandonment of their role as champions of African Americans' rights. In a chronological narrative he offers vivid accounts of the planning and execution of the tours as well as reaction to them by the press, northern and southern, and black and white citizens.

The motivation for Rutherford B. Hayes's conciliatory southern tour preceded the alleged Compromise of 1877, the impact and demonstrability of which modern scholars doubt. Hayes had long embraced a let-alone policy toward the South. As a candidate for president, he had signaled his intention to end federal military intervention, provided that the region's leaders would agree to uphold the new constitutional amendments. Early in his term, after he had secured such assurance from leaders in Louisiana and South Carolina, he withdrew the troops. A few months later Hayes went south to tout sectional and racial harmony. Before his term ended, however, southern white leaders had reneged on promises of fair treatment of blacks. When Democrats in Congress sought to repeal voting rights legislation by attaching riders to appropriations bills, Hayes repeatedly used his veto to save Reconstruction election laws. By 1880 he had concluded that southern white recalcitrance required Republicans to place issues of section and racial justice again at the top of their political agenda.

President Benjamin Harrison's southern swing was part of a larger nationwide tour that had a variety of objectives. He urged southerners to transcend past racial and sectional prejudices and embrace the Republicans' nationalistic economic program, which, he said, promised prosperity for all. Harrison addressed his hosts respectfully, but he also lectured white southerners on the sanctity of the law, thereby presenting a thinly veiled endorsement of African Americans' constitutional rights. Moreover, in messages to Congress and otherwise, he forcefully pushed for new legislation to protect blacks' right to vote. The Lodge or Federal Elections Bill of 1890, which came within a whisker of passage, would have gone far to upend the oppressive racial settlement in the South. Before he left office, Harrison became the first American president publicly to condemn lynching.

As Frantz shows, the William McKinley administration proved to be the pivotal turning point in the Republicans' abandonment of African Americans. After the defeat of the Lodge Bill, three circumstances rendered McKinley's course all but inevitable: the "legal" disfranchisement of blacks by southern states, the Democrats' 1894 repeal of Reconstruction-era federal voting-rights laws, and Booker T. Washington's 1895 Atlanta Compromise speech, which seemed to sanction a general submergence of blacks' political rights. Mobi-

lizing support for the Spanish-American War and subsequent peace negotiations, McKinley forbore solicitude for African Americans in his drive to rally white southerners to the cause of national unity.

President Theodore Roosevelt's 1905 tour followed McKinley's example. After offending white southerners by dining with Washington at the White House and making unpopular patronage decisions, Roosevelt visited the region to make amends. Although on one occasion he condemned lynching, he generally saluted southern patriotism and urged blacks to acquiesce in gradual change. His trip soured his relations with the black press, which hit rock bottom after Roosevelt's impulsive mishandling of the 1906 Brownsville affair.

In 1908 William Howard Taft campaigned in the South, reprising a strategy dating back to 1884 when James G. Blaine had swung through West Virginia, appealing to New South interests to reject sectional prejudice and benefit from Republican economic policies. In his inaugural address, Taft declared that the Fifteenth Amendment should be observed, but he considered it entirely consistent with the amendment for states to disfranchise the "ignorant" of both races. During a tour early in his term, Taft fell victim to southern mendacity; he reveled in the warm greetings of whites who had no intention of giving him real support. In an epilogue, Frantz chronicles Herbert Hoover's doomed attempt to build a white southern Republican Party after winning several southern states over Catholic contender Al Smith.

Underlying this depressing narrative is the utter intractability of southern racism. No amount of presidential propitiation could break dominant white southerners' fanatical determination to retain power through one-party control at whatever cost. Although ill-served by his publisher's editorial staff, Frantz writes lively prose. Readers interested in the devolution of Republicans' commitment to racial justice—the descent from the party of Lincoln to the party of Reagan—will reap substantial rewards from this fascinating and disturbing book.

CHARLES W. CALHOUN
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DONNA A. BARNES. *The Louisiana Populist Movement, 1881–1900*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 2011. Pp. xx, 318. \$45.00.

Donna A. Barnes has made an important contribution to the body of existing statewide studies on Populism in the South. Her book is the first major work on Populism in Louisiana to appear since William Hair's *Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest: Louisiana Politics* (1969). When discussing Populism in the South, much of the scholarly focus has been on attempted explanations of why "biracial coalitions" between African Americans and white southerners did not succeed. Most famous are the cases of Populism in Georgia, Texas, and North Carolina. Barnes looks at Louisiana, arguing that the principal organization of African Americans with re-

gard to the Populist movement, the Colored Farmers' Alliance (CFA), "a parallel organization of the whites-only Alliance" (p. 85), was out of sync with the needs of most rural African Americans (largely cashless sharecroppers). Barnes states that the CFA employed strategies that were more appropriate for landowners with cash to support the organization's projects. That, combined with high rates of illiteracy among African Americans and white Louisianans' racist attitudes, led to only moderate mobilization among African Americans by white Populists, argues Barnes. A black and white independent coalition would never be consolidated, let alone developed, in the state.

Explaining the inability to initiate or sustain biracial alliances in the Populist movement has long been a project among scholars of the period, beginning with C. Vann Woodward in the late 1930s. Populism became equated with racist actions, most famously in Richard Hofstadter's *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F. D. R.* (1955). Efforts to counter this narrative came in the 1960s, for instance with Walter Nugent's *The Tolerant Populists: Kansas, Populism and Nativism* (1963), and in the 1970s with Lawrence Goodwyn's *The Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America* (1976). Emphasis was placed instead on the economic commonalities between rural African Americans and their poor white counterparts. Nevertheless, the perspective articulated remained that of white Populists.

The idea of looking at Populism from the perspective of African Americans is only beginning to be considered more fully. (Jack Abramowitz's "Accommodation and Militancy in Negro Life" [Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1950] did so but had a marginal impact on subsequent historians.) Black farmers, sharecroppers, and agrarian workers were not merely an "appendage" to the white-led Populist movement, as John Hicks characterized them in *The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party* (1931); they were building a movement of their own that was, at times, in tactical alliance with the white-led movement. Charles Postel's *The Populist Vision* (2007) and my own *In the Lion's Mouth: Black Populism in the New South, 1886–1900* (2010) are recent efforts to look at African American Populists as having a separate movement with their own leaders, organizations, and interests.

Barnes follows in the footsteps of most historians of Populism. For instance, she repeats the concept of the CFA being white-led, since its general superintendent, Richard M. Humphrey, was white (p. 85). What is not discussed is how Humphrey was chosen by sixteen black leaders of the organization to engage the white press and lobby in Congress on their behalf. Moreover, Barnes discusses how African Americans benefitted from a "ready-made diagnostic framework" (p. 88), alluding to the existing white Farmers' Alliance, but she fails to examine the networks of black organizations that articulated many of the same concepts of economic cooperation and uplift.

Notwithstanding this critique, Barnes's book is ex-

tremely valuable in detailing the history of Populism—white Populism—in Louisiana. Her study is steeped in archival research—some of which builds on the work of others, notably Joel Sipress—and offers a clear chronology of Populism as it moved from agrarian-based organizing to electoral politics.

Ultimately, Barnes offers a critical account of the rural white farmers' movement in the state through the framework of competing sociological theories—"Resource Mobilization, Political Process, and Framing theories" (p. xvii). While her theoretical explanations/descriptions may be of some interest to historians, and of particular interest to historical sociologists and those concerned with social movement theory, the new archival findings she brings forth are of value to all. Barnes should be highly commended for delving into a less-studied manifestation of southern Populism, highlighting new archival records, and contributing to the ongoing debate regarding the possibilities and limitations of the white movement in the South.

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GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA. *The Tragedy of William Jennings Bryan: Constitutional Law and the Politics of Backlash*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2011. Pp. x, 238. \$40.00.

Constitutional scholars have in recent years examined the relationship between political movements and Supreme Court decision-making, generally with an eye to the ways that successful political parties and movements have brought Court decisions in line with the dominant political regime. In this book Gerard N. Magliocca considers the ways in which unsuccessful parties and candidates can influence Court decision-making. He is specifically concerned with showing that late nineteenth-century constitutional decisions were influenced by the rise of the Populist Party in the early 1890s and by William Jennings Bryan's defeat in the 1896 presidential election.

Magliocca advances as "a central theme" that Bryan "was the greatest constitutional figure at the turn of the twentieth century" (p. 3), but his "unique constitutional contribution was not in what he did; it was what the fear of him and his followers caused others to do" (p. 5). Magliocca's principal argument is that Justices' concern about the growing appeal of the Populist Party caused them to "change the law in response to the goals and arguments of reformers" (p. 117), most notably in a series of decisions from 1894 to 1896. He argues that aspects of the Court's ruling in *Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.* (1895) invalidating a Bryan-sponsored income tax law suggest "the Justices were chafing to attack the Populists" (p. 80). Meanwhile, the Court's decision in *U.S. v. E.C. Knight* (1895), narrowly interpreting the commerce clause in a case involving the Sherman Antitrust Act, "reads like a direct response to the Populist agenda" (p. 74). The author also discerns a connection between Populists and *Plessy v.*

Ferguson (1896), in that "the Justices threw their weight behind the strategy of using race to drive a wedge into the reform coalition" such that "*Plessy* aided the enemies of Populism just as much as, if not more than, *Pollock* did" (pp. 94, 95).

By Magliocca's account, Bryan's 1896 loss to William McKinley had a further impact on the Supreme Court. In part, this was because "the Populists still posed a threat, and over the next four years political and legal elites took additional steps to codify the mandate of 1896 and to ensure that the spirit of reform would not make a comeback" (p. 115). Additionally, "the Justices took McKinley's victory as a sign that they could expand on the principles that they had articulated right before the election" (p. 119), such that the outcome served as a "green light" and "alter[ed] the balance within the Court in favor of those who wanted more protection for property and contract rights, less protection for civil liberties, and greater deference to the states on racial questions" (p. 119). The author points to rulings in 1897 in *Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago* and *Allgeyer v. Louisiana*, which applied the takings clause against state and local governments and protected a liberty of contract against state regulation. These decisions, along with *Maxwell v. Dow* (1900) declining to apply criminal procedure guarantees against state governments and *Giles v. Harris* (1903) upholding state disfranchisement measures, were "transformative cases that elaborated the principles flowing from the mandate against Bryan" (p. 126). In fact, Magliocca argues, Bryan's influence was so strong that it was only once "the specter of Bryan was removed" after his third presidential defeat in 1908 that political and legal elites "felt free to relax their resistance to reform" and permit some Progressive policies to be sustained, although most doctrinal innovations from the 1890s remained intact (pp. 133, 134).

At one level, this original analysis is likely to provoke debate about whether Bryan's influence on the Supreme Court was as significant as Magliocca claims—to the point that Bryan "exerted more influence over constitutional law than anyone else at the turn of the twentieth century" (p. 149). Conventional accounts have tended to explain constitutional developments in this period primarily by reference to broad currents in political and constitutional thought that gained ascendance at a time when the Court was grappling with a new set of economic conditions and the legitimacy of governmental responses to these changed circumstances. The challenge is to determine what specifically is achieved and how much ultimately is gained by giving such prominence to Bryan and his 1896 defeat that cannot otherwise be explained by standard accounts and to sift through Magliocca's particular claims in this regard. However, at a broader level—and this is likely to be the book's key contribution—by calling attention to the possibility that unsuccessful political movements can influence Court decision-making, Magliocca may prompt a renewed focus on such movements among scholars who have been fruitfully engaged in specifying

linkages between political regimes and constitutional development.

JOHN DINAN
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MARK D. HERSEY. *My Work Is That of Conservation: An Environmental Biography of George Washington Carver*. (Environmental History and the American South.) Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2011. Pp. xv, 290. Cloth \$69.95, paper \$24.95.

Mark D. Hersey's book is gracefully written, exhaustively researched, insightful, and compelling. Its author offers an honest assessment of the subject's personal flaws and his accomplishments as a scientist and social/agricultural reformer.

Hersey cuts through the "Peanut Man" myth to reveal the real George Washington Carver. He unravels the complexity of the individual, the scientific field in which he worked, and the society in which he dwelled. Other books have done something similar, but they stop short of probing Washington's conservation impulses. This monograph is devoted to pursuing that examination. In so doing, it positions itself in southern, environmental, and African American history.

Carver was more than a scientist or the one-dimensional all-star in black history highly mythicized in elementary schools and social memory. He was an advocate for improved conditions and opportunity for southern black farmers. In the ecologically depleted landscape of Alabama's Black Belt in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Carver was moved by the abject plight of southern blacks, who were wedded culturally and socially to the land. Their livelihood depended on new kinds of sustainable agriculture, which in turn depended on sustainable relationships with the natural environment. Carver had astute answers for the greater economic independence of black farmers, but the region's entrenched social and economic structures impeded innovation, and Carver gained no advantage with his outsider credentials.

A year after Booker T. Washington's "Cast Down Your Bucket" address at the Atlanta Cotton States Exposition, he recruited Carver to launch the Tuskegee Institute's new department of agriculture. It was God's choice that he should go to Alabama, concluded the religious-minded Carver, who also believed that divine will had led him to study agricultural science. Immediately upon completing his graduate work at Iowa Agricultural College in 1896, he relocated to the Black Belt, very much a foreign place and a cultural shock to the socially sheltered midwesterner.

At Ames, he had been integrated into the virtually all-white society and academic community. He had a stable of friends, smart and supportive mentors, and a well-equipped school that valued his presence and endowed him with a fine education. The realities in Jim Crow Alabama were stark. Indeed, Carver barely escaped lynching. Racism and poverty were overt and black disfranchisement nearly complete. All were man-

ifested in the feudalistic nature of the share-tenant system.

The two-crop economy (cotton and corn) and the ways of agriculture seemed equally medieval to Carver. Soil erosion and silted rivers and streams were already a problem worsened by the food demands and market prices during World War I. For a time, farmers could buy new land for less than they could "manure" old worn-out land (p. 63), and when they did stimulate crop growth they turned increasingly to inorganic fertilizers, which took a heavier toll on the land and the water. Tuskegee had its own issues. Washington could not fulfill many of the promises he had made when recruiting Carver. He micromanaged the institute and expected more out of the scantily funded and poorly equipped agriculture department and its head than either could possibly deliver. Carver, nevertheless, remained optimistic about changing things, and the "limited funding," promoting creative frugality, proved "a blessing of sorts in shaping his environmental vision" (p. 89).

Colleagues and locals regarded Carver as eccentric. His dress seemed beneath that of a college professor, and he was pedantic and somewhat aloof. But he was very much in touch with the real world, especially conventional farming practices that sustained the racial status quo but not the land. Carver's own lack of resources helped him identify with the region's struggling black farmers. Drawing from an ecological understanding of the interconnectedness of the elements, he devised numerous alternative farming practices that cost the farmer up-front labor but saved him/her money, easing dependence on the landowner. Carver even made dietary recommendations, publishing bulletins with cost-saving food recipes that made use of what grew naturally in the area. His most famous, *How to Grow the Peanut and 105 Ways of Preparing It for Human Consumption*, published in 1916, contributed to his mythic sobriquet.

Throughout his tenure at Tuskegee, Carver was fighting not only racism and poverty but the growing artificiality of agriculture. He was known as a pioneering chemurgist, although in reality he bucked its trends. For example, he discouraged the use of commercial fertilizers, once referring to the typical inorganically grown tomato as a "hull or shadow of the savory, nutritious, palatable vegetable it should be" (p. 173). Chemurgists were moving agriculture toward corporate farming and the development of farm products as industrial commodities, such as cellulose and ethanol. But Carver remained always committed to the independent farmer and the land.

So too is Hersey. His work reminds scholars of the importance of the land to understanding the southern past, something pioneers of the field appreciated but their successors forgot. Southern historians and others should put Hersey's book at the top of their reading list.

JACK E. DAVIS
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ANDREW P. HALEY. *Turning the Tables: Restaurants and the Rise of the American Middle Class, 1880–1920*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 356. \$39.95.

In this book Andrew P. Haley offers a persuasive and engaging analysis of how dining at restaurants became an integral part of the lives of the American middle class. Locating the change in the period between 1880 and 1920, Haley maintains not only that the middle class was responsible for the growth of restaurants but that restaurant-going became a critical channel of middle-class formation.

From the opening of Delmonico's in New York City in the 1820s and throughout much of the nineteenth century, restaurants were the preserve of the American aristocracy. Elite establishments served extravagant, multicourse meals in elegant surroundings. The French menus and high prices announced the social standing not only of the restaurant but of the clientele as well. But such restaurants were not welcoming to the growing middle class of urbanites who, especially in the post-Civil War decades, wanted and could afford to eat out. Snooty waiters and French menus intimidated middle-class eaters who were unschooled in the language and etiquette of fine dining. Prices, moreover, were steep and many a middle-class diner felt unsatisfied if not cheated by the experience. This was exactly, according to Haley, the purpose of such places: to distinguish the aristocracy from the middle class. At the same time, he contends, the response of those dissatisfied middle-class diners constituted a "middle-class revolution in public dining that transformed the class structure and the cultural hierarchies of the United States" (p. 45).

Middle-class men and women effected this transformation by making other eating choices and inventing a more "cosmopolitan" approach to restaurant dining. They patronized the small ethnic eateries that began to flourish in immigrant neighborhoods, the moderately priced lunchrooms that offered day-time and evening meals, as well as the chop houses, ice cream parlors, and coffee and cake saloons that sprouted throughout the city. Clerks, managers, female shoppers, bachelors who were unhappy with boarding house food, and housewives who were too tired to cook used their middle-class purchasing power and created a demand "that no successful restaurant owner could ignore" (p. 83). In doing so they were, according to Healy, exerting class power and "turning the tables" on a culture that valorized the elite. Working very much in the mold of E. P. Thompson, Haley argues that a class can make demands unselfconsciously: voting with their pocketbooks and their feet in a growing consumer market, individual middle-class men and women had a collective impact. In the process the middle class both created and defined itself.

Haley suggests that restaurants became battle grounds where the middle class—asserting its right to enjoy itself in public eating spaces—waged a form of class warfare. Some battles were more successful than

others. The fight to end tipping, perceived by the middle class as "an elusive passkey to service and status," failed (p. 175). But restaurateurs slowly did change their establishments to reflect the needs of their middle-class patrons. As English replaced French on the menus, restaurants offered simpler, more modestly sized, and lower-priced plated dinners. And, perhaps most importantly, women, once denied the right to dine in public restaurants without a male escort, began to be welcomed. Women who wanted to enjoy an evening meal alone at a restaurant risked their respectable reputations, because being an unescorted female in a public place still made a woman morally suspect. Restaurants apparently made exceptions for aristocratic women whose rank guaranteed their status as "ladies." Such respect, however "did not automatically extend to . . . their middle-class counterparts" (p. 151). So angry was prominent feminist Harriot Stanton Blatch, when she and a female companion were refused service at the elegant Hoffman House in 1907, that she sued the restaurant. While Blatch lost the suit, restaurants increasingly realized that they could not afford to ignore or alienate the growing numbers of middle-class female customers. By 1920 such restrictions had been relaxed and unescorted middle-class women joined the throngs of restaurant diners.

Haley relies heavily on the lively discussions and debates about eating out that appeared in newspapers and magazines during these decades and does an excellent job of using these sources to analyze how middle-class Americans altered the restaurant experience. His evidence fully supports his contention that leisure-time activities, like eating out, were critical in making the modern American middle class. I am less sure, however, that the language and metaphor of struggle that Haley deploys serve him well. In the context of the many challenges that middle- and working-class people faced during these decades, grappling with a French menu or being ridiculed by a haughty waiter do not quite seem to qualify as battles. Still, Haley's book reinforces the importance of consumption as a vehicle for class formation and does immeasurable service in exploring restaurants as one of the important sites where this occurred.

CINDY S. ARON
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DAVID STRAUSS. *Setting the Table for Julia Child: Gourmet Dining in America, 1934–1961*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 324. \$45.00.

Few of us remain unaffected by the remarkable change in American foodways over the past quarter century. Celebrity chefs peddle their *savoir-faire* and their wares; the Food Network broadcasts 24/7; books and blogs enjoin us to check vitamins, track pesticides, pay attention to the provenance of the food we eat, and concern ourselves with its sustainability. Gurus of every persuasion urge us to embark on our own food adventures, preferably exotic ones. Academics have not failed to profit

by what many have proclaimed a revolution. Studies of food in one or another of its many forms have gotten at least a toehold in American universities and colleges as well as abroad.

David Strauss speaks to this food world in turmoil. He takes advantage of the now considerable scholarship on American foodways and also does a great deal of archival digging to explore the cultural phenomenon that he calls, with some exaggeration, the gourmet movement, which came before the food revolution and which he dates from the publication of *Mastering the Art of French Cooking* (1961, 1970) by Julia Child and her French co-authors.

The first chapters review Americans' utilitarian approach to dining, the claims of scientific cookery, and a pervasive distrust of sensuality. Would-be gourmets battled the nutritionists, on the one hand, and the moralists, on the other. Chapters three and four move into much less explored territory as Strauss examines the various gourmet societies across the United States in the 1930s. The self-consciously exclusive establishments, resolutely male ("the ladies" were not welcome), made it their business to further fine dining in the United States, which American parlance turned into "gourmet" food. For Americans "gourmet" meant fancy, and fancy meant French. Only in the loosest of constructions could these interlocking elites be considered a movement. "Network" seems the better term.

Exclusivity marked dinners and diners alike. Rigorously trained French missionary-chefs gave the stamp of authenticity to the elaborate banquets where the members of private clubs and dining societies celebrated the higher gustatory joys in a world far removed from the instrumental practicality of women's magazines and cookbooks. Strauss has mined the relevant papers including membership lists, menus (some of which are reproduced), and correspondence. He appends a useful essay on sources which covers manuscript collections, interviews, newsletters from newspapers and magazines as well as a judicious sampling of scholarship.

The next three chapters follow the vicissitudes of *Gourmet*, which began publication in 1941 with the avowed purpose of raising American culinary consciousness. But *Gourmet*, with its emphasis on travel narratives, particularly those of Samuel Chamberlain, and its general celebration of fine food, remained too true to its origins in heavily masculinized gourmet dining. Women read *Gourmet*, but it took several years and two chef columnists for the magazine to come up with recipes that could be attempted by the home cook unversed in the finer points of French cuisine.

Although it is incorrect to claim that *Mastering the Art of French Cooking* transformed the American food world (for Strauss it is a convenient benchmark), it was Julia Child who most effectively worked to translate the arcana of French cuisine into the American culinary lexicon. Child knew that any real change in American foodways had to pass through the women who, in the United States as elsewhere, then as now, do the lion-

ess's share of cooking. With *The French Chef* on television in 1963, Child did what the clubs and societies and life-style glossy magazines such as *Vogue*, *The New Yorker*, and even *Gourmet* could not accomplish. She brought what Americans thought of as fancy French food (it was in fact *cuisine bourgeoise*) into the American kitchen.

The exclusivity cultivated by the gourmet groups yielded to the open arms of television. Cooking shows profited by and disseminated not only new knowledge but also new attitudes toward food. Strauss's final chapter on Julia Child and her principal co-author Simone Beck—he has mined the Child papers at the Radcliffe Institute's Schlesinger Library—gives a fascinating account of negotiating different understandings of French cooking, as the French woman's defense of authenticity invariably, at times poignantly, came up against the American's insistence on translation into American terms.

The catchy title of Strauss's careful examination of gourmet dining is, however, misleading. That Child on occasion frequented gourmet groups such as the Chevaliers du Tastevin emphasizes all the more her own inclusive, generous conception of French cooking. Unlike gourmet dining, the food revolution, following Child, laid a different table.

PRISCILLA PARKHURST FERGUSON
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BRUCE E. STEWART. *Moonshiners and Prohibitionists: The Battle over Alcohol in Southern Appalachia*. (New Directions in Southern History.) Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 2011. Pp. xii, 325. \$50.00.

Bruce E. Stewart's new book makes a worthy contribution to our historical understanding of the liquor issue in modern America. Specifically, he examines the changing attitudes toward alcohol in western North Carolina during the nineteenth century that produced the region's strong support of a statewide liquor ban in 1908. This endorsement of prohibition is impressive given the region's earlier acceptance of local liquor distilling. Mountain dwellers, who, before the Civil War, had viewed moonshiners as honorable businessmen entitled to make a living, came to see them as a threat to social order by the end of the century. This changing attitude toward liquor advanced even as southern Appalachia residents were depicted, in the mass media, as a backward people who needed to be brought into the modern world. Stewart sees the social split over the liquor question as class based; middle-class reformers in urban areas promoted prohibition as part of their modernizing campaign.

Stewart begins in the antebellum period, noting the economic circumstances that encouraged whiskey production and consumption in western North Carolina. Middle-class town dwellers, viewing temperance as a badge of respectability, sought to curb the local liquor industry, but accomplished little because the larger population associated them with northern advocates of

temperance and abolition. During the Civil War, distillers came under sharp attack for expending scarce grain and fruit resources in the manufacture of liquor. This criticism ended in the postwar years as food security returned. Federal officials' efforts to enforce liquor taxes during this period endeared the liquor industry to the local population, and its violent defiance of governmental authority was sometimes supported by local chapters of the Ku Klux Klan.

The last decades of the century brought the railroad into the North Carolina mountains, and with it came middle-class professionals who championed a new South based on commerce and manufacturing. Such people initiated new reform efforts against the liquor industry, which they, like reformers throughout the industrializing South, saw as an antiquated deterrence to economic and moral progress. The religious campaign against the liquor men was joined by town dwellers who wished to shed the growing image of traditional southern Appalachia as backward and brutish. These reformers presented their anti-liquor efforts as a civilizing campaign aimed at moonshiners, the personification of that unrefined image. By the 1890s the townsfolk of western North Carolina had embraced the anti-liquor campaign. Numerous communities voted to ban liquor through local option and subsequently voted solidly in favor of statewide prohibition in 1908. Stewart acknowledges that religious issues played a role in North Carolina's decision to ban liquor, but he asserts that the modernizers' industrializing efforts joined those of evangelical religious groups already favoring liquor restrictions to create a considerable prohibition majority in western North Carolina.

While Stewart notes that prohibition's success was due to the joint efforts of evangelicals and modernizers, his focus on the latter places him among recent prohibition scholars who, tapping earlier studies by James H. Timberlake, challenge the more established assertions by Paul Kleppner, Norman H. Clark, and others that the liquor issue is best explained as a struggle between pietistic and liturgical religious denominations. They instead frame the liquor debate as an economic class issue. Stewart's stress on the desire for respectability as a primary motivation for prohibition reinforces this focus on economic class and ethnicity.

The author's extensive examination of the middle-class stance toward prohibition eclipses discussion of the working class. Railroad construction projects brought modernizers to the mountains, but also wage-earners to staff these massive construction projects and subsequently to maintain and operate the railroad lines. Stewart acknowledges this but says little about this population's recreational habits, despite the extensive scholarship that presents liquor consumption as a central feature of turn-of-the-century working-class culture.

Focusing on western North Carolina, Stewart largely ignores the influence of statewide politics on the dry campaign in the mountains. He does not address the disfranchisement of North Carolina's black population

and its impact on statewide prohibition efforts, nor does he examine the influence of gender attitudes on both sides of the liquor question.

These limitations, while noteworthy, are perhaps beyond the scope of this extensive study. Though identifying areas for future research, they should not detract from the book's highly significant contribution to the understanding of prohibition. Stewart sheds light on a region and a topic that have been egregiously under-examined. Regional studies such as his offer a more nuanced understanding of the historical liquor question in modern America.

JAMES E. KLEIN
Del Mar College

ANTHONY MORA. *Border Dilemmas: Racial and National Uncertainties in New Mexico, 1848–1912*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 379. Cloth \$89.95, paper \$24.95.

Anthony Mora has written a thoughtful extended essay on the racialization of citizenship and the demarcation of distinct communities in the context of the U.S.-Mexico border region. Situating his story in southern New Mexico territory (1848–1912), Mora focuses on the border cities of Las Cruces and La Mesilla. These two towns, together with Doña Ana, form the eastern boundary of the valley of Mesilla, a fertile agricultural district on the floodplain of the Rio Grande that marks a three-way border between New Mexico, Chihuahua, and Texas. All three communities were founded in the nineteenth century: Doña Ana as a settler colony of El Paso in the early 1840s, and Las Cruces and La Mesilla in the crucible of the U.S.-Mexico war. Under the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, following the U.S. invasion of Mexico (1846–1848), Las Cruces fell just north of the binational boundary. Several hundred New Mexican families responded to the Mexican government's colonization efforts in Chihuahua, settling the communities of Guadalupe, La Mesilla, Refugio, and Santo Tomás de Iturbide. Located just five miles south of Las Cruces, La Mesilla fell into the territory that was the object of the Gadsden Purchase of 1854, placing the fledgling Mexican colony yet again under the aegis of U.S. military and civilian authority. A second southward migration established Ascensión in northwestern Chihuahua for those Mexicans who feared the loss of property, security, and dignity under U.S. control in La Mesilla.

New Mexico was governed as a dependent territory for fifty-eight years; the delay in achieving statehood—despite repeated formal applications to the U.S. Congress—forms a leitmotif for Mora's discussion of racialized national identities. Six substantive chapters weave a multilayered tapestry of local and regional histories, following an approximate chronological order. Chapter one sets up Mora's argument that Euro-Americans—his preferred term for Anglo-Americans who settled in New Mexico and dominated territorial governance until the twentieth century—defined Mexican

in racial terms: that is, as an immutable category of difference and inferiority, in contrast to Mexicans living in New Mexico, whose concept of *mexicanidad* was rooted in the cultural performance of citizenship, ritual, and the sense of community. Chapter two examines the contrasting vernacular architectures and landscapes of Las Cruces and La Mesilla. The urban grid for La Mesilla, a planned Mexican town, had its roots in the presidios of Bourbon New Spain, although Mora does not acknowledge these colonial antecedents. The salient difference between the two communities at mid-century was the division of town land into individual plots in Las Cruces—following U.S. legal norms—and the persistence of communal grazing lands in La Mesilla, surrounding the central plaza, church, and residential lots. Chapter three turns to religion to argue that church construction was altered by French bishops and francophile clergy during the second half of the nineteenth century in an attempt to replace Mexican traditions with “modern” Euro-American Catholicism. Chapter four couples race and gender, referring to legislation aimed at Mexican women that restricted women’s employment in public venues and to the subordinate relations that hardened between Euro-Americans and Mexicans, as some Mexican women found work as domestic servants in the homes of wealthy newcomers from the eastern United States. The last two chapters return to the themes of statehood and region. Mora argues that Euro-Americans fashioned a regional identity to compensate or elide the perceived racial differences between themselves and the Mexicans who still formed the majority of the population, while Mexican elite families espoused their claims to New Mexican identity, defending their status as equal citizens and the right to maintain their cultural practices. Yet, not all Mexicans in New Mexico—especially those in La Mesilla—eagerly embraced U.S. citizenship, and some explicitly identified with Mexico.

Mora develops his argument through the language of locally produced texts, mainly newspapers, published interviews, and the papers and memoirs of a few prominent New Mexicans. While reminding us of the importance of discourse and memory for the construction of regional identities and cultural boundaries, the book’s message would have been strengthened by a deeper archival base and a broader historiographical framework. Mexico drops out of the story after the first chapter, and Mora develops his tale of two cities without reference to the social networks that would have connected them to border towns in Chihuahua and trade routes deeper into Mexico. Mora frames his study around the binary division between Euro-Americans and Mexicans, referring to indigenous peoples rarely and mainly as hostile raiders; only in the epilogue does he acknowledge them as historical actors with a central role in the formation of New Mexico. Mora leaves it to future scholars to integrate these regional spaces into the social history of

New Mexico and “larger discussions about Mexico’s national identity” (p. 289).

CYNTHIA RADDING
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BRIAN D. BEHNKEN. *Fighting Their Own Battles: Mexican Americans, African Americans, and the Struggle for Civil Rights in Texas*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2011. Pp. xix, 347. \$45.00.

Most histories of the fight for civil rights are written in shades of black and white. Not in Texas. With its large Mexican American population, civil rights in Texas by necessity encompassed three colors: white, black, and brown. Unlike most other southern and southwestern states, where a single narrative (black or Chicano) dominates civil rights history, Texas presents two related, yet distinct, civil rights storylines, which complicate the history of the fight for civil rights there.

Brian D. Behnken explores this dual civil rights narrative. He notes how African Americans and Mexican Americans might have seemed natural allies in the fight against de jure and de facto segregation. Both groups faced a similar mix of legal exclusions, informal discrimination, and threats of violence from the dominant white Anglo establishment—what Behnken defines as “a dual Jim Crow system” (p. 5); both groups organized to fight this discrimination in similar ways, adopting both legal and direct-action reform strategies. Yet, as the title of Behnken’s book makes clear, each group largely fought its civil rights battles alone. Although there were occasional instances of collective action, on the whole, “blacks fought for their community, while Mexican Americans fought for theirs” (p. 11).

Behnken places the blame for these groups’ failure to act in concert—which he argues “might have had greater success than the two individual struggles” (p. 11)—on a mix of social, economic, and political factors, including “cultural dissimilarities, class tensions, organizational and tactical differences, and geographic distance” (p. 11). However, Behnken places the greatest blame on the issue of race itself.

Although African American and Hispanic Texans faced similar legal and informal constraints, their available options in fighting these constraints differed. Unlike blacks, who had no choice but to take on Jim Crow segregation directly, Mexican Americans had the option of playing the “white” card. Legally, Mexican Americans were classified as white. By stressing their “whiteness,” Mexican Americans could thus separate themselves from other minority groups (such as blacks) and in this way gain some measure of protection from discrimination. This whiteness strategy, which Mexican American leaders promoted from World War II through the mid-1960s, damaged relations between African American and Hispanic Texans. Blacks rightly saw this effort as reinforcing the legitimacy of Jim Crow; they came to view Mexican Americans as “competitors who took political power away from African

Americans and monopolized government aid programs" (p. 9). In the mid-1960s when Mexican Americans began to move away from a "whiteness" strategy, blacks condemned this shift to "brown power" as a "disingenuous, opportunistic" (p. 226) tactic aimed at riding the coattails of the successful civil rights and black power movements and taking advantage of the legislative gains (such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965) for which they had fought.

For their part, Texas blacks adopted many of the dominant Anglo attitudes toward Hispanics as "foreigners who took jobs away from the native born" (p. 9). They saw Hispanics as anti-civil rights and anti-black; in response, they "lashed out violently at Mexican Americans on several occasions" (p. 10). The result, once again, fostered distance rather than unity. Hence, even when individual leaders from both groups sought common ground, the results were of limited effect and duration. In the end, each group decided to allow the other side to fight its battles alone.

Although the idea that race and the "whiteness" of Mexican Americans stood in the way of black-brown solidarity is not new (a point Behnken himself acknowledges), Behnken's book brings to the table a detailed examination of these parallel and competitive civil rights movements in Texas. By examining African American and Mexican American civil rights struggles in Texas side by side, Behnken makes clear the similarities and the differences between the two groups in their fights for equal rights. In so doing, he shows just how possible an alliance of the dispossessed could have been—and how racism within both communities doomed the effort. It was both groups' acceptance of the racism underlying Jim Crow segregation—the very thing that each fought with regard to itself—that undermined the possibility of cooperation.

Well written, soundly researched, and persuasively argued, Behnken's study is a welcome addition to the history of civil rights in Texas. The book reminds us that to view the issue of civil rights in only black and white (or brown and white) terms is to miss the many complexities of a complicated yet important story.

CHARLES L. ZELDEN
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PRISCILLA A. DOWDEN-WHITE. *Groping toward Democracy: African American Social Welfare Reform in St. Louis, 1910–1949*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 2011. Pp. xviii, 300. \$44.95.

Priscilla A. Dowden-White's book offers a counterargument to those historians of urban African American life and activism during the interwar years who focus on protests and social and labor movements rather than on social welfare reform. These scholars oftentimes assert that black social welfare reformers—for example, those in the National Urban League (NUL)—proved too accommodating to powerful white interests, rendering ineffective their fight to end racial and economic inequality. According to Dowden-White, such historians have

stressed the "powerlessness of elite black reformers in the face of white industrialists' hegemony—at the expense of the broader range of African American community organization efforts" (p. 7).

Dowden-White argues that black social welfare reformers chose their strategies and tactics based on the belief "that broadened economic opportunities, social justice, and the rhetoric of American democracy belonged equally to blacks and to whites" (p. 5). She discusses the leadership and the agenda of organizations for racial equality from 1910 to 1949, when legally sanctioned racism and institutionalized segregation were most entrenched. Dowden-White narrates how reformers developed—groped toward—effective approaches to community organization and built interracial alliances to undermine segregation and promote the drive for democracy. She highlights how reformers debated social work theories and researched black urban conditions when structuring their campaigns against, for example, segregation in housing and health care. Dowden-White takes issue with several historians who play down social welfare reformers' use of social action as a tactic within the broad range of social work strategies to force white Americans to regard black Americans as their equals. She sees St. Louis reformers as particularly skillful in shaping the black freedom struggle, as they demanded concessions from the white elites. Dowden-White shows that black social welfare reformers proved modestly successful in their endeavors at a time when numerous white St. Louisans, and white Americans generally, regarded segregation as beneficial for the common good.

Black and white social welfare reformers tailored their agenda for black empowerment and racial equality according to conditions in St. Louis, a "border city" between the North and the South. In that segregated city, black townspeople faced racial discrimination in housing, education, health care, and other areas in economic and civic life but freely exercised the franchise and worked with white residents who believed that black Americans deserved their full civil rights. In addition, some factions among the city's white elites wanted to avoid interracial violence, showed a willingness to include African Americans in various projects to improve urban life, and fostered interracial cooperation. More importantly, talented, tireless black leaders like George E. Stephens, Jr., and Susan Vashon and white allies like the influential Roger Nash Baldwin built and led social work, neighborhood club, and block unit movements to challenge segregation along two major lines of attack. On one hand, they emphasized the equal in "separate but equal." For instance, reformers mobilized the black community in a fight that resulted in the establishment of a tax-supported black hospital to ensure that African Americans received high quality health care within the segregated medical system. On the other hand, reformers sought to stop the spread of, if not end, segregation. They saw their battles against city ordinances in favor of neighborhood segregation culminate in victory in the late 1910s when the United

States Supreme Court declared such ordinances unconstitutional. Yet, their attempts to stop the widespread use of homeowners' racially restrictive covenant agreements proved futile during the interwar years. They were most effective in winning support for black St. Louisans when their objectives did not threaten powerful, entrenched special interests that had access to or control of labor markets and political or financial resources. Nevertheless, leading social welfare reformers propelled the St. Louis chapters of the NUL and the League of Women Voters and their allied organizations into the forefront of the civil rights struggles of the interwar years.

The book under review, an in-depth, nuanced account, combines early twentieth-century social work, urban, and social history. One of the book's major contributions is its exploration of African American social welfare and community organization activism. It looks at another side of the history of the black freedom struggle that led to the post-World War II direct mass action phase of the civil rights movement in St. Louis, a topic covered in Clarence Lang's *Grassroots at the Gateway: Class Politics and Black Freedom Struggle in St. Louis, 1936–1975* (2009). Furthermore, Dowden-White's monograph is on the leading edge of a wave of recent publications that re-examine social welfare reformers, such as Felix L. Armfield's *Eugene Kinckle Jones: The National Urban League and Black Social Work, 1910–1940* (2011). This is a thoughtful book about black social welfare reformers who constituted, according to Dowden-White, the center of the anti-racism vanguard during the interwar years.

CHARLES L. LUMPKINS

Pennsylvania State University

CORNELIUS L. BYNUM. *A. Philip Randolph and the Struggle for Civil Rights*. (The New Black Studies Series.) Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2010. Pp. xix, 244. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$25.00.

Cornelius L. Bynum's fine study focuses on A. Philip Randolph's life-long commitment to social justice for all working-class Americans. By exploring the intersections of race and class, Bynum presents a more complex analysis of Randolph's evolving social and political thought as he developed into an effective labor and civil rights leader from the 1910s to the 1960s. By examining the intersectionality of class and race, Bynum explains the often contradictory motivations behind Randolph's actions and leadership decisions, especially when these categories overlapped with Randolph's attitudes toward gender issues and religion. Bynum's narrative demonstrates how Randolph consistently evolved from the hard lessons learned in each phase of his activism, by showing how several critical decisions Randolph made as a social movement leader, like calling off a strike or a march, resulted from his deepening understanding of interest group politics and belief that the executive branch of government was where African Americans could best exercise political leverage (p. xv).

Finally, Bynum's work reflects the trend of recent scholarship that connects Randolph's early labor activism (class) with his civil rights (race) agenda.

Bynum divides Randolph's evolution from the poor son of an African Methodist Episcopal (AME) minister to a nationally known labor and civil rights leader into four periods. The first period, at the turn of the twentieth century, was characterized by Randolph's close connection to a stable, religious family in the South where his race separated him from the social and economic opportunities available to most American boys. Bynum illustrates how Randolph's early religious faith was deeply connected to black empowerment through the living example of his parents. As Bynum points out, religion for Randolph was "less about salvation than faithfully persevering in the face of relentless racial persecution" (p. 25). In the second period, the years just before World War I, Bynum describes Randolph's migration to Harlem as one of the "talented tenth." During this period, Randolph blended his race-conscious religious values with a class consciousness as he joined the Socialist Party. Bynum's narrative seamlessly weaves together the various social and political venues available to the young Randolph in "Harlem's radical political climate during and after the war," where he could explore "his class sensibilities more fully" (p. 74). Bynum's analysis is especially helpful in explaining Randolph's intense opposition to Marcus Garvey's "racial self-sufficiency" program at a time when Randolph "firmly believed that only interracial class cooperation could effectively overcome the inequitable conditions created by racial discrimination" (p. 81).

Randolph's third intellectual transition came as the editor of the *Messenger* magazine during World War I and the early 1920s. In this section, Bynum inserts "the issue of gender in terms of manhood and masculinity" because these ideas were "prominent in Randolph's thinking about and articulation of genuine social justice" (p. xi). Using numerous examples from Randolph's *Messenger*, Bynum shows how the magazine's bold, unapologetic rhetoric helped to define "a new and decidedly race-conscious standard of conduct for African Americans in the postwar years" (p. 96). *Messenger* editorials, which endorsed manly and militant behavior by all African American males, advocated black self-defense, collective action, and economic boycott tactics, argued that racial prejudice would cease when it "ceased to pay." Bynum correctly concludes, "In connecting their economic and social agenda rooted in a class critique of industrial capitalism to New Negro ideology, Randolph and the *Messenger* hoped to co-opt the growing racial sentiment of the emerging ghetto and direct it toward more class-based outlets" (p. 99). In this section, Bynum devotes one paragraph to "New Negro" women and their role in serving the New Negro manhood movement. Although Bynum's race-class-religion analysis enhances the understanding of Randolph's evolving political philosophy, the rather glaring omission of how and where women figured into Ran-

dolph's activism undercuts his thesis regarding Randolph's deep commitment to social justice.

In the final section, from the 1920s to the 1940s, Bynum argues that in the hard years it took for the Pullman porters union to be recognized by both the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Pullman Company, Randolph learned three important lessons on the necessity of blending race and class consciousness: that blacks faced special obstacles in the workplace; that existing labor laws did not protect black workers; and that only through concerted political effort by blacks themselves would they gain their political and economic rights. In his fight for the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, and later for the Fair Employment Practices Commission, Bynum's scholarship reveals more clearly than before how Randolph successfully crafted a coherent political philosophy based on a race and class consciousness that reflected the spiritual aspirations and the economic hopes of the black masses.

CYNTHIA TAYLOR

Dominican University of California

LUTHER ADAMS. *Way Up North in Louisville: African American Migration in the Urban South, 1930–1970*. (The John Hope Franklin Series in African American History and Culture.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2010. Pp. xiv, 272. \$49.95.

Luther Adams connects the story of black movement within the South to the better-known narrative of the Second Great Migration. That migration, which is understood generally as the movement of five million black southerners to the North and the West between 1940 and 1970, has received more attention from historians during the past decade. Yet scholars have not yet fully explored the relationship between the migration that crossed regional boundaries and the migration that occurred within a single region. African American men and women who chose to leave the South during this time period frequently moved within the region before heading out of it entirely. Their journeys often took them from a rural southern landscape to a southern city, or from one southern city to another, and then to a northern or western metropolis. Typically, scholars of the Second Great Migration have studied the southern movements with an eye toward understanding the final relocation to the North or West. The intra-regional migration, in and of itself, has garnered scant attention. To tighten the discussion, it might be helpful for scholars to develop terms to describe the migration's varied components.

Adams astutely blends the story of migration with the tale of civil rights and urban renewal, providing a nuanced picture of race relations within Louisville, Kentucky, during the second half of the twentieth century. More than 17,000 African Americans migrated to the city between 1930 and 1970. New Deal policies helped to encourage the move, as Agricultural Adjustment Administration payments led to both ■ reduction of the

acreage under cultivation and the mechanization of farm work, and the National Recovery Administration's requirement of equal wages, while a step forward in terms of social justice, deprived black workers of their value as low-cost employees. During World War II, the migrants found that those hiring at the Louisville industrial plants discriminated openly against black workers, even in the face of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Executive Order 8802. And any gains made during the war were short lived; when white male soldiers returned from the front, the majority of blacks and white women were summarily discharged.

Adams finds that Louisville, as a city of the Upper South, beckoned to migrants with the promise of improved social conditions. In Louisville, blacks encountered what might be termed "polite racism"; the city had, for example, more black police officers than any other city, although they were assigned only to black segregated areas. Whites in Louisville prided themselves in being relatively progressive, but the city had widespread residential segregation and very limited economic opportunities for its black residents. The strides Louisville made toward integration can be attributed to a concerted effort by the civil rights community, rather than any pre-existing progressive attitudes. At the same time that Louisville appeared to offer an improved lifestyle for black migrants, it was still considered to be part of the South, and truly "home" in a way that was not necessarily safe. Violence and oppression were apparent, but the space also felt familiar and important. Adams claims that while the city "was a site of oppression, it was also a site of resistance," and he does an excellent job of recounting the varied forms this resistance took, including the open housing movement, the desegregation of public schools and public accommodations, and the fight against discriminatory hiring practices (p. 57). In this important book, Adams offers a fine study of Louisville's local civil rights activism as well as an account of intraregional migration.

Adams writes, "in their zeal to understand black migration in the urban North, historians seemingly overlook the fact that while more than five million African Americans abandoned the South during this period, an equally large number chose to remain, often relocating to southern cities" (p. 6). I would like to know the extent to which Adams feels that this was an active choice on the part of those who stayed in the South, or to what extent, if any, could the story be interpreted as an interrupted or unrealized migration to the North. Of course, life unfolds for everyone in unexpected ways; some migrants who resettled permanently in the North were surprised that life events never led them back to the South. Were any of those who stayed in Louisville equally surprised that they never found themselves in Chicago, New York, or Los Angeles?

LISA KRISOFF BOEHM

Worcester State University

THOMAS BRUSCINO. *A Nation Forged in War: How World War II Taught Americans to Get Along*. (Legacies of

War.) Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. 2010. Pp. xi, 348. \$39.95.

In this study, Thomas Bruscino examines how white veterans embedded ethnic and religious pluralism brought home from World War II in the American Cold War consensus. Bruscino builds his thesis on a mix of sources, including letters, memoirs, government documents, and the GI Roundtable pamphlet series produced during the war by the American Historical Association. His well-written, accessible narrative will interest both scholars of war and society and the general public.

The World War II military experience, Bruscino argues, taught white American GIs to unite across ethnic and religious boundaries in order to win the war. From the humiliations of boot camp to the terrors of combat, and even during the long periods of tedium in between, white American GIs learned to depend upon, and even love, people who were different from themselves. Focusing primarily on the Army infantry, Bruscino finds numerous soldiers commenting both on the diversity of their units and the bonds of brotherhood that carried them throughout the war. The multi-ethnic "band of brothers" so popular in recent Hollywood portrayals, he discovers, was not a myth.

The crux of Bruscino's argument, however, is what happened when the war ended, and more than fifteen million servicemen came home to a civilian nation far less tolerant than they now were. Particularly through various veterans organizations, including the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, as well as political campaigns, veterans worked diligently to apply the lessons they had learned in the armed forces to the home front. They defined the war's meaning, at least in part, as the obligation to respect ethnic pluralism, fight discrimination, and defend religious freedom. As a result, Bruscino argues, domestic anticommunism, however extreme at times, usually refrained from scapegoating ethnic and religious identities. The political culmination of those efforts, according to Bruscino, was the election of John F. Kennedy as the first Catholic president in 1960.

Bruscino's findings, as he rightly notes, underscore the tragic significance of the decision to segregate the armed forces racially during World War II. If Italians, Irish, Germans, Mexicans, American Indians, Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, once so divided, could get along so well during the war, imagine the social impact that a truly desegregated World War II military might have had. But, alas, that did not happen. Indeed, Bruscino's focus on the leadership of national veterans organizations and the military in the postwar years more than the veteran rank-and-file leads him to overstate the unity of white veterans on the war's meaning and its implications for the postwar world. American GIs, the majority of them white, male, and straight, may have learned very well how to get along with each other but not necessarily how to get along with anyone else. Moreover, Bruscino misses the opportunity to gauge

the depth of white veterans' new-found tolerance by examining the testimony and records of congressional hearings or state, regional, and national veterans conventions held throughout the postwar years. In these venues, veterans often testified on or debated the most polarizing issues of the day, such as the renewal of the Fair Employment Practices Commission or the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. Bruscino does not provide that window into the rank and file for the postwar era, making it harder to determine the depth to which ethnic and religious tolerance really took root. Nonetheless, his book is a solid and entertaining assessment that further humanizes the generation of veterans who played such an important role in shaping the postwar United States.

JENNIFER E. BROOKS
Auburn University

MICHAEL CULLEN GREEN. *Black Yanks in the Pacific: Race in the Making of American Military Empire after World War II.* (The United States in the World.) Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2010. Pp. x, 207. \$35.00.

What was the nature of the African American military experience in Asia during the late 1940s and early 1950s? Michael Cullen Green attempts to answer that question by exploring the thoughts and actions of black GIs who participated in the American occupation of Japan and the Korean War. It was through the evolving relationship between African American GIs and Asian-Pacific people and the making of the American military empire that black GIs perceived themselves as American citizens.

Analyzing primary sources culled from military and National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) records, oral testimony, and the African American press, Green argues that the efforts by black GIs to achieve higher socio-economic status in the emerging American century prohibited any inter-ethnic bonds that they may have established with Asian populations while serving abroad during the immediate post-World War II period. American reconversion woes during the middle to late 1940s and the rapid expansion of American military spheres of influence in Japan and South Korea encouraged African American servicemen and civilians to reconfigure their racial politics to meet the demands of empire. By the end of the Korean War, a desegregated army and an increased American military-based economy further problematized encounters black servicemen shared with Asian friends and foes alike and would have a profound impact on African American-Asian relations.

Organized thematically, the book examines the African Americans who served in the American military in East Asia and their encounters with Asian peoples after World War II through the dual lenses of personal consumption and African American-Asian sexual and romantic relationships. Green demonstrates how harsh living conditions stateside outweighed familial pressures and generational views of military service in ways

that made enlisting in the army quite attractive for young African Americans at the time. "The American military offered what American civilian society would not: decent wages, low-cost housing, adequate health care, affordable commodities, and job security," he contends (p. 10).

At the same time, the massive transfer of black service personnel from Europe to the Pacific after 1945 and fundamental shifts in government recruitment policies increased the number of African American GIs in occupied Japan, thus exposing them to the accoutrements of American democracy that eluded them at home while bringing them in closer contact with Asian peoples. But intimate relations between black servicemen and their Asian partners were doomed from the beginning. Stringent American military regulations barring marriage, strict American immigration laws, and the black press's negative coverage of the motivations of Asian women worked alongside Japanese and Korean pseudoscientific myths about race to produce bouts of suspicion and hostility among black GIs and Asian indigenous populations. Public debate over the fate of the offspring of African American-Asian couples opened a new chapter in the making of American military empire as American policymakers and black domestic interests in the fate of the GI babies yielded to growing support for the war in Korea and to American Cold War imperatives during the 1950s. Green concludes that by the end of the war, African Americans interpreted their roles in the army in ways that produced irreparable fissures in African American-Asian relations.

While insightful at times, Green's analysis is somewhat myopic. First, his heavy reliance on the reflections of those who voluntarily entered the army at the time tends to overshadow the perceptions that black draftees may have had regarding Asian combatants and civilians. Second, his exploration of the racial and sexual encounters between black GIs and Asian women and the implications that these relations may have held for future African American-Asian bonds of fellowship comes up a bit short. For example, Green points out that the fractious relationship between black GIs and Asian civilians in Japan, Korea, and later Vietnam "seemed once again to doom a generation of Afro-Asian children to physical, economic, and emotional exploitation" (p. 146). However, not once while discussing the experiences of the African American-Asian progeny does he ever consider how they may have perceived the dilemmas they faced. Indeed, the reflections of the heirs of this experience are often overlooked. Having said this, the study clearly points the way to future avenues of inquiry to be considered in order for us to fully understand the complexities of this epochal moment in the African American experience in the post-World War II U.S. Army.

ROBERT F. JEFFERSON, JR.

University of Alabama at Birmingham

Jackson: University Press of Mississippi. 2011. Pp. xi, 440. \$55.00.

Although cotton has probably been the subject of more historical studies than any other crop grown in the United States, few of these works focus on the history of this crop in recent times. Thus, we know a great deal about the U.S. cotton industry during its antebellum rise to power and about the transformation of the industry as a result of the Civil War. Studies abound on the cotton industry's reconstruction along retrograde lines in the late nineteenth century and about the inefficiencies and economic and social pathologies associated with the reconstructed industry in the period from the late 1860s to World War II. Only a handful of works have treated cotton's post-1945 revival, however, and none so systematically and methodically as the book under review.

In many ways, the division between the pre- and post-1945 history of cotton is understandable. As D. Clayton Brown points out more than once, the post-1945 history of cotton cultivation in the United States bears little resemblance to the cultivation history of the crop during the preceding century and a half. From the late eighteenth century through World War II, cotton cultivation in the United States was labor intensive, largely non-mechanized, and dependent almost entirely on animate power sources. With the demise of slavery and the subsequent transformation of southern agriculture, cotton cultivation, formerly relatively efficient, was rendered inefficient and technologically backward, with an oversupply of undercapitalized, low-productivity black, white, and, in south Texas, Mexican American farmers eking out livings on tiny, scratch holdings. After World War II, this situation changed quickly and dramatically.

Over the course of one generation—roughly from 1950 to 1970—the U.S. cotton industry, long associated with poverty and underdevelopment, shed such associations once and for all and, in so doing, increasingly found its place in the landscape of modern American agribusiness. It was out with the mules, the walking plows, the sharecroppers (on whom the U.S. Census Bureau stopped compiling statistics after 1959), and the tarpaper shacks; it was in with tractors, mechanical pickers, consolidated and capital-intensive holdings, and spiffy farm homes with the latest urban amenities. Such changes accelerated and intensified after 1970, and today the small number of cotton farms remaining—about 18,600 in 2009 as opposed to 1.5 million in 1945—are among the most modern and efficient in the entire United States.

Brown chronicles this transformation in great detail in his study, which is by far the most thorough and comprehensive scholarly account of the modern U.S. cotton industry yet to appear. The subtitle of Brown's book is *A Cultural, Political, and Economic History since 1945*, and the author really does try to back up this claim. He devotes attention, for example, not just to standard agricultural concerns—mechanization, seed breeding, crop finance, markets, the eradication of the boll wee-

D. CLAYTON BROWN. *King Cotton in Modern America: A Cultural, Political, and Economic History since 1945*.

vil, environmental problems, and the like—but also to topics ranging from the politics of farm subsidies to commercial advertising and branding campaigns to the rise of professional trade associations such as the National Cotton Council of America and Cotton Incorporated. Indeed, he finds space in his account for lengthy discussions of the evolution of the U.S. textile industry, the place of cotton in southern music and literature, and the history of Memphis, which he refers to as the epicenter of the Cotton Belt.

Among the most interesting sections of the book are those on cotton's protracted, multipronged "war" against synthetic fibers and on the westward movement of the industry in the postwar period, particularly to the plains of west Texas and to the San Joaquin Valley of California. These areas—and others in Arizona and New Mexico—pioneered many of the practices that subsequently came to characterize cotton agribusiness in older cotton regions such as the Mississippi-Arkansas delta and, to a lesser extent, the South Atlantic states.

Brown is stronger on narration and description than on analysis, some important work on cotton by economic historians is missed—that by Alan Olmstead and Paul Rhode and by Wayne Grove and Craig Heinicke immediately comes to mind—and the author's research, by and large, cuts off in the middle of the last decade. These quibbles aside, this book represents an impressive scholarly effort, for which Brown deserves considerable praise.

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CHRISTOPHER MCKNIGHT NICHOLS. *Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. 445. \$35.00.

In this book Christopher McKnight Nichols puts contemporary debate over the U.S. role in the wider world in historical perspective. He tracks American ideas about isolationism, internationalism, and political and military interventionism from the late nineteenth century through U.S. involvement in World War I to collective security issues in the war's aftermath and (briefly) the neutrality debates of the 1930s. Often taken to be wizened, embittered, and irrelevant to post-1941 American politics, isolationism is a somewhat neglected tradition that Nichols seeks to restore. His sympathetic reading of isolationism's ideas among key opponents of American colonial and military actions abroad is deserving of close attention. William James, Randolph Bourne, W. E. B. Du Bois, Jane Addams, and the Women's League for International Peace and Freedom leader Emily Greene Balch in intellectual life, and Eugene Debs and William Borah in politics—all are analyzed as part of a constantly changing intellectual disposition.

Nichols makes three essential points. First, isolationism and internationalism should not be considered as purely political phenomena, but intellectual and cul-

tural as well. He locates foreign relations in a context that includes the perspectives of pacifism, socialism, missionary endeavors, and Progressive reform. Second, isolationism and interventionism abroad have often been closely related. The same people could, at different times or in different ways, advocate both positions. Third, isolationism and its alternatives were not themselves monolithic. Acknowledging that the United States could not be a nation sufficient unto itself in the modern world, Nichols divides isolationism into broad camps of political (allowing or encouraging other interactions) and protectionist (walling the United States off economically or demographically) isolationism. This typology hides a myriad of positions, however, and the exposition of this complexity takes precedence in Nichols's account.

Modern controversies over isolationism had their origins, Nichols argues, in the acquisition of an American formal empire in the 1890s. The catalyst was "large policy" thinking expressed by architects of empire such as Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Alfred T. Mahan. They were prepared to intervene in other countries to assert American power, through colonial rule, use of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and participation in faraway wars. These were advocates of American independence of action, though interventionists differed on whether muscle-flexing should occur only in the Western Hemisphere, or be deployed more broadly. In the course of analyzing opposition to these Rooseveltian "large" policies, Nichols offers a substantial re-evaluation of pre-World War I American anti-imperialism.

With Woodrow Wilson, the "large policy" took a new turn toward liberal internationalism. Wilson's adherence to the protocols of neutrality qualified him to be both isolationist (incurring the enmity of ex-president Roosevelt) and advocate of interventionism designed ultimately to create a new liberal world order. Opposing this stance was Bourne, who drew on American exceptionalism to argue for a non-interventionist internationalism. Bourne would exemplify in the development of American immigrant diversity a model for the world in peaceful cultural interchange.

Throughout, key critics of "expansion" and interference in foreign wars favored building the internal strength of the United States through reform. Generous attention goes to philosopher James's search for the moral equivalent of war at home, but this idea was also attractive to Progressive imperialists. Although Roosevelt gets a negative treatment as an advocate of the "large policy," Roosevelt himself sought to strengthen the United States domestically by (selective) reformist actions to restrain "bigness" and by conservation of natural resources. Some of his actions could provide flesh for James's suggestions on this latter subject (p. 96) and show the strength of Nichols's underlying arguments about the complex mingling of isolationism and internationalism.

While Nichols's main interest lies in the ideas of those he terms isolationists, his explanations depend on

the social underpinnings of opinion in the broader sphere of American life. Non-governmental organizations favoring internationalism, such as the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), did not simply prepare the way for or bolster American state power abroad, Nichols understands. YMCA leader John Mott was one of many acting out an ethic different from "large policy" assumptions: Americans could act internationally on a non-governmental level without coercion or military action. Nichols's formulation here comes close to the concept of soft power. But, through sheer association, the YMCA and Mott became rather more entangled with Wilsonian foreign policy than Nichols shows (serving overtly political and ideological as well as humanitarian functions). Soft power and hard power were difficult to separate.

Others before have treated most parts of Nichols's story, but not as constituents in an ambitious synthesis. If the complex taxonomy of isolationist positions portrayed here will baffle some readers, and raise questions over the applicability of the term "isolationism" to his depictions of diverse movements, this is a thoughtful and important contribution to the intellectual history of U.S. foreign relations and to scholarly understanding of the forces shaping a broader U.S. international engagement in the twentieth century.

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MATTHEW FARISH. *The Contours of America's Cold War*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 2010. Pp. xxvii, 351. \$25.00.

In this study, geographer Matthew Farish examines the "imaginative geographies" that emerged in the United States during the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s. The title is slightly off base; although Cold War developments are explored in depth, much of the analysis focuses on World War II. Farish's main concern is the intellectual response to the global engagement forced on a previously parochial United States by foreign dangers, real and imagined, during the mid-twentieth century. In grappling with geopolitical challenges, the mid-century scholarly community reconfigured its spatial conception of the world. As a result, academic geography faced its own challenge as the zeitgeist surrounding its core concerns shifted. Farish thus tells two intertwined stories, one of changing geographical ideas found across society at large, the other focused on the response to such changes by professional geographers.

In considering academic geography, Farish confronts a central paradox of the discipline. Just as the demand for geographical knowledge and methods surged due to the global commitments that accompanied World War II and the Cold War, university-based geography was increasingly marginalized, denigrated by social and natural scientists who found its methods inadequately rigorous and its main concerns insufficiently weighty. As Farish shows, albeit in an oblique manner, geographers did not rise adequately to the challenges posed by this

intellectually hostile atmosphere, and as a result their discipline began to decline.

The Cold War American global imagination has often been framed as anti-geographical, as it was widely assumed at the time that technology was obviating distance and that the spread of modern, scientific civilization—essentially that of the United States—was erasing local cultural distinctions. Farish, however, shows that mid-twentieth-century global discourse was intensely geographical in its own terms. In doing so, he explores four distinct spatial scales: global, continental, regional, and urban. At each level, he argues, military thinking constrained and molded conceptualization. At the global scale, Farish describes a totalizing bifurcation of the world into positive and negative realms, which portrayed the United States as both centrally located and besieged by other landmasses. Continental discourse, he contends, depicted North America as a "cybernetic continent" that could be guarded from atomic attack by high tech warning installations. At the more local level, military intelligence agents along with anthropologists re-envisioned the region as an "abstract tool [used] for instrumental objectives" (p. 139) rather than a simple area amenable to straightforward description. At the level of the city, Farish argues, civil defense considerations outweighed all others; as urban cores came to be seen as uniquely vulnerable to nuclear attack, mass suburbanization was heavily encouraged.

Although focused on geographical matters, the book occasionally moves further afield, delving into such subjects as military psychology and information technology. Farish links such excursions to his central themes through a Foucauldian analysis of postwar American society, one that emphasizes the militarized and masculinist mindset of social engineering. Through most of the text, Farish deploys his theoretical armature with reserve and precision, using it to illuminate key points but never dragging his readers into the thickets of post-structuralist exegesis.

Farish's final chapter, however, is a different matter. Although labeled "conclusion," it does not provide an overview of the book's main themes or a meditation on its ultimate significance. Instead, the concluding chapter takes on yet another scale of the geographical imagination, that of outer space. Here he begins with a straightforward description of the 1956 motion picture *Forbidden Planet*. When he turns to analyze the film, however, Farish veers into the kind of abstruse, name-dropping theorization that once threatened to turn a large segment of human geography into an annex of postmodernist literary studies. For example, he writes, "But the philosophical dislocation of objective science has produced an alternate 'horizon of intelligibility,' which Michel de Certeau has dubbed *science/fiction*." Noting that the unreal multivocality of fiction haunts the singular privilege of science, de Certeau proposed an interspace, or heterology, at the juncture of these two categories" (p. 243).

Farish's turn to ponderous poststructuralism is unfortunate, as his substantive chapters provide valuable

insights into the geographical imagination underpinning intellectual culture in the mid-twentieth-century United States. His exposé of the military's influence on geographical scholarship and the development of the social sciences is especially compelling. Farish has dug deeply in the archives, and has synthesized a large array of disparate materials into a compelling story of intellectual militarization.

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JENNIFER FROST. *Hedda Hopper's Hollywood: Celebrity Gossip and American Conservatism*. (American History and Culture.) New York: New York University Press. 2011. Pp. xv, 281. \$35.00.

Confronting the complex, ambiguous, and contradictory personae of a politically predisposed movie gossip columnist for the *Los Angeles Times*, Jennifer Frost produces a sincere yet thoroughly researched examination of Hedda Hopper's rise and decline with precision and skill. Refusing to shy away from Hopper's reputation as "unpredictable and ruthless," "cold-blooded," "vicious," "fascist" (p. 1), Frost launches her study by acknowledging the controversial image that Hopper herself fabricated. That image was distinguished by conservative verbal politics and a flamboyant visual style, evinced most notably by her attention-grabbing hats. But it was Hopper's "nasty reputation [that] dominated her career, persists today, and overshadows her historical significance" (p. 1). Dismantling her contentious reputation to re-establish Hopper's importance as a cultural and to some extent political icon who navigated the cinema industry while promoting her conservative views from 1938 to 1966, Frost attempts to reposition Hopper as both gossip columnist and American conservative.

This work succeeds in accomplishing two goals. While it presents itself as a biography of Hopper, it also is a critique of how Hopper is contextualized within twentieth-century U.S. sociocultural history. Exploring Hopper's political views, Frost refers to her as a libertarian who "embraced antistatism" (p. 35), aligned herself with conservatives who feared big government as a threat to personal liberty, and endorsed anticommunism. This led her to join J. Edgar Hoover and the House Un-American Activities Committee during the red scare as they targeted actors such as Paul Robeson and Larry Parks and studio executive Dore Schary, among others.

In eight chapters, Frost demonstrates how Hopper sought to create her own style and establish her appeal with fans by positioning her next to contemporaries, most of whom she was in competition with, such as Louella Parsons, Sheilah Graham, Jimmie Fidler, Sidney Skolsky, Edith Gwynne, Ed Sullivan, and Walter Winchell. Relying on Hopper's gossip columns and a range of other sources to read Hopper's intentions and interpret how fans responded to her, Frost unveils the power that Hopper wielded over careers, studio executives, and politicians.

When Hopper interviewed James Roosevelt, son of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, regarding his impending divorce, she was deemed by *Time* magazine as having "'set a new record for keyhole journalism'" (p. 17). She employed foot soldiers, studio press agents, and social gatherings to provide her with the ammunition needed to fill her columns. Hopper wrote "'words that wound or silence that kills'" (p. 29) and made conscious decisions about what to reveal and what to conceal, leaving many in Hollywood fearing her attention.

Navigating Hollywood in a period when her conservative views were not popular, Hopper was reminded that she was a gossip columnist and not a politician. Frost suggests that "Hopper's politics . . . were primarily ideological—whereby longstanding conservative ideas and beliefs determined the political positions she took—and she never wavered in her dedication to using her column in the interests of her political agenda" (p. 35). She shows that Hopper was not above using racial epithets, as she did when black athlete Jackie Robinson visited her home, an act that was in direct contrast with her support of black actor James Baskett, whom she endorsed to receive an Academy Award for his role in *Song of the South* (1946). Hopper denounced claims that she was antisemitic; yet when Louis B. Mayer, MGM production head, wanted her to use her influence to assist his daughters in obtaining admission to an exclusive private school that excluded Jews, she refused.

Targeting entertainers in Hollywood was part and parcel of Hopper's political agenda, yet her politics extended beyond this arena. Hopper used her celebrity status to elevate the Republican Party, advocate for women's rights, campaign for Republican candidates, and destabilize Democratic opposition. Frost suggests that Hopper's political interests may have been an extension of her own ambitions.

Frost ends the book by coming full circle. In the beginning she reveals that the young Hopper was an aspiring actress; toward the end of her career, Hopper played herself, a gossip columnist, in *Sunset Boulevard* (1950). This casting would not have occurred if she had not cultivated, crafted, and fashioned her reputation.

The work succeeds in reconstructing Hopper's politics, unveiling her contradictions objectively, and allowing her personae to emerge. Frost grounds her work in film scholarship regarding spectatorship and reception studies. Most of all the work fills a void in the literature in terms of how gossip columnists shaped the movie industry and influenced the lives of Hollywood stars. What remains unresolved is whether Hopper was indeed an unsuccessful actress who turned to writing gossip columns. Or was she a frustrated divorcee who failed to create a life for herself after her marriage disintegrated and targeted those in the industry? Or was she a small-town girl who was determined to make a name for herself at whatever cost? Or was Hopper not motivated by any particular interest other than becoming

ing a renowned gossip columnist who, by the end of her career, may have regretted her predatory style?

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SUSAN ZEIGER. *Entangling Alliances: Foreign War Brides and American Soldiers in the Twentieth Century*. New York: New York University Press. 2010. Pp. xi, 299. \$45.00.

In this book, Susan Zeiger sheds light on generations of “war brides” whose marriage to American servicemen and subsequent immigration to the United States generated intense public debate and discussion throughout the twentieth century. Defining war brides as a “special category of female immigrants” and a “cultural construction,” Zeiger shows how “intercultural marriages” involving foreign women and American servicemen during and immediately after World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War were never simply private and individual matters but rather public affairs that had much to do with national and international politics. To illuminate the deeply politicized nature of the war bride phenomenon, Zeiger traces three major dynamics that contributed to the “construction” of foreign war brides: American government policies on fraternization, marriage, and immigration; American public reactions to the entry of foreign women into postwar society; and the thoughts and perspectives of war brides themselves.

The picture of war brides that emerges out of the book is rich and multilayered. Far from homogeneous, foreign war brides were a diverse group of women who came from more than one country or region. During and after World War I, primarily European brides, especially French and German women, became the focus of public attention and discussion. Following World War II, Asian and especially Japanese women arrived as a new group of war brides, playing a role in postwar alliance making and facilitating a transition in United States-Japan relations. Through the Korean War and the Vietnam War, yet another group of Asian women, this time Korean and Vietnamese war brides, stepped into the center stage of public debate, reflecting American ambivalence and anxieties about wars that achieved neither closure nor resolution.

Throughout the study, Zeiger highlights the complex ways in which race, gender, and sexuality intersected to inform war brides’ experiences as well as American public responses and reactions. Perceived as “other women,” war brides were often subject to intense suspicion by the American government and public, who understood their racial-national differences in gender and sexual terms and viewed them as dangerous seducers who posed threats to postwar American society. These dynamics were made even more complex when foreign women were involved with minority servicemen. Within the context of Jim Crow racism and anti-miscegenation laws that informed domestic racial dynamics in the United States, minority and especially

African American soldiers’ involvement with white European women heightened public concerns and anxieties about racial mixing, resulting in a further proliferation of discourses and practices concerning gender, race, and sexuality. The strength of Zeiger’s analysis is particularly evident in chapter five, “Interracialism, Pluralism, and Civil Rights: War Bride Marriage in the 1940s and 1950s,” where she offers fascinating accounts of war brides, minority soldiers, and postwar civil rights mobilization. Tracing the stories of white European women who married African American servicemen, Zeiger reveals how some of these women came to experience American racism in personal terms and participated in civil rights struggles in order to defend their spouses. While challenging racism in their newly adopted country, however, these women did not necessarily challenge gender inequality but rather upheld traditional expectations by being mothers and wives and fulfilling the postwar ideal of American womanhood. The ways in which gender, race, sexuality, and nationality intersected in these women’s lives were far from obvious or predictable.

Zeiger’s project is part of the ongoing endeavor of scholarship in which researchers such as Cynthia Enloe, Elaine Tyler May, Katharine Moon, Sandra Pollock Sturdevant, and Brenda Stoltzfus continue to point to the significance of women and gender in our understandings of international relations. Drawing on this tradition, Zeiger situates the stories of war brides at the center of her analysis of wartime mobilization and postwar demobilization and illustrates how seemingly mundane grassroots experiences of foreign women who married American servicemen open a window onto geopolitics of war, nation, and empire. Culling varied and sometimes obscure tales of war brides from various parts of the world, Zeiger makes a clear case that excavating women’s experiences from historical obscurity is a crucial component in scholarly understanding of the nation’s past. Furthermore, as the book provides “a story of deep and continuing uneasiness with internationalism on the part of Americans” (p. 9), it offers opportunities for critical reflection on American encounters with racial and national others. Against the backdrop of current and sometimes excessive celebration of “multiculturalism” and “globalism,” the monograph provides a much needed reminder of America’s involvement in racism and xenophobia in the past that has shaped and continues to inform American domestic and international practices vis-à-vis racial and national others.

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CHRISTINE YANO. *Airborne Dreams: “Nisei” Stewardesses and Pan American World Airways*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2011. Pp. xv, 228. Cloth \$79.95, paper \$22.95.

Between 1955 and 1972, Pan American World Airways recruited a small corps of Japanese American flight

stewardesses in order to add Japanese-language speakers to the famously luxe service on their Pacific routes. In this intriguing study, Christine Yano opens up the meaning of that initiative for both the airline and the women themselves, tapping some thirty or more oral histories that she conducted with former stewardesses. Identified as “Nisei” (second-generation Japanese Americans) regardless of their individual circumstances, these women domesticated international travel by blending the racially exotic appearance that embodied Pan Am’s promotion of global tourism with the comfort of a native speaker of English. In many cases, the Japanese-language abilities of these women were minimal due to the wartime dismantling of Japanese-language schools in Hawai‘i and the suppression of the Japanese language at home by cautious parents. This was a racial hire under the guise of language, Yano tells us, incorporating women’s bodies into the airline’s global strategies.

Yano blends three themes: the global ambitions of Pan American Airways, the minority status of the Japanese American stewardesses and their community, and the cosmopolitan lifestyle of the Jet Age. Of the three strands, she explores the Jet Age the least, noting that increased speed meant increased access to distant countries, but the deeper possibilities in this inherently technological periodization remain undeveloped. Importantly, the stewardesses occupy the center of the analysis, for Yano intends to invert the conventional hierarchy of history and biography, taking “the women’s lives and voices as the overarching framework within which the larger history of airlines, industries and nations may be ‘narrated, situated and embodied’” (p. 58). Yano argues that while Pan Am’s genius was to mesh corporate dreams with individual ones, the Nisei stewardesses quietly “carved out their own sense of self within its framework” (p. 162). They made many choices—defying family expectations of married life, appropriating elements of upper-class culture, accepting subservience to passengers in cabin service, rejecting the geisha image, circumventing the mandatory dress code, challenging the division of labor among the crew, declining invitations to after-hours parties—and Yano argues that both the acceptance and rejection of expectations should be seen as a constant assertion of self. Indeed, the book makes its largest contribution in an examination of racialized gender, of self-assertion within a powerfully conformist culture offered by family and corporation.

Historians who use oral histories will be sympathetic to Yano’s ambition to use the small details of everyday life to illuminate the larger issues of corporations and nations. The author achieves that in part by focusing on cultural meaning. To that end, Yano subordinates narrative to analysis and draws upon a wide array of secondary literature from the last decade to extract conceptual tools for her inquiry. Some will be disappointed that the voices of the women themselves do not constitute a larger part of the book, but Yano’s analysis makes us much more sophisticated listeners than we

would have been otherwise. She acknowledges that the one weakness of her sources is that the women that she interviewed were recruited through employee social organizations that outlasted Pan American itself; their enthusiasm for the “Pan Am way” is not surprising, given their continuing engagement with that period of their lives. That she was able to recover the history of this small changing cadre at all is impressive and valuable.

Yano finds power in the concept of “frontier,” navigating this difficult terrain with scholarship from the new western history and borderlands as reference points. She deploys a refurbished concept of “frontier,” which she describes as a shifting zone of innovation and social contact lying on the margins or interstices of cultural networks. An anthropologist, she claims that the “frontier” works both as an emic and an etic; it is both how contemporaries understood the pioneering aspects of Pan Am, Nisei stewardesses, and Jet Age travel, and a heuristic concept useful for scholarly analysis. Her study persuasively shows Nisei stewardesses operating within a shifting zone in the interstices of cultural networks; they negotiated race, class, gender, and cultural difference in a new space created by technological innovation, all in the course of a simple cabin service. However, Yano clearly shows that Pan American executives like Juan Trippe understood their technological and corporate pioneering in terms sympathetic to the older ideological definition of frontier—an innovative space so far in front of cultural practice that the individual invents and dictates the new rules. These multiple meanings suggest that a single term is not as useful as it seems at first, flattening distinctions rather than sharpening them. Yet it would be a mistake not to embrace the notion of the aircraft cabin on an international flight as a “frontier,” and to miss the complex cultural analysis that Yano provides in this deft study of pioneering Japanese American women.

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BARRY REAY. *New York Hustlers: Masculinity and Sex in Modern America*. (Encounters: Cultural Histories.) New York: Manchester University Press. 2010. Pp. xiv, 279. Cloth £65.00, paper £17.99.

Rather than the businessman’s suit of gray flannel, this book sees the New York hustler’s cuffed jeans and tight t-shirt as American masculinity’s representative mid-twentieth-century attire. In actuality and imagery, Barry Reay insists, the hustler is essential to understanding American male sexuality before the late 1960s. It is an author’s occupational hazard to overstate the significance of his or her subject, and Reay does so with hustlers. Nonetheless, the book provides fresh information and insight about the occupation of male sex work.

But Reay stalks bigger, more elusive game in this ambitious book. Even if his argument for the hustler’s centrality may not convince many readers, he lucidly and engagingly theorizes about male sexuality. At the very

least, New York's hustlers make for an intriguing case study in midcentury manhood; but these few men are not shown to be—they are merely said to be—representative of American males in general. Because of his discoveries about hustlers, Reay makes a provocative argument that American male sexuality in the twentieth century needs a new periodization; while he does not conclusively demonstrate said necessity, this book will nonetheless spark scholarly conversations about the matter.

To examine the doings, self-definition, and symbolic significance of New York hustlers, Reay makes elaborate use of the large archive on Thomas Painter, Alfred Kinsey's "key informant" (p. 21) who himself studied, photographed, housed, and habituated Times Square hustlers. Additionally, Reay cleverly interprets an impressive array of other mid-century material: novels, plays, song lyrics, and paintings, as well as social scientific writing about hustling and about men in prison. Reay sees hustler types all over the place: in Arthur Miller's *View from the Bridge* and William Inge's *Picnic*, for example; in the persona of James Dean and the paintings of Paul Cadmus (surely no stretch there); in the portrayal of convicted murderers Richard Hickock and Perry Smith in Truman Capote's *In Cold Blood* (1965) and in Richard Avedon's photographs of the two.

To Reay, hustlers are the prototypical males of mid-century America, especially in how they defined—or, as Reay would have it—refused to define themselves sexually. Painter wrote Kinsey that a young hustler once told him, "Thank God I'm just a cocksucker and not queer" (p. 20); widespread refusal among hustlers to define themselves as homosexual, even though their livelihood required extensive homosexual activity, represented "a very different sexual regime" (p. 45), an "untidiness of categories" (p. 69) that was pervasive in the United States, Reay maintains, until the gay rights movement and its opponents reified a binary view of sexuality. According to Reay, until the late 1960s, the only American men unequivocally identified as homosexual by themselves and others were those who were effeminate in manner and often passive in their sexual activities.

The influence of Michel Foucault has familiarized us with the distinction between homosexual activity, widely found, and homosexual identity, constructed only at certain times in certain places. In American historiography, George Chauncey's *Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male World, 1890–1940* (1994) has been highly influential in arguing that a distinct gay identity began emerging in the United States in the late nineteenth century. Although that identity was initially confined to those men who were thought somehow womanly in manner and sexual practice, Chauncey maintains that a dichotomized male sexuality was firmly in place by the twentieth century's midpoint, with anyone who engaged in homosexual activity, regardless of his mannerisms or particular sexual practices, identified as gay. Reay in-

sists that Chauncey assigned too early a time for the firm implantation of the sexual binary. "I am resisting," says Reay, "gay identity as a heuristic guide to the period before the late 1960s" (p. 253).

But Reay himself sometimes uncritically takes people at their word and then cavalierly assigns those words broad relevance. He assumes wide import in Richard Bruce Wright's recollection of the ambiguous sexual atmosphere of a Harlem Renaissance speakeasy: "Nobody was in the closet. There wasn't any closet" (p. 253). Reay accepts at face value John Cheever's and Roy Cohn's insistence, echoing the declarations of many a hustler, that, in spite of extensive sexual activity with men, they were not homosexual—because they did not fit an effeminate stereotype. Similarly, he points to Gore Vidal's differentiation of himself from Truman Capote by likening Capote to a woman. It ought at least to be considered that Cheever's, Cohn's, and Vidal's remarks attest more to a denial of self than to defiance of a sexual binary, that their gendered declarations might document the already firm implantation of the binary in American culture. Self-definition can be misleading as historical evidence, or even as a description of a historian's own work.

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ROBERT WUTHNOW. *Remaking the Heartland: Middle America since the 1950s*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 358. \$35.00.

In this study, sociologist Robert Wuthnow counters accepted narratives of the Midwest as a region in decline. Rather, Wuthnow contends, the region is characterized by adaptation, much of it for the better, and survival. In the rural heartland (Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota) change, not stasis, was the common condition, and the declension narrative only pertains if images of historic midwestern stability are accepted at face value. Furthermore, recovery from the Great Depression took longer and was more painful in the Middle West than scholars and commentators have assumed, and lasted throughout the 1950s. The ensuing postwar readjustment was successful in terms of "bringing economic restructuring to the region, in redistributing the population to take fuller advantage of changing labor markets, and in strengthening its ties to other parts of the country" (p. 16). By 2000, the heartland states had experienced gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates that equaled or excelled those of other states, attracted new residents at a comparable rate with states in other regions, and become more diverse and more tolerant. Wuthnow concludes that the great American midsection is better off than it was sixty years ago.

The book is an ambitious and successful project. While Wuthnow's "multimethod research design" may not sound familiar to historians, the results look much

the same as traditional historical research. He draws on statistical data and qualitative source material (oral history and interviews, newspapers, local histories, government documents, and memoirs) to show the ways in which Midwesterners altered farming techniques, reorganized business ventures and community life, and emphasized high quality public education. Edge cities became increasingly important in the region, because the office parks, corporate headquarters, and research labs located there helped retain midwestern university graduates and attracted outsiders. Readers will appreciate that the post-1950s period does not exist in a vacuum. In each chapter and to great effect, Wuthnow examines nineteenth- and early twentieth-century antecedents to explain the postwar period. One notable example of this is the way the author demonstrates how the rise of agribusiness after World War II did not represent a disjuncture with prewar conditions. Stories of the decentralization of the meatpacking industry from cities to rural areas of low wages and easy access to transportation need greater context, Wuthnow shows. Farm families of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries fought monopoly power through cooperation, both informal and formal, and actively sought greater control over price through ever greater market connections, efforts that prepared the way for major agribusinesses. Towns such as Garden City, Kansas exemplified this trend by welcoming and accommodating significant economic and demographic change.

The author is not always completely persuasive, however. The chapter on remaking midwestern identity is the least satisfactory of the book's seven chapters. Wuthnow claims that Middle Westerners retained a local and regional identity "by shaping the meaning of the various traditions at their disposal," simultaneously deemphasizing the region's Wild West past and stressing the stories of creative and dogged pioneers such as the Ingalls family, made famous by Laura Ingalls Wilder (p. 59). But changing perceptions about the Wild West as an increasingly mythical and remote place, both temporally and spatially, seem much more of an American phenomenon than a specifically midwestern one. Wuthnow's definition of the heartland is provoking. On the surface, the selection of the nine states as the heartland makes sense. These states occupy the great middle swath of the nation from Canada to the northern boundaries of Texas and Louisiana where there are few metropolitan centers and agriculture remains among the most significant economic activities. Yet Arkansas is undeniably southern and is an outlier in regard to educational attainment and other evidence the author presents. Excluding Illinois and Indiana, not to mention Ohio, Wisconsin, and Michigan, is odd, given the many similarities with Wuthnow's heartland states and their traditional midwestern association. Finally, the book would benefit from greater attention to the ways in which the ecosystems of the rural Midwest have been shaped by significant economic transformations. Irrigation is an important topic in the book, but there is little note of changes in water quality and availability, such

as groundwater contamination related to livestock and crop production or the impact of irrigation on the Ogallala Aquifer. Despite these comparatively minor complaints, the book under review is a well-written, detailed, and persuasive account of change in the region.

J. L. ANDERSON

Mount Royal University

DAVID HAMILTON GOLLAND. *Constructing Affirmative Action: The Struggle for Equal Employment Opportunity*. (Civil Rights and the Struggle for Black Equality in the Twentieth Century.) Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 2011. Pp. xiv, 248. \$50.00.

The last two decades have seen a rise in book-length historical studies of affirmative action. David Hamilton Golland's work is a welcome addition to the literature and debates on this contentious issue. Focusing on Philadelphia, the title puns the particular focus he has taken on this key aspect of affirmative action, namely the struggle for equal employment opportunity for African Americans who for years were excluded from the construction industry and its trade unions.

Golland reminds us that "affirmative action" has been not just a public policy filled with ironies, interest convergences, and unintended consequences but also a struggle that at its heart challenges the privileges of white supremacy. The book's dust jacket features a 1963 photograph of black men and women picketing a construction site in Philadelphia, led by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and other civil rights groups. One picket sign reads: "Phila.'s Labor Bigots Must Go Also." Indeed, the NAACP and the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) locked horns over segregated trade unions both North and South in the 1960s. George Shultz, Secretary of Labor and Commerce under President Richard Nixon, once wryly commented that before the Philadelphia Plan the quota for blacks in the construction industry was zero.

Golland has successfully mined primary sources from government, labor, and civil rights organizations to debunk notions of Nixon as an affirmative action pioneer or civil rights president. He seeks instead to help restore to the historical narrative the important role played by popular forces campaigning for civil rights as sparks to this public policy, which he further notes was kept alive by certain government bureaucrats through the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Chapters one and two chart the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations' reluctant response to civil rights movement pressure. Chapter three highlights federal officials' testing employment integration plans between the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1967 introduction of the Philadelphia and Cleveland Plans. Chapters four and five use Philadelphia as a point of departure to view local and national battles over affirmative action in construction from 1967 to 1973.

"This book," writes Golland, "treats the two itera-

tions of the Philadelphia Plan as the collective watershed moment in the origin of affirmative action" (p. 3). Tracing the history of that plan, Golland effectively contrasts it with progress or obstruction in other cities. Despite opponents' claims that this was a quota system, Golland points out that it was not, noting that civil rights leaders themselves were "leery of quotas" (p. 128). The plan did, however, require the construction industry and unions to set goals and timetables for training and hiring African Americans. Golland highlights the work of affirmative action advocates like NAACP Labor Secretary Herbert Hill and Assistant Secretary of Labor Arthur Fletcher, contrasted with Nixon's cynical usage of affirmative action to try to split the Democratic Party's labor and civil rights constituencies. That overt attempt was perhaps best exemplified with his appointment of trade union leader and affirmative action opponent Peter Brennan as secretary of labor.

Golland makes no apology for his affirmative action advocacy. This is not problematic in itself. But he encounters analytical gridlock by narrowly framing affirmative action as simply "positive steps" (p. 173) for "equal opportunity," with "preferences and quotas" being departures from what was "originally intended" (p. 5). Who intended this? What if "positive steps" alone turned out to be an insufficient remedy to combat discrimination? How do we undo historical white preferences in construction or anywhere else without introducing correctives that include some kind of black "hiring preferences," as Nancy MacLean put it in her discussion of the Philadelphia Plan (p. 173)? Golland also misreads "diversity" as a diversion from affirmative action public policy (p. 172), whereas Kimberle Crenshaw and others have noted that "diversity" became an affirmative action strategy after the 1978 *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke* decision banned minority admissions preferences and quotas in higher education.

The book is clearly argued and accessibly written—no easy task when trying to describe details of the construction trades, popular movements, labor organizations, and civil rights law. It is less successful in its broader view of the affirmative action struggle. In addition, some antiquated conceptualizations periodically pop up (e.g., "white backlash," pp. 119, 150). There is also the occasional odd generalization such as: "At the start of 1961, civil rights leaders could look back at two decades of progress in voting rights and public accommodation" (p. 33), suggesting a need for better editing.

Nonetheless, this is both a good scholarly and general read, not to mention teaching tool. Few historians have focused so much research on the construction industry and trade unions as one of the key sites of the modern affirmative action battle. With the U.S. Supreme Court possibly poised to overturn affirmative action, we need to see what we may lose with its dismantling.

PHILIP F. RUBIO

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LARRY GRUBBS. *Secular Missionaries: Americans and African Development in the 1960s*. (Culture, Politics, and the Cold War.) Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 2009. Pp. viii, 243. \$34.95.

Larry Grubbs's book is a thoughtful account of the creation, implementation, and shortcomings of U.S. aid policy in Africa during the 1960s. Based on archival material, published primary sources, and a wide range of secondary works, this history utilizes the examples of Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Congo to show that American aid policy toward Africa was flawed from the beginning and therefore had no chance for success. The book delves into cultural ideas ingrained in "secular missionaries" who executed development policies in Africa.

Shortly after his inauguration, President John F. Kennedy acted on his campaign promise to assist the development of African nations in order to ensure that they looked to the United States rather than to the Soviet Union for "leadership." To that end, he created the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Peace Corps, and assigned them to promote development and modernization in Africa. While USAID focused on grants and technical aid, Peace Corps volunteers provided a variety of educational and community development services. Fittingly, Kennedy termed the 1960s the "Decade of Development" and brought into his administration leading experts on modernization theory and African affairs.

USAID's performance was stymied from the beginning by its cumbersome procedures, burdensome congressional oversight, and budget cuts. African governments were to abide by guidelines that were generally unclear as Ambassador William Attwood of Guinea noted: "You couldn't blame the Guineans for being confused in our procedures; we had trouble understanding some of them ourselves" (p. 133). USAID delayed aid to Somalia, Senegal, and other nations on the grounds that their development plans were poorly designed and did not include enough "self-help" projects, prompting Somalia's prime minister to complain that American aid "procedures are too slow, conditions too restrictive" (p. 132). In addition officials in Washington often failed to consult with leaders of African nations. Uncertain of the procedures, nations turned to American experts for help. Nigeria's development plan, for example, was written by an American economist, Wolfgang Stolper, who had limited knowledge of Nigeria's history. Little was achieved. Considered by the agency to be an emerging leader in Africa, Nigeria experienced a coup in 1966 and the following year was thrown into a civil war. In the Sudan USAID did a feasibility study of a road from Khartoum to Port Sudan, but the project was only completed in the 1990s by a company known as the Bin Laden Group. The Congo crisis exposed the tragedy of U.S. policy in Africa. The nation eventually fell under the control of Mobutu Sésé Seko, one of Africa's worst despots and a key U.S. ally in the region. And so went the story of USAID's involvement in Af-

rica. By the mid-1960s the "Decade of Development" had turned into a "Decade of Discouragement," and policy makers rushed to provide an explanation.

The book is equally revealing about the role of race in the creation of American foreign policy. A very "white" agency, USAID ignored repeated requests from African American leaders to assist in the formulation of an African policy. When the American Negro Leadership Conference asked to provide input, it was marginalized while members of the white-dominated African Studies Association received uninterrupted access to Washington corridors. Increasingly, African leaders grew impatient with American racism. With limited success policy makers argued that Africans were backward and culturally inferior, and as a result modernization needed more time in order to succeed there. Even President Lyndon Johnson was not immune: "We just couldn't allow the cannibals kill a lot of people," (p. 147) he said in reference to the Congo crisis. Africa's allies in Washington such as G. Mennen Williams could not emancipate themselves from such views. Africans were used to their "communal ways of living," he wrote (p. 146). Washington bureaucrats dismissed Africans as "irrational," "too sensitive," "irresponsible," "provincial," and as a people with "deep personal insecurity" (p. 146). In a rush to scapegoat someone for failed policies, few considered that the African region received the least amount of U.S. aid. In addition, a colonial legacy of exploitive trade practices and recurring unfair policies from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund thwarted Africa's overall development efforts. Given those forces, Grubbs's conclusion is apt: "Assigning Africans the blame for their misfortunes has freed Western governments and the World Bank from shouldering responsibility, which is one reason why representations of African barbarism persist in popular culture, the media, and officialdom" (p. 179).

Despite the strengths of the book, Grubbs's discussion of Peace Corps performance is a little superficial. While volunteers shared beliefs of Africa's difference, they lived and worked alongside the local community. Their work helped to tear down racial barriers and educate Americans about African societies. Returned volunteers have increasingly challenged the notion that globalization is just about economic imperatives, adding that it is also about human dignity, respect, and understanding. Also, it would have been helpful to place the analysis within the broader spectrum of the ideology of U.S. foreign policy.

But these weaknesses should not detract from this timely and insightful addition to the literature. Grubbs's book will encourage additional work on the performance of USAID, the Peace Corps, and the role of African Americans in shaping U.S. policy.

JULIUS A. AMIN
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STEFAN M. BRADLEY. *Harlem vs. Columbia University: Black Student Power in the Late 1960s*. Urbana and Chi-

cago: University of Illinois Press. 2009. Pp. ix, 249. \$40.00.

While the Black Power and student movements of the 1960s and 1970s have each received ample attention from historians, the northern black student movement during this era has been somewhat overlooked. This has been due, in part, to the relative inability of historians of the New Left to fit black student groups within their analytical frameworks. The few studies we do have on black student protest in the North have tended to overcompensate for this problem by pushing white students out of the picture. Moreover, scholars who have focused on black student politics have largely failed to bring their stories down from the ivory tower and connect them to civil rights and black power struggles in the communities below. For example, few, if any, have placed black high school and college students in the same frame. The result is that the northern black student movement has been cast off on its own, isolated from both the New Left and the black power movement.

To be sure, bringing together the stories of black and white student protest in the 1960s is no easy task, and Stefan M. Bradley deserves much credit for doing so admirably in his study of campus activism at Columbia University. Columbia, in particular, became a key battleground for both the New Left and black power movements in 1968 and 1969 after it embarked on a plan to build a new gymnasium in Harlem's Morningside Park despite the vocal objections of black community leaders and organizations. For the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), mobilizing against this racist land-grab fit into its larger strategy of radicalizing the student body in order to build a powerful movement to challenge a range of university policies, including the administration's links with the Defense Department and its refusal to give students a meaningful say in campus affairs. For black student activists and Black Power leaders like H. Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael, both of whom joined Columbia's black student protestors, confronting the attempt by this symbol of white privilege to seize a vital resource from a working-class black community was a critical test for the Black Power movement's ideas about local control and self-determination. Bradley concludes that both white students and black students ended up achieving their objectives, but they did so by abandoning "the racially integrated struggle approach" and "separating along racial lines" (p. 7).

This study attempts to approach the events that transpired at Columbia from many different angles—perhaps too many. In addition to telling the story of the so-called "Gym Crow" issue from the perspective of both Columbia's Students Afro-American Society (SAS) and its SDS branch, Bradley also examines the university's troubled relationship with the black and Puerto Rican communities of Harlem and Morningside Heights, provides an overview of similar black student protests at several other Ivy League universities, and tries to explain why university administrations at Columbia and elsewhere yielded to the demands of stu-

dent protestors. This is an ambitious agenda, and the results are mixed. Bradley is at his best when he is exploring the relationship between the SAS and SDS, and explaining why SAS broke from what seemed like a powerful coalition. Black students at Columbia decided to go it alone, he argues, “so they could have an identity of their own” (p. 78) and so the university would be forced to deal with the issue of race on their terms. These feelings reflected the desire of black students, more than half of whom came from working-class families, to develop a sense of racial and class solidarity with the residents of Harlem and Morningside Heights. In addition, black students mistrusted the commitment of their privileged white peers to the plight of working-class communities. These are important perspectives that contribute to a clearer understanding of how Black Power ideology played out on college campuses in the late 1960s. However, Bradley does not deliver on his account of the relationship between the university and its neighbors, because his depiction of Harlem and Morningside Heights lacks texture. This is partly due to the book’s overreliance on published, campus-based sources and its lack of documentation from neighborhood sources. We thus learn little about the give and take that likely characterized the relationship between Columbia’s black students and community leaders. And, while Bradley frequently mentions Puerto Ricans as another community victimized by university policies, we are never sure of how they fit into the picture.

Despite these shortcomings, the book succeeds in complicating and enriching our understanding of the forces that shaped northern black student politics in the 1960s and 1970s.

ANDREW J. DIAMOND

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FRITZ UMBACH. *The Last Neighborhood Cops: The Rise and Fall of Community Policing in New York Public Housing*. (Critical Issues in Crime and Society.) New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 2011. Pp. x, 233. \$39.95.

In its 1968 report, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the “Kerner Commission”) highlighted the difficult relations between African Americans and the police. The Kerner Commission echoed charges that the police frequently brutalized African Americans, particularly young criminal suspects, and many critics accused the police of being occupiers of a restive ghetto colony. Even during this turbulent period, however, a majority of African Americans continued to express their faith in the police in public opinion surveys, although opinions varied based on the respondent’s age. This should have surprised no one, because poor African Americans were more likely to be the victims of crime (unfortunately perpetrated by their neighbors) than any other group in American society. This is an insight that escaped most commentators at the time and most historians since.

Fritz Umbach’s book is therefore a welcome correc-

tion that engages many more topics than its narrow subtitle suggests, including the history of public housing, the war on poverty, civil rights, and the “procedural rights” revolution of the 1960s. Based on careful archival research into the New York City Housing Authority police department archives and interviews with both former officers and residents, Umbach’s book provides a bottom-up view of residents’ interactions with police.

Tenants, at least until the 1970s, saw the housing police as “our cops” largely because they were. At a time when the New York City Police Department (NYPD) was nearly completely white, the housing police were forty-five percent black and Latino in 1965, a proportion that increased over the next decade, and some housing police lived in housing projects themselves. Moreover, except for a couple of failed experiments with organizing the housing police hierarchically in precincts, housing cops patrolled the same projects on foot every shift, thus allowing residents and police to forge close ties. Police enforced community norms as well as housing authority regulations, and residents cooperated with police in reporting violations and disciplining their children. Some of the recollections in the book may seem tinged with nostalgia, but, as Umbach shows, New York’s housing projects generally had lower rates of violent crime than nearby neighborhoods. The housing police pioneered what became known as “community policing,” in which residents were empowered to take action in conjunction with police.

So why did the model fail? Umbach points to the procedural rights revolution sparked by poverty lawyers funded through the Office of Economic Opportunity as a key change. Efforts to exclude unmarried mothers with children, felons, and applicants with a history of behavioral issues from public housing failed due to a combination of extreme need—an increasing homeless population caused by gentrification and real estate speculation—and court cases charging the housing authority with using arbitrary and illegal discriminatory criteria for selecting applicants. Rules for daily conduct and a system of fines for violators ended on due process grounds, and after *Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority* (1970), evictions of drug dealers and others who preyed on their law-abiding neighbors became nearly impossible. Simultaneously, the growth of the underground economy made reliance on illegal income more necessary, so-called “ghost tenants” (persons not registered on the lease) more prevalent, and close ties to police more problematic. In Umbach’s telling, communitarian ideals clashed with individual rights and, unfortunately for the residents of New York’s housing projects, individual rights won and crime rates in the 1980s and 1990s soared as difficult residents and dysfunctional families accumulated.

The housing police had a role in the collapse of community policing too. They envied the better-paid and more prestigious NYPD and wanted a promotion ladder that the horizontal organization of the housing police (in which nearly everyone patrolled) could not provide. Residents’ demands for more police as crime rates

rose facilitated a shift to a precinct model in which police were dispatched by car to trouble spots, and arrests and responsiveness to 911 calls became the measure of efficiency in a more militarized organization. The precinct model also created more supervisory positions for police and blurred some of the differences between police forces. Finally, the merging of recruitment lists and the assignment of new officers to the city police, the housing police, and the transit police according to a formula resulted in the housing police becoming whiter and more suburban even as the NYPD itself became more diverse. Community policing was dead before New York's three police forces merged in 1995.

Umbach embeds the agency of residents and police within larger processes of deindustrialization, gentrification, and the rise of the underground economy. Some will no doubt disagree with Umbach's emphasis on the role of difficult families in worsening community life while inexorably changing the relationship with police. But even if Umbach's account of the procedural rights revolution and its results could be more nuanced, he is right to emphasize the role of resident activists in demanding safer environments for their community. Safety, as Umbach notes, was a civil right too.

ERIC C. SCHNEIDER

University of Pennsylvania

EDWARD R. SCHMITT. *President of the Other America: Robert Kennedy and the Politics of Poverty*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 2010. Pp. ix, 324. \$39.95.

Dismayed by continued war and violence in the late 1960s, millions of Americans looked to Robert F. Kennedy to renew the idealism lost with the murders of his brother, John F. Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, Jr. In this thoroughly researched study, Edward R. Schmitt argues that the younger Kennedy's brand of idealism centered on a theme that John Kennedy had neglected and King championed near the end of his life: the elimination of poverty in the United States. Schmitt reveals both the dwindling significance of poverty to the national discourse and the personal values that compelled Robert Kennedy to dwell "on the tragedy of the poor" (p. 1).

Schmitt traces Kennedy's life from his boyhood through his political career and death with an eye on how his experiences shaped his relationship with the poor. Despite his privileged upbringing, Kennedy's early life and Irish Catholic identity engendered empathy for excluded minority groups and impoverished Americans. Friends depicted young Robert as a socially awkward outsider in prep school and at Harvard. Unlike his gallant older brothers (German flak guns killed Joseph in a bombing raid during World War II), Robert served in a less-than-glamorous capacity as a naval officer. The younger Kennedy lacked both the charisma and the heroic war story that propelled his brother into the national political spotlight.

Schmitt provides new insight into Kennedy's influ-

ence on federal civil rights initiatives and the early stages of the War on Poverty in his capacity as Attorney General. While Schmitt acknowledges that the Kennedys dragged their feet on civil rights to avoid alienating southern Democrats, RFK established his reputation as an ally to African Americans with his support for the rights of marchers (if not always their physical defense). The younger Kennedy also significantly influenced antipoverty policy as it expanded through the 1960s, particularly with his advocacy of community action. The administration emphasized programs organized locally by the poor themselves to reform dysfunctional economic environments that perpetuated poverty. RFK's boyhood friend David Hackett, appointed to direct the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, applied the theories of Columbia sociologists Lloyd Ohlin and Richard Cloward in experimental projects to curtail gang violence and narcotics trafficking. The Kennedy administration extended Ohlin and Cloward's ideas to antipoverty efforts in the Appalachians. President Lyndon B. Johnson, in turn, made community action the primary strategy of federal antipoverty policy on a national scale.

After his brother's assassination, Kennedy wanted to lead the War on Poverty, which Johnson declared in 1964. The mutual animosity between Johnson and the attorney general made such an appointment unlikely, but Schmitt makes a convincing case that Kennedy genuinely desired to become the nation's chief antipoverty warrior. Johnson appointed Kennedy's brother-in-law Sargent Shriver to direct the new Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) but might have been well advised to appoint Kennedy to the post. As New York's junior senator, Kennedy pushed LBJ aside as the champion of the impoverished. The OEO became embroiled in controversy and derided by critics from the right and left, including RFK. An appointment to OEO would have at least delayed Kennedy's political ambitions, if not derailed them altogether (as OEO did to Shriver's ambitions).

Arguably the most significant role Kennedy played in the national debate on poverty was his highly visible presence among the poor themselves. As a senator and presidential candidate, Kennedy regularly toured urban slums, Appalachian hollows, and Indian reservations. More than any previous politician, even LBJ, Kennedy embraced Latinos as a constituency deserving national attention. Schmitt portrays Kennedy's concern for minorities and the poor as heartfelt and genuine, not merely politically opportunistic. Indeed, Kennedy rejected the advice of advisors who discouraged the attention he devoted to poverty. At one point he labeled his advisors "a bunch of bastards" when they suggested he not waste precious campaign time on politically marginal "Injuns" (p. 204). He went out of his way to shake the dirty, calloused hands of coal miners or to speak with frightened ghetto or barrio children. He walked into shacks in the Mississippi Delta and was shocked to find American children in the late twentieth century who endured Third World hunger and squalor. By get-

ting to know the poor personally, Kennedy created conditions for, in Schmitt's words, a rare and "honest dialogue with racial minorities and the poor in America" (p. 228).

Schmitt's portrait of Kennedy's intimacy with the poor makes the candidate's 1968 murder all the more tragic. The book may strike some readers as a bit too hagiographical, but there can be little doubt that Bobby Kennedy was the last American politician able to keep the nation's attention on the contradiction of entrenched poverty amidst great affluence, at least through the summer of 1968.

WILLIAM CLAYSON
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JEFFERSON COWIE. *Stayin' Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class*. New York: New Press. 2010. Pp. 464. \$27.95.

Jefferson Cowie's prize-winning book creatively interweaves three narrative lines: the anger and frustrations of the white working class, the attempts of politicians to mobilize those feelings electorally, and representations of working-class concerns in popular culture. For the first, Cowie frames his story around Dewey Burton, a Michigan Ford autoworker, whom national news reporters repeatedly represented as a typical worker. Burton, a self-described New Deal Democrat outraged by busing, welfare abuse, and his perception of diminishing opportunities for people like himself, still voted Democrat in 1972 despite misgivings about George McGovern, but by 1980 he was an enthusiastic Reagan Democrat. For his second theme, electoral politics, Cowie gives most attention (predictably) to Richard Nixon, George Wallace, Ronald Reagan, and George McGovern. The first three, Cowie contends, figured out how to speak to the Dewey Burtons of America while McGovern—and other liberal Democrats—did not. That difference, the author suggests, explains why American politics and culture shifted to the right in the 1970s and have remained there ever since. Cowie uses such cultural icons as Merle Haggard, Bruce Springsteen, and John Travolta to explain the emotional basis of this transformation.

Haunting these narratives is an underlying sense that it did not have to turn out this way. In the late 1960s a sudden upsurge in working-class protest seemed to suggest that those protests might transcend the class boundary between New Left college students and blue-collar workers. Strike rates increased and included not only conventional strikes within the normal collective bargaining model but illegal and unsanctioned wildcat strikes by the rank-and-file, directed at union bureaucrats as much as employers and focused on union democracy and quality of life issues as much as wages, hours, and benefits. The mostly young strikers at the Lordstown, Ohio, auto plant who explained their grievances sounded like part of the Woodstock Nation to many political analysts. Organizers for Miners for Democracy, Teamsters for a Democratic Union, Ed Sad-

lowski's Fight Back campaign against the leadership of the United Steelworkers, and Cesar Chavez's United Farm Workers actively sought the support of New Left activists. Organizations like the Coalition of Labor Union Women, 9to5, the United Farm Workers, the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, and the League of Revolutionary Black Workers raised gender and race issues in ways that suggested the labor movement, by responding to these concerns, could not only re-energize itself but also serve as a vehicle for transcending divisions among working people. Some politicians, most notably Bobby Kennedy just before his assassination, explicitly argued that Democrats could forge a new governing coalition by uniting people across cultural boundaries with common class concerns.

Cowie seeks to explain those lost possibilities. He emphasizes two themes. First, he argues that, "Class . . . died a slow death of a thousand cuts in the 1970s, but few problems sliced as deeply as how race and class were set against each other." Although the New Deal had linked "black and white working people politically . . . in popular discourse 'working class' still meant white. In the 1970s race and class were often at odds, trumping any possibility of . . . an interracial class identity" (p. 236). Second, when economic changes undermined significant parts of the old industrial working class, replacing them with a new service-based working class of "Women, immigrants, minorities, and, yes, white guys," there was "no discursive, political place for them comparable to the classic concept of the industrial working class" (p. 362).

It is easy to see why this is a prize-winning book. The author poses big questions, imaginatively links material from what are usually separate topical specialties, and writes with considerable literary flair. However, readers theoretically predisposed to think of class as a structural relationship as well as a discursive phenomenon may not be completely satisfied. While the author discusses such social and economic changes as increased capital mobility, international relocation of manufacturing capacity, new technologies, stagnant real incomes, interregional shifts within the United States, suburbanization, immigration, or changes in family structures and gender systems he does not analyze in substantial depth the relationships between these factors and the discursive failures he describes. It is perhaps symbolic that two of the sentences quoted in the previous paragraph are both in passive voice, leaving mute the question of who constructed or failed to construct these discourses in the ways they did.

RICHARD OESTREICHER
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JUDITH STEIN. *Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2010. Pp. xvi, 367. \$32.50.

Judith Stein has written a provocative and compelling history of the political economy of the 1970s in the United States. She traces what she sees as the devolu-

tion of the American economy from “The Great Compression” of the immediate post–World War II decades (a time when lower- and middle-class Americans saw their incomes increase at a faster rate than the incomes of the rich) to the more recent “Age of Inequality.” A number of excellent histories of the 1970s have now been published; Stein’s is one of the very best. It is an essential guide to economic policy in this critical period.

Stein begins by explaining why working-class and middle-class Americans prospered in the post World War II years and what factors contributed to the reversal of those distributional gains. Stein argues, almost in shorthand, that New Deal measures ended the maldistribution of wealth that had characterized Jazz Age America. She also pays homage to the role government-defended labor unions played in securing for workers a greater share of the national income. Stein is more concerned with what went wrong with this equitable model of political economy. Above all, she writes, “free trade was the snake in the postwar Garden of Eden” (p. 7). Stein lucidly explains that from the mid-1940s through the 1970s American policymakers willfully allowed allies to protect their domestic markets from American goods while opening U.S. markets to their products. She quotes George Ball, Kennedy’s undersecretary of state for economic affairs—and a one-time lobbyist for the European Economic Community—who claimed, “we Americans could afford to pay some economic price for a strong Europe” (p. 8). Much of the rest of Stein’s book tells us exactly which Americans would pay the price not only for a strong Europe and Japan but also for an interdependent global economy fueled by extravagantly rewarded capitalists seeking ever greater returns on their investments.

In making her case, Stein meticulously examines key economic policy decisions that affected Americans’ ability to maintain a strong industrial base and the well-paying jobs that base had provided wageworkers. She employs a wide cast of characters to tell her story, which focuses on the Nixon and Carter administrations. Organized labor leaders emerge as heroes in her history as they work tirelessly to protect American workers from foreign competition—competition, Stein shows, that was subsidized by unfair trade policy, a counterproductive focus on geopolitical and international strategic concerns, and too many politicians’ willingness to support international investors’ interests rather than those of American workers. Some unexpected heroes and villains do emerge in Stein’s account. The hard-nosed Texan John Connally, Richard Nixon’s secretary of the treasury, wears a white cowboy hat as he fights for domestic American industry, snarling “My philosophy is that all foreigners are out to screw us, and it’s our job to screw them first” (p. 40). George McGovern comes across as an economic incompetent who ignored the Democratic Party’s labor base while he snuggled up to movie stars. Consumer advocate Ralph Nader is castigated as a middle-class reformer indifferent to how his causes affected American workers. In general, the non-labor union Left—in other words, activists who can

loosely be lumped together as New Leftists—is blamed for ignoring the plight of the American working class. Stein writes, provocatively (and I think misleadingly), that the “New Left vision contributed to the culture of anti-unionism” (p. 189).

But Stein is interested in far more than separating the good guys from the bad. More compellingly she analyzes how the New Deal Keynesian vision of domestic demand-management policies fell prey to American policymakers’ international economic decisions. She states: “The increased openness of the U.S. economy—integrated finance, floating exchange rates, global trade, unencumbered capital flows—reduced the potency of Keynesian policies in the domestic economy” (p. 206). Stein does not argue that demand-management policies would have been sufficient to maintain the American economy in the post-1970s world. She spells out how the decisions of the prior decades—especially bad trade policy—meant that American industry needed to become more productive and that new tactics would be needed to bring about such an improvement. Industrial policy, as championed by Lane Kirkland of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, as well as Democratic Party stalwart Walter Mondale, appears to be Stein’s preferred path. Stein spends her last chapters castigating “new” Democrats, including President Bill Clinton, for focusing too much on promoting capital formation and deregulation and not nearly enough on policies that would have supported and developed key domestic industrial sectors. While a political critic might wonder about Stein’s faith that old industries wedded to labor leaders in the mold of George Meany and carefully regulated by government bureaucrats are Americans’ best answer to global competition, historians, at the least, are in her debt for this passionate and broadly convincing analysis of recent American economic policy.

DAVID FARBER
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BRADFORD MARTIN. *The Other Eighties: A Secret History of America in the Age of Reagan*. New York: Hill and Wang. 2011. Pp. xix, 242. \$26.00.

Once upon a time, following Ronald Reagan’s retirement, historians were surprisingly silent about his presidency. Disdain for Reagan was so ubiquitous among scholars that even spending time with his papers, let alone taking him seriously historically, was unseemly. At the time, Reagan scholarship was not for the faint-hearted—or the untenured.

Then, gradually, came glasnost. More and more historians starting understanding that Reagan was the greatest American president since Franklin D. Roosevelt—in the *Time* magazine person-of-the-year meaning—for better or worse. That phase culminated with Sean Wilentz’s *The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974–2008* (2008). Wilentz, whom journalists have repeatedly

dubbed a “liberal historian,” pronounced Reagan significant and not as destructive as he first seemed.

Inevitably, the reaction to the counterreaction has begun. Bradford Martin returns the historical conversation to where it began. Martin set out to prove that not every book about the 1980s “turns into a Reagan book” (p. ix). Still, the subtitle is misleading. This history is not so secret. It describes the protest movements that, Martin shows, were louder, larger, and more lasting than we remember.

Rejecting the new “Reaganocentrism,” Martin concentrates on “a sizable but less-trumpeted group of Americans” who dissented from Reagan’s “Morning in America” (p. x). Martin offers a different alphabet soup for readers to digest. Most books on the 1980s talk about the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), CNN and MTV, “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), VCRs and PCs, mutual assured destruction (MAD) and *Praise the Lord* (PTL), and “USA, USA, USA.” Martin’s study is more politically correct, focusing on the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) and the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), the hardcore and punk rock music club CBGB (Country, BlueGrass, and Blues) and Skinheads against Racial Prejudice (SHARP), AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) and People United to Save Humanity (Operation PUSH).

In eight well-structured, well-written chapters, Martin details eight expressions of the decade’s “progressive impulses” (p. xiv). He studies three grass-roots activist movements that advocated nuclear freeze, embraced Central American solidarity, and opposed apartheid in South Africa. He offers two case studies of cultural opposition, analyzing mainstream popular culture amid the “culture wars,” and the marginal post-punk or alternative scene. The last three chapters of the book explore the flowering of identity politics, emphasizing African American politics, feminist mobilization, and AIDS activism.

Turning from “the highly visible stage of national political life,” (p. xiv) Martin effectively paints a pointillist picture of what is often overlooked. We see less white male selfishness and more diversity, community, and engagement, countering the media stereotype and baby boomer guilt trip that portray youth as apathetic. These activists were more globally aware, more technologically savvy, less earthy, and far less likely to disrobe than their hippie older siblings—or parents. Their accomplishments included mainstreaming many of the transformations from the 1960s and 1970s that older activists feared were lost in the “backlash,” what I call the Reagan Reconciliation. Their activism resulted in cultural or social shifts that did not always make headlines and, most problematic for historians, prevented rather than precipitated some events. Just as one of President George W. Bush’s major accomplishments was averting another 9/11, one of the 1980s dissenters’ major accomplishments was that there was no Nicaragua War.

Martin describes the Democratic Party’s anemic drift toward the center, criticizing its “abandonment of full-throated progressive idealism” (p. xi). The book is particularly strong in describing the excitement of Geraldine Ferraro’s vice-presidential candidacy. But a book analyzing the 1980s opposition, even impressionistically, should at least mention Tip O’Neill, Mario Cuomo, and Jim Wright, none of whom are listed in the index.

The book also lacks a cumulative power. In his preface, Martin offers some integrative conclusions. But the rest of the book feels disjointed and anecdotal. Each chapter describes a different form of activism with little interrelationship or engagement with the broader story. In discussing Ferraro’s vice-presidential candidacy, Martin mentions hurriedly that she and Walter Mondale ran “against an incumbent who had revived the economy and restored a sense of patriotism to many Americans” (p. 155). This comment speaks to impressive Reaganite success that the readers of this book—and Martin’s heroes—tend to forget but should be integrated into the decade’s overall portrait.

Martin ends by showing how the other 1980s helped spawn twenty-first century America. Most notably, Barack Obama’s presidency stemmed from the messy, conflicted 1980s as well as the mythical 1960s. Martin’s welcome work helps to restore important balance to scholarly understanding of what remains a significant decade, the 1980s of Ronald Reagan and his opponents.

GIL TROY
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THOMAS A. STAPLEFORD. *The Cost of Living in America: A Political History of Economic Statistics, 1880–2000*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2009. Pp. xviii, 421. Cloth \$90.00, paper \$29.99.

Economic statistics seldom spark historians’ imaginations, but they possess enormous power to shape economic perceptions and political decisions. Disputes over measurements that are both highly technical and deeply politicized set into sharp relief distinctions between surplus and deficit, growth and recession, stability and upheaval. By the mid-1970s, changes in a single number—the Consumer Price Index—directly affected the incomes of half of all Americans. Thomas A. Stapleford’s careful, nuanced, and sophisticated study draws on the histories of economics, science, and public policy to tell how this particular number came into being, and how cost-of-living statistics acquired meaning and influence in twentieth-century America.

Stapleford adeptly explores the complex political history of cost-of-living statistics as they developed in three distinct periods: the formative decades from 1880 to 1930, the mid-twentieth-century heyday of New Deal liberalism from 1930 to 1960, and the post-1960 era of neoclassical utility theory. Cost-of-living measures originated in early statistical bureaus as a form of “practical statistics” designed to address discrete, localized problems and special investigations connected to the “labor

question,” but they gradually evolved into now-familiar forms of regularly collected wage and price data. By World War I, the Progressive social scientists who staffed wartime agencies aspired to standardized cost-of-living statistics as “crucial tools for rationalized, bureaucratic management of industrial relations” (p. 20). But the Weberian ideal of rationalized bureaucracy and depoliticized expert knowledge could never overcome the inherently political nature of gauging the cost of living. As Stapleford demonstrates, no amount of statistical technique could do away with the normative judgments involved in defining the cost of life’s basic necessities, especially as technologies and the quality of goods changed, and consumer habits and expectations shifted dramatically over time. During World War II, for example, economists at the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) clashed with labor unions’ own economic experts over the most basic questions of definition. Should cost-of-living estimates rely on the official prices set under wartime price controls, or on the high prices of scarce goods found in the black market? Did geographical relocation to take work in the defense industry constitute a voluntary choice, or an increase in the cost of living that wartime wage agreements needed to acknowledge? Where could one find the most reliable estimates—in the aggregate data produced by the neutral experts of the BLS, or, as labor unions argued, in the subjective, real life experiences of families faced with higher prices for lower quality goods? Although the BLS warned against reliance on individual experience, the labor unions’ economists reached for local, qualitative data as a proxy for national trends that they considered unmeasurable, and when the Bureau of Agricultural Economics produced estimates of increased cost-of-living figures that more closely matched the unions’ numbers, labor considered itself vindicated.

It is difficult to convey in a short space the analytical complexity of Stapleford’s study. The book succeeds admirably on several levels. First, Stapleford manages to describe advanced economic concepts and techniques in easily comprehended terms. Readers who have never taken an economics course will have little difficulty understanding, say, the workings and rationale behind the BLS’s assumption of a constant market basket in the 1940s, or professional economists’ enthusiasm for constant-utility approaches in the 1960s. Second, the book eschews simplistic explanations based on material interests and instead appreciates the real technical problems that economists faced as well as the political challenges, expectations, and aspirations—often unrealistic—that both economists and policymakers attached to numbers. Stapleford’s attention to organized labor also opens new research possibilities. Histories of knowledge production have tended to focus on academic and bureaucratic contexts, and scholars need to examine how other bodies, such as unions, corporations, trade associations, and credit rating agencies, also produce and deploy economic knowledge. Stapleford offers new insights into the history of institutional and neoclassical economics as well, particularly the in-

stitutionalists’ emphasis on objective measurement even if it required ignoring important aspects of lived experience, versus the willingness of neoclassical economists to incorporate ideas about “satisfaction” and other subjective imponderables into economic analysis. Conventional accounts have contrasted the philosophical pragmatism of institutionalism with the neoclassical emphasis on elaborate statistical technique and a search for quantitative objectivity. To some extent, Stapleford turns the tables and thereby asks historians to rethink their assumptions about both methodological approaches.

Ultimately, the book also suggests the ways in which objectivity and the ideal of neutral, depoliticized knowledge undermine the possibilities for a healthy and vibrant national political life. Existing scholarship has pointed to the impossibility of objective, scientific representation of social reality, but Stapleford goes further and examines the corrosive political consequences of the Weberian vision of governance. The problem of objectivity lies not simply in the way it masks normative judgments, but in the illusion it creates of the possibility of simple, definitive answers, and the cynicism that arises when expert knowledge inevitably fails to produce incontestable, apolitical solutions. As a result, serious discussion of difficult choices by an engaged citizenry and functioning polity has moved increasingly out of reach. Stapleford concludes with the hope that a more modest conception of objectivity as “community consensus” might “allow economic statistics to serve a political purpose without being ‘politicized’” (p. 386). Given the polarized nature of contemporary political discourse in the United States, it is difficult to imagine how that might happen. But greater willingness of experts to acknowledge the inherently normative dimensions and political implications of their work might constitute a useful first step.

JESSICA WANG

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LOUIS HYMAN. *Debtor Nation: The History of America in Red Ink*. (Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century America.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2011. Pp. 378. \$35.00.

Exploring the origins of consumer debt in the United States has long been a fertile field for historians, yet few works have examined how the nature of personal debt has changed over time. Louis Hyman seeks to remedy this in his book, which traces the evolution of personal credit over the course of nearly a century. His analysis focuses on four intertwined themes: how consumers financed purchases, the types of institutions involved in personal lending, the role of government policy, and the technological innovations that made modern forms of credit possible. By identifying the ties among capitalists, consumers, and policymakers, he provides a better understanding of the business of personal lending and how debt has become such a mainstream element of American financial life.

Hyman opens by examining the rise of installment credit in the 1920s and its impact on both consumers and businesses. For consumers, this form of financing offered an affordable path toward a solid middle-class lifestyle, which in turn helped make being in debt more socially acceptable. Manufacturers, in turn, relied on credit to generate sales and finance retailer inventories of expensive goods like cars, a process made easier by forming a separate finance company. While banks were not significant direct lenders to consumers because of the risk involved, their role grew in the 1930s after participation in Federal Housing Administration (FHA) lending programs gave them a glimpse of the profitability and potential of personal finance.

One of the stronger sections involves the transition from installment credit (used to finance specific purchases) to revolving lines of credit that could be used to pay for a variety of consumer goods. It began in the 1940s following the Federal Reserve's enactment of Regulation W, an anti-inflation measure that restricted maturities on installment loans. To evade these rules, retailers gave customers lines of credit with no preset maturities as a way to finance goods normally paid for on the installment plan. Consumers embraced this new form of financing, because they appreciated the sense of control they had over both how much they could borrow, and how they could use the credit. Large retailers like department stores initially dominated the revolving credit market, with banks becoming more involved after improvements in technology led to the formation of the VISA and MasterCard networks. By the end of the 1970s, the universally accepted, bank-issued credit card was the dominant form of personal credit, and using "plastic" to finance consumerism had become a broadly accepted part of American life.

The rise of debt securitization is an example of how public and private forces converged to shape the availability of consumer debt. In the early 1970s, the Federal National Mortgage Association and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation began buying and selling bonds backed by personal debt like mortgages, home equity loans, and eventually credit card receivables. This created a stable secondary market for consumer loans and gave lenders the ability to raise capital directly from individual and institutional investors. The result was billions in new funds for loans, and the entry of new financial institutions into the consumer credit business. None of this, however, would have been possible without improvements in technology and the sophisticated statistical models needed to analyze credit risk, track consumer accounts, and structure the sale of debt to investors. Unfortunately, the success of debt securitization became the core of the current financial crisis, as investor demand for these securities encouraged banks to lend more to consumers so those debts could in turn be securitized and sold.

Hyman is at his best when describing how necessity, chance, and basic capitalism influenced how and why businesses pursued different forms of non-mortgage credit, and these insights provide a solid contribution to

the literature. Similarly, his analysis of the shortcomings of computer-based credit evaluation systems, especially as they relate to financial discrimination, is also compelling. However, the chapter on changes in mortgage lending practices, which emphasizes the role of the FHA in shaping how Americans finance their homes, is less persuasive. His conclusions would be better supported and more accurate if the key role traditional home lenders played in this complex process had been included. The work also would have benefitted from greater use of statistical tables on the levels of consumer debt over time, the inclusion of which would enhance its value as a reference source. Such issues, however, do not diminish the merits of this book whose readable overview of the history of personal debt in the United States will be of value to scholars new to the subject.

DAVID L. MASON

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DAVID GARLAND. *Peculiar Institution: America's Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2010. Pp. 417. \$35.00.

David Garland's book poses this question: what explains the United States' continued use of capital punishment in the face of a worldwide abolition movement? Garland approaches the question not as a debate participant but as a detached sociologist (p. 7). His conclusion: American executions persist "because of the structure of the American polity" (p. 310). "America's federated system," he emphasizes, produces "state-by-state variation" (p. 160) with "local" control remaining a dominant feature (p. 122).

The book is an impressive work of scholarship. It explains the death penalty's demise in other Western countries—and even in places like South Africa—as it grapples with its persistence in the United States. It gives a compelling account of the racial prejudice that once spawned lynchings and that still plagues America's death penalty. It recounts how the U.S. Supreme Court, in 1976, retreated from its 1972 decision in *Furman v. Georgia*—the case that once declared U.S. death penalty laws, as then administered, unconstitutional (p. 206). And it persuasively explains how America's death penalty—now judged under the Court's "evolving standards of decency" test—has itself evolved as American society has changed.

Much of Garland's analysis is spot on. Pointing to lynch mobs in the Jim Crow South, Garland aptly argues that "local popular justice" (p. 32) has long been an American tradition. While prosecutors and judges in more centralized European states, he explains, are mostly "tenured civil servants," American prosecutors and state court judges must run for office (p. 48). The death penalty's popularity, especially in the Deep South, has thus made it difficult to outlaw executions nationwide. Capital juries also contribute—as Garland notes—to the death penalty's staying power (p. 49), es-

pecially since the Supreme Court allows “death-qualified” juries that systematically exclude death penalty opponents. Only sixteen American states now outlaw executions, though in many other states executions are extremely rare.

The Supreme Court, Garland writes, has adopted a rationalizing, democratizing, and localizing jurisprudence. The Court’s attempt to subject executions to legal rules—the “rationalizing” component—is rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment. Its “democratizing” and “localizing” jurisprudence is grounded in separation-of-power principles, with much control ceded to state legislators and the discretion of local prosecutors, judges, and juries (p. 262). “If the Court were now to declare the death penalty illegal,” Garland contends, alluding to language in the Constitution contemplating state-sanctioned killing, “it would have to set aside the letter of the law and reverse all the relevant precedents” (pp. 221–222). Yet, the Eighth Amendment—which now bars executing the insane, juveniles, the mentally retarded, and less culpable offenders—has itself, Garland acknowledges, already contributed to another facet of the Court’s jurisprudence: a civilizing and humanizing one (p. 262).

Garland masterfully explains why executions still endure in the United States, but his suggestion that the Constitution “limits the possibility” of capital punishment “being plausibly regarded as unconstitutional” (pp. 187, 222) is contestable. The Eighth Amendment unequivocally bars all “cruel and unusual punishments.” Although the Eighth Amendment originally applied only to the national government, the Fourteenth Amendment made the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. In guaranteeing “due process” and “equal protection,” the Fourteenth Amendment transformed American law, ensuring that the “cruel and unusual punishments” prohibition would trump any offending local practices. The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, in fact, currently require prison officials to protect inmates from harm, and corporal punishments short of death have long been abandoned (p. 103) and struck down as unconstitutional.

That executions should be declared unconstitutional is supported by the facts that Garland so cogently presents. While mandatory death sentences for murder were once the norm, they have disappeared (p. 260). Death sentences are now discretionary and executions take place predominantly in a few southern locales (p. 201). Executions—far crueler than corporal punishments—have thus become “unusual,” less common even than being struck by lightning (p. 312). While death sentences are still infrequently imposed in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner, life-without-parole sentences are now the standard—or usual—punishment for first-degree murder.

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments—referencing “capital” and “life” or “limb”—contemplated gruesome corporal punishments and the death penalty’s infliction (p. 221). Those provisions, however, were put in place to protect individual rights when corporal pun-

ishments and mandatory death sentences were still prevalent. Indeed, the concept of judicial independence requires the Supreme Court to decide the Eighth Amendment’s meaning for itself. The Court’s continued deference to legislators (p. 275) and conviction-prone “death-qualified” juries to gauge “evolving standards,” particularly in the face of sporadic, discriminatory executions, actually contradicts that principle and the Court’s own obligation to assess independently what is “cruel and unusual.” Ear cropping and lopping off limbs are already part of a bygone era (p. 145). A truly principled Eighth Amendment analysis would bar executions, too.

Anyone wanting to understand America’s death penalty should read Garland’s superb book. But readers should remember that the fate of death-row inmates ultimately lies in the hands of the U.S. Supreme Court.

JOHN D. BESSLER

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ERIKA DOSS. *Memorial Mania: Public Feeling in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2010. Pp. xvii, 458. \$25.00.

Americans are manic about memory. From temporary roadside memorials to sprawling heritage corridors, the commemorative impulse has grown so powerful as to obscure who or what we hope to remember. This observation introduces Erika Doss’s survey of the nation’s current mnemonic landscape and sustains it at a surprising clip over nearly four hundred pages. In what may be the most penetrating contribution to American memory studies since Kirk Savage’s *Standing Soldiers, Kneeling Slaves: Race, War, and Monument in Nineteenth-Century America* (1997), Doss suggests that modern memorial culture is an index of our capacity for civil discourse. That it is, by her account, is cause for real concern.

Among the study’s most important contributions is Doss’s contention that memorials function today as “archives of public affect” (p. 13). Some historians may be unfamiliar with affect studies, which make significant claims for the critical examination of feeling. The presumption is that feeling of any kind, whether it is happiness or shame, is socially constructed and therefore worth interrogating for what it reveals about how and why we interact with one another. By asserting that memorials embody affect, Doss expands her analytical possibilities beyond categories like place, power, and identity, which have become *de rigueur* in scholarship concerning monuments.

Memorials, however, as Doss explains in her first chapter, are not monuments, at least not inasmuch as we recall the statue mania that prevailed until early in the last century. Commemorative genres like Savage’s standing soldiers made essentialist claims about the American past on behalf of a supposedly singular body politic. By World War II, though, doubts about the feasibility of visually representing collective trauma triggered a commemorative frame shift. Minimalist public

art displaced figurative statuary as the preferred vessel for public feeling. Maya Lin's 1982 Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., illustrates the point. Unlike their predecessors, the new memorials are "equivocal, unresolved, and ambivalent" (pp. 44–45). They foreground the experiences of individuals, especially those who have endured tragedy.

And yet, despite their focus on individuals, modern memorials demonstrate how vital the concept of nation remains even in our postnational world. Doss argues that national belonging, unmoored from geography by neoliberal statecraft, is increasingly understood in terms of emotional allegiance. Memorials are where one goes to become an "emotionally engaged member of the nation" (p. 56). Doss is quite forthright, however, in asserting that the unfettered curation of individual experience, as in projects like the September 11 Digital Archive, risks being "critically vacuous" (p. 74). Nonetheless, its popularity demonstrates how significantly emotion figures in national conversations about the past. In this regard, Doss's book recalls Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen's *The Presence of the Past: Popular Uses of History in American Life* (1998), which arrived at a similar conclusion by surveying hundreds of Americans about their everyday uses of history.

Doss is more concerned to identify the cultural and political conditions that have privileged public feeling since the late twentieth century. To that end, she offers each of the book's remaining five chapters as studies in the excesses and possibilities of a particular vector of commemorative affect. In "Grief," for instance, Doss tackles stuffed-animal death shrines and public response to events like the 1999 Columbine High School shootings. She observes that the failure of mass media to put national traumas into social and historical context has conspired alongside other factors, such as the growing prominence of evangelical Christianity, to commodify the public act of grieving and prolong it well beyond what could possibly be healthy for anyone. The best kind of grief memorials, in Doss's opinion, are those like the AIDS Memorial Quilt, which make grief "ethically, socially, and politically beneficial" (p. 113).

Later chapters—one each for fear, gratitude, shame, and anger—similarly conclude that, if left unchecked, affect all too easily stands in for the civic dialogue that memorials can otherwise encourage. Doss's handling of the nation's various September 11 memorials, for instance, reveals the tendency of these sites to represent absence, rather than loss, thereby compromising our ability to confront the politics of terror in any meaningful way. In an especially poignant rebuke of the ongoing apotheosis of World War II memory, Doss illustrates how modern war memorials encourage a new American militarism by recycling the visual iconography of sacrifice and gratitude popularized by cinematic "war porn." "Shame," which contends with the memory of lynching and Japanese American internment, and "Anger," wherein Doss parses contests over the memorialization of Native American pasts, are particularly

taut and will, I suspect, be heavily excerpted in the classroom.

Doss's great skill lies in sifting through dense cultural landscapes wherein images, buildings, objects, and utterances provide the richest source material. Some historians may prefer a longer view of today's affect in light of yesteryear's sentiment. Some public historians will want more first-person narrative from the people who flock to memorials. In all other respects, though, the book is a masterwork of American Studies. Meticulously researched, thoughtfully illustrated, and powerfully relevant, it is in some ways its own memorial to a genre of big-tent interdisciplinary scholarship that has grown too uncommon. One wishes that Doss had concluded by showing us how her insights might be operationalized in the daily work of monument makers and managers. Perhaps we would not even need this study had preceding generations of memory scholars done the same.

SETH C. BRUGGEMAN
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BRADLEY G. SHREVE. *Red Power Rising: The National Indian Youth Council and the Origins of Native Activism*. Foreword by SHIRLEY HILL WITT. (New Directions in Native American Studies, number 5.) Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 2011. Pp. xviii, 275. \$34.95.

Bradley G. Shreve provides the first monographic treatment of the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC), a Native activist organization that emerged during the 1960s and continues its work in Indian Country today. He contends that his book broadens our conception of the "origins" of "Native activism" by locating it not in 1969, with the much written about occupation of Alcatraz Island, but in August 1961, when a group of young men and women met in Gallup, New Mexico, to found an organization dedicated to realizing "A Greater Indian America."

Shreve's telling of the NIYC's history unfolds over an introduction, eight chronological chapters, and an epilogue. The first of these situates the book within the fields of American Indian history and Native political activism. From there Shreve reviews prominent early to mid-twentieth-century American Indian protest and reform movements. Chapters two and three detail how the Southwest Regional Indian Youth Council, a network of clubs at colleges and universities across the West, and the Workshop on American Indian Affairs, a six-week summer program for students, served as catalysts for the founding of the NIYC.

Chapters four and five recount the organization's tentative beginnings between 1961 and late 1963 and its embrace of direct action via the Pacific Northwest fishing rights movement shortly thereafter. Shreve suggests in the next three chapters that the NIYC moved toward militancy and experienced internal dissension during the latter half of the decade. The final chapter and epilogue do the important work of following the organization into the early twenty-first century. Rather than

just being a relic of the 1960s, Shreve suggests, NIYC's legacy continues to unfold.

Shreve writes well and reveals a great deal about the leading personalities within NIYC, including Herb Blatchford, Clyde Warrior, Mel Thom, Hank Adams, and Bruce Wilkie. In addition, he wisely, if unevenly, emphasizes the role of women within the organization. In so doing he makes extensive use of archival collections, and the oral interviews Shreve conducted serve him well. The breadth of the latter, however, could have been more expansive, and while he mentions several of the women involved in NIYC, he focuses in-depth on only one. Moreover, Shreve's discussion of women avoids more complicated issues, such as how the Native youth movement might resolve if viewed through the analytical lens of gender.

Shreve's decision to make his primary contribution an earlier start date for the Red Power movement seems to sell NIYC's significance short. While he makes a convincing case for how his work fits into scholars' ongoing efforts to reconfigure our understanding of American Indian political activism, Shreve could have done more to demonstrate how the story he tells intersects with and contributes to scholarship on 1960s-era rights movements.

For instance, Shreve suggests that the NIYC stood apart from the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), organizations that "challenged the fundamental ideals and assumptions of their elders" (p. 4). NIYC members did praise "traditional" elders, but they had little good to say about the generation directly ahead of them. (They referred to elected tribal leaders as "little brown Americans" and the National Congress of American Indians as the "National Congress of Aged Indians.") In this sense, NIYC actually had a lot in common with SDS and SNCC. The New Left found much to celebrate about the Old Left; it was their parents' self-satisfied, suburbanized generation that they had a problem with. Plus, SNCC identified with "the people" rather than "so-called leaders." And what of historian Arthur Marwick's contention that the bright line separating "young" and "old" has been overdrawn? A close analysis of the relationship between NIYC President Clyde Warrior and NCAI Executive Director Vine Deloria, Jr., might lend support to it.

Finally, while Shreve certainly tells a detailed story of American Indian youth activism during the 1960s, he does not complicate the pre-existing metanarrative that places as its culminating moment the rise of the American Indian Movement. The two organizations may have intersected and even collaborated with one another during the 1970s and after, but we need to know more about NIYC members on their own terms and in (instead of over) time. Shreve offers a window into their thought worlds, in other words, but the view seems partially obstructed. It is further hindered by a celebratory tone that favors description over critical analysis.

These criticisms aside, Shreve has succeeded in writing an accessible and insightful one-volume organiza-

tional history of the National Indian Youth Council. His book helps prepare the ground for the next round of sophisticated intellectual and comparative histories that should take scholarship even further beyond clichés and worn-out narratives and deeper into the complex space of Native political activism during and after the 1960s.

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BRIAN KLOPOTEK. *Recognition Odysseys: Indigeneity, Race, and Federal Tribal Recognition Policy in Three Louisiana Indian Communities*. (Narrating Native Histories.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 391. Cloth \$89.95, paper \$24.95.

The literature on the federal tribal acknowledgment process is reaching maturity. Brian Klopotek's new book fits squarely within the body of existing scholarship in its major conclusions and theoretical model; like others, the author finds that colonialism and racial oppression have unduly affected unrecognized Indian communities and that their legacies continue to infuse the government process, a hegemonic state project that denies many groups their rightful place as federally recognized tribes. The work is at once narrowly conceived yet broad in its theoretical and topical approach. The study focuses on three groups within fifty miles of each other in Louisiana: the Tunica-Biloxi Tribe, the Jena Band of Choctaws, and the Clifton-Choctaws. Through these communities, however, readers can see the problems and opportunities inherent in federal acknowledgment writ large. While the framework is not new, Klopotek's study is the first to examine acknowledgment policy as it affects the state of Louisiana, a major testing ground for tribal survival and notions about tribal existence in the Southeast.

The work's real contribution is its case studies, which reveal both the devastating effects of non-recognition and the pitfalls and opportunities that accrue after federal acknowledgment. Klopotek is an advocate for the tribes in his work. Through his accessible prose, readers learn that the Louisiana enclaves shared many of the same historical experiences: lack of federal trust protection led to shocking land loss; Jim Crow racism in the dichotomous black-white South left these groups a legacy of poverty, racial insecurity, and obscurity. Klopotek finds that white supremacist ideology encouraged others to deny the indigeneity of Louisiana tribes; the racial landscape also forced these tribes to adopt anti-black racism to protect their fragile position in society. Although claiming to detail three communities, the work really centers on the Jena Choctaws and Tunica-Biloxi. With valuable quotations, the author densely details the efforts of tribal leaders to secure federal aid in the twentieth century. The Louisiana groups took part in the 1960s Indian Renaissance, securing state recognition, formalizing their governments, obtaining federal grants, and after long, unconscionable struggles, the Tunica-Biloxi and Jena Band achieved recognition

through the federal process. The study really shines in detailing how federal status affects tribes. Klopotek ultimately concludes that the federal imprimatur is no panacea. As the Tunica-Biloxi history shows most clearly, it has been a mixed blessing. Their newfound casino wealth has promoted community cohesion as individuals move back to the reservation for economic and cultural opportunities, yet it has also engendered growing pains, leading to difficult questions regarding who can enroll and why, class divisions, and a generational divide.

Klopotek too easily and often dismisses the work of other scholars who raise the possibility that certain groups may not be historical tribes or otherwise-defined longstanding Indian communities without offering empirical evidence that would refute their findings. Similarly, tribes that question other groups are painted as greedy, even racist, for their challenges to entities like the Clifton enclave, an admitted multi-racial community of European, Indian, and African descent with a contested history and identity. One clearly senses the author's idealism and political commitment to unacknowledged groups; he pleads for lawmakers to nurture indigeneity wherever it is found and pursue a more inclusive, liberal policy. However popular this ideological position is in academia today, to critics it has several flaws. In the Clifton case, the author offers theories as to why the group may not have evidence of its indigenous heritage, yet ultimately relies on the position that the group is an aboriginal people because its members say they are one. Post-World War II evidence that the group identifies as a Choctaw entity does little to dismiss the possibility that their ancestors may have chosen to accent an Indian identity for the benefits this could bring in the Jim Crow South. Discounting the sociological phenomenon of "optional ethnicity" or that "ethnic shifting" may have occurred in the past does not move the scholarship forward. Klopotek does not provide a linear history of the Clifton group, so his readers are left without a clear grasp of its community outlines. The time is ripe for scholars to begin discussing (as tribal leaders are already doing) the real chance that certain groups professing to be "tribes" may not be historical aboriginal enclaves. Those familiar with acknowledgment politics know that academic theorizing about the flaws of the current process and potential reforms seem to have little impact on acknowledgment decisions. While the author is laudable for his call for a new, liberal approach to recognizing tribes, labeling tribes and scholars who question unacknowledged petitioners agents of colonial and racial oppression seems unproductive. Without hard, empirical evidence demonstrating long-standing indigenous identity for groups like the Clifton-Choctaw, those with a vested interest in the outcome of acknowledgment cases will remain unmoved.

MARK EDWIN MILLER
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MARK RIFKIN. *When Did Indians Become Straight? Kinship, the History of Sexuality, and Native Sovereignty*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 436. Cloth \$99.00, paper \$35.00.

Scholars familiar with the work of historian Mark Rifkin will recognize the theoretically dense and analytically insightful prose in this book. The careful reading required pays off when one comes to the multiple moments of analytical revelation in which Rifkin insightfully links the emergence of sovereignty to the emergence of heteropatriarchy among Native peoples. Kinship becomes the vehicle with which to carefully navigate a criticism of the social, political, and intellectual uses of inherent sovereignty, which is "the uneven and fraught dynamics by which the settler state recognizes/disavows indigenous modes of peoplehood and indigenous peoples negotiate the shifting imperatives/contingencies of settler rule" (p. 17). Sovereignty is thus explicitly connected to a technique of settlement that has through time destroyed indigenous forms of kinship in favor of "bourgeois homemaking" and sought "to validate tribal autonomy through investments in native straightness" (p. 17). Straightness, which inspired the title of the book, is taken in its popular contemporary form (as an opposition to "gayness") and reformulated into a historical process of imposing linear logics into Native kinship and homemaking in order to scaffold settlement. Thus sovereignty emerges as an entanglement set on reorienting Native kin-based social structure away from its "queerness" and toward an image of the settler state. The literary readings following the introduction set out to "explore the role of settler politics and native presence in the emergence of normative discourse of sexual and familial (dis)order, and reciprocally, they trace the ways that such discourse have served as a key matrix through which to represent and regulate native decision-making, land tenure and resource distribution" (p. 38).

Rifkin's theoretical apparatus becomes a lens through which to examine some of the most influential works in American Indian historical literature and contemporary queer writing by Natives. The examination of literary works benefits from a consistent contextualization in the sociopolitical goals of U.S. Indian policy; this helps connect historical moments throughout the trajectory of "straightening" Native peoples. One of the most impressive applications of Rifkin's analysis comes in chapter one, which takes up the ways a historic disrecognition of the fluidity in Native social institutions acts to construct racial boundaries between white and Indian. *A Narrative of the Life of Mrs. Mary Jemison* (1824), the captivity narrative of a white woman among the Seneca during the eighteenth century, has largely been unquestioned by scholars as a firsthand account of captive life. Here, however, the work is used to tease out depictions of Indians as lacking the ability to obtain the "privatized intimacy" and "familial formations" integral to American national identity. Jemison's story relies on a "racial grammar" that "depends on a vision of

native identity that is soldered to procreative couplehood, rather than imagined in terms of clans and other more expansive forms of kinship-based collectivity" (p. 98). Rifkin's analytical lens does not simply critique the *Narrative*; rather he rereads Jemison as firmly rooted in Seneca kinship by adoption, marriage, bearing Seneca children, and having been a clan matron.

The chronological construction of a straight Indian in the image of a settler continues through the middle chapters, which move from the effects of mid-nineteenth-century civilization policy to allotment. Through the institutions of civilization, such as boarding schools, the Bureau of Indian Affairs slowly chipped away at Native kinship, which contained the fundamental ethics and values of most Indian communities (and their queerness). The various techniques of civilization, such as allotment, emphasized the settler institutions of heterocoupling, the nuclear homestead, and privatized kin relations. The author's use of literature, primary historical documents, and historical analysis constructs a foundation for the final chapter, which insightfully contextualizes Craig S. Womack's *Drowning in Fire* (2001), a novel about Creek culture and the problems faced by queer-identified Natives. The book comes full circle to reengage how heteropatriarchy became an aspect of what many Natives consider to be tradition. Rifkin does not analyze *Drowning in Fire* but instead places the text in conversation with broader contemporary concerns for the emancipatory aspects of a queer indigenous concept and the embeddedness of "imperial efforts to constrain, regulate, and disavow Native ways of being" (p. 277). Rifkin helps us understand *Drowning* as a "narration of intratribal homophobia" but also as an attempt at "reimagining native nationalisms by tracking how compulsory heterosexuality helps naturalize the foreclosure of modes of collective identity not sanctioned by Indian law and policy" (p. 277).

In the end readers may find themselves overwhelmed by the capillary intrusion of settler ideas into the foundational concepts on which many national level tribal authorities rest their claims to sovereignty. In this way, Rifkin reminds us that sovereignty is a selective, exclusionary, and straight concept.

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STEPHEN C. TAYSON. *Shakers, Mormons, and Religious Worlds: Conflicting Visions, Contested Boundaries*. (Religion in North America.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 259. \$34.95.

In a provocative sociological analysis of historical events and actors, Stephen C. Taysom interprets nineteenth-century Shaker and Mormon responses to social opposition. His interpretation relies on a broad range of interpretive tools, including organizational behavior, cognitive anthropology, ritual studies, and critical theory. He is to be congratulated also for bringing a com-

parative approach to subjects too frequently treated in isolation.

The first of the book's four chapters analyzes Shaker practices for achieving holiness. Taysom finds it remarkable that Shakers used an "absolutist rhetoric" when preaching separation from the world, but joined it in commercial, charitable, and proselytizing activities (pp. 10, 13). He interprets this as a failure of Shaker physical boundaries and argues that it led to investment of their separatist ideals in ritual, especially on the frontier where they lacked the "village" setting of their eastern counterparts. But even in the East, Shaker identity "would have been impossible without the catalytic spark provided by the outsiders" for whom they performed (p. 15). The second chapter comes to the same conclusion with respect to Mormons. Their hopes for physical separation were frustrated when mobs overran their holy cities in Missouri and Illinois. Thus, in Utah, Taysom argues, separatist ideals were invested in a narrower space—a temple—and individually embodied through its ritual.

The third chapter compares the significance of Shaker and Mormon views on marriage. The focus is not on the substance of these views, but on their strategic deployment as boundary markers: among the Shakers primarily to separate the weak from the strong inside the community and among the Mormons primarily to "exacerbate and prolong" a sense of "crisis tension" with outsiders (p. 129). Taysom's analysis is undermined by the unproven premise that polygamy did not serve the same function among the Mormons as celibacy did among the Shakers. This is an especially disappointing turn in his analysis, since one of the stronger contributions of the book is its discussion of how these contrary practices were rooted in identical aspirations to imitate godliness. Nevertheless, Taysom asserts that celibacy was for Shakers too critical a dimension of their identity to abandon or adapt, but not so for Mormons who only "chose to play up potential tension-building signs," i.e., polygamy (p. 135).

The fourth chapter compares Shaker and Mormon rhetoric during times of "internal boundary" crisis: one deemed real, the other manufactured. As in the previous chapter, Taysom accuses Mormons of posturing in service of hierarchal tyranny. In contrast, he represents Shakers as suffering a real crisis from too many converts motivated by economic need, not religious conviction. To purge this sin from the community, an "Era of Manifestations" erupted in the 1830s. As proof of the purge's legitimate aims, Taysom relies on its "organic," non-hierarchical origins (p. 162). This sets up the necessary contrast with the Mormon Reformation in the 1850s. Notwithstanding its occurring merely seven years after the impoverished pioneers entered the deserts of the Great Basin and two years after the last refugees from Illinois arrived, Taysom argues that these were years of peace and wealth that undermined insider boundaries comprised of hierarchical power. Consequently, the Reformation's demand for greater purity served to shore up that power. By not situating

Mormon rhetoric in Puritan jeremiad and enduring de-
 clension narratives, and by omitting the relation of the
 Reformation to, *inter alia*, the public announcement of
 plural marriage and reinstitution of temple rites, Tay-
 som is able to cast the Reformation as a fraud upon the
 people by their despotic rulers. Unlike good Shaker
 folk who restored their community's "delicate balance"
 between insider and (should be) outsider, bad Mormon
 hierarchs "inflicted the crisis and claimed sole prop-
 ertyship of the salve to heal it" (pp. 176, 195).

The sociological approach and purposes of this book
 are most clearly reflected in its concluding pages, which
 offer a typology for "high-tension religious groups."
 The stated goal of this typology is to moderate over-
 reaction to such groups by showing that their rhetoric
 is an existential necessity, not a reflection of real world
 intentions. There is no little irony in this caution since
 Taysom himself at times seems to overreact to the rhet-
 oric of the Shakers (in chapter one) and the Mormons
 (in chapter four). Nevertheless, the project's point is
 well taken and its venture into psycho-social explana-
 tions of historical events will make for a lively conver-
 sation in the classroom.

KATHLEEN FLAKE
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SARA DUBOW. *Ourselves Unborn: A History of the Fetus
 in Modern America*. New York: Oxford University
 Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 308. \$29.95.

Sara Dubow offers a nuanced analysis of how American
 perceptions of the social, legal, and political status of
 the human fetus changed over the last century. Fetal
 identity, she argues, was tied more closely to the social
 and political context of the times than to the advance-
 ment of scientific knowledge or theological assump-
 tions of any given period.

Dubow begins with Progressive-era transformations
 such as rapid industrialization, urbanization, and im-
 migration. Social commentators transferred anxieties
 and fears associated with such change to fetal imaging,
 as evidenced in the anti-abortion campaign and the rise
 of eugenics, pronatalism, and euthenics. A conflict
 emerged between embryologists in need of fetuses as
 specimens for laboratory research and doctors who
 treated the fetus as a living subject from the moment of
 conception in order to gain public support for the crim-
 inalization of abortion. Attention to the fetus increased
 by the mid-twentieth century with fetal exhibitions at
 fairs and museums, specimens in laboratories (the Car-
 negie Institute alone had 9,000 fetuses by 1944), and
 portrayals in scholarly monographs as well as in main-
 stream publications such as *Parents*, *Newsweek*, *Time*,
 and *Life*. While the World's Fair of 1933 displayed fe-
 tuses as "curiosities or specimens" (p. 40), the situation
 changed substantially by the 1970s when fetuses were
 transformed into "babies" and "human bodies." Con-
 currently, the legal interpretation of fetal torts evolved
 based on the increased value courts placed on science,

and the long-standing practice of fetal research became
 highly contested and controversial.

Dubow offers a micro-analysis of events in Boston to
 demonstrate the politically explosive nature of fetal
 politics by the 1970s. Examining Dr. Kenneth Edelin's
 trial for performing a second-trimester abortion on a
 black teenager, Dubow concludes his prosecution was
 ultimately a referendum on abortion, not on his specific
 actions, which were legal at the time. The state also in-
 dicted, under an obscure grave-robbing statute, four
 doctors for transporting aborted fetuses from pathol-
 ogy to research laboratories in their effort to discover
 safe antibiotics for pregnant women allergic to peni-
 cillin. Pro-life advocates employed these cases to swell
 grassroots support for fetal protection. That such
 events occurred simultaneously with the busing crisis
 added to the race and class tensions exploding in the
 city, demonstrating the coalescence of racial and abor-
 tion politics. The analysis of these converging events is
 particularly strong: issues raised here led to the political
 realignment of many working-class Catholics from the
 Democratic to the Reagan Republican camp and dom-
 inated the politics of abortion into the twentieth-first
 century.

Fetal protection arguments also brought attempts to
 curtail women's reproductive and medical rights. New
 fetology specialists often branded women heroic if they
 were willing to allow risky intrauterine interventions
 while looking askance at women who refused such pro-
 cedures. Doctors increasingly turned to court orders to
 force noncompliant pregnant women to accept recom-
 mended treatment. In the workplace, companies elim-
 inated women from high-paying traditionally male oc-
 cupations based on fetal protection justifications, yet
 men who faced mutagenic risks encountered no similar
 discrimination. Women in low-paid employment also
 met no exclusion: women banned from high-wage
 chemical industry jobs were not banned from low-wage
 agriculture work where they faced similar chemical ex-
 posure. In addition to private industry, states also
 evoked fetal health to prosecute women delivering in-
 fants with evidence of drugs in their system; women of
 color were ten times more likely to be prosecuted than
 white women. Thus fetal protection could be manipu-
 lated to serve various agendas. Courts have foiled such
 attempts, striking down forced medical treatments for
 pregnant women, workplace discriminatory codes, and
 prosecution for drug delivery to a fetus.

Yet attempts to manipulate fetal images continue.
 Pro-life advocates have used the film "The Silent
 Scream" to raise concerns over fetal pain. They have
 also linked abortion to breast cancer and to post-abor-
 tion psychological stress disorder. No scientific evi-
 dence exists to support fetal pain, increased risk of
 breast cancer, or mental health issues, yet these emo-
 tional and fear-inducing tactics have been effective in
 increasing attempts to limit severely or overturn com-
 pletely *Roe v. Wade* (1973).

Dubow's work makes a significant contribution to our
 understanding of fetal history. The book sometimes

strays from the fetus to the intricacies of abortion politics. The author could strengthen her analysis of the dichotomy the medical profession faced as some doctors fought to shield medical areas such as abortion from state interference while other doctors called on the state to force pregnant women to undergo medical treatments prohibited by their religious principles in order to protect fetal rights. The author overstates her case that the fetus was “a symbol that paradoxically embodied both the strength and the vulnerability of the American individual and of American democracy during those perilous times” (p. 7). Still, this work will quickly become a standard in the field. Dubow places fetal history within a broad historical context that makes the book valuable to scholars interested in twentieth-century gender, race, politics, and medicine.

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CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA

JONATHAN CURRY-MACHADO. *Cuban Sugar Industry: Transnational Networks and Engineering Migrants in Mid-Nineteenth Century Cuba*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. Pp. xiv, 264. \$85.00.

Nothing so profoundly transformed the course and character of Cuban history as the expansion of sugar production between the late eighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century. The title of the introduction to the book under review—“succumbing to cane”—was aptly chosen. Sugar production increased almost threefold from 17,000 tons in 1791 to 47,000 tons in 1821, and increased threefold again by 1841 to 162,000 tons. The number of sugar estates increased from nearly 230 at the end of the eighteenth century to almost 1,600 by the mid-nineteenth century, even as the average size of the estates increased from 400 acres to 1,400 acres, with estates between 5,000 and 7,000 acres not uncommon. Labor demands increased proportionally. The expansion of chattel slavery was as stunning as it was swift. The underreported colonial censuses offered an approximation of the changing demographics of the island: 85,000 slaves in 1791 increased to 287,000 in 1827 and increased again to 436,000 in 1841. By mid-century, the African-descended population of Cuba—free and enslaved—constituted a majority of the inhabitants of the island, with far-reaching implications.

The transformation of Cuban agriculture was in fact a triumph of technology. That Cubans arrived comparatively late to sugar production meant that planters could avail themselves of modern technology and indeed industrialize the production of sugar on a scale never before possible. Steam power increased the efficiency of sugar manufacturing. Railroad construction served to facilitate the expansion of production zones deeper into the interior: rail systems within the estates linked larger fields to bigger factories, rail networks linked estates with newly constructed port facilities,

many of which were built in response to expanding sugar exports.

These developments are well-established themes in the historiography of late colonial Cuba, and are competently examined in Jonathan Curry-Machado's study of the transformation of sugar production in the nineteenth century. Not as well known, however, are the sources and methods of technology transfers, the character of the vast capital inputs that new technology required, and the complex transnational networks that were summoned into existence during the early decades of technology imports and sugar exports. All, Curry-Machado correctly notes, contributed to transforming nineteenth-century Cuban sugar production into “the most advanced in the world” (p. 25). That the technology applied to sugar production, principally in the form of steam-powered mill machinery and the railroads, was of foreign origins—largely British and North American—as were the engineers, technicians, and mechanics who supervised the construction sites, maintained the machines, and directed their use, has long been recognized but incompletely understood.

No longer. In this nuanced and richly-detailed account of the science and technology of sugar production, the role of the *maquinistas*—as the foreign technicians were known—has been properly recognized and their strategic importance at the center of complex transnational networks of trade and commerce, finance capital, engineering, and migration superbly documented. This is historical scholarship at its best, richly grounded in archival and manuscript collections as transnational as the subject of the book, including the national archives of Cuba, Spain, and England. The result is a compelling account of the global reach of nineteenth-century capitalism, informed by an expansive knowledge of the impact of technology on evolving land tenure forms and production systems, joined with an understanding of evolving labor systems within the larger context of the transatlantic slave trade and transnational sugar markets. All in all, this is a remarkable achievement.

No less important, Curry-Machado examines the complex patterns of the daily life of the *maquinistas* in Cuba as related to social customs, political attitudes, and race relations. The middle decades of the nineteenth century were years of deepening tensions, as the forces released by sugar production acted to deepen the contradictions of colonialism and set in relief the multiple and multifaceted ways that Cuban economic development could no longer be contained within existing Spanish colonial structures. These were the formative years of Cuban independence sentiment, with a generation of men and women coming of age in and formed by the anomalies of a dynamic capitalist system within archaic colonial institutions. The ways that *maquinistas* integrated themselves—or did not—into the world of the Cuban planter class were factors central to this process, and properly belong to the larger narratives of nineteenth-century Cuba. That Curry-Machado continually shifts his attention between the global and the local, moreover, provides a transnational perspective on

what has hitherto been approached as principally national developments.

Curry-Machado has made a splendid contribution to the expanding historiography of nineteenth-century Cuba. In the process, he offers insight into a society in the throes of far-reaching transformations, the consequences of which reached deeply into the century that followed.

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WILLIAM F. CONNELL. *After Moctezuma: Indigenous Politics and Self-Government in Mexico City, 1524–1730*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 2011. Pp. xviii, 316. \$45.00.

William F. Connell presents the evolution of native political institutions and culture in Tenochtitlan México from 1524 to 1730. The sources used in this book's elaboration mainly come from Mexican archives and are related to public works, taxes, and property. The *Codex Chimalpahin* also provides a great amount of information. According to the author, the recomposition of pre-contact politics began in the sixteenth century with two occurrences. The first was renaming the core of the ethnic state or *altepetl*, together with its constituent units or *calpollis*, as the *Parcialidad de México* Tenochtitlan, and its four neighborhoods or *barrios* (San Juan Moyotlan, San Pablo Teopan, San Sebastián Atzaqualco, and Santa María la Redonda Cuepopan). The second was the establishment of a municipality or *cabildo de indios*. This organ of self-government was composed by one *juez gobernador*, four mayors or *alcaldes*, and a community of voters. While the *alcaldes* were elected officials, governorship was a hereditary office reserved for direct descendants of the royal family. Nevertheless, as in the past, electors had to take part in their selection when the order of succession was not clear. From the point of view of peninsular authorities, the most important tasks of the *cabildo* were to collect the taxes, known as *Reales Tributos*, that indigenous peoples owed to the crown, and to keep civility in the *barrios*. The first objective was reached by making the governor accountable for the contributions in front of the viceroy; the second by leaving Indians at liberty to forge their own games of power, providing the collection of taxes was not compromised. In those cases, governors could be replaced, and even imprisoned.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century a fully realized political system had been formed. It encompassed competitive elections, coalitions, patronage, and the manipulation of Spanish law and courts. The *juez gobernador* ceased to be a post held for life, and set aside for the members of the Tenochca lineage, and expanded to embrace noblemen or *caciques*, commoners, foreigners, and even men of mixed blood—*mestizos*. New actors succeeded in seizing the apex of the *cabildo* whenever they were able to assure the collection of taxes through wealthy guarantors or *fiadores*, and to el-

egantly intertwine the aforementioned elements of local government. That was the case of *cacique* Francisco Benitez Inga, from the Viceroyalty of Perú, who was appointed *juez gobernador* in 1659. Since mid-seventeenth century, governors had faced jurisdictional problems with the recently created position of *alguacil amparador*, whose duty was to extract the *Reales Tributos* from blacks and mulattoes of the city. The community of electors was pivotal in the new way to deal with power. After royal family members excluded themselves from native offices, the electoral body had to select not only *alcaldes*, but also the highest position in the civic hierarchy. According to the author, it was through the act of voting that the newcomers became legitimate leaders. In addition, over the course of two hundred years the assembly itself experienced profound changes. In the past, it had only been composed by noblemen; under the Bourbons, commoners with some experience in public affairs became part of it.

Well-researched and well-written, Connell's book portrays México Tenochtitlan politics from an interesting perspective. He does not begin with restrictive structures, but with a scenario composed of ambitious and smart actors, where the governor is the protagonist, and competition for office becomes an increasingly delicate and complex game. Especially important is Connell's view of the imminent decay of hereditary mechanisms for accessing governorship, and their replacement by indigenous and Spanish cultural routes to power. Equally relevant is the rebuttal of Charles Gibson's argument that continuity in the regime was provided by the annual rotation of *alcaldes* according to territorial criteria. What Connell affirms is that governors kept their clients in mayoralties for years, thanks to alliances with voters established by the time of their election.

Nevertheless, the evidence supporting Connell's point does not show adequately how those relations actually worked. Nothing is said, for example, about the rewards each actor expected to get from his performance. On the other hand, the characterization of *cabildos* as fiscal organizations does not translate their complete reality. As Connell himself mentions, they were also in charge of the administration of justice, with governors acting as *corregidores* or *alcaldes mayores*. Developing the content of that affirmation, together with some consideration of its religious implications, would have helped to give a clearer idea of who the *jueces gobernadores* were. Finally, it would have been desirable to have some discussion of Tlatelolco, the second indigenous municipal area that emerged in sixteenth-century México City from old Tenochca society. The author only mentions that, in contrast to ever-changing Tenochtitlan, it was stable. Future comparative research could provide insight into each *parcialidad*'s particular political development.

CLAUDIA GUARISCO
El Colegio Mexiquense

DAVID TAVÁREZ. *The Invisible War: Indigenous Devotions, Discipline, and Dissent in Colonial Mexico*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 384. \$65.00.

This book is an innovative and meticulously researched history of the extirpation of idolatry campaigns that various branches of the Catholic Church launched against indigenous communities in central Mexico (the basin of Mexico, Toluca, and the Coahuila-Tlaxcala region) and Oaxaca from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Within this vast time frame, David Tavárez chronicles the investigations of the “apostolic inquisition” of the mid-sixteenth century, those conducted by the regular orders, and those of the post-1571 secular tribunals under the jurisdiction of the Provisorato de Indios. The author is to be commended, in particular, for unearthing previously unused or under-examined archival materials. Tavárez analyzes over 125 trials of roughly 900 “individual ritual specialists” whom courts accused of engaging in idolatry, sorcery, and superstition. He concentrates especially on those acts that most troubled the colonial church: sacrifice, divination, spell-making, and the possession of cosmological knowledge.

Tavárez’s analysis of this fascinating body of materials points him toward several conclusions. Most importantly, the variegated devotional practices across time, between regions, and even as articulated by distinct individuals within the same communities prompt him to argue against understanding colonial indigenous ritual practice as a monolithic phenomenon. Diverging from earlier scholars, who have tended to understand indigenous spirituality in the colonial era in terms of either syncretism (Nancy Farriss, Inga Clendinnen, and Serge Gruzinski) or the crystallization of indigenous vs. Christian spirituality (James Lockhart and Juan Pedro Viquiera), Tavárez argues for the existence of “a colonial archipelago of faith composed by hundreds of local cosmologies that incorporated insights and theories drawn from Mesoamerican and European beliefs” (p. 271). Beneath this variation, however, Tavárez does posit that one unifying trait characterized indigenous ritual practice in the colonial period: “epistemological dissent” from Christianity, which occasionally resulted in violent challenges to Catholic domination. Beyond this major conclusion, the author generates others: after the late sixteenth century, female commoners rather than male noblemen were more frequently accused of heterodox spiritual practices; in Central Mexico, accusations against native leaders diminished after 1571, while in Oaxaca, investigations of collective ritual practices continued at high levels beyond the late sixteenth century. Further, he cautions that the absence of consistency and the lack of increased rationalism among ecclesiastics’ application of disciplinary techniques demonstrate that these, although intended as public demonstrations of power exercised over the bodies of the ruled, should not be understood in strict Foucauldian terms.

Tavárez also offers a new framework within which to

understand Mexican indigenous ritual practice in the colonial era: the “collective” and “elective” spheres. The former implies orientation toward communal well-being and the latter an act or belief directed toward private or familial gain. Tavárez effectively considers the distinctions between the two ritual spheres throughout the text, although his rationale for rejecting the more familiar concepts of “private/public” distinctions is not consistently clear.

Tavárez has undertaken an ambitious study of a key and hitherto insufficiently addressed issue in Mexican indigenous and religious history. His training in anthropology and history and his impressive command of indigenous cosmology and of Nahuatl and Zapotec allow him to track some of the linguistic subtleties that led Spanish clerics to distortions and misperceptions when parsing such phenomena as *nahualtocaitl*, a Nahuatl oral genre that allowed for the embodiment of deities. Tavárez is also scrupulous about substantiating each of his claims with evidence from his own sources and from the conclusions of previous scholars.

In spite of the book’s many strengths, this reader was occasionally left questioning exactly what subject this book hopes to reveal to us. Tavárez frames his study by qualifying the limitations he has self-consciously placed on its scope. In the introduction, he recognizes that, in part, he is studying official constructions of indigenous ritual practice, asserting that idolatry “became attached to specific practices only through the conjunction of legal discourses, doctrinal rhetoric, and specific accusations” (p. 3). And while one of his central concerns is how the traits and preoccupations of particular extirpators shaped the pursuit of idolatry, their influence, and the varying frequency and intensity with which they pursued prosecutions, are not always explicit in his conclusions.

This point aside, Tavárez has written an impressive and a scholastically rigorous book that will be welcomed by students and scholars of colonial Latin America, ethnohistory, colonialism, and religious history.

NORA E. JAFFARY
Concordia University

RACHEL A. MOORE. *Forty Miles from the Sea: Xalapa, the Public Sphere, and the Atlantic World in Nineteenth-Century Mexico*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 230. \$49.95.

This innovative and rigorous book will have a stimulating impact on the historiography of nineteenth-century Mexico. Rachel A. Moore focuses on the history of Xalapa and makes original claims about nineteenth-century Mexican politics and culture, the development of its public sphere, and the place of Xalapa and the state of Veracruz in relation to the Atlantic world and the Mexican nation. Moore deftly places public culture in space through multiple scales of analysis that include the circulation of commodities and news across the ocean, the relations between Cuba and Mexico, the everyday conditions of travel between Mexico City and

the port of Veracruz, and the sociabilities rooted in Xalapa's press and public spaces. Social connections and the information that flowed through the city became key political capital for *Xalapeños*. Moore's analysis, however, goes beyond communications, and effectively builds on the category of the public sphere as an intersection of actors, institutions, practices, and ideas. The result is a very perceptive and empirically rich understanding of local and regional politics.

Moore demonstrates the central importance of reliable information in the construction of commerce, political alliances, and public opinion during a time of institutional uncertainty. Orality was as important as literacy in this regard. These dimensions of the public sphere, as explored by Moore, add up to a study that is socially and materially deeper than existing intellectual histories of public life in Latin America. Since the pioneering work of François-Xavier Guerra, those studies have added a political angle (inspired by Alexis de Tocqueville and François Furet) to the Enlightenment model first described by Jürgen Habermas. In Moore's analysis, citizenship, a central theme in the recent political historiography of Mexico and Latin America during the national era, is defined by access to the public realm. Thus, secularization is more than a liberal fiscal recipe for state building but also represents the opening up of debates about themes that were off limits in the past.

The chapters combine objects that are seldom treated together but that, in Moore's clear prose and careful organization, provide new perspectives on the history of political culture: the world of cafes and inns; the dissemination and reading of newspapers, pamphlets, and books; discussions about citizenship; the control of travelers and disease; the development of road infrastructure and the postal service; the circulation of letters; and commerce and finance throughout Xalapa. Travel literature, press debates, political manifestos, administrative and penal archives form the empirical basis of the book, allowing Moore to combine anecdotal evidence with broader arguments about geography, institutions, and culture.

Xalapa is the perfect anchor for such a study because it reflected the tension between Mexico City, the center of national politics but also a source of the unreliable information, and the Atlantic coast, which brought news, people, and goods from across the sea. Moore's analysis of Xalapa's role in the national space is supported by a constant comparison with the rival city of Orizaba, which enjoyed a closer relationship with Mexico City and was less open to people and products coming from the east. The route connecting Veracruz with Mexico City emerges from this book as more than an annoying but inevitable part of the voyage between the Atlantic world and the capital. The ability of *Xalapeños* to capture information and engage travelers was a defining aspect of their city's identity and political development, explaining its fraught relationship with Mexico City. In the name of hygiene and national defense, the capital tried to limit the mobility that was a key resource

for Xalapa's inhabitants. Thus, federalism, for *Xalapeños*, meant the ability to freely move and to gather and validate information coming from the east and the west.

General and sometimes president Antonio López de Santa Anna, with his ideological metamorphoses and political cunning, personified this tension and is productively used by Moore to connect politics and culture. Moore, however, does so without losing sight of the difficult state-building process that made Santa Anna and other strong men of his ilk possible. Santa Anna, in Moore's view, was as interesting because of his participation in open discussions about the local autonomies that defined the nation as he was because of his centralizing instincts. This book is bound to elicit a reconsideration of the notion of *caudillos* as leaders whose charismatic appeal was accepted without much examination: they thrived, and were judged, in the public sphere.

PABLO PICCATO
Columbia University

MATTHEW D. ESPOSITO. *Funerals, Festivals, and Cultural Politics in Porfirian Mexico*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 2010. Pp. xvi, 313. \$29.95.

This book is an exhaustively detailed study of the origins and intentions of state-sponsored public rituals commemorating death in Mexico City during the reign of Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911). Matthew D. Esposito argues that as a central historical trope in the Mexican imaginary, official funerary and memorial events helped Díaz establish, legitimate, and maintain his lengthy authoritarian regime.

The book's six chapters are organized both chronologically and thematically, emphasizing the periods before and after 1890 as times of regime consolidation, expansion, and decline. The introduction explains the central theme of memorialization as "the active construction of official memory through the use of state ceremony . . . that allowed the state to control public space, time, memory, and ultimately behavior at regular intervals throughout the calendar year" (pp. 4–5). Setting the stage for the broader work, Esposito examines how Mexico City elites utilized memorialism as an integrated element in their efforts to establish hegemony, nationalism, and modernity in the newly industrializing and urbanizing country.

Chapter one discusses how a "death industry" emerged from the Federal District's stark reality of chronically low life expectancy and quotidian exposure to dying and death. Commercialization and increased regulations of funeral businesses, cemeteries, and traditional celebrations—such as the Day of the Dead—were hallmarks of Díaz government efforts to harness all aspects of the country's cultural practices. Although initiated during the liberal, anticlerical reform period of the nineteenth century, social segregation in once public burial grounds reflected public health concerns rather than efforts to wrest power away from the Catholic Church.

From 1877 to 1889, Mexico's federal government sponsored seventeen state funerals "to unite citizens and reconcile with the nation's troubled past" (p. 56). Chapter two explores how Díaz sought, by manipulating such events, to weave himself into the newly invented tradition of a heroic national past. Some attention is paid to the conspicuous exclusion of social groups such as workers, students, and women from state processions and how Porfirian elites attempted to control the state's official narrative through physical and discursive elisions of "alternative memories."

Chapter three looks more broadly at how Porfirian officials codified the ritual calendar and added holidays in order to cast "narratives of power and progress." Focusing on the popular holidays of the Grito de Dolores, military parades, civic processions, and memorial services, Esposito explores how elites utilized such events to assert their political legitimacy and authority and thus "cemented the imagined community of Mexicans" (p. 86). Esposito also shows how state-contrived holidays played a role in assertions of Mexican state sovereignty vis-à-vis the United States and explores their eventual transnational dispersion as part of the expanding cultural influence of the greater Mexican diaspora.

In a similarly extranational vein, the following chapter begins with the claim that "central to [Díaz's] political survival was selling the legitimacy of his regime to the world community" (p. 113). This thread, however, is not developed. Instead this chapter and the final two add considerable details concerning state funerals in the second half of the *Porfiriato*. These chapters feature Díaz's attempt to insert himself into a Holy Trinity with the national heroes Miguel Hidalgo (1753–1811) and Benito Juárez (1806–1872), and they also introduce the history of the lone commemorated female in the long list of state "pantheonization," Josefa Ortiz de Domínguez (aka *La Corregidora*).

At the outset, Esposito makes a number of bold claims and attempts to position his monograph within a historiography of Mexico that seeks to integrate cultural and political analyses of the nation-state and its inhabitants. Despite its in-depth examination of the subject, the book does not adequately explain its relevance and impact in broader national and metropolitan contexts. Although the practice of transporting artifacts and exhumed bodies for display and commemoration in the nation's capital was consistent with Díaz's attempts to centralize control over the provinces, Esposito—relying almost entirely on Mexico City-based archives—largely ignores the fact that the inhabitants of Mexico's many cities, states, and regions had divergent experiences that have been documented by several recent state-level histories. Furthermore, despite some attempts to link public rituals to the creation of a social habitus in certain areas of Mexico City itself (p. 91), the work never integrates the distinct spaces and neighborhood populations of the Federal District as constitutive elements of this primarily urban history. Although the book's focus on the cultural production of rituals of rule by Porfirian elites helps us to better un-

derstand political power in Mexico City, it does little to uncover how, if, and the degree to which hegemonic projects affected everyday Mexicans throughout the country.

These critiques notwithstanding, Esposito's detailed study and elegantly crafted depiction of elite Porfirian public ritual and hegemony in Mexico City will nicely complement courses on modern Mexico.

MARK OVERMYER-VELÁZQUEZ
University of Connecticut

JASON DORMADY. *Primitive Revolution: Restorationist Religion and the Idea of the Mexican Revolution, 1940–1968*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 2011. Pp. x, 206. \$28.95.

his book offers concise, valuable insights into religion in *priista* Mexico. Jason Dormady's central, convincing thesis is that restorationist religions—those premised on the recuperation of primordial religious purity—served as effective mediating structures linking state and society. This articulation, Dormady argues, was achieved by a combination of Israelite (even *indigenista*) theologizing, which provided a spiritual bridge to revolutionary nationalism, and by degrees of legal exceptionalism, through which *local* states multiplied the corporatist arrangements that classical liberalism disdained. Religious groups sacralized official ideology; they also negotiated informal recognition, such that they could own property and continue illegal religious practices. In sum, what Dormady suggestively calls "informal religious corporatism" (p. 5) allowed ecclesial bodies to regulate the stress of urbanization, state formation, and capitalism. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), meanwhile, appears in benign historiographical light as a defender of non-Catholic liberty. Indeed, the author stresses a subtle ideological affinity between the regime and churches that performed model patriotism (pp. 20, 29) rather than any crude state instrumentalization of religion.

Dormady builds towards this conclusion through three case studies. Chapter one explores Luz del Mundo (LDM), a Pentecostal movement founded in 1920s Guadalajara by revolutionary Eusebio González, baptized "Aarón" after Israel's high priest. Dormady's LDM is nationalistic, hierarchical, and even clerical: LDM grounded rural migrants to the city, for whom it offered quasi-Catholic structure plus revelation and economic self-help. Dormady disputes claims that LDM flourished on the back of a clientelistic pact with Jalisco's PRI—although actually he offers ample counter-evidence to this assertion. LDM's assimilation into the PRI's popular sector was deep; through judicial sleight of hand, Aarón was buried in sacred ground, not a municipal grave, while PRI oligarchs sold Guadalajara real estate to LDM.

Chapter two focuses on the Mormon schism known as the Church of the Kingdom of God in Its Fullness (IRDP), founded in the state of México by Margarito Bautista in 1922. Bautista, a Náhuatl-speaker and ex-

Baptist, blended Sonoran-style developmentalism with a providential reading of the 1910 Revolution as an epic reinauguration of true religion. Indeed, Bautista conceptualized 1910 as a struggle in which a Mormon tribe—the Lamanites, *qua* the Mexica—would restore the verities of “Eternal Mexico” that Catholicism had ruptured. Leaving aside this patriotic teleology, IRDP was also patriarchal in that community brides were reserved for polygamous elders (p. 85). Dormady strives, using anthropological evidence, to situate IRDP’s polygyny within Nahua culture, though the practice’s putatively autochthonous roots remain unclear.

The final empirical chapter studies the María Auxiliadora colony founded in 1940s Baja California by *sinarquista* Salvador Abascal. María Auxiliadora has been studied before, though Dormady is the first to mine Abascal’s memoirs so deeply. Even so, the *sinarquistas* seem misplaced, given that Abascal claimed no divine charisma: he was a militant with religious proclivities but, unlike Aarón and Bautista, no “God in embryo” (p. 65). The basic principle was therefore different than those of Hermosa Provincia or New Jerusalem; likewise, political manipulation of the colony seems more palpable, suggesting a different process. Lastly, the *sinarquistas*’ antimodernism, while necessary for the book’s thesis, seems overdone.

Cumulatively, however, Dormady’s book effectively challenges some celebrated scholarly assumptions, not least reification of the *prístia* state or the Protestant acculturation thesis. Religious pluralization in Mexico, Dormady shows, consisted of *arreglos* joining a variegated authoritarian state and multiple corporations. Dormady is admirably clear as to how religious pluralism in Mexico was built on, rather than against, corporatist values, and this in a legal penumbra: indeed, it was the uneven rule of law that created space for the tolerance of minority religions.

Despite these nuances, characterizing Mexico’s state as a U.S.-style “bastion of dissident religious traditions in the Western hemisphere” (p. 146) seems provocative, even triumphalist. Because, of course, the state did not simply defend minority rights but, for significant periods, injured those of the Catholic majority. Secularization, in other words, meant non-Catholic corporatism rather than impartial laicism. The restoration concept could also be fleshed out more: rather than a post-1940 innovation, this was a standard feature of Mexican radicalism kept alive during the revolution by religious groups such as the Mexican Catholic and Apostolic Church and intellectuals like Miguel Cabrera and Antonio Soto y Gama. What changed, perhaps, was the meaning of the restorationist trope, which developed from the New Testament ecclesiology favored by liberal Catholics to the Old Testament, covenanter primitivisms of *prístia* Mexico. Despite some caveats, this book is a strongly argued addition to the literature on religion in modern Mexico, one that well illustrates

the patchy nature of religious modernization in the country and its relevance to broader political culture.

MATTHEW BUTLER
University of Texas

VIRGINIA GARRARD-BURNETT. *Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit: Guatemala under General Efraín Ríos Montt, 1982–1983*. (Religion and Global Politics Series.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. xvi, 269. \$55.00.

Virginia Garrard-Burnett’s examination of General Efraín Ríos Montt is one of the best available historical-political analyses of Guatemala’s brutal armed conflict. As Garrard-Burnett points out, historians and others have produced a great deal of scholarly and journalistic analysis of the horrific period of violence and destruction that Guatemalans suffered in the late twentieth century. While she focuses specifically on Ríos Montt and his eighteen-month rule, her study goes well beyond these chronological parameters.

Garrard-Burnett is arguably one of the most important contemporary historians of Protestantism in Latin America. In this slim volume, she not only demonstrates her deep and nuanced understanding of the evangelical movement in Guatemala but also explains the dynamics and contours of the political crisis that brought Ríos Montt to power in 1982. She gives the most plausible and sophisticated explanation to date of Ríos Montt’s violent campaign, as well as his populism and political longevity, and in doing so she also provides a succinct and beautifully written history of the role of religion in contemporary Guatemalan society.

Garrard-Burnett explores Ríos Montt’s populism and enduring presence in Guatemala and explains how he was able to reclaim a position of moral authority lost by the Guatemalan military during the chaotic and bloody rule of Romeo Lucas García (1978–1982). Despite the fact that in absolute terms Ríos Montt’s regime was more deadly than Lucas’s had been, the popular perception was that the counter-insurgency campaign of Ríos Montt restored both logic and moral clarity to the military. The role of Ríos Montt’s Pentecostal faith in promulgating that perception is not as straightforward as earlier scholars and critics have suggested. Garrard-Burnett claims that the appeal of Pentecostalism and of Ríos Montt himself were not rooted primarily in coercion and manipulation but rather in “the general’s vision of a new Guatemala, formed, as it were, from a potent admixture of religion, racism, security, nationalism, and capitalism” (p. 13). Therefore, Ríos Montt’s vision had genuine appeal in Guatemala’s particular political and social reality.

Garrard-Burnett includes in this book a brief but sophisticated chronology of violence (1952–1982) during the military period leading up to the coup that brought Ríos Montt to power. She then gives a very detailed account of Ríos Montt’s counter-insurgency strategy from March 1982 to August 1983. She avoids what she refers to as the “pornography” of violence, although she

does recount the most important atrocities of the period in graphic detail. Although she claims that she seeks to avoid explicit descriptions of brutality, she is not entirely successful in this regard. Nevertheless, I think that the details of these horrors—especially incidents that are well documented and had significant political impact—are important for scholars to analyze.

Garrard-Burnett also provides an elegant and insightful history of Guatemalan religion during this period and describes the dynamic interplay among Catholic Action, liberation theology, and Pentecostalism. She outlines Ríos Montt's religious biography, underscoring his use of religious rhetoric to define his vision of a "new Guatemala." She deftly balances her analysis of the role of coercion in the rapid growth of Pentecostalism among indigenous Guatemalans in the 1980s, stating that Guatemalans used "*evangélico* identity as a shield with which to protect themselves" (p. 132). The author avoids, however, simplistic and counterfactual descriptions of the conflict as one between leftist Catholics and fascist Protestants supported by the United States, writing that "at its core, the Guatemalan struggle in the late 1970's and early 1980's was about competing moral discourses" (p. 142). Both of these discourses included explicitly religious elements that cut across lines of Catholicism and Protestantism.

Garrard-Burnett finishes the book with a thoughtful consideration of the role of U.S. foreign policy, media, and foreign evangelicals. In some ways, the order of the final two chapters seems off, as her most important observations and arguments are found in the penultimate chapter. Still, this does not really detract from the book's significance. I believe that this book and Francisco Goldman's account of the murder of Archbishop Juan Gerardi (2007) together provide the most revealing and insightful account of Guatemala's violent recent past. Both approach the topic by explaining more confined events, and both texts consider the question of violence by including an analysis of the role of religion and religious institutions. Each avoids simplistic binary explanations of the horrors that truly overshadow everything else about this history. I believe that Garrard-Burnett's book is one of the best political histories written on the subject to date.

RACHEL A. MAY
University of South Florida

TÁMIS PARRON. *A política da escravidão no Império do Brasil, 1826–1865*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira. 2011. Pp. 373. \$49.90.

A meticulously researched contribution to recent scholarship on slavery in nineteenth-century Brazil, this book examines the politics of slavery within parliamentary debates on the slave trade and the future of the institution from the 1820s through the 1860s. While slavery survived the end of Portuguese sovereignty in 1822, the material fact of slavery, Tâmis Parron argues, did not "naturally" rest on, or produce, a proslavery politics in independent Brazil. A "politics of slavery"

was "historically constructed and reinvented" in "a network of political and social alliances . . . [that] employed the most powerful agencies of the Brazilian national state in the interests of slave owners" (p. 18). Thus, Parron defends a return, after decades of fruitful research on the economic, social, and cultural history of slavery, to the study of the political contexts, practices, and discourses of slavery in the nineteenth century and to the much debated relationship between slavery and liberalism in Brazil. As Parron's research shows, it was in the "spaces of liberalism"—the parliament and the press—where Brazilian elites forged and defended claims about the ramifications of the slave trade and slavery for social, political, and economic order. Although Parron is not the first to argue that the maintenance of slavery did not mean that Brazilian liberalism was simply rhetorical, his rigorous reading of parliamentary debates reveals much about how liberalism and slavery shaped each other.

Throughout this book, Parron is attentive to past and current analyses of what Brazilian historians like to call *conjuntura*, historical realities produced in the convergence of distinct forces and circumstances. While previous scholarship has tended to privilege one group of agents in sorting out why the trade and slavery endured and then ended the way that they did, Parron insists that the final decades of slavery were defined at once by local and national responses to growing world markets, the institutionalization of liberalism, and mounting challenges posed by slave resistance and British abolitionism. Parron re-examines parliamentary and diplomatic documentation and restores to a certain degree the role of the British in both the end of the trade and the gradual abolition of slavery. He also weighs in on recent debates on the abolition of the trade by suggesting ways to integrate slave resistance into the Brazilian Empire's political history. To strike a balance between competing claims that slave resistance was either inconsequential or the principal impetus behind the end of the trade, Parron argues that while not all slave resistance and rebellion registered the same way within political culture, the rebellion of the Malês in 1835 had an undeniable effect on "public opinion." However, if that rebellion led some elites to call for the end of slavery, it also led others, ultimately more powerful, to defend the reopening of the trade (p. 233).

In the first three chapters, Parron examines the relationship between the illegal slave trade and political elites and institutions. Proceeding chronologically, he traces the ways in which international agreements and national legislation criminalized the trade in the 1820s and early 1830s, culminating in the 1831 law that declared free Africans illegally brought to Brazil. While some historians have dismissed this legislation as a superficial response to international pressure, Parron argues for analyzing the law and its genesis within the context of struggles over the boundaries of executive and legislative power, and recognizing some genuinely antislavery drive behind it. Thus, he explains the ascendance in the mid-1830s of a group parliamentarians that

would become the core of the Conservative Party and their public defense of the trade (p. 85). Arguing that enslavement would bring material and social benefits to Africans and that the trade benefited all of Brazil, elites who were tied to coffee-producing regions in need of labor offered a political defense of illegal slave property and ensured that the trade would continue, in some years even grow. Contraband, facilitated by a lack of enforcement, went from being “residual” to “systematic” until under British pressure the legislature ended the trade in 1850 (p. 173). In the last chapter, Parron argues that after the trade ended, debates about slavery became less tied to partisan politics and shifted toward immigration as a parallel source of cheap labor and to strategies for enhancing the sale of slaves in the countryside. Here and throughout the book, Parron’s insights, founded on extensive research and historiographical critique, are sure to stimulate further debate among historians of slavery in the Brazilian Empire.

KIRSTEN SCHULTZ
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AMY CHAZKEL. *Laws of Chance: Brazil’s Clandestine Lottery and the Making of Urban Public Life*. (Radical Perspectives.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2011. Pp. xvii, 346. Cloth \$89.95, paper \$24.95.

Established during the late nineteenth century in Rio de Janeiro, the animal game (*jogo do bicho*) gained popularity just as Brazil embraced modernity. Before long, it would become a near ubiquitous social practice that not only ran parallel to the rise of modern capitalism but also offered a critical perspective on “the ideologies that capitalism implies” (p. 3). As Amy Chazkel insightfully writes, games of chance “[have] both parodied and epitomized the ideas and practices of modern society by trading on the volatility of pecuniary value while short-circuiting the necessity for productive labor” (p. 3). In Brazil, *jogo do bicho* provided players the possibility (however slim) of making money without really having to work for it. Ordinary folks, in other words, could get in on the emerging global casino.

This intriguing study carefully considers the game from its modest beginnings up through its florescence as a virtual “culture industry” in Brazil. Not surprisingly, this process occurred in tandem with an ever-expanding state apparatus and legal system that sought to regulate illicit gambling. Chazkel points out that attempts to control *jogo do bicho* “derived as much from a desire to increase tax revenues as to punish wayward police as from a preternatural fear of the popular classes and their folkways” (p. 25).

The author covers an impressive array of topics as she traces *jogo do bicho* across the twentieth century. Her early discussion centers on the criminalization of the game as it gained popularity in Rio de Janeiro and other Brazilian cities. An early 1895 law first attempted to regulate gambling by ruling that wagering on games of chance (*jogo do bicho* as well as other athletic events) could only legitimately take place one day a week.

While police and government officials tracked down *bicheros*—as well as those who helped finance them (*banqueros*)—clandestine gambling too closely resembled the very economic principles upon which modern Brazil was then being established. The author informs us that “objects [namely tickets, paper money, notebooks, tip sheets, newspaper clippings, etc.] related to the animal game began to appear in random places” (p. 42). In so doing, *jogo do bicho* became notorious: a presumed threat to public order.

This process, of course, paralleled a wide number of other developments; transition to wage labor and a cash economy, professionalization/specialization of labor, advent of “leisure” time, enclosure of public space, rise of the modern state, advanced capitalism, and so on. With this, Chazkel notes the emergence of what was later dubbed the “informal economy” and incisively demonstrates how *jogo do bicho* colorfully epitomizes this social phenomenon.

Further, the author perceptively charges that criminalization of the game served as an indication of the changing relationship between the Brazilian state and civil society. “[C]riteria for arrest, not actual aggregate behavior” (p. 66) determined the difference. Thus, “[one] can understand *jogo do bicho*’s descent into the underworld, then, not so much as the result of preexisting social inequalities, but rather as defining new ones suited to and intelligible in a postabolition, republican, urbanizing age” (p. 67). The game became a signifier of a host of “disorderly tendencies in urban petty trading” unwanted by Brazilian elites (p. 68). Enforcement of legislation by police, judges, and politicians provided new opportunities for corruption and personal gain.

This fascinating history of *jogo do bicho* reveals much. As Chazkel writes “[t]he intertwined histories of elite and popular forms of playing with money forces us to question the artificial division between *jogo* and *negócio*, between play and business, that underlies both historical and contemporary conceptions of social history of the turn of the twentieth century” (p. 143). For the author, there was basically little difference between the criminalized game and its allegedly more legitimate commercial counterpart. Reflecting on Chazkel’s fine study, one cannot help but apply this point when considering the recent history of the stock market in the aftermath of the 2008 Wall Street debacle.

ANDREW GRANT WOOD
University of Tulsa

PAULA ALONSO. *Jardines Secretos, Legitimaciones Públicas: El Partido Autonomista Nacional y la política argentina de fines del siglo diecinueve*. Buenos Aires: Edhasa. 2010. Pp. 390. \$75.00.

The period between 1880 and 1916 is one of the most studied stages of Argentine history. Those were the years in which Argentina turned into one of the main grain and meat exporters of the world. The country was transformed and experienced spectacular growth as it

solved a host of problems, particularly those related to a political system dominated by the Partido Autonomista Nacional (PAN), which controlled the executive and legislative branches of the national government and a good many provincial governments as well. This formidable political machine has been variously labeled an "oligarchy," "ruling class" or "Generation of 80." Such designations are not inaccurate, but they contribute to an image of political power in Argentina being controlled by a small, unified group with limited fissures. This vision minimizes disagreements within the PAN and dismisses the diversity of party politics.

Paula Alonso's book attempts to correct this image of what political power is in Argentina, and especially assumptions about Argentinian elections. It covers the first two presidential periods between the years 1880 and 1892 (Alonso does not clearly explain why her analysis ends in 1892). There seems to be little doubt that the PAN constituted a hegemonic party facing only limited political opposition during this period. At the same time, the party lacked formal political organization, institutionalization, and internal structure. This made selecting presidential candidates a difficult process in which diverse actors exercised different degrees of influence, "but none of them enjoyed a complete control" (p. 16). Using the concept of "interoligarchic conflict" developed by Natalio Botana to refer to the struggles within the PAN, Alonso attempts to explain numerous and complex intraparty struggles. President, governors, legislators, and administrators formed alliances and competed among themselves for power. The political scene described by Alonso shows a poorly disciplined party without a defined hierarchy in which no single actor dominated and power remained fragmented.

Alonso also analyzes the complex relations between the central and provincial governments. This allows her to establish notable differences in the bases of power enjoyed by president Julio A. Roca (1880–1886) and his successor, Miguel Juárez Celman (1886–1890). Roca governed by concentrating power in his own person and attempting to discipline and subordinate the provinces' interests. This engendered a struggle with governors who resisted his efforts at centralization. By contrast, when Juárez Celman became president, he enhanced his relationship with provincial governors by giving them an important degree of political and financial autonomy. One of Alonso's most interesting arguments is that *juarismo* established "a dynamic in which power moved between provinces and the presidency" (p. 224). This strategy, more federal, made Juárez Celman the undisputed chief of the PAN, displacing Roca.

The book concludes by discussing struggles within the party following the crisis in 1890, the sudden end of Juárez's presidency, the reappearance of Roca, and the construction of a "modernist" faction that appropriated some of the *juarists'* strategies for building political power. Although it does not break with a historiographical tradition that focuses on governors rather than the governed, this study constitutes an important contribu-

tion to our understanding of the PAN and Argentinian politics at the end of the nineteenth century.

JUAN SURIANO

Universidad Nacional de San Martín

MARK A. HEALEY. *The Ruins of the New Argentina: Peronism and the Remaking of San Juan after the 1944 Earthquake*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2011. Pp. xvi, 395. Cloth \$94.95, paper \$25.95.

On the hot summer evening of January 15, 1944, an earthquake reduced the capital city of the Argentine province of San Juan to shambles, killing around 10,000 people and leaving half of the surviving population homeless. This tragedy is the subject of Mark A. Healy's intelligent, well-researched, and exemplary political history. Healy traces the interaction between the national and the provincial government and, at the same time, offers a superb analysis of the role that the destruction of the city and its reconstruction played within the transformative Peronist project.

The book is divided into four sections corresponding to moments in the relationship between San Juan and the national government after the earthquake. Part one commences with an overview of the economic and social landscape of the province, followed by a detailed account of the earthquake, and ends by illustrating how relief efforts became a spring board for the ascendancy of Juan Domingo Perón. San Juan was among the poorest provinces in the country. San Juan's politics had historically been particularly violent, with governors rarely finishing their terms in office either because they were killed, toppled by the opposition, or removed through federal intervention. The earthquake has mostly been remembered as a pivotal moment in which Perón was catapulted from a second tier of the military regime that had taken over in 1943 to a major figure on the political scene. He launched relief operations, mobilizing massive popular support and displaying features of his political style that would be increasingly important in the coming years.

Part two address the ups and downs, the (few) starts and the (many) stops, and the dilemmas of reconstruction projects. To relocate or not to relocate the city; to reconstruct with or without adobe; to start at the center or the periphery; to prioritize public buildings or family homes; to rely on public or private (subsidized) construction; to employ national or local agents were many of the issues to be resolved. The reconstruction projects ranged from the very ambitious to the timid and, while imaginations ran wild at times, local and national politics intertwined uneasily, resulting in deadlock and paralysis in a phase full of contradictions, frustrations, and ineffectiveness.

Parts three and four are the most interesting sections of the book. Here, Healy takes us in slow motion through the emergence of Peronism as a labor-based mass movement, the mounting of opposition, and Perón's triumphal seventeenth of October and subsequent presidential victory. While these are well-known

moments in the country's history, Healy examines them through the lens of San Juan. The initial rallies to collect funds for the victims and the early promises that San Juan would become critical in the forging of a new Argentina were significant to Perón's ascendance. These efforts, however, faltered after Perón became president, revealing the limits of Peronism. Still, while Peronism did not deliver in the physical reconstruction of the city, the province experienced a significant and long-lasting transformation of a different kind. The old political divisions subsided, and Peronism became the umbrella that embraced the many, until then, boisterous factions. Ultimately, reconstruction was not achieved under Perón's administration but under the military regime that deposed him. Still, the reconfiguration of power that had taken place in San Juan survived Perón's downfall.

Healy deserves much praise for the many accomplishments of this book. Argentina's history has a long tradition of being written either as a "national" history in which the provinces play no part (except for the province of Buenos Aires), or as multiple provincial histories with little relation to national governments, except when the latter intervened directly in a province's economy or politics. Healy overstates his case, however, when he argues that the interior remains unexplored (pp. 9–10), as the relation between the national and subnational powers has been an increasing area of research in recent years, including for the period he covers. It is nonetheless true that much research remains to be done, and his book offers a good example of how to intertwine the local and the national effectively. At times, however, this relation appears one-dimensional and the story unbalanced. The book pays considerable attention to the means by which the state imposed itself (with different degrees of success) in the province through federal interventions, the deployment of reconstruction "experts," and by transferring or withholding funds destined to rebuild the province's capital. Healy frequently portrays San Juan as powerless or reactionary, at the "receiving end" of national and provincial relations. Within San Juan itself, the book also centers on the many squabbles among the political elite and the professional groups in charge of reconstruction, with less attention being paid to low-income sectors of the population who were greatly affected by these events. The book would have benefited from a comparative analysis between the housing projects of San Juan and the many other housing projects that became hallmarks of Peronism elsewhere, particularly in the city of Buenos Aires and its surrounding areas.

What Healy masterfully underscores, however, is that the relation between the state and the provinces is a fundamental angle of analysis that deserves further attention. This book is an excellent example of the value of such an enterprise. It is also an innovative and creative contribution to the study of Peronism that ventures beyond traditional thematic and geographic perimeters. One only hopes that in the future many more

will follow Healy's steps in breaking through those traditional boundaries.

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JODY PAVILACK. *Mining for the Nation: The Politics of Chile's Coal Communities from the Popular Front to the Cold War*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 2011. Pp. xx, 396. \$84.95.

This book concerns the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) and Chile's 1948 Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy from the vantage point of workers in the country's coal-mining region. The 1948 legislation sought to eradicate the PCCh and politically neutralize its members. It was passed by both houses of the Chilean Congress with the support of President Gabriel González Videla (1946–1952). Chapter ten, "Democracy under Siege: González Videla's 'Damned Law,' Internment Camps, and Mass Deportations," details the law and its implementation. Earlier chapters all build toward understanding this controversial measure and how it affected the coal miners participating in municipal civic life through the PCCh. Jody Pavilack shows leaders organizing to improve the lives of their families, with little interest in things grand or global. She contrasts what the PCCh national leaders wanted and planned with what local leaders did and said. Communist coal miners locally suffered repression for how opponents perceived the PCCh nationally and internationally. According to the author, "Communist influence on the coal zone residents had little to do with programmatic decrees wired from party headquarters in Santiago or Moscow, as many reductive references to the 'Red zone' would have us believe" (p. 342).

The introduction and first chapter draw from established historiography to provide a quick grasp of coal mining in Chile from the 1850s to the 1920s. In subsequent chapters, with marvelous and well written detail, Pavilack examines the work and political lives of the miners and their families through 1952. She paints a picture of hope, frustration, and patience. The book's treatment of the 1940s adds important regional detail to the history of the Popular Front, especially the October 1947 coal miners' strike (chapter nine). Pavilack makes use of company and governmental archives, labor records, union and church files, newspapers and pamphlets, and several dozen interviews in order to expand beyond previous understandings of the PCCh in the mining south. Pavilack effectively relies on secondary sources for national context, although some Chilean specialists might quibble about occasional overreliance on one or another author. It is easy to believe that Pavilack has exhausted all possible records in her effort to piece together the growth of the PCCh and coal miner unionization in Lota and Coronel.

Pavilack compares the legislated proscription of the PCCh during the Popular Front presidency of González Videla with the military overthrow of the Popular Unity government of Salvador Allende (1970–1973). Her pur-

pose is to call attention to how the 1947–1948 repression of the Left, and the PCCh in particular, were perceived at the time. She makes the points that Gonzalez Videla was elected with PCCh support, and that Allende's personally selected Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Augusto Pinochet, led the 1973 coup. Thus Pavilack argues, "there emerges the figure of a traitor and the act of betrayal—with its multiple layers of meaning" (p. 344). Some readers may find her interpretation of 1973 too one-sided; there were supporters in Chile for the coup. The subsequent repression is another matter.

An excellent aspect of the book occurs in the final pages. Having shown through ten chapters the details of "worker-citizen" efforts culminating in the political events of 1947–1948, Pavilack then notes how early career involvement in the government and the military over these same years shaped the outlook of three subsequent Chilean heads of state: President Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964–1970), Allende, and Pinochet (1973–1990) (pp. 347–348). Thus, popular resentments and suspicions have deep historical roots in Chile.

Pavilack's book is a welcome addition to the historiography of mining in Latin America. The book makes clear that coal miners sought "decisive intervention of the state to rectify the fundamental imbalance of power between the 'progressive' proletariat and a bourgeoisie that was 'reactionary' in thought and practice" (p. 343). National leadership of the Popular Front professed to support improvements for mining families, while provincial governmental appointees and representatives in Congress defended the mining companies in their resistance to change. This book makes clear that the 1947–1948 attack on the PCCh, and the disenfranchisement of its members, were unfair when seen from the local level. By book's end, the reader knows that in 1947–1948 local Communist Party committee leaders were not concerned with global perspectives—they just wanted justice and equity for their people.

This book belongs on the shelf of anyone following twentieth-century Chilean politics, communist parties anywhere, and the politics of miners and mining everywhere. Lota's mining buildings are now protected as national monuments. The mines nationalized by Allende in 1970 were closed in the late 1990s. One of the oldest mines (*Chiflón del Diablo/Devil's Draft*) has been opened for tourists guided by retired miners. Pavilack's work is a monument to labor.

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EUROPE: ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL

ERICH S. GRUEN. *Rethinking the Other in Antiquity*. (Martin Classical Lectures.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 415. \$39.50.

In this book of panoramic scope, Erich S. Gruen challenges an entrenched scholarly interpretation of cross-

cultural perceptions, assumptions, and practices in antiquity. Under the influence of Edward Said's powerful idea of Orientalism as a politico-cultural instrument for European triumphal chauvinism, classicists and ancient historians have been keenly attuned to a polarizing and self-affirming disparagement of an inferior "Other" in ancient texts (it is noteworthy that in *Orientalism* [1978], Said offered Aeschylus's *Persians* as his first example of the Western penchant for self-glorification by means of constructing inferior, "orientalized" others). As Gruen describes the phenomenon, "Denigration of the 'Other' seems essential to shape the inner portrait, the marginalization that defines the center, the reverse mirror that distorts the reflection of the opposite and enhances that of the holder" (p. 1). His project is to show that the so-called "Other" in ancient Greek, Roman, and Jewish texts has been overplayed to the point of gross caricature and misleading stereotype, that seemingly condemnatory statements of other ethnic and cultural collectivities in these texts have frequently been wrenched out of their proper contexts and profoundly misread, and that there is ample—and overlooked—evidence for a very different ancient view of foreigners, which created links and bridges through fictive common genealogies, kinship myths, and mutually enhancing ancestral legends. The thrust of this revisionist cultural history is one of interconnection and reciprocal respect, rather than any putative dichotomizing and alienating ethnocentrism.

This is a vast undertaking, and Gruen confesses that in this book "it receives treatment . . . through soundings rather than survey" (p. 352). *Rethinking the Other in Antiquity* is composed in two parts: "Impressions of the 'Other'" and "Connections with the 'Other.'" Chapters in part one discuss Persia and Egypt in the ancient Greek historical imagination, Greek and Roman views on Carthaginians, Roman ideas about Gauls, Germans, and Jews as they are reflected in the writings of Caesar and Tacitus, and the question of "people of color." Part two contains chapters on foundation legends, fictitious kinships manufactured by Greeks and Jews in relation to foreign peoples, and "cultural interlockings and overlappings."

Readers might feel that some of the terminology Gruen employs is in need of sharper definition and qualification. Two such examples are the terms "nation" and "race." In discussing Egypt in classical texts, Gruen notes that the portrait of Alexandrians in the *Bellum Alexandrinum* cannot be applied to all Egyptians. He writes, "the stereotype applies to inhabitants of that volatile city, not to Egyptian national character" (p. 108). Is the use of the phrase "national character" unproblematic in this context? Readers of Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, or Benedict Anderson, for example, might well think that some explication is required before one can talk about "nation" or "national character" in the ancient world. In the chapter "People of Color," Gruen acknowledges that "race may be an altogether misleading and erroneous category" (pp. 197–198). Might it not be better, then, to avoid the term

entirely, perhaps employing something like “color prejudice” (the phrase used by Frank M. Snowden, Jr. in a well-known book)? A good argument, after all, can be made that “race” and “racism” as we commonly understand those concepts had to await Gregor Mendel’s peas and Charles Darwin’s voyage on H.M.S. *Beagle*. Benjamin Isaac, aware of the problem, opted for the term “proto-racism” in his 2004 book on the subject.

Perhaps the point about terminology is close to quibbling, but two more substantive questions arise. First, the book may foster an ancient view of others that is too uniform and monolithic (as in the phrase “classical views” on p. 114). Was there an ancient Greek, Roman, or Jewish view of any particular foreign people? The answer to that question is bedeviled by the fact that we can rarely hear non-elite voices from antiquity, and Gruen’s “soundings” are taken almost exclusively from what we must call elite texts (on page 19, he acknowledges that literary texts may not have reached beyond their elite readerships). Next, contextualizing ethnic statements in the larger arguments in which they are embedded allows us to see that they are often fleeting and labile, serving the rhetorical needs of the moment (see page 132 on Cicero’s characterizations of Carthaginian character). Any “sounding,” therefore, must be treated with extreme caution, either as genuine evidence for ethnic prejudice or multicultural solidarity.

Notwithstanding these reservations, Gruen has produced an important book, impressive in its range, on a perennially timely question. *Rethinking the Other in Antiquity* will serve as a salutary corrective against the persistent scholarly tendency to see ancient Greeks, Romans, or Jews as unsavory, ethnocentrist chauvinists, helping us to replace that misguided notion with a much more nuanced and historically sensitive perspective.

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KARL SHOEMAKER. *Sanctuary and Crime in the Middle Ages, 400–1500*. (Just Ideas: Transformative Ideals of Justice in Ethical and Political Thought.) New York: Fordham University Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 269. \$65.00.

Karl Shoemaker’s book fills an important gap in scholarly literature by tracing the institution of sanctuary from its early continental roots to its eventual abandonment in the early modern period, guiding the reader through sanctuary practices from late imperial Rome to the reign of Henry VIII. That such a broad overview finds room for the sort of anecdotal and narrative details that bring issues alive for a non-specialist reader is a tribute to the thorough research and meticulous planning brought to this volume.

Shoemaker begins his study in the late Roman Empire, presenting as a precursor to the concept of sanctuary Augustine’s belief that a sinner could redeem himself in the eyes of God and society by performing penance through priestly intercession. The “Ten Laws” attributed to Constantine—now known to be a forgery but accepted as genuine in the early Middle Ages—re-

quired a guilty person fleeing to a consecrated church to be defended. This privilege, however, was often denied to debtors and Jews, and—added in an edict of 398—the ever-felonious “purple dye fish collector” (p. 36). Shoemaker concludes that “Sanctuary drew on meanings embedded deeply in both ancient aristocratic and Christian traditions” (p. 43).

The turn to the incorporation of sanctuary into the early medieval sub-Roman territories presents the only weak point in Shoemaker’s narrative. As Daniella Fruscione has demonstrated in *Das Asyl bei den germanischen Stämmen im frühen Mittelalter* (2003), the concept of legal asylum was already present in Germanic tradition, facilitating the incorporation of Christian sanctuary into the laws of newly-converted territories. Although Shoemaker scatters references to such practices in pre-Christian Germanic territories, his account would be strengthened by beginning this chapter with a more focused discussion of the existing groundwork. As does Fruscione, he links sanctuary in post-Roman societies to the blood feud; the respite allowed settlement of the requirements of *wergild*. The institution also served a quasi-proselytizing function in admitting Jews only if they converted and the ever-belligerent Saxons only if they adopted the new religion of Christianity.

Shoemaker now moves to England; the primary focus of his study. In Anglo-Saxon England, resolution of offenses leading to sanctuary could be achieved by royal laws or by penance. Violation of sanctuary, concomitantly, came to be seen as a violation of the king’s protection, and at Canterbury also of the archbishop’s. Although hindsight views the Norman Conquest as a watershed, Shoemaker points out that “William claimed the English throne by right of succession, not sheer conquest” (p. 96). Continuity rather than change marked sanctuary law under the Normans: blood feud remained the primary context. This focus changed under Henry II, when abjuration of the realm by perpetrators of crimes replaced feud resolution as the primary purpose of sanctuary practice.

A new counterpart to sanctuary were chartered liberties, in which a person could live in peace, but also leave to conduct business. These refuges provided more permanent protection; concomitantly, they often sheltered offenders for prolonged periods, inspiring opposition that sounded the first knell for the demise of sanctuary.

In the thirteenth century, canon lawyers began to espouse punishment as a deterrent for future wrongdoing; a position that sanctuary law seemed to oppose. This approach moved to England by the end of the fourteenth century. Henry VIII’s secularization of sanctuary practice had nothing to do with his disagreements with the papacy: his purpose was to avoid abjuration, because he was afraid that Englishmen abroad were teaching military skills to the French. Despite his establishment of permanent sanctuaries in eight towns in England, the institution was near its end. “Once sanctuary was universally understood as an impediment to

punishment and an invitation to further wrongdoing, the interest of authority in certain and exemplary punishment swept the field and the venerable privilege was no more" (p. 173).

There are few faults to find with this study. Substitution of "complimented" for "complemented" (p. 103) could have been solved by careful proof-reading. More concerning are issues of translation. Old English *myndbyrde* (p. 88) is simply copied from the source, resulting in a misuse of the dative case, and the use of "anyone" for "any" in a charter from Battle Abbey represents a literal rendition of the Latin that is ungrammatical in English (p. 103). A quotation from Pope Innocent III occurs in two different translations within the same paragraph, providing slightly different semantic scopes (p. 163). None of these details is germane to Shoemaker's discussion; nonetheless, readers who wish to pursue any specific instance of sanctuary law might be wise to consult again the primary source.

The overall narrative that Shoemaker has constructed of the rise and fall of sanctuary in England from its earliest roots on the continent to its demise under the Tudors is convincing and impressive. He provides an eminently readable account of an important historical institution, and I recommend it highly to both specialist and non-specialist readers.

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LYNDA L. COON. *Dark Age Bodies: Gender and Monastic Practice in the Early Medieval West*. (The Middle Ages Series.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 390. \$65.00.

This is an investigation of the ideology of masculinity in early medieval Western monasticism. Except for one chapter on the Rule of Benedict, Lynda L. Coon concentrates on Carolingian monastic texts and architecture. The first and last chapter are on Hrabanus Maurus, abbot of Fulda (d. 856), as an exemplary monastic figure and a sophisticated biblical commentator. The chapters between discuss the eclectic nature of Carolingian culture, the commentaries on the Rule by Ardo Smaragdus and Hildemar, and the architecture of and hagiography produced in several great ninth-century abbeys, notably Fulda. Coon offers an analysis of monastic perceptions of the body through the prism of modern research on gender. In her epilogue, she concludes that "the bodies of Dark Age monks perform the opposition between the masculine and the feminine, the spiritual and the profane, the classical and the barbaric, and the saved and the damned. In doing so, monastic bodies make available to the historian of early medieval spirituality a wealth of material on the role played by gender in the Christianization of the early medieval West" (p. 253).

Coon's title reflects her view that early medieval churchmen perceived themselves as "consciously thwarting the uncivilized effects of the Dark Age" (p. 11). Carolingian monastic authors like Hrabanus or

Hildemar tried to classicize an age they thought of as barbaric, not just by living ascetically but by adopting classical models of rhetoric (p. 11, n. 56). Monks were the heirs of Roman ideals of masculinity, including eloquence and self-control (*constantia*) (pp. 75, 125). A gendered monastic hierarchy was dominated by high-ranking adult males. These "voice men" with their "undefiled liturgical mouths" ranked highest, while the "body men" (boys, novices, excommunicates, and incompetent chanters) came last (p. 81). Accordingly, the inner precinct of the monastery, the *claustrum*, was the reserve of adult males who had achieved perfect self-mastery (p. 192).

Coon's reading of these major monastics is often refreshing, especially when she manages to escape from her self-imposed duty to "gender" everything in sight. Her comments on Hrabanus's exegeses are imaginative and her guided tour of the Plan of St. Gall, with its thorough survey of a vast body of German literature, is well worth taking. Yet this strength is also a weakness. "Gendering" her sources, Coon takes too many liberties. The Rule of Benedict and its ninth-century commentaries especially suffer from this treatment. For example, where Benedict stipulates that the abbot needs to distinguish between monks capable of understanding a verbal rebuke (*honestiores*) on the one hand, and the *improbi* who should be whipped on the other (RB 2.27–28), Coon reads this as an opposition between high-born literate monks and boys and lower-class monks (p. 95). She also assumes that Hildemar's commentary, written two centuries after the Rule of Benedict, maintained the same distinction (pp. 113–114), as did the Plan of St. Gall (p. 169). But Hildemar explicitly argued against any interpretation in terms of social status or learning: the *improbi* were monks, learned and otherwise, who, having resisted six successive attempts at verbal and corporeal correction, should be expelled—except those who had grown up in the monastery, for they should not be banished to a world they had never known. *Pace* Coon, most Carolingian monastic educators thought children should live at the heart of the *claustrum*, along with the "voice" who raised them. After all, these youngsters represented the future of the community.

Given her extensive bibliography Coon is aware of this, but she rarely engages with alternative views on her topic. Her priority seems to be her own gendering of the material at hand, arguing that boys and "body men" ranked lowest, because they were associated with female weakness. Ninth-century authors were more subtle, however. Brun Candidus did not think of St. Michael's crypt in Fulda as a "squat and dark" and therefore feminine space, as opposed to its light and masculine upper tier (p. 149). As Coon herself notes, to Candidus this crypt signified interiority. More in general, monastic self-mastery also entailed managing anger and violence, a problem as persistent in male communities as the control of sexuality. Finally, I see no evidence for ninth-century monastic authors perceiving themselves as cultural beacons in a sea of barbarism.

The notion of monks as the agents of a top-down process of civilization comes straight from nineteenth-century historiography, as does Coon's sharp divide between clergy and laity. As for gender, there is a wealth of recent work (e.g., by Janet L. Nelson, Pauline Stafford, Conrad Leyser, Albrecht Diem, and Rachel Stone) arguing that early medieval elite cultures were shaped by competing and interacting models of masculinity (and femininity)—monastic, secular, and otherwise. Coon has chosen to downplay such complexities, but underneath her at times modish rhetoric on Dark Age gender, there lurks an interesting and thought-provoking book.

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RACHEL KOOPMANS. *Wonderful to Relate: Miracle Stories and Miracle Collecting in High Medieval England*. (The Middle Ages Series.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 337. \$65.00.

This book sets out to challenge the idea that miracle collections were created to serve "the immediate political needs of monastic communities" (p. 2). It does so by asking why miracle collectors active in England between ca. 970 and ca. 1200 chose to gather accounts of miracles posthumously worked by saints and to write them up in Latin. Turning away from reception theory, Rachel Koopmans resists the trend for finding political dialogues between authors and imagined audiences concealed in hagiographical texts, preferring simpler, less speculative arguments based on what those authors say about their motives and what is known of their circumstances. Even if this approach seems to divorce text from context, it allows us to view these authors as agents with private concerns more powerful in shaping their work than the general anxieties of their age.

Chapter one contends that the living existence of any cult dwelt in its orality, not, as is often supposed, in its written Latin memorials. Colorful tales of the saints' miracles flitted around like butterflies, ever moving, ever changing; later some were processed, pinned in collectors' cases (in written collections), but these chloroformed specimens were merely a reminder of their living counterparts. Written records were not needed to sustain a cult. It is an argument that fits with John Blair's idea that obscure Anglo-Saxon cults could survive into later centuries solely on the strength of oral traditions.

Chapter two argues that the formulaic quality of Latin miracles, which scholars often take to reflect the editorial proclivities of learned authors processing raw information in accordance with literary conventions, was itself one product of orality; stories molded themselves to conventional templates before they were written down. In the grand scheme of the book, the opening chapters challenge our scholarly propensity to see text as a formative medium. In the case of miracle collections, the texts came not at the dawning of cults but at dusk, like Minerva's owl.

Chapter three examines England's first miracle collector, the French monk Lantfred, who made a compilation of miracles worked by the Winchester saint Swithun, ca. 980. Rejecting the argument that Lantfred did so to legitimize the reforms of the resident bishop, Æthelwold, Koopmans instead points to a tradition of miracle collecting at his home monastery of Fleury to explain Lantfred's interest in recording miracles for posterity. Here she overlooks a point that supports her case, for the only other miracle collector known in England at that time, the monk Abbo, who added some miracles to the end of his Passion of St. Edmund in the 980s, also came from Fleury.

Chapter four looks at the Flemish hagiographer Goscelin, who has long been regarded as a champion of English saints. From ca. 1080 to ca. 1100, he toured southern England and recorded the lives and miracles of many saints, supposedly—so the argument runs—to make them acceptable to Norman tastes. Koopmans rejects the idea that Goscelin envisaged such a project. Instead she explains his activity in terms of an endless quest for patronage and love of this genre. Indeed, he came from Saint-Bertin, where hagiography was appreciated as an art form.

Koopmans then contends that Goscelin started a trend; that until the 1090s, he was the only miracle collector in England; that others imitated his handiwork; and that Osbern (at Christ Church) was the first to do so. Here, the links in the chain are not so strong. Further work is needed before we can ascertain whether the genre revived through Goscelin's work or through Herman's at Bury St. Edmunds. (Koopmans, unfortunately, has been led astray by Antonia Gransden's misidentification of Herman as a certain Bertrann.) Leaving aside these matters of detail, the case for attributing the sudden burst of miracle collecting after the 1090s to the inspiration of individual initiatives is very attractive.

Osbern and Eadmer are the case studies in chapters five and six. Chapter seven argues for the late twelfth century what earlier chapters do for earlier periods, again rejecting the argument that miracle collections "were propagandistic texts aimed at the laity" (p. 131). Koopmans's most original research follows in chapters eight, nine, and ten. Here she focuses on the collectors of Thomas Becket's miracles, Benedict of Peterborough and William of Canterbury, redating the work of the former to the period 1171–1173. These last three chapters read well as a separate study, with their valuable appendices.

Koopmans's book, though bound to be controversial, is right to challenge the tendency to read politics and propaganda into texts primarily envisaged as devotional exercises. If anything, it lays insufficient stress on the religious impulse, which inspired miracle collectors to create these records for posterity, as testimony to the wonders God could work through the saints. Stylistically engaging and elegantly written, it proceeds with discernment from one sensible position to the next, always stimulating, ever sensitive to the human condition,

and following all the best traditions of historical scholarship.

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LOUIS I. HAMILTON. *A Sacred City: Consecrating Churches and Reforming Society in Eleventh-Century Italy*. (Manchester Medieval Studies.) New York: Manchester University Press. 2010. Pp. xi, 272. £60.00.

Louis I. Hamilton's book provides us with a study of church dedication liturgies from the time of Pope Leo IX (1049–1054) to Pope Paschal II (1099–1118). Its chronological scope encompasses the investiture controversy, which played out in a period of demographic expansion, urban growth, communal formation, and a significant increase in church construction. Given the more frequent practice of dedication liturgies that resulted from church building, papal reformers rediscovered in dedication liturgies a form or paradigm for bringing order to the complicated and deeply contested world of eleventh-century Italy. Hamilton provides a thoughtful and interesting narrative of the process whereby men like Peter Damian, Anselm of Lucca, and Bruno of Segni learned to see with the rich symbolism of the liturgy, and to apply what they saw to the formidable tasks that confronted them as reformers.

Hamilton uses three organizing themes to tell this story: the symbolic significance of the liturgy; conflicts over the meaning and application of these symbols; and efforts of papal reformers to gain control of this symbolism in order to promote papal-centered ecclesiology. In chapter one, Hamilton develops the first theme by walking the reader through the rite step by step and offering helpful descriptions of its symbolism and its traditional interpretations. Against this background, he then examines local variations in the rite as evidenced in the manuscript traditions of the Carolingian Romano Germanic Pontifical and the Roman Pontifical, the two forms of the rite circulating in eleventh-century Italy (helpfully summarized in a detailed table at the end of the chapter). These variations demonstrate the fundamentally multivocal character of the rite's symbolism.

The rite's multivocality sets the background for the second major theme, which Hamilton introduces in chapter two. From an examination of fourteen dedications between 980 and 1116 (using mostly chronicle sources), he argues that dedication liturgies attracted a large and varied group of people. Moreover, Hamilton notes that while dedication ceremonies often served as occasions for conflict, the patterns of conflict defy the types of schematization for which historians like R. I. Moore have argued (i.e., elites/non-elites, lay/ecclesiastical, etc.). The liturgy was too symbolically rich and multivocal to lend itself to such functionalist categories.

Hamilton then turns to the book's central concern: the efforts of papal reformers to promote dedication liturgies as a means for asserting papal authority. In chapter three, Hamilton calls attention to an important development in these efforts as evidenced by a sermon

preached by Peter Damian on the occasion of a dedication ceremony. Drawing upon I. S. Robinson's concept of "political allegory," Hamilton argues that Damian applied the liturgy's symbolism in novel ways—i.e., to the "political" struggle between reformers and lay magnates, who threatened the peace of the church. This stands in contrast to more traditional sermons that emphasized the liturgy's application to the moral life of the individual believer.

In chapter four, Hamilton examines the way in which Anselm of Lucca collected, edited, and organized materials concerning church dedications into his *Collectio canonum*, thereby codifying the very types of "political allegories" that Damian developed in his sermons. Here, Hamilton draws upon Eric Hobsbawm's concept of "inventing tradition." "By compiling selections from papal epistles, selections divorced from their original circumstances . . . Anselm attempted to create a tradition of papal authority over church dedications" (p. 122). Lest the concept of "inventing tradition" (an oxymoron?) lend itself to overly sinister connotations, Hamilton softens this characterization of Anselm later in the chapter. "In short, Anselm tapped into the powerful imagery and experience of the dedication in order to advance the reforming papacy" (p. 134). "Tapping into powerful imagery" sounds more like working within a tradition than inventing one.

In chapter five, Hamilton's narrative reaches its culmination with an examination of two commentaries by Bruno of Segni—*De laudibus ecclesiae* and *De sacramentis ecclesiae*—both of which address the dedication rite. Although Hamilton employs the political allegory motif here as well, he calls attention to the danger of anachronism inherent in the concept (i.e., imposing an overly sharp distinction between politics and morals). "In both cases, whether ruling a kingdom or bearing the Church, legitimate authority was rooted in the virtues . . . This chapter reveals how inextricable the critique of secular power is from Bruno's ecclesiology and from his ideals of personal morality. This observation exposes the weakness of the notion of a separate 'political' allegory in Bruno: there was no true boundary between political, biblical, moral or ecclesial within his thought" (pp. 182–183). It would seem that the same limitations would have to apply to Damian's use of political allegory as well.

Hamilton has given us a rich and detailed study of the role of dedication liturgies in medieval society. His compelling account of the ways in which this liturgy formed and inspired the thoughts and actions of church reformers offers a refreshing reminder of often neglected dimensions of human action.

DAVID FOOTE
University of St. Thomas

DAMIAN J. SMITH. *Crusade, Heresy and Inquisition in the Lands of the Crown of Aragon (c. 1167–1276)*. (The Medieval and Early Modern Iberian World, number 39.) Boston: Brill. 2010. Pp. xii, 249. \$138.00.

This welcome monograph goes a long way toward filling some serious gaps in the otherwise burgeoning historiographies of its subjects—both regional (the east-Iberian Crown of Aragon) and thematic (crusade, heresy, and inquisition). The fact that King Peter of Aragon died fighting French crusaders just months after his own crusading triumph against the Almohads at Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) is a well-known irony. Peter's son James, for his part, went on to enjoy a lengthy career as an anti-Islamic crusader and opponent of heresies who nevertheless had few scruples about fighting alongside Cathar sympathizers as the need arose, or cutting out his Dominican confessor's tongue when displeased. Damian J. Smith's careful, nuanced, and well-documented study sheds light on the intricacies of local religio-political conditions underlying such seemingly contradictory aspects of high medieval life in a complex and fragmented land.

Two initial chapters examine how episodes of the Albigensian crusade fit into wider patterns of long-term local and international conflict, with implications beyond the borders of Languedoc. The lead-up to Peter's defeat at Muret and his son's subsequent loss of control over much of the Midi (sealed by the 1258 Treaty of Corbeil) are thus explained within a context reaching back to Roman times. Smith's analysis does not extend much beyond the immediate Franco-Aragonese context whose intricacies he knows best, however, and his account is most comprehensive for the period around the turn of the thirteenth century. The earlier period remains somewhat obscure due to a comparative lack of sources, and by the later decades of the thirteenth century events in the expanded crown become too complex to permit the level of detail Smith achieves for Peter's reign, James's minority, and the 1198–1216 pontificate of Innocent III (on which he has previously published). Nevertheless this is a most helpful presentation of what can at times be a vexedly confusing political scene, shifting as it did from year to year, castle to castle, and from one valley to the next.

In two subsequent chapters Smith turns to the topic of spiritual heterodoxy. His main concern is to establish that there really were communities of heretics in parts of Aragon-Catalonia and not just in Languedoc; such an assertion hinges for the early period on acceptance of problematic sources such as the *Charte de Niquinta*. After laying out problems of interpretation surrounding this unique (and potentially late and/or forged) description of a 1167 heretics' council at Saint Félix de Caraman, Smith cautiously opts to follow Bernard Hamilton rather than skeptics like Mark Gregory Pegg in accepting it for the most part at face value. Along with later ecclesiastical documents, polemics by figures such as Lucas de Tuy or Durán de Huesca, and some scattered inquisitorial testimony, this allows him to conclude that there were indeed significant numbers of Cathars and above all Waldensians active in parts of the Crown. A final chapter on "Inquisitions in the Crown of Aragon" tracks the evolution of royal and ecclesiastical legislation drafted to confront this apparent

problem, with short sections on the actual practitioners of inquisition (chiefly Ramon de Penyafort) and their victims.

Smith's greatest achievement is his skilled presentation of previous Spanish, French, and above all Catalan scholarship that has been too often ignored by anglophone researchers. The important personalities and events involved in years of inquisitorial persecution at Urgell, for example, are well explained here with frequent reference to the work of Cebrià Baraut and Carme Batlle—for the most part only available in the specialized local journal *Urgellia*. Focus and depth of knowledge also result in Smith's making few concessions to a non-specialist readership, however. Translations are eschewed in favour of original-language editions, to the extent that even the author's own version of King James's *Book of Deeds* is omitted. Smith is clearly aware of anglophone scholarship in his field, and it is cited when necessary, but situating his analysis within that historiographical milieu is not his chief concern.

The book is thus marked by a certain narrowness at times. Its grasp is surest when dealing with the heartlands of the crown's Provençal, Aragonese, and Catalan territories, with only passing attention given to local developments in newly conquered regions such as Mallorca or Valencia. And it is really most concerned with internal power struggles among Christian elites; the lives of more modest heretics hauled before the inquisitors briefly emerge when sources allow, but there is little to be found here about crusades or other persecutory approaches to Muslims and Jews. Still, within the limits he has set himself Smith has done a great service by bringing specialized research on the Crown of Aragon more fully into dialogue with the fields of crusade, heresy, and inquisition studies. His efforts will undoubtedly help others to better explore the many questions that remain.

ROBIN VOSE
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JESÚS D. RODRÍGUEZ-VELASCO. *Order and Chivalry: Knighthood and Citizenship in Late Medieval Castile*. Translated by EUNICE RODRÍGUEZ FERGUSON. (The Middle Ages Series.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2010. Pp. 292. \$65.00.

Though a stranger to Iberia, the great military historian of the fourteenth century, Jean Froissart, accepted the words of European knights who had crossed the Pyrenees to ply their martial trade and declared that the Christian kingdoms of Spain were thoroughly ignorant of chivalry. The work of modern Spanish and American scholars, such as Jesús D. Rodríguez-Velasco and Noel Fallows, has seriously challenged this argument and redefined the role of chivalry in late medieval Iberia. Fully accepting chivalry's existence in Castile-León, the Crown of Aragon, and Portugal during the last centuries of the Middle Ages, they have moved beyond traditionally defined intellectual limits to investigate chiv-

alry's effect on the construction of modern state structures within premodern Iberia.

In this work, Rodríguez-Velasco traces the sociological influence of chivalry through an examination of one of Iberia's great warrior-kings, Alfonso XI (r.1312–1350). The author explores the relationship of the monarch to his subjects by analyzing the “indissoluble natural bond” between the king and an order (*ordo*) of knights who swore both allegiance and subordination through knighthood under the auspices of the monarch himself. In order to explain this “dialectic between dependence and independence,” Rodríguez-Velasco assesses a number of thirteenth-century works including those of Alfonso X of Castile (r.1252–1284), Ramon Llull, and Juan Manuel.

Rodríguez-Velasco extends his investigations of the effect chivalry had on medieval Spain's urban sector and investigates the *Cuaderno de la Hermandad* (1315), which was designed to establish a brotherhood of non-noble knights who lived in Castile's cities. This work, which describes Alfonso XI's attempt to fully establish control over urban centers, initiated the process of transforming urban residents into true citizens. Rodríguez-Velasco focuses on Burgos, the capital of León-Castile, and explains how this process took place and traces the unintended consequences that accompanied it. In this section, he directs his gaze on the principal confraternities of the second half of the fourteenth century, those of Santa María de Gamonal and Santiago. He paints a vivid picture of the operations of such knightly brotherhoods within Burgos and evaluates the institutional foundations of these two bodies by assessing how they changed over time. Though they carried out Alfonso XI's original intentions for them, they also exceeded them by propelling their members into the ranks of Castile's nobility.

Rodríguez-Velasco then analyzes the chivalric *Orden de la Banda*. Reviewing the *Libro de la Banda* and various regulatory ordinances of the new organization, he makes an interesting claim that Alfonso XI founded the *Orden* more to expand his own sovereignty than to improve chivalric behavior. The king's actions sought to advance the prestige of his middling court nobles, the *mesnaderos*, over the old baronial families who considered themselves his equals. Despite the king's specific aims in regard to the *Orden*, his successors, Pedro I (r.1350–1369) and Juan I (r.1379–1390), took the institution in quite a different direction and solidified the position of the Castilian barony while preventing middling nobles from gaining access to these upper rungs of society.

In his last chapter, Rodríguez-Velasco studies the insignia of Castile's bourgeois knights as well as those of the members of the *Orden*. Studying the heraldic markers of these groups, he concludes that these important coats-of-arms were fashioned through the merging of Castilian royal emblems with those of both baronial and middling noble families, all of whom served in the new chivalric orders. These insignia also portray the fasci-

nating metamorphosis of Castile's nobility during the fourteenth century.

Rodríguez-Velasco's accomplished and massive study makes use of a variety of literary and organizational documents from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and effectively establishes the social and institutional genealogy of the Castilian aristocracy on the verge of Spain's Golden Age. While setting the stage for the disastrous conflict of the early sixteenth century, the Comunero Revolt, this book also points unerringly to modern Spain's first literary masterpiece, *Don Quijote de la Mancha*, in which Miguel Cervantes held up to gentle ridicule the chivalric establishment of the later Middle Ages.

Despite its occasionally impenetrable style, this work is well worth the effort for medievalists and Hispanists alike, and is an essential addition to the literature of their fields.

DONALD J. KAGAY
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KIRSTEN A. FUDEMAN. *Vernacular Voices: Language and Identity in Medieval French Jewish Communities*. (Jewish Culture and Contexts.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2010. Pp. xi, 254. \$59.95.

Focusing on a small but suggestive group of Hebraico-French texts from the twelfth through fourteenth centuries, Kirsten A. Fudeman has produced a fascinating work that sheds new light on the culture of northern French Jewry. Her inquiry focuses on two questions: to what extent did French Jews, who spoke the vernacular of the communities in which they lived, develop a separate linguistic identity from their Christian neighbors, and how does their use of language inform us about their identity (p. 151)? Although learned Christians in medieval France were familiar with Latin, Latinity among Jews was quite limited (pp. 14–18). Indeed, this may be the leading reason why Jews were often aware of Christian intellectual values and methods that could be transmitted through everyday conversation but were virtually unaware of the contents of Christian legal and theological writings, even those that were central in the twelfth-century renaissance and beyond.

The written language of Jewish scholarship in northern France was Hebrew, along with an Aramaic component. Translations of liturgical or biblical texts for less learned Jews employed forms of the vernacular. As Fudeman demonstrates, French biblical commentators such as Joseph Kara wove French into their commentaries in a sophisticated way, a technique that can also be found in important liturgical and rabbinic works of this period such as *Mahzor Vitry*. Fudeman characterizes this kind of alternation between Hebrew and French as “code-switching,” which signals that these writers (and their readers) belonged simultaneously to two linguistic communities (pp. 45–47, 55–59). In chapter two, Fudeman treats several Hebrew texts related to the martyrdom at Blois in 1171. She deftly highlights differences in the ways that women and men expressed

themselves, and offers an assessment of one of the records of this incident that suggests that even when Jews appeared to place their trust in Christian authorities, their suspicions were nonetheless aroused. This emerges from an understanding of the subtleties of the reformatting of the conversations between Jews and Christians (that took place in French) into a formalized Hebrew record.

Fudeman moves next to pin down the relationship between Hebrew and French in the written texts produced by French Jewry. Marshaling an impressive array of magical texts and recipes (such as those used to “open the heart,” *petihat ha-lev*, in order to understand and retain Torah studies), ritual phrases from a *halisah* ceremony, glosses to biblical texts, and medicinal cures, her conclusion is that a Jewish literary tradition in French never fully came into being (p. 123). With few exceptions, the (Old) French texts that were produced in Hebrew letters remained bound to their larger Hebrew contexts. In the final chapter, she discusses two Hebrew-French wedding songs that were performed in both languages. The Hebrew portions contain aspects of Jewish learning and literature, and are similar to other Jewish wedding poems. The French portions, however, reflect vernacular cultural influences. In the tradition of medieval French romance, the bridegroom is portrayed as a knight or warrior while the bride is portrayed as a maiden and as a castle or palace garden. These poems combine a strong presentation in Hebrew, which only the more learned fully understood, with a French dimension that all those present could understand. Fudeman notes that the French portions also served to underscore the legitimacy of the Jews’ place within the larger culture of France, in the eyes of the Jews themselves if not in the eyes of the Christians (p. 150).

Scholars of medieval European linguistics will undoubtedly admire this book; the author’s complete mastery is evident from beginning to end. Substantive possibilities also emerge for further study by intellectual and social historians. The most important literary product of the rabbinic elite in northern France, the *Tosafot* comments and glosses to the Talmud, were composed in a Hebrew-Aramaic mélange that is often disjointed. The regnant approach maintains that these texts reflect a series of accretions or layers. The editing or redaction process led to the pressing together of disparate formulations of rabbinic discourse and analysis that represent the work of multiple teachers over the course of several generations, resulting in structural and syntactical difficulties. Based on Fudeman’s pioneering work, it is possible to suggest that while the language of instruction in the study hall was some combination of French and Hebrew, the bringing together (and transposition) of these oral discussions into a more formal kind of Hebrew (and Aramaic) contributed to the linguistic and stylistic anomalies. Recent research has analyzed stories and tales written by or of interest to Jews that reflect the literary works and ideas being consumed on a more popular level. Fudeman’s work provides an

entirely new avenue along which to look for additional resources.

Vernacular Voices presents a bevy of fresh perspectives and cutting-edge methodological tools. Anyone with an interest in medieval Jewish studies ought to read this book carefully. It tells a wonderful story that is beautifully narrated and illustrated.

EPHRAIM KANARFOGEL
Yeshiva University

JANE ALDEN. *Songs, Scribes, and Society: The History and Reception of the Loire Valley Chansonniers*. (The New Cultural History of Music.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. xxi, 283. \$45.00.

This book, a study by Jane Alden of a handful of fifteenth-century songbooks known as the Loire Chansonniers, is a welcome addition to the existing literature on the topic. Despite some occasional pandering to fashionable terminology, Alden’s monograph moves ahead the considerable body of existing research on the fifteenth-century French *chanson* by making some interesting proposals about songbook production. Not surprisingly, these owe their greatest debt not to the “new philology” mentioned in the introduction (pp. 5–6), but to some of the oldest research in historical musicology—from the foundational histories of Edmond de Coussemaker (mentioned on pp. 21–23) to the biographic excavations of the twentieth century. In this latter area, Alden’s fifth and longest chapter provides a genuinely new twist, since her biographies relate not to musical pieces, as is traditionally the case, but to the books that transmit them.

Arguing for the importance of studying books as physical objects, Alden focuses on two in particular: the Laborde Chansonnier and the Dijon Chansonnier. Her analysis proper opens with a chapter entitled “the material objects,” mainly a retelling, gathering-by-gathering, of the Loire manuscripts’ creation and the work of their most prolific writer, the so-called Dijon Scribe; incidentally, references to Albert Derolez’s standard study, *Codicologie des manuscrits en écriture humanistique sur parchemin* (1984), are missing from the discussion of ruling patterns (pp. 73–77). A close comparison of these chansonniers’ contents makes clear that the Dijon Scribe’s manner of copying differed from book to book. The next chapter compares song concordances and questions some of the accepted chronology of the Loire Chansonniers (pp. 109–136). By positing a slightly earlier date for the Laborde Chansonnier, Alden places this book as the first in the sequence of five, rather than the Nivelles Chansonnier. In her next chapter, Alden reviews the compilation process of songbooks. Having raised the issue of how extant books were planned (p. 148), she engages in an important discussion of lost exemplars that were either bifolia or individual gatherings (quaternions), speculating innovatively on how individual voices were laid out in these (pp. 152–158). This excellent chapter on the Dijon Scribe as both notator and curator could have prof-

ited from a comparison with medieval precedents, as covered in Margot E. Fassler's essay, "The Office of the Cantor in Early Western Monastic Rules and Customaries: A Preliminary Investigation," in *Early Music History* 5 (1985): 29–51. A final chapter elaborates on the commissioning of the Loire Chansonniers, highlighting the role of Étienne Petit II and Adam Fumée I, and concludes with close readings of several songs (pp. 210–241). Here, as elsewhere in the book, the author overstates the uniqueness of the Loire Chansonniers (pp. 138, 168, 184). Indeed, the creation of handsome songbooks—"the earliest . . . deluxe musical collections" (p. 65), beautifully illuminated and laid out, intricately organized as whole codices, and intended as symbols of their particular commissioner's social standing—goes back over three centuries to the lost chansonniers of Anglo-Norman kings.

The third in Oxford University Press's "New Cultural History of Music" series, *Songs, Scribes, and Society* occasionally makes claims for newness that seem more dressing than substance. As Alden acknowledges, the presumed newness of the much-cited "new philology" she invokes in her introduction has been questioned (p. 6), and for good reason, since the study of the make-up of books was fundamental to the now vilified critical study of texts. Textual criticism was, and continues to be under its various new guises (codicology, "new philology," material culture, and so on), not just the quest for an original "Ur-text," as too often maintained (p. 138), but the study of sources, both extant and lost, in all their complexity. Much of Alden's book, as described in the previous paragraph, flows directly from source studies and musicological research of the last two centuries. Newer, perhaps, is her first chapter covering the life and activities of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century bibliophiles working on the Loire Chansonniers. Yet despite its series of interesting biographical vignettes, the gist of the chapter—nationalistic researchers misconstruing medieval pieces as popular "songs of the people" (p. 46) and misjudging manuscripts' individual characteristics—is unfortunately not integrated into the rest of the book.

Such negligible reservations aside, Alden's fine monograph presents important conclusions that future research on the fifteenth-century *chanson* will not be able to sidestep. Beyond the substantial documentary evidence provided in the book, Oxford University Press offers additional material on a companion website devoted to *Songs, Scribes, and Society*: three appendices (codicological descriptions, a synoptic table of contents, and gathering diagrams for all five chansonniers) and some forty supplementary color images.

JOHN HAINES

University of Toronto

JUSTIN K. STEARNS. *Infectious Ideas: Contagion in Pre-modern Islamic and Christian Thought in the Western Mediterranean*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2011. Pp. xx, 279. \$60.00.

Justin K. Stearns has produced a work on plague in the Islamic world that is unique in its scope and a boon to students of the Second Plague Pandemic and medical history more generally. Before the pioneering publications of Lawrence I. Conrad and, more pointedly, Michael W. Dols in the 1970s and 1980s, the subject remained terra incognita to anglophone and other students of the Black Death. More recent studies, such as Stuart J. Borsch's 2005 comparative analysis of plague-era Ottoman Egypt and England, the 2008 University of Chicago unpublished dissertation on plague in the early modern Ottoman Empire by Nükhet Varlik, and Miri Shefer-Mossensohn's *Ottoman Medicine: Healing and Medical Institutions, 1500–1700* (2009), have built upon and challenged much of the earlier work, which can only add texture and detail to our understanding of medieval and early modern reactions to plague outside of Christian Europe.

Stearns's contribution concentrates on the late medieval western Mediterranean, Andalusia in particular, but it draws on traditions rooted in Muhammad's life and teachings and developed over the intervening centuries. Muhammad lived in the age of the First Plague Pandemic, and the hadith record two seemingly dispositive statements: neither enter nor leave a plague-stricken area, and there is no contagion. At first glance, the former seems like sound advice for the sake of public health. The latter clearly reflects the Muslim theological position that God controls all that happens, including the contracting of disease, which precludes any seemingly random act such as "catching" it from another more or less randomly. It seemed clear to earlier scholars that accepting the pair of dicta at face value could—and did—lead to a fatalism and quiescence that characterized Ottoman and other Islamic reactions to the Black Death.

By carefully unpacking both the medical and theological literature from 1348 to the eighteenth century, Stearns discloses the active dialogue between the men of religion and those who treated the sick and dying. As he builds his picture, it becomes clear that what was at stake was the integrity of an interlocking set of core Islamic beliefs, including the will and power of God, causality in this world, and the existence or illusion of human free will. Both more and less than a text on medical history, *Infectious Ideas* is a study of intellectual foundations and currents coursed by physicians, philosophers, and religious teachers. Islam was far from monolithic, and differences, ranging from subtle nuances to incompatibilities, distinguished theological and juridical conclusions as they did strictly medical advice. Many of these Stearns articulates and compares with skill and clarity, concluding that the religious protection of God's omnipotence trumped the appearance of contagion, though some acceptance of Christian public health measures did appear before the nineteenth century.

Although predominantly occupied with Muslims "constructing the significance of the disease" (p. 2), Stearns adds a dimension by outlining some of the con-

temporary Iberian Christian discussions of the same questions. Rightly assuming that Islamic scholarship and medicine did not develop in a vacuum, in his second chapter he discusses the pre-Black Death figures Isidore of Seville, Beato of Liébana, Alphonso X, and the fiery Vincent Ferrer. Stearns concludes that Christians clearly believed in contagion, but that most discussion of it revolved around the “diseases” of sin and heresy. As in most other matters, Muslims had little to learn from those to whom Islam was the disease in need of cure. In his fourth chapter, Stearns comes closer to the mark in his discussion of biological contagion among late medieval Christian men of medicine. He correctly notes that they were content to hold multiple conceptions of disease origin and transmission, sometimes weaving them into semi-coherent systems that began with God and ended with poisoned organs. Christian Europe indeed had a multivalent understanding of plague and its transmissibility, which contrasted with the Muslim attempt to square the circle. One can see from his brief discussion why the Christian relative openness to “seedlets,” “animalcules,” “fomites,” and other invisible but natural means of transmission would lead to coping mechanisms such as isolation of the sick and quarantining of the suspected.

Infectious Ideas is thus a welcome addition to the growing literature on plague—and medical thought—in the premodern Islamic world. Stearns’s translations add new voices to those already known, and approach known figures with subtlety and nuance, challenging or at least refining the conclusions of the established scholarship. Though I am not in a position to judge the validity of his theological interpretations, they are complementary to rather than critical of current research. Stearns has provided future students commanding the requisite skills and depth of vision both a model and a solid target.

JOSEPH P. BYRNE
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JONATHAN HARRIS. *The End of Byzantium*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2010. Pp. xxii, 298. \$40.00.

Consciously or unconsciously, Jonathan Harris’s book echoes one published more than thirty years ago: Donald M. Nicol’s *The End of the Byzantine Empire* (1979). Two books with almost the same title could hardly be more different, for whereas Nicol covers the last three hundred years of Byzantine history in just 112 pages, Harris covers the last half century in close to 300, including nineteen pages of notes. Yet Harris is writing in the same line of historiography as Nicol and, before him, Steven Runciman: a particularly British tradition of narrating late Byzantine history, especially its dramatic climax, as a stirring story of people and events. Runciman produced a popular history of the fall of Constantinople, and Nicol wrote a biography of the last Byzantine emperor, Constantine XI Palaiologos. *The End of Byzantium* is a worthy successor to both books

and indeed supersedes them as an introduction to the empire in its final hour.

The story is a poignant and gripping one of how the tiny, fragmented Byzantine state, on the point of being strangled by the expanding Ottoman sultanate, made use of the breathing space it was given in 1402 when Timur defeated and executed Sultan Bayezid. For the next fifty years, three emperors of the Palaiologos dynasty—Manuel II and his sons John VIII and Constantine XI—performed an incredible and ultimately unsustainable balancing act. They had to placate the reigning sultan, on whose goodwill they ultimately depended for their political survival, while doing all they could to weaken his power by fomenting rivalries within his family. They had to build up their defenses and their territorial resources in the Peloponnese at the risk of provoking the aggression they were preparing to resist. Their communications, supply lines, finances, and naval defense depended on the Italian maritime republics of Venice and Genoa, which in addition to being commercial rivals were desperate not to offend the sultan in whose ports they traded. The empire’s only hope of breaking its dependency on the sultan lay in forming alliances in Western Europe that would deliver military assistance in the form of a crusade, but, in addition to antagonizing the sultan, this policy threatened dependence of another kind: submission to the Roman papacy, widely hated among the Byzantine church and people for its perceived past role in encouraging Latin violence against the Greeks. In all of this delicate maneuvering, the last Palaiologan emperors constantly risked being thrown off balance by the non-cooperation, or worse, of their closest relatives, who attracted the internal opposition to imperial policies. It did not always help that some of the leading members of the emperor’s court were in close contact with the sultan’s entourage and possessed bank accounts as well as citizenship rights in Venice and Genoa. The emperors faced a constant choice between high-risk and low-risk investment strategies. John VIII tended to go for the high-risk option. In 1422 his choice was almost fatal when Murad II laid siege to Constantinople. In the years after 1439 the gamble of church union, negotiated and proclaimed at the Council of Florence-Ferrara, seemed to pay off when the pope preached a new crusade. However, the crushing defeat of the large crusading army at Varna in 1444 left no alternative but to return to an accommodation with the sultan that Murad’s son and successor Mehmet II saw no point in maintaining.

The complex story of this last-ditch survival effort, its final dénouement in 1453, and the aftermath of lingering Byzantine resistance in the Peloponnese has been told often, but Harris retells it well, without sacrificing historical accuracy to cinematic effect. He explains the unfamiliar without dumbing-down and lets the players speak for themselves while maintaining a critical distance from his sources. Although he tells the tale from the Byzantine point of view, he avoids the nationalistic and religious value judgments that tend to go with it. In

addition to providing a readable and judicious distillation of previous scholarship, he makes two original contributions. He places the political infighting of the Palaiologan dynasty in its fifteenth-century context, thereby correcting the censorious attitude of modern historians to what seems to be a selfish betrayal of the "national" cause. Harris also illustrates Byzantine relations with the West from his own research into Greeks in fifteenth-century England. What is missing from his colorful canvas of individuals and events is a sense of collective identities and interactions. What were the groups, institutions, and cultural codes that characterized Byzantium at its end? How did Byzantium in the fifteenth century differ from other contemporary states and societies, and from its own past? Readers who are interested in these questions may be referred to another recent publication, Tonia Kioussopoulou's *Emperor or Manager: Power and Political Ideology in Byzantium before 1453* (2011).

PAUL MAGDALINO
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EUROPE: EARLY MODERN AND MODERN

ROBERT GOULDING. *Defending Hypatia: Ramus, Savile, and the Renaissance Rediscovery of Mathematical History*. (Archimedes: New Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, number 25.) New York: Springer. 2010. Pp. xx, 201. \$99.95.

Perhaps the greatest accomplishment of Robert Goulding's book is that it rescues from oblivion an intellectual tradition that was of considerable importance in its own time, but has been largely forgotten since: Renaissance histories of mathematics. This in itself is a significant contribution to Renaissance studies, given that humanists of the period famously elevated grammar, rhetoric, and history far above the disciplines of mathematics and the natural sciences. Despite this, as Goulding demonstrates, numerous leading scholars of the period devoted a great deal of time and effort to mathematics, if not to expanding its boundaries then to establishing its past. Not only the oft-cited Federico Commandino and Bernardino Baldi but also Polydore Vergil, Girolamo Cardano, and Philipp Melanchthon contributed accounts of the history of mathematics, as well as the book's two protagonists—Peter Ramus and Henry Savile. Taken collectively they form an impressive tradition that left its mark on contemporary humanism, as well as on later scholarship.

Goulding begins with a survey of the main sources, both ancient and modern, used by Renaissance historians of mathematics. These include Proclus, the fifth-century Platonist who remains the most reliable source for the history of ancient mathematics, but also more surprising authors. Diodorus Siculus, for example, who attributed the origins of geometry to Egyptian priests, and Josephus, who in his *Jewish Antiquities* traced mathematics back to Adam, Abraham, and Moses, were

widely accepted as equal and often superior authorities to Proclus. This is an uneven collection of sources and accounts for some of the glaring errors of Renaissance historiography of mathematics. But as Goulding points out, humanists did not study the history of mathematics for its own sake, but rather as a rhetorical tool in fierce debates over the proper organization of knowledge and its relation to practice, the role of the universities, and even the proper reading of Scripture.

For no one was this truer than for Ramus, who awarded mathematics pride of place in his efforts to reform the scholastic curriculum at the University of Paris. Mathematics, Ramus claimed, was pure unadulterated logic, natural to the human mind as well as embedded in the very structure of the physical world. Accordingly, mathematics was the foundation of all the arts, but whereas other fields of learning had been corrupted by human artifice, mathematics had not. True mathematics, Ramus believed, permeates the daily lives and discourse of common people, from simple vineyard workers to merchants and architects, and all that needs to be done is collect it and arrange it in proper logical order. Euclid, who in his *Elements* did precisely that, was therefore the greatest mathematician of all. To support this conception Ramus happily relied on the most ancient genealogies of mathematics, which traced it, little changed, from the Hebrews to the Egyptians and the Greeks.

Ramus, however, was no expert mathematician, and his view of mathematics as simple natural reason did not survive his first sustained efforts in the field. Much to his surprise, Goulding reports, Ramus discovered that mathematics was hard—not at all what one would expect of a discipline that was supposedly natural to the human mind. To defend his core beliefs, Ramus now recast the history of mathematics: natural and intuitive in its origins, mathematics was later corrupted by Greek scholars who made it into an abstract and insular discipline. Euclid, chief hero in the old narrative, was now the chief villain: his *Elements*, with its counter-intuitive structure and convoluted proofs, was largely responsible for the decline of mathematics. The way forward for mathematics and its dependent arts required clearing the corruptions of millennia and returning to the simple and practical mathematics of the days before Euclid.

Ramus's iconoclastic account came under attack from many quarters, but few of his critics were as systematic and thorough as the Englishman Savile. Like Ramus, Savile sought to reform mathematical teaching at the University of Oxford, which was in an even sadder state than it was in Paris. But unlike Ramus, the core of the curriculum in Savile's scheme remained Euclid, whose *Elements*, Savile wrote, was akin to a perfect and beautiful human body. Ramus's effort to discredit the text and assign it to numerous authors was reminiscent of the fate of the beautiful mathematician Hypatia, who was torn limb from limb by a bloodthirsty mob. As Goulding shows, Ramus and Savile stood for two opposing conceptions of mathematics and its educational role, each complete with its own historical narrative.

By far the most intriguing part of the book is contained in passing references to the religious significance of mathematics and its history. Ramus's conversion from a positive to a negative view of the Greek mathematical tradition, Goulding notes, closely paralleled his religious conversion from Roman Catholic to Protestant. Surely it is no coincidence that Catholic Ramus's praise for tradition, and acclaimed authorities like Euclid who handed down true knowledge through the generations, was replaced by Protestant Ramus's call for a return to an unadulterated original purity. The connection between mathematics and faith becomes even more suggestive if we consider that in the same years Christopher Clavius was laying the foundations for the great Jesuit mathematical school, famous for its close and fierce adherence to Euclid. This suggests that the stakes in the debates over mathematics and its history went well beyond questions of the reform of the universities and straight to the heart of the religious divisions that were tearing apart Western Christendom. One would have liked to hear much more about this, but even as it stands the book provides intriguing clues on the interrelationship of mathematics and faith at a time of religious struggle.

Defending Hypatia is a book of meticulous scholarship, based on a close reading of difficult and—in some cases—largely forgotten texts. Goulding does a commendable job of tracing the complex relationships among them. Indeed, he exhibits a natural affinity to the scholars he studies, engaging with relish in the humanist practices of textual recovery and criticism. The end result is a study of relatively narrow focus but impressive depth, which can serve as a starting point for a broader study of the place of mathematics in the religious and cultural life of the Renaissance.

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BERNARD BOURDIN. *The Theological-Political Origins of the Modern State: The Controversy between James I of England and Cardinal Bellarmine*. Translated by SUSAN PICKFORD. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. 2010. Pp. vii, 282. \$59.95.

Originally published in French in 2004 under the title *La Genèse théologico-politique de l'État moderne*, Bernard Bourdin's study of early modern political theology takes as its point of departure the controversy that erupted in the aftermath of the Gunpowder Plot. During the period 1606–1610, King James I of England engaged Cardinal Robert Bellarmine in a wide-ranging, no-holds-barred controversy stemming from the issue of the loyalty owed by Roman Catholic subjects to their sovereign. A great deal of ink was spilled on both sides addressing questions concerning the source of princely power, the constitutional authority of natural law, the “two kingdoms” of spiritual and temporal rule, the distinction between a visible and an invisible church, the relative merits of royal versus papal ecclesiastical su-

premacy, as well as the definition of catholicity and possible grounds for religious toleration. Bourdin situates his inquiry with particular reference to two conflicting accounts of the secularization thesis by German scholars: Carl Schmitt's *Politische Theologie* (1922) and Hans Blumenberg's *Die Legitimität der Neuzeit* (1966). In order to buttress his strong affirmation of the theological sources of modernity Bourdin interacts extensively with scholarship of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—indeed on this particular theme one is not in the least surprised to find oneself in the company of S. R. Gardiner, Henri-Xavier Arquillière, John Neville Figgis, Ernst H. Kantorowicz, and Francis Oakley. Bourdin's book is a vigorous foray into a theme of longstanding interest among scholars of early modernity, and unabashedly reasserts the derivation of modern concepts of sovereignty and liberty from profoundly theological presuppositions: clearly Schmitt rules here. Throughout the monograph there is a strain of implicit agreement with recent revisionist historiography of “re-enchantment” such as one finds, for example, among the historians of the so-called “Long Reformation” with their dismissal of the anachronism of the secularization thesis, or in Charles Taylor's argument in *A Secular Age* (2007).

Bourdin's monograph consists of six chapters. The first three set the stage with a survey of the theological implications of the Henrician and Elizabethan claims to royal headship of the Church of England, an account of James's encounter with Presbyterian resistance, and an exploration of the distinctively irenic streak of his ecclesiastical policy. The later chapters explore Bellarmine's political ecclesiology in light of papal claims to indirect temporal jurisdiction, James's hermeneutics of scripture in his *Trew Law of Free Monarchies* (1598), and their sharp controversy over the conflicting claims of royal and papal authority in the *Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance* (1608). Bourdin traces an interesting parallel and contrast between the responses of “Puritan Jesuits” and “Gallican royalists.” There are a few slips of diction and typography, some no doubt owing to the vagaries of translation. Reference is made to a “conciliatory” form of church government where the sense of the passage plainly demands “conciliar,” and to the “Episcopal Church” where “episcopacy,” in the Scottish context, would be considerably less anachronistic; the outmoded and imprecise term “Anglican” is employed throughout the discussion of Tudor church politics; the claim that both Adam Blackwood and William Barclay “became French” is slightly jarring when their shift of allegiance to another sovereign is clearly the event in question. At one point the author confuses William Cecil with his son Robert (p. 54). This reviewer is obliged to admit to being somewhat disconcerted by the discovery that half of a chapter devoted to describing the political theology of Richard Hooker consists largely of a summary of a portion of the argument of the his own monograph, *Richard Hooker's Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy* (1990), which links Hooker's defense of the royal headship of the English Church with his

christological, trinitarian, soteriological, and ecclesiological presuppositions. Numerous selected quotations from the works of Hooker, Archbishop John Whitgift, and the Disciplinarian Puritan Thomas Cartwright—some twenty in number—are, without exception, quoted *verbatim* from this monograph without acknowledgement of their source in the notes.

This complaint aside, Bourdin's study is stimulating and interesting, and curiously timely for all its close attention to scholarly debates of generations past. Perhaps historiography, rather like Friedrich Nietzsche's account of history itself, is subject to some deep pattern of eternal recurrence. The current vigorous debate among historians of early modernity concerning the secularization thesis—"enchantment" versus "disenchantment"—certainly raises once again some of the foundational questions concerning the origins of modern political theory. According to participants in this early seventeenth-century debate about the loyalty oath, one man's secularization of ecclesiastical authority is another's sacralization of the civil power. When viewed through the lens either of recent challenges to the Weberian thesis among historians of the Reformation both in England (Alexandra Walsham) and on the continent (Jonathan Clark), or of an inversion of traditional readings of the Counter-Reformation in favor of a Catholic contribution toward a secularized modernity, any serious attempt to re-engage with the profoundly theological substance of two such eminent early modern political theorists as James and Bellarmine can only be greeted with gratitude.

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HARRY LIEBERSOHN. *The Return of the Gift: European History of a Global Idea*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 210. \$80.00.

This book advances an intriguing thesis regarding gift-exchange in modern European social thinking. According to Harry Liebersohn, notions of gift-giving that were abundant in the premodern era declined by the early nineteenth century, but subsequently revived and came to a full fruition in Marcel Mauss's wide-ranging study, *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies* (1925; English translation, 1954).

The thesis is explored in five sections, each focusing on a major tradition of European thought. The first chapter sets the stage by looking at the nineteenth-century utilitarian critique of the traditional gift, which viewed it as an epitome of corruption rather than a primary social bond. Next Liebersohn turns to earlier periods and to the liberal tradition (Thomas Hobbes, Adam Smith), which in his reading emerges as a broad approach that not only advanced notions of possessive individualism and self-interest but also was cognizant of the value of gift offering and mutual exchange—an understanding that in the nineteenth century re-emerged among German historical economists. Chapter three delves into theories of primitive communism, focusing

on the civic humanism of Adam Ferguson, the evolutionary theory of Lewis Henry Morgan, and its subsequent elaboration by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. While offering a powerful alternative to the liberal vision of self-interest, this tradition, with its formulation of altruistic archaic communities devoid of politics, power, or conflict, further diminished European thinking about gifts. Chapter four focuses on the innovativeness of the founders of modern anthropology who, based on their explorations of rituals that resonated with acts of gift exchange, articulated a far more nuanced account than the one entailed in either utilitarian models or communitarian schemes of societal evolution. In the Indian potlatch documented by Franz Boas, the sexual favors of the Banaros (New Guinea) described in the work of Richard Thurnwald, and the Kula in Bronislaw Malinowski's study of communities in the Trobriand Islands, these anthropologists found competition, power, status, and self-interest interwoven into and sustained by acts of gift exchange that created ties of commitment and obligation. The final chapter rounds up the treatment of a return of the gift with a discussion of Mauss, placing his ideas in the context of existing accounts of gifts as well as the politics of the postwar period, his personal life, and especially his close and intimate ties with intellectuals in France and abroad. A thinker rather than an explorer immersed in fieldwork, Mauss's innovation and originality ultimately resided in his synthesis of an enormous amount of research into a single whole, pinpointing the dynamics of gift exchange as a generalized and globalized principle rather than a distinctive, localized form of exchange.

Focusing as it does on major thinkers across large tracts of time, the book provides a concise if disparate exposition rather than a full-scale study of thinking about gifts since the seventeenth century. Questions linger about the wider diffusion of ideas and notions of gifts among lesser-known thinkers or even the populace at large, and about the dissemination of ideas about gift giving in looser and more intricate forms, and in a broader range of literary genres and texts. The argument about the retreat of thinking on gifts in the face of liberal and communitarian thinking appears overstated and overlooks subtle notions of gifts and gift-exchange that permeated the traditional but still pervasive understanding of "generosity" or even the novel concept of "altruism." Nor is it clear, given the inventiveness of anthropological thinking on gift-exchange, that these formulations amounted to a "return" to earlier articulations of the gift. Whether what we observe is the waning and subsequent return of notions of the gift, or more properly the shifts and mutations of a set of ideas involving gift-giving and reciprocal obligations, remains an open question.

For all this, the book provides a perceptive account that traces the genealogy of an idea commonly associated with a single modern thinker, Mauss, and places it in its broader intellectual context. It offers an important perspective on the gift as an idea and a construct, point-

ing to notions of obligation and regard for others that coexisted alongside an emerging conceptualization of possessive individualism, self-interest, and market competitiveness. It places the major founders of modern anthropology in their political and cultural milieu, offering compelling portraits and intellectual biographies that, while hardly insensible to the racial prejudices of these explorers of remote societies, still highlight the enormity of their endeavors, their "willingness to listen and learn from foreign cultures" (p. 96), and the originality and insight they brought into their reflections on acts and rituals of gift-exchange. Fully conscious of the value of gift theory as a conceptual tool that enhances our understanding of societal ties and interactions, the book uncovers the pivotal role of the discourse of reciprocal gifts in modern anthropology and social thinking more broadly, inviting further consideration of gift-offering and social bonds in modern contexts, in Europe and elsewhere. Scholars in a wide range of disciplines will find it an engaging and rewarding read.

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JANET L. POLASKY. *Reforming Urban Labor: Routes to the City, Roots in the Country*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2010. Pp. xii, 238. \$55.00.

Comparative history is sometimes a hard sell. Presented as side-by-side contrasts of places or themes, it can come across as artificial and unconvincing. Comparative history is most persuasive when it identifies the right topics to juxtapose and when an author has the skill to weave an historical narrative from separate threads. Janet L. Polasky's book succeeds because it offers compelling topics to compare and because it is deftly written.

This book is mostly about nineteenth-century Europe's "social question," which in essence had to do with the unmet promises of the Enlightenment and industrialization: citizenship and an improved standard of living. Inventive in offering a finely tuned comparative approach to the social question, it covers the period of roughly 1880 to 1914, with a concluding chapter that briskly takes the analysis through the present. The settings compared are Brussels and London, as well as their respective hinterlands. The book is organized into seven concisely written chapters on carefully selected topics and includes images, maps, tables, graphs, and a thirty-page bibliography.

The reformers of the title are government officials, British philanthropists, Belgian Catholic paternalists, political leaders, engineers, social and municipal reformers, labor leaders, and others, on both sides of the English Channel, all of whom shared a nagging concern about the bitter fruits of industrialization in Brussels and London: densely crowded populations of workers and their families living in decrepit urban housing, and the attendant conditions of poverty, disease, moral decline, and threat of rebellion. These are familiar themes to scholars who have studied the social question for Eu-

rope's "long" nineteenth century. Polasky's unique approach is to compare Belgian and English efforts to address these circumstances by creating good housing and neighborhoods away from the cities, and providing reliable "locomotion"—railroads in particular—to move commuting workers from homes in rural and suburban green space to jobs in the city; this is the source of the book's subtitle. The strategies taken, the sometimes erratic modifications enacted over the decades, and the results achieved in the two capital cities make up the substance of the book.

Belgian and English reformers both acted on the assumption that good homes equal good citizens. Moreover, it was unconscionable that working-class families should be living in conditions that were unhealthy and that also appeared to threaten the larger society. The seeming solution was to place workers in extra-urban neighborhoods of "cottages" and build elaborate rail networks that would in the process graft another identity to workers: that of commuter. Over many years and on both sides of the English Channel, reformers and politicians grappled endlessly with policies that sought the right balance between government initiative and laissez-faire. National tendencies—if not precisely national traits—emerge in the telling: changes in England were more dependent upon philanthropy than in Belgium, where government took a stronger hand; British reformers focused more on skilled workers than did Belgian officials; British commuters were more likely than their Belgian counterparts to be segregated by class; the romanticized peasant was more a part of the formula in Belgium than in England.

The topics of housing and transportation for Brussels and London are large, and so the author has wisely chosen to limit her coverage and the themes she explores. The research rests upon archival collections and official reports from Belgium and England, as well as an extensive secondary literature. The author describes this book as long in the making, and the secondary literature relies heavily upon titles published before 1990. The primary sources mostly come from the reformers themselves. The words of commuting workers are difficult to locate and show up only here and there in this account. Although Belgian and British reformers feared strikes and other kinds of collective action, and used their threat as an explanation for reform, there are remarkably few worker actions cited in this history (the 1899 "Battle of Enfield" near London is an exception). Belgian and British workers may have evoked class interests on the job site, but they rarely acted together as commuters or consumers.

Reforming Urban Labor is elegantly written and revealing of its topic in ways that only the best comparative history achieves. A few years ago this book might have been considered an old-fashioned case of municipal labor history, a field that has given way in recent decades to cultural history. Polasky, however, reminds us that nineteenth-century reformers in Brussels and London were grappling with what we now label "sustainability." In that sense, this is a history with reso-

nance, and representative of a scholarly field that is likely to make a return in the shadow cast by the most recent crises of capitalism.

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KEVIN J. CALLAHAN. *Demonstration Culture: European Socialism and the Second International, 1889–1914*. Leicester: Troubador Publishing Ltd. 2010. Pp. xxxii, 324. \$33.95.

European socialism in the era of the Second International is a subject about which much has been written. Innumerable books, monographs, articles, and dissertations have analyzed the historical development, political dynamics, and ideological evolution of individual parties as well as the International itself. Many of these analyses are marked (some might say marred) by a sort of reverse Whig history: they start with the divisions and seeming inefficacy of the International at the outbreak of World War I and move back in time to try to find reasons for this ostensible failure. In *Demonstration Culture: European Socialism and the Second International, 1889–1914*, Kevin J. Callahan aims to add a new dimension to our understanding of European socialism as well as correct the existing literature's tendency to see the movement as a failure by examining the International as an "inter-national performative movement of symbolic demonstration" (p. xii).

Putting aside this off-putting (at least to a political scientist) jargon, what Callahan suggests is that rather than view the Second International primarily as a political movement or as the carrier of a powerful ideological tradition (as most of the existing literature does), we should instead understand it as a body whose aim was to create a "mass based political culture of demonstration." By "demonstration" Callahan means practices of "showing, manifesting, expressing, and displaying" (p. xiii): i.e., activities designed to create a common culture, identity, and sense of purpose within the International. This emphasis on "demonstration culture," Callahan argues, will direct our attention toward different aspects of the International's existence as well as enable us to gain a greater appreciation for its successes rather than failures. It will also, of course, help draw the historiography of the International away from its traditional focus on political and intellectual history and put it more in line with current trends toward cultural studies, "history from below," and discourse analysis.

So rather than focusing on critical political junctures and ideological divisions, Callahan shifts attention to cultural and symbolic activities, examining, for example, how much time was devoted to thinking about the location, venues, entertainment, and lodging for each of the International's congresses. (Want to know how much organizers spent on a "music and tambourine group" at the Basel congress? Or about how Karl Kautsky "dazzled the audience" at the Amsterdam congress with a ballet performance? Or about how, in ad-

dition to scintillating debate, congress delegates were treated to everything from boat excursions to fireworks? If so, then this is the book for you.) This focus is designed to show how seriously organizers took the experiential, communicative, and symbolic aspects of the congress. Callahan provides similar analyses of a range of other socialist activities including speaking tours, funerals, song lyrics, and manifestos in order to show how different forms of "demonstration" were used to spread socialism's message, convey its opposition to the existing order, and create a sense of unity among supporters.

By shifting attention away from political and ideological debates and junctures, *Demonstration Culture* does help students of the Second International appreciate the myriad ways in which socialists strove to counteract division and disunity. We are reminded that socialists during this era saw themselves as engaged in more than political battles. Socialists believed they were preparing for a new world, one where different ideals and organizing principles would reign. For this to occur, more than political organization, electoral campaigns, and ideological appeals would be necessary.

Yet we are left at the end of the book with the sobering reality that socialism did, on some level, fail in 1914 (and again later on during the interwar years). Divisions and disunity did prevent the movement from being able to exert influence over political development commensurate with membership numbers or electoral support. Despite his emphasis on the efforts made by socialists to create unity, Callahan bumps up against this reality time and time again. For example, Callahan notes that the "examples of the Boer War and the Macedonian conflict illustrate the difficulty the ISB had in responding to international injustices. The injustices themselves were readily condemned, but when the perpetrator of the acts had to be identified, national loyalties, priorities, and prejudices of the various sections came to the fore" (p. 214). In this case as in many others, vague and general statements (i.e., forms of "paper demonstration") could be agreed upon, but often little more could be done to actually influence the course of history.

And so we are left wondering: how important ultimately are cultural and communicative efforts if not matched with corresponding political ones? Can cultural or communicative activities alone significantly shape the course of political development? These are questions that Callahan's book raises but does not fully answer.

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PETER E. GORDON. *Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2010. Pp. xiv, 426. \$39.95.

The 1929 Davos disputation between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer has become the stuff of philosophical legend. By the same token, as Peter E. Gordon

shows in his fine study of the encounter, its legendary status has at times proved something of an obstacle to subsequent interpretation. Both philosophers were at the height of their respective powers. Heidegger's masterpiece, *Being and Time*, had appeared two years earlier. Cassirer was the reigning heir of the esteemed tradition of German neo-Kantianism, which, since the Great War—a veritable watershed in German political culture—had endured a considerable loss of prestige. German youth associated neo-Kantianism, rightly or wrongly, with the old regime that had been responsible for the cataclysmic defeat of November 1918.

Yet, an even greater barrier to interpreting this landmark philosophical disputation lies with Heidegger's impassioned commitment to National Socialism in 1933, an allegiance that the philosopher never fully renounced, even after the war. As late as 1953, in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger still praised the movement's "inner truth and greatness." And the 1966 *Der Spiegel* interview, Heidegger insisted that National Socialism had proceeded in the right direction; however, ultimately, "those people [i.e., the Nazis] were far too limited in their thinking" to rise to the epochal challenges of technology qua fate.

Gordon sets aside Heidegger's later political compromises in order to retrieve the lost philosophical substance of this historic debate. He claims that, time and again, the Cassirer-Heidegger dispute has been misapprehended (and, hence, degraded) as a melodramatic political allegory concerning the collapse of Weimar liberalism—a political standpoint that Cassirer had vehemently championed—at the hands of the sinister forces of German irrationalism. Here we are confronted with two apparent paradoxes: first, a historian arguing explicitly for the systematic extrusion of historical and political resonances in favor of a strictly text-immanent, conceptual reading of the exchange in question; and, second, a historian who in his introduction claims to be methodologically interested in the way that ideas "ramify" ("The chief task of this book . . . is to follow philosophical concepts themselves as their meanings branch out into the wider world to which they already implicitly belong. It is to understand how concepts ramify" [p. 4]), but who nevertheless wishes to place far-reaching strictures on the extent and nature of such ramifications.

Thus, from the book's opening pages, political ramifications are deemed reprehensible and illicit. In his conclusion, the author goes so far as to label attempts to read the Cassirer-Heidegger dispute politically as a "tragedy" (p. 364). But Gordon protests too much. The tragedy lies with the German catastrophe itself, Nazism's victims (an estimated twenty-five million), and German intellectuals' eager participation in the so-called German Revolution (see *Nazi Germany and the Humanities*, ed. Wolfgang Iser and Anson Rabinbach [2007]).

Gordon's impulses are noble. And upon reviewing the actual terms of the debate, one cannot help but be struck by its non-polemical, "objective" (*sachlich*) char-

acter. Much of the colloquy turns on some fine points of Kant interpretation: above all, Kant's treatment of the faculty of the imagination in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781). Whereas Cassirer sought to accord primacy to the faculty of synthesis as realized by the pure concepts of the understanding, Heidegger, conversely, stressed the foundational import of "temporality" in the *Critique*. Thereby, Heidegger sought to invert the priority that had been established by Cassirer and other Kant scholars of the transcendental analytic (whence our capacity for synthesis arises) over the transcendental aesthetic (the repository of our pure intuitions of space and time.) In this way, Heidegger sought to claim that the first *Critique* was really a work of metaphysics rather than a treatise on epistemology.

Cassirer feared that, by downplaying the first *Critique*'s status as a theory of knowledge, and by making truth dependent on the contingent modalities of *Dasein* (e.g., the doctrine of temporality), Heidegger flirted with a full-blown philosophical relativism. As Cassirer observes at one point in the colloquy: "Heidegger . . . says: there can be no truths in themselves, nor can there be any external truths at all. Rather, insofar as they occur in general, truths are relative to *Dasein*" (*Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 195.) Heidegger, whose reputation as a convinced anti-neo-Kantian had preceded him, believed that the neo-Kantian stress on "theory of knowledge" amounted to a thinly veiled scientism; as such, it embodied an inferior approach to knowledge and truth that was incapable of fathoming the more profound, existential aspects of Being-in-the-world and fundamental ontology. In Heidegger's view, such questions—and they were for him the crucial ones—simply dropped off of the neo-Kantian radar screen. Only a standpoint that took human finitude as its point of departure, claimed Heidegger, was capable of disclosing and addressing such matters of pivotal ontological import. As Heidegger argues in the course of the Davos Disputation: "To hold oneself . . . in the openness of beings is what I describe as Being-in-truth, . . . On the grounds of the finitude of the Being-in-truth of human beings, there exists at the same time a Being-in-untruth. *Untruth belongs to the innermost core of the structure of Dasein*" (*Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p. 197). One can only begin to imagine how disconcerting Heidegger's provocative conflation of "Being-in-truth" with "Being in-untruth" must have been for the sober and austere author the four-volume *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*.

The intellectual substance of the dispute may be captured via the philosophical opposition between "finitude" and "spontaneity." The revolutionary demarche of Heidegger's fundamental ontology consisted in arguing for the primordially (*Ursprünglichkeit*) of non-cognitive or "existential" modalities of Being-in-the-world: "moods," "anxiety," "ambiguity," "falling," and so forth. In Heidegger's view, any attempt to theorize or define the basic constituents of *Dasein* or human being must begin with such formal prerequisites or "existentials." Conversely, Cassirer, the unbowed cham-

pion of Kant and the Enlightenment spirit, argued repeatedly for the primacy of autonomy or “spontaneity”: the sovereign human capacity to shape or impose form on the phenomenal world as it is given or as it appears to us.

It does not take a master hermeneutician to discern that the basic opposition between “finitude” and “spontaneity” that structures the exchange is already amply freighted with ideological resonances, although I wish to emphatically agree with Gordon that, in Heidegger’s case, these resonances should not be construed as “Nazi.” This would be a gross falsification. There can be no doubting the fact that Cassirer’s stress on the virtues of Kantian autonomy or *Mündigkeit* represents an unequivocal defense of the values of Western humanism. Heidegger’s embrace of “finitude,” conversely, is of a piece with the “anti-humanism” that culminated in his 1947 “Letter on Humanism.” Heidegger’s later philosophy revolved around the notion of *Seinsgeschick*, the “destining of Being.” Although I cannot do justice to its nuances or ramifications in this review, one thing should be transparently clear: Heidegger’s standpoint is not merely a *critique* of the humanist perspective embraced by Cassirer and others; it represents a *rejection* of that perspective *tout court*. It embodies an explicit disavowal of the project of human autonomy in favor of the mysterious and fateful “sendings of Being” (*Schickungen des Seins*). As mortals, all we can do is passively await Being’s arbitrary and inscrutable dispensations. For this reason, observers have aptly characterized Heidegger’s later philosophy as *Seinsmystik*, a “mysticism of Being.”

One of the most troubling aspects of Heidegger’s political engagement is that his pro-Nazi declarations, which suffuse his seminars and lecture courses from the 1930s, seem to flow from the discourse of fundamental ontology he had contrived in *Being and Time* and other works of the 1920s. Gordon is convinced that Heidegger’s theoretical vindications of Nazism—which we now know to be much more extensive than we first suspected—“debased” Heidegger’s own peculiar brand of *Existenzphilosophie*. Here, the problem is that the lexical continuity between the two discourses, philosophical and political, is striking and compelling. Attempts to build a firewall between the strictly philosophical and broader cultural resonances of Heidegger’s thought have repeatedly come up short.

In retrospect the Davos debate has been read, not incorrectly, as the swan song of Cassirer’s staid variety of neo-Kantianism (as well as neo-Kantianism’s accompanying humanist shibboleths) and the triumph of Heidegger’s bold and innovative *Existenzphilosophie*. Today, Heidegger is read, taught, translated, and commented upon throughout the world, whereas Cassirer’s thought, noble though it may be, lives on as something of a period piece or a historical curiosity. Thus, anyone who is concerned with the Davos disputation’s legacy must confront a curious and troubling paradox. The version of philosophy that “triumphed” at Davos—Heidegger’s “fundamental ontology”—despite its ad-

mitted brilliance, contains elements that are both groundbreaking and genuinely disturbing. The peculiar stress Heidegger placed on “finitude” during the Davos encounter is certainly one of these.

When all is said and done, there remain too many obscurities in Heidegger’s thought that, among the faithful, pass for self-evident truths. Heidegger’s supporters do him no service by treating his more questionable and portentous insights and claims with reverence rather than subjecting them to the open-minded critical scrutiny that all thought deserves.

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VALERIO PERNA. *Relazioni tra Santa Sede e Repubbliche baltiche (1918–1940): Monsignor Zecchini diplomatico*. (Istituto di storia sociale e religiosa di Gorizia; Depurazione di storia patria per il Friuli.) Udine: Forum. 2010. Pp. 238. €14.50.

The collapse of the German, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires at the end of World War I led to the emergence of new national states. The appearance of a host of smaller states created economic, political, and diplomatic difficulties for the established European powers, which initially questioned their viability and hesitated granting them recognition. Their appearance also posed problems for the Vatican, which tended to follow the cautious lead and diplomacy of the major powers. Both deemed other issues more pressing, including the prospect of a defeated Germany seeking revenge while the Soviets preached universal revolution in their quest for European, if not world, domination.

In postwar Europe the Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania were not given the same military protection and diplomatic attention showered on the larger ones such as Poland. The Poles, in turn, challenged not only their border with the Soviet Union, which received considerable attention, but also that with the Baltic state of Lithuania, which aroused less interest. The Vatican, however, was motivated by the desire to protect the church and the faith in both small and large states and sought to craft a policy to keep them not only safe but friendly to the Vatican and the church. The course it pursued toward three Baltic republics in the interwar period is carefully traced in this book by Valerio Perna.

Perna provides a focus for the complex Vatican policy toward the Baltics by focusing on Monsignor Antonino Zecchini’s diplomatic career and major contributions in the development and implementation of the papacy’s Baltic policy. Born in Visco in 1864, this Jesuit studied in various parts of Europe and was ordained a priest in Krakow, where he served as a professor of canon law and spiritual director of the Central Seminary of Gorizia. After World War I he was summoned by the Holy See to visit Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which had recently received independence. Ordained archbishop in 1922, he served as apostolic delegate to these republics, then apostolic nuncio in Latvia, where

he died in 1935. During his fifteen-year tenure he initiated the policy the Vatican would pursue toward the three Baltic states that was followed by his successor, Antonino Arata. His contribution and career is succinctly described in the preface to the volume, written by Ferruccio Tassin—a grand-nephew of Zecchini and a scholar of the Italian region from which the family hails. It serves as an introduction to Perna's six chapters and the conclusion that follow.

Perna notes that prior to Zecchini's involvement the Vatican sought additional information on the independent Baltic states and with that aim in mind in 1920 commissioned the nuncio to Warsaw, Achille Ratti—who in 1922 succeeded Benedict XV as Pope Pius XI—to make an apostolic visit to the region. In his report of January 4, 1921, Ratti perceived the need for a more protracted visit (p. 52), which led secretary of state Pietro Gasparri to appoint Zecchini apostolic visitor to the Baltic states. Gasparri, who had defined the difference between papal "impartiality" and "neutrality" during the Great War, clung to it in the aftermath. It differentiated conflicts in principles, in which the Holy See could have a say, from specific political or military disputes, in which the Holy See would not intervene.

Adhering to this differentiation, Zecchini's formal instructions stressed that his mission was purely religious with the aim of assessing and reporting on the religious life and ecclesiastical organization in the three Baltic republics (pp. 58–59). In practice, however, Gasparri called upon Zecchini to facilitate a resolution of the conflict over Vilna and to assist returning Italian prisoners of war. He was warned not to be seen to undertake any action that might be judged political. Zecchini fulfilled his delicate assignments by facilitating the conclusion of a treaty with Latvia in 1922 and securing the Holy See's recognition of Lithuania that same year. He was rewarded by being named apostolic delegate. Perna then traces Zecchini's subsequent achievements.

Perna has had recourse to the recently opened papers of the pontificate of Pius XI (1922–1939) in the Secret Vatican Archive, as well as the documents in a number of state archives, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the six fact-filled chapters of the book are based on solid research and are quite informative—if less than interesting. Although the volume has a useful chronology of events and an index of names, it does not include a bibliography—very likely because there has been little written on the topic of this volume. There is a page, however, which refers to the archives the author consulted and abbreviations used. The resulting volume, replete with little-known facts, will not attract the general reader but will prove invaluable to the specialist.

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IVAN ERMAKOFF. *Ruling Oneself Out: A Theory of Collective Abdications*. (Politics, History, and Culture.)

Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2008. Pp. xxxiii, 402. Cloth \$99.95, paper \$27.95.

On March 23, 1933, the unanimous support of the Catholic Center Party gave Adolf Hitler the necessary two-thirds majority in the Reichstag for the Enabling Act and thus the legal authority to impose a dictatorship over Germany. On July 10, 1940, the overwhelming vote by senators and deputies granted Marshal Philippe Pétain power to promulgate the constitution for a "French State" based on his personal rule. For Ivan Ermakoff, these decisions are examples of "constitutional abdication" (p. 54). To investigate why elected representatives would cede their authority so absolutely, he has combined sociology's logistic regression and game theory methods with history's archival, documentary, and memoir sources.

Ermakoff considers the roles played by coercion, miscalculation, and collusion and claims that they were important but not determining factors of the collective abdications in Germany and France. Fear debilitated. In Germany, Nazi violence and intimidation were proof of what awaited Hitler's enemies. In France, military collapse encouraged conjecture that the French might face the atrocities visited upon the Poles. Yet the Social Democratic Party voted against the Enabling Act, and eighty senators and deputies, nearly 12 percent, opposed Pétain. Judgment misled. Few acknowledged that Hitler and Pétain were pursuing truly radical agendas. Yet neither had troubled to conceal his intentions. Latent sympathy enticed. Hitler and Pétain were each regarded as the antidote to chaos and perhaps the only alternative to communism. Yet the Catholic Center and the great majority of French legislators were firmly democratic.

Ermakoff's explanation for why German and French legislators engaged in political suicide is the theory of collective alignment. At a time of uncertainty and danger, they sought the comfort of solidarity when confronting a decision of such extraordinary consequence—thus the term "collective." The exact "alignment" derived from the process of arriving at this solidarity, talking among themselves, passing on bits of information, and seeking some dominant figure to provide leadership. Such actions might be called "politicking"; Ermakoff designates them, respectively, "sequential alignment," "local knowledge," and "tacit coordination."

In March 1933, the dominant leader was Monsignor Ludwig Kaas, chairman of the Catholic Center Party, who argued that Hitler would do what he wanted despite the vote on the Enabling Act and that the party should therefore curry favor by supporting him. In July 1940, the dominant figure was Pierre-Étienne Flandin, a principal supporter of appeasement in the late 1930s who appealed for a new regime under Pétain to engender a revived France able to treat with Germany. Ermakoff presents the preliminary sequences of collective alignments through various gaming diagrams and sta-

tistical tests, but the final and decisive aspect in both cases is personal agency: the role of the individual.

Traditional historians may reject as procrustean the application of social science methods to history, and may reject as well the assertion that these two moments in history are truly comparable. The telling objection to Ermakoff's approach is, however, that aside from Kaas and Flandin, he treats only superficially the motivations of the Catholic Center or the French senators and deputies.

The only possible counter to Kaas was Heinrich Brüning, German chancellor from March 1930 to May 1932, who governed largely through the use of emergency decrees and was acutely aware of both their temptation and their danger. Brüning opposed the Enabling Act but kept silent and voted for it to maintain, he asserted, party solidarity. Some prominent French legislators like Jean Mistler, Joseph Caillaux, Camille Chautemps, and Anatole de Monzie aligned themselves with Flandin, but others, above all Yvon Delbos, Marx Dormoy, Auguste Champetier de Ribes, and Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie, stridently did not—with d'Astier exclaiming after the vote, "Long live the Republic anyway!" Ermakoff and social science have yet to devise a method for measuring courage, or indeed its absence.

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JOHN BOHSTEDT. *The Politics of Provisions: Food Riots, Moral Economy, and Market Transition in England, c. 1550–1850*. (The History of Retailing and Consumption.) Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2010. Pp. 312. \$99.95.

John Bohstedt has been studying food riots in England for over three decades, and his accounts of this quintessential early modern phenomenon have appeared in an important monograph and dozens of articles, book chapters, and conference papers since the 1980s. The book under review is the culmination of that work, and it seeks to synthesize not only Bohstedt's many discrete studies but also the immense amount of historical research of the past half century that relates to this topic. One can pick holes in Bohstedt's arguments, but this does not detract from the sheer volume of work that he has done and the monumental task he has set himself in repositioning the discussion of food riots away from the conceptual framework of the "moral economy of the crowd" and toward a more empirically based "politics of provisions."

Studies of early modern food riots proliferated after the publication of E. P. Thompson's "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century" (*Past and Present* 50 [1971]: 76–136). In an article that kindled the historical imagination of a generation of social historians and helped reset the terms of debate for eighteenth-century social relations, Thompson argued that English crowds rioted not from some gut reaction to hunger but rather in defense of and through

the mechanisms of a shared "moral economy," which was pitted against the rising mentality of political economy. While Thompson's analysis fundamentally shaped the field, it rested less on empirical research than on an empathetic leap into the *mentalité* of eighteenth-century communities. Bohstedt's work takes full advantage of numerous and sophisticated studies by historians such as John Walter and Nicholas Rogers to build his conceptual framework on firmer empirical ground. He argues that, while Thompson correctly identified the "intense moral dimensions" (p. 169) of crowd action, his article misrepresented the chronology of the phenomenon, failed to capture adequately the political dimensions of food rioting, and underplayed the importance of the market transition as a cause of food riots.

Using a comprehensive database of information on food riots (which he has generously made available on the internet), Bohstedt discusses three major periods of food rioting in early modern England. During "Tawney's Century" (ca. 1550–1650), food riots emerged alongside increased market dependency and growing numbers of "masterless men." The classic matrix of provision politics from this point forward would include cycles of riot, rhetoric, regulation, relief, and repression negotiated between parish elites and rioters, who were led by the middle third of non-agrarian society, the group Paul Slack has called the "shallow poor." The second period (1650–1739) witnessed fewer riots; these "regressed toward simple seizures" (p. 102), while landowners turned a "harder face to the poor" (p. 91). Bohstedt deals with this era rather cursorily.

In contrast, the monograph presents 1740–1812 as the golden age of food riots, and gives an especially sophisticated and comprehensive analysis of 1740–1779 as the formative age of provision politics. In rural industrializing districts, mining communities, and corporate provincial towns, specific economic problems caused direct action by food rioters whose demands were "lubricated" (p. 105) but *not caused* by a notion of moral economy. With the new presence of the militia and Yeomanry and increased local surveillance, this period was followed by a fraught quarter century of intense food riots and repression. Still, by the 1810s, thanks to greater state capacity for control as well as the rise of new forms of working-class politics and action, Bohstedt sees the demise of the classic food riot.

Bohstedt's overarching analysis of the phenomenon is compelling. He argues convincingly that while economic and demographic trends set the parameters for food rioting, the local political context essentially defined the events. His contention that the historical memory of successful popular action formed "veteran communities" of rioters would have benefited from more thorough and theoretically rich discussion. Nonetheless, it is clear that these communities (whether motivated by memory or more immediate concerns) successfully used food riots to force the provision of emergency funds and food for the hungry. Indeed, Bohstedt's ability to link the history of food rioting to the history of social welfare is one of the most impor-

tant contributions of the book. While historians such as Joanna Innes have effectively demonstrated England's use of a "mixed economy of welfare" comprised of poor relief and charity, Bohstedt shows that the provision of large-scale emergency food supply represented a new and fundamentally different third strand in that mixed economy. While the "politics of provisions" may not replace the moral economy in the lexicon of early modern social historians, Bohstedt's book is an important work of synthesis in this exceptionally rich field.

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STEPHEN BANKS. *A Polite Exchange of Bullets: The Duel and the English Gentleman, 1750–1850*. Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press. 2010. Pp. 317. \$115.00.

This is a well-researched book on dueling in Britain in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It examines the cultural and theoretical underpinnings of dueling, its prevalence, social composition, and changing character, as well as its final demise. The book is based on a large body of primary material, which the author skillfully uses to establish a number of novel and important points. One of its merits is that it combines theoretical sophistication with a thorough analysis of primary sources. Stephen Banks makes numerous interesting points and draws many important conclusions but never overstates his case.

The book consists of ten chapters, which could be thematically divided into four groups. The first three place dueling in cultural and intellectual contexts. Banks opens with a brief discussion of earlier centuries, emphasizing that, although the duel was never legal, it "appeared to have successfully subverted the actual operation of the criminal justice system" (p. 23). This was so because it had a significant role to play in the social and cultural world of the gentleman. Banks demonstrates that dueling was an integral part of the broader culture of competitiveness, self-assertion, and violence. Fair and manly violence became, in the course of the eighteenth century, an integral part of the British national identity. At the same time, however, Banks also emphasizes that dueling was closely linked with civility and politeness; the duel was, as the title of the book puts it, a polite exchange of bullets. Gentlemen were trained in the arts of courtesy at the same time they were educated to endure and inflict violence.

Chapters four and five offer a social historical analysis of the duel. While acknowledging the difficulty of determining the absolute number of duels, Banks points out that there were certain periods when they seemed to have been more prevalent. During the Napoleonic wars the number of duels increased, and after a subsequent decline, there seems to have been another minor upsurge in the latter part of the 1820s and 1830s before a final decline in the following decade. Geographically, duels were unevenly dispersed. More than half of those reported were fought in London and its environs, and most of the rest took place in port and

garrison towns. Smaller inland towns and expanding centers of manufacture witnessed very few duels, which leads Banks to conclude that the middle classes did not embrace dueling. The most common professional group involved in duels was, as could be expected, military officers. But the duelists also included "the aspiring lawyers and surgeons whose order were intent on ascending the social ladder" (p. 93). The honor culture of dueling also prevailed among those gentlemen who served abroad in military, political, or administrative roles. Banks attributes this to the more intimate and limited nature of colonial societies.

Chapters six and seven return to cultural aspects of dueling. Although the figure of the second has an important place in romantic fictional depictions of the duel, his role has been mostly ignored by historians. Banks offers a fascinating analysis of the second, emphasizing how, during the eighteenth century, his role changed from that of a retainer, who often joined the fight, to that of an intermediary. Rather than determining who was at fault, seconds often sought to find a resolution acceptable to both parties and therefore safeguarded their principals' honor. The shift from swords to pistols also changed the seconds' role, as they were crucial for determining the distance of the parties and the number of shots to be fired. In chapter seven, Banks discusses the relationship between dueling and the criminal justice system. He establishes that juries were reluctant to convict duelists if the duel had been fair. Prosecutors therefore needed to show, if they wanted to secure a conviction, that the honor code had been breached.

The final three chapters focus on the demise of dueling in Britain. Banks does not see this simply as the result of a rise of novel commercial, middle-class values but rather as the culmination of a long civilizing process that included thorough changes in the experience of life. At the same time, he points to important changes in the duel itself. Increasingly during the earlier part of the nineteenth century, the duel was seen not as a way for the offended party to remove a stain on his honor, but as a mode of apology.

The discussion of the end of dueling, as everything else in the book, is convincing, and the author is to be commended for having written such a comprehensive, persuasive, and engaging account of the duel in modern Britain.

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ROGER MORRIS. *The Foundations of British Maritime Ascendancy: Resources, Logistics and the State, 1755–1815*. (Cambridge Military Histories.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. xvii, 440. \$99.00.

It is the contention of this book that "the bureaucratic culture of the British state" was an essential—perhaps the principal—element that gave "Britain the ability to become the dominant power at sea" in the eighteenth century (p. 5). By "bureaucratic culture" the author

means government administrative attitudes and practices (and also their interaction with private-sector suppliers and contractors). Many historians who know the field will be surprised by Roger Morriss's diminishment of the importance of the British government's remarkable financial capability; he suggests that John Brewer's *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783* (1988) has caused too much emphasis to be placed on it. That French naval administration was repeatedly and in multiple ways rendered incapable during the Seven Years' War by lack of funds is a fact he recognizes (p. 61) but seems not to have given great weight.

Morriss claims that "the structure, culture and capabilities of the British state developed during the second half of the eighteenth century" (p. 7), and his supporting argument for this periodization is based mainly on developments in naval administration. Years ago this reviewer reached the opposite conclusion, maintaining that by 1750 "the Royal Navy as an institution had acquired almost all of the attributes that would carry it through the Napoleonic era" (in J. R. Hill, ed., *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy* [1995], p. 156). Specifically, the forms and practices of British naval administration were nearly all established during the first half of the century. The Victualling Office, for instance, was a remarkably efficient organization by 1750. (Morriss would have gained insight by reading the work of Christian Buchet, *Marine, économie et société-un exemple d'interaction: L'avitaillement de la Royal Navy durant la guerre de sept ans* [1999], which explores questions similar to his own.) Although many government agencies impressively enlarged their geographical reach after 1750, as Morriss points out, it is not clear that this had a significant impact on the size of the administrative system. According to Morriss's figures, the number of employees of the state at the beginning of the century (about 12,000) increased to 16,267 in 1797 (pp. 8–9)—not much growth considering that the tonnage of the British fleet increased from 200,000 in 1705 to 512,000 in 1795.

The book's primary focus is on the administrative improvements, or "reforms," advocated during the second half of the century, such as substituting individual for collective responsibility, salaries for fees, administrative staff for contractors, and appointments based on merit for ones dependent on patronage connection. A good deal of the information is drawn from the commissions of inquiry appointed from the 1780s onward. It is not clear, however, whether and when the recommendations of these commissions were implemented. What is known (as Morriss plainly sets forth) is the disastrous consequence of Earl of St. Vincent John Jervis's rashly aggressive approach to "reform" during his tenure as First Lord of the Admiralty (1801–1804). In any case, these sorts of reforms notwithstanding their long-term advantages, cannot have had much effect on the military capabilities of the navy before 1815.

One fundamental circumstance not mentioned in the book is that the British navy's bureaucrats had the pub-

lic eye on them and knew it. The officers at sea were even more aware of this, and their probity and sense of responsibility were absolutely essential to the navy's administrative system. Members of organizations if not carefully watched tend, sooner or later, to serve themselves rather than the purpose for which they were ostensibly created. Sea officers as well as administrators were frequently exposed to temptation, but very few broke the unwritten rules of responsible conduct. They were restrained professional and aware that the navy tended to be under continual public scrutiny. On the subject of personal conduct and patronage in eighteenth-century British government there is great wisdom to be found in Brewer's *Sinews of Power* (esp. pp. 71–87), but Morriss has ignored these pages, perhaps because they potentially refute his general argument. Nor has Morriss, when exploring the interaction of the Treasury and the naval boards, made the best use of Clive Wilkinson's *The British Navy and the State in the Eighteenth Century* (2004), many chapters of which deal precisely with some of his major concerns.

In a chapter on supplying land forces overseas Morriss seems to imply that naval administrative improvement was more or less matched by developments in army administration. The demands of providing logistic support for troops overseas did indeed increase markedly in the second half of the century. During the Seven Years' War the Treasury assumed the burden of supplying an army of almost 100,000 in Germany, a very difficult undertaking because the men were largely Hanoverians and Hessians, and reliable contractors who spoke German were scarce. The American Revolutionary War involved, of course, a large force of British regulars in North America, and the war of the 1790s against revolutionary France witnessed major expeditions to the West Indies. But did the management of army logistics overseas really acquire a sound and efficient foundation? Regarding the army in Germany during the Seven Years' War, Morriss has missed Reed Browning's article in the *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 49 (1971), which reveals that no effective commissariat was in place until the struggle was almost over, allowing a long track of very expensive and politically damaging failure. Did the Treasury learn much from the experience? Two officials who had served in Germany proved quite useful in the American Revolutionary War, but R. Arthur Bowler has shown that the Treasury lacked any sense that America presented a special situation requiring unusual technical competence (*Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America, 1775–1783* [1975], a book not cited by Morriss). Although Morriss writes very little about feeding the army overseas in the war of the 1790s, it is interesting that in October 1793, soon after Britain went to war, "the Treasury formally delegated responsibility for provisioning troops overseas to the naval Victualling Board" (p. 372). It appears, therefore, that to this point the Treasury had not developed a reliable system for army provisioning overseas.

The book is ill-written and frustrating to read. Too

often it is not clear what time period is being discussed. Too many sentences involve mindless assertions, such as that "Ships were central to any operation beyond Britain's shores" (p. 397). These should not have survived a copyeditor's pen.

Yet there are also passages and features of great interest. Because it spans sixty years, the book, when it discusses shipping and provisioning, reveals (but does not emphasize) how utterly unprepared the British government was to employ a large army against the colonists in North America. The best parts, however, concern the period from 1790 to 1815, where Morriss's long-developed expertise and deeper research pay dividends. Especially valuable are the statistical tables that he provides. There is a very interesting chapter on "Ordnance and Technology"; undoubtedly Britain's power at sea toward the end of the century was greatly enhanced by guns and powder of a kind and quantity that opponents could not match. Also, Morriss is right to bring in private merchants and their informed co-operation, the improvement of equity law, and, above all, shipping. On these subjects, he has very usefully brought together his own fruitful research and that of others.

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C. I. HAMILTON. *The Making of the Modern Admiralty: British Naval Policy-Making, 1805–1927*. (Cambridge Military Histories.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. x, 345. \$99.00.

On first glance, this is a massive topic to cover in one book: just over 120 years of war and peace, technological advances, and material change. However, it would be wrong to assume that this is the task C. I. Hamilton sets himself. Indeed, he is at pains to differentiate between how policy was made—the personnel, structure, and development of an organization that was both an administrative and operational headquarters—and the policy itself. This may seem like a rather semantic distinction, but it is a highly important one. After all, a long line of naval historians have attacked policy in its various forms from one direction or another over various parts of this period; these include John Beeler, John Brooks, D. K. Brown, Andrew Lambert, Nicholas A. Lambert, Arthur J. Marder, N. A. M. Rodger, and Jon Tetsuro Sumida, to name but a few. What has escaped serious scrutiny has been the Admiralty organization itself. Hamilton's book addresses this lacuna.

In many ways, Hamilton's work builds on themes developed by Roger Morriss in *Naval Power and British Culture, 1760–1850: Public Trust and Government Ideology* (2004) to illustrate cultural changes in the general attitude toward management during the early nineteenth century, with a shift from collective to individual responsibility. Of course, changing attitudes were only part of the story, as Hamilton makes clear; the evolving role of a permanent secretary and the civil service, as well as the much later development of a naval staff, are

key features in the Admiralty's story. However, I feel the most significant aspect of this book is its analysis of the tensions and problems arising from two causes—a failure to delegate and the dual role of the Admiralty as an operational and administrative headquarters. As Hamilton shows, even the development of a naval staff to deal with operational issues did not solve all of the problems; poor staff training in the early days of the naval staff hindered its effectiveness, while the stubborn refusal of some senior naval officers to delegate authority also subverted the best efforts of the civil service members of the Admiralty as well as the uniformed sections.

That many of the problems within the Admiralty structure can be traced back to individual personalities unfortunately falls outside of Hamilton's terms of reference. The process through which the Navy selected its senior officers (and the skills and abilities the selection process venerated) is ripe for wider exploration, as is the professional education of officers, especially that which occurred outside of the basic training framework. It would be a valuable addition to naval history, military studies, and the history of the government to blend and elaborate some of the ideas about the personalities of senior officers highlighted in Andrew Gordon's *The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command* (2000) with Hamilton's detailed structural analysis of the Admiralty headquarters and its personnel. The fact that Hamilton's work does not address this issue will not detract from the value of his conclusions. As Hamilton himself argues, there is only so much that can be done in one book, if it is to be done well and rigorously; the book under review is done well and is most rigorous in its approach. Indeed, my only complaint is that Hamilton, for completely understandable reasons of space and readability, has to draw his analysis to a close in 1927. I hope that he is working on a companion monograph that will take the story through World War II and to the end of the Admiralty as a separate body in the late 1960s, and then there will be a need for someone to chart the development of Britain's Ministry of Defence with the same eye for detail and analysis that Hamilton has cast over the Admiralty.

Hamilton's book joins a growing body of high quality research into neglected, misunderstood, or incompletely explored areas of naval history that is successfully broadening the subject to include a variety of approaches and methodologies rather than just focusing on battles or "how big is my dreadnought?" Hamilton has thrown a welcome light on an understudied area and, now that he has done so, may leave many readers wondering why it has taken so long for naval historians to look at how the Royal Navy's operational and administrative headquarters developed.

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CHRISTINE KINEALY. *Daniel O'Connell and the Anti-Slavery Movement: "The Saddest People the Sun Sees."* Lon-

don: Pickering and Chatto Publishers. 2011. Pp. viii, 218. \$99.00.

Christine Kinealy's book is just what the title suggests: a narrative history that traces the involvement of Daniel O'Connell in the movement against slavery. In it, Kinealy recounts the antislavery work of the prominent nineteenth-century Irish leader, who is best known for his agitation for Catholic Emancipation in Great Britain and for his commitment to promoting Irish autonomy within the British Empire. Kinealy traces O'Connell's activities during the struggle for British West Indian emancipation, discusses his outspoken critiques of American slavery, and presents evidence of how O'Connell's words and actions influenced reformers well after his death. It is the most detailed accounting of O'Connell's antislavery activities to date, and the work will serve as a useful resource for anyone interested in that subject.

That said, Kinealy's book lacks a strong point of view. Her thesis is simply that O'Connell played an important role in the antislavery movement, a fact that has been well documented by scholars. Although she mentions some of the other literature on the topic in her notes, she engages only selectively with that scholarship. Instead, she focuses on narrating the details of O'Connell's crusade against slavery. Indeed, she relates a great amount of information on the subject, documenting O'Connell's antislavery arguments with long quotations and providing detailed accounts of the meetings he attended and his exchanges with others on the topic of slavery.

Kinealy does try to contextualize all of this data by discussing the political environment in Great Britain and in the United States between the 1820s and the 1860s. As a scholar of Irish history, she is understandably more adept at presenting the British context than the American. Her narrative of O'Connell's involvement in the fight against both slavery and apprenticeship in the British Parliament is well informed. Her discussion of the politics of slavery in the United States is less so.

Kinealy's treatment of the American antislavery movement, for example, lacks nuance. She describes American abolitionists at large as being optimistic about their impact on the American political system in the 1840s, a portrayal that overstates their confidence and glosses over the divisions within the movement on the subject of political action. Furthermore, she refers to the antislavery third party that arose during that decade, the Liberty Party, as the "Liberal Party" (pp. 81, 92). She also refers to the nativist parties of the 1840s as the "Know Nothings," yet the Know Nothings did not emerge until the next decade (p. 105). In addition, her discussion of the annexation of Texas and the beginning of the Mexican War is overly simplistic. She explains the delay in the American annexation of Texas between 1836 and 1845 as an attempt to avoid war with Mexico, and she characterizes the outbreak of the Mexican War in 1846 as a result of annexation. In reality, both the

delay in annexation and the outbreak of war with Mexico were tied to the politics of American sectionalism, expansionism, and slavery in a much more complicated way.

Most problematic, however, is Kinealy's suggestion that Irish Americans became more sympathetic to antislavery in the decade before the Civil War. She notes that while they largely rejected O'Connell's antislavery appeals in the 1840s, "after 1861, thousands of Irish men had signed up for the Union army to join in the military crusade against slavery" (p. 165). Kinealy thus characterizes service in the Union Army as an expression of commitment to antislavery in order to document a change in sentiment. In fact, for most, service in the Union Army was a defense of the Union and not an attack on slavery, especially in the years before the Emancipation Proclamation. While some Irish American soldiers may have fought out of an antislavery sensibility, far more fought to prove their loyalty to the United States, for financial gain, or because they were conscripted into the army. Most evidence, in fact, points to continued widespread (though certainly not universal) animosity toward emancipation among Irish Americans throughout the entirety of the war.

Kinealy's main interest, however, is not American history but Daniel O'Connell, and her discussion of his position on slavery is thorough. Her documentation of his activities demonstrates O'Connell's importance in the transatlantic antislavery movement. Her last chapter, on the way O'Connell's antislavery activities were remembered for years after his death, contains much evidence of the great importance of his legacy. The value of this work lies in its accounting of O'Connell's antislavery activities throughout his life and the ways in which those activities were remembered after his death.

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MARJORIE WHEELER-BARCLAY. *The Science of Religion in Britain, 1860–1915*. (Victorian Literature and Culture Series.) Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. 2010. Pp. x, 311. \$45.00.

In this book, Marjorie Wheeler-Barclay starts from the assumption that some early British classics within the academic discipline now commonly known as the comparative study of religions have frequently been analyzed to ascertain their contribution to the present state of knowledge in the field, but without a sufficient view to elucidating their role in Victorian discourse on religion. To remedy this, she discusses in detail six writers who justifiably can be taken to exemplify the full scope of non-theological Victorian writing on religion and the religions. In her introduction, the author argues "that their work is best regarded not as a cause of, but as a response to, the sense of cultural disorientation that was engendered by religious turmoil" (p. 2), claiming that the "widespread interest in the 'utility' and human 'meaning' of all forms of religious belief and practice

offered a favourable atmosphere for the creation of a comparative study of religions" (p. 7). Chapter one consequently details some major influences that had shaped the perception of religion and religions by the early decades of the Victorian period, most notably the evolutionary ideas propagated by Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer. Following this setting of the stage, the author discusses in the following six chapters the lives and works of Friedrich Max Müller, Edward Burnett Tylor, Andrew Lang, William Robertson Smith, James George Frazer, and Jane Ellen Harrison; each of the chapters moves from vital biographical information via key themes and concepts to an outline of the contemporary reception. In her conclusion, Wheeler-Barclay reaffirms her conviction that the "Victorian 'science of religion' was a reaction to and a reflection of the sense of crisis that had troubled the educated classes of British society as the traditional Anglican cultural elite came under increasingly successful attack, a process that had reached its most intense phase in the years between 1850 and 1890" (p. 247). Summarizing the individual positions taken by the authors discussed in her book, she notes that "while the science of religion was not able to create a new cultural consensus, it had contributed in ways not always easy to trace to a new and more wide-ranging conception of religion" (p. 252).

The book is well written, clearly structured, and carefully produced. As it does not presuppose a great deal of familiarity with the lives and ideas of the authors discussed in it, there is inevitably much that is not new and may in fact be found in earlier introductions to and histories of comparative religious studies. However, the carefully arranged chapters, focusing on Britain in the crucial period between 1860 and 1915, present a coherent and tightly knit argument, well suited to the author's aim of highlighting the contemporary background of Victorian comparative religious studies. In this context, it was a wise decision to discuss in detail the work of Lang, which has tended to be dismissed as amateurish in recent years but is an illuminating and by no means idiosyncratic reflection of the spirit of the times. Moreover, readers will find not only well-structured basic information and orientation but also shrewd remarks on details, as, for instance, when the author notes that Robertson Smith's biographer John Sutherland Black had arrived at a view of religion much more radical than Smith's and therefore should not be assumed to represent the views of his friend without bias (p. 273, n. 1). In fact, it might be argued that the source problem is even more complex, as the 1912 biography was a collaborative effort of Black, his friend George Chrystal, and the latter's son George William Chrystal, whose relative share in the enterprise must remain largely a matter of speculation. As another source-critical caveat, the author should perhaps have used Max Müller's various accounts of his own career with a little more discretion, questioning their romantic self-stylization and balancing it with the views of Müller's contemporary critics. These remarks, however, in no way detract from the book's value; it offers basic information well

suited to the needs of the undergraduate student, as well as fresh insights to the advanced scholar.

BERNHARD MAIER

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INA ZWEINIGER-BARGIELOWSKA. *Managing the Body: Beauty, Health, and Fitness in Britain, 1880–1939*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. xi, 394. \$115.00.

Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska's research into the history of the body began when she became interested in women's body image and weight issues since the 1960s. It then expanded to cover attitudes affecting the size and shape of both men's and women's bodies from the 1880s onward. This book presents the fruits of her research on the period between 1880 and 1939. It provides a fascinating and richly illustrated history of discourses surrounding the making of British bodies during that time.

The monograph is divided into two parts, topped and tailed by an introduction and conclusion. The first part deals with the period 1880–1914 in three chapters. The first two concern male bodies. Chapter one places the growth of interest in the male body in the context of increasing anxieties about the effects of modern urban lifestyles on health and physical fitness. Chapter two shows how concerns about physical deterioration were woven into arguments about patriotic and imperial necessity. The third chapter illustrates the impact of these ideas on women, focusing on themes of physical culture, "race motherhood," and the importance of proper feeding.

Part two covers the period between 1918 and 1939. Chapter four shows how wartime revelations about the health of British men generated a campaign to build an "A1" nation. Chapter five examines issues associated with the popularity of physical culture, its relationship to fascism, anxieties about male obesity, and male dress reform. Chapter six discusses the parallel movement to encourage women's fitness, the relationship between sex and race, and the yoking together of food, health, and beauty. The seventh chapter suggests—a little contentiously, perhaps—that "the historical literature and popular perceptions of the 1930s" are still dominated by a "left-wing perspective" that emphasizes the long years of unemployment and deprivation; Zweiniger-Bargielowska contrasts this with an alternative image of fit and healthy bodies nourished by rising living standards.

The book is animated by two underlying and inter-related ideas. The first is that the failure to achieve high standards of physical health and fitness was interpreted in primarily individualistic terms or, in other words, as a symbol of *personal* failure. The second is that individuals were told that they had a patriotic duty to overcome this failure in order to discharge the responsibilities of citizenship. As a result, individual men and women were placed under increasing pressure to make themselves fit for the world in which they lived. These ideas were expressed directly by the Scottish medical

officer William Leslie Mackenzie, who wrote that “it has taken a century to persuade the ordinary citizen that his environment of home and street and atmosphere is . . . in some measure his own creation. Perhaps, with the greater pace of today, it will take less than a century to persuade him that it is . . . his duty to fit himself to live in it” (*The Health of the Schoolchild* [1906], p. 50).

This book will undoubtedly become a major reference point for students of the history of the body and the history of medicine more generally, but there are a number of ways in which it might have been developed further. Although the author has gone to some lengths to place the history of the body in the wider context of improvements in health standards, she makes comparatively few references to the work of anthropometric historians, who have used data on the size and shape of people’s bodies to illustrate those changes. This is particularly apparent in chapter seven, which discusses the impact of unemployment on the height of children but makes no reference to changes in the physical measurements of children more generally. Secondly, although the book emphasizes the individualistic nature of the discourse about health and fitness, it would be interesting to know how far these concerns were also reflected in other aspects of social and public policy, such as campaigns to improve housing conditions and promote town planning.

On the back cover of my copy, Peter Mandler suggests that this book “makes our own most deeply-held beliefs and practices look strange and circumstantial” while, in other ways, it also illustrates some striking similarities between the period it discusses and the present day. Mandler argues that “yesterday’s answers . . . once focused on men rather than women, on elites rather than ordinary people,” and yet the book demonstrates how the pursuit of “health, beauty and fitness” was enjoined on people of both sexes and all classes. Zweiniger-Bargielowska also highlights the importance of concerns about anorexia, obesity, and the struggle for physical fitness. The lives of our parents and grandparents may not have been so different from our own.

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TONY MASON and ELIZA RIEDI. *Sport and the Military: The British Armed Forces, 1880–1960*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. ix, 288. Cloth \$90.00, paper \$32.99.

This deeply researched book provides the first close look at the role of sport in the British military. Tony Mason and Eliza Riedi offer a fascinating account that highlights the importance of military sport, not just at home but on battleships, behind the trenches in World War I, and in the midst of the Desert War. Sport was played by servicemen and women, both officers and those in the ranks. Sport remained strictly sex segregated, but it increasingly brought together people from all ranks. It functioned both as a marker reinforcing

military and social hierarchies and as a means to blur these distinctions, at least on the playing field. This book charts the rise of military sport from informal beginnings in the late Victorian period to the foundation of the Army Sport Control Board in 1918 and the creation of corresponding bodies in the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, concluding with the era of national service. While equestrian sport and particularly hunting and polo dominated officer sport until the 1930s, football was most popular among the ranks, followed by rugby, boxing, cricket, and track and field. Mason and Riedi also explore the relationship between military and civilian sport; for example, they point to the pioneering role of the Royal Engineers in promoting the new game of football in the 1870s and 1880s.

The sheer amount of time spent playing sport is striking. In peacetime the lives of officers stationed in Britain and India appear to have been dominated by a variety of sporting activities. Under the leadership of enthusiasts such as Captain Reginald Kentish, a prime mover in extending the provision of sports grounds for troops, opportunities for sport were increasingly made available to the ranks from the turn of the century. Playing sports did not end following the outbreak of war. Soldiers short of equipment early in World War I improvised cricket sets, using old jam tins as balls, hop poles for bats, and bully beef tins for wickets. As the military situation stabilized, competitions and tournaments behind the lines became an established routine in northern France. This practice was replicated in World War II. Accomplished sportsmen were frequently excused from ordinary duties, and professional footballers were used to entertain troops.

Why was sport such a prominent aspect of military life? Sport served a variety of functions. One longstanding argument posits sport as training for war, and indeed, the value of sport in cultivating fitness and a fighting spirit has long been recognized. From the later nineteenth century, this perspective was increasingly extended to include the ranks, and military reformers advocated sports as a means of social control. Troops kept busy playing and watching sports were less likely to frequent pubs or brothels. However, there were limits to the morally uplifting impact of sport, because competitions also provided opportunities for drinking and gambling. Secondly, sport helped to foster an *esprit de corps* within the unit and, more generally, to maintain morale, distracting the troops from the horrors of war. The maintenance of morale was equally important during demobilization after the two world wars, when the military authorities used sport to counter potential discontent and to maintain discipline. In January 1919, a British Expeditionary Force Sport Board was established to coordinate sporting activities to keep the men from “grousing,” and after VE Day, sport was promoted to “occupy the waking hours of the troops” (pp. 107, 206). Perhaps the most important function of sport was to provide relief from the “boredom unspeakable” (p. 91) endured by most servicemen, whether garrisoned or stationed far from home. This was even more

important for prisoners of war in Germany during World War II, who developed a sporting culture as a source of solace.

This book would have benefitted from a more fully developed gender analysis, both with regard to situating military sport within wider debates about masculinity and in giving more space to women. The implication of sport as a site of male bonding within and between ranks and the diverse masculine codes represented by the promotion of amateurism in the face of a working-class culture of professionalism could have been discussed further. Although the book promises to address both sexes in the introduction (p. 13), a mere six pages toward the end are devoted to women. Women's military role was of course auxiliary and they accounted for only a fraction of personnel, but this topic deserves greater attention. There is virtually nothing about the relationship between female military sport and constructions of femininity in wartime or following the establishment of permanent women's services in the late 1940s. Regardless, Mason and Riedi provide new insight into an important and neglected topic. Their book should be essential reading not only for scholars and students working on military history and the history of sport, but also for those interested in modern British social and cultural history more generally.

INA ZWEINIGER-BARGIELOWSKA
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RUPERT RICHARD ARROWSMITH. *Modernism and the Museum: Asian, African, and Pacific Art and the London Avant-Garde*. (Oxford English Monographs.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 228. \$110.00.

This book recalls Moncure Daniel Conway's character Professor Omnium, who, proposing "an excursion round the world," explains that "we can never go round the world, except in a small, limited way, if we leave London . . . Ten thousand people and a dozen governments have been at infinite pains and expense to bring the cream of the East and of the West to your own doors" (*Travels in South Kensington* [1882], pp. 21–23). In Rupert Richard Arrowsmith's study, the geography of the British Museum becomes a microcosm of world culture. We encounter Ezra Pound haunting the reading room and confronting the massive Assyrian *Shedu*. Under the museum's influence, Henri Gaudier-Brzeska turns against "the fair Greek [who] saw himself only" in favor of a gallery of hieratic Egyptian and Assyrian stone carvings; from there, we catch a fleeting glimpse of him "heading for the Asiatic section" and Japanese *netsuke* (p. 97). Arrowsmith argues persuasively that these powerful stimuli, buried deep behind the museum's classical facade, decisively affected the work of the London avant-garde.

There is now a sizeable literature on the relationship between the practices of collecting and display by museums and the wider history of imperialism. Arrow-

smith, however, is interested in the impact of the imperial collections of non-Western art, and the institutions that preserved and disseminated them, on the development of English Modernism. Frustrated with the lack of expertise in the areas his subtitle denotes—the arts of Asia, Africa, and the Pacific—on the part of historians of Modernism, he intends to reorient the avant-garde narrative, insisting that objects in London collections of work from outside the Western tradition left a profound imprint on major Modernist practice, especially in the fields that most interest him: sculpture and poetry.

The question of influence—or, even more vaguely, of inspiration—still generates anxiety in art historians. A generation ago, controversy greeted the Museum of Modern Art's (MoMA) celebration of Modernist responses to African objects in the exhibition "*Primitivism*" in *Twentieth-Century Art: Affinity of the Tribal and the Modern* (1984). James Clifford's lethal critique of the exhibition revealed its replication of colonial ethnological categories and its lack of expertise concerning—or interest in—the origins, meaning, and function of the African objects displayed. But what should replace "primitivism"? In his treatment of Benin bronzes and their influence on Jacob Epstein, Arrowsmith could have usefully referenced Annie E. Coombes's fundamental work *Reinventing Africa: Museums, Material Culture and Popular Imagination* (1994). He provides a compelling account both of the British Museum's acquisition of the bronzes and their direct impact on Epstein's work but fails to connect the two.

Epstein looms large, moving back from Paris to London in 1905 to be near the British Museum and creating a scandal, well documented in the existing literature, with his relief sculptures for the new headquarters of the British Medical Association. Arrowsmith, however, argues that Epstein worked in dialogue with the architect Charles Holden and the historian of Indian art Ananda Kentish Coomaraswamy to create what was understood as "an Indian temple on the Strand," a "building based on Indian rather than European aesthetic principles" (p. 34). This might be pushing it too far, but Arrowsmith has no truck with theories of ambivalence and hybridity of the Homi Bhabha school. He demonstrates the direct influence of Buddhist and early Hindu sculpture at the heart of imperial London. Further, Arrowsmith argues persuasively that Epstein's masterpiece, the unmistakably phallic *Rock Drill* of 1913, ostensibly a dystopian product of the machine age, actually issues forth from Epstein's study of African art, revealing colonial parentage for a troubled icon of British Modernism.

Arrowsmith is well versed in most, if not all, the many aspects of global artistic production referenced in this book and writes knowledgeably about Asian, African, and Pacific objects as well as about London Modernism (itself other to the self-elected metropolises of Paris and New York). It is a rare scholar who can move with such expertise across these fields, each with its own historiography; rarer still is the art historian who troubles to

piece together evidence from fragmentary institutional archives. Some of the most important details in this book are revealed by the Register of the British Museum's print room; the dates of Pound's visits, for example, are painstakingly correlated with new acquisitions made by Laurence Binyon, which are in turn linked to the poet's literary productions.

Also significant is Arrowsmith's refashioning of the role of the museum not as merely a crude agent of imperialism, but rather as a source of expertise and a treasure trove of objects of extraordinary beauty. Many of the best effects in this text concern interactions between curators and artists, such as that between Binyon and Pound poring over Japanese prints. Nobody would mistake Binyon's own poetry, however, for Modernism, and Arrowsmith could have moved his revisionist project further had he undermined the avant-garde/academic binary which is an unquestioned premise of his project. The creative exploration of museum collections was not restricted to the small avant-garde discussed here.

The text is not without slips. Arrowsmith is unlucky in having miscited the present reviewer's work (p. 2). Henry Hardy Cole (p. 43, but given in the index as p. 40) was not the "president of the South Kensington Museum" but an employee of the Archaeological Survey of India and the son of the first director of the museum. Arrowsmith describes as Chola (a period ending in the thirteenth century) a bronze *Parvati* that he dates to the mid-sixteenth century (fig. 3). The captioning is imprecise and the photographs sometimes poorly reproduced, especially for a book far too expensive for any student, and most professors, to purchase.

Arrowsmith's project is an important one, and it is to be hoped that a new generation of scholars will consult this work: it offers a genuinely important revision of Modernism's interactions with the museum and with art from beyond the Western tradition. He refuses, however, to make the next obvious move and suggest that, whatever its ostensible political affiliations, Modernism was made possible by, and was indeed perhaps an aspect of, European imperialism, two historical formations that peaked and collapsed together.

TIM BARRINGER
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H. L. MALCHOW. *Special Relations: The Americanization of Britain?* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2011. Pp. xvii, 368. \$65.00.

H. L. Malchow's important new book refreshingly treats the "special relationship" between Britain and the United States not in terms of high politics, diplomacy, or economics—as scholars have usually done—but rather in terms of popular culture, concentrating on the two decades separating the Suez Crisis and the U.S. Bicentennial.

Malchow divides the book into four parts, treating urban architectural modernism and student protest (part one), the counterculture (part two), the liberation

movements of blacks, women, and gays (part three), and, finally, the subsequent reaction against modernism and counterculture (part four).

The British, according to Malchow, associated modernism with America, and this provoked in the "swinging London" of the early 1960s both optimism about new possibilities and anxiety that London was being "Manhattanized." The Hilton Hotel (1963) overlooking Hyde Park became the focus of criticism given its culturally significant location, while Eero Saarinen's Grosvenor Square U.S. embassy became a symbol of American arrogance and the site of student protest against the Vietnam War.

Student protest, and the counterculture with which it was associated, attacked U.S. Cold War leadership and mainstream American culture, but for Malchow protest and counterculture were just as much American exports as the Hilton. The counterculture then, defined here as a "system of aesthetics the central purpose of which was the destruction of boundaries and conventions," represented not a break with "American modernity but its continuation" (p. 97). In Britain it relied on American rhetoric, American example, and even American expatriate leadership.

In his discussion of the counterculture, Malchow responds to revisionists who have emphasized that the radicals were a minority and never achieved their ambitious political goals. He argues that Britons far beyond the committed militants were touched by the "powerful sense of liberation," including the many young people listening to American-influenced pirate radio and attending the massive music festivals of the era. Indeed, he maintains that the counterculture was "uniquely unsettling" in a "class-bound country with a postwar identity crisis," providing British youth with "an alternative deeply informed by American populism, anarchic libertarianism, and antiestablishment youth style to focus their own cultural and political assault on the British Establishment" (pp. 106, 112).

While Malchow acknowledges that the countercultural moment was short-lived, confined to a few years in the late 1960s, it influenced the subsequent liberation movements, which drew on counterculture's militant subjectivity and theatricality. Each of these movements broke with a peaceful, integrationist, and reformist past, embracing radicalism and focusing not on what white (or male or straight) liberal sympathizers could provide but on constructing identities apart from historical stereotypes: assertive, unashamed, and self-empowered. Here too Malchow responds to revisionists who would deny the lasting impact of the liberationist movements. What endured was the transformed mentality, the new confidence, and self-awareness.

Throughout Malchow challenges those scholars who have sought an "authentic" British counterculture or who have maintained that "local reception" of American culture resulted in a "negotiated" cultural "hybridity." Here are the buzzwords of the recent history of cross-cultural contacts. The easy approach would have been to accept this template. Malchow does not.

Though he does acknowledge at times a circularity of influence and admits differences of context between the United States and Britain, he forcefully argues from the start for the “hegemonic reality of the postwar American cultural presence” (p. 2). For him, “to privilege and exaggerate local difference” is to lose sight of this overwhelming truth.

Indeed, even the subsequent reaction against American modernity, the 1970s retreat to “Heritage Britain,” provides further evidence of cultural hegemony for Malchow. Many of the elements of this nostalgic turn were related to the “growing American market, real and potential” (p. 263). Here Malchow expands on the cultural theorist Dominic Strinati’s suggestion that “Americanization may also take the form of Britain selling to Americans ‘Americanized’ representations of itself, and bringing back American produced and validated versions of constructions of ‘Britishness’” (quoted p. 264). While there was certainly a domestic demand for nostalgia, “Heritage Britain” owed much not only to the demand of American consumers for nostalgic British television, sport (Wimbledon tennis), and antiques but also to the expectations of American tourists.

There is little here to criticize. The narrative does falter when treating the liberation movements, if only because the chapters on feminism and gay liberation seem repetitive following the chapter on black power, perhaps necessarily given the reliance of the former movements on the rhetoric and example of the last. Likewise, his insistence on the lasting legacy of the counterculture, though certainly plausible, is difficult to demonstrate fully. One might also note a tendency to refer too straightforwardly to “the Establishment.” In the end, however, Malchow has produced a very readable and exceptionally stimulating book. Historians and other scholars of postwar Britain ought to consult it, and to include it on their graduate students’ reading lists. Many Americanists will also find it of interest.

JAMES LOTHIAN
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GRACE E. COOLIDGE. *Guardianship, Gender, and the Nobility in Early Modern Spain*. (Women and Gender in the Early Modern World.) Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2011. Pp. viii, 176. \$104.95.

When scholars have addressed the subject of aristocratic women as guardians of minor children, they have done so either indirectly, as part of a study of widowhood (Stanley Chojnacki, Ann Crabb, Christiane Klapisch-Zuber), or by focusing on England (Barbara Harris, Joel T. Rosenthal, Sue Sheridan Walker), Italy (Guilia Calvi), or the Low Countries (Martha C. Howell). Spain has been notably absent from the historiography. Grace E. Coolidge’s excellent, tightly focused study of women from families at the pinnacle of the early modern Spanish nobility, the *grandezas* (grandees)—dukes, marquises, and counts—now fills this

gap. Working with an impressive set of legal sources, Coolidge makes an important distinction between Spain and the rest of Europe. Spanish women guardians “enjoyed more economic and political power than many of their contemporaries” (p. 5) because they could own property, and because inheritance laws mandated dividing familial property equally among all legitimate children. Female guardians, “legally knowledgeable . . . resourceful, clever, and tenacious in defense of their wards and property” (p. 127), renounced laws in favor of women when they temporarily assumed the legally male status of head of household, and were solely responsible for their decisions. In a cultural milieu of aspiration, social competition, and acquisition, Spanish women guardians were vital to family, politics, and economics. Coolidge’s book is an important addition to the study of women and gender in the context of legal, social, and family history.

Spanish noblewomen guardians were well-educated, experienced, and self-confident widows who had the full approval of their husbands and the willing support of male family members (eighty percent of noblemen chose their wives to serve as guardian in the event of their death). Coolidge describes these women as “double-edged swords” (p. 152) who violated traditional norms of deferential modesty while acting openly in political, military, economic, and legal realms. They could do so because their steadfast loyalty to family and lineage made their families eager to violate gender norms. Moreover, because women’s authority was temporary, men who would not ordinarily be inclined to share power with women found female guardianship more palatable. This contingent status in a pragmatic “flexible patriarchy” (p. 8) allowed female guardians between 1349 and 1751 to protect the integrity of their lineage and to “cheat death of its triumph” (p. 13).

Coolidge’s meticulously documented study is more than an accounting of the mundane legal, economic, social, cultural, and political details of estate management. Her sources yield fascinating insights into the emotional worlds and the affectionate character, happy or otherwise, of marriage and family life. This book also reconfigures the lineaments of political power, showing women as far more central to royal politics than most studies to date have described. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, women guardians strategically asserted rights to property, consolidated power, and used military force to defend borders. When the economy worsened in the sixteenth century, as heads of land-rich but cash-poor aristocratic families, they managed debt and used their influence at court rather than armies to defend their wards. Moreover, guardianship provides important evidence concerning women’s education. The noblewomen Coolidge describes were educated at home, in the convent or *colegio*, and in the company of other active, vocal, shrewd, intelligent, tough-minded politically savvy women.

Coolidge taps the wealth of proscriptive and descriptive sources produced by a litigious society: law codes, guardianship documents, wills, dowry and marriage

contracts, lawsuits, family archives, and letters. The book outlines the life-cycle of a guardian, whether as a *tutor* (for girls age twelve or younger, boys age fourteen or younger), *curator* (girls and boys between twelve or fourteen and twenty-five), or *curator ad litem* (guardian of property, not people). Similarly, Coolidge details premortem provisions to establish guardianship, education, estate management, and legal representation, and describes the arranging of marriages and dowries, and the relinquishing the guardianship when wards came of age.

Coolidge never claims more than evidence can support. The book, however, would have been richer and no less credible had she been willing to reach farther in her analysis of gender and power. She suggests that scholars think comparatively about a “flexible patriarchy,” but her thesis would be deeper and more nuanced if she had included a discussion of what Judith M. Bennett terms “patriarchal equilibrium” and Sarah Hanley’s analysis of how the practices of noblewomen in early modern France influenced laws concerning women of all ranks. Coolidge also missed an opportunity to link guardianship to other, related forms of temporary authority granted to women such as queens-regent and queens-lieutenant. Nevertheless, her meticulous research should prompt comparisons across a wide swath of time and space to enable us to better understand a fuller range of a noblewoman’s access to and use of power in premodern Europe.

THERESA EARENIGHT
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BRYAN GIVENS. *Judging Maria de Macedo: A Female Visionary and the Inquisition in Early Modern Portugal*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 255. \$48.00.

In November 1635, Maria de Macedo, a ten-year-old girl in Lisbon whose mother had died and who had a difficult relationship with her stepmother, began to claim she was being touched at night. Maria then suggested she was being visited by creatures, including a giant lizard. Encouraged by her aunt, who was hopeful of good fortune, Maria began to see the creatures as enchanted Moors who could shift shape and bring treasure. During fourteen years, in her imagination, Maria became their servant, working daily in the mines of their lands and bringing them water. As Maria grew older, and more aware of her own Christian faith, the creatures whom she served were gradually transformed. In May 1650, when Maria became associated with *sebastianistas*, the Moors of her original visions became the Christian people of King Sebastian (1557–1578) and their land his Hidden Isle, from whence he would return with his fleet to Portugal. In May 1658, Maria was denounced to the Holy Office, but her case was not acted upon until 1665, when her visions had become more widely known. After a process lasting about a year, Maria was found guilty of falsely claiming revelations, transportations, and visions and was sentenced

to five years of exile. Refusing to confess, she was tortured and then admitted to inventing her story so her stepmother would treat her better. Maria repeated this confession without torture, appeared in an auto-da-fé, but was spared a public whipping because it was decided that her husband, Feliciano Machado, was of noble stock. Maria was ultimately spared exile as well, because Feliciano had died during the trial and she was thus a widow with four children.

This strange story is not unknown to historians and is discussed by Jacqueline Hermann in her study of Sebastianism, *No reino do desejado* (1998). Bryan Givens’s work is the first monograph on the case and is of special interest to historians of the Inquisition. He utilizes testimony from Maria prior to her trial, dictated to her husband in 1650, as well as Feliciano’s record of his wife’s experiences written down in 1658. Thus we can hear Maria in large measure as she wished to be heard (and, most interestingly, her testimony to the Inquisition was not dramatically different from that offered previously).

Givens does a good job in sketching the background to the complicated development of Sebastianism in Portugal after the king’s defeat at Alcazarquivir in 1578—its popularity during the Iberian Union (1580–1640), the competition with supporters of João IV (1640–1656), and the association of Sebastian with the Hidden Isle. Very usefully, Givens then offers us a translation of Maria’s testimony concerning her visions, which is followed by a careful description of her trial. Givens establishes the timeline for the evolution of Maria’s fantasies before analyzing the diverse cultural strands that were interwoven into her descriptions. Finally, Givens looks at the culture of the inquisitors who tried Maria. Although Maria’s story tells us a significant amount about early modern Portuguese non-elite culture, it may well be that this final section proves of most historical interest. The inquisitors were far from uniform in their interpretation of the answers they received from Maria and other witnesses. Fernão Correa de la Cerda appears to have remained convinced throughout that Maria had made a pact with the Devil, while his companion Francisco Barreto thought quite differently. The *qualificador* João Gomes countenanced the possibility that Sebastian might still return, which reminds us that divisions between the “elite” and “non-elite” are far less clear-cut than sometimes supposed.

Inevitably there are points where the reader might disagree with Givens’s conclusions. Is it likely that de Sousa de Macedo’s initial denunciation of Maria was largely disinterested? If Maria did have visions and they were brought on by over-vigorous fasting (which was not uncommon), why did neither her defense counsel, Domingos Vieira de Santo, nor any of the witnesses mention something that could have been used in her favor? Were the Cockaigne legends influential on Maria’s imaginings about the Hidden Isle? Could Maria’s island not be influenced by Euhemerus’s *Panchaea*, transmitted indirectly through Lactantius, whose work her friend Father Manoel da Costa was reading? And

could the James of Aragon on the island not be James II the Just, the sometime protector of the Joachite Arnau de Vilanova?

Of course, if we may veer away from Givens on occasion it is only because he has allowed us to travel the same route by presenting his evidence and his arguments clearly. This is a valuable book for the history of Sebastianism, the operations of the Inquisition, and the religious culture of early modern Portugal.

DAMIAN J. SMITH
Saint Louis University

GILLIAN WEISS, *Captives and Corsairs: France and Slavery in the Early Modern Mediterranean*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 389. \$65.00.

The last decade has witnessed a rise in academic literature focused on global or transnational studies. In regard to early modern history, this trend has reanimated discussions famously initiated by Fernand Braudel on the Mediterranean as a unit for historical study. Scholars of medieval, Renaissance, and early modern Italy have led historical discussions in this vein, sharing insight on questions of identity, commerce, colonialism, and cultural hybridity. For American scholars of French early modern history, however, the Mediterranean has remained largely terra incognita. Accepting that the Ottoman Empire declined by the eighteenth century, and that the Mediterranean became relevant to France only under Napoleon Bonaparte or with the conquest of Algeria, early modernists have traditionally left research on the Mediterranean to modernists, whose research on imperialism has dominated scholarship on French encounters with the “other.”

In this new book, Gillian Weiss challenges the assumption that the Mediterranean world was irrelevant to early modern France. Canvassing an interdisciplinary array of archival and printed sources, including newspaper accounts, novels, plays, paintings, correspondence among diplomats in Marseille, Versailles, and North Africa, and religious accounts pertaining to slave redemptions, Weiss enriches our understanding of Barbary slavery and its impact on French identity and state-building. While filling a major historiographical gap, she revises the dominant story of French nation-building by demonstrating that notions of Frenchness, French subjecthood, and French citizenship were negotiated through interactions among royal administrators, diplomats, municipal leaders, religious personnel, and private individuals in Muslim territories and France’s Mediterranean seaports. The French state, in other words, was not directed solely from “the center” nor developed in a domestic bubble.

By placing the story of early modern state-building in global context, *Captives and Corsairs* enhances scholarship on slavery and Christian-Islamic relations. Steering away from measuring Old World servitude against New World slavery, Weiss charts how, over three centuries, human bondage transformed from an institution understood in terms of “religion and mischance” to one

defined by “race and destiny” (p. 3). While Atlantic slavery replaced Mediterranean, Weiss demonstrates how the imperative toward saving French slaves in Barbary and making free Frenchmen informed the later projects of “destroying slavery and making colonies” (p. 5). This argument is strengthened, moreover, as Weiss complicates the historical narrative of Christian-Islamic interactions in the Mediterranean. Questioning the traditional story of crescent and cross warring against one another, she shows how sultans, beys, deys, kings, municipal leaders, and diplomats responded to slavery and fostered relationships between France and the Ottoman satellites that ranged between amicable and antagonistic.

Framed between the establishment of the Barbary regencies (1580s) and the conquest of Algeria (1830), the book begins by establishing how Franco-Ottoman relations were relatively relaxed due to the diplomatic alliance between Suleiman and Francis I. Foreign policies pursued by Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli independently of Constantinople, combined with tit-for-tat violence between Christians and Muslims along the sea-coasts, however, rendered peace between Turkey and France tenuous. Piracy and slave-taking followed. Between the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, municipal authorities, religious personnel, most notably the Trinitarians and Mercedarians, and communities along France’s Mediterranean coast took it upon themselves to liberate French slaves in Barbary while the French crown remained preoccupied with anti-Habsburg warfare. While working independently of the monarchy, they produced publications and organized processions of freed slaves that projected an image of an idealized France and a depraved Barbary that would form the foundation for future, royally led projects for state-building.

Weiss describes how the monarchy became more invested in manumission under Louis XIV, who “charted a more aggressive course” (p. 53) against Barbary to validate French absolute power in the Mediterranean. Traditional rituals and practices of slave liberation fell under centralized guidance and glorified the French king, French freedom, and the French religion. Philippe d’Orléans, Louis XV, and Louis XVI similarly used slave manumission as a strategy to bind subjects to the state. The combination of domestic troubles, financial crises, Enlightened secularism, and decline in Mediterranean slavery, however, put traditional methods of slave liberation in crisis by the end of the eighteenth century. Christian servitude and “scenes of religio-political salvation” (p. 117) became less relevant as Atlantic racially determined slavery predominated. The French Revolution completed this shift as the suppression of religious orders brought manumission under the aegis of the state. Nonetheless, religious vocabulary saw continued usage as revolutionary and Napoleonic ideologies of regeneration and the civilizing mission appropriated traditional notions of redemption and deliverance. Such rhetoric helped racialize slavery and

"connect the advent of French liberty to the colonization of North Africa" (p. 130).

Captives and Corsairs makes major contributions to the literature on early modern religion, slavery, diplomacy, and culture. Its municipal, provincial, and overseas perspectives enrich traditional narratives of absolutism and state-building, create a much-needed dialogue between early modern and modern histories of France, and demonstrate that new, global methodologies can enliven traditional historical questions.

JUNKO THÉRÈSE TAKEDA
Syracuse University

MEREDITH MARTIN. *Dairy Queens: The Politics of Pastoral Architecture from Catherine De' Medici to Marie-Antoinette*. (Harvard Historical Studies, number 176.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. 328. \$45.00.

Making the case for the significance of the pleasure dairy, most famous in relation to Marie-Antoinette's penchant for playing the milkmaid, seems a tall order. But Meredith Martin reveals that the history of this early modern building type tells an important story about the dynamics of class, gender, and power in Old Regime France.

Introduced from Italy by Catherine de' Medici, the pleasure dairies she constructed at Fontainebleau and Saint-Maur asserted images of responsible female political authority that rested on maternal care and agricultural management. Catherine's retreats and the entertainments she sponsored at them highlighted her combining work and leisure (*negotium* and *otium*) in service of the monarchy. Pastoral poetry and astrological decoration associated with the dairies evoked female rule, as when Pierre de Ronsard called Catherine "the French Cybele" (p. 53) and celebrated her support of her royal sons. Despite some dissent, Catherine's message emphasized her work on behalf of the prosperity and peace of the kingdom.

The gender politics of Catherine's dairies were not acceptable to Louis XIV. He sought to assert "royal renewal, domesticated femininity, and agricultural reform" with his menagerie at Versailles (p. 71). The didactic decoration and spatial organization there projected his claims for control over nature and fertility. Reflecting the scholarship on the cultural politics of Louis XIV's monarchy, Martin traces the contestation over the meanings of the pleasure dairy. Elite women such as the Duchesse de Montpensier retired from court and established pleasure dairies as a mode of protest against Louis XIV's controlling proclivities. The princes of Condé undercut the king's claims by establishing a pleasure dairy at Chantilly in order to declare the strength, fecundity, and skilled husbandry of their family. Louis then reconfigured the dairy at Versailles for Marie-Adélaïde, Duchesse de Bourgogne (the wife of his grandson), allowing her to situate herself in the Versailles social hierarchy. That Marie-Adélaïde was associated with the *dévo*t reform movement headed by

Louis XIV's morganatic wife, Madame de Maintenon, only complicated the dynamics of containment and protest, feminine industry and masculine control.

If disaffected aristocrats could stake political claims by means of the pleasure dairy, so could the king's mistress—when the king was Louis XV and the mistress was Madame de Pompadour. Building her position at court in part through patronage associated with her pleasure dairy, Pompadour supported industry (Sèvres brought out drinking vessels specifically for milk) and neo-Hippocratic health claims based on the healing power of nature. Pompadour's pleasure dairy activities fit comfortably within notions of agricultural productivity and the value of domesticity for health and fertility espoused by the Physiocrats. The artificiality of Pompadour's country retreats and assertions of simplicity, however, encouraged skepticism about aristocratic devotion to health and reform.

While Pompadour's assertions of health and clean living were countered by claims that her body was diseased and her influence pernicious, she had it easy compared to Marie-Antoinette. Louis XVI's wife had her pleasure dairy at the Hameau de Versailles. The queen did not actually milk the cows herself—she preferred to watch—and her retreat into (faux) country living contributed to complaints about her extravagance. Attempts to associate the queen with fertility and French agricultural traditions failed in part because she insisted on control over her dairy, excluding the king and allowing scandalous informality among her intimates. Marie-Antoinette's performances of the pastoral highlighted her distance from the realities of rural life. Sexually ambiguous pastoral imagery opened the door for criticism based on georgic understandings of agricultural life as a matter of labor rather than leisure. Reformers increasingly demanded that women remove to the countryside and into domesticity. Idealized images of feminine, maternal care enjoyed tremendous popularity and underscored the artifice of Marie-Antoinette's pastoral playgrounds.

Reform impulses came from within the monarchy as well, but efforts to reassert royal, masculine control over the pastoral semiotics of the pleasure dairy failed. Louis XVI's building director, the Comte d'Angiviller, attempted to impose a vision of political regeneration and domesticated femininity at the king's estate at Rambouillet. The pleasure dairy there, constructed as a present for Marie-Antoinette without her input, developed a French neoclassical aesthetic that stressed masculine public service. Celebrations of breastfeeding and domesticity aimed to relegate elite women to the sidelines and allow the monarchy to renew the polity on its own terms. The fantasy of dutiful femininity combined with the reform of taste in the direction of utility to render Marie-Antoinette as an exemplar of degeneration.

While Martin speculates on occasion (usually when documents are no longer extant) and at times offers somewhat jarring readings, as when Rambouillet is described as creating a feeling "reminiscent of the womb

or the polymorphous pleasures of infancy" (p. 236), her overall achievement far outweighs these passing moments. Martin conveys the complexity of these strange remnants of and monuments to feminine power, monarchical fecundity, aristocratic protest, and reformist impulses.

KATHERINE CRAWFORD
Vanderbilt University

THOMAS E. KAISER and DALE K. VAN KLEY, editors. *From Deficit to Deluge: The Origins of the French Revolution*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 345. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$25.95.

Forget "revisionism" and "Marxism"! This stimulating and valuable collection edited by Thomas E. Kaiser and Dale K. Van Kley reminds us just how far debates on the origins of the French Revolution have come since the heady days when two supposedly diametrically opposed interpretations confronted each other. Here we find, instead, the more valuable and subtle kind of historical debates, where the disagreements are about approaches and about the emphasis to be placed on particular causal factors. The seven essays are written by some of the leading English-language specialists on eighteenth-century France and offer well-written examples of some of the most significant recent approaches to the origins of the revolution.

Not that the editors present the volume that way. Rather, they offer us a "central thesis . . . that the French Revolution arose from an unprecedented politicization of the Old Regime's many problems" (p. 249). And the introduction by Kaiser and Van Kley, which includes a wide-ranging and incisive survey of the historiography, indeed makes the case that the fiscal problems of the monarchy, taken alone, need not have resulted in its collapse. It was the government's attempts at reform that opened the way for revolution, and those decisions only made sense within the new political circumstances of the late eighteenth century: the widening of political participation and the relocation of sovereignty in the "nation." Yet neither the fiscal crisis nor the new politics makes sense, the editors point out, if we do not understand the longer-term changes in the world view of French people and the equally long-term shifts in the economy and in the social and political organization of the kingdom. While such factors constrained and structured events in particular ways, they did not lead inevitably to revolution. The political events of 1789 were equally a product of unforeseeable behavior by individuals and groups, of mutual misunderstandings, and sometimes of unpredictable reactions to unprecedented situations.

The three essays that admirably fit this intended re-interpretation are those by Gail Bossenga, Van Kley, and Kaiser. Bossenga's piece on the "financial origins" of the French Revolution is a brilliant synthesis. She explains with remarkable clarity the development of the byzantine fiscal system of the Old Regime, and shows that the finances of the monarchy were integrated with

some of its key political and social institutions, office-holding in particular. The tax system was "inefficient, arbitrary, and unresponsive to economic growth" (p. 45). The contradictory measures taken to deal with these problems, aggravated by conflicting assumptions about credit and economic management as much as by the opposition of vested interests, destroyed the French government's credit in the money markets. The reforms of successive ministers undermined the domestic "court capitalism" that was one of the pillars of royal authority, at the same time giving international financiers ever greater power: an explanation for political instability that today's readers will find particularly persuasive. The Estates General was a fiscal necessity as much as a political one.

Van Kley's chapter on the religious origins of the French Revolution, a reworked version of a previously published essay, is also a remarkable synthesis. It explains the way that the French monarchy became Catholic and sacred, essentially in the seventeenth century, and the way that key decisions by Louis XIV destroyed what might have been a crucial alliance between monarchy and Gallicanism. Instead, they set in train the eighteenth-century conflicts over Jansenism that in the long term undermined sacral absolutism, both conceptually and by creating—in alliance with the Enlightenment—a new "public opinion." Van Kley links all this, very convincingly, to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy rather than to the collapse of the Old Regime. He does not reiterate his past arguments about the influence of Jansenism on the "patriot party" of the 1770s and 1780s, and while he defends the idea that the monarchy was desacralized in the late eighteenth century, he does not make the case in any detail. As a result, the connections between the immediate crisis of the 1780s and the "religious origins" remain unclear.

Kaiser's essay on court politics and foreign policy makes a very convincing case for the importance of both in the crisis of the Old Regime. Again, much of this material is familiar, but it is very clearly laid out and like the other essays skillfully links short- and long-term factors. France's long-term decline as a European power, largely because of financial difficulties, as well as successive foreign policy failures and the unpopular Austrian alliance embodied by Marie-Antoinette, discredited the monarchy in "the contemporary public mind" (although quite who this "public" was remains unclear). The detail of foreign policy is fascinating and enlightening, yet in the end "public" misunderstanding of what was happening seems to have been more important than the reality.

The other essays in the volume are all valuable and stimulating, but vary in their contribution to the "central thesis" offered. Keith Michael Baker provides a characteristically brilliant survey of the "symbolic complex" of ideas, assumptions, and discourses that were a crucial part of struggles over representation, sovereignty, and national identity. The resulting revolution, however, looks perilously like a purely discursive construction, with little room for sordid economics or for

personalities. Jack A. Goldstone's piece on "social origins," an updated summary of his 1991 book, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*, deals with long-term demographic and economic factors, the "social" being restricted to some useful analysis of the impact of taxes and prices on various economically defined interest groups. Jeffrey Merrick's perceptive essay argues that shifts in thinking about gender helped to "make the new regime thinkable," but did not directly undermine either the authority of husbands or of the king. Jeremy D. Popkin makes a strong case for the contribution of colonial issues to the revolution, although his discussion shades into an explanation of revolutionary policy toward the colonies. All this leaves the volume as a whole with next to nothing on literacy and communications, on social conflicts independent of economic ones, on consumerism, or on changing social ideologies and hierarchies, the kinds of themes explored, for example, by Daniel Roche and his students, and in recent work on the nobility (for instance, the collection *The French Nobility in the Eighteenth Century: Reassessments and New Approaches* (2006), edited by Jay M. Smith). Nor does state building receive much attention, despite the occasional reference to Alexis de Tocqueville.

As will be evident from this summary, it is not always clear which revolution is being explained. Some of the essays are primarily concerned with the collapse of the Old Regime, while others better explain the subsequent directions that the revolution took. These are closely related questions, but they are not identical. Another difficulty is the varying points at which "origins"—defined in a footnote as "long-term preconditions that, whether necessary or not, made a French revolution increasingly probable" (p. 272)—become causes. A true synthesis would need to grapple with that question.

This is not, therefore, an integrated interpretation of the origins of the French Revolution. Although the "politicization" theory does provide a certain coherence, and the editors are to be commended for trying, some of the essays go in quite different directions. That is not necessarily a bad thing. Teachers and established scholars will all find something new here, and it will give advanced students the opportunity to debate the various approaches and methodologies and the insights each offers.

DAVID GARRIOCH
Monash University

GISÈLE SAPIRO. *La Responsabilité de l'écrivain: Littérature, droit et morale en France (XIX^e-XXI^e siècle)*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. 2011. Pp. 746. €35.00.

France may not have marked the origin of the modern intellectual, the archetypal voice in opposition to institutional repression, social injustice, and moral conformity. Contrary to Jürgen Habermas's assertions about the rational French bourgeois public sphere in the eighteenth century, for example, Jonathan Israel has argued that a more radical Enlightenment, espe-

cially in opposition to religious oppression, originated much earlier in the Netherlands. But Gisèle Sapiro's magisterial history of the author's responsibility over the past two hundred years makes a powerful case for its development in postrevolutionary France. Since the fall of Napoleon Bonaparte, she contends, literature, the law, and morality interacted in mutually reinforcing ways to elevate the author very nearly to an acknowledged legislator of the world. Such a "déontologie" (p. 40) did not have to wait, as Christophe Charle suggests, until the Dreyfus Affair in the 1890s. Rather, it began with the impassioned commentary on the Interior Ministry's efforts to censor Paul-Louis Courier and Pierre-Jean de Beranger during the Bourbon Restoration, and its conclusion outlasted the *fin de siècle*, requiring no less than the engaged existentialist assertions of Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre. Words, like those of the collaborationist Robert Brasillach, were powerful weapons during the German occupation of France.

It is impossible to summarize in short compass the richness of Sapiro's 730-page argument, documented by extensive use of both primary sources, especially from the liberation period, and the scholarly literature on the social history of ideas, more generally concerning the long nineteenth century. Suffice it to state that her approach borrows heavily from Pierre Bourdieu's theories of autonomous cultural fields and Michel Foucault's analyses of the discursive author-function to define the French writer's responsibility over a genealogy of exemplary court cases. Sapiro, a historical sociologist, traces the changing guises of the author in defiant dissent: during the Restoration, this figure was held accountable to the political implications of his or her recently acquired property rights in print (part one); during the Second Empire, the author evolved into a moral arbiter, notwithstanding the efforts of writers like Gustave Flaubert and Charles Baudelaire to recast their authority in a strictly literary domain, that of art for art's sake (part two); during the Third Republic, the increasingly professional writer, a journalist as much as a *littérateur*, assumed much greater political and nationalist responsibility, just as Emile Zola and Lucien Descaves proclaimed during their trials (part three); and with the occupation, the author, either as a collaborator like Pierre Drieu La Rochelle or as a resistor like Albert Camus, was expected to take sides, to be engaged in matters of immediate public import, far afield from a strictly literary craft, however divided the response to Brasillach's execution and the nature of literary engagement (part four). Over the course of 130 years, the writer became an authority, one empowered to guide the political, social, and moral fortunes of a country that in turn has honored its men (and some women) of letters in institutions like the Académie française and the Panthéon. Sapiro's method is thus to seize upon four significant moments in this trajectory toward authorial autonomy, setting each moment in its proper historical context, whose changing laws constrained free speech in the name of a contested public interest. Ultimately, the intellectual prevailed.

Sapiro's thoughtful epilogue describes the waning influence of literary engagement in France since World War II. The underlying sources of this weakness include the diffusion of the author's professional activities in media other than print; cinema, radio, television, and the Internet compete with traditional vehicles for expressing opinion, such as newspapers and books. New figures now rival literati with comparable public responsibilities: television and radio talk-show hosts, academics, scientists in research centers, and bloggers online, many of them international experts and artists. Moral engagement has given way to commercial promotion, thereby undermining the credibility of intellectual authorities in the eyes of an increasingly distracted and skeptical public. But it may well be the paucity of widely publicized court cases against authors on matters of immediate moment that has had the most telling effect. Censorship is more subtle, more self-imposed, less visible to the reading public; literary *causes célèbres* are far fewer and much less significant to an "éthique de la forme" (p. 715).

Sapiro's sweeping history is of interest to more than specialists in modern French literature and history. Intellectual historians fascinated by the role of ideas well beyond the boundaries set by growing professionalization of writers in their narrow specializations will want to learn how literature developed more than a life of its own in a culture that has long been the conscience of the West. While authorial responsibility may have indeed changed over the past two hundred years, as Sapiro documents and analyzes with such care, the French intellectual is far from dead to the world.

JAMES SMITH ALLEN

Southern Illinois University Carbondale

CYNTHIA A. BOUTON. *Interpreting Social Violence in French Culture: Buzançais, 1847–2008*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 256. Cloth \$39.95, e-book \$39.95.

In this book Cynthia A. Bouton undertakes an original and very engaging exercise of historiography. She studies the way in which violent riots in the small village of Buzançais, situated in the heart of provincial France, have been the focus and site, since January 1847, of extremely different interpretations that have varied according to historical context. Bouton also highlights the impact of the choice of the media used to narrate, comprehend, and think about the riots. This is therefore a study of the cultural reception of a distinctive event, wherein different memorializing and political interpretations are offered as competing claims over a period of some one hundred sixty years.

Bouton demonstrates that, from the beginning, four main elements have constituted the discursive economy of accounts of violence at Buzançais: the initial spark that led to the obstruction of the grain convoy, the lynching of a local notable who had murdered one of the insurgents, the role played by women in several key episodes of rioting, and finally the behavior and the re-

sponsibility of local and departmental authorities and elites. Naturally there is an evolution in the interpretation of these four elements and the weight assigned to them, as well as in the play of their encounter or evasion in the structure of each account. These vary in relation to the timing of the account as well as to the economic and commercial context, to the political and social debates of the time, and to the support of the various media.

In chapter one Bouton reviews the facts of the unfolding of the riots and the violent repression by the government of the July Monarchy that followed. This was not merely another instance of a peasant uprising, but a "mixed conflict" facing in two directions, one toward the past of grain riots and the other toward the future of modern social revolts. Chapter two shows how, after a speedy and demonstrative trial, the event captured the attention of the press, a medium fast on the rise, whose practitioners used it to indict the regime of the bourgeois King Louis Philippe or, conversely, to stigmatize the pyromaniac intellectuals, both republican and socialist, who exploited the ignorance of the people and turned them away from a sane understanding of liberal modernity. Chapter three evokes the perennial quality of the memory of the events of January 1847 throughout the nineteenth century on the part of politicians and journalists as well as song writers and even novelists. In 1880, Jules Vallès offered such an account in his serial novel, *Les Blouses*. Vallès presented Buzançais as an ancestor of the Commune of 1871. Ten years after the Wall of the Federals, he informed his readers that the issue at stake in the young Third Republic was first and foremost social.

In the wake of 1918 two publications evoking the riots of 1847 introduced an innovation of format, the presence of illustrations. Chapter four discusses Pierre Bouchardon, a conservative magistrate and later admirer of the Vichy regime who published an illustrated fictional account in 1925. In his hands, the old episode of Buzançais became the original expression of violent revolution and class conflict fomented by a population longing for pillage and violence. In chapter five Bouton takes us between the France before May 1968 and the France after that date. In 1956, in the prominent daily newspaper *France-Soir*, Paul Gordeaux and the illustrator Jean-Albert Carlotti published a comic strip on Buzançais. In a nation thrown off course following World War II, this kind of serial served to recall certain moral values upon which "eternal France" had relied. In this context the rioters of 1847 appeared essentially as ignorant brutes and criminals. By way of contrast, "Bread or Wine," presented on French public television in 1978, invited viewers to judge the riots collectively. The film's "visual grammar" seemed to endorse the validity of certain social demands as well as the right to rise up and precipitate change. This account of the revolt of Buzançais thus assumed a meaning that was at once a prolongation of May 1968 and an anticipation of May 1981.

While the final chapter demonstrates how historians

of the past thirty years have attempted to address the ambiguity of the Buzançais riots, the book's conclusion emphasizes the fact that this history bears witness to the indisputable place of the right of insurrection in French political culture when the question of bread and subsistence is at stake. The results of Bouton's efforts are far from negligible, even if more definitive conclusions might have been reached had the author taken a more comparative approach, examining riots, insurrections, and rebellions engendered in the aftermath of July 1830 with respect to their cultural reception over a century and a half. This book offers a very promising route to a broader investigation that remains to be undertaken.

LUDOVIC FROBERT

École Normale Supérieure de Lyon

SOFIE LACHAPELLE. *Investigating the Supernatural: From Spiritism and Occultism to Psychical Research and Metapsychics in France, 1853–1931*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2011. Pp. 198. \$50.00.

Sophie Lachapelle offers a *Wunderkammer* of the late nineteenth-century séance and psychical research. The fourth book in as many years to deal with heterodox phenomena in France, Lachapelle's study approaches the subject from the angle of science. Spiritualists and occultists, as others have noted, claimed to be scientific. Lachapelle asks what that meant for them, and what it meant to orthodox science. Her book surveys the various movements, beginning with spiritism in the mid-nineteenth century, with chapters devoted to the occult, to medical and psychological science, to psychical research in general, and finally the Institut métapsychique internationale (IMI) in the early twentieth century. Lachapelle's original contribution lies in her mining of the early archives of the IMI, which was founded in 1919.

Like her subjects, Lachapelle accepts a broad definition of science. She explores the ways that each group tried "scientifically" to explain mediumistic phenomena, including talking tables, mediums' ability to talk to the dead, the production of ectoplasm, and the movement of objects. Each chapter offers a fascinating cabinet of curiosities and insight into how malleable the idea of science was, especially for those outside the professionalizing realm of the university scientist. Lachapelle also keeps an eye on religion, occasionally noting the ways that religion used science, as in the increasing turn by the Roman Catholic Church to use scientific methods to verify miracles. However, the meat of the book is a *reportage* of the varieties of "science" that flourished around the supernatural and the subliminal in the later nineteenth century. We learn that occultism tried to revise science to include ancient teachings, while psychical research combined professional scientists and philosophers such as Charles Richet and Henri Bergson with a mass audience of amateur "ghost hunters" looking for evidence of appearance of the dead and hauntings. The combination, not surprisingly, was incompatible. Although Lachapelle's

main argument seems to be that science was a more open and possible realm for these fifty to sixty years than might be assumed, her book concludes again and again that science and the supernatural do not mix. Each attempt to use the methods of science to investigate these phenomena ran into roadblocks from the mediums who produced them and the people who believed in them. Science offered explanations that were unacceptable to the people who cared about these phenomena. For orthodox science, and even some psychical researchers, involuntary muscle movements or subliminal influence were at work, rather than the spirits or occult knowledge. The investigations themselves proved unsatisfactory to scientists who strove to fit these phenomena into the system of natural laws and could not do so. Mediums refused to submit to controls and were discovered in fraud, yet they were the only means of investigation; scientific objectivity was called again and again into question and psychical science remained uncomfortably on the margins of acceptability.

This is a brief book, only 148 pages of text. It has a tendency to the succinct, recording the ideas of one group of investigators and moving on to the next without comparing them or offering an argument that links them into a whole. One wishes at times for a longer book, and that Lachapelle had asked deeper questions about whether science was more influenced than it thought. Did psychical research push science beyond the empirical? What linked occultism's exteriorization of the soul to psychical research's study of hauntings? Lachapelle's book seems to have been finished too soon to interact with M. Brady Brower's fine work, *Unruly Spirits: The Science of Psychic Phenomena in Modern France* (2010), which asks similar questions but concentrates on the link between psychology and psychical research. Partly because of its attempt to survey such a broad range of movements, this book is uneven, at times falling into a catalog of views and events. This is the case in her chapter on psychical research, which bogs down in summaries of what the *Annales des sciences psychiques* published, rather than exploring the fascinating tension posed by the power men of the professional scientific and literary world and their values held over those would-be scientists who shared the pages of the same journal. Why France? is also a question never fully answered, although the struggle of metapsychism to become international is explored in the final chapter.

Investigating the Supernatural straddles the line between cultural history and history of science; its main interest lies in showing how science and the marvelous came together as the supernatural struggled for scientific status. The book's greatest strengths lie in its evocation of the popularity of these new "sciences" as it at the same time explains their ephemeral nature, at least as far as orthodox science was concerned.

LYNN L. SHARP

Whitman College

LAURENCE BADEL. *Diplomatie et grands contrats: L'état français et les marchés extérieurs au XX^e siècle*. (Inter-

nationale, number 80.) Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne. 2010. Pp. 512. €40.00.

A central argument of Laurence Badel's latest book is that the active role played by the French state in promoting French exports within the international economy, particularly since the end of World War II, has long been overlooked by French historians. If diplomatic historians have failed to recognize the ways in which domestic economic concerns have influenced both foreign policy and the machinery of policy making within France, political and economic historians have focused mainly on the role played by the state in the domestic economy. In what Badel terms a regime of "organized liberalism" after 1945 the French state developed a new set of institutions, staffed by personnel trained in the new *École nationale d'administration*, which was designed to enable the French economy to compete more effectively in international trade than it had done during the first wave of globalization after 1870, without endangering French security in the process.

Tracing the origins of the new approach to foreign policy making back to World War I, when the demands of running a war economy temporarily ended the diplomats' monopoly over questions of foreign trade, Badel shows that it was not until after World War II that the most significant administrative breakthroughs occurred. Each step along the way, from the cautious transfer in 1918 of the commercial attachés from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Quai d'Orsay*) to the Ministry of Commerce, to the decision in March 1920 by the Ministry of Commerce to set up, with the help of an annual state subsidy, a private bank responsible for foreign trade, through to the creation of a raft of new institutions and policy instruments after the liberation of France in 1944, is clearly documented. A new emphasis on helping French firms find export markets outside the protected markets of the colonies while exposing them to increasing competition on the domestic market from the countries in the European Economic Community (EEC) came to be seen as essential to reversing France's decline as a great power. Key foreign policy decisions in the 1950s, the author stresses, were taken for pragmatic rather than ideological reasons.

But as her impressive research into a wide range of public and private archives in France reveals, it was not the creation of institutions that explained the foreign policies adopted. If the Ministry of Finance managed for several years to dominate the *Secrétariat général du Comité interministériel pour la coopération économique européenne*, set up in 1948 within the prime minister's office, initially to coordinate the French government's action within the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the *Quai d'Orsay* reasserted its power over foreign economic policy in the 1960s. Badel's thorough discussion of the series of cooperation agreements that France concluded with the Soviet Union and countries in Eastern Europe in the 1960s and 1970s and in the Middle East

in the 1970s reveals multiple objectives, some of which excluded financial logic. In some cases private organizations and interests played a key role in defining French commercial policy. The rationale behind the Gaullist policy of securing large export contracts was that the establishment of a French presence in foreign markets would strengthen French power in the world while the diffusion of French technological expertise would reinforce French influence.

By the end of the 1970s, however, as Badel documents, recognition that the structure of French trade had scarcely changed since the early 1960s, with the main suppliers and markets still concentrated in Western Europe and the United States, and that almost all of the public subsidies for foreign trade had gone to large firms that accounted for no more than fifteen percent of all exports, reopened the debate about the structure and effectiveness of foreign economic policy making in France.

Badel's research sheds much new light on the historical origins of that debate. By revealing the extent of the efforts made by the French state to promote the exports of French firms, alongside its more highly visible role in securing large defense contracts for them, she makes an important contribution to the abundant literature on French state intervention in the economy. Because her focus is on institutions rather than on trade itself, however, her book ends up detailing the trade that was of marginal importance to the French economy. Western Europe is curiously absent from her field of study, yet the decisions to form the EEC and, thirty years later, the Single Market were of critical importance for French exports. A full investigation into how those decisions were taken within the French administrative structure and in whose interests they were taken would open up an area of study that is still largely the preserve of diplomatic historians and political scientists.

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REBECCA J. PULJU. *Women and Mass Consumer Society in Postwar France*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 260. \$85.00.

Bringing a fresh perspective to the history of gender and consumer culture, Rebecca J. Pulju explores in this volume the development of an economy and culture of modern mass consumerism in France from 1944 to 1968. Pulju argues that in the immediate post-World War II decades the French state, women's organizations, consumer groups, and Frenchwomen themselves participated in the construction of a female "citizen consumer" who not only managed her household economy effectively but also contributed to national economic prosperity.

This notion of a citizen consumer emerged at a historical moment in which France experienced liberation at multiple levels: for the nation as a whole, liberation from Nazi occupation; for women, the additional lib-

eration of suffrage rights. In this environment, Pulju contends, the idea of a citizen consumer offered women a form of citizenship that was consonant with traditional gender precepts, as it kept definitions of femininity—and female citizenship—centered on home and family. Liberation for women could be manifested in their power as consumers with access to modern consumer goods for the household (among them, washing machines, refrigerators, and vacuum cleaners) that would allegedly empower them by transforming the home into a place of familial comfort, and wherein the previously labor-intensive nature of household management would be alleviated by rational methods and tools. The maintenance of traditional prejudices toward women was evident in the belief shared by planners and consumer organizations that women would have to be educated and disciplined regarding appropriate modes of fulfilling their roles in the creation of this rational, modern mass consumer economy (such as conscientiousness about monitoring the prices of goods for purchase). The implication was that women, if left to their own devices, would consume indiscriminately, unwisely, and irrationally to the detriment of the national economy, not to mention their own household finances.

Pulju emphasizes the confluence of goals among the French state and its modernization drive, women's organizations looking to improve women's living and working conditions, and entities that promoted heightened economic productivity and consumption. Each sought to create what one productivity advocate termed a "market community" in which consumers, planners, and business worked together to establish a rational and profitable mass consumer economy that served the interests of producers, consumers, and the state. Because the costs of many technological consumer goods for the home were still prohibitive in the aftermath of the war, an emphasis on the use of credit gained currency; as Pulju shows, more consumers relied on credit to make purchases once the cultural stigma surrounding credit was mitigated by a discourse portraying credit as a way to boost the national economy and to benefit the home. The result was a redefinition of "necessity" as opposed to "luxury," since credit placed modern consumables within financial reach of most French families. In turn, the acquisition of "necessary" goods came to be viewed as a veritable right of families to enjoy an acceptable standard of living and comfort. The emergence of this cultural ideal, Pulju demonstrates, caused tensions over the possible collapsing of class distinctions, as in the postwar decades lifestyles heretofore reserved for the bourgeoisie could be enjoyed by those of lower socioeconomic strata. This did not lead to a classless society, as some feared it would, but rather to the reassertion of class and status differences on grounds other than household consumption.

Pulju's work draws together several disparate threads of consumption-based discourses and realities in order to illustrate the nature of France's postwar development toward a society of modern mass consumerism. It is a testament to the quality and clarity of Pulju's writing

that these varied motifs are elucidated in a manner that is consistently clear, both on their own merits and in their relation to the wider arguments being made in the text. A fascinating epilogue traces the breakdown, starting in the late 1960s, of cooperation among the individuals, interest groups, and the state that had produced the "market community." In this section, Pulju documents increasing French disillusion over the perceived shortcomings and unfulfilled promises of mass consumer society, from a continued lack of social equality, to a sense of alienation and limitation within the confines of such a society, to women's rejection of the notion of consumption as the locus of feminine emancipation and citizenship. In so doing, Pulju illuminates extremely promising avenues for future research. On the whole, this book is an impressive work of scholarship and will undoubtedly have a significant impact on the historiography of gender and consumer culture in postwar France.

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R. J. B. BOSWORTH. *Whispering City: Modern Rome and Its Histories*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2011. Pp. xvii, 358. \$35.00.

History and its representations are the focus of R. J. B. Bosworth's fine analysis of the way the past has been used over the centuries to impose meaning on the eternal city. Wishing to reaffirm that the reading of history is never neutral but conflictual, Bosworth examines critical moments in the life of Rome that display the fight of different protagonists over the ability to interpret the past and formulate master narratives for public consumption.

Bosworth's main argument is that different pasts interpenetrate, coexist, and clash. When claims over the past impose a dominant tale that eschews the complexity of historical processes, however, we see politics and power at work. The past is tapped to present a version of the truth and to give significance to present-day concerns and interests, Rome being a case in point.

Although aware of the difficulties one faces when deciphering the layers of history that are superimposed over one another, Bosworth embarks on a reading of Rome's architecture, urban planning, and celebrations as signs of how history is deployed. He takes the reader on a fascinating journey that, covering the period from the Enlightenment to the present and through more or less well-known Roman landmarks, reveals the politics of history and its undemocratic workings at crucial moments in the life of the city and of Italy more generally. Bosworth's gaze moves through the topography of Rome, its street corners, squares, and alleys. It pauses on different sections of the urban landscape, including the center and the periphery, popular neighborhoods and more privileged ones, and looks at monuments and buildings, ruins and reconstructions. Among the several cases scrutinized, we find St. Peter's Church, the statue

of Giordano Bruno, and the Eur neighborhood. Each is taken to represent a particular reading of Rome and to reflect larger political and cultural struggles.

One of the book's main accomplishments is its emphasis on the central role played by the Roman Catholic Church in these power struggles. Bosworth is at his best when detailing the church's relentless efforts to impose a Catholic past on the history of Rome. Beginning in the eighteenth century, for instance, the church promoted a reading of Rome as the holy city and fought against the classical view of Rome epitomized by archeology and ruins, and privileged by visitors to the city. The church did not wish to see the Christian narrative superseded by the classical view of Rome and, in a counter move, tried to use archeological evidence to affirm the entrenched religious origins of the city. Along the same lines, the church clashed with the national movement of the Risorgimento for undermining the church's dominance and challenged its legitimacy and legacy well into the twentieth century.

Opposed to the Roman Catholic Church, liberal Italy sought to impose a reading of history that was fundamentally anticlerical and that aimed at overcoming the popes' long political and symbolic rule over Rome. Bosworth shows that in this case we also see an attempt to affirm one single "true" history, as well as a strategic interpretation of that history. This is evident in the Liberals' choice of commemorative figures for conveying the meaning of the Risorgimento. The "romantic" Giuseppe Garibaldi won over the more strictly political Giuseppe Mazzini. Garibaldi indeed remained and still is the Risorgimento's representative figure of choice. His myth was later adopted and adapted by Benito Mussolini, while it is rejected today by the Northern League.

Bosworth's discussion of the contested nature of Risorgimento history exemplifies the battle over meaning between powerful protagonists. Crucial to his argument, however, is evidence that the battle over the meaning of the Risorgimento was also fought against the people of Rome, whose old ways of living were challenged by the Liberals' imposition of a more active and modern worldview that was supposed to overcome prejudice and ignorance. This same top-down pattern had emerged in the late 1700s during the revolution, when rationality was intended to replace the superstitions and illusions of ordinary people fostered by religious authorities. Once again, Bosworth faults a unilinear imposition of history and exposes its undemocratic nature.

In a book thick with historical cases and examples, Bosworth spends several pages discussing fascism and its active reading (or one could say transformative re-writing) of Rome. He particularly emphasizes the use of fascist monuments and constructions for contemporary purposes and raises another important issue one confronts when studying the uses of the past: forgetting. Rome and its fascist legacy testify to Italy's amnesia about its fascist history, he argues; the lack of self-reflection that characterizes Rome's relationship to the Resistance, as well as the church's oblivion of its role under fascism, confirm this trend.

In the end, this book's great lesson is that the selection of one history always constitutes a simplification and mystification, and historians should also steer away from such temptation. Claims to one single truth obliterate the different pasts, lead to the imposition of meaning from above, and seriously threaten and undermine the democratic process.

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JOEL F. HARRINGTON. *The Unwanted Child: The Fate of Foundlings, Orphans, and Juvenile Criminals in Early Modern Germany*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2009. Pp. xvii, 437. \$45.00.

Readers interested in "the unwanted child" or "early modern Germany" should set this book aside. It treats in far greater detail their unwilling keepers in one small corner of the Holy Roman Empire. Joel F. Harrington embraces the anthropological notion of "child circulation" (p. 7), the variety of ways—formal and informal, public and private—children may pass from one caregiver or family to another to be adopted, fostered, educated, or exploited. He claims thus to avoid the "statist trap" (p. 7) and "statist distortions" (p. 9) of "a post hoc legally-defined category of actions . . . and self-referential terms" (p. 7) that he contends are the unavoidable result of relying on government records and their categories. To achieve the goal and avoid the catch, he employs a methodology that is strangely familiar and sadly fumbled: combing through early modern state documents, the decrees of the city council of Nuremberg, and the records of its foundling home. The result is an extraordinary database that reveals the background and passage of 4,018 children without recognizing its own internal contradiction and irony.

Harrington apparently does not realize that the informal circulation of children in the past remains conjectural. Early modernists may not doubt that it happened, but they cannot measure its scope. Because it was informal, few people wrote about it, and most officials did not record it. They certainly did not use the word "unwanted." Harrington must rely, therefore, on the state—in this case, the city—and contend with its regulations and categories. To prefer the anachronistic "unwanted" to the more usual "orphaned," "abandoned," "abused," or "neglected" is to traduce history and meaning. Caregivers and officials, participants and observers used these terms because they captured important distinctions. Orphans were not the same as foundlings; among other things they had better prospects of survival. Nor were all abandoned children alike; it mattered if a child was "abandoned" to the care of others or "abandoned" in a ditch. Finally, whether orphaned, abandoned, abused, or neglected, no child was necessarily "unwanted." Such a determination requires more evidence—qualitative as well as quantitative—than Harrington commands.

That lack of evidence dogs this study like the child-

beggars of its fourth chapter. To finesse it, to get at the “unwanted,” Harrington advocates the methods of *l’histoire croisée*, which he describes as “an attempt to construct ‘a specific connection between observer positions, perspective, and objective’ without reliance on artificial . . . categories of comparison” (pp. 15–16). Each chapter takes up some person related to or involved in the “fate of foundlings, orphans and juvenile criminals”: the “unwed mother” and infanticide, Apollonia Vogt; the “absconding father” and mercenary, Stoffel Baur; the “beleaguered magistrate” and patrician, Albrecht Pömer; the “street orphan” and burglar, Jörg Mayr; and the “state wards” and orphans, Eberhardt and Susanna Schier. Juxtaposing their perspectives and examining their interactions is supposed to result in a “de-centering of the historian-observer” that yields new insights.

That does not happen. In Harrington’s hands, these real people are no more than “a variation on a familiar literary topos” (p. 22) or “a universally familiar figure” (p. 74). The interpretation of their actions requires a grasp of their circumstances, which, in turn, “suggest a reality that is far more nuanced than might be expected” (p. 123), but Harrington can offer little direct testimony or evidence about anyone’s “reality.” Instead, in every chapter, he relies on modern scholarship—too often from far afield—or comparable cases to create synthetic contexts and composite options. His street orphans, finally, are allowed to speak for themselves, but they are not cross-examined. Qualitative sources are read transparently, without reflection on their purpose, context, or audience and how these affect what appears on the page. Quantitative sources are uncritically adduced without pause to consider their statistical liabilities. Harrington likens his conclusion to St. John of the Cross’s “dark night of the soul, the moment of utter desolation and confusion before the emergence of clarity” (p. 281). But no clarity comes. We learn nothing new, rather the opposite: these microhistories serve as little more than epigrams of macrohistory. They present caricatures of a group or class of real people, mindless pawns of social forces or historical models, alleged to describe the experience of all. Their subjects become stereotypes.

Historians as disparate as Carlo Ginzburg and Richard White have challenged us to respect the past as real and discrete. Historians must provide context so that the subject’s place and motion in society become clear. They must respect the individual in all his or her idiosyncrasy and contingency, not reduce him or her to a subjective projection of themselves. *The Unwanted Child* not only disregards these simple guidelines, it casts them down and treads upon them.

THOMAS MAX SAFLEY
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MARK TILSE. *Transnationalism in the Prussian East: From National Conflict to Synthesis, 1871–1914*. (The Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series.)

New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. Pp. xiii, 276. \$85.00.

In the decades between German unification in 1871 and the beginning of World War I, Reich German nationalists and significant factions within the Prussian and Reich governments came to see the “Polish Question” in the Prussian East as one of the most pressing problems of the age. The Polish question served as a motivation for Otto von Bismarck’s *Kulturkampf*, the strict regulation of foreign labor, and the redefinition of German citizenship in 1913, all policies with implications beyond Prussia’s Eastern Marches. Still, the widest-reaching efforts to assert clear German political and cultural predominance over Poles were carried out in the Prussian East, where Polish-speakers were most concentrated. Mark Tilse’s book contributes to a growing literature exploring the German-Polish nationality conflict by examining the dynamics of German-Polish relations in Posen and West Prussia. Tilse argues that from the 1870s on, the German-Polish nationality conflict produced transnational interactions and milieus as well as national divisions.

The book is at its strongest in its discussion of efforts by the Prussian government and nationalist organizations to control national populations and national narratives by means of statistics, school regulation, the creation of cultural institutions, and party politics. Tilse shows that statistics on linguistic distribution led Prussian administrators and German nationalists to see the Eastern Marches as a region in which the German nation, and thus the German state, was losing ground to Poles. They responded with a variety of efforts to shift demographics. They bought Polish-held land and tried to settle it with German peasants, promoted German-language schools, libraries, and theaters, and discouraged nationally mixed marriages, Catholicism, and bilingualism, all phenomena they perceived as damaging to German national interests. As the author shows, these efforts were never fully successful. Polish speakers used German-language schools to make their children bilingual rather than to make them German. German-speaking Catholics frustrated nationalists by siding politically with Polish-speaking Catholics rather than German-speaking Protestants in the wake of the *Kulturkampf*. And Social Democrats had some limited success in recruiting political support for an “internationalist” class-based politics across the national divide.

Tilse argues that his use of the paradigm of synthesis distinguishes his work from previous studies of the German-Polish conflict and allows him to explore these nationalist failures in new ways. By synthesis, he means a process whereby two contradictory phenomena combine to create something fundamentally new. In this case, he proposes that German and Polish nationalisms jointly produced transnational contexts such as mixed marriages, confessional politics (especially connected to the Catholic Church), and social democracy. Those transnational contexts served, he suggests, to harmonize relations between the two national communities.

The synthesis argument is the least successful aspect of the book. Tilse shows that that nineteenth-century nationalists' vision of populations divided unambiguously into distinct national groups, each structuring their social, political, and cultural lives around national commitments, was often at odds with lived experience. This is an important observation that Tilse shares with a number of scholars. Most recently, historians including Pieter M. Judson, Tara Zahra, and (specifically for the German-Polish case) James E. Bjork have proposed that we should understand such disjunctures between nationalists' programs and popular behavior in terms of "national indifference." The national indifference model suggests that even at the height of Central European nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, significant numbers of people did not accept nationalism as the primary frame for their lives and that national populations were a lot harder to define than contemporary nationalists and subsequent scholars have often assumed. Although Tilse suggests that his synthesis model is akin to that of national indifference, there are important differences. In particular, he proves to have a more traditional view of nationality insofar as he treats Germans and Poles as distinct, recognizable categories even when particular members of those categories did not always behave in strictly "national" ways. Thus German-speaking Catholics who chose to support Polish (Catholic) political parties did so because, Tilse suggests, they "conflated" national and confessional categories. Yet, what if they simply understood those categories differently than did nationalists? Further, it is not clear that people who engaged in transnational behavior through mixed marriage or confessional allegiance necessarily did so in direct response to nationalist movements, as the synthesis models suggests. Indeed, Tilse shows that the rate of mixed linguistic marriages remained remarkably constant throughout the nineteenth century. The argument that nationalist policies often undermined themselves, perhaps to the point of acting as catalysts for the creation of transnational communities, is an interesting one, but the kind of detailed attention to popular behavior and opinion that would be needed to prove this assertion falls outside the scope of the book. Nevertheless, his work adds to the discussion both of the dynamics of German-Polish conflict in the Prussian East and of the ways in which historians interpret the scope and implications of such national conflicts.

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ERIC N. JENSEN. *Body by Weimar: Athletes, Gender, and German Modernity*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. ix, 184. \$50.00.

KATIE SUTTON. *The Masculine Woman in Weimar Germany*. (Monographs in German History, number 32.) New York: Berghahn Books. 2011. Pp. vii, 204. \$70.00.

Considerable recent scholarship has tackled the history of either the body or the emotions. These two books treat the physicality and emotionality of historical actors together. In doing so, they provide analyses that combine some of the most interesting insights of the linguistic turn with the important goal of applying discourse back onto actual historical agents. Their subjects thus appear as rounded human beings, filled with the multiple—and sometimes conflicting—desires, identities, and appearances that we find easy to accept in the contemporary world but that often seem to evade us in the past, particularly when historians take "ordinary" people as their subjects.

Both books explore the physical and emotional history of German men and women during the Weimar Republic, focusing particularly on the experience and construction of their gender roles. Copious academic texts have discussed, either in detail or in passing, the Weimar phenomena of the "new," more masculine woman and her complement, the supposedly more effeminate man, in order to examine the extent to which traditional gender and sexual norms were destabilized during the Weimar era. But by exploring these issues from the perspectives of the history of the body and of the emotions, and in uniting discursive analyses with social histories that take as their focus often ignored case studies, these two books offer valuable new insights.

Katie Sutton explores discourses about the masculinization of women and the ways in which the idea of masculinization reflected social change. She also examines the process of social change itself, investigating the emergence of more masculine women, from those who cut their long braids short and changed their clothing style to those who openly identified as a *garçonne*, or boy. While the latter sometimes self-consciously identified themselves as part of a lesbian subculture, Sutton's book argues that the desire to appear masculine affected both straight and gay women. In other words, the author does not conflate fears of the ramifications of masculinization—i.e., homosexuality—with the study of homosexuality itself. Instead, she suggests that the idea of masculinization was pervasive, endorsed, and accepted by many German women and men as normal or even advisable. Conversely, others feared that it heralded the downfall of Germany, in part because it necessarily implied the feminization of men.

Eric N. Jensen takes up a complementary argument, exploring Germany's attempt to remold the body and psyche (both individual and collective) through popular sports and exercise regimes. In the wake of defeat in World War I, Germans feared they had become soft; a Berlin newspaper went so far as to photograph President Friedrich Ebert with defense minister Gustav Noske shirtless in a lake, their flabby, weak flesh on display for all the world to see. Increased physicality would rescue the nation. More importantly, it presented a legitimate means for women to develop strength and aggression, masculine traits hitherto seen as unacceptable. Jensen uses the culture of sport to shine new light

on the motivations for, and ramifications of, shifting gender roles for both men and women. The modern sporting man and the new, aggressive woman concomitantly promised to reinvigorate Germany and to threaten its future reproductive chances. Jensen's focus on both men and women is compelling. Although Sutton argues that the "new woman" is still neglected in academic literature, despite the frequent discussions of moral panic surrounding them, her focus only on women does not allow us totally to recast our understanding of how they were perceived. Sutton's implicit references to the corollary feminization of men and its wider social ramifications—on both men and women—would have been better if made explicit.

By focusing on both genders, Jensen is able to demonstrate the surprising extent to which changes in gender roles were supported, if not openly encouraged. Running coaches openly stated that they wanted to take German girls and give them hard, manly bodies. Men were held to be great athletes, not women; to make a woman a great athlete was important, but it necessitated her becoming more masculine. As long as it did not prevent the "right sort" of German woman from reproducing, this masculinization was acceptable to many Germans. Despite what Jensen shows to be the clear preference for manliness among some sectors of the population, Sutton contends that the masculinization of women was seen by some Germans as much more frightening than feminization of men, which was often perceived as being comical. It would be interesting to explore further how to reconcile these conflicting interpretations, particularly given the equation of male weakness with German degeneration. Doing so would help uncover what these two authors show to be a distinct, subtle, but persistent sexism at work in Weimar.

This sexism manifested itself in multiple ways. Male-identifying lesbians acted chauvinistically toward feminine lesbians, even going so far as to claim to have higher intelligence. More drastically, Jensen reveals that breast reduction surgery was extremely popular in Weimar, and not just among openly male-identifying, or lesbian, women. Breast reduction is a step further than the masculine styles of hair and dress that Sutton shows were so prevalent. Weimar women actually tried to remove one of the most distinctive markers of femininity. Attempts to create a male psyche to complement the male body extended to masculine women's publications: the magazine *Frauenliebe* (*Womanly Love*) changed its name to *Garçonne* (*Boy*) in 1930. Clearly, regardless of one's sex, it was often better to be of the male gender.

But that was not always the case. In Jensen's discussion of tennis, he shows that the game provided a space where both the masculinization of women and feminization of men were equally permitted if not explicitly encouraged. Female tennis players were the much-admired champions of a masculine game, while male tennis players were dandies, preferring grace and style to competitive drive in their matches. The former were aggressive flirts, while the latter were effeminate if not

openly homosexual. Sutton's exploration of lesbian clubs and lesbian-oriented literature contributes another interesting aspect to the discussion of the acceptable subversion of gender and sexual norms. Her analysis would have been all the more provocative if she had made a similar comparison across gender lines. How, for instance, did male and female homosexual clubs simultaneously shift and threaten norms of behavior? While we know that many homosexuals visited the other gender's clubs, did expressions of solidarity and subversion extend beyond this?

Both books do well in escaping from the city limits of Berlin, demonstrating that these issues were prevalent across Germany, in both urban and rural areas. Berlin, the "city of sin," was not an exception in an otherwise conservative and traditional land. Sutton demonstrates the subtle differences in urban and rural thinking on issues of gender norms by revealing the ways in which provincial longing for the city was complemented by an urban desire to escape to the purity of the countryside. Through his exploration of Germans' reception of sports, Jensen demonstrates that cosmopolitan attitudes were common across Germany, with rural Germans indulging in exotic tastes much in the same way as their urban peers.

What both volumes also make clear is that wherever one lived, it was much easier to live or play unconventionally if one was protected by a high-class status. Tennis dandies could get away with their effeminate displays because they were generally wealthy; working-class male boxers, by contrast, were far more tied to traditional ideas of male comportment. Conversely, women who chose a masculine life had a far easier time, whether in Berlin or the countryside, if they were upper class. It is a shame that neither book takes the ramifications of this crucial class divide further. The idea that women were becoming more masculine and aggressive and men were losing their edge definitely frightened some Germans. But so too did the fact that the working classes were also becoming aggressive and emancipated: in short, masculine. Although German elites were happy to accept gender transgressions among their ilk, they were less tolerant of the same transgressions among the lower classes. Jensen's cartoon of a dandy tennis star with a banner campaigning to keep the plebs out of the sport makes this particularly clear. Gender is a useful category, but its meanings become more useful still when connected with class, as well as race and ethnicity, another issue only hinted at in these books.

Despite such omissions, these two books are an important addition to the history of Germany and the history of human actors. They complement an emerging body of literature that seeks to explore the complicated and often contradictory nature of Weimar's social values, demonstrating that while the progressive democracy did much to modernize German society, it did not uniformly enable or support more liberal policies and outlooks. While histories of Weimar should not fall into the trap of trying to find pre-Nazi ideas in the repub-

lic—as Sutton’s book unfortunately does—they should enable us to understand how some of Weimar’s policies led quite naturally, as Jensen suggests, into the Third Reich.

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SHELLEY BARANOWSKI. *Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 368. Cloth \$90.00, paper \$24.99.

Shelley Baranowski strives to contextualize National Socialism and its mass violence within the broader history of the rise and disintegration of empires. Her perspective includes long-term German imperial ambitions and the competition with other empires. She has based her arguments on an impressive amount of recent secondary literature in English and German.

Baranowski argues that the Nazis grounded their empire in the principle of racial homogeneity and not in ethnic and religious diversity. German nationalism, she claims, was already distinctive in 1914 with its “explosive cocktail of will to power and the fear of dissolution” (p. 65), and under the Nazis the “prospect of annihilation coexisted with the euphoria of triumph” (p. 280). The twin goals of racial purification and the expansion of German *Lebensraum* lay at the core of the drive to build an empire between 1933 and 1945, which was intended to avoid the failures of the Second Empire (1871–1918) and the Weimar Republic (1918–1933).

Following up on Dirk Moses’s insight that a society that had been colonized might turn into a colonizing empire, Baranowski suggests that Germans experienced the Weimar Republic as a form of colonization, and that they then turned aggressively against their alleged colonizers, first and foremost “the Jews.” The Nazi variant of empire came to be “the most extreme manifestation” of the longstanding European problem of combining diversity and homogeneity. Total war and Adolf Hitler’s charismatic authority were, to Baranowski, decisive for the outcome, transforming the homogenizing capacities of the European nation state into what Hannah Arendt called the “attack on human diversity as such.” The annihilation of enemies would solve the problem of dominion.

Baranowski argues that the dilemma between nation (uniformity) and empire (diversity) was allegedly “more intense in Germany” and “encouraged a nationalism that fused pride and aggression with insecurity and pessimism” (p. 13). That claim allows her to address two important debates on the context of Nazi violence and the Shoah. First, did Germany follow a special path in modern history that can explain the exceptional violence of the 1940s? Second, to what extent did Germany’s colonial experience inform Nazi mass violence and the Shoah?

With regard to the question of continuity and discontinuity in German history, Baranowski remains vague. To give a few examples (with my emphasis add-

ed): German exploitation, the apartheid system, the “gravitation of prominent veterans of African campaigns to the Nazi Party after World War I, and the persistent, nagging fears of racial mixing *might have constituted* a bed of experiences that *would* shape the Third Reich” (p. 49). She claims that “German suppression of colonial revolts” and the “German military’s conduct in Africa . . . adhered to a common pattern,” only to counter this a few pages further on when she contends that the “system of racial privilege and segregation that the German colonial administration honed after the Herero War . . . was distinctive in its severity” (pp. 50, 51). The reader is left with the impression that continuities, discontinuities, similarities, and transformations somehow coexisted, but no clear, substantiated argument is presented. Baranowski distances herself from the “special path” argument but emphasizes the existence of a “common thread” in Germany between 1871 and 1945, despite many discontinuities. Comparisons with other states might have strengthened her argument, but she does not attempt them. Moreover, the historiographical debates she addresses are mostly hidden in footnotes rather than analyzed in the text.

This leads me to another problem with the book. Baranowski explains in the preface that her initial impetus was to write an accessible textbook for undergraduates on the Third Reich. She then extended the scope of the topic to explore German history from 1870 to 1945 as a problem of empire. So what is this monograph, an undergraduate textbook or an analytical study of the development of German imperialism? It tries to be both, surveying imperial German history from 1871 to 1945 while also touching briefly on many topics concerning German society and politics during this period. The result is most likely too complicated and ambitious for students, and at the same time too sketchy, vague, and in parts too simplistic for academics. Since Baranowski continues to work in this field, her promising approach of examining the Nazi regime and its violence from the perspective of empire may produce a more enlightening monograph in the future.

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MONICA BLACK. *Death in Berlin: From Weimar to Divided Germany*. (Publications of the German Historical Institute.) New York: Cambridge University Press. Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute. 2010. Pp. xvi, 308. \$80.00.

If there is one universal human experience that challenges our contemporary predilection for culturalist readings of history, it is surely death. All people, into whatever circumstances they are born, have their time—and then they die. But as Monica Black convincingly demonstrates in this outstanding monograph, which deservedly won the Fraenkel Prize for Contemporary History, the ways in which people thought and talked about death, the practices they developed, and

the rituals they enacted changed over time in line with evolving political, ideological, and material conditions. At the same time, as she rightly argues throughout, bereaved citizens were not simply *tabulae rasae* onto which new mourning habits were inscribed; neither were their enactments of grief simply a performance of whatever the discourse of officialdom prescribed at any given moment. Rather, the bereaved drew upon a complex, varied, and often contradictory repertoire of beliefs, habits, and practices inherited from pasts both recent and distant, and their acts of mourning evolved in a process of constant negotiation with the changing precepts of authority, even under conditions of totalitarian domination where a more homogenizing dynamic might be assumed. The history that Black outlines is thus one in which much changed, but in which all sorts of surprising continuities also operated, continuities that demonstrate anew that the history of cultural practices cannot be reduced to expressions of politics but rather have a life and rhythm of their own.

The book is organized into a series of broadly chronological chapters, starting with the 1920s and working through the successive attempted reframing of death pursued first by the Nazi regime and then by the competing postwar regimes in East and West Berlin. Mindful of the fact that people's attitudes toward death are not always verbalized, but are inscribed in the rituals they perform, Black blends historical analysis with anthropology. In pursuit of the simultaneous presence of modern discourses of hygiene and efficiency and older habits of magical thinking and superstition, she draws on material as diverse as bureaucratic records and folkloric tales or poetry with equal dexterity. She tells a fascinating set of histories, whose actors range from pallbearers and undertakers to priests, cemetery officials, and holders of high political office. At the center, however, are the bereaved themselves.

Looming large over these histories is the experience of mass death in the two world wars. For the authorities, the challenge lay simultaneously in the need to attribute positive meaning to mass military death—be it through the mobilization of the dead as a call to national renewal, or the portrayal of the deceased as workers who lived positively for the cause of socialism—while domesticating the overwhelming experiences of violence that had given rise to the deaths in the first place. For the bereaved, meanwhile, the challenge lay in retaining a sense of dignity and decency (themselves of course contingent and contested terms) in the face of experiences of death that, at points, rendered all attempts to bury the dead in accordance with traditional standards of propriety almost impossible. The most obvious of these moments was the last months of the war, when coffins—themselves profound symbols of moral order—were so scarce that they were repeatedly reused. The war bequeathed a landscape of random improvised graves and temporary cemeteries, the gradual rationalization of which took place against the wider background of reconstruction. At the same time, the emotional landscapes of grief to which the war also gave rise

were such that many Berliners resisted attempts to exhume the bodies of loved ones whose resting place had become a profoundly meaningful site of mourning, inconvenient to the authorities as that may have been. Black describes, for instance, how East German authorities' attempts to generate a socialist culture of cremation and burial collided with popular sentiments concerning death and burial—political, religious, ethical, magical, and habitual—so ingrained that it took until the late 1950s before much progress could be made.

Yet Black is careful not to reduce all stories about death in Berlin to war. Equally persuasive is a set of histories that trace, for example, the persistence of class-based patterns of mourning and the ascription of gendered roles (for example in the figure of the *Leichenfrau* who dressed the body), or the unfolding of attitudes toward cremation. If these stories beg a question, it is the obvious one of comparison. Did timeworn practices such as the laying-out of bodies persist longer in rural areas? Given Black's argument about the negative associations of cremation for Germans after Auschwitz, did evolving attitudes toward cremation differ greatly from those in other countries? This exceptional book stimulates many fascinating thoughts and questions and deserves a wide readership.

NEIL GREGOR

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THOMAS KÜHNE. *Belonging and Genocide: Hitler's Community, 1918–1945*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2010. Pp. vii, 216. \$40.00.

Against the backdrop of the burgeoning field of Holocaust studies, with its growing emphasis on the complexity of events leading up to the mass murder of European Jews, historians have produced a string of insightful studies designed to explain how Nazi Germany really worked. This book, succinctly written and well structured, will intrigue many with its compelling thesis of a “national brotherhood of mass murder” that resulted from a “completely new kind of nation-building” rooted in perpetrating genocide (p. 171). Thomas Kühne develops his argument in five chapters covering the forging of male bonds during World War I and their subsequent commitment to the concept of racial homogeneity, Heinrich Himmler's attempts at creating a genocidal esprit de corps in his SS and police apparatus, and the effect of complicity in mass murder within German society at large as represented by men in the ranks of the army and women involved in the regime's “strategy of community-building through crime” (p. 7). The strongest part of the book is chapter three, “Performing Genocidal Ethics: Togetherness in Himmler's Elite,” as it points to the subtle effects of indoctrination and applied violence creating what Kühne calls the “mafia principle” that “united the hard-core group of fanatic, eliminationist anti-Semites and included murderers, occasional doubters, more serious dissenters, and unwilling yet submissive collaborators” (p. 92).

Despite its importance, Himmler's elite resembled

but a small slice of German society. Frequent repetitions of his thesis and its partial incompatibility with the more nuanced, often fascinating, yet largely anecdotal evidence presented in the chapters evokes the impression that the author is aware of the flaws in his approach. Indeed, Kühne's focus on the camaraderie of male core groups and their societal impact can be easily criticized as neither very original (in view of his own book on *Kameradschaft* and earlier works by scholars like George Mosse, Klaus Theweleit, or Michael Wildt) nor innovative as it largely ignores the role of gender, coercion, spatial factors, systemic specifics, and social practices—all essential factors for the working of the Third Reich and for the emergence of the Final Solution, not to mention the persecution of other outgroups. In view of the rich mosaic of multicausal interpretations produced by scholars since the 1990s to better understand the destructive dynamics of Nazi Germany, one might question the explanatory value of an approach that insists on the prevalence of "state guided community-building by criminal means" (p. 8) and accepts the Nazis' propaganda projection of the *Volkgemeinschaft* as social reality without providing sufficient empirical evidence for the claimed transfer of bonding mechanisms from core groups of convinced racists to the wider public. Despite the graphic nature of some of the sources used, the picture of "Hitler's community" painted by Kühne appears remarkably amorphous and static, with little happening once the mental building blocks of collective identification were in place and the outcome remaining uncertain as "the project of building the new society was still in its infancy" even in late 1943 (p. 92). Similarly, the book implies that the crossing of the threshold from the persecution of Jews to their annihilation was more driven by the inherent determinism of the Nazi project than by concrete causes emerging from the course of events. As a result, the author seems to argue for a kind of collective intentionalism that extends Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's thesis and claims Adolf Hitler and "the Nazis" successfully co-opted "the Germans" for a genocidal utopia of classless harmony.

Despite its shortcomings, the book makes for a fascinating read and has the potential to trigger readers' interest in further exploring crucial questions as to what prompted Germans' involvement in a genocidal campaign. If Holocaust perpetrators "created a new 'society' – with new boundaries, new inner hierarchies, and new values" (p. 59), what happened to it after the war's end? If there was a "joy of togetherness" (p. 73) among perpetrators, is it possible that there was also a joy of murder derived from the smooth workings of a cooperative process fed by the decisions of those involved? If belonging in the Third Reich consisted of more than participation in genocide, are we overlooking significant aspects of German society if we restrict our analysis of the Nazi system to its most destructive aspects?

JÜRGEN MATTHÄUS
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DAN MICHMAN. *The Emergence of Jewish Ghettos during the Holocaust*. Translated by LENN J. SCHRAMM. New York: Cambridge University Press. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem. 2011. Pp. viii, 191. \$85.00.

In this book Dan Michman offers what he calls a semantic, linguistic, and cultural approach to answer the question "where and when did the idea for the ghettos originate?" (p. 145). One of the most important contributions of the book is his analysis of the different meanings of the term "ghetto" and the need, therefore, to be more conscious and precise when using it. As a generic term, the word originated from the name of the specific geographical location for the residence of Jews in sixteenth-century Venice. By the twentieth century the term could be used to denote the dense urban concentration of any particular group, but in the European context it usually referred to poor and crowded Jewish neighborhoods in Eastern Europe. For German Jews in the 1930s it was invoked as a metaphor (an invisible ghetto or ghetto without walls) for the social isolation imposed by Nazi regulations. Michman makes an especially important point when he stresses the importance of Peter-Heinz Seraphim's *Das Judentum im osteuropäischen Raum* (1938) in providing the Nazis with their dominant image of the ghetto as a repulsive urban neighborhood of Jewish overpopulation and misery but also the central location and source of strength for sustaining the Jewish community, enabling them to threaten and contaminate others. He then identifies the "classic" or "new Nazi concept of the ghetto" created in Poland between 1939 and 1941, in which Lodz represented the "quantum leap" from a "vague concept" to the "tangible form" of an officially demarcated area (either closed or open) within which Jews were forced to reside separate from others (p. 86). Once the Final Solution was underway, various labor, transit, and collection camps were also occasionally referred to as ghettos, most notably in Transnistria, Thessaloniki, and Hungary.

Despite the dominance of Lodz and Warsaw as the paradigmatic ghettos in both historiography and memoirs, Michman correctly emphasizes the need to refer to Nazi ghettos in the plural, since they were not a uniform phenomenon. He also rightly notes that the ghetto and the *Judenrat* were two distinct instruments of Nazi policy that existed independent of one another and not as "conjoined twins" (p. 151). He argues, again correctly in my opinion, that ghettos were not a premeditated, integral, or even necessary step on the road to the Final Solution.

Despite its undoubted contribution to the historiography of the Holocaust, two aspects of Michman's book irritate me. To be open with readers of this review, let me be clear that both aspects involve points of friction between my own work on Nazi ghettos and Michman's assertions. Noting a serious omission in the current state of research concerning the first ghetto at Piotrków-Trybunalski, Michman proceeds to the sweeping indictment that "the study of Holocaust-era ghettos

has been based on erroneous generalizations rather than on an empirical approach to history" (p. 79). He laments the "implicit assumption that all ghettos were entirely alike" and attacks what he considers the dominant paradigm that the ghettos were the product of a premeditated, centralized, preparatory policy integral to the Final Solution (p. 104). This is, however, a long-obsolete paradigm fatally wounded in the 1980s by Israel Gutman's work on the Warsaw ghetto and my initial article on Nazi ghetto policy in Poland, and then buried under an avalanche of subsequent scholarship. Michman is attacking a straw man that requires no further demolition.

Second, Michman elevates his semantic-linguistic-cultural interpretation above what he dubs the "administrative and planning perspective" utilized by Raul Hilberg and me that "looks for organizational and bureaucratic rationales." He insists that the motivation for creating ghettos was "psychological rather than bureaucratic." They were created as a response to the "fear of the cultural stereotype of the Ostjuden as the source of Jewish power, and fear of the crowded Jewish neighborhoods of Eastern Europe" (p. 146). Michman claims he has thereby refuted the functionalist explanation that ghettos emerged from real problems stemming from the German encounter with the Jewish population in Poland, problems that he dismisses as rationalizations; rather, ghettos "resulted from the history of anti-Semitism" (p. 154). In my opinion this is an unhelpful regression to the false dichotomy of the intentionalist-functionalist controversy. The problems German occupiers cited (hunger, epidemic, black market, etc.) were real. Germans too often perceived the cause of these problems through ideological lenses, attributed them to inherent Jewish inferiority and malice, and thus created a self-fulfilling prophecy by adopting policies that made these real problems even worse. Nazi ideology and bureaucratic problem-solving are not mutually exclusive explanations; rather, they mutually reinforced one another in the grim history of Nazi ghettoization.

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NILS ROEMER. *German City, Jewish Memory: The Story of Worms*. (The Tauber Institute Series for the Study of European Jewry.) Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis University Press. Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England. 2010. Pp. x, 316. Cloth \$85.00, paper \$35.00.

In this book Nils Roemer focuses on the city of Worms as a contested site of Jewish memory. By tracing Jewish life in Worms over a thousand years, Roemer examines the impact of political and social developments on Jewish culture, memory, and identity. The book is organized chronologically into three sections, each containing three chapters. Part one describes Jewish settlement and memory in Worms from its medieval origins to the Enlightenment, part two explores the Jewish heritage in Worms from the modern era until its

destruction in the Holocaust, and part three focuses on the post-Holocaust period.

Jews had settled in Worms by the end of the tenth century, and by 1034 Christian masons built a synagogue, and a few decades later, a Jewish burial ground. The community consisted of a few hundred Jews, with families averaging two or three children. During the Investiture Controversy in 1073, Henry IV rewarded Jews and other burghers with tax freedom for allowing him to take refuge there, and he granted Jews comprehensive protection and jurisdiction over internal disputes. Despite these extensive rights, crusaders and burghers attacked Jews during the 1096 campaign and devastated the community. A rumor that Jews had boiled a Christian corpse and then poured the concoction into the city's water supply to poison the population was the pretext for the attacks. With the exception of a few who were forcibly baptized, most of the city's Jewish population was killed. Henry IV allowed those forcibly baptized Jews to return to Judaism, and the community re-established itself.

In response to the devastation, Roemer shows how a new paradigm emerged that viewed persecution as a divine test of Jewish faith. A local communal day of fasting, liturgical prayers memorializing the crusade's destruction, and the commemoration of the martyrs contributed to a culture of remembrance. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries there was another series of violent anti-Jewish attacks. The outbreak of the plague, in particular, fueled accusations that Jews promoted disease by poisoning water supplies, which resulted in the expulsion of Jews from almost all urban centers.

This pattern of expulsion and re-establishment of the Jewish community of Worms continued in the early modern period. Roemer details how Jewish martyrs and rabbis made the cemetery a holy ground where God would more willingly receive prayers, and thus it acquired an important role for the local community and visitors.

During the modern period, religious reform, social advancement, and civic equality altered religious traditions. Reform Judaism emerged as a response to Jewish emancipation, and the Revolution of 1848–1849 threw Jews into the turmoil of political conflict. The city's local heritage became important for Jewish travelers, and its historical sites contributed to Jews' local identity.

The most interesting section is the final one, "After the Holocaust." During this era, Worms was reinvested with multiple meanings, and memory operated as a means of representing and integrating the past into different contexts. For example, in the 1930s Friedrich Illert, the local archivist and travelogue author, who a few years earlier had promoted Worm's rich Jewish legacy, now described the city as the source of the *Nibelungen*, and in 1937 submitted a proposal to Joseph Goebbels for a national celebration of the Third Reich. Goebbels attended the staging of Friedrich Hebbel's *Nibelungen*, and Worms recast its historical heritage as the birth-

place of Nazism. In the postwar years, Illert reinvented himself as the postwar trustee of Jewish interests. Still the local archivist, he was responsible for collecting, preserving, and even restoring Jewish historical landmarks. These actions were ensnared in worldwide debates over whether Jews should remain in Germany, if Jewish sites should even be rebuilt, and who owned the property of those murdered Jews whose legal heirs could not be identified.

The rebuilding of the Jewish synagogue in 1961 was heavily politicized. Illert and the mayor of Worms, Heinrich Völker, promoted its reconstruction as an act of German-Jewish reconciliation, despite there being no Jews still living in Worms. Isaac Holzer, Worms's former rabbi, questioned whether the synagogue should be rebuilt at all. Elke Spies, a former member of the Worms community who, like Holzer, now in the United States, argued that almost all of the surviving Worms Jews rejected the reconstruction of the synagogue. The rebuilding project continued, and eventually included the restoration of the cemetery, a new museum, and an archive. Nonetheless, its meaning was and is still contested. Are the Jewish sites in Worms a place of commemoration for victims of persecution, or are they a visible sign of German-Jewish reconciliation? Do these sites and artifacts reflect the centrality of Judaism in German culture, or are they a reminder of Nazi crimes? All told, Roemer's meticulous study illustrates how Jewish memory was created and contested in Worms through religious commemorations, historical writings, travelogues, and the creation of museums and monuments.

LYNN RAPAPORT
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BERND SCHAEFER. *The East German State and the Catholic Church, 1945–1989*. Translated by JONATHAN SKOLNIK and PATRICIA C. SUTCLIFFE. (Studies in German History, number 11.) New York: Berghahn Books. 2010. Pp. xiii, 303. \$90.00.

The cover of Bernd Schaefer's book depicts an atypical occurrence: only once during his entire tenure as bishop of Berlin from 1979 to 1989 did Cardinal Joachim Meisner meet Erich Honecker, the head of the East German state and its communist party. It was an arranged tête-à-tête on the occasion of East Germany's celebration of Berlin's 750th birthday in 1987. The picture does not symbolize harmony between the East German state and the Catholic Church any more than the photo that was taken when Pope John Paul II encountered Honecker in 1985. Schaefer places both episodes in their historical context (pp. 186, 232–234). Meisner, who had close ties to the Polish pope, had, by 1987, long since dissolved the so-called "business fundamentals" (*Geschäftsgrundlage*) between church and state. The "political abstinence" (*politische Abstinenz*) that his predecessor Cardinal Alfred Bengsch had practiced yielded in the 1980s to a stronger push by the church into the public sphere.

Schaefer traces the tortuous path of the Catholic

Church in the East German state (GDR) from the beginning (1949) to the end of the Socialist Unity Party's (SED) rule in 1989/1990. He asks, first, how successful were the party's attempts to neutralize, if not marginalize, the church, which it saw as an ideological rival, through a combination of repression ("security policy" or *Sicherheitspolitik*) and support for elements that were loyal to the state ("alliance policy" or *Bündnispolitik*) (pp. 43–46). Second, he investigates the Catholic Church's conduct in response to the state's religious policies. At the heart of the study is the political interaction between the party-state and the Catholic Church leadership (including the Vatican); theological and cultural aspects play only a marginal role.

Schaefer's investigation is based on a broad fundamen-
tation of party and government files, as well as the archival holdings of the Berlin Bishops' Conference. The files of the Ministry of State Security (the "Stasi"), in particular, provide insights into the scope, and also the partial successes, of four decades of security policy by the SED regime. The SED regime succeeded in neutralizing the Catholic Church, but only after the leading powers in the party and state had put aside their image of the church as an ideological "bogeyman" in favor of a pragmatic policy and accepted the church's "political abstinence" as approving silence rather than denied affirmation. This transformation, which was accomplished under Honecker, shifted balance between church and state to the advantage of the latter. The intentionally small circle of episcopal representatives who negotiated with state agencies no longer served as a protective shield, as the church intended. Instead, they were increasingly instrumentalized by the state in accordance with its church policy. Under pressure from the East German state, church interlocutors (*Gesprächsbeauftragte*) and Cardinal Bengsch also enforced political abstinence against Catholic dissidents. The hypertrophically expanding security apparatus, which stabilized the GDR both externally and internally, was the necessary precondition for this policy. The SED regime succeeded not least because the church itself limited its latitude for action by suppressing any reform-oriented pluralism within its ranks. The effects of such questionable closeness to the state continued to manifest themselves during the revolutionary year 1989.

Even more inauspicious than the Catholic Church's political abstinence in the 1970s and 1980s, in Schaefer's estimation, was its unconditional anticommunism prior to the building of the Berlin Wall. Especially under the leadership of Bishop Julius Döpfner of Berlin (1957–1961), the church appeared to be the virtual handmaiden of Konrad Adenauer's policies. Döpfner's "Western"-oriented course obstructed any possibility of a *modus vivendi* with the GDR and overtaxed the powers of the small diaspora church, which was already strained by flight and expulsion (pp. 77–84).

Schaefer's book is still the only comprehensive treatment of this subject. It is a very literal and not always easy to read translation of his dissertation, which was

published in Germany in 1998. From the publisher's perspective, it is understandable that the author would shorten only footnote references and individual text passages—though not always in a plausible manner (p. 34, notes 105, 106; pp. 85–88)—for the “slightly abridged English version” (p. x), the only other change being the reduction of the text to a smaller typeface. But the study suffers from its lack of any engagement with present scholarship. A thorough revision would likely have given a different complexion to the chapters on the Catholic Church in the Soviet occupation zone and in the early GDR of the 1950s, in particular. Twenty years after the unification of Germany, a balanced scholarly account of the Catholic Church in the Soviet occupation zone and the GDR remains a desideratum in Germany as well as the United States.

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KAY SCHILLER and CHRISTOPHER YOUNG. *The 1972 Munich Olympics and the Making of Modern Germany.* (Weimar and Now: German Cultural Criticism.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2010. Pp. xiii, 348. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$24.95.

In public memory, the 1972 Munich Olympics have become associated with the nadir of modern Olympic history: the hostage-taking and murder of eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team by the radical Palestinian group Black September. This association was further cemented by Kevin MacDonald's high-profile documentary *One Day in September* (1999) and, more recently, Steven Spielberg's film *Munich* (2005). Kay Schiller and Christopher Young discuss the terrorist attack in the final chapter of their book as part of an account of West Germany's shifting international relations and tensions with the Arab world and the state of Israel. The book refuses, however, to reduce the history of the 1972 Olympics to one tragedy and asks larger questions about the significance of the planning, preparation, and, to a lesser extent, aftermath of the games. It succeeds in developing an interlocking narrative that explores the interdependence of domestic and international developments even though the authors' main arguments are sometimes obscured by too detailed descriptions of international negotiations and domestic organizational matters.

The study examines the relationship between different levels of the German government and the organizers during the bidding and planning stages for the Olympics. This forms the basis for a wider analysis of international relations and their political and cultural implications. Memories of the 1936 Berlin games—through which the Nazi regime tried to project a positive image abroad—formed an important subtext for the Munich event. While this is not surprising, the authors convincingly analyze the complex and contradictory ways in which the organizers negotiated the legacy of 1936. The Berlin games were as much cultural capital

as they were a burden for the Munich bidders. While West Germans liked to play down the legacy of the 1936 games, some of the leading international functionaries of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) had fond memories of the Berlin games that made them sympathetic to the Munich bid. The American president of the IOC, Avery Brundage, was an uncritical Germanophile who had been on friendly terms with Carl Diem, the chief organizer of the 1936 games, and the German IOC member, Karl Ritter von Halt, who had served as the last Reichssportführer. Willi Daume, the president of the German National Olympic Committee (NOK), was able to harness the positive reputation of the Berlin games for the Munich bid. In public, however, associations with 1936 were avoided. The East Germans did their best to discredit the Munich games, and by extension the Federal Republic's attempt to promote a positive self-image, by associating them with the Nazi past.

While the ghosts of 1936 were never far below the surface, the organizers of the 1972 games promoted a different image for the Munich event. Informed by contemporary ideas about social planning and technological feasibility (*Machbarkeit*), they tried to present West Germany as a modern, forward-looking place that was not much disturbed by its past. The architecture of the stadium, with its innovative tent-like roof designed by the architectural firm Behnisch and Partner, can be read as a rejection of the gigantism of the Berlin Reichssportfeld and its monumental Olympic stadium. In the cultural program of the 1972 Olympics, elements of classical culture such as opera, theater, and classical music were relegated to venues in the city center. As the authors demonstrate, the organizers favored less elitist forms of art that were located close to the stadium. The area around the stadium was designed to encourage the active involvement of the public and break down barriers among performers, athletes, and visitors. An “Avenue of Games” provided a forum for less conventional forms of culture and entertainment. There were thirty stages for theater, music, dance, pantomime, and circus acts that mixed elements of popular and avant-garde culture. In Schiller and Young's view, the open and hedonistic aspects of the program were part of a cautious attempt to engage with the youth culture emerging from the 1960s.

This is an important book that uses the 1972 Olympics to raise larger questions about international relations and West German society in the 1960s and 1970s. Still, in some ways it is too ambitious and does not deliver on all its promises. The claim of the subtitle that the history of the 1972 games can shed light on the making of modern Germany seems an overstatement. Which German modernity are the authors talking about? The particular modernist and technocratic visions of the 1960s that they have analyzed so convincingly? Or do they intend to make larger claims about German history in the twentieth century?

MICHAEL HAU
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CAITLIN E. MURDOCK. *Changing Places: Society, Culture, and Territory in the Saxon-Bohemian Borderlands, 1870–1946*. (Social History, Popular Culture, and Politics in Germany.) Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 2010. Pp. x, 275. \$70.00.

Caitlin E. Murdock's book is a significant contribution to the growing literature on frontiers in European history. Her impressive research in both German and Czech archives allows her to write a book that is simultaneously transnational and regional, using the history of the Saxon-Bohemian borderlands to challenge the centrality of the nation-state in the history of Central Europe.

Murdock begins by describing a Saxon-Bohemian border that has been remarkably stable and peaceful throughout the majority of its history. This was a region whose frontier status was unremarkable up until the later years of the nineteenth century, when it first became simultaneously a transit point for migrant workers and shoppers and the site of increased nationalist concern for both Czech and German nationalists. These economic and political developments were largely overlooked by both the Austro-Hungarian and German empires, both of which mostly pursued a policy of benign neglect. This changed with World War I, when even this peaceful frontier was subject to ramped up border patrols intent on ferreting out spies and smugglers. Meanwhile, states at war sought to clarify formerly fuzzy citizenship statuses for the purpose of the draft.

After the war, two new states confronted each other across the Saxon-Bohemian border: the democratic Weimar Republic and Czechoslovakia. As a result of their identification as nation-states and economic and financial turmoil, the border assumed a new role. Politicians highlighted the border as a zone of conflict, and people living in the region fought to keep border networks intact against protectionist states. By the end of the Weimar period, the border zone had become a site of crisis. The region was particularly hard hit by the depression, and both states saw managing border traffic as a means to combat political radicalism. When the Nazis came to power in 1933, they largely continued the border policies of the previous regime, much to the disappointment of German Bohemian nationalists who had hoped for a greater level of support from a state explicitly devoted to the rights of all Germans, regardless of citizenship. They got their wish later in the 1930s, as the Nazi state, concerned by the supposedly threatened status of ethnic Germans in the Sudetenland, adopted an increasingly aggressive posture vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia.

Murdock fluidly weaves a narrative that combines the economic and political history of the Czech-German borderlands. She convincingly explains how border dwellers sought to assert their unique relationships and interests in the face of shifting political regimes and growing efforts on the part of states to delimit and patrol the border and sort out their populations. Murdock stresses how irrelevant nationalism and state power of-

ten were to residents' lives. She claims that this reflected a kind of "borderland thinking" that characterizes this and similar regions with transnational economic and personal connections and movements. In order to make this argument, it is crucial to explain what makes borderlands distinct from non-borderland regions. Perhaps the most important distinction is that the Saxon-Bohemian region contains a border between two states. And it is here that Murdock could have gone further with a more extended analysis of the role and understanding of the various states active in this region. Were there shifting relationships between the local and national states over this period? How and to what degree did states themselves borrow policing tactics or citizenship policies from across the frontier? Was there any pattern to why and how border residents chose to identify with the state vis-à-vis the nation? Murdock's evidence hints at some interesting developments, but she could have done more to tie them together analytically to articulate the shifting relationships between the local and national state as well as between the German/Habsburg and German/Czechoslovak states.

Furthermore, while Murdock does an excellent job explaining the uniqueness of the Saxon-Bohemian border, her study might have benefitted from some comparisons with other German or Czech borderlands. In particular, as time goes on, this borderland appears to be increasingly inflected with language imported from the German-Polish border region, which was generally more confrontational. Some attention to this and other border regions might have supported her argument about the nationalization of a discourse of threatened borders and helped to explain when, how, and to what degree this occurred.

These caveats aside, this is an important and carefully researched book that should be read by specialists on Central Europe as well as historians of borderland regions more generally.

ANNEMARIE SAMMARTINO
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MARIA CRĂCIUN and ELAINE FULTON, editors. *Communities of Devotion: Religious Orders and Society in East Central Europe, 1450–1800*. (Catholic Christendom, 1300–1700.) Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2011. Pp. xvi, 284. \$124.95.

Although the Berlin Wall collapsed over twenty years ago, current scholarship on Christianity in early modern Europe still focuses mainly on the western side of the continent. While language barriers and lack of familiarity with library and archive holdings often serve as a rationale for the lesser attention paid to the lands east of Wittenberg, the bigger hurdle may be the mindset of Western European and North American scholars that everything of genuine importance happened in Western Europe, with East-central and Eastern Europe relegated to a derivative backwater.

Therefore, works that challenge these assumptions not only help to rectify the imbalance between schol-

arship on Western and Eastern Europe in the Reformation era but also introduce readers to the diversity and rich complexity of confessional interactions in East-central and Eastern Europe in the early modern period. One such work is the volume of essays edited by Maria Crăciun and Elaine Fulton on Catholic religious orders in East-central Europe from the fifteenth to the late seventeenth centuries. As the editors point out in the introduction, these religious orders faced many challenges, including the near-collapse of Catholic institutions in the sixteenth century, strong competition from other confessional groups, internal rivalries between secular and regular clergy, and rivalries among the different religious orders.

The first four contributions focus on the pre-Reformation context. Crăciun's chapter on friars in Transylvania from 1450 to 1550 shows that parish clergy resented the friars' influence over the laity, particularly their popularity as confessors and their success in attracting donations because of the perceived power of their intercessory prayers. Marie-Madeleine de Cevins's essay on the Franciscans' impact in Hungary in the later 1400s focuses on their role in shaping Hungarian piety. Her analysis of surviving Franciscan sermons highlights the friars' commitment to Marian devotion and an emphasis on the inner life of faith. Carmen Florea analyzes friars' impact on charity and devotional practices in Transylvanian towns, including confraternities overseen by the Dominicans and Franciscans. These confraternities (including some for women) served as focal points for charity, and for the growing cult of the rosary. In her essay, Gabriella Erdélyi examines the Augustinian convent in Körmend, Hungary. In this instance, the laity criticized the Augustinians' lax morals, including sexual misconduct and drunkenness. The friars' drinking even affected their ability to celebrate the sacraments. The laity showed their commitment to the church and their clout in refusing to countenance the friars' misbehavior.

The next five chapters deal with the period after 1550, when the religious orders' situation became even more precarious due to external pressure from various Protestant groups and to the competition between older and more recent orders, including the Jesuits. Rona Johnston Gordon analyzes jurisdictional conflicts and the complex cooperation between church and state authorities in the Austrian lands who were charged with overseeing the process of reforming decayed monasteries. In her essay, Fulton examines the activities of the Jesuits in Vienna and the key support they received from the Habsburg courtier Georg Eder. He ensured that competent Catholic clergy were selected to fill vacancies and dealt with cases of clerical immorality. Christine Peters continues the focus on the Jesuits with her analysis of their work in Transylvania between their arrival in 1579 and their expulsion in 1588. The Jesuits took over as landlords from other religious orders but their mistreatment of the peasants on their lands antagonized the laity. Martin Elbel focuses on the practice of pilgrimage promoted by the Franciscans in Bohemia,

which could include the veneration of relics but also the Stations of the Cross, which became a Franciscan hallmark. Finally, Greta-Monica Miron analyses the work of the Basilian monks in the Uniate or Greek-Catholic church of Transylvania in the eighteenth century. The challenges for the order included recruiting and training sufficient numbers of monks and ensuring their effectiveness in missionary work directed toward Transylvanian Orthodox communities.

In his epilogue, R. Po-chia Hsia describes the work of these religious orders as a triptych: the first panel shows the early work of the orders prior to the Reformation; the second shows the decline in the Reformation era, but also the greater involvement of the laity and the new orders; and the third shows the gradual renewal of the clergy after 1600.

The first chapter includes illustrations of church interiors and altarpieces, and several of the contributors provide maps of the areas under discussion. This work helpfully expands geographic and cultural horizons and contributes to a greater understanding of the ways in which East-central Europe was an active and important player in the complex confessional history of the early modern era.

KARIN MAAG
Calvin College

MAGDA TETER. *Sinners on Trial: Jews and Sacrilege after the Reformation*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 331. \$39.95.

In this beautifully written and richly documented study, Magda Teter examines the accusation that Jews desecrated communion wafers, which became a commonplace of Christian-Jewish relations in Poland-Lithuania in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These accusations led to many Jews being accused of sacrilege, brought to trial, tortured, and even executed. Drawing on a wide array of sources from Polish and Vatican archives, as well as the literature of the period, Teter vividly brings to life a number of these cases, including the famous 1556 Sochaczew case and a range of other less well-known instances. Her goal is to examine them in the context of religious and social life in Poland, presenting them as part not only of the tensions aroused by the Reformation, but also of changes in the contemporary criminal justice system. In this way, she aims to examine the interplay of sacred and sacrilege in the development of early modern religious tolerance in the region.

The discussion revolves around two major arguments. The first of these is that the accusation of Jews desecrating the host had its roots in intra-Christian polemic over the nature of transubstantiation. Since Jews did not believe in that miracle they had no reason to desecrate the wafer, so the use of the accusation by Christians must be explained as part of the theological struggle over the Eucharist. Claiming that Jews pierced the host with miraculous results (i.e., its bleeding) was clearly meant to serve those Catholics who believed

that it had become physical flesh. This is not a new thesis. Gavin I. Langmuir made it in the context of medieval theological polemics, and Hanna Węgrzynek discussed it in the context of post-Reformation Poland. Teter's strategy is not to analyze this literature but to illustrate the argument with case studies. In her fourth chapter, for example, she shows how the legend that the Jews had desecrated the host in Poznań during the Middle Ages was manipulated by the local Carmelite order in the sixteenth century as part of its war against Protestants. It ended up enabling them not only to defeat the Protestants and persecute the Jews, but also to establish their own chapel for eucharistic worship in the town. Thus, as much as she is using the history of the reformations to elucidate the history of Polish Jewry, she is also using the history of Polish Jewry to elucidate the history of the reformations, giving her study broader significance for historians of religion in Europe.

The book's second major thesis also has implications that extend well beyond the borders of Poland-Lithuania. Teter argues that it was the transfer of jurisdiction over crimes of sacrilege from the ecclesiastical to the secular courts following the Reformation that opened the way to judicial murder for the crime of host desecration; church courts in Poland had traditionally shied away from that form of punishment. As a result, the trials she describes, such as that in Przemyśl in 1630, show how the jostling for jurisdiction, power, and authority within Poland-Lithuania affected the fate of the Jewish victims. She is clear that the outcome of this process was the reinforcement of "the Catholic religion as the only true religion, the only one considered sacred" (p. 6). This is an interesting twist on the thesis of her previous book, which argued against a triumphalist view of Catholic supremacy in early modern Poland. From the perspective of the sacrilege trials, however, the close cooperation of state institutions with the church was crucial for the Counter-Reformation's success. This is an argument of great significance for the discussion of whether (or how) the process of confessionalization, well studied for Central and Western Europe, took place in Poland-Lithuania.

The author concludes with a broadside against Polish historiography, claiming that her work overturns the concept that Reformation Poland was a "state without stakes," as Janusz Tazbir, the doyen of Polish cultural-religious historians, contended in 1967. Teter is undoubtedly correct in asserting that religious tolerance in early modern Poland-Lithuania had its limits and that judicial violence and murder formed part of the picture. In fairness, however, Tazbir has argued much the same thing in a series of studies published after the fall of communism, including essays on the anti-Jewish accusations themselves. In fact, a whole generation of Polish scholars has been at work for the last two decades to deconstruct the rose-tinted descriptions of Tazbir's early study. Any assessment of the impact of Teter's book needs to take that body of research into account.

To say this, however, does not detract from Teter's achievements. On the basis of a large body of primary sources, some of them unknown in previous research, her book sheds new light not only on the history of Poland and Polish Jews but also on the history of the reformations in East Central Europe. In doing so, it opens the way to the fuller integration of these histories into larger narratives of European history in the age of the reformations, helping further break down the east-west borders that still plague research in this area. Though its materials are highly technical, the book's writing and argumentation are clear and easy to follow, making it a very enjoyable read.

ADAM TELLER
Brown University

NATHANIEL D. WOOD. *Becoming Metropolitan: Urban Selfhood and the Making of Modern Cracow*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 2010. Pp. xiv, 272. \$40.00.

A newcomer to Cracow in 1900 would have found the city a dirty, provincial place dominated by its past. Thanks to new technologies of communication, transportation, energy, and especially the modern newspaper, by 1915 Cracow had joined other contemporary cities in an "interurban matrix of words and images describing the modern world" (p. 51). In his excellent monograph, Nathaniel D. Wood defines this process as "becoming metropolitan," and indeed in the first fifteen years of the twentieth century "little Cracow" was transformed physically and culturally. Moreover, its infrastructural innovations proved attractive to surrounding communities incorporated into "Greater Cracow" between 1910 and 1915, even if "big city" building codes and crime did not. Consequently, the city's territory increased eightfold and its population doubled, making Cracow the fifth largest city in the Habsburg Empire.

If this sounds like a familiar story to those who have studied urban development in other European cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, that is exactly Wood's point. Cracow may have lagged behind Paris, Vienna, and Berlin in its urban planning, infrastructural improvements, and expansion, but in many ways it was "becoming metropolitan" sooner than Warsaw to the north. Moreover, Cracow's popular illustrated daily newspapers, a boulevard press that promoted, described, and defined the city's metropolitan development, also preceded those of Warsaw. Their flavor—featuring sensational headlines and advertisements, and cultivating immediacy and novelty—and their distribution on the street would have made Cracow's popular dailies siblings of those in other great cities.

For Wood, Cracow's boulevard press serves as both subject and source, and therefore receives extensive treatment. Although Cracow had daily newspapers before 1900, they had connections with the era's political parties. Beginning with the short-lived *Kuryerek Krakowski*, followed by the more popular *Nowiny dla*

wszystkich, which in turn was superseded by *Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny* (IKC), Wood documents the rise and significance of an essentially new medium with considerable skill. Ludwik Szczepański, the editor of *Nowiny* who Wood refers to as the “Cracovian press pioneer” (p. 57) is one of the book’s two central figures, more so than his protégé, Maryan Dąbrowski, “the Polish William Randolph Hearst” who founded IKC (p. 64). The other central character is Juliusz Leo, Cracow’s vice-mayor and then mayor and the prime mover behind the city’s greater metropolitan expansion. Yet it is through the lens of the popular press rather than of the city administration that we experience Cracow’s modernization, whether the first day of electric streetcar operations or the pros and cons of incorporation as debated by the communities on Cracow’s periphery. The boosterism prominent in dailies like *Nowiny* and IKC contained missions that, according to Wood, were both “civilizing” and “colonizing,” although the vision of rational modernization promoted by them and politicians like Leo was not so much contested but negotiated by their targeted lower-class and suburban subjects.

A main point of Wood’s thesis is that urban identification is an “imagined community” that has a place in the modern self, one that has been seriously overlooked in the scholarship on Central Europe, which has focused to a great extent on the process of “becoming national.” He argues convincingly that in the mundane everyday lives of Cracovians, the imagined community “was not national, but metropolitan” (p. 202). The popular press, moreover, was instrumental in shaping how Cracovians imagined their city and its place in modern European civilization. Although one can readily agree with the author that national identity is less situated in the quotidian, it is not necessarily in competition with urban identity; rather, “becoming metropolitan” and “becoming national” are better viewed as mutually reinforcing forms of selfhood in the modern era. As Wood himself notes, Leo consciously pitched his arguments for metropolitan incorporation to suburban leaders in national patriotic colors.

Wood’s chapters on Cracow’s expansion raise another issue. His discussion of the making of Greater Cracow is based almost entirely on a reading of the popular daily press, which works better when the press is the subject rather than the source. The reader is not offered a more direct perspective from inside the city administration and council or from the self-governing institutions of the surrounding communities. Instead, the views of all participants in the process and the interactions between them are relayed and filtered through the press. Finally, with so much of his argument based on the importance of the mass-circulation boulevard press in the metropolitan project, more extended discussion of the literacy and education of its readership would have been helpful.

That being said, this book has a great deal to recommend it. The first serious study of the making of modern Cracow, *Becoming Metropolitan* contributes valuable new perspectives to a dynamically growing lit-

erature on the city in Central and Eastern Europe. Methodologically sophisticated and superbly written, Wood’s book clearly demonstrates that Cracow’s story is not exceptional but part and parcel of modern European urban history.

ROBERT BLOBAUM
West Virginia University

VLADIMIR SOLONARI. *Purifying the Nation: Population Exchange and Ethnic Cleansing in Nazi-Allied Romania*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center. 2010. Pp. xxviii, 451. \$65.00.

In the past decade and a half numerous works have appeared on the Holocaust in Romania, along with studies of race, eugenics, and the rise of right-wing extremism in interwar Romania. The *Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania* (edited by Tuvia Friling, Radu Ioanid, and Mihail E. Ionescu [2005]), the late Jean Ancel’s *The History of the Holocaust in Romania* (2011) and other important publications have moved these topics from the margins into the mainstream of Romanian and Holocaust historiography.

With this book Vladimir Solonari did not intend to present yet another major work on the history of the Holocaust in Romania, although parts of the book are devoted to the subject. He sets the fate of Romanian Jewry in the wider context of Romania’s attempts to “purify the nation,” which included persecution of the Roma, a subject that Viorel Achim has brought attention to. Yet, until recently there were very few English-language studies on racist stereotypes of the Roma in Romania and their place in eugenic theories of the interwar period. Solonari also dwells on less well-known cases of population exchange, including Hungarians and Germans, whose fate was so different from that of the hundreds of thousands of Jews killed and left to die. The Romanian regime did not attempt to exterminate Hungarians and Germans; rather it subjected them to Romanization. Romanian attitudes toward Germans is an interesting subject that calls for deeper study. Romania was allied with Germany during the war, but the German minority in Romania experienced a racial awakening during the Nazi era.

Solonari does not use the word “Holocaust” in the title of this book, preferring the terms “population exchange” and “ethnic cleansing.” While he does describe the theory and praxis of removing “disturbing elements” from the body of the nation, these terms are perhaps too mild for some of the book’s contents. Jews, for instance, were not ethnically cleansed; they were exterminated.

Solonari correctly emphasizes that Ion Antonescu’s policies were not carried out as a result of Nazi pressure, a claim made by the communist-era historiography and Holocaust deniers since 1989. The outbreak of extreme violence in Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transnistria was not a result of extreme forms of violent

behavior in a wartime situation, but rather the implementation of a radical and fanatical idea in the northern parts of Romania and territories occupied by the Soviet Union. This violence served as a model to be applied in other parts of Romania, but when it became clear that Nazi Germany would lose the war, the Antonescu regime, for pragmatic reasons, did not extend it to the entire country.

While Solonari does an excellent job (especially in chapters four and five) presenting racial and eugenic thought in interwar Romania, he is less focused on some of the major intellectual pillars of Romanian nationalism and antisemitism in the 1930s. Mircea Eliade (whose approach to Jews and Hungarians was racist), Emil Cioran, and Nae Ionescu all made important contributions to the development of Romanian antisemitism during this era, but they receive only scant attention.

This is a valuable and well-documented book on a topic that, until recently, has been neglected by historians of both Romania and the Holocaust.

RAPHAEL VAGO
Tel-Aviv University

MARIANNE HIRSCH and LEO SPITZER. *Ghosts of Home: The Afterlife of Czernowitz in Jewish Memory*. (The S. Mark Taper Foundation Imprint in Jewish Studies.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2010. Pp. xxiv, 362. \$39.95.

The city of Czernowitz has long captured the imagination of people with Eastern European roots. Presently situated in western Ukraine, the city's peak of prosperity was during the nineteenth century when it was the capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire's eastern province of Bukovina. By 1900, the multinational and multilingual city possessed a modern, largely Germanized Jewish community. Czernowitz was also a center of modern Yiddish culture, hosting the first international Yiddish language conference in 1908. After World War I, Czernowitz was severed from Austria and ruled successively by Romania, the Soviet Union, and Ukraine. It had an estimated Jewish population of 43,000 (47 percent of the city's inhabitants) in 1919, reaching more than 50,000 by 1940; the Holocaust halved that number. Waves of postwar Jewish emigration further reduced the Jewish population of Czernowitz to the present-day estimate of 6,000.

Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer's book recaptures Czernowitz's legacy. Hirsch, who developed the concept of "postmemory" to describe the memory of children of Holocaust survivors in her *Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory* (1997), is the daughter of Carl and Lotte Hirsch, Holocaust survivors from Czernowitz who are the book's subject. In 1998, Hirsch and coauthor Spitzer (her husband) traveled to Czernowitz with her parents, who were returning there for the first time since 1945. Hirsch had never been to Czernowitz, yet her "postmemory," derived from a childhood infused with stories of the city before and

during the war, was so powerful that she felt she was returning to a place she had already known.

This is a nuanced book of many layers and themes. It is in part a "second-generation journey" (p. 167) back to the old country: a family history of Carl and Lotte Hirsch that covers their ancestry, childhood in interwar Romania, dramatic survival during the Holocaust, and postwar exile, told through the eyes of the couple's daughter and son-in-law. By situating the story of the Hirsches within the larger history of wartime Czernowitz's Jewish population, *Ghosts of Home* is also about the Holocaust in Romania. The result is a book that puts a profoundly human face on the experience of wartime Romanian Jewry. The authors draw on artifacts, documents, and photos, including a tile stove from the apartment the Hirsches abandoned in 1945, a 1942 photograph of the Hirsches in Czernowitz, a little book of illustrations by an inmate of the concentration camp in Transnistria (where Jews from Czernowitz were deported), a 1941 photograph of the historic Czernowitz synagogue after it was set on fire, two 1942 Czernowitz Jewish identity cards with a yellow star imprinted in the background, and a wartime document naming Carl Hirsch on a list of Jews exempted from deportation. The search for and discovery of the latter documents, some of which required considerable persistence in Soviet-era Ukrainian archives, is a pronounced part of the book. Such records, among others, are skillfully and carefully used to fill the gaps in oral testimony.

Considerable attention is focused on a single photograph of Hirsch's parents taken in Czernowitz in 1942. The wallet-size image, which shows well-dressed, confident newlyweds on an afternoon stroll, offers a stark contrast to the wartime stories of deportations, brutality, and deprivation that formed Hirsch's "postmemory" of her parents' experience. A spot on the lapel of Carl's jacket in the 1942 photo, barely visible, is the subject of an entire chapter in which the authors speculate about whether or not it was a Jewish star. Carl maintained that Jewish stars were larger and more distinct (p. 166). But if Hirsch's parents were openly defying the ordinance requiring Jews to wear such badges of identification in public (it was rescinded in July 1943), then Carl and Lotte must have felt relatively secure in Czernowitz, even in 1942.

The authors situate the 1942 photo in its historical context. Romanian and German troops retook Czernowitz in June 1941, Jews were ordered to wear the yellow star in August, and they were moved into a ghetto on October 11, 1941, after which Hirsch's parents married to avoid being separated. In October-November 1941, some 30,000 Jews were deported from Czernowitz to a Romanian-run concentration camp in Transnistria that Robert D. Kaplan has called "the only non-German run extermination camp in Europe" (*Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* [1993], p. 128). But Carl and Lotte Hirsch were spared almost certain death, along with 19,000 other Czernowitz Jews, due to the efforts of local officials who placed them on a list of people exempt from deportation. The second and

last deportation action, in January 1942, led to the round up and deportation of 4,000 more Czernowitz Jews.

Hirsch's parents lived out the rest of the war in Czernowitz. As a result of their research, the authors came to understand the photograph in an entirely new light. "Looking at the picture now," Hirsch and Spitzer write, "we realize that in it Carl and Lotte are *already* survivors, alive within a fortunate minority that had been spared a terrible fate" (p. 193). They contend that "the fact that local officials had such significant impact on government policy is one of the peculiarities of the Romanian Holocaust" (p. 192).

The authors conclude that children of Holocaust survivors born after the war belong to "the generation of postmemory" (p. 269). *Ghosts of Home* is a highly personal work about the attempt by two members of that generation to reconstruct the experience of their parents' wartime past by combining memories and the historical record. Hirsch and Spitzer have deepened their self-understanding while providing readers with a valuable study of memory and the Holocaust.

JOSHUA D. ZIMMERMAN
Yeshiva University

STEVEN B. BOWMAN. *The Agony of Greek Jews, 1940–1945*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2009. Pp. xiv, 325. \$55.00.

Long neglected in the English-language historiography on the Holocaust, the plight of Greek Jewry has found partial redress in recent years through the work of eminent historians such as Mark Mazower, K. E. Fleming, and Steven B. Bowman. Whereas Mazower and Fleming have concerned themselves with the broader history of Salonican Jewry, Bowman is recognized as an authority on the Greek Holocaust. In this book Bowman expands on his previous chronicle of Jewish participation in the National Liberation Front–National Popular Liberation Army (EAM/ELAS) resistance movement by mapping out the prewar and wartime structural, political, social, and psychological factors that facilitated the expulsion and ultimate destruction of Greece's Jewish community.

Bowman's discussion of the fateful effects of the general belief in German good will, in conjunction with the "entrapment" of Jews as a consequence of the tripartite partitioning of the country, although greatly indebted to the work of Michael Matsas, makes for compelling reading. Bowman's depiction of the sheer scale of population movement through mass deportation restores to the term "displacement" its true meaning. The description of an ever-expanding constellation of labor and concentration camps across Europe, and of the method and precision deployed in the development of a highly sophisticated infrastructure designed for the purpose of annihilation, horrifies and baffles the reader anew. Equally engaging is Bowman's discussion of the politics of relief, where he lays out the delicate and intricate negotiations undertaken by international and lo-

cal relief organizations with the conqueror, to facilitate their work and also to advance their respective interests. The combined impact of institutional rivalry, the complexities of intracommunal Jewish politics, and the role of respective governments, both occupied and free, whose Jewish citizens had fallen within the grasp of the Axis powers contributed considerably to the fate of Greek Jewry. These are among the strongest sections in the book.

Overall Bowman's book does little to advance the existing scholarship on this still-obscure chapter of the Holocaust and does not do justice to the author's own considerable labors over the last two decades. But it does reflect them, at times seeming to act as a repository for data that perhaps did not find a home in Bowman's previous publications. The book presents a catalogue of minutiae, details of events, incidents, and the fates of individuals that, invaluable as they may be, are rendered meaningless by not being used selectively and integrated into a binding narrative. The reader is left to do the messy work of assimilating the data and evaluating its myriad significances. A better negotiation of the balance between detail and narrative would have produced a more cohesive, engaging book. In addition, there are problems of structure, awkward and often confusing prose, and numerous typographical errors.

The history of Greek-Jewish coexistence and solidarity—and sometimes the lack thereof—presents itself as Bowman's potential narrative hook, the missing scaffolding. The story of successful multiculturalism, the equilibrium struck between difference and assimilation, is ever-present but only half-told in this account. It finds expression in Greek law and policy, in the return of confiscated properties by the Greek state after the war, in community loyalty and solidarity evident in the willingness to hide, protect, smuggle, and generally assist Jewish citizens during the occupation, often at great personal risk. This seems to be the strongest, yet still unexplored, potential of Bowman's research, an aspect that also distinguishes the Greek case from the experience of many, though not all, Jewish communities elsewhere in Europe during World War II. Today, the memory and legacy of Greek-Jewish coexistence is, or remains, absent from public discourse, from Greek self-understanding, and from narratives of national identity. In its place is a widespread but arguably epidemic antisemitism within Greek society and the diaspora communities, coupled with an entrenched assumption of its historic nature—a cultural condition that Bowman's account of the plight of Greek Jewry calls into question.

MARGARITE POULOS
University of Sydney

CHRISTINE RUANE. *The Empire's New Clothes: A History of the Russian Fashion Industry, 1700–1917*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2009. Pp. xii, 276. \$65.00.

On first picking up Christine Ruane's history of the Russian fashion industry, a reader might easily be deceived into assuming, because of the book's coffee-ta-

ble size and beautiful photographs, that it was written to entertain rather than educate. That would be a mistake. The author does not limit her history to fashion as an aesthetic and cultural phenomenon but accomplishes something larger: the book is at once a broad analysis of changes in Russian fashion from Peter the Great to the revolution and a history of the development of imperial Russia's clothing industry. Ruane weaves the two subjects together to produce a colorful tapestry of topics and stories, some of them familiar and unsurprising, others new and intriguing.

If one were to isolate a single thread running through and connecting the various themes of this wide-ranging book, it would be the familiar subject of Russia grappling with economic and social changes emanating from Western Europe. In studies of imperial Russia, Western influence can be a virtually inescapable theme. Here the theme becomes particularly engrossing for the simple reason that developments in the fashion industry often took place among little-known figures and unfamiliar groups. As Ruane points out, the state had a difficult time controlling Russian fashion and its effects since "even an autocratic government could not hope to eliminate the idiosyncratic choices that individual Russians made when they decided what to wear each day" (p. 151). Thus ordinary women, both as clothing makers and wearers, take center stage here, as do textile workers, the publishers of fashion magazines, and writers who condemned what they saw as fashion's excesses.

Approaching fashion from a variety of angles, the book dips into less familiar aspects of Russian history. For instance, press censorship is a common theme in the history of imperial Russia, but censorship of the fashion press reveals the extremes to which it could go. Likewise, historians are familiar with the origins of Russian publishing and know about many of imperial Russia's remarkable women, but few are likely to be aware that the fashion press was partly inaugurated by two female publishers in the mid-nineteenth century. Ruane also details the history of artisanal tailoring, the role of sewing in women's education, Russian mail order catalogues, the surprisingly widespread dissemination of Singer sewing machines, the Russianization of court attire and uniforms, the place of the garment trade in Russian labor history, and the riots that destroyed German clothing stores in Moscow during World War I.

As for the book's more familiar topics, the fashion industry proves particularly illuminating when it comes to the ever-troubling problem of Russian identity vis-à-vis Europe, as well as the expanding role of women in the public sphere. With respect to the former, it seems to this reviewer that Ruane uses fashion to contribute to the case for what might be termed the "undecidability" of Russian identity. She shows how, in the world of fashion, national identity continually wavered between the expression of a full-fledged Europeaness and the desire to embrace something more native. Indeed, my only disagreement with the book involves Ruane's argument in the epilogue that a fashion show in

May 1916 marked a "resolution of Russia's cultural conundrum" in fashion by establishing a blend of Western and Russian styles (p. 238). The rest of the book seems to suggest that had the revolution not intervened in 1917, the struggle for an acceptable Russian identity would have continued unabated. With respect to gender, developments in the fashion industry reflect the slow but steady advance of women into the public sphere. Accompanying this progress, not surprisingly, there arose a conservative backlash. The backlash culminated in a book by Iulii Elets that (absurdly) demonized women for the rise of fashion and consumerism, a viewpoint Ruane deftly ties to the similar stigmatization of modern women in Leo Tolstoy's *Kreutzer Sonata* (1889).

Finally, the photographs in this book should not be overlooked. Among the most interesting and enjoyable aspects of this study are the long captions analyzing these photographs. Ruane demonstrates a keen eye for visual analysis of clothing and brings out subtle and revealing features of the photographs that most observers would likely never notice. The photographs themselves, moreover, can be haunting. The often well-dressed figures, presumably chosen for the fashionable clothing they flaunt, seem particularly concerned to demonstrate their up-to-the-moment modernity, and yet, from today's perspective, their very fashionability makes them appear poignantly frozen in time. Rather than dressing up an otherwise traditional social history in excessive finery, the photographs and captions enhance the overall fascination of this study, rendering it all the more revealing and absorbing.

CHRISTOPHER ELY
Florida Atlantic University

JOHN DOYLE KLIER. *Russians, Jews, and the Pogroms of 1881–1882*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. xxiv, 492. \$110.00.

This splendid book, nearly completed at the time of John Doyle Klier's untimely death at the age of sixty-two in 2007, was edited and seen through production by a devoted team including his wife and historian François Guesnet. It is undoubtedly the best of Klier's many publications: a work that challenges but, oddly enough, also substantiates something of the thrust of Jewish collective memory with regard to the pogroms of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The intermittent, violent attacks on the streets of Russia's cities, towns, and also villages—starting in earnest in the spring of 1881 and becoming more violent in 1905–1906, and particularly with the disintegration of the Romanov regime in 1918–1920—still constitute for many the epicenter of Jewish recollections of the past. Klier's careful, thoughtful study, focusing on the first of these explosions, is as good an account of their etiology as we are likely ever to have. He argues that the pogroms cannot be traced to tsarist machinations; rather, they were inspired by a mesh of hatreds and sus-

pictions fanned by the authorities and shared equally by elites and the masses in late imperial Russia.

In waves of attacks erupting first in Elizavetgrad in April 1881, in Warsaw later that year, in Balta a few months later, and then, finally, in Ekaterinoslav in the summer of 1883, hundreds of locales suffered violence almost entirely aimed at Jewish property. Millions of rubles of damage resulted while few were killed (probably no more than twenty-five Jews in all), very few were raped (numbers remain uncertain, but such attacks, far more common in later anti-Jewish outrages, were rare in the early 1880s), and thousands of attackers were arrested. Klier argues that Cossacks were primarily present to protect Jews from marauders and that authorities mostly sought, as vigorously as they could, and with the use of sparse, poorly prepared police or troops, to maintain order. Not only was the new tsar, Alexander III, not responsible for either their planning or execution, but he, and many close to him, feared that revolutionaries had ignited them.

Klier's interpretation of the pogroms contradicts many of the still-regnant Jewish assumptions about the Russian Jewish past. His analysis of Russia's *fin-de-siècle* anti-Jewish violence is coherent and persuasive, arguably the fullest and best available. Still, this is not what most distinguishes the book. Its single most significant achievement is Klier's demonstration that while the government was not literally culpable it was nonetheless responsible for the violence, if only because of how it both sustained and vigorously articulated so many of the assumptions at the core of pogromist animus.

For this reason, Klier begins his account not in 1881 but a year earlier when, following a failed attempt on the life of Alexander II, Russia's chief of gendarmes ordered authorities to investigate the "universal Jewish Kahal's" support for the anti-imperial revolutionary movement. By the summer of 1881, once the first pogroms had erupted, Vilna's Okhrana (Department for Protecting the Public Security and Order) dispatched an agent to Königsberg to shadow an old rabbi it suspected of working with revolutionaries to transport contraband in an effort to topple the Romanov regime. "Any honest voice of the Russian land is drowned out by Polish-Yid cries" (p. 2), declared in 1880 the soon to be appointed Minister of Interior N. P. Ignatiev, who would be largely responsible for the formulation of Russian policy toward Jews in the period immediately following the pogroms.

"It will suffice to note that every non-Jewish assessment of the pogroms without exception, relied on the concept of Jewish exploitation . . . All asserted, with one voice, that the Jews themselves were to blame for the disorders," writes Klier (p. 122). This meant that those responsible for Russian policy toward the Jews sought, in the short term, to restore calm to Russia's streets while seeking to check, in the long-term, Jewish economic chicanery. This, in essence, was the impulse at the heart of the May Laws instituted by the regime soon after the pogroms, regulations that, as Klier puts

it, were "Born in haste, muddled in intent, [and] designed to be temporary" (p. 224).

Regarding pogromists themselves, Klier makes a good case for them having been drawn mostly not from vagrants or hoodlums but from the peasantry or semi-urban dwellers with a small number of furloughed soldiers and the occasional nobleman or cleric. Polite society showed little horror at the sight of the riots, often watching from the sidelines and causing police or troops to complain that they blocked access. Leaning on the comparative work of Donald L. Horowitz, Klier describes the critical role played by rumors, outsized tales that often stressed how Jews were swallowing Russia whole; he even ferrets out of the archives at least one pogrom-era Dracula rumor involving Jews.

Where the book stumbles, badly at times, is in its last section when it seeks to make sense of the post-pogrom reactions of the Jews themselves. Here, the range of primary sources Klier utilizes is more constrained, his insights less sharp. Most unfortunate is the book's conclusion, which culminates in observations so reductive, so unintelligible that one can only presume they were written by Klier in haste with the expectation of recasting: "Conspiracy theories have had the power of charming Jewish audiences as they have gripped groups of antisemites. Just as the latter find a strange comfort in the myths propagated by the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, so too do many descendants of the East European Jewish diaspora retain an unshakable belief in the malevolent pogrom-mongering of the Russian state" (pp. 413–414). It seems bizarre to establish a parallel between a hideous forgery still used to promote hatred and Jewish perceptions of pogroms that led to a reductionist image of the Russian-Jewish past. And the assertion is also out of kilter with the book's key discovery: namely that collective Jewish memory retained a more accurate understanding of the pogroms—centered on the culpability of the Russian regime and the explosive nexus between official xenophobia and popular violence—than did most recent historians of the region.

The bulk of the work, however, is a superbly wrought, multilayered treatment of pogrom-era Jews as seen through the eyes of the Russian public, government, press, radicals, and others. It is the achievement of a consummate archival historian, a true expert on Russian attitudes toward Jews who died in his prime.

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OLGA KUCHERENKO. *Little Soldiers: How Soviet Children Went to War, 1941–1945*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 266. \$99.00.

In *Little Soldiers* Olga Kucherenko explores the factors that led young people, predominately boys, under the enlistment age of eighteen to join the Soviet armed forces during World War II, and their experiences in the army, the navy, and among partisan groups. Poor record keeping, especially among partisan units, makes

specifying the total number of underage soldiers impossible; estimates range widely from 60,000 to 300,000. The age range of such soldiers is also difficult to determine. As Kucherenko notes, sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds were sometimes allowed to enlist. She uses the terms “child,” “underage,” “adolescent,” “teenager,” and “youngster” interchangeably to refer to those aged ten to sixteen, although it is not clear—and indeed may be impossible to determine—how frequently the “little soldiers” were much younger than sixteen. For Kucherenko, what seems to distinguish these youngsters from their adult comrades in arms was their greater susceptibility to the exhortations to defend the motherland (*rodina*) that permeated Soviet schools and Soviet culture more generally in the 1930s.

The first three chapters examine the ways in which prewar programs for children and the broader Soviet culture prepared young people mentally and physically to participate in warfare. Kucherenko provides a general overview of a large number of topics ranging from Soviet school policy to Soviet cinema. Much of this information will be familiar to specialists, particularly as Kucherenko reaffirms relatively uncontroversial conclusions—for example, that Soviet education stressed collectivist values, hard work, and, beginning in the 1930s, patriotism—rather than analyzing the ways in which paying attention to child soldiers might reinforce, challenge, or reshape these conclusions. At the same time, the brief treatment of so many topics may be confusing for those without some specialized knowledge, as numerous individuals, books, and movies are mentioned without any accompanying explanation. Moreover, many topics—for example, the re-education of homeless and abandoned children—while part of a general picture of Soviet childhood lack a clear connection to the question of why during the war a minority of children set out for the front.

Emphasizing “adolescents’ propensity for collective activities, heightened susceptibility to everything that accentuates their maturity, and their desire for positive evaluation by others,” Kucherenko concludes “it is hardly surprising that some should have sought to enhance their self-esteem by asserting their capability and participating in the war” (p. 46). She appears to have conducted in-depth interviews with an unspecified number of child veterans. However, in the first section little of this material is quoted or analyzed. Rather, it is cited in the footnotes to support generalizations such as “ideological convictions stimulated emotions” (p. 45).

The child soldiers themselves begin to emerge from the general context in the book’s second section. An initial chapter provides overviews of wartime propaganda directed at adults and children as well as of the war’s effects on children’s lives. Three chapters then describe children’s experiences in three distinct wartime situations: the army (“Babes in Grey”), partisan units (“Imps and Eaglets”), and the navy (“Sea Whelps”). As the chapter titles suggest, Kucherenko is keen to emphasize the immaturity, if not innocence, of

the child soldiers. However, she does not specifically engage with the question of why or whether someone like sixteen-year-old Katia Mikhailova, who arrived at a military base in Smolensk as a trained and certified medic, is best understood as a “child soldier” or a “babe in grey,” terms that emphasize age and obscure gender. Kucherenko raises but does not develop the question of how Soviet child soldiers in World War II compared to those at earlier times in Russian history or to those in more recent conflicts worldwide.

The most engaging sections of the book reproduce and analyze the words of the child veterans themselves. Kucherenko effectively draws on memoirs and interviews to demonstrate that for many children military service constituted less the end of childhood than a means of coping with the overwhelming disruptions caused by the war: hunger, abandonment, the death of family members, the destruction of their homes. Children who left home to join relatives at the front, who were “adopted” as *vospitanniki* (wards) by Red Army units passing through their villages, or who joined partisans in the forest were often already adrift and endangered. While teenagers’ service in the army and partisan units was often unplanned and (in the case of the army) officially discouraged by the state, the navy attempted to channel youthful enthusiasm into approved channels by establishing schools to train approximately five thousand boys aged twelve to seventeen to become *jungi* (ship’s boys), the lowest naval rank established by Peter the Great and reintroduced during World War II.

Focusing on the impact of ideology on Soviet children’s decisions during World War II, *Little Soldiers* highlights the importance of understanding children as historical actors.

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KRISTIN ROTH-EY. *Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire That Lost the Cultural Cold War*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2011. Pp. ix, 315. \$39.95.

Kristin Roth-Ey has written a remarkably intelligent book about the exponential post-Stalin expansion of the mass media, particularly film, radio, and television. Based in equal parts on the memoirs of culture producers and on archival records, it is a major contribution to our understanding of post-Stalin culture and society. Roth-Ey focuses not on the cultural analysis of individual films or programs, although she does that very well, but on media production and consumption. One of her central arguments is that in terms of production, programming, and reach, the mass media were immensely successful—by the late 1960s Soviet society was thoroughly plugged in—yet Soviet culture producers failed to meet their own stated goal of offering an attractive, distinctively Soviet alternative to competing Western media. That was because the regime’s goal of cultural uplift and its antipathy to mass culture hobbled the media. A second argument is that the growth of the

media was accompanied by increasing complexity, including the emergence of multiple points of control that gave media producers room to maneuver. A third argument is that, in the context of increasing leisure time (by my own calculation, there was at least a thirty-five percent increase between the mid-1950s and the late 1960s), rising income, increasing years in school, and massive housing construction, cultural consumption was transformed from a predominantly public to a predominantly private experience, from relative uniformity (at least in the cities) to a multiplicity of options and consequent audience segmentation. These points fit nicely with what we know about other developments in post-Stalin society. Roth-Ey's detailed case histories, however, often cut against received wisdom, and against what leading figures in the Soviet media have told us in their memoirs.

How can we explain, for instance, the economics of the Soviet film industry, which was hugely profitable even though most Soviet films barely broke even or lost money? One answer is that foreign films (although ideologically suspect) and Soviet domestic blockbusters (although scorned for aping Western mass culture) filled the big theaters. Highbrow films could play to small audiences and uphold the honor of Soviet film at international festivals, while boring politicized films had their own niche. The film establishment, including the directorial intelligentsia, claimed to be elevating the Soviet public's cultural tastes, but the industry depended upon providing films that the audience wanted. Why then was Grigori Chukhrai's Experimental Creative Studio (ETK, 1966–1976), which aimed for its every movie to make a profit, shut down? Not, suggests Roth-Ey, because of political or cultural transgressions, as is usually maintained, but because the profit principle threatened the rest of the Soviet film establishment. In general, Roth-Ey convincingly plays down the role of politics and ideology in hampering media creativity. As she points out, directors whose films were banned were never forced to produce popular or politically acceptable films but went on producing for small or restricted audiences because they had cultural capital; they were artists, and thus valuable. Meanwhile, a fan culture grew up spontaneously around popular actors and actresses, and was then fed by the movie magazine *Sovetskii ekran*. Cultural authorities disapproved of but profited from fandom.

Why, as Nikita Khrushchev asked at a 1963 meeting of the Presidium, did the Soviet Union produce more radios with short wave capacity than the rest of the world taken together, while it was at the same time trying to prevent foreign short wave signals from reaching the Soviet public? Roth-Ey's answer is in part that this was a successful growth industry that satisfied both the strong public demand for short wave radios and the regime's goal of connecting with as many people as possible. But short wave radio was also part of the leadership's effort to export Soviet culture to the rest of the world via Radio Moscow: it was too easy to tout Radio Moscow's achievements, to believe claims that the sta-

tion had a strong appeal to foreign audiences, and to assume that on this cultural front the Soviet Union would eventually predominate. Meanwhile, Radio Maiak was set up in 1964 as a twenty-four-hour news and music station specifically to compete with foreign broadcasts. The Central Committee for a time resisted this initiative because the proposed programming seemed to be borrowed directly from the enemy. That was indeed what made the station hugely successful (except in news programming: political controls did stifle news), but it turned out that the Soviet radio audience could listen both to Maiak and to foreign stations.

One reason why the Soviet government invested billions of rubles developing television was the belief that the television audience would be walled off from foreign competition, but in Roth-Ey's telling most of the television programming in the 1950s was the work of amateurs. Only in the 1960s did the regime begin to impose central controls over programming. The 1960s are, in post-Soviet recollection, the golden age of experimentation and authenticity in programming, but the author tells the story differently: the *KVN* program (a popular game show) and others held up as exemplars of cultural liberalism were in fact committed to cultural uplift and to providing exemplary heroes (even if in the form of clever male students who excelled in improvisational sketches); that is, their producers shared the regime's cultural predilections. Roth-Ey argues further that programming during the allegedly regimented 1970s was not much different from what it had been in the 1960s. While audience surveys were abandoned in the 1970s because cultural authorities already knew what audiences should be watching, there was nevertheless progressively less opera and more sports and movies. The television audience was huge, but it always wanted more of the mass culture programming that both ideological watchdogs and the intelligentsia despised. Television, radio, and film responded to audience demand, but always cautiously and always with the conviction, or pretense, that their mission remained cultural uplift.

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MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA

FARIBA ZARINEBAF. *Crime and Punishment in Istanbul, 1700–1800*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2010. Pp. xiii, 287. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$22.95.

It is common wisdom that crime does not pay. But this is not true for historians, since crime is a rich and exhaustible source for social history. Unfortunately, very few historians of the Middle East have ventured into this field. Therefore, Farina Zarinebaf's book on crime in Ottoman Istanbul is a welcome addition to the literature. The study is divided into three parts. In the first section, the author discusses social developments, focusing especially on migration, marginalization, and the

impact of the 1703 and 1730 rebellions. This is followed by a section on the categories of crime, in which she addresses crimes against property, prostitution, violence, and homicide. The book's final section deals with policing and the administration of justice. Zarinebaf makes use of a wide range of archival sources, such as Islamic court records, police records, prison records, and imperial orders. The result is a lively book, full of illustrative examples of crime.

Despite its strengths, the book is in some respects problematic. The first is methodological. Although she acknowledges that archival sources do not allow her to ascertain statistical trends, Zarinebaf aims to examine the impact of socioeconomic transformations on crime. Unfortunately, she limits herself to a description of the types of crime against property, their perpetrators, and their objects. In a chapter on "Prostitution and the Vice Trades," she claims that moral standards declined during the first part of the century, that commercial sex spread, and that the state tried to get control of the vice trade (pp. 87, 104, 110–111, 176). As proof of this moral decline, Zarinebaf notes that moralists composed poems criticizing the relaxation of the moral codes and that other poets wrote to promote "love and romance in an open and direct manner" (p. 88). I am not convinced by her evidence and do not believe that the simultaneous circulation of both moralist and amorous poetry is per se an indication of the easing of moral boundaries. Similarly, she shows that the state began to suppress the vice trade, yet does not prove that efforts at suppression were more intensive than before. Finally, court records are not very helpful since very few cases of adultery and prostitution were tried (pp. 107, 116).

The author's limited knowledge of shari'a at times leads her to misinterpret her sources. I will cite a few examples out of many. First, the slave's blood money is the value of his/her market price, and not half the amount of a free Muslim as the author claims (p. 162). Secondly, Zarinebaf offers no evidence to support her assertion that the rate of polygamy in the Ottoman Empire was lower than elsewhere in the Muslim world because of Hanafi law (the official code of the Ottoman Empire), which favors monogamy, an equally unsubstantiated claim (p. 94). Finally, to support her claim that slave traders were involved in prostitution, Zarinebaf presents two cases (p. 97). One is about a slave trader who sued three men for damages for deflowering his female slave, because her market price decreased as a result. This apparently was a case of rape, and the men were sentenced to penal servitude in the galleys. The register deals only with criminal sentences, and we do not know how the civil suit ended. The second case is about the purchaser of a female slave, who slept with her after the sale but before paying her price. Evidently dissatisfied, he attempted to rescind the sale. The slave trader refused and sued the purchaser's guarantor, and the judge found for the slave trader. Neither case suggests that prostitution was involved.

In the last chapter, Zarinebaf makes some sweeping

statements about trends in the Ottoman penal system. She argues that capital punishment was slowly dying out during the eighteenth century and that punishment moved from the private to the public domain (p. 173). She does not, however, provide any statistical data about capital punishment. Therefore, I doubt that it was gradually being abolished. Private prosecution of homicide and violence certainly did not disappear in the eighteenth century. Actually, capital punishment according to shari'a law continued into the early twentieth century because the revised Ottoman penal code of 1858 retained it.

Although this book offers interesting glimpses of daily life and criminality in eighteenth-century Istanbul, its inadequate methodology makes it disappointing.

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MAX WEISS. *In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shi'ism, and the Making of Modern Lebanon*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2010. Pp. x, 341. \$39.95.

In the Shadow of Sectarianism is a welcome, topical addition to the study of the social history of Shi'ism, the Lebanese political system, and French Mandatory rule in the Middle East. Remarking that sectarianism in Lebanon is neither a preternatural mode of being nor a colonialist scheme imposed by the West, the author opts for a middle path and traces the institutionalization of a specifically Shi'i sectarian identity, under the French Mandate (1920–1943), through such diverse processes as a public debate in the Shi'i press over the proper observance of the 'Ashura mourning ritual, the management by the Shi'i community of its own separate cemeteries, and especially the formal recognition of the Shi'i Ja'fari legal school and creation of a separate system of Shi'i courts of law. Sectarianism, or a community's political reference to its sole confessional identity, he convincingly argues, was thus a distinctly modern phenomenon and differed as a process from one community to another. In the case of the Shi'as, sectarianism constituted the interface by which they first participated in the modern state, and it began much earlier than the political mobilization campaign of Musa al-Sadr in the 1960s.

The author concentrates on three main sets of sources to demonstrate how sectarianism was produced both "from below" by the Shi'i community and "from above" by the French authorities: *al-'Irfan*, the well-known Shi'i literary journal in whose pages contemporary intellectuals argued for and over their community's modernity; French Foreign Ministry archives that showcase the Shi'as' "politics of demand" and attempts to oblige the central state to pay more attention to their development; and the records of the Ja'fari tribunal in Beirut and other towns. This last source deserves particular note as Weiss appears to be the first to have exploited it in any systematic manner. Court proceedings have of course long been a mainstay of Middle Eastern

social history, and only a handful of the cases treated here relate to Shi'a-specific concerns such as *mut'a* marriage. Still, these constitute some of the most recent and potentially sensitive of such records to be have been used (the author judiciously changes several of the names involved) and thus open the way to further legal studies on the Mandate and post-Mandate period.

Weiss is well read on Lebanon's political system and the problem of sectarianism, and he offers several generally pertinent comparisons with other societies under European domination. Given the overall nuance of his approach, it is only a bit striking that he so summarily dismisses many previous scholars' contributions as "crude," "failing to appreciate," "unsubstantiated," "reductionist," and "cynical" (or waves aside as a "bizarre historical narrative" the less-known but well-attested fact of Shi'i support for the French campaign against Acre in 1799 [p. 116]). Weiss's own statements are often a bit grandiose themselves, for example where he announces that the Ja'fari court was capable of re-fashioning power relationships within the Shi'i milieu "in a way that would have been downright impossible before its foundation" (p. 141) or that the recognition of Ja'fari law in 1926 was no less than the "birth moment" of a visible Shi'i community in Lebanon (p. 159).

The bluster and occasional jargon, however, should not distract from the author's very substantive contribution. Correctly pointing out that what was new was not the recognition of Ja'fari jurisprudence per se (one might add that Ottoman-era practice generally did not distinguish between Hanafi and other sources of law anyway, so that locally Shi'i practice could indeed enjoy de facto recognition) but its formalization and "unprecedented bureaucratization" under the French mandate (pp. 160–162), Weiss's research suggests that the real story of the Lebanese Shi'as' modern transformation is the emergence of a new sectarian elite. In redefining the confessional court as the new locus of traditional Shi'i legal authority (*marja'iyya*), pro-French and essentially secular lawyers such as Munir 'Usayran not only engendered a revolution in Shi'i legal and political thought but also irrevocably tied the Lebanese community's fate to the system of national sectarian politics as a whole.

Far from struggling in the shadow of sectarianism, Weiss shows how the Shi'a rather emerged from *under* the shadow to seize on the peculiar benefits of French mandatory rule and, perhaps more than any other community, turn the politics of sectarian differentiation to its advantage. Well researched and passionately argued, this study offers some fresh insights into the development of Shi'i identity in modern Lebanon and provides several new starting points for the discussion of law, colonial rule, and sectarian politics in the Middle East overall.

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM BISSELL. *Urban Design, Chaos, and Colonial Power in Zanzibar*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 378. Cloth \$70.00, paper 24.95, e-book \$21.95.

William Cunningham Bissell has written what he describes as an ethnography of colonial rule in British Zanzibar. He examines the "chaos" of urban planning under the colonial government and suggests that its failure demonstrates "that the rationality, regularity, and reach of colonial states have been vastly overrated. Colonial governance was far more inconsistent, incomplete, and incoherent than is commonly assumed" (p. 71). While one might quibble with the degree to which colonial omnipotence has been commonly assumed in Africa or anywhere else, Bissell certainly does prove that the British in Zanzibar spectacularly failed to fulfill their own plans for Zanzibar town.

Bissell takes as his case one of the more unique colonies created out of the scramble for Africa, the protectorate of Zanzibar. In the nineteenth century the Busaidi sultans of Oman had moved their capital to the East African island of Zanzibar in order to exert more control over the trade of the East African coast and to take advantage of the growth of plantation production on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. Zanzibar town became their capital, and what had been a relatively small Swahili town before the nineteenth century, most notable because it had also hosted a Portuguese post earlier, became the center of international commerce in East Africa. Zanzibar developed on a triangular promontory jutting into the Zanzibar Channel with a tidal creek almost totally cutting off the triangle from the rest of the island. The triangle developed as *Mji Mkwewe*, Stone Town in English, with the palaces and building of the sultanate, a number of large buildings housing merchant firms, and residential areas clustered around the port. "Arabs," "Shirazi," and Indians made up much of its population. Across the creek in *Ng'ambo*, a residential area developed populated primarily by Africans. Stone Town became an urban area with many narrow streets and crowded bazaars surrounding the large buildings along the waterfront.

When the British took control of the protectorate in the 1880s, one of their early focuses was on "improving" the urban environment by rationalizing residential patterns, separating residences from work places, and imposing segregation. Bissell shows how colonial fantasies about order conflicted with the complex social relations that existed within Zanzibar society and the legal restrictions on a colonial state bound both by existing codes of law, and by the need to guarantee the rights of particularly Indian colonial subjects. Most importantly, he argues that Zanzibar's decline from the main international port of East Africa to one that handled only the export of spices from Zanzibar and Pemba severely limited the resources available to the colonial state. As a result, planning for urban development suffered de-

lays, and implementation of the plans developed never matched the scope of their design.

The colonial state did make two attempts to develop full-fledged town plans for Zanzibar and Stone Town in particular. Both sought expertise in town planning from within the empire. These plans, one developed in the 1920s and one in the 1950s, were never formally adopted by the colonial government. Bissell shows that the plans lacked grounding in local social relations. Both called for extensive clearance in Stone Town to enhance sanitary conditions, and the 1920s one called for more extensive residential segregation. Bissell shows how a lack of resources meant that neither plan's most grandiose designs ever came close to implementation. The colonial government did complete a couple of the plans' most economically important aspects: they built a new port with new access roads that skirted Stone Town and filled the tidal creek. But their failure to master either the social complexity of Zanzibar or to raise enough resources meant that the physical structure of Stone Town remained at its core a nineteenth-century town even as it filled in during the colonial era.

Bissell has provided an interesting and informative book that links urban policy in Zanzibar to broader currents in urban planning. He provides a detailed analysis of colonial bureaucracy at work, highlighting the indeterminacy caused in part by the shuffling of personnel. Bissell's work is limited by his reliance on colonial archives. His claim to reveal the chaotic nature of colonial rule is not new, and his focus on colonial chaos excludes other important aspects of the history of urban space on Zanzibar. He does not examine in great detail the nature of urban development in Omani or pre-Omani Zanzibar. He alludes to rather than describes actual land use practices in the town. He does not use local written or oral sources extensively. Similarly, he does not make much use of court cases that might potentially have yielded important information on Zanzibari conceptions of space. Nonetheless, Bissell has written an interesting book on a fascinating topic.

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PAUL S. LANDAU. *Popular Politics in the History of South Africa, 1400–1948*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. xvi, 300. \$90.00.

On the dust jacket of Paul S. Landau's path-breaking book we are greeted by armed men. An age-regiment is conducting a ceremonial dance. Bechuanaland in 1934 provides this vestigial image of precolonial hinterland southern Africa, the area of Landau's study. Wearing leopard skins, the dancers mimic the loping movements of the predator. Holding outmoded rifles, they confront the lens directly. For an instant the photographer is the hunted.

The photographer in question was Isaac Schapera, author of *The Ethnic Composition of Tswana Tribes* (1952), an anthropological work consulted by Landau. Although Schapera's oeuvre signals otherwise, it is pos-

sible for readers to ask whether his image catches "perennial tribesmen" in an act signifying that Africans were threatened by change. Landau eventually answers this question by showing how Schapera's research refutes such a claim (pp. 232–238, 240–241). It is possible to return to the dustjacket and interpret images of this rite of passage differently. The performers in their leopard skins, a revered symbol of lineage power, were not hostile. As inheritors of an inclusive politics that Landau calls "self-rule," they welcomed others into their fold, in this case the visiting Resident Commissioner of Bechuanaland. Landau attributes self-rule and its hybrid signs (guns and skins) to an enduring logic shaping Highveld societies. It was this flexible tradition of political inclusion, rather than defensive tribal machinations, that was "very hard to smash" (p. xii).

Landau's bold interpretation is developed over six chapters, the first of which explores the challenge to self-rule posed by upheavals in the Highveld during the early nineteenth century, a period of spreading violence conventionally known as the *Difaqane*. Here Landau considers the new militarized polities feeding off the spoils of war: a Griqua state comprised of "mixed race" people who kidnapped laborers; Mzilikazi's "Ndebele invaders"; and—underscored in this account—the fearsome regiments of Shaka Zulu. Evocatively titled "History before Tribes," chapter two extends deep in time to discuss the influence of more ancient patterns of mobilization on the Highveld, from the development of states like Great Zimbabwe, with its Indian Ocean orientation, to the expansive ancestral alliances aligned with twin courts and animal totems. In this and subsequent chapters, the author's mastery of linguistics greatly enriches his analysis. The third chapter, heralding the "invention of Christianity," shifts to the 1800s to consider the historical impact of evangelists like Robert Moffat who, arriving in southern Africa to save heathens, encountered chiefdoms buffeted by *Difaqane* turbulence. Moffat and his fellow missionaries barely converted a soul, but their proselytizing produced lasting misconceptions about indigenous definitions of the ancestors and God. They also reinforced a European belief that tribes were naturally naïve and insular. Landau demonstrates how this dogma became gospel for "native experts" and even contemporary scholars. They assumed that tribal otherness drove colonists, fearful of "inter-racial" contact, to institute segregation, and that missionaries preaching personal salvation awakened Africans from a pre-political torpor and propelled them to seek individual freedom through independent churches and nationalist movements.

This Eurocentric explanation, Landau writes, fails to capture how Highveld societies functioned. Since the opening of the nineteenth century, these societies had indeed interacted with Christianity, incorporating its elements to advance ancestral traditions of social inclusion and collective autonomy. These constitutive traditions were increasingly attacked by intruding white rulers (Boer and British), who by the twentieth century had eroded chieftaincy, appropriated land, and at-

tempted to regulate emergent strains of African religiosity that provided “a potent field for insurgent movements” (pp. 82, 88–95, 248).

One fascinating “Christian” movement, the Samuelites, is the subject of chapters four and five. Landau eloquently brings the Samuelites to life. Emerging in Thaba Nchu during the 1880s, this forty-year movement claimed *métis* adherents that colonial authority viewed as distinctly native yet partly European. For their part, Samuelites “refused to emphasize ethnicity or race”; they also drew on transnational “Ethiopian” and Garveyite millenarianism, which stirred their rebellion against the oppressive powers of white supremacy (pp. 177–183). Above all, the Samuelites rose and fell fighting for what they could claim to embody—the tradition of self-rule practiced by their Highveld ancestors.

In the concluding chapter, Landau summarizes lines of inquiry that are at once impressively broad and sharply focused. In honing one point about continuity

and change in the Highveld, however, he makes an argument that may spark a new (and old) controversy. If his story has concentrated on the exploits of men, this is because they could “strategize beyond their domestic arrangements,” while women could not. Why? His answer is that women remained homebound, supplying “mashed sorghum (*bogobe*) to their children and in-laws” (p. 41). This contrast between maneuvering men and, in Landau’s terminology, “idle” women could well reignite debate over the perceived neglect of female agency in histories such as that of the Xhosa cattle-killing (p. 86). This provocation aside, Landau’s superb scholarship offers a compelling new understanding of how indigenous people conceived their politics in a world before the colonists arrived bearing faith in Christianity, tribe, and ethnicity.

BENEDICT CARTON

George Mason University

Collected Essays

These volumes, recently received in the *AHR* office, do not lend themselves readily to unified reviews; the contents are therefore listed.

COMPARATIVE/WORLD

MARGUERITE RAGNOW and WILLIAM D. PHILLIPS, JR., editors. *Religious Conflict and Accommodation in the Early Modern World*. (Minnesota Studies in Early Modern History, number 3.) Minneapolis: Center for Early American History. 2011. Pp. xi, 257. \$55.00.

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EUROPE: ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL

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DAVID ONNEKINK and GIJS ROMMELSE, editors. *Ideology and Foreign Policy in Early Modern Europe (1650–1750)*. (Politics and Culture in Europe, 1650–1750.) Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate. 2011. Pp. xi, 320. \$134.95.

STEVE PINCUS, Absolutism, Ideology and English Foreign Policy: The Ideological Context of Robert Molesworth's *Account of Denmark*. GARY EVANS, Partisan Politics, History, and the National Interest (1700–1748). DOOHWAN AHN, From "Jealous Emulation" to "Cautious Politics": British Foreign Policy and Public Discourse in the Mirror of Ancient Athens (ca. 1730–ca. 1750). DAVID ONNEKINK, The Ideological Context of the Dutch War (1672). STÉPHANE JETTOT, Ideologies of Interests in English Foreign Policy during the Reign of Charles II. BENEDICT WAGNER-RUNDELL, Holy War and Republican Pacifism in the Early-Eighteenth-Century Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania. SOLANGE RAMEIX, Justifying War: Churchmen and War in France and England during the Nine Years War (1688–1697). HENK VAN NIEROP, Romeyn de Hooghe and the Imagination of Dutch Foreign Policy. ANA CRESPO SOLANA, A Change of Ideology in Imperial Spain? Spanish Commercial Policy with America and the Change of Dynasty (1648–1740). GIJS ROMMELSE, Mountains of Iron and Gold: Mercantilist Ideology in Anglo-Dutch Relations (1650–1674). ANDREW C. THOMPSON, Balancing Europe: Ideas and Interests in British Foreign Policy (c. 1700–c. 1720). WOUT TROOST, "To Restore and Preserve the Liberty of Europe": William III's Ideas on Foreign Policy.

TOM CROOK, REBECCA GILL, and BERTRAND TAITHE, editors. *Evil, Barbarism and Empire: Britain and Abroad, c. 1830–2000*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. Pp. x, 290. \$85.00.

TOM CROOK, REBECCA GILL, and BERTRAND TAITHE, Liberal Civilisation and Its Discontents: Evil, Barbarism and Empire. TOM CROOK, Evil in Question: The Victorian Social and the Politics of Prostitution, 1830–1900. DAVID SPEICHER, Terror, Spectacle and the Press: Anarchist Outrage in Edwardian England. ANTONY TAYLOR, "And I Am the God of Destruction!": Fu Manchu and the Construction of Asiatic Evil in the Novels of Arthur Sarsfield Ward, 1912–1939. EUGENIO F. BIAGINI, The Politics of Italianism: *Reynolds's Newspaper*, the Indian Mutiny, and the Radical Critique of Liberal Imperialism in Mid-

Victorian Britain. H. S. JONES, *The Victorian Lexicon of Evil: Frederic Harrison, the Positivists and the Language of International Politics*. BERTRAND TAITHE, *Evil, Liberalism and the Imperial Designs of the Catholic Church, 1867–1905*. REBECCA GILL, “Now I Have Seen Evil, and I Cannot Be Silent about It”: Arnold J. Toynbee and His Encounters with Atrocity, 1915–1923. CHRISTINA TWOMEY, *Atrocity Narratives and Inter-Imperial Rivalry: Britain, Germany and the Treatment of “Native Races,” 1904–1939*. THOMAS OSBORNE, *Conrad’s Horror: Heart of Darkness and the Imaginary of Power*. SCOTT MCCrackEN, *The Lives of Others: The Defeat of Evil or the Evil of Defeat?* TIM JACOBY, *Islam, Violence and the New Barbarism*.

SABRINA P. RAMET and OLA LISTHAUG, editors. *Serbia and the Serbs in World War Two*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. Pp. xvii, 324. \$105.00.

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Documents and Bibliographies

Books listed were recently received in the AHR office. Works of these types cannot normally be reviewed by the AHR.

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CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

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- FRANZEN, CHRISTOPH JOHANNES, KARL-HEINZ KOHL, and MARIE-LUISE RECKER, editors. *Der Kaiser und sein Forscher: Der Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm II. und Leo Frobenius (1924–1938)*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 2012. Pp. 664. €49.90.
- HALPERN, PAUL, editor. *The Mediterranean Fleet, 1919–1929*. (Publications of the Navy Records Society, number 158.) Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company, for the Navy Records Society. 2011. Pp. xxv, 620. \$134.95.
- KEIRN, TIM, and NORBERT SCHÜRER, editors. *British Encounters with India, 1750–1830: A Sourcebook*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. Pp. xv, 229. Cloth \$95.00, paper \$32.00.
- KOLBERG, LENA. *Letters from Lena: An Account of the Great Prussian Exodus of 1945*. Edited by Donna R. Liberman. Translated by ELMER RUHNKE. Lanham, Maryland: Hamilton Books. 2012. Pp. xvi, 148. \$28.99.
- LANDAU, ABRAHAM W. *Branded on My Arm and in My Soul: A Holocaust Memoir*. Edited by JOSEPH D. THOMAS, MARSHA L. MCCABE, and JAY AVILA. New Bedford, MA: Spinner Publications. 2011. Pp. 143. \$25.00.
- MCVAY, ATHANASIOS D., and LUBOMYR Y. LUCIUK, editors. *The Holy See and the Holodomor: Documents from the Vatican Secret Archives on the Great Famine of 1932–1933 in Soviet Ukraine*. Afterword by LAURA PETTINAROLI. Ontario, Canada: Kashtan Press. 2011. Pp. xli, 98.

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA

- KAPLAN, ERAN, and DEREK J. PENSLAR, editors. *The Origins of Israel, 1882–1948 : A Documentary History*. (Sources in Modern Jewish History.) Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 2011. Pp. ix, 380. Paper \$29.95, e-book \$21.95.

Other Books Received

The following books were recently received in the *AHR* office. Books listed here do not include works scheduled for review.

METHODS/THEORY

- AHMED, SIRAJ. *The Stillbirth of Capital: Enlightenment Writing and Colonial India*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2012. Pp. x, 291. Cloth \$80.00, paper \$24.95, e-book \$24.95.
- BURTON, ANTOINETTE. *A Primer for Teaching World History: Ten Design Principles*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2012. Pp. xiii, 154. Cloth \$74.95, paper \$21.95.
- CORTADA, JAMES W. *History Hunting: A Guide for Fellow Adventurers*. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe. 2012. Pp. xii, 281. \$29.95.
- EDKINS, JENNY. *Missing: Persons and Politics*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2011. Pp. xvii, 277. \$29.95.
- FLOYD, JONATHAN, and MARC STEARS, editors. *Political Philosophy versus History? Contextualism and Real Politics in Contemporary Political Thought*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. x, 228. Cloth \$95.00, paper \$29.99.
- FREVERT, UTE. *Emotions in History: Lost and Found*. (The Natalie Zemon Davis Annual Lecture Series at Central European University.) Budapest and New York: Central European University Press. 2011. Pp. 255. \$24.95.
- GENET, JEAN-PHILIPPE, and ANDREA ZORZI, editors. *Les historiens et l'informatique: Un métier à réinventer*. (Collection de l'école française de Rome, number 444.) Rome: École française de Rome. 2011. Pp. ix, 350. €60.00.
- HIRSCH, MARIANNE, and NANCY K. MILLER, editors. *Rites of Return: Diaspora Poetics and the Politics of Memory*. (Gender and Culture.) New York: Columbia University Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 310. Cloth \$84.50, paper \$27.50, e-book \$21.99.
- KARATANI, KOJIN. *History and Repetition*. Edited by SEIJI M. LIPPIT. (Weatherhead Books on Asia.) New York: Columbia University Press. 2012. Pp. xxx, 239. Cloth \$34.50, paper \$27.50, e-book \$21.99.
- MACINTYRE, STUART, et al. *The Oxford History of Historical Writing. Volume 4: 1800–1945*. (The Oxford History of Historical Writing.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. xx, 650. \$180.00.
- MIGNOLO, WALTER D. *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options*. (Latin America Otherwise: Languages, Empires, Nations.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2011. Pp. xxxvii, 408. Cloth \$94.95, paper \$25.95.
- MIRZOEFF, NICHOLAS. *The Right to Look: A Counterhistory of Visuality*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2011. Pp. xix, 385. Cloth \$89.95, paper \$26.95.
- PILON, JULIAN GERAN. *Soulmates: Resurrecting Eve*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers. 2012. Pp. xx, 273. \$34.95.

- RICCI, GABRIEL R. *The Tempo of Modernity*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers. 2012. Pp. xxx, 213. \$39.95.
- STRAUB, JÜRGEN, and JÖRN RÜSEN, editors. *Dark Traces of the Past: Psychoanalysis and Historical Thinking*. (Making Sense of History.) New York: Berghahn Books. 2010. Pp. vi, 226. \$85.00.
- WILLIAMS, ROBERT C. *The Historian's Toolbox: A Student's Guide to the Theory and Craft of History*. 3d ed. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe. 2012. Pp. xvi, 230. Cloth \$73.95, paper \$26.95.

COMPARATIVE/WORLD

- ADAM, THOMAS. *Intercultural Transfers and the Making of the Modern World, 1800–2000: Sources and Context*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2012. Pp. x, 158. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$23.95.
- ALDRICH, ROBERT. *Gay Lives*. New York: Thames and Hudson. 2012. Pp. 304. \$29.95.
- ANAGNOSTOU, SABINE. *Missionspharmazie: Konzepte, Praxis, Organisation und wissenschaftliche Ausstrahlung*. (Sudhoffs Archiv, number 60.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. 2011. Pp. 465. €68.00.
- BARHAIM, GABRIEL A. *Public-Private Relations in Totalitarian States*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers. 2012. Pp. xi, 181. \$44.95.
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- BEATTY, JACK. *The Lost History of 1914: Reconsidering the Year the Great War Began*. New York: Walker & Company. 2012. Pp. 392. \$30.00.
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- COURLAND, ROBERT. *Concrete Planet: The Strange and Fascinating Story of the World's Most Common Man-Made Material*. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus. 2011. Pp. 396. \$26.00.
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- JACKSON, MARK, editor. *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Medicine*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. xviii, 672. \$150.00.
- JOHNSON, KENDALL, editor. *Narratives of Free Trade: The Commercial Cultures of Early US-China Relations*. (Global Connections.) Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 2012. Pp. xi, 234. Cloth \$50.00, paper \$25.00.
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- REINHARD, WOLFGANG. *A Short History of Colonialism*. Translated by KATE STURGE. New York: Manchester University Press. 2011. Pp. vi, 308. Cloth \$100.00, paper \$38.95.
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- HENG, DEREK, and SYED MUHD KHAIRUDIN ALJUNIED, editors. *Singapore in Global History*. (ICAS Publications Series, number 14.) Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 2011. Pp. 317. \$55.00.
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- PICKOWICZ, PAUL G. *China on Film: A Century of Exploration, Confrontation, and Controversy*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. 2012. Pp. x, 365. Cloth \$85.00, e-book \$84.99.
- STARRS, ROY. *Modernism and Japanese Culture*. (Modernism and . . .) New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. Pp. xix, 323. Cloth \$80.00, paper \$25.00.

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- PEEL, MARK, and CHRISTINA TWOMEY. *A History of Australia*. (Palgrave Essential Histories.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. Pp. xv, 305. \$49.95.
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- ALVIS, JOHN E. *Nathaniel Hawthorne as Political Philosopher: Revolutionary Principles Domesticated and Personalized*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers. 2012. Pp. ix, 282. \$49.95.
- ARMFIELD, FELIX L. *Eugene Kinckle Jones: The National Urban League and Black Social Work, 1910–1940*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2012. Pp. xi, 116. \$55.00.
- ARMSTEAD, MYRA B. YOUNG. *Freedom's Gardener: James F. Brown, Horticulture, and the Hudson Valley in Antebellum America*. New York: New York University Press. 2012. Pp. x, 209. \$35.00.
- ATER, RENÉE. *Remaking Race and History: The Sculpture of Meta Warrick Fuller*. (A George Gund Foundation Book in African American Studies.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2011. Pp. 200. \$49.95.
- BALLON, HILARY, editor. *The Greatest Grid: The Master Plan of Manhattan, 1811–2011*. New York: Columbia University Press, with the Museum of the City of New York. 2012. Pp. 226. \$40.00.
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- BARTLE, HARVEY III. *Mortals with Tremendous Responsibilities: A History of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania*. Philadelphia: Saint Joseph's University Press. 2011. Pp. xvii, 285. \$35.00.
- BAUMAN, JOHN F., ROGER BILES, and KRISTIN M. SZYLVIAN. *The Ever-Changing American City: 1945–Present*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. 2012. Pp. x, 199. Cloth \$90.00, paper \$49.95.
- BELLETO, STEVEN. *No Accident, Comrade: Chance and Design in Cold War American Narratives*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2012. Pp. viii, 206. \$65.00.
- BESSLER, JOHN D. *Cruel and Unusual: The American Death Penalty and the Founders' Eighth Amendment*. Boston: Northeastern University Press. 2012. Pp. xiv, 456. \$39.95.
- BLAKELY, EDWARD J. *My Storm: Managing the Recovery of New Orleans in the Wake of Katrina*. Foreword by HENRY CISNEROS. (The City in the Twenty-First Century.) Philadel-

- phia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2012. Pp. x, 182. \$34.95.
- BLOCK, JAMES E. *The Crucible of Consent: American Child Rearing and the Forging of Liberal Society*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2012. Pp. xii, 447. \$45.00.
- BORICK, CARL P. *Relieve Us of This Burthen: American Prisoners of War in the Revolutionary South, 1780–1782*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 2012. Pp. xiv, 170. \$29.95.
- BRADDOCK, JEREMY. *Collecting as Modernist Practice*. (Hopkins Studies in Modernism.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2012. Pp. xii, 319. \$39.95.
- BULLOCK, CHARLES S. III, and MARK J. ROZELL, editors. *The Oxford Handbook of Southern Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2012. Pp. xi, 564. \$150.00.
- CAROCCI, MAX, and STEPHANIE PRATT, editors. *Native American Adoption, Captivity, and Slavery in Changing Contexts*. (Studies of the Americas.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2012. Pp. x, 267. \$90.00.
- CASTEL, ALBERT. *Victors in Blue: How Union Generals Fought the Confederates, Battled Each Other, and Won the Civil War*. With BROOKS D. SIMPSON. Maps by GEORGE SKOCH. (Modern War Studies.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2011. Pp. xii, 362. \$34.95.
- CHARTRAND, RENÉ. *Forts of the War of 1812*. Illustrated by DONATO SPEDALIERE. (Fortress, number 106.) Oxford: Osprey. 2012. Pp. 64. \$18.95.
- CHARTRAND, RENÉ. *Tomahawk and Musket: French and Indian Raids in the Ohio Valley 1758*. (Raid, number 27.) Oxford: Osprey. 2012. Pp. 80. \$18.95.
- CHONG, SYLVIA SHIN HUEY. *The Oriental Obscene: Violence and Racial Fantasies in the Vietnam Era*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2012. Pp. xiii, 364. Cloth \$94.95, paper \$26.95.
- CHUSID, JEFFREY M. *Saving Wright: The Freeman House and the Preservation of Meaning, Materials, and Modernity*. New York: W. W. Norton. 2011. Pp. 256. \$55.00.
- CLOUD, DANA L. *We Are the Union: Democratic Unionism and Dissent at Boeing*. With R. KEITH THOMAS. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2011. Pp. xvi, 236. \$55.00.
- COLLINS, PERRY McDONOUGH. *Siberian Journey: Down the Amur to the Pacific, 1856–1857*. Edited by CHARLES VEVIER. Reprint. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 2011. Pp. ix, 370. \$29.95.
- CONTOSTA, DAVID, and CAROL FRANKLIN. *Philadelphia's Wisahickon Valley, 1620–2020: Metropolitan Paradise, The Struggle for Nature in the City*. In four volumes. Philadelphia: Saint Joseph's University Press. 2010. Pp. xxii, 184; 187, 428; 431, 694; 697, 902. \$85.00.
- COOPER, WILLIAM J., JR., and JOHN M. MCCARDELL, JR., editors. *In the Cause of Liberty: How the Civil War Redefined American Ideals*. Paperback edition. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, with the American Civil War Center at Historic Tredegar. 2011. Pp. viii, 195. \$18.95.
- COZEAN, JESSE. *My Grandfather's War: A Young Man's Lessons from the Greatest Generation*. Guilford, Conn.: Lyons Press. 2012. Pp. 220. \$19.95.
- DANISI, THOMAS C. *Uncovering the Truth about Meriwether Lewis*. Foreword by ROBERT J. MOORE, JR. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus. 2012. Pp. 466. \$26.00.
- DAVIES, ROBERT B. *Baldwin of the Times: Hanson W. Baldwin, A Military Journalist's Life, 1903–1991*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press. 2011. Pp. x, 399. \$32.95.
- DAVIS, WILLIAM C., and JAMES I. ROBERTSON, JR., editors. *Virginia at War, 1865*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, for the Virginia Center for Civil War Studies. 2012. Pp. x, 237. \$40.00.
- DE LEÓN, ARNOLDO, editor. *War along the Border: The Mexican Revolution and Tejano Communities*. (University of Houston Series in Mexican American Studies, number 6.) College Station: Texas A&M University Press. 2012. Pp. viii, 345. \$50.00.
- DEE, CHRISTINE. *"Feel the Bonds That Draw": Images of the Civil War at the Western Reserve Historical Society*. (Cleveland Illustrated History Series.) Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, with the Western Reserve Historical Society. 2011. Pp. ix, 118. \$34.95.
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- ELDRIDGE, LAWRENCE ALLEN. *Chronicles of a Two-Front War: Civil Rights and Vietnam in the African American Press*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 285. \$45.00.
- FADERMAN, LILLIAN. *Odd Girls and Twilight Lovers: A History of Lesbian Life in Twentieth-Century America*. (Between Men—Between Women.) Paperback edition. New York: Columbia University Press. 2012. Pp. viii, 373. \$24.50.
- FASS, PAULA S., and MICHAEL GROSSBERG, editors. *Reinventing Childhood after World War II*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2012. Pp. xiii, 182. \$42.50.
- FELLMAN, MICHAEL. *Views from the Dark Side of American History*. (Conflicting Worlds: New Dimensions of the American Civil War.) Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 2011. Pp. 155. \$22.50.
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- FLUCK, WINFRIED, DONALD E. PEASE, and JOHN CARLOS ROWE, editors. *Re-Framing the Transnational Turn in American Studies*. (Re-Mapping the Transnational: A Dartmouth Series in American Studies.) Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 460. Cloth \$85.00, paper \$35.00.
- FORMAN, SAMUEL A. *Dr. Joseph Warren: The Boston Tea Party, Bunker Hill, and the Birth of American Liberty*. Gretna, La.: Pelican. 2012. Pp. 455. \$29.95.
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- HARWOOD, JOHN. *The Interface: IBM and the Transformation of Corporate Design, 1945–1976*. (A Quadrant Book.) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 2011. Pp. 278. \$34.95.
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REVIEWS

TO THE EDITORS:

In his reply to my response, Eric Ehrenreich reiterates his original contention that I ignored evidence in my book, *The Nazi Symbiosis: Human Genetics and Politics in the Third Reich*, that von Verschuer willfully pursued a "pseudoscientific" agenda in the field of racial science. Moreover, Ehrenreich contends that my decision not to discuss Verschuer's abject failure of methodological rigor in his publications dealing with racial biology of the Jews "does not make for compelling scholarship." Were this claim true, then it would be a damning indictment indeed.

Because of the severity of his critique, I would like to offer the assessment of another scholar on this issue. In the bibliography of Ehrenreich's own book, *The Nazi Ancestral Proof: Genealogy, Racial Science, and the Final Solution* (Bloomington, Ind., 2007), he cites Alan E. Steinweis's highly acclaimed work *Studying the Jew: Scholarly Antisemitism in Nazi Germany* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006). Steinweis's volume, unlike mine, is specifically dedicated to a discussion of science and the "Jewish question" in the Third Reich and devotes several pages to an analysis of von Verschuer's pronouncements at the notorious 1937 and 1938 conferences sponsored by the Jewish Research Department of the Institute for History of the New Germany. Steinweis observes that in both talks von Verschuer "took stock of the then current state of biological knowledge about the Jews, and outlined an agenda for future scientific research employing cutting-edge methods" (p. 50). In

contrast to the position Ehrenreich intimates in his review, Steinweis's statement suggests that there was no commonly agreed-upon scientific methodology for studying the racial biology of the Jews in the 1930s. Moreover, Steinweis points out that in his 1938 lecture, von Verschuer focused on medical pathology, using disease patterns within disparate populations. As both Steinweis and Veronika Lipphardt's book *Biologie der Juden: Jüdische Wissenschaftler über "Rasse" und Vererbung, 1900–1935* (Göttingen, 2008) demonstrate, many of these studies on Jewish biology had already been undertaken by Jewish scholars. Indeed, several of the studies Verschuer cites come from Jewish sources. These investigations were serious works of scholarship which, as Steinweis makes clear, were subsequently appropriated into a Nazi "antisemitic framework."

In the context of the back-and-forth discussion between me and Ehrenreich on the question of "pseudoscience," one can, I believe, profit from Steinweis's important insight: "Historians of science have sometimes distinguished between the serious 'scientific' work and the 'pseudoscientific' activities conducted by Verschuer, Fischer, Lenz, and similar figures who were active in the Nazi era . . . Lectures and articles about the racial origins of the Jews, in this typology, constituted pseudoscience, but did not necessarily negate the legitimacy of the genuine science conducted concurrently by the same scholars. The distinction between science and pseudoscience is a reasonable one, *but it did not exist in the minds of those scientists at the time. In his lectures in 1937 and 1938, when Verschuer emphasized to his audience the desirability of making the study of the Jewish question more scientific, it is unlikely that he imagined to himself that he was engaging in or promoting pseudoscience*" (p. 52, my emphasis). Although Steinweis's assessment is not specifically directed to Ehrenreich, I find it a perfect rejoinder to this obsession with labeling von Verschuer's work on race "pseudoscience."

As Ehrenreich himself admits, von Verschuer's research was not devoted to racial biology. Upon receiving a position as the division director for human heredity at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity, and Eugenics (KWIA) the year it opened, von Verschuer's longstanding *völkisch* outlook took a back seat to his significant research in applying twin studies to the field we would today call

medical genetics. Adolf von Harnack, a renowned liberal Protestant theologian and the first president of the internationally celebrated Kaiser Wilhelm Society, certainly did not view von Verschuer's mentor at the KWIA—the racial anthropologist Eugen Fischer—as engaging in “pseudoscience” when he appointed him director of the new research institute in 1927. Nor did he suspect von Verschuer of doing so.

In February 1933, Fischer was denounced for a speech where he appeared not to toe the party line on the “Jewish question.” There is little doubt that both Fischer and his protégé were antisemitic. Their prejudices notwithstanding, there is no evidence that they were eager to offer obvious unscientific pronouncements on the “Jewish question” during the Third Reich—if for no other reason than it would harm their reputation among members of the international scientific community. This becomes clear from the following example: having received an invitation to speak at the 1938 antisemitic conference, in a letter von Verschuer persuaded Fischer to join him so that together they could place the “Jewish question” on a more “rational” scientific footing—one resulting in a “calmer view of the topic.” I sincerely doubt that von Verschuer would have written these private words to his mentor had he wished to willfully promote “pseudoscience.”

To be sure, it would have been laudable had von Verschuer refused to give any such talk. But even under circumstances that are far more congenial than those existing under a totalitarian society, people often receive and accept invitations they do not seek. Von Verschuer was not courageous, and he was certainly no resister to the Nazi regime. In order to promote his research in medical genetics, he, like Fischer, tried to negotiate a way through the labyrinth that was the Third Reich without compromising his scientific standing or angering party racial fanatics.

One of the main aims of my book—a volume, by the way, primarily designed for the layperson, not the specialist—is to demonstrate that history, even the history of human genetics in the Third Reich, should not be viewed in black-and-white terms. By seeking to force a sharp demarcation between the production of so-called good science and “pseudoscience” under the swastika, I believe Ehrenreich does a serious disservice to the complexity of this tragic episode in the twentieth century.

SHEILA FAITH WEISS
Clarkson University

ERIC EHRENREICH RESPONDS:

In her response to my reply, Sheila Weiss looks to a book by Alan Steinweis to defend the lack of analysis

in her own book regarding the scientific rigor of Verschuer's “racial scientific” pronouncements on the Jews. In 2006, I reviewed the very book on which she relies. And in that review, I took issue with the exact quote that Weiss asserts in her own defense, for much the same reason that I critique Weiss's work. For the sake of efficiency, I simply quote the relevant part of my earlier review here:

Steinweis . . . seems to argue . . . that many of the scholars were simply unaware of the illogic inherent in their assertions about Jews. Indeed, with regard to the “hard scientists” (geneticists, physical anthropologists, and the like), Steinweis claims that a “distinction between science and pseudoscience did not exist in the minds of those scientists at the time” (pp. 52–53). In other words, they could not comprehend that they were spreading ideas that today would be considered “pseudo-scientific.” This assertion is difficult to believe.

Germany in the first third of the twentieth century was home to scientists of the caliber of Albert Einstein (who published his paper on the special theory of relativity in 1905). By 1933, Germans had received more Nobel prizes in science, including the life sciences, than members of any other nationality. Moreover, the life scientists in particular must have been aware of the growing number of (non-German) scholars in the 1930s who disputed the claim that science had “proven” the link between “race” and culture, the key assumption underlying the assertion that Jews constituted a hereditary threat to Germans.[footnote omitted] Were scientists of this caliber really incapable of judging the credibility of a “scientific theory” based on the nature of the data used to support it and its internal logic? It is possible. But because Steinweis does not take into consideration the sophistication of scientific practice in Germany in the first third of the twentieth century, it is hard to buy this assertion without further discussion.

Contrary to Weiss's claim, I am not trying to “force a sharp demarcation between the production of so-called good science and ‘psuedoscience’ under the swastika.” Rather, I am trying to force a sharper analysis of what German life scientists actually did under the swastika. There is no dispute that during the Third Reich the scientists in question claimed that their activities aimed at identifying “racial Jews” complied with proper scientific methodology as then widely understood. My critique of Weiss's book is that it (like Steinweis's book) seems to take these scientists at their word, rather than analyzing what they actually did.

ERIC EHRENREICH
Washington, D.C.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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

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
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
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
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
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
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
Anne Marshall has won the inaugural George and Ann Richards Prize for the best article published in *The Journal of the Civil War Era* in 2011. Her article, "The 1906 *Uncle Tom's Cabin* Law and the Politics of Race and Memory in Early-Twentieth-Century Kentucky," was selected by a two-person panel from the journal's editorial board. The prize earns the recipient a \$1,000 award.

The article examined early twentieth century efforts by the Lexington chapter of the United Daughters of the Confederacy to block stage productions of the popular play, *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. In announcing the prize, the panel praised the essay for conveying "a sense of the rich dialogue over how slavery ought to be remembered" and demonstrating "how this was not just a local Kentucky issue, but also something that resonated nationally." Marshall's essay expands the parameters of the Civil War Era in ways that correspond with the goals of the journal.

Marshall is assistant professor of history at Mississippi State University. Her research focuses on nineteenth century southern history and women's history. Professor Marshall published her first book, *Creating a Confederate Kentucky: The Lost Cause and Civil War Memory in a Border State* with the University of North Carolina Press in 2010. Her essay, "'A Crisis in Our Lives': African-American Protest and the Kentucky Separate Coach Law, 1892-1900" in the summer 2000 issue of the *Register of the Kentucky Historical Society* was awarded the journal's Richard Collins Prize.

Awarded annually, the prize recognizes the generosity of George and Ann Richards, who have been instrumental in the growth of the Richards Civil War Era Center and in the founding of *The Journal of the Civil War Era*.

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
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
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


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


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
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
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


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

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
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
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

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



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
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


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


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



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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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

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

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


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


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


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


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


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


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
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

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
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
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
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
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

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
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
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
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In This Issue

The June issue contains a stand-alone article on medical testing in early-twentieth-century Algeria and an *AHR* Forum on historiographical turns that consists of four essays and two comments. There are also two featured reviews, followed by our usual extensive book review section. "In Back Issues" draws attention to articles and features in the *AHR* from one hundred, seventy-five, and fifty years ago.

Article

In "The International Politics of Vaccine Testing in Interwar Algiers," **Clifford Rosenberg** examines a European debate over standards of scientific truth that resulted in a massive human experiment carried out in Algeria. The debate pitted one of Europe's leading laboratory scientists, the microbiologist Albert Calmette, against a group of statisticians gathered in 1928 by the newly founded League of Nations Health Committee, who had called into question the efficacy of Calmette's new TB vaccine, BCG. In his response to the League, Calmette took advantage of connections overseas to run a fully randomized clinical trial with a control group in the Algiers Kasbah. The density of the patronage networks that Calmette mobilized suggests that colonies and quasi-colonial territories such as Algeria were not as isolated from metropolitan conflicts as most work on colonial "laboratories of modernity" has assumed. This experiment combined a backward-looking kind of power—a metropolitan mandarin taking advantage of national resources overseas—with a kind of medical modernism, in response to a newly powerful international agency. It created a triangular relationship between a major pharmaceutical company, international regulators in Geneva, and poor African test subjects, thereby anticipating some of the moral problems raised by AIDS research in contemporary Africa and Asia.

AHR Forum

The *AHR* Forum, "Historiographic 'Turns' in Critical Perspective," looks at what several of the contributors call "turn talk"—a preoccupation with dramatic or decisive changes in historical understanding in the last thirty years. The best-known of these are the cultural and linguistic turns proclaimed at the end of the 1980s, transformations in the theorizing and practice of history that both grew out of and critiqued the prevailing mode of social history. But subsequent turns have been announced with increasing alacrity—the transnational turn, the spatial turn, the moral turn, the emotional turn, and the digital turn, among others—suggesting that per-

haps the concept itself has lost some of its heuristic value. The six contributors to the forum offer particular, and often personal, interpretations of the history of this historiography.

In “When Was the Linguistic Turn? A Genealogy,” **Judith Surkis** revisits the storied rise and fall of the “linguistic turn.” Tracing its emergence in a specific Euro-American historiographical context, she illustrates the difficulty of identifying a single coherent “turn” as ever having taken place. The term has come to describe a discipline-wide moment of methodological ferment in a way that both relegates it to the past and preempts our contesting its implications and assumptions. Rather than endorse this hegemonic narrative, she attempts to both complicate and provincialize our understanding of “the turn.” Providing a genealogical counternarrative, Surkis restores a sense of what was at stake in the many debates in a variety of fields—European intellectual and social history, feminist history, and subaltern studies. She ultimately questions the usefulness of the concept of “turns” itself. “Turn talk” implies the supersession of one disciplinary trend by another, especially when understood as an attribute of a specific historiographical generation. While seeming to signal innovation and renewal, the spatio-temporal logic of a “turn” more often than not entails foreclosure. Surkis aims, instead, to keep multiple strains of historical critique open for the future.

Gary Wilder also emphasizes this theme of foreclosure in “From Optic to Topic: The Foreclosure Effect of Historiographic Turns.” Indeed, he argues that the analytical openings created by the linguistic and cultural turns were foreclosed through a process of domestication whereby new “optics” gave way to routine research topics that reaffirmed traditional historiographical practices and assumptions. He argues that proponents of the turns themselves bear some responsibility for this development insofar as they framed the turns in terms of a new theoretical consensus, decisive transformations, and professional rapprochement following divisive discussion. Because the linguistic turn conflated positivistic social history with structural analysis more generally, and because it tended to restrict “theory” to poststructuralism, its advocates tended to marginalize critical *social* theory and history concerned with large-scale social processes. Wilder forcefully argues for the need both to recover the linguistic turn’s commitment to fundamental epistemological questioning and to reclaim for history Marxism’s concern with social formations and long-term transformations.

In “The Kids Are All Right: On the ‘Turning’ of Cultural History,” **James W. Cook** both acknowledges the importance of this historiographical development and interrogates its meaning. It is hard to escape “the cultural turn,” he notes, citing as evidence the fact that in Google Books alone, this phrase generates more than 100,000 hits, many of which refer to works of academic history. Like Surkis and Wilder, however, he questions its very nature and historicity. Above all, he seeks to explicate the broader patterns of recent “turn talk,” a fast-forming discourse that has increasingly come to define our broader sense of cultural history. But he also challenges turn talk’s larger assumptions. Indeed, his central contention is that much of

this talk has made it harder to see the shifting contours of cultural history—how it has changed, the varied forms it has taken, and what it means to practice it now.

In “Another Set of Imperial Turns?” **Durba Ghosh** identifies three moments of the recent British imperial turn’s engagement with other historiographical turns—the global, the postcolonial, and the archival. Instead of arguing that the imperial turn represents a revision of existing historical methods, her essay shows how the imperial turn is both the product and the source of other historiographical developments. Through a compressed and selective retelling of the history of British imperial history, she challenges scholars of the British Empire who have called for imperial history to be “detached and apolitical” or dispassionate. From the late nineteenth century to the present, histories of British imperialism were frequently generated during moments of colonial conquest or “new imperialisms.” Although there have been many disagreements over the last century, they are largely battles within a shared political project, that of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. Rather than a singular or comprehensive method for imperial history, Ghosh’s essay calls for a continuation of scholarly work along these same lines of critique and engagement.

The two comments are contributions in their own right. In “Not Yet Far Enough,” **Julia Adeney Thomas** submits each of the four essays to a critical reading, arguing especially with some of Surkis’s and Wilder’s claims and interpretations. But her comment, which is both critical and appreciative of the authors’ intellectual engagement, does not end with these historiographical issues. Rather, she urges us to go beyond the concerns evoked by “turn talk” and confront the challenges of climate change and environmental crisis, which she discusses in the last pages of her comment. Calling for a “new materialism,” she urges, in a sense, a qualitatively different kind of turn, one that “will produce new questions, new objects of study, and new types of evidence beyond those developed through the social, linguistic, cultural, and imperial turns.”

Nathan Perl-Rosenthal takes a very different approach in “Generational Turns.” Positioning himself within a generational cohort that is just now coming of professional age, he notes that a generational self-consciousness seems to characterize the whole subject of turns, including the essays in the forum. Seizing upon this perspective, he surveys a number of dissertations by younger scholars, in part to “re-examine the balance between continuity and disjuncture in scholarly generations.” He finds that while many of the concerns central to the cultural and linguistic turns play a part in current thinking and practice, these are framed by a “pragmatic approach” illustrated by a renewed interest in the histories of communication, transportation, material culture and political economy.

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With this issue, the terms of five members of the Board of Editors come to an end. We would like to thank Jonathan Brown, Paul Freedman, Jane Kamensky, Jeremy Popkin, and Ruth Rogaski for their service over the last three years. In addition, William Novak has had to resign. Their successors will be announced in the October issue.

In Back Issues

In the hope of encouraging readers to dip into the long history of scholarship contained in the pages of the *American Historical Review* (now in the 117th year of its publishing history), and to take advantage of the digital availability of this archive to most readers, the *AHR* editors offer a look back at issues from one hundred, seventy-five, and fifty years ago. What follows is not a comprehensive survey of the contents of those issues, but rather a glance at some of the articles and other features that might be of interest, or even of use, today.

Volume 17, Number 4 (July 1912)

The first two articles in the July 1912 issue offer an interesting study in contrasting styles and methods of historical scholarship. "The European Reconquest of North Africa" is by Archibald Cary Coolidge (1866–1928), who became professor of history at Harvard in 1908 and two years later was named the first director of the university library. (The library he led was soon to have a benefactor in the mother of Henry Elkins Widener, a young victim of the *Titanic* disaster, which occurred on April 15 of that year—probably while Coolidge was putting the finishing touches on this piece.) His article hinges on an interesting question. After a brisk survey of the history of North Africa that emphasizes its relationship to Europe across the centuries—the various phases from antiquity through the rise of Islam when it was a part of either "Asia" or the West—he pauses at the year 1830, when the French marched into Algiers, and asks, "As we muse over these latest transformations, we wonder not so much that they have occurred as that they did not occur centuries earlier." What puzzled Coolidge, in other words, was why North Africa remained under the control of "Asiatic" Muslims while other parts of the world, from the Western Hemisphere to the Indian subcontinent, fell into the possession of the West. "Why did such weak, barbarous states, lying closer to many parts of Europe than these do to each other, remain so long unconquered, when the vast and remote empires of the Incas and of the Moghuls had for generations been in European hands?" His answer, however, is less interesting than the question. After discounting Islam's power to resist European control, he simply posits that compared to these other lands, North Africa offered very little to tempt the Spanish, French, or British to its shores except for the occasional bout with Barbary pirates. His account also allows that competition among European powers blocked serious attempts at conquest on the part of any single one of them. In any case, his survey—which, it must be said, is virtually devoid of sources or references—ends with some revealing ruminations on whether French control would have merely material or "moral" consequences. "Granting that

the majority of the people will always be of the primitive native stock, what will be the expression of their civilization, the French of advanced modern thought or the Arabic of the Koran?"

"Canada versus Guadeloupe: An Episode of the Seven Years' War," by William L. Grant, is a very different piece of work, although not without its own moral commentary. Grant, who taught history at Upper Canada College, examines the so-called paper war in the early 1760s, which involved an intense exchange of pamphlets pertaining to the future of the British Empire in the Western Hemisphere in anticipation of the end of the Seven Years' War. Indeed, his article is impressive for the number of texts he discusses and the clarity with which he parses the issues in play. Essentially, the matter came down to whether Britain would focus its imperial intentions on the Caribbean, which promised great profits with the endlessly expansive sugar market as well as more opportunities to extend its sea power, or whether it would turn its colonial interests toward Canada, which, while not promising riches, was favored by many as an outlet for expanded settlements and a market for British industry. Those in support of Canada embraced the vision of "an Universal Empire on the Continent of North America," bolstered by the claim that "a northern colony is . . . healthier and more suited to the development of a white race." But their opponents saw this union in alarming terms, asserting, with rather remarkable prescience, that this vast territory across the ocean, with its untapped resources and a growing population, would one day seek independence from Britain. "Thus from these measures you lay the surest foundation of unpeopling Britain, and strengthening America to revolt; a people who must become more licentious from their liberty, and more factious and turbulent from the distance of the power that rules them," wrote one pamphleteer. Interestingly, this argument was countered by the best-known participant in the paper war, Benjamin Franklin, who, perhaps disingenuously, pointed to the hopelessly fractious nature of the American colonies as insurance against this possibility. Ultimately, the advocates of North American expansion prevailed. And while Grant concedes that Prime Minister William Pitt was subject to pressure from West Indian planters in the House of Commons, who feared that the addition of Guadeloupe would rival their interests, he tentatively concludes, "Let us hope that no such motives really influenced the Great Commoner." An unabashed champion of British imperialism, Grant frames the choice as a crucial step in Britain's progress from a strictly self-contained mercantilist empire to one based on "liberty." But his pathbreaking research underscores the genuinely interesting finding that "imperial theories were much more a subject of discussion than is sometimes thought to be the case."

Volume 42, Number 4 (July 1937)

The July 1937 issue contains several workmanlike articles, including one on the political thought of an early Tudor lawyer by the Yale intellectual historian Franklin Le Van Baumer, and another on the use of hot-air balloons in the Civil War by J. Duane Squires, author of a four-volume history of New Hampshire. There are also

two articles listed under "Notes and Suggestions." The second of these is probably the most interesting piece in this issue, an essay on "Fictitious Biography" by Margaret Castle Schindler, who was on the faculty of Goucher College. This is a first-rate exercise in historical sleuthing, which does nothing less than reveal the existence of widespread fraud in the six-volume *Appletons' Cyclopaedia of American Biography* (1887–1889). This venerable publication, which even in 1937 had no equal, contained entries on 20,000 individuals who had played a part in the history of North and South America. The articles were unsigned. That some were fraudulent was first revealed in 1919 by a botanist named John Hendley Barnhart, who used his expertise to prove that fourteen of the Europeans cited in the *Cyclopaedia* as supposedly having studied plant life in Latin America never even existed. Schindler's *AHR* article goes farther; through a thorough examination of the entries under the letter "H," she was able to add fifteen more to "the list of those believed to be fictitious. Three additional sketches found in other letters of the alphabet, in the course of this study, bring the number of fictitious articles to at least forty-seven." Subsequent research demonstrated that a full two hundred of the biographies had been fabricated. Schindler's method consisted mostly of tracking down the works ascribed to each subject and cited in the entries. In most cases, the trail ended in a bibliographical black hole. For other entries, the subjects were real but, as Schindler demonstrates, did not live when the authors claimed they did. Authors were free to submit entries, which were apparently never verified by the editors; they were paid for each contribution, suggesting that financial gain was their motivation. As Schindler notes, however, the authors, while unscrupulous, were certainly not ignorant. Their fraudulent labors required the linguistic capacity to adapt or invent titles of books in six languages as well as knowledge of the history, geography, and botany of Latin America, as most of the entries in question deal with that part of the Western Hemisphere. The existence of fraud on this scale in a widely distributed reference work might give pause to those today who insist that scholarship could easily do without editorial and peer review.

Volume 67, Number 4 (July 1962)

The July 1962 issue is distinguished by the appearance of David M. Potter's important article "The Historian's Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa," a piece that continues to be cited to this day. Potter was a well-known historian of the American South who taught at both Yale and Stanford. His service as president of the American Historical Association was cut short by his untimely death in 1971. This article begins as a kind of think piece, reviewing and criticizing the ways historians have understood, or rather misunderstood, nationalism. More than anything, it urges an appreciation of the complexity of nationalism as an experience, not simply as an expression of political identity, and certainly not as a mere ideology. Nationalism is both theory and practice. Thus while nationalism as an ideology may seem to embody a supreme form of group allegiance, trumping or even negating all lesser sorts of loyalty, in actuality it can easily coexist with strong attachments to family, region, religious group, or another collectivity. Indeed, he argues for the exact opposite: that

different loyalties are mutually reinforcing, not competing. "The only citizens who are capable of strong national loyalty," he asserts, "are those who are capable of strong group loyalty." (It is not likely, however, that many historians today would illustrate this point by adding, "A well-known phrase runs: 'For God, for Country, and for Yale'—not 'For God, or Country, or for Yale.'") In general terms, Potter sees nationalism as dually constituted: it is composed of both common feelings—that is, a culture—and a set of interests.

Up until this point, Potter's article is an elegant and tightly reasoned argument for conceiving nationalism as a complex phenomenon requiring an appreciation of its psychological, subjective, and cultural dimensions, while also taking into account the different political and social contexts that can create a variety of nationalistic expressions. For the present-day reader, however, who is likely coming to this article with an understanding derived from works such as Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (1983), there is not much in Potter's presentation that seems novel. But the first part of the article, which treats the subject in very general terms, is really a wind-up for the second—an interpretation of nationalism in the context of the American Civil War. Here is where his analysis bears fruit, for it becomes clear that all along, Potter was preparing us to accept a very particular—and probably contentious—interpretation of the sentiments and allegiances of southerners. In short, he argues that it is a mistake to ascribe nationalism to the North while seeing the South as merely sectionalist. Rather, he urges that we adjust our perspective and admit that southerners were just as nationalistic as northerners. "The equation of northernism with nationalism and southernism with sectionalism prejudices by definition the question which purports to be under scrutiny," he argues, "and denies without actual analysis of group feelings, that the southern movement could have been truly national." The rest of the essay goes on to argue the point. He emphasizes that strong regional sentiments, which are often cited as "proof" of southerners' primary loyalties and their lack of allegiance to the nation, are hardly inimical to nationalism—no more so than were the regional affinities among people living in the North. Northerners had no monopoly on American nationalism, something borne out, he argues, by the fact that long before the period of the Civil War and long afterward, the South remained steeped in nationalist sentiments. Potter does not spare his fellow southern historians, especially regarding the common assertion that the South's "claim to nationhood was validated by a complete cultural separateness." Such antitheses are simply caricatures, he insists. To be sure, Potter fully admits that there was a lot at stake in the Civil War, especially a clash of interests ignited by tariffs and the extension of slavery. But these issues, while fundamental, did not override the historically more durable identification of southerners with the American nation. "The historical process is far too intricate to be handled in terms of the simple dualisms of culture versus culture, nation versus section, interest versus interest, or Americanism versus southernism." Today this seems like a perfectly reasonable methodological assertion. Fifty years ago, when the memory of the Civil War was only a century old—and at the high-water mark of the civil rights movement—its reasonableness as a guide to understanding the conflict was in all likelihood more difficult to accept.



The ancient core of Algiers, with its narrow, winding streets, the Kasbah is built into the hillside facing the Mediterranean. Poor and overcrowded, it was the segregated colonial city's one predominantly Muslim neighborhood: 75–80 percent of its residents were Muslims (Arabs and Kabyles) in the early twentieth century. Rates of tuberculosis and other respiratory diseases soared along with population densities, as the dispossessed from the surrounding agricultural hinterland arrived with their families. Between the world wars, the Pasteur Institute began a massive human experiment there involving the administration of a new tuberculosis vaccine to children.

The International Politics of Vaccine Testing in Interwar Algiers

CLIFFORD ROSENBERG

IN 1928, ALBERT CALMETTE, one of the most powerful scientists in the world, found himself in a bind. Heir apparent to Émile Roux at the Pasteur Institute and a leading contender for a Nobel Prize, Calmette was convinced that he had found a successful vaccine for tuberculosis, the Holy Grail of medical research. Since Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch, vaccines have held out the promise of preventing the world's deadliest diseases, none a greater killer than TB. Years of careful laboratory work and animal testing suggested that Calmette had succeeded where his rivals had failed. His initial human trials at a Paris maternity clinic confirmed his laboratory work, or so he thought.¹ But a bitter international dispute called his findings and the efficacy of his vaccine, known as BCG, into question.² A commission of expert statisticians convened by the newly formed Health Organization of the League of Nations—men Calmette considered his professional inferiors—repudiated his reading of the evidence. More effectively than any international advisory panel had been able to do before, the assembled experts in Geneva called for a set of best practices for establishing the worth of medical interventions.³ They insisted on a randomized clinical

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¹ On Calmette, see his unpublished autobiography, "Quelques notes sur ma vie et ma carrière pour mes fils et pour mes petits enfants," 1932, Archives de l'Institut Pasteur, Paris [hereafter IP], Fonds Calmette, CAL A/1; as well as Lion Murard and Patrick Zylberman, *L'hygiène dans la République: La santé publique en France, ou l'utopie contrariée, 1870–1918* (Paris, 1996), chap. 17; and Noël Bernard, *La vie et l'œuvre d'Albert Calmette* (Paris, 1961). For the initial human trials in Paris, see Benjamin Weill-Hallé and Raymond Turpin, "Premiers essais de vaccination antituberculeuse de l'enfant par le bacille Calmette-Guérin (BCG)," *Bulletins et mémoires de la Société médicale des hôpitaux de Paris* 49 (1925): 1589–1601. Calmette provides a thorough review of prior efforts to develop a tuberculosis vaccine in *La vaccination préventive contre la tuberculose par le "BCG"* (Paris, 1927), 13–58.

² BCG stands for *Bacillus Calmette-Guérin*.

³ Norman Howard-Jones, *The Scientific Background of the International Sanitary Conferences, 1851–1938* (Geneva, 1975); Howard-Jones, *International Public Health between the Two World Wars: The Organizational Problems* (Geneva, 1978); Neville M. Goodman, *International Health Organizations and Their Work*, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh, 1971); Martin David Dubin, "The League of Nations Health Organization," in Paul Weindling, ed., *International Health Organisations and Movements, 1918–1939* (Cambridge, 1995), 56–80; Weindling, "Philanthropy and World Health: The Rockefeller Foundation and the

trial with a control group, laying out in detail many of the criteria that have since been adopted by scientists and regulatory agencies around the world.⁴

The problem, for Calmette, was both political and practical. There were precious few places he could carry out such a study. He knew immediately that French family doctors and their powerful unions would block his efforts on the mainland. No other European country seemed any more hospitable, and he feared the likelihood of damaging publicity, especially after a laboratory error in Germany in 1930 killed dozens of infants and infected many others.⁵ So he turned to French colonial populations: he worked first with African soldiers on the mainland, and when that failed to produce meaningful results, he moved his efforts overseas.⁶ But the colonial territories he tried did not have adequate civil recordkeeping. He could vaccinate huge numbers of children, but he could not monitor them long enough to convince critics that his vaccine had given them protection. The only place experiencing rampant tuberculosis that also offered civil records he could use, without facing resistance from patients or their doctors, was neither colonial, in formal terms, nor part of the French mainland: Algeria. Invaded in 1830 and annexed four years later, the former Ottoman territory became part of France in 1848. When civil authorities took over from the military in 1870, the minister of the interior in Paris rather than the minister of colonies appointed its governor-general, who shared power with European settlers.⁷ That quasi-colonial status, combining massive social and political inequality with a functioning administrative state, set Algeria apart and made it an ideal site for vaccine testing.

Calmette called on colleagues at the Algiers branch of the Pasteur Institute in

League of Nations Health Organisation," *Minerva* 35, no. 3 (1997): 269–281; Iris Borowy, *Coming to Terms with World Health: The League of Nations Health Organisation, 1921–1946* (Frankfurt, 2009); John Farley, *To Cast Out Disease: A History of the International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation, 1913–1951* (Oxford, 2004); Susan Pedersen, "Back to the League of Nations," *American Historical Review* 112, no. 4 (October 2007): 1091–1117; and Sunil Amrith, *Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast Asia, 1930–65* (New York, 2006).

⁴ Harry M. Marks, *The Progress of Experiment: Science and Therapeutic Reform in the United States, 1900–1990* (Cambridge, 1997); Christian Bonah, *Histoire de l'expérimentation humaine en France: Discours et pratiques, 1900–1940* (Paris, 2007); Desirée Cox-Maksimov, "The Making of the Clinical Trial in Britain, 1910–1945: Expertise, the State and the Public" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1997); J. P. Bull, "The Historical Development of Clinical Therapeutic Trials," *Journal of Chronic Disease* 10 (1959): 218–248; Anne Fagot-Largeault, "Les origines de la notion d'essai contrôlé randomisé en médecine," *Cahiers d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences* 40 (1992): 281–300; and Abraham M. Lilienfeld, "Ceteris Paribus: The Evolution of the Clinical Trial," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 56, no. 1 (1982): 1–18.

⁵ Philippe Menut, "The Lübeck Catastrophe and Its Consequences for Anti-Tuberculosis BCG Vaccination," in Anne Marie Moulin and Alberto Cambrioso, eds., *Singular Selves: Historical Issues and Contemporary Debates in Immunology* (Amsterdam, 2001), 202–210.

⁶ On the overseas Pasteur institutes and Calmette's influence, see Annick Guénel, "The Creation of the First Overseas Pasteur Institute, or the Beginning of Albert Calmette's Pastorian Career," *Medical History* 43 (1999): 1–25; Anne Marie Moulin, especially "The Pasteur Institutes between the Two World Wars: The Transformation of the International Sanitary Order," in Weindling, *International Health Organisations and Movements*, 244–265; Moulin, "Patriarchal Science: The Network of the Overseas Pasteur Institutes," in Patrick Petitjean, Catherine Jami, and Anne Marie Moulin, eds., *Science and Empires: Historical Studies about Scientific Development and European Expansion* (Dordrecht, 1992), 307–322; and Jean-Pierre Dedet, *Les Instituts Pasteur d'outre-mer: 120 ans de microbiologie française dans le monde* (Paris, 2000).

⁷ Claude Collot, *Les institutions de l'Algérie durant la période coloniale, 1830–1962* (Algiers, 1987).



FIGURE 1: The main building of the Algiers branch of the Pasteur Institute in 1934. © Pasteur Institute.

his bid to satisfy League statisticians.⁸ Scientists used birth records held by the Government General to create a random sample and sent teams of nurses to the second *arrondissement*, the Kasbah, the poorest, most overcrowded neighborhood in the city. Those nurses delivered oral doses of BCG and observed a control group (without giving a placebo), returning periodically to provide boosters to the vaccinated and to monitor both groups' health. They tested and tracked some 40,000 subjects over the course of a generation, from 1930 to 1956. The Algiers BCG trial was the largest study of its kind carried out anywhere in the world before the Salk, Sabin, and Koprowski polio trials of the 1950s, which got under way just as the Algerian War put a stop to testing in Algiers.⁹

Calmette's inability to carry out his experiment in a formal colony, such as Indochina or West Africa, shows the limitations of an approach to empire that has been enormously fruitful over the past generation. Colonial reformers routinely likened empire to the controlled conditions of the laboratory, and scholars of imperialism followed suit. Since Paul Rabinow and Gwendolyn Wright's landmark works in the 1980s, the metaphorical notion of colonies as "laboratories of modernity" has been

⁸ Calmette, "Quelques notes sur ma vie et ma carrière," fol. 25; M.-P. Laberge, "Les instituts Pasteur du Maghreb: La recherche scientifique dans le cadre de la politique coloniale," *Revue française d'histoire d'Outre-Mer* 74 (1987): 27–42; John Strachan, "The Pasteurization of Algeria?," *French History* 20, no. 3 (2006): 260–275.

⁹ John R. Paul, *A History of Poliomyelitis* (New Haven, Conn., 1971), 426–440; and David M. Oshinsky, *Polio: An American Story—The Crusade That Mobilized the Nation against the Twentieth Century's Most Feared Disease* (Oxford, 2005), chap. 12.

ubiquitous in the literature on empire. In this view, colonial settings, isolated from Europe and unencumbered by stifling regulations and domineering mainland mandarins, enabled mid-level experts—Rabinow calls them “specific intellectuals”—to elaborate new forms of social discipline from the Maghreb to Madagascar and French Indochina. Even earlier, one of Rabinow’s mentors, Bernard Cohn, had called attention to the energy the British Raj devoted to marking boundaries between colonizers and colonized.¹⁰ Work in this vein on the history of science has had the virtue of calling attention to scientific research that political and environmental conditions made impossible in Europe.¹¹

Increasingly, however, the idea of a distinct colonial modernity has come to seem problematic. Area studies specialists have long objected that colonies were never empty spaces that Europeans could manipulate at will. Latin Americanists have shown that nineteenth-century experiments in free trade depended upon financial institutions built by indigenous elites, not a power vacuum left by the collapse of Spanish authority.¹² More recently, international historians and immigration specialists have discovered the salience of juridical categories—protectorates, condominiums, mandates, dominions—too often lumped together as “colonial,” which influenced how local administrative infrastructures related both to European capitals and to an increasingly dense international system.¹³ Moreover, European colonies, as Meghan Vaughan has pointed out, were not modern states at all for most of their existence. They refused to treat colonial subjects as autonomous individuals, and they relied on brute force rather than Foucauldian discipline to impose their will. Other scholars, especially those working on penitentiaries, have gone so far as to describe the French Empire as a brutal throwback to an archaic, Old Regime style of governance.¹⁴

Placing European mainlands, colonies, and quasi-colonial territories such as Algeria into a single analytical frame requires broad context. It requires breaking down a series of basic colonial oppositions, starting with colony/metropole and colonizer/

¹⁰ Paul Rabinow, *French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 16, and chap. 8 for “specific intellectuals”; Gwendolyn Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* (Chicago, 1991); Bernard S. Cohn, *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays* (Oxford, 1987); Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton, N.J., 1996).

¹¹ See in particular Roy MacLeod, ed., *Nature and Empire: Science and the Colonial Enterprise*, Special Issue, *Osiris* 15 (2000).

¹² Paul Gootenberg, *Between Silver and Guano: Commercial Policy and the State in Postindependence Peru* (Princeton, N.J., 1989).

¹³ Pedersen, “Back to the League of Nations”; Susan Pedersen, “The Meaning of the Mandates System: An Argument,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 32, no. 4 (2006): 560–582; and Alexis Spire, *Étrangers à la carte: L’administration de l’immigration en France (1945–1975)* (Paris, 2005), chap. 6. For science and medicine, see Amrith, *Decolonizing International Health*; Helen Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870–1950* (Chicago, 2011); and Deborah Neill, “Paul Ehrlich’s Colonial Connections: Scientific Networks and Sleeping Sickness Drug Therapy Research, 1900–1914,” *Social History of Medicine* 22, no. 1 (2009): 61–77.

¹⁴ For the concept of discipline, see Michel Foucault, *Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison* (Paris, 1975). For critiques, see Megan Vaughan, *Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness* (Stanford, Calif., 1991), esp. 8–12; Guillaume Lachenal, “Le médecin qui voulut être roi: Médecine coloniale et utopie au Cameroun,” *Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 65, no. 1 (January–February 2010): 121–156; Frank Dikötter and Ian Brown, eds., *Cultures of Confinement: A History of the Prison in Africa, Asia, and Latin America* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2007); Florence Bernault, ed., *A History of Prison and Confinement in Africa* (Portsmouth, N.H., 2003); and Peter Zinoman, *The Colonial Bastille: A History of Imprisonment in Vietnam, 1862–1940* (Berkeley, Calif., 2001).

colonized, and recognizing that the meanings of “tradition” and “modernity” were contested, not only overseas but in Europe as well. A generation of scholars have shown how colonized peoples adapted, appropriated, and translated Western scientific ideas in a wide range of contexts.¹⁵ But the most influential currents of post-colonial scholarship continue to rely on a reductive notion of “post-Enlightenment rationality,” a monolithic “imaginary figure . . . embedded in *clichéd and shorthand forms*” that Dipesh Chakrabarty calls a “hyperreal Europe.”¹⁶ Frederick Cooper has countered that these efforts to challenge European narratives of progress have too often simply reversed their value judgments without altering their terms: “the history they evoke is canned, a three-hundred- or four-hundred-year story that we need only name . . . Hegel stands in for a European history reduced to the claim of progress.”¹⁷

In the case of Calmette’s human experiment, a complex interplay of colonial, national, and international forces shaped a major scientific dispute within Europe, a dispute *within* the Enlightenment tradition. In response to the League of Nations, Calmette took advantage of patronage networks that radiated out from Paris and bound colonies and quasi-colonial entities such as Algeria together with the metropole. It was the very depth of Algeria’s implication in metropolitan webs of influence and power that enabled him to use the Kasbah as a laboratory. Like the Pasteur Institute’s work on rabies in French Indochina and Madagascar and Robert Koch’s on sleeping sickness (human trypanosomiasis) in German East Africa and Togo—but unlike later work on sleeping sickness in sub-Saharan Africa, which was much more international—the Algiers trial calls to mind old-fashioned imperialism. A metropolitan research institute took advantage of opportunities created by overseas expansion. In this respect it was broadly similar to the trial of the contraceptive pill Enovid, launched in Puerto Rico in the 1950s to avoid the jurisdiction of the Comstock Laws, which made the testing of contraceptives illegal in most U.S. states.¹⁸

If Calmette’s experiment relied on a rather backward kind of power, it was no throwback to the Old Regime. The Algiers BCG trial stands at the crossroads of two

¹⁵ Gyan Prakash, *Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India* (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Omnia El Shakry, *The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt* (Stanford, Calif., 2007); Nancy Rose Hunt, *A Colonial Lexicon of Birth Ritual, Medicalization, and Mobility in the Congo* (Durham, N.C., 1999); Luise White, *Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa* (Berkeley, Calif., 2000); and Julia Livingston, *Debility and the Moral Imagination in Botswana* (Bloomington, Ind., 2005).

¹⁶ Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, N.J., 2000), 3–4, 27, 37, 39–40, 45, emphasis in original.

¹⁷ Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley, Calif., 2005), quotes from 124 and 20. See also Lachenal, “Le médecin qui voulut être roi,” esp. 123–131; Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory*, 9–11; and, more generally, “AHR Roundtable: Historians and the Question of ‘Modernity,’” *American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (June 2011): 631–751.

¹⁸ Laurence Monnais-Rousselot, *Médecine et colonisation: L’aventure indochinoise, 1860–1939* (Paris, 1999), 403–416; Eric T. Jennings, “Confronting Rabies and Its Treatments in Colonial Madagascar, 1899–1910,” *Social History of Medicine* 22, no. 2 (2009): 263–282. On sleeping sickness, see Neill, “Paul Ehrlich’s Colonial Connections”; Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory*, chap. 4; Wolfgang U. Eckart, “The Colony as Laboratory: German Sleeping Sickness Campaigns in German East Africa and in Togo, 1900–1914,” *History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences* 24, no. 1 (2002): 69–89; Myriam Mertens, “Chemical Compounds in the Congo: A Belgian Colony’s Role in Chemotherapeutic Knowledge Production during the 1920s” (paper presented at ECAS 2009: 3rd European Conference on African Studies, Leipzig, June 4–7, 2009); Vaughan, *Curing Their Ills*, chap. 2; and Maryinez Lyons, *The Colonial Disease: A Social History of Sleeping Sickness in Northern Zaire, 1900–1940* (Cambridge, 1992). For the Enovid trial, see Lara Marks, *Sexual Chemistry: A History of the Contraceptive Pill* (New Haven, Conn., 2001), chap. 4.

momentous transitions: it provides an early example of an international agency dictating the terms on which scientific claims are evaluated, and at the same time it represents an important step in the emergence of recognizably modern clinical trials and, more broadly, in the spread of statistical modes of thinking.¹⁹

The BCG trial also anticipated many of the moral and practical problems of human subject research in developing countries that have emerged as major concerns in the age of AIDS.²⁰ European scientists in Algiers were much less invasive than those in the British Raj, which experienced an outbreak of bubonic plague in the late nineteenth century, not to mention Victorian England, where mandatory vaccination laws provoked powerful resistance.²¹ They did not withhold treatment, as Dr. Vonderlehr and his colleagues did in the notorious Tuskegee syphilis experiment in the United States.²² In fact, they made routine care available to people in desperate need. In the process, the Algiers BCG trial created a new, triangular relationship between European researchers, poor African test subjects, and regulators in Geneva. The vast human experiment was controlled by experts and addressed concerns that had little if anything to do with conditions in the Maghreb, even as it provided access to cutting-edge care.

THE ALGIERS BCG TRIAL, like so many overseas experiments, resulted from the difficulty of carrying out research on the European mainland.²³ Calmette and his colleague Camille Guérin, a veterinarian, began to develop BCG at the Pasteur Institute laboratory in Lille, France, in 1905. They noticed that animals that ingested a small quantity of tuberculosis bacilli tested tuberculin-positive and developed a resistance

¹⁹ For the history of clinical trials, see fn. 4 above. For the emergence of statistical modes of thinking, see Theodore M. Porter, *The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820–1900* (Princeton, N.J., 1986); Ian Hacking, *The Taming of Chance* (Cambridge, 1990); Russell C. Maulitz, “Physician versus Bacteriologist: The Ideology of Science in Clinical Medicine,” in Morris J. Vogel and Charles E. Rosenberg, *The Therapeutic Revolution: Essays in the Social History of American Medicine* (Philadelphia, 1979), 91–107; and Gerald L. Geison, “Divided We Stand: Physiologists and Clinicians in the American Context,” *ibid.*, 67–90.

²⁰ Marcia Angell, “Ethical Imperialism? Ethics in International Collaborative Clinical Research,” *New England Journal of Medicine* 319, no. 16 (1988): 1081–1083; Angell, “The Ethics of Clinical Research in the Third World,” *New England Journal of Medicine* 337, no. 12 (1997): 847–849; Peter Lurie and Sidney M. Wolfe, “Unethical Trials of Interventions to Reduce Perinatal Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Developing Countries,” *ibid.*, 853–856; Harold Varmus and David Satcher, “Ethical Complexities of Conducting Research in Developing Countries,” *ibid.*, 1003–1005; Ronald Bayer, “Ethical Challenges of HIV Vaccine Trials in Less Developed Nations: Conflict and Consensus in the International Arena,” *AIDS: Official Journal of the International AIDS Society* 14, no. 8 (2000): 1051–1057; and David J. Rothman, “The Shame of Medical Research,” *New York Review of Books* 47, no. 19 (November 30, 2000): 60–64.

²¹ David Arnold, “Touching the Body: Perspectives on the Indian Plague, 1896–1900,” in Ranajit Guha, ed., *Subaltern Studies V: Writings on South Asian History and Society* (Delhi, 1987), 55–90; Amal Das, “Calcutta Plague: Epidemic, Colonial Intervention and Indigenous Society, 1898–1900,” in Chitabrata Palit and Achintya Kumar Dutta, eds., *History of Medicine in India: The Medical Encounter* (Delhi, 2005), 87–110; and Nadja Durbach, *Bodily Matters: The Anti-Vaccination Movement in England, 1853–1907* (Durham, N.C., 2005).

²² Allan M. Brandt, “Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,” *Hastings Center Report* 6, no. 8 (1978): 21–29; James H. Jones, *Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment*, new and expanded ed. (New York, 1993); and Susan M. Reverby, ed., *Tuskegee’s Truths: Rethinking the Tuskegee Syphilis Study* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000).

²³ This section builds on the work of Christian Bonah, especially *Histoire de l’expérimentation humaine en France*.

to active TB.²⁴ They spent the better part of the next sixteen years developing culture media and conducting exhaustive animal testing to attenuate what remained a live virus and make it safe for use in humans. In 1921, after 230 successive cultures and repeated testing, they declared their attenuated virus completely safe, incapable of causing lesions even when injected in massive doses into the most sensitive laboratory animals. At that point, Calmette and Guérin felt they had exhausted the potential for animal testing.²⁵

Calmette and his colleagues studiously avoided mention of the term “human testing,” which remained a particularly strong taboo in France, especially for live vaccines administered to otherwise healthy infants.²⁶ Testing vaccines on human subjects has always posed unique ethical, practical, and political problems. Vaccines, unlike other medications, expose patients to definite risk in order to combat an uncertain threat. The vaccinated, usually young children, run the risk of complications or, in rare cases, death to gain protection against a disease they may never contract.²⁷ There was tremendous optimism in the early twentieth century that vaccines could render infectious diseases obsolete. “It is within the power of man to eradicate infectious disease from the earth,” Pasteur famously proclaimed.²⁸ That optimism, however, was tempered by memories of the resistance that compulsory vaccination against smallpox had provoked; Edward Jenner’s smallpox vaccine remained the only one required by the French government until just before World War II. In this context, Calmette had to proceed cautiously and persuade the public that his new vaccine was safe and effective.²⁹

Above all, he had to convince doctors. General practitioners were uncommonly powerful in France and jealous of their prerogatives.³⁰ They would not have rec-

²⁴ A. Calmette and C. Guérin, “Origine intestinale de la tuberculose pulmonaire,” *Annales de l’Institut Pasteur* 19 (1905): 611.

²⁵ Albert Calmette, *L’Infection bacillaire et la tuberculose chez l’homme et chez les animaux*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1922).

²⁶ Philippe Menut, “Éthique et *ethos* de la recherche biomédicale en France: L’introduction de la vaccination par le BCG, 1921–1931,” in Christian Bonah, Étienne Lépicaud, and Volker Roelcke, eds., *La médecine expérimentale au tribunal: Implications éthiques de quelques procès médicaux du XX^e siècle européen* (Paris, 2003), 95–124; Giovanni Maio, “Das Humanexperiment vor und nach Nürnberg: Überlegungen zum Menschenversuch und zum Einwilligungsbegriff in der französischen Diskussion des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts,” in Claudia Wiesemann and Andreas Frewer, eds., *Medizin und Ethik im Zeichen von Auschwitz: 50 Jahre Nürnberger Ärzteprozess* (Jena, 1996), 45–78; and Bonah, *Histoire de l’expérimentation humaine en France*.

²⁷ Douglas S. Diekema and Edgar K. Marcuse, “Ethical Issues in the Vaccination of Children,” in G. Roberto Burgio and John D. Lantos, eds., *Primum Non Nocere Today*, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam, 1998), 37–47; Ross D. Silverman and Thomas May, “Private Choice versus Public Health: Religion, Morality, and Childhood Vaccination Law,” *Margins* 1, no. 2 (2001): 505–521.

²⁸ Pasteur quoted without attribution by René Dubos and Jean Dubos, *The White Plague: Tuberculosis, Man, and Society* (1952; repr., New Brunswick, N.J., 1987), 228.

²⁹ France began to require vaccination for diphtheria in November 1939, and for typhoid in 1940; smallpox vaccination was required until 1984, well after the disease was eradicated. For smallpox vaccination in France, see Pierre Darmon, *La longue traque de la variole: Les pionniers de la médecine préventive* (Paris, 1986); Anne Marie Moulin, ed., *L’aventure de la vaccination* (Paris, 1996); and Murard and Zylberman, *L’hygiène dans la République*, 369–393; for the rest of Europe, see Peter Baldwin, *Contagion and the State, 1830–1930* (Cambridge, 1999), chap. 4; and for England, see Durbach, *Bodily Matters*. For vaccination in the United States, see James Colgrove, *State of Immunity: The Politics of Vaccination in Twentieth-Century America* (Berkeley, Calif., 2006), esp. chap. 3, “Diphtheria Immunization: The Power, and the Limits, of Persuasion.”

³⁰ Dominique Damamme, “La jeunesse des syndicats de médecins ou l’enchantement du syndicalisme,” *Genèses: Sciences sociales et histoire* 3, no. 3 (1991): 31–54; Bénédicte Vergez-Chaignon, “Le

commended a therapy without evidence that it worked; once convinced of its efficacy, however, they felt bound to provide it to their patients. Most independent doctors rejected the idea that any method, no matter how sophisticated, could surpass their own cultivated clinical judgment. The idea of leaving their patients' treatment to chance was anathema. The democracy of the French healthcare system, the disproportionate influence enjoyed by general practitioners at the expense of specialists and government ministries, has often been seen as a sign of backwardness.³¹ Their power posed formidable challenges for research institutes and government agencies interested in applying new forms of applied mathematics to medical research and provided a powerful defense for the interests of individual patients at the expense of the community. It compelled Calmette to rush his work and attempt to keep debate from spilling over into the metropolitan public sphere.

The first human vaccinations with BCG took place in a Paris maternity ward in 1921.³² Calmette later emphasized that the director of the Hôpital de la Charité's École de puériculture had asked for access to his new vaccine and offered to obtain parental permission to vaccinate children Calmette thought were certain to contract TB. By writing that a doctor had approached him—Calmette said he was “tormented” by the shift from animal to human subjects and “would likely have hesitated for quite some time”—the microbiologist distanced himself from accusations of human experimentation.³³ After seven years of testing, using an oral dose to ease compliance and avoid resistance even though it was known to be less effective, Calmette and his team showed that the vaccine was safe by taking temperature and weight readings of all the children and comparing them to established norms.³⁴ Establishing its efficacy, however, was much more difficult.³⁵

In order to prove that BCG worked, they would have to show that vaccinated children developed active TB less often than unvaccinated children. French doctors were not obligated to report TB cases; there were no definitive statistics. Calmette tried to resolve the issue by sending a questionnaire to 500 dispensaries around France. From the replies, he calculated an infant mortality rate of 24 percent. That is, he claimed that 24 out of every 100 children in France would die within their first year if one of their immediate relatives had a declared case of active TB.³⁶

syndicalisme médical français de sa naissance à sa refondation: Intérêts et morale au pays de l'individualisme (1892–1945),” *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 43, no. 4 (1996): 709–734; Martha L. Hildreth, “Medical Rivalries and Medical Politics in France: The Physicians' Union Movement and the Medical Assistance Law of 1893,” *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 42, no. 1 (1987): 5–29; Claudine Herzlich, “The Evolution of Relations between French Physicians and the State from 1880 to 1980,” *Sociology of Health and Illness* 4, no. 3 (1982): 241–253; and Julie Fette, *Exclusions: Practicing Prejudice in French Law and Medicine, 1920–1945* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2012), chaps. 1–3. For comparison, see Michael H. Kater, “Professionalization and Socialization of Physicians in Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 20, no. 4 (1985): 677–701.

³¹ In particular by Murard and Zylberman, *L'hygiène dans la République*, and following them, Baldwin, *Contagion and the State*.

³² Weill-Hallé and Turpin, “Premiers essais de vaccination antituberculeuse.”

³³ Calmette, *La vaccination préventive contre la tuberculose par le “BCG,”* 186.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 186, 212–213. The dose had to be delivered in the first ten days, so that it could be absorbed properly. Yet the boosters given after that initial period were still given orally rather than by injection.

³⁵ Bonah, *Histoire de l'expérimentation humaine*, chap. 4.

³⁶ Infection with the TB bacillus, testing “tuberculin-positive,” may or may not lead to active disease. In most cases, infection creates a primary lesion, usually in the lungs, within four to twelve weeks. The primary lesion may heal or, more often, become calcified or ossified in a complex that contains the

From his study of vaccinated children at La Charité, he found a death rate of 0.8 percent.³⁷

Armed with this evidence, Calmette emulated his idol, Louis Pasteur. In 1924, he presented his work to the Academy of Medicine, and it was immediately taken up by the medical press. He was inundated with requests from French physicians for samples of BCG, which he sent them free of charge, in return for the doctors' observations; he used the responses to supplement his findings from the Charité hospital. In 1927, he published the final results and went on a whirlwind publicity tour, insisting that BCG offered a safe and effective means to prevent what remained the leading cause of death in France.³⁸ As Christian Bonah has shown, for Calmette as for Pasteur, laboratory work took pride of place in establishing the worth of a medical procedure. Calmette allotted only a few pages of his major 1927 presentation of BCG to statistical evidence while devoting more than one hundred pages to his laboratory work. Although he hired statisticians to validate his experiments, he ultimately treated statistical evidence as an afterthought, useful only to compensate for the practical limitations on human experimentation and to lend support to his laboratory work.³⁹ This fits with Harry Marks's observation that in the United States, even "in laboratory disciplines that had long ago embraced quantification, researchers still [the 1950s] regarded a merely statistical study as intellectually inferior to a carefully planned out program of experimental investigation."⁴⁰

Even before Calmette published his final results, a violent controversy erupted. Criticism of his work emerged on two fronts. The first challenge, and the one he found most upsetting, came from a veterinarian trained at the Pasteur Institute, and a fellow member of the French Academy of Medicine. In 1927, José Lignières insisted that the absence of lesions found during an animal autopsy did not prove that BCG was innocuous. Recognizing that most subjects supported the vaccine, he suggested that a live vaccine might nevertheless pose a risk for an unquantifiable minority of people, especially those with compromised immune systems. He was rebuffed the following year by Calmette, who suggested that as a veterinarian, Lignières lacked the standing to engage in debate.⁴¹

A series of pediatricians and statisticians from Scandinavia and, especially, England issued a more damaging critique. They took immediate aim at Calmette's claim that 24 percent of infants born to parents with active TB would die within a year.

tubercle bacilli, preventing them from spreading through the body. At this point, the subject remains asymptomatic but will likely test tuberculin-positive. Unless treated with antibiotics, the infection will remain and may progress to active TB at a later date, often many years later, if the subject's immune system is compromised.

³⁷ Calmette, *La vaccination préventive contre la tuberculose par le "BCG,"* 206–210.

³⁸ Calmette, "Quelques notes sur ma vie et ma carrière"; and Calmette, *La vaccination préventive contre la tuberculose par le "BCG."*

³⁹ Bonah, *Histoire de l'expérimentation humaine*, 232–237.

⁴⁰ Marks, *The Progress of Experiment*, 137.

⁴¹ See the following series of articles by José Lignières: "Contribution à l'étude des qualités pathogènes du vaccin BCG contre la tuberculose," *Bulletin de l'Académie de médecine* 91, 3^{ème} série, no. 98 (session of July 26, 1927): 127–145; "Nouvelle contribution à l'étude des propriétés pathogènes du vaccin BCG et son application à la prophylaxie de la tuberculose," *ibid.* 92, 3^{ème} série, no. 99 (session of May 15, 1928): 512–529; and "Le vaccin BCG, bien que très atténué et sans action tuberculigène, reste encore trop pathogène pour l'espèce humaine," *ibid.* 92, 3^{ème} série, no. 100 (session of July 24, 1928): 865–878. For Calmette's reply, see *ibid.* (session of October 23, 1928): 1038–1048.

A careful study of unvaccinated children in a pair of Copenhagen dispensaries found an overall mortality rate of 7.7 percent within the first year, and a TB mortality rate of 4.9 percent. The authors corroborated their findings by comparing them with other contemporary studies, which had reached similar results. The magnitude of the reduction that Calmette claimed, from 24 percent to less than 1 percent, led others to wonder about selection bias: how did the children who received the vaccine compare to those who did not?⁴²

Perhaps the most searching questions came from University of London professor Major Greenwood, a central figure in the new field of epidemiology. How did Calmette select children to vaccinate? Were they separated from their parents long enough for the vaccine to take effect (as much as two months)? How were they fed and looked after? Different treatment in the first weeks of life, Greenwood asserted, could easily account for Calmette's findings. If the Copenhagen study was correct, and Greenwood thought that it was, the risk posed by TB was too small to measure with the sample sizes that Calmette had worked with, even if they were truly random.⁴³ His final conclusion was damning: "Dr. Calmette has deliberately appealed to the statistical method, and in my submission, his use of that method has been so gravely defective, that no confidence can be placed either in his statistical inferences or in the reliability of the data which he has assembled." In a similar vein, the Swedish pediatrician Arvid Wallgren accused Calmette of having gotten so carried away with enthusiasm for his new vaccine that he had overlooked the basic rules of logic.⁴⁴

BEFORE WORLD WAR I, SCIENTISTS would likely have solved this kind of standoff themselves. In this case, however, resolution came from a new international agency, the League of Nations Health Organization. For all that Calmette's hard-charging personality and the prestige of the Pasteur Institute had done to win over the French public, the international community remained hesitant about the new vaccine. The Health Organization operated on a shoestring budget. It lacked the legal standing or power to enforce its decisions. But that very weakness presented an opportunity: it conferred the appearance, at least, of neutrality, of objectivity, and thus the ability to arbitrate the competing claims of interested parties.⁴⁵ Moreover, widespread respect for its director, the charismatic Pasteur-trained Polish doctor Ludwik Rajchman, earned it considerable influence. Rajchman wanted to surpass the achievements of prewar international health organizations, which had been limited primarily to coordinating responses to epidemics. Distancing himself from his Anglo-French sponsors, he cultivated support from the Rockefeller Foundation to help guard his

⁴² The study, by R. Kjer-Petersen and J. Ostenveld, originally presented in the *Ugeskrift for Læger*, March 31, 1927, 257, is quoted in the *British Medical Journal*, May 7, 1927, 845–846.

⁴³ Major Greenwood, "Prophylactic Vaccination of the Newly Born against Tuberculosis," *British Medical Journal* 1, no. 3466 (June 11, 1927): 1082–1083.

⁴⁴ M. Greenwood, "Professor Calmette's Statistical Study of B.C.G. Vaccination," *British Medical Journal* 1, no. 3514 (May 12, 1928): 795; and Arvid Wallgren, "Observations critiques sur la vaccination antituberculeuse de Calmette," *Acta Paediatrica* 7, no. 3–4 (1927): 120–137, esp. 134–135. For a thorough analysis of these critiques, see Bonah, *Histoire de l'expérimentation humaine*, 244–285.

⁴⁵ Borowy points out that members of the Health Committee routinely informed their governments of goings-on in Geneva, and governments, in turn, routinely lobbied the committee; *Coming to Terms with World Health*, esp. 69.

independence and take the initiative in making public health policy. Unable to fund ambitious field programs, he endeavored instead to establish international standards for biological products and to have his Health Organization act as an international agency for sanitary reform.⁴⁶

The BCG controversy presented Rajchman and his colleagues with an ideal opportunity. On short notice, in the fall of 1928, the organization's Health Committee invited a select group of leading experts to take part in a conference on the status of the new vaccine. Who convinced Rajchman to call the meeting? Was it Greenwood, in an effort to establish the power of the new discipline of medical statistics? Did Wallgren approach the League to save what he thought was a useful vaccine from its critics and to advance his own alternative method of delivery? Rajchman's close friend and colleague Thorwald Madsen, director of the Health Committee and its program in medical standardization, as well as the Danish Statens Serum Institute (which produced BCG), was surely interested. Perhaps Calmette sought to use the League to put the criticism to rest? If so, his efforts to influence the selection process had no effect, much to his consternation. Rajchman and Madsen selected the experts from hospitals, government agencies, and research institutes, primarily in Europe. With the help of Yves Biraud, a specialist in medical statistics, they directed the panel to pay special attention to the kind of proof that would be required to determine the vaccine's protective power. In deference to Calmette, they held the event at Pasteur's campus in Paris.⁴⁷

The expert panel, chaired by Danish statistician Harald Westergaard, roundly dismissed Lignières's critique of BCG. After a thorough review of the literature, the committee issued an official report accepting all of Calmette's claims for safety. The years of intensive testing, without documented mishaps attributable to BCG, impressed the experts:

It seems reasonable to say that nearly everyone who has published on BCG, either on an experimental level or in veterinary or human practice, agrees that it is innocuous at the doses prescribed by Professor Calmette and his collaborators; that efforts to provoke active tuberculosis with BCG have failed and that the hypothesis of its spontaneous return to virulence, a hypothesis contradicted by observation up to the present, shall remain in the realm of pure speculation for the foreseeable future.⁴⁸

Rajchman's study commission was not willing to condemn years of work by one of Europe's leading scientists on the basis of conjecture.

Nor, however, were the international experts on the commission prepared to

⁴⁶ In addition to the works cited in fn. 3 above, see Marta A. Balinska, *For the Good of Humanity: Ludwik Rajchman, Medical Statesman*, trans. Rebecca Howell (Budapest, 1998).

⁴⁷ While the published minutes of the Health Committee indicate that Calmette proposed the conference, in private correspondence with Rajchman he had previously written that if Rajchman and Madsen were so inclined, he had no objection to a conference to study BCG; League of Nations Archives, Geneva [hereafter SDN], Organisation d'hygiène, Comité d'hygiène, *Procès-verbaux*, 12^e session, May 5, 1928, C.254.M.79, 43; Calmette to Rajchman, February 3, 1928. For Calmette's attempt to influence the selection process, see Calmette to Biraud, June 26, 1928; and for the selection process, see the correspondence between Biraud and Madsen, all in SDN 8A [General], ser. 552, cart. R5850. See also League of Nations Health Organization, *Report of the Technical Conference for the Study of Vaccination against Tuberculosis by Means of BCG* (Geneva, 1928).

⁴⁸ SDN, Organisation d'hygiène, Vaccination antituberculeuse par le BCG, typescript report, "Note sur l'innocuité du BCG," 30, SDN C.H./BCG/1-38 (1928-1929) [397].

accept the claims for the vaccine's efficacy. Greenwood's attack on Calmette's statistical reasoning earned their full support. The experts were merciless on the subject of selection bias. Calmette, they pointed out in unison, had never explained how he selected which children to vaccinate; nor could he account for which children his study followed. He minimized the mortality rate of vaccinated children with a series of apparently careless errors. In the absence of autopsies, many of the deaths he attributed to "other causes" could well have resulted from tuberculosis. While the report writers were willing to admit that the mortality rate among vaccinated children in France was probably lower than the rate for the general population, just how much lower was impossible to say.⁴⁹ At the end of the conference, a Commission of Expert Statisticians set out guidelines for future research, which were published and circulated widely, to avoid the pitfalls of Calmette's work. The most challenging section insisted:

It is essential to use the method of sampling in selecting experimental (vaccinated) and control (unvaccinated) groups, preferably by vaccinating alternate infants in tuberculous families, in which the factors referred to in the special Sub-Committee's report . . . are comparable.⁵⁰

The statistical committee went beyond consultation and the sharing of information, as earlier international meetings had typically done; it handed down guidelines that vaccine developers were expected to follow.⁵¹ This was hardly the crowning moment of Calmette's publicity tour, as historians of science have written.⁵² The microbiologist replied bitterly to a colleague at the League: "How could such supposedly intelligent men come up with *this*? I forget which moralist said that statistics is the official language of liars. I'm beginning to think he was right and that, in any event, we cannot allow statisticians to have the final word on BCG."⁵³

The League's effort to establish guidelines for clinical research marks an important milestone in relations between statisticians and medical researchers. Even in England, home to the most important national bureau of medical statistics, the Medical Research Council (MRC), most of whose members had been trained by one of the key figures of modern epidemiology, Karl Pearson, statisticians appear to have had very little influence over the design of clinical trials before World War II.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Ibid., typescript report, "Note sur l'efficacité prémunisante du BCG chez l'homme," esp. 10–35. See also the preparatory memoranda by Drs. Siegfried Rosenfeld (Ministry for Social Administration, Vienna) and Professor Carl Prausnitz (State Institute of Hygiene, Breslau), and correspondence from Greenwood, who recommended that any testing be conducted outside France, all in SDN C.H./BCG/1-38 (1928–1929) [397].

⁵⁰ League of Nations, Health Committee, published Minutes of the Fourteenth Session, May 2–8, 1929, "Statistical Appraisal of Data Concerning the Results of Vaccination by Means of BCG," 100, in SDN C.H./BCG/1-38 (1928–1929) [397].

⁵¹ Neill, "Paul Ehrlich's Colonial Connections," 61–62; and Howard-Jones, *The Scientific Background of the International Sanitary Conferences*.

⁵² Bonah, *Histoire de l'expérimentation humaine*, 243, claims that the League of Nations capped Calmette's publicity tour of 1927 by approving BCG. For a similar account, see Institut national de la santé et de la recherche médicale, *Tuberculose: Place de la vaccination dans la maîtrise de la maladie* (Paris, 2004), 116–117.

⁵³ Calmette to anonymous, duplicate letter, on Pasteur Institute letterhead, May 4, 1929, SDN 8A (General), ser. 5370, cart. R5890, doss. Tuberculosis, Vaccination by BCG, Correspondence with Pasteur Institute, Paris.

⁵⁴ Pearson had recently developed the chi square test, which remains fundamental to modern epidemiology, and his student Major Greenwood ran the statistical office. For Pearson, see Theodore M. Porter, *Karl Pearson: The Scientific Life in a Statistical Age* (Princeton, N.J., 2004). For the MRC's sta-

Doctors generally approached statisticians late in the day, to help minimize problems they encountered after experimental design was complete. Greenwood's student Austin Bradford Hill—who later designed the landmark trials of the antibiotic streptomycin (1948) and persuaded British clinicians to adopt the principles of controlled experimentation—wrote of his experience at the MRC in the 1920s and 1930s that he and Greenwood had “worked hard and well in correcting and improving the statistics in the reports the Council proposed to publish.”⁵⁵ Desirée Cox-Maksimov found no evidence of written consultation between statisticians and clinicians before the war.⁵⁶ As one wag put it, “like the pathologist, the statistician was consulted only after the damage was done,” to determine “what the experiment died of.”⁵⁷

The recommendations issued by the League statisticians in 1929 posed enormous problems for Calmette and compelled him to start over with the help of professional statisticians. As the League itself recognized, the experts presented what they considered to be best practices, but those practices were not necessarily feasible. Rajchman's staff pointed out to Calmette that a truly systematic study would face insurmountable legal and administrative barriers, not to mention resistance from French family doctors. In reply to a proposal from Calmette, an attempt to accommodate the new guidelines, the League asked him:

How do you plan to impose systematic vaccination on all children, even the premature or disabled in a district? How, moreover, do you plan to prevent doctors in the other [control] district from performing a vaccination they deem beneficial? It would be difficult to justify the legal obligation to vaccinate in one district since the non-vaccination in the other would highlight the experimental character of the operation.⁵⁸

Accommodating the League became even more important the following year. In 1930, seventy-six newborns died in Lübeck, Germany, after being inoculated with contaminated doses of BCG. The Pasteur Institute was ultimately absolved, but the catastrophe resulted in a lengthy trial, which dominated news coverage and exacerbated doubts about the vaccine. Even though Calmette had been experiencing serious health problems, he persevered. “I’ve begun working again,” he wrote to Charles Nicolle, the Nobel Prize-winning director of the Pasteur Institute in Tunis, “and cannot even think of rest. I have to go to Bern and Lausanne by train, to Bar-

tistical unit, see Edward Higgs, “Medical Statistics, Patronage and the State: The Development of the MRC Statistical Unit, 1911–1948,” *Medical History* 44 (2000): 323–340; Cox-Maksimov, “The Making of the Clinical Trial in Britain”; and Anne Hardy and M. Eileen Magnello, “Statistical Methods in Epidemiology: Karl Pearson, Ronald Ross, Major Greenwood and Austin Bradford Hill, 1900–1945,” *Sozial- und Präventivmedizin* 47, no. 2 (2002): 80–89.

⁵⁵ Austin Bradford Hill, “Introduction,” in Major Greenwood, *The Medical Dictator and Other Biographical Studies* (London, 1986), xi.

⁵⁶ Cox-Maksimov, “The Making of the Clinical Trial in Britain,” 208.

⁵⁷ That was no less than R. A. Fischer, the British geneticist who, along with Egon Pearson and Jerzy Neyman, helped develop the statistical theory of modern experimental design; quoted in Marks, *The Progress of Experiment*, 148. Hill urged that testing be carried out *before* doctors came to believe in a new treatment; A. Bradford Hill, “The Clinical Trial,” *British Medical Bulletin* 7 (1951): 279.

⁵⁸ SDN Health Section to Calmette, March 19, 1929, SDN 8A (General), ser. 5370, cart. R5890, doss. Tuberculosis, Vaccination by BCG, Correspondence with Pasteur Institute, Paris. Cf. Greenwood, “Professor Calmette’s Statistical Study of B.C.G. Vaccination,” 795.

celona on April 13, always for BCG . . . You know, I'm out there on the barricades. This is no time to let up."⁵⁹

Calmette turned first to the French army. In fact, he had done so even before opposition to BCG arose. When he began sending samples of the vaccine to interested doctors in 1924, he took the liberty of approaching the French army command. For years the Pasteur Institute and army medical staff tested African soldiers, who doctors thought were less likely to have been exposed to the disease, working out the dosage for subcutaneous delivery.⁶⁰ Perhaps in response to Greenwood and the League, Calmette carried out random trials with control groups in 1929, to achieve "acceptable" levels of side effects such as cold abscesses, which initially sent many to the hospital. One virtue of testing the new vaccine on soldiers was that Calmette encountered no resistance from civil doctors. Military leaders had no qualms about forcing troops, especially African troops, to serve as test subjects for the good of the service. Despite the army's help, however, the trials proved inconclusive. TB rates among soldiers were too low by the late 1920s for a determination to be made about whether the vaccine made any appreciable difference. The director of the army's vaccine program concluded that soldiers did not make the best test subjects; they were too well fed and too healthy: "tuberculosis is extremely rare in both groups [vaccinated and control]. Appropriate testing would need to take place under less favorable conditions" to produce meaningful results.⁶¹

To find less favorable conditions, Calmette looked to the colonies. As a former navy doctor and member of the medical staff for colonial troops, he had connections throughout the empire. He had played a central role in creating outposts of the Pasteur Institute in Saigon in 1904, as he had in Lille in 1895, and in reorganizing the Algiers Institute in 1909–1912. He had placed members at several other new overseas branches, including Tunis, Tangiers, and Dakar. Inaugurated in 1888 with a mix of private and public gifts and the proceeds from vaccine sales, the Pasteur Institute in Paris initially focused exclusively on rabies. Its activities quickly expanded, however, to include a mix of pure and applied sciences aimed at tackling all infectious diseases.⁶² The overseas Pasteur institutes were charged with applying the pure science developed in Paris, although scientists in the colonies often chafed at playing such a subordinate role. Researchers went overseas to make careers, hoping to profit from exotic locales by discovering new diseases or cures. Tuberculosis research was not a high priority among them, but it was Calmette's singular obses-

⁵⁹ Menut, "The Lübeck Catastrophe and Its Consequences for Anti-Tuberculosis BCG Vaccination"; and Calmette to Nicolle, February 21, 1930, IP, Fonds Nicolle, NIC.A.3, doss. Correspondance avec Albert Calmette. See also Calmette's letter to Nicolle, November 3, 1931, in the same dossier, which expresses his frustration over the Lübeck disaster's influence on public and expert opinion. On Nicolle, see Kim Pelis, *Charles Nicolle, Pasteur's Imperial Missionary: Typhus and Tunisia* (Rochester, N.Y., 2006).

⁶⁰ On the use of colonial troops during World War I, see Marc Michel, *L'appel à l'Afrique: Contributions et réactions à l'effort de guerre en A.O.F., 1914–1919* (Paris, 1982); Myron Echenberg, *Colonial Conscripts: The "Tirailleurs Sénégalais" in French West Africa, 1857–1960* (Portsmouth, N.H., 1991); and Richard S. Fogarty, *Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914–1918* (Baltimore, 2008).

⁶¹ C. Toullec to Calmette, January 26, 1932, quoted by Bonah, *Histoire de l'expérimentation humaine*, 340.

⁶² On the early history of the Pasteur Institute and its complex mix of private, public, and commercial activity, see Ilana Löwy, "On Hybridizations, Networks and New Disciplines: The Pasteur Institute and the Development of Microbiology in France," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 25, no. 5 (1994): 655–688.

sion. If he had little leverage with the likes of Nicolle, he enjoyed considerable influence elsewhere. Especially in Saigon and Algiers, directors had put aside their own work to devote themselves to Calmette's cause since the mid-1920s.

The Pasteur Institute in Saigon vaccinated huge numbers of children. According to an internal report, the local institute administered some eight hundred doses a week throughout Cochinchina in 1924–1925.⁶³ Over the next half-dozen years, nurses vaccinated some 300,000 infants, and by the 1930s they were vaccinating more than 100,000 per year.⁶⁴ However, as Calmette himself recognized all too well in the wake of his encounters with statisticians, the number of vaccinations mattered little as a brute fact on its own. Without centralized administrative records, what the French call *état-civil*, doctors had no means of tracking the people they vaccinated. Calmette remarked: “In effect, the absence of *état-civil* and the resulting impossibility of finding mothers and children among the masses constitute virtually insurmountable obstacles. It must be acknowledged, moreover, that hospital patients often register under assumed names and give false addresses,” thwarting any effort to study the effects of a vaccine, or any other treatment.⁶⁵

The northern coastal zone of Algeria was better served with the rudiments of an administrative state than more classically colonial territories. Unlike Indochina, Algeria had a functioning system of public records.⁶⁶ Its major cities—Oran, Constantine, Bône, and especially Algiers—with their predominantly European populations, enjoyed the most fully developed civil administration and public services in the empire outside the French mainland. After a pair of false starts, an 1882 law imposed the French *état-civil* on Algeria. Already in the late nineteenth century, French authorities had begun to create genealogical trees and to impose officially recognized names. Within a decade, they had recorded the names, birthdates, and marital status of more than 3 million Muslims; imperfect as it was, the civil bureaucracy in Algeria had been keeping basic administrative records for nearly fifty years by the time BCG became available.⁶⁷

The capital city of Algiers also suffered devastating levels of tuberculosis mortality. The disease began to alarm French colonial and medical authorities before the turn of the twentieth century. A member of the French Academy of Medicine, Victor Widal, told his colleagues in 1890:

It is impossible to say, in the end, if phthisis [tuberculosis] existed in our colony before the French occupation. We have no records on that score. What is certain is that, in the first years of the conquest, we saw some cases among our soldiers and settlers, but everything suggests

⁶³ J. Bablet, “Les vaccinations antituberculeuses des nourrissons par ingestion de BCG en Cochinchine (1924–25),” mimeo, n.d., IP, Fonds BCG, cart. 37, BCG dans les colonies.

⁶⁴ Laurence Monnais, “Preventive Medicine and ‘Mission Civilisatrice’: Uses of the BCG Vaccine in French Colonial Vietnam between the Two World Wars,” *International Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies* 2, no. 1 (2006): 57.

⁶⁵ Calmette, typed mimeo, n.d., doc. no. 10, IP, Fonds BCG, cart. 37, BCG dans les colonies.

⁶⁶ French Indochina did have the most sophisticated, most highly developed police force in the French Empire, especially its political branch. See Patrice Morlat, *La répression coloniale au Vietnam, 1908–1940* (Paris, 1990).

⁶⁷ E. Cornu, *Guide pratique pour la constitution de l'état civil des indigènes* (Algiers, 1889); and Charles-Robert Ageron, *Les algériens musulmans et la France, 1871–1919*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1968), 1: 176–183.

that the root of the problem was not encountered in Algeria but brought from France . . . [I]f it can't be proven that we imported phthisis, we have at least helped propagate it.⁶⁸

He went on to note that during his nearly twelve years in Algeria, from 1853 to 1867, he had seen no more than perhaps twenty cases of pulmonary tuberculosis. Since then, however, there had been a dramatic increase.⁶⁹ TB constituted 2 percent of reported deaths in Algiers in 1838, 7.5 percent in 1860, and 14.7 percent, on average, for the years from 1900 to 1905.⁷⁰ By 1913, the general mortality rate in the Algiers Kasbah, where most Muslims lived, had reached 380 per 10,000, with TB the leading cause.⁷¹

As in so many other areas, World War I magnified trends that were already under way. Tuberculosis mortality exploded during and then again after the war. Rudimentary statistics for tuberculosis become available in Europe only in the late nineteenth century. Doctors were not required to report TB cases in France until 1964, and recordkeeping in the colonies was always unreliable. Mortality rates in French Algeria must therefore be taken as orders of magnitude and not precise indicators, more trustworthy for European citizens than for Muslim subjects. In this regard, local hospital records can help establish rough benchmarks. According to the records for Algiers, provided by the director of the city's TB program at the Mustapha Hospital, the disease routinely accounted for less than 15 percent of hospital deaths for Europeans in the city in the 1920s; the Muslim share was consistently more than twice that number, hovering just over 30 percent in the same time period.⁷² This ratio of 2:1—two Muslims dying of TB for every one European in a hospital setting—must have been lower than the ratio in Algeria as a whole. Given the glaring inequalities in access to medical care, it seems likely that a much greater percentage of European TB patients ended up in hospitals when they got sick, and thus the disparity in TB mortality rates between Europeans and Muslims was even wider than that 2:1 ratio. TB rates recorded for European settlers in Algiers were roughly the same as those in Paris at the time, which seems plausible. If those figures are correct, the Muslim rate was almost certainly greater than 50 per 10,000, and probably reached much higher levels. Referring to the TB epidemic, the head of the city's health office (the Bureau d'hygiène), Dr. Lemaire, said that "anyone who lives in the Kasbah has cut his life expectancy in half."⁷³ One of Lemaire's students recalled in his medical thesis: "We often diagnosed pulmonary phthisis just by listening to them cough and an affirmative response to the question, 'Have you been in France?'"⁷⁴ By the mid-1930s, 95 percent of Muslims who had traveled to France and back tested tuberculin-

⁶⁸ Vidal "Sur la prophylaxie de la tuberculose," *Bulletin de l'Académie de Médecine*, 3rd ser., vol. 23 (session of January 7, 1890), 9, 13.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁷⁰ Dr. Gillot, "Progression de la tuberculose en Algérie," in *Congrès international de la tuberculose, tenu à Paris du 2 au 7 octobre 1905*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1906), 1: 550.

⁷¹ The municipal record leaves the percentage of TB mortality unspecified in the breakdown by *arrondissement*. Ville d'Alger, *Compte rendu des travaux du Bureau municipal d'hygiène pour 1912 et 1913* (Algiers, 1914), 107.

⁷² A. Lévi-Valensi, "La tuberculose pulmonaire chez l'indigène musulman algérien (adulte)," *Algérie médicale*, 4th ser., 37, no. 66 (June 1933): 347–392.

⁷³ Dr. Gaston Lemaire, quoted by his student André Albou, *Étude sur la tuberculose des travailleurs indigènes algériens dans les grandes villes: France et Algérie—De son expansion des centres vers les campagnes* (Algiers, 1930), 28.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 13.

Tuberculosis Mortality in Algiers




TABLE 1: From A. Lévi-Valensi, "La tuberculose pulmonaire chez l'indigène musulman," *Algérie médicale*, 4th ser., 37, no. 66 (June 1933): 356.

positive.⁷⁵ The settler government proved deaf to appeals to address TB until it appeared the disease might spread to European neighborhoods.⁷⁶

Whether or not their mortality rates reached the recorded highs, the Muslims of Algiers clearly experienced one of the great TB epidemics of the twentieth century, obscured by population growth in Algeria as a whole.⁷⁷ If the figures recorded by the health office—which were routinely cited by well-informed local doctors—are correct, they are staggering: in the 1920s, Muslims in Algiers were four to five times more likely than Europeans to die of TB.⁷⁸ The levels at which Muslims suffered tuberculosis were comparable to those among blacks in South Africa at the height

⁷⁵ Although the authors do not cite the sample size for this cell of their table, it appears to have been several thousand. F. Trens, "Étude de l'infection tuberculeuse chez les indigènes de la Grande Kabylie par la cuti-réaction à la tuberculine," *Archives de l'Institut Pasteur d'Algérie* 12, no. 2 (June 1934): 198.

⁷⁶ At that point, in the mid-1930s, they looked to the North African services on the French mainland as a model. See Archives Nationales de l'Algérie, Algiers [hereafter ANA], materials on the Commission de la tuberculose in series 17E cartons 660, 662, and 663. For the reference to the metropolitan services, see "Assistance et préservation anti-tuberculeuse indigène," n.d. (1933?), page 8, in carton 663, folder 1. On the Paris services, see Clifford Rosenberg, *Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control between the Wars* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2006), chap. 7.

⁷⁷ Louis Chevalier, *Le problème démographique nord-africain* (Paris, 1947); and Kamel Kateb, *Européens, "indigènes" et juifs en Algérie (1830–1962): Représentations et réalités des populations* (Paris, 2001).

⁷⁸ Lemaire claimed that Muslims were six times more likely to be infected and suffered mortality rates three times higher than Europeans. He based that claim on different, less deadly, years in "La lutte contre la tuberculose en Algérie," *Algérie médicale*, 4th ser., 37, no. 67 (July 1933): 487.

of the mining boom and apartheid years, in terms of both the TB mortality rate (in devastated areas) and the disparity between dominant and subaltern groups; and they were greater than the 66 per 10,000 suffered by the Parisian Communards during the Prussian siege of 1870–1871 and the 60 per 10,000 Jews who died of TB in the Warsaw Ghetto in 1942.⁷⁹

When the statistical experts at the League of Nations asked for random groups of subjects living in areas with rampant tuberculosis who could be monitored over a period of years, Algeria was the only place in the French Empire where it was practical to undertake such work. The Pasteur Institute provided vaccines and laboratory services, as local branches did elsewhere. Leading Pasteur scientists worked with the medical faculty in Algiers: they helped train doctors and collaborated in public health campaigns. Those ties enabled Calmette to enlist the colonial government's help where others, offering vastly greater resources, had failed. The director of public health services in Algeria, the indefatigable Lucien Raynaud, sought out the support of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1923 for his chronically underfunded office. The director of the Rockefeller Foundation's International Health Board in New York, Frederick Russell, showed immediate interest and dispatched his deputy, Selskar Gunn, to Algeria the next fall. Gunn spent three weeks in Algeria and returned an enthusiastic advocate.⁸⁰ Raynaud clearly made a good impression. Richard Pearce, who accompanied Gunn, noted in his diary: "Raynaud in public health is a corker—splendid administrator and excellent grasp of problems, but he finds Government slow to furnish funds for anything not already on paper."⁸¹ This auspicious start soon collapsed, when the new Socialist governor-general of Algeria, Maurice Violette, proved wary of outside influences and dissuaded Raynaud from working with the Americans.⁸² He could not, however, turn down Calmette's advances. With the help of the French government in Algeria, Calmette took a haphazard vaccine program like the ones in Indochina, in Senegal, and on the French mainland and, by 1935, turned it into a random trial with a control group that continued into the 1950s.

UNLIKE THE CADASTRAL SURVEYS and censuses carried out by the British Raj after the 1857 mutiny or the state-sponsored urban reform projects in Morocco following World War I, the Algiers BCG trial was run by a para-public research institute. If it took advantage of inequalities wrought by the French presence in Algeria, this was

⁷⁹ Dubos and Dubos, *The White Plague*, 191, report rates of 900 per 10,000 at the Qu'Appelle Valley Reservation in western Canada without providing a date or source; see p. 195 for the Warsaw Ghetto. On the Paris Commune, see David S. Barnes, *The Making of a Social Disease: Tuberculosis in Nineteenth-Century France* (Berkeley, Calif., 1995), 7; and for South African blacks, Randall M. Packard, *White Plague, Black Labor: Tuberculosis and the Political Economy of Health and Disease in South Africa* (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), 34–38, 83–89, 145, 160, 212.

⁸⁰ Selskar M. Gunn, "Public Health in Algeria," typescript report (1925), Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, N.Y. [hereafter RAC], Record Group 6.1, Paris Field Office, Pre-war Correspondence, ser. 1.3, box 45, fol. 521.

⁸¹ Pearce Diary, February 7–8, 1925, RAC, International Health Board Record Group 1.2, ser. 501, box 234, fol. 2996.

⁸² Gunn to Russell, letter no. 441, October 15, 1925, *ibid.* For Violette's instructions to Raynaud, see the manuscript note dated October 7, 1925, on the letterhead of the Cabinet du Secrétaire Général, Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie, in ANA 17E 663, folder 1.

no “high modernist” attempt to mark boundaries or remake the world.⁸³ It was a defensive effort to respond to scientific critics and would-be regulators.

The Pasteur Institute in Algiers had created a lab to produce BCG before controversy erupted in Europe, around the same time Calmette gave his work-in-progress lecture at the Academy of Medicine (1924). For the first few years, the local branch of the Pasteur Institute gave samples to doctors and veterinarians who requested them, and began recording their own efforts at shelters and dispensaries in several cities. In the wake of the public controversies of 1927–1928 and the Lübeck catastrophe, Yves Biraud, director of epidemiology at the League of Nations, joined the team in Algiers. Biraud had worked with Calmette before, reviewing and helping to present the initial statistical evidence that Calmette published in 1927 to buttress his laboratory work. Now the microbiologist called in Biraud, the statistician, in the initial stages to help design the study.⁸⁴

Under Biraud’s watch, the Algiers team limited their purview. Instead of working with dispensaries wherever they could find them, they concentrated on the Kasbah, with a population density of more than 2,000 people per hectare.⁸⁵ The authors asserted that focusing on a single poor neighborhood reduced the possibility of selection bias. All of the families there endured the same grinding poverty. Children had no opportunity to escape to a wet nurse or a healthy environment in the countryside. During the three years of the study, 4,260 children were born in the second *arrondissement*. The team vaccinated more than half of them, then compared their mortality over time to that of the unvaccinated, as a control. At this stage, they calculated that BCG decreased the general mortality rate by 29 percent for the first year of life.⁸⁶

In 1935, the Algiers team moved to a fully randomized trial with a control group. Following the League’s guidelines, Pasteur researchers published their research plan. The vaccine would be administered by mouth to newborns in their homes, “under medical conditions,” with revaccinations at specified intervals: at one, three, seven, and fifteen years of age. All procedures would be followed “like a laboratory experiment.” The campaign would cover more than 40,000 subjects, more than 20,000 vaccinated and another 20,000 unvaccinated as a control, over the course of a generation.⁸⁷

The scope of the study bears comment. While James Lind famously conducted

⁸³ See Rabinow, *French Modern*; Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism*; Cohn, *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays*; and Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge*. On high modernism, see James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, Conn., 1998).

⁸⁴ Biraud was, notably, the author of the *Preliminary Report on the Causes of the Recent Decline of Tuberculosis Mortality*, Health Committee doc. no. 291 (Geneva, 1925); he had served as an independent expert for Calmette’s initial studies of BCG on the mainland, and would later become the director of epidemiology for the World Health Organization. See fn. 8 above on the Algiers branch of the Pasteur Institute.

⁸⁵ To be precise, 2,255 per hectare in 1926. René Lespès, *Alger: Étude de géographie et d’histoire urbaines* (Paris, 1930).

⁸⁶ Edmond Sergent, Henriette Ducros-Rougebief, and Yves Biraud, “Enquête sur les résultats de la vaccination antituberculeuse par le BCG dans la Casba d’Alger dans les années 1931–1932–1933,” *Archives de l’Institut Pasteur d’Algérie* 14, no. 1 (March 1936): 1–5.

⁸⁷ Édmond Sergent, A. Catanei, and Henriette Ducros-Rougebief, “Prémunition antituberculeuse par le BCG: Campagne poursuivie depuis 1935 sur 21,244 nouveau-nés vaccinés et 20,063 non-vaccinés, première note,” *Archives de l’Institut Pasteur d’Algérie* 32, no. 1 (March 1954): 2.

a controlled test on the use of lemons in the treatment of scurvy in the 1740s, the first semi-random experimental trial was carried out in Denmark in the 1890s: Johannes Fibiger gave diphtheria antitoxin to several hundred patients on successive days. In the twentieth century, between the world wars, the British MRC struggled to coordinate semi-random trials of serum treatment for pneumonia in several research settings in England and Scotland, applying the same methods Fibiger had used a generation earlier.⁸⁸ In the United States, the Cooperative Clinical Group, a collaborative effort to evaluate syphilis treatments, struggled to construct a sample of 150 patients in the 1920s.⁸⁹ The Algiers BCG trial was the largest trial yet attempted that was coordinated in a single setting, and its randomization was the most sophisticated until the MRC's streptomycin trials after World War II.

The Algiers Pasteur Institute worked in the Kasbah, taking advantage of the neighborhood's poverty in a way that Calmette had not been able to do with African soldiers in France: "With families this destitute, this malnourished, over-crowded and vulnerable to the elements, the risk of disease is extreme. Mortality rates, not only from tuberculosis but from all pulmonary and intestinal afflictions . . . , are extremely high. The slightest reduction in general mortality, coincident with the use of BCG, would be highly significant."⁹⁰ Here the reference is not to the moral impact of success, but to the statisticians' complaints about trials involving African soldiers, in which almost no one in the control group got sick. There was no discussion of the ethical problems posed by working in the Kasbah.

A team of certified visiting nurses—European women, most likely from the French mainland—administered the vaccinations.⁹¹ At first there were only two nurses, but by 1946 there were fourteen, working in teams of two or three. On appointed afternoons, the nurses noted the names and addresses of all newborns declared by Muslim families the day before at their local city hall. The governor-general of Algeria had no hesitation about granting the Pasteur Institute (illegal) access to Muslim families' personal records, which was essential so that a random sample could be created. The nurses wrote down the names in a special register and numbered them: even numbers were vaccinated with BCG; odd numbers were observed as a control. The nurses contacted the families and administered the oral vaccine the following morning; then they returned to administer two successive doses with two days in between. They visited and observed the control group on the same timetable, without giving a placebo. In both cases (vaccinated and non-vaccinated), the nurses referred patients to local clinics for any health problems they discovered. "Very quickly," the authors noted, "the mothers appreciated the solicitude shown them, and when a child is born in their neighborhood, they wait for the nurse to come and then follow her."⁹²

The Muslim reaction to the vaccination effort remains difficult to assess. Al-

⁸⁸ Accepting patients for a trial on alternating days to achieve a random sample can introduce bias if doctors know which days count toward their study.

⁸⁹ See Marks, *The Progress of Experiment*, 59.

⁹⁰ Sergent, Catanei, and Ducros-Rougebief, "Prémunition antituberculeuse par le BCG," 2.

⁹¹ The French government in Algeria began to recruit and train Muslim women as nurses in 1935: Gouvernement général de l'Algérie, Direction de la santé publique, *Recrutement et formation des infirmières-visiteuses indigènes* (Algiers, 1935). Formal standards for nurse training emerged in the early twentieth century. Most nurses in Algeria came from Catholic mission organizations.

⁹² Sergent, Catanei, and Ducros-Rougebief, "Prémunition antituberculeuse par le BCG," 4.

though authors of Pasteur reports had every reason to want to convey the impression that there was minimal resistance, there are grounds to believe that the Muslim community in the Kasbah accepted their efforts. The French police did not record any trace of discontent in their routine reports on Muslim opinion.⁹³ Nor was any recorded in the popular press.⁹⁴ Algerian Muslims had a long familiarity with French medicine, dating back to the smallpox vaccination campaigns in Algiers in the 1830s; before then, variolation had been common practice in the countryside. Yvonne Turin points out that if Muslims resented those earlier vaccination efforts, their protests were no stronger than those of French settlers and other Europeans. By the late nineteenth century, moreover, she notes that the use of Muslim vaccinators eased any residual tensions, and she counts vaccination as the most successful effort by the French to spread their values to the Maghreb:

With respect to [smallpox] vaccination, for example, it is clear that the Arab population did not rush—did Europeans?—to demand immunization for their children. But there was, all the same, the experience of Arab vaccinators, and especially after 1870, the wave of “rumors” seems to disappear.⁹⁵

Pasteur researchers also benefited, perhaps unwittingly, from an ongoing publicity campaign in favor of the vaccine that had been launched several years before their study got under way in a systematic manner. Calmette was already convinced that BCG was safe and effective, and he wanted to vaccinate as many children as possible. Several clinics and a dispensary near the Kasbah had begun vaccinating children in the late 1920s, so BCG was not unknown. The public health office supported them by plastering the following tract, in Arabic, on the walls of buildings in the Kasbah, publishing it in the local Arabic press, and handing it out to families:

PROTECT YOUR CHILDREN AGAINST TUBERCULOSIS

Everyone knows this is a terrible disease, and its contagiousness is undeniable. In your families, in your houses, a person with tuberculosis poses a real danger to everyone, especially young children. Do not hesitate to vaccinate them against this disease. *The vaccine that has been discovered by the French savants MM. Calmette and Guérin is absolutely safe . . .*

Spread this information broadly in your neighborhood. Good health is a right for rich and poor alike. Thousands of French children have been vaccinated, and more are vaccinated every day. *These are not trials that are being carried out*; we want your children to benefit from the progress of French medicine. Just as you vaccinate your children against smallpox, do the same to protect them from the terrible tuberculosis.⁹⁶

The tract said that BCG was the standard of care, the pride of the French medical establishment. It also insisted that the testing phase for the vaccine was complete.

⁹³ Gouvernement général d'Algérie, “Rapport sur la situation politique et administrative des indigènes,” quarterly, 1920–1925, Archives Nationales de la France, Centre d'Archives d'Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence, 11 H 46 and 47.

⁹⁴ Amrith found no press reports of resistance to BCG vaccination in post–World War II India; *Decolonizing Public Health*, 142.

⁹⁵ Yvonne Turin, *Affrontements culturels dans l'Algérie coloniale: Écoles, médecines, religion, 1830–1880* (Paris, 1971), 408.

⁹⁶ French translation in Madeleine Forgeot, *La tuberculose pulmonaire chez les nourrissons arabes et kabyles à Alger* (thèse de médecine, University of Algiers, 1930), 93, emphasis added.

Indeed, Calmette had claimed no less to anyone who would listen during his publicity tour several years earlier.⁹⁷

Compliance rates were initially high, and the ability of the Pasteur teams to follow subjects over decades suggests that there was at least a bare minimum of acceptance, if not more. According to Pasteur reports, the scientists expanded their study outside the Kasbah—that is, they changed the scope of the study and compromised its statistical power—at the request of mothers from nearby neighborhoods who saw the teams from across the street and wanted their children to have access to the new vaccine.⁹⁸ It no doubt helped that the trial was run by a metropolitan research institute, with metropolitan nurses, as opposed to male representatives of the settler government, who tended to blame the local inhabitants for conditions in the Kasbah and the TB crisis. At least two contemporary medical theses corroborate the institute's claim that families welcomed them with open arms, and Pasteur researchers themselves noted quite candidly years later, during the Algerian War, that they had lost public confidence.⁹⁹ The institute called off the trial when Algerian nationalists assassinated the nurses' driver in 1956.¹⁰⁰

The Algiers BCG trial ran for twenty-six years, yielding encouraging but not definitive results. Working with larger samples and avoiding the selection bias of earlier studies produced more sober numbers, generally showing that the mortality rate in the first year was roughly 3 percent lower for the vaccinated than for the control group. Given the numbers of people sampled and the extremely high general mortality rate, that was a significant improvement. The protection conferred, moreover, appeared impressive for the youngest age groups—BCG cut the general mortality rate by nearly 60 percent for children below the age of 11. It is critical to stress, however, that the scientists never showed what part a decline in TB mortality played in that larger trend.¹⁰¹

THE ALGIERS TRIAL RAISES far-reaching ethical questions. Unlike sleeping sickness or malaria, TB remained a major problem on the French mainland in the interwar years: the Pasteur Institute went to Algeria exclusively for political expediency. Calmette and his colleagues violated the confidentiality of Algerian Muslims' personal records (*état-civil*) and, it appears, failed to obtain informed consent as well. The sources are

⁹⁷ It also calls into question the Pasteur Institute's ability to abide by the guidelines that League statisticians imposed. The same policies that made testing difficult on the mainland may have skewed results in Algiers. Giving out BCG free of charge to any doctor or clinic that requested it surely tainted the control group. Although Geneviève Bottin notes that the Kasbah was a living laboratory for the Pasteur Institute, she also notes that every child in the Mustapha Hospital maternity ward was vaccinated and lists a range of dispensaries, doctors, midwives, and clinics that vaccinated thousands. It remains unclear whether the Pasteur Institute stopped sending BCG to those groups once their study got under way. Bottin, *Prophylaxie de la tuberculose infantile en Algérie* (thèse de médecine, University of Algiers, 1941), 81–83.

⁹⁸ Sergent, Catanei, and Ducros-Rougebieff provide no explanation for the decision, saying only that they granted mothers' wishes; "Prémunition antituberculeuse par le BCG," 3.

⁹⁹ Forgeot, *La tuberculose pulmonaire chez les nourrissons arabes et kabyles à Alger*; and Bottin, *Prophylaxie de la tuberculose infantile en Algérie*.

¹⁰⁰ IP, IPO.B 1 (1956).

¹⁰¹ To do so would have required autopsies and raised the cost of the study. Sergent, Catanei, and Ducros-Rougebieff, "Prémunition antituberculeuse par le BCG," 131–137.

notably silent, for example, on the subject of the propaganda campaign on behalf of BCG before the trial began. Researchers viewed the trial as a service to the Muslim community and gave no thought to any special protections that might be appropriate in a study carried out on such a vulnerable population. In response to powerful taboos against experiments on healthy human subjects, Pasteur researchers failed in Algiers, as they had on the mainland, to provide clear statements about their study's intent. They took advantage of their subjects' poverty and the absence of independent general practitioners ultimately for their own ends. It is critical to stress that informed consent was not included in formal ethical guidelines until after World War II, and Pasteur researchers took advantage of poor patients in the Charité maternity ward as well. The initial study of BCG vaccination in Paris made no mention of consent, although Calmette felt compelled to suggest that he had obtained it when he presented his work in Paris for public approval (but not in Algiers), suggesting that scientists appreciated the principle before its formal adoption.¹⁰² The major difference was that running the BCG trial in Algiers allowed the Pasteur team to withhold treatment from patients and create a valid statistical control.

By the standards of its day, before the Nuremberg Code (1947) or the Declaration of Helsinki (1964), the human experiment carried out in Algiers was relatively benign.¹⁰³ Western scientists provided access to cutting-edge care that had virtually no side effects with oral delivery and that significantly reduced the death toll in a very deadly neighborhood. They did not inoculate children with tuberculosis, as Austrian doctors did as the Algiers trial was being carried out.¹⁰⁴ They did not impose lumbar punctures or inject patients with Atoxyl, an arsenic-based drug that can cause blindness, as their Pasteur colleague Eugène Jamot did when he was competing with German scientists to find a cure for sleeping sickness in sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁰⁵ But the Algiers BCG trial did anticipate some of the moral problems raised by AIDS research in contemporary Africa and Asia. Most of the ethical debate has centered on the use of placebos and the withholding of a known effective treatment—a long course of zidovudine (AZT)—to see whether a short course could reduce mother-to-child transmission of HIV infection; some scholars and activists have challenged

¹⁰² On informed consent, see Ruth R. Faden and Tom L. Beauchamp, *A History and Theory of Informed Consent* (New York, 1986). On the initial trials at the Charité, see fn. 1 above; on Calmette's presentation of those results for a broad public audience, see *La vaccination préventive contre la tuberculose par le "BCG,"* esp. 186.

¹⁰³ George J. Annas and Michael A. Grodin, eds., *The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code: Human Rights in Human Experimentation* (Oxford, 1992); Paul Weindling, "The Origins of Informed Consent: The International Scientific Commission on Medical War Crimes, and the Nuremberg Code," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 75, no. 1 (2001): 37–71; and Ulf Schmidt and Andreas Frewer, eds., *History and Theory of Human Experimentation: The Declaration of Helsinki and Modern Medical Ethics* (Stuttgart, 2007).

¹⁰⁴ Matthias Dahl, "'... deren Lebenserhaltung für die Nation keinen Vorteil bedeutet': Behinderte Kinder als Versuchsobjekte und die Entwicklung der Tuberkulose-Schutzimpfung," *Medizinhistorisches Journal* 37, no. 1 (2002): 57–90.

¹⁰⁵ Jean-Pierre Dozon, "Quand les Pastoriens traquaient la maladie du sommeil," *Sciences sociales et santé* 3, no. 3–4 (1985): 27–56; and the works cited in fn. 18 above. For human subject research more broadly, see Wolfgang U. Eckart, ed., *Man, Medicine, and the State: The Human Body as an Object of Government Sponsored Medical Research in the 20th Century* (Stuttgart, 2006); Bonah, *Histoire de l'expérimentation humaine*; Susan E. Lederer, *Subjected to Science: Human Experimentation in America before the Second World War* (Baltimore, 1995); and Jordan Goodman, Anthony McElligott, and Lara Marks, eds., *Useful Bodies: Humans in the Service of Medical Science in the Twentieth Century* (Baltimore, 2003).

the validity of consent obtained in developing countries. But there were other questions raised by the AZT trials that have become increasingly important in the years since they were carried out. Ethicists began to move beyond a procedural emphasis on informed consent and clinical practice. They have increasingly emphasized the risk that research subjects assume and the value they contribute to drug development, insisting that trial subjects receive fair benefits, if not delivery of the proven interventions that their participation helped create. The 2001 Hastings Center Conference on Ethical Aspects of Research in Developing Countries stressed that “as the benefits to the sponsors, researchers, and others outside the population increase, the benefits to the host population should also increase.”¹⁰⁶ These considerations have become pressing around the world in recent years with the dramatic growth in industry-sponsored trials in developing countries, as clinical research increasingly serves as a surrogate for underfunded state healthcare systems.

COLONIES AND QUASI-COLONIAL TERRITORIES such as Algeria were useful to reformers not because they were empty but because they offered unique opportunities. They brought together authoritarian governments willing to overlook their subjects’ interests in a way that no democratic state could, often unique ecological conditions, and, in some instances, cutting-edge technical capacity. Recent debates about colonial modernity show no signs of abating, in large part because the combination of those variables, and of local state resources, has varied widely. The most influential work on colonial reform projects has concentrated on extreme cases—state-sponsored urbanism and population policy, on the one hand, and penitentiaries, on the other.¹⁰⁷

Responding to powerful international pressure, the Algiers BCG trial fit between those extremes. The initial impetus for running a randomized trial with a control came from pragmatic reformers with ties to Geneva. They initiated a public debate about the relative weight that should be accorded to different kinds of technical expertise. Calmette’s answer to their challenge, the Algiers trial, bought him time and goodwill. That response, and the Pasteur Institute’s decision to bring Health Committee epidemiologists on board, not only to review data but to help design trials from the outset, kept international experts from turning against the new vaccine when they were ready to do so. It also, inadvertently, reinforced the League’s au-

¹⁰⁶ For the initial AZT controversy, see fn. 20 above. For works insisting that research subjects and their communities be compensated for their contribution to trials, see Peter Wilmshurst, “Scientific Imperialism: If They Won’t Benefit from the Findings, Poor People in the Developing World Shouldn’t Be Used in Research,” *British Medical Journal* 314, no. 7084 (1997): 840–841; Ezekiel J. Emanuel, David Wendler, Jack Killen, and Christine Grady, “What Makes Clinical Research in Developing Countries Ethical? The Benchmarks of Ethical Research,” *Journal of Infectious Diseases* 189, no. 5 (2004): 930–937; Jennifer S. Hawkins and Ezekiel J. Emanuel, eds., *Exploitation and Developing Countries: The Ethics of Clinical Research* (Princeton, N.J., 2008); and the collective statement by participants in the 2001 Conference on Ethical Aspects of Research in Developing Countries, “Moral Standards for Research in Developing Countries: From ‘Reasonable Availability’ to ‘Fair Benefits,’” *Hastings Center Report* 34, no. 3 (2004): 17–27, quote from 22.

¹⁰⁷ In addition to the works cited in fn. 10 above, see Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley, Calif., 2002); Nicholas B. Dirks, *The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006); Zinoman, *The Colonial Bastille*; and Dikötter and Brown, *Cultures of Confinement*.

thority to define standards for clinical trials at the expense of French voters and, especially, family doctors, who resented challenges to their clinical judgment.

Calmette's ability to call upon associates in Algiers and throughout the French Empire suggests the need to rethink basic assumptions about French colonialism. The same kinds of social and political inequality that enabled "specific intellectuals" to conduct experiments overseas created opportunities for Parisian mandarins as well.¹⁰⁸ The French colonies were not as isolated from metropolitan conflicts, patronage networks, and patterns of influence as most work on colonial modernity has contended. But Algeria did serve as a laboratory in this case for a human experiment that combined traditional paternalism with a kind of medical modernity in complex and contradictory ways. By falling back on national, colonial, and quasi-colonial resources, Calmette was able to parry a threat posed by a newly powerful international agency. He was able to overcome practical and political challenges to vaccine testing on an unprecedented scale.

The Algiers trial failed to provide conclusive proof of BCG's efficacy, but it cemented a lasting partnership with the League of Nations. After World War II, doctors at the much more powerful and better-funded World Health Organization, the League Health Organization's successor, worked with Calmette's successors at the Pasteur Institute to conduct massive BCG vaccination campaigns throughout North Africa and in dozens of countries around the world.¹⁰⁹ The vaccine was inexpensive and easier to administer than any other form of TB control, and it appeared to offer a significant, if unspecified, level of protection. It fit the postwar fascination with technology and its power to reshape the world in the era of eradication campaigns.¹¹⁰ The postwar campaigns were among the largest undertakings in the World Health Organization's history.¹¹¹ Despite continued doubts over its protective powers, which remain uncertain, Calmette's vaccine is still one of the most widely used in the world, administered to roughly 100 million children every year.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ "Specific intellectuals" is from Rabinow, *French Modern*.

¹⁰⁹ Calmette died in 1933.

¹¹⁰ Randall Packard, "No Other Logical Choice": Global Malaria Eradication and the Politics of International Health in the Postwar Era," *Parassitologia* 40, no. 1–2 (1998): 217–229.

¹¹¹ World Health Organization, Tuberculosis Research Office, *Mass BCG Vaccination Campaigns, 1948–1951* (Copenhagen, 1954); and Niels Brimnes, "BCG Vaccination and WHO's Global Strategy for Tuberculosis Control, 1948–1983," *Social Science & Medicine* 67, no. 5 (2008): 863–873.

¹¹² Results have varied widely, from a finding of no protection at all to rates as high as 80 percent. The largest study carried out to date, the Chingleput study in southern India in the 1970s, found that BCG offered no protection. There are several explanations for the disparate results. Different studies have used different doses. Even if dosages were kept constant, BCG is a live vaccine, produced at several sites around the world. Before the technology to freeze-dry standardized seed lots became available in the 1960s, several distinct versions of the vaccine had evolved from the original source in Paris. Each version is now referred to by origin: BCG (Paris), BCG (Trice), BCG (Montreal), and BCG (Copenhagen), among others. Some epidemiologists speculate that exposure to other environmental mycobacteria—the genus of bacteria that includes TB—creates a non-specific immune response against all mycobacteria, and thus BCG does not provide any additional benefit. The lowest results have generally been found in southern latitudes with dense mycobacterial populations (e.g., Chingleput and the U.S. state of Georgia); studies in the United Kingdom, by contrast, have consistently shown high levels of protection, ranging from 50 to 80 percent. Finally, population geneticists have found variable levels of susceptibility to tuberculosis. A thorough review of the medical literature concluded that BCG confers "over 50 percent [protection], on average"; G. A. Colditz, C. S. Berkey, F. Mosteller, T. F. Brewer, M. E. Wilson, E. Burdick, and H. V. Fineberg, "The Efficacy of Bacillus Calmette-Guérin Vaccination of Newborns and Infants in the Prevention of Tuberculosis: Meta-Analyses of the Published Literature," *Pediatrics* 96, no. 1 (1995): 29–35. See also their "Efficacy of BCG Vaccine in the Prevention of Tu-



FIGURE 2. A non-postal stamp (1948) sold by the private Comité national de défense contre la tuberculose to raise money for their TB program, sponsored by Nestlé. © Pasteur Institute.

The very success of controlled clinical trials as a means of evaluating medical interventions poses great challenges today. Human testing is the most expensive part of vaccine development, and the available pool of research subjects is shrinking in saturated Western markets. Pharmaceutical companies have responded to these pressures and the demands of regulatory agencies by shifting their trials from disadvantaged domestic groups to poor countries overseas.¹¹³ As in interwar Algiers, clinical trials in developing countries often offer the only means that sick people have to obtain basic medical care, blurring the already fuzzy distinction between research and treatment. Basic moral questions remain unresolved: Who assumes the risk in vaccine and drug development? Who benefits? How are health resources allocated between rich and poor countries, and between rich and poor communities more generally? Like many pharmaceutical companies today, the Pasteur Institute resorted to a study in a poor country to prove the worth of its new product and to make good on a significant investment. Unlike those companies—which devote 90 percent of their research to conditions that make up 10 percent of the global disease burden, in a quest to find blockbuster drugs for the developed world—Calmette and his colleagues sought a remedy for a problem that was devastating test subjects and their

berculosis," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 271, no. 9 (1994): 698–702; and George Wills Comstock's widely influential "Field Trials of Tuberculosis Vaccines: How Could We Have Done Them Better?" *Controlled Clinical Trials* 15, no. 4 (1994): 247–276. On its current use, see World Health Organization, position paper on BCG, *Weekly Epidemiological Record* 79, no. 4 (2004): 34.

¹¹³ Adriana Petryna, *When Experiments Travel: Clinical Trials and the Global Search for Human Subjects* (Princeton, N.J., 2009).

community.¹¹⁴ At the behest of international experts in Geneva, they obtained results faster and much more easily than they could have in Europe, in an effort to prevent a disease that was ravaging, and continues to ravage, the developing world.

¹¹⁴ Sameera Al-Tuwaijri et al., *The 10/90 Report on Health Research, 2003–2004* (Geneva, 2004); Doctors Without Borders, Drugs for Neglected Diseases Working Group, *Fatal Imbalance: The Crisis in Research and Development for Drugs for Neglected Diseases* (Geneva, 2001).

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AHR Forum
Historiographic “Turns” in Critical Perspective
Introduction

How should we now understand the various “turns” that have marked the recent history of the writing and theorizing of history? One way might be to think of them as merely historiographical markers, denoting definable moves or shifts in how some in our profession have understood, approached, and explained their work. In an academic environment where a premium is increasingly placed on novelty and innovation, and where an interest in theory has long marked the humanities, it is perhaps not surprising that many have been eager to characterize their scholarship in ways that call attention to precisely these qualities. In history, especially in the wake of the enormous—and intellectually transformative—impact of social history in the 1960s and 1970s, there was clearly a powerful pull to see subsequent shifts in scholarly approaches in similarly decisive terms. Hence the cultural and linguistic “turns” taken by many historians who came of professional age in the late 1980s—a development whose relationship to social history was dramatically depicted in Geoff Eley’s 2005 study *A Crooked Line*, itself the subject of an *AHR Forum* in April 2008. Without the tsunami effects of social history, would the proclamations of “turns” have even been conceivable?

While the contributors to this forum present different views on this intellectual trajectory, for the most part they refuse to see “turning” as a simple or unproblematic feature in the recent past of our profession. Rather, they both analyze the turns and historicize them—subjecting them to a searching and wide-ranging critique that at once reminds us of what can be gained by such historiographical retrospection and also what might be lost in thinking of them in both definitive and categorical terms.

This is especially true with the first two essays here. In “When Was the Linguistic Turn? A Genealogy,” Judith Surkis casts a skeptical light on the very notion of a single “turn,” suggesting that such a formulation not only is wrong but also has the regrettable effect of foreclosing possibilities and blocking from view the variety of approaches and intellectual trends that were in play at the time. The sense of foreclosure is explicit in Gary Wilder’s “From Optic to Topic: The Foreclosure Effect of Historiographic Turns.” For Wilder, the balance sheet for the cultural and linguistic turns is negative indeed, especially insofar as their critique of supposedly positivistic social history also meant the abandonment of the structural analysis of long-term social developments.

In “The Kids Are All Right: On the ‘Turning’ of Cultural History,” James W. Cook takes a similarly critical look at “turn talk,” but his intent is less to criticize

the cultural or linguistic turns than to interrogate what they mean for the practice of history both in recent times and today. He too historicizes the turns, reminding us that speaking of *the* cultural turn ignores the considerable work in cultural history that preceded the proclaiming of its advent in the 1990s as well as more recent work that continues to explore its possibilities. With Durba Ghosh's "Another Set of Imperial Turns?," the forum shifts to a historiography that is both older and newer than the cultural and linguistic turns. Focusing on the history of British imperialism, Ghosh points to several "turns" that have marked the recent historiography of this field: the global, the postcolonial, and the archival. Whatever the relationship between these different approaches and the study of imperialism may be, she argues that the most revealing work has always been infused with a critical understanding of the historical experiences of imperialism and colonialism.

The two comments offer arguments in their own right. In "Not Yet Far Enough," Julia Adeney Thomas vigorously critiques each of the four essays, pushing back especially against some of Surkis's and Wilder's claims and conclusions regarding the nature and status of the cultural turn. But she also suggests that none of the essays are "broad and bracing enough." Calling attention to the phenomenon of long-term climate change, she argues, in essence, for another "turn"—a historically grounded but scientifically informed "new materialism" that addresses "the precarious state of our world." In "Generational Turns," Nathan Perl-Rosenthal takes a very different approach. Underscoring the generational aspect of the discussion of historiographical turns, he surveys the scholarship of twenty or so younger historians, mostly dissertations, and shows that their work in the history of communication, transportation, and material culture reflects an enduring interest in culture, now enriched by the language of "practice and process."

There is undoubtedly more to say about historiographic turns, and more insights will surely be generated as we gain greater perspective on this fertile period of historical innovation and critique. One also suspects that with time, we will develop a greater appreciation for the deep history that generated these turns, rendering some of their claims to novelty and "turning" less convincing and some of the fears of foreclosure expressed in this forum less well-founded.

When Was the Linguistic Turn? A Genealogy

JUDITH SURKIS

One cannot make true or erroneous statements about the digestive or reproductive processes of centaurs.

Paul Veyne

An examination of descent also permits the discovery, under the unique aspect of a trait or a concept, of the myriad events through which—thanks to which, against which—they were formed.

Michel Foucault

IN HIS WORK ON THE HISTORY of historical periodization, Reinhart Koselleck describes the experience of “acceleration” as a distinguishing feature of an implicitly European modernity. He figures this process as a speeding-up of the rate at which “one’s own time is distinguished from the preceding time.”¹ According to Koselleck, the rhythm of temporal compression is marked by an increasingly rapid retrospective designation of moments consigned to the past. Starting in the Enlightenment, and especially after the French Revolution, he claims, this accelerated sense of historical time gave rise to a new notion of the present as well. In the sped-up temporality of European modernity, the present is always also a moment of transition to an immanent future. Conceived in the crucible of colonialism and capitalism, *Neuzeit* established and encapsulated difference in terms of “the contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous.”² From the vantage of Europe’s modernity, the pasts of Greco-Roman antiquity and the “Middle Ages” also became “fundamentally other.”³ In Koselleck’s narrative

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¹ Reinhart Koselleck, “The Eighteenth Century as the Beginning of Modernity,” in Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*, trans. Todd Samuel Presner, Kerstin Behnke, and Jobst Welge (Stanford, Calif., 2002), 154–169, here 168.

² Reinhart Koselleck, “‘Neuzeit’: Remarks on the Semantics of the Modern Concepts of Movement,” in Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. Keith Tribe (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), 231–266, here 246.

³ *Ibid.*, 250.

of modernity's narrative, the present is demarcated from this past and resolutely oriented toward a new, secularized vision of the future. The concept of "progress" (as well as its paired concept of "decline") emerged in and underwrote this movement. Grouping together many meanings and experiences under a single term, progress, like the history it authorizes, moves forward in the "collective singular," even as it produces difference in the form of uneven development.⁴

Koselleck is invoked here not to unproblematically endorse his claims, but to suggest how normative assumptions about the relationship between time and an implicitly European modernity are written into historical and historiographical writing itself. By historicizing the modern practice of history, Koselleck's work is a case in point. In his self-referential account, the periodization whose emergence he traces also underwrites his conception of "conceptual history." In his view, the disciplinary coherence of history depends on a theory of periodization: "without such a theory, history loses itself in boundlessly questioning everything."⁵ Taking modern European history as his object of study, Koselleck's work renders explicit some of the temporal concepts that conventionally govern "modern" historiography: logics of periodization and a view of history as a "collective singular," as well as attendant ideas of both decline and delay.

The periodizing impulse that Koselleck describes as quintessentially "modern" has, of late, proceeded at an accelerated clip. History-writing seems to have undergone a rapid succession of historiographical moments or "turns." If the "linguistic turn" initiated a turn to turn talk, it was soon followed by the cultural and the imperial, and more recently the transnational, global, and spatial turns. The problem of how to narrativize these historiographical developments has become a minor historiographical subfield in its own right.⁶ Ideas of succeeding—and competing—his-

⁴ Reinhart Koselleck, "'Progress' and 'Decline': An Appendix to the History of Two Concepts," in Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History*, 218–235, here 229. For a critical discussion of Koselleck's account of modernity, the temporal logic of capitalism, and its attendant "time lags," see Harry Harootunian, "Remembering the Historical Present," *Critical Inquiry* 33, no. 3 (2007): 471–494, here 479.

⁵ Reinhart Koselleck, "On the Need for Theory in the Discipline of History," in Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History*, 1–19, here 4. For a powerful critique of Koselleck's model of periodization, see Kathleen Davis, *Periodization and Sovereignty: How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization Govern the Politics of Time* (Philadelphia, 2008). See as well the AHR Roundtable "Historians and the Question of 'Modernity,'" *American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (June 2011): 631–751, especially Carol Symes, "When We Talk about Modernity," 715–726.

⁶ See, in addition to the other essays in this forum, "Forum: Critical Pragmatism, Language, and Cultural History: On Roger Chartier's *On the Edge of the Cliff*," *French Historical Studies* 21, no. 2 (1998): 213–264; "AHR Forum: Geoff Eley's *A Crooked Line*," *American Historical Review* 113, no. 2 (April 2008): 391–437; Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, eds., *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture* (Berkeley, Calif., 1999); Antoinette Burton, ed., *After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation* (Durham, N.C., 2003); Roger Chartier, *On the Edge of the Cliff: History, Language, and Practices*, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Baltimore, 1997); Geoff Eley, *A Crooked Line: From Cultural History to the History of Society* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2005); Georg G. Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge* (Hanover, N.H., 1997); Georg G. Iggers and Q. Edward Wang, *A Global History of Modern Historiography* (Harlow, 2008); Akira Iriye, "The Transnational Turn," *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 3 (2007): 373–376; Terrence J. McDonald, ed., *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996); Yair Mintzker, "Between the Linguistic and the Spatial Turns: A Reconsideration of the Concept of Space and Its Role in the Early Modern Period," *Historical Reflections* 35, no. 3 (2009): 37–51; William H. Sewell, Jr., *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago, 2005); Gabrielle M. Spiegel, "Revising the Past/Revisiting the Present: How Change Happens in Historiography," *History and Theory* 46, no. 4 (2007): 1–19; Spiegel, "The Task of the Historian," 2008 AHA Presidential Address, *American Historical Review* 114, no. 1 (February 2009): 1–15; Ronald Grigor Suny, "Back and Beyond: Reversing the Cultural

toriographical turns have proliferated. But in this methodological whirlwind, little attention has been paid to the implicit temporality of turn talk itself. What does it mean to describe a historiographical moment as a “turn”?

A brief history of what has come to be called the “linguistic turn” can be useful in addressing this broader question. The reason for undertaking such a review is not to offer a more comprehensive narrative of the “linguistic turn” or to privilege one version of it over another, but rather to question the usefulness of the concept itself. As a look at some key texts in the adventure of this concept will show, it is difficult to clearly pinpoint a singular or coherent “turn” as having taken place.⁷ In addition to being reductive and constraining, the temporality of turn talk presumes a supersession of one disciplinary trend by another. While a turn seems to signal innovation and renewal, its spatio-temporal logic more often than not entails foreclosure. By contrast, a genealogical counternarrative can keep multiple strains of critical interrogation open for the historiographical future.

Closely linked to a spatio-temporal logic of supersession is a generational model of historiographical development. In narrativizing the “linguistic turn,” historians have drawn on implicit and explicit arguments about historiographical “generations” as one way to lend coherence to an otherwise diverse and mutually questioning set of methods and epistemologies. But what are the limits of such generational thinking and the logic of supersession that it often implies?⁸ What are the contours of a historiographical generation? When and where is it located? These questions can be answered through an exploration of how the idea of the “linguistic turn” took shape within a specific Euro-American historiographical context. The goal is not to reassert the hegemony of this narrative, but to provincialize it.⁹

Gabrielle Spiegel’s 2008 AHA presidential address provides a good point of entry.¹⁰ Her comments can be read as exemplary in their adroit summary of much recent work on the shifting paradigms of postwar Euro-American historiography. Given that she made them as president of the American Historical Association, her remarks carried symbolic and institutional as well as temporally ritualized significance.

In keeping with generic convention, Spiegel’s speech takes stock of recent historiographical trends in order to offer thoughts on the future of the discipline. Her narrative describes the “semiotic challenge” to “traditional” ways of writing history that arose in the period following the Second World War.¹¹ As she recounts it, this

Turn?,” *American Historical Review* 107, no. 5 (December 2002): 1476–1499; John E. Toews, “Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn,” *American Historical Review* 92, no. 4 (October 1987): 879–907; Barney Warf and Santa Arias, *The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (London, 2009).

⁷ I borrow the phrase from Martin Jay, *Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas* (Berkeley, Calif., 1984).

⁸ Conversations with Peter Gordon have clarified my thinking on this point. On the problem of generational thinking, see the introduction to Gordon, *Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010), 1–42.

⁹ On the “provincialization” of European historical temporality, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, N.J., 2000). For a related account of the provincialism of the linguistic turn when viewed from the perspective of American, Latin American, and hemispheric studies, see the essay in this forum by James W. Cook.

¹⁰ Spiegel, “The Task of the Historian.”

¹¹ Spiegel first used the expression “semiotic challenge,” adopted from John Toews, in 1990: Ga-

challenge issued from multiple domains at once: philosophical investigations of language, anthropological explorations of culture, psychoanalytic interrogations of subject formation, and radical questionings of the possibilities and limits of knowledge formation. While admittedly diverse and divergent, these strands of epistemological questioning roughly coincided in time. And, Spiegel argues, they took on great significance for the generation of European and American historians who came of age in the 1960s and 1970s; that generation, in turn, went on to pose new questions about the objects and subjects of historical knowledge. The resulting linguistic, cultural, and poststructuralist “turns” provoked what Spiegel describes as a “massive change in our understanding of the nature of historical reality.”¹² Her account of this “massive change” in many ways depends on a grouping together of these “turns.” Such groupings have now become something of a historiographical commonplace. In tracing a genealogy of the “linguistic turn,” we can critically reexamine (and unsettle) these conflations.

Spiegel’s argument parallels and draws on another recent account of historiographical trends, William Sewell’s *Logics of History* (2005). Sewell likewise links “history’s linguistic turn” to broader trends in cultural history, which questioned materialist accounts of historical causality, especially in the field of European social history.¹³ For Sewell, “a linguistic model of the social” subtended these developments in both cultural history and cultural anthropology. And it is this linguistic model, he claims, that informs “the ontological assumptions underlying contemporary cultural history.”¹⁴ But can we make broad generalizations about debates that were themselves intently focused on questions of existence? As recent commentators have noted, “French theory” alone is a problematic assemblage. Distinct institutional and intellectual convergences, in the United States and France, certainly fostered demonstrable personal and philosophical connections between French thinkers and their American acolytes. It was, however, the contentious debate between Heideggerians and Marxists, psychoanalysts and literary critics, structuralists and historians of science, that made those encounters so bracing. When the scope of thinkers assembled under the rubric of the “linguistic turn” is further widened to include Clifford Geertz, Jürgen Habermas, and Quentin Skinner, its coherence becomes still more difficult to sustain.¹⁵

brielle M. Spiegel, “History, Historicism, and the Social Logic of the Text in the Middle Ages,” *Speculum* 65, no. 1 (1990): 59–86.

¹² Spiegel, “The Task of the Historian,” 2. Spiegel offers a fuller account of this narrative in the introduction to Gabrielle M. Spiegel, ed., *Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Turn* (New York, 2005). “Practicing history” appears here as a supersession of the “linguistic turn.” For a critical appraisal of this project, see Dominick LaCapra, *History and Its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2009), 45–52.

¹³ Sewell, *Logics of History*, 23. For an examination of the problematic conflation of the “cultural turn” with “cultural history,” see Cook, this forum.

¹⁴ Sewell, *Logics of History*, 331.

¹⁵ See the sample list *ibid.* Sewell notably discusses some of the instability and incoherence of both the “linguistic turn” and “French theory” in an extended review of Roger Chartier’s essay collection, in which Chartier critiques the “American linguistic turn.” William H. Sewell, Jr., “Language and Practice in Cultural History: Backing Away from the Edge of the Cliff,” *French Historical Studies* 21, no. 2 (1998): 241–254, here 245–246. Recent analyses of the history of “French theory” include Warren Breckman, “Times of Theory: On Writing the History of French Theory,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 71, no. 3 (2010): 339–361; François Cusset, *French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co. Trans-*

It is not enough, however, to merely call for more nuance and complexity. We need to interrogate how the distinct strands of thought highlighting “language” as constitutive of intellectual and social life were braided together. How, when, and where did these presumptive convergences take place? And why describe them in terms of a “turn”?

The model of the “turn” is, of course, itself a trope or turn of phrase. It implies a change of course or direction, a turning away at the same time as a turning toward, which lies at the Latin root of “conversion.”¹⁶ Etymologically, it is linked to the notion of “revolution”—and to “lathe” in ancient Greek. Turns can be understood not only to have directional movement, but also as formative: they shape and reshape by cutting away.¹⁷ Similarly, the language of linguistic and other “turns” not only describes, it produces a specific understanding of the epistemological challenges described by Spiegel and Sewell (among others) as a discernible historiographical event. Did a “massive change” take place? Was this shift part of a collective, singular movement or historical logic? Who was included, and when?

A number of assumptions have been written into narrative accounts of historiography as a succession of “turns.” Because it “fragments what was thought unified” and “shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself,” genealogy is particularly well suited to the endeavor of revising those suppositions.¹⁸ It was in the field of European intellectual history that the language of the “linguistic turn”

formed the *Intellectual Life of the United States*, trans. Jeff Fort (Minneapolis, 2008). While works of synthesis and summary have long been available, intellectual histories of thinkers associated with “French theory” are just now beginning to appear. These histories are distinguished by their efforts to keep epistemological and political stakes vibrant in and by contextualization. See, for example, Edward Baring, *The Young Derrida and French Philosophy, 1945–1968* (Cambridge, 2011); Julian Bourg, *After the Deluge: New Perspectives on the Intellectual and Cultural History of Postwar France* (Lanham, Md., 2004); Bourg, *From Revolution to Ethics: May 1968 and Contemporary French Thought* (Montreal, 2007); Tamara Chaplin, *Turning On the Mind: French Philosophers on Television* (Chicago, 2007); Michael Scott Christofferson, *French Intellectuals against the Left: The Antitotalitarian Moment of the 1970s* (New York, 2004); Stefanos Geroulanos, *An Atheism That Is Not Humanist Emerges in French Thought* (Stanford, Calif., 2010); Ethan Kleinberg, *Generation Existential: Heidegger’s Philosophy in France, 1927–1961* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2005); James D. Le Sueur, *Uncivil War: Intellectuals and Identity Politics during the Decolonization of Algeria*, 2nd ed. (Lincoln, Neb., 2005); Samuel Moyn, *Origins of the Other: Emmanuel Levinas between Revelation and Ethics* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2005); Camille Robcis, *The Law of Kinship: Anthropology, Psychoanalysis, and the Politics of the Family in 20th-Century France* (Ithaca, N.Y., forthcoming 2013).

¹⁶ OED, s.v. “conversion.”

¹⁷ OED, s.v. “turn.”

¹⁸ Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, trans. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977), 139–164, here 147. Genealogy as an approach has been taken up primarily by political theorists, philosophers of history, and anthropologists, but not by historians—perhaps because of its presumptive “presentism.” See, for example, Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore, 1993); Mark Bevir, “What Is Genealogy?,” *Journal of the Philosophy of History* 2, no. 3 (2008): 263–275; Wendy Brown, “Politics without Banisters: Genealogical Politics in Nietzsche and Foucault,” in Brown, *Politics out of History* (Princeton, N.J., 2001), 91–120; Raymond Geuss, “Nietzsche and Genealogy,” *European Journal of Philosophy* 2, no. 3 (1994): 274–292; Webb Keane, “Self-Interpretation, Agency, and the Objects of Anthropology: Reflections on a Genealogy,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 2 (2003): 222–248; Martin Saar, “Understanding Genealogy: History, Power, and the Self,” *Journal of the Philosophy of History* 2, no. 3 (2008): 295–314. For the historical interest of genealogy, see Joan W. Scott, “History-Writing as Critique,” in Keith Jenkins, Sue Morgan, and Alun Munslow, eds., *Manifestos for History* (London, 2007), 19–38. Some recent work by historians might nonetheless be characterized as genealogical, including Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010).

first emerged. Even in that delimited domain, however, these turns were multiple and mutually questioning rather than singular or synonymous. When European social historians seized on the notion of the turn, further occasions for conflation and confusion proliferated. By recalling the at once diverse and circumscribed contexts in which the expression “linguistic turn” took on meaning, as well as the skepticism expressed by some of its earliest chroniclers, we gain insight into how, when, whether, and for whom this historiographical event took place. The point is not to better secure the epistemological or political foundation of the “linguistic turn,” but rather to interrogate the periodizing impulse on which its postulation and subsequent passing depends. These temporal and disciplinary presumptions show how turn talk constrains our vision of the historical and historiographical future.

AS AN EXPRESSION, THE “linguistic turn” has an involved history, whose complexity is to some extent belied by the concise movement that a “turn” is supposed to describe. One landmark in this history is the 1967 anthology edited by philosopher Richard Rorty.¹⁹ As Spiegel notes in her presidential address, the essays collected in that volume were devoted to contemporary trends in analytical, rather than continental, philosophy.²⁰ The figures that Rorty discussed were thus, for the most part, logical positivists and ordinary language philosophers, not the structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers who are most often cited by historians as having influenced the discipline’s epistemological crisis. The term “linguistic turn” was coined by one of these figures, Gustav Bergmann, who quickly qualified his use of it to distinguish between two competing schools (he called them formalists and anti-formalists) whose relationship, he suggested, was characterized by “much strain and lack of mutual appreciation.” Between these two sides, Bergmann sought out a “middle position.”²¹

In citing Bergmann, Rorty sought to pose questions about this turn, rather than simply confirm its existence.²² More specifically, in outlining the multiple claims (and contestations) of “linguistic philosophy,” he interrogated whether it had, in fact, achieved a thoroughgoing disciplinary “revolution.”²³ In this sense, his invocation of “a turn” was ironic. By highlighting the diversity of its proponents’ arguments, he pointed to the role of “linguistic philosophy” (especially that espoused by Rudolf Carnap) in rejuvenating debate within the discipline. But Rorty also resisted the purported turn’s more hyperbolic and totalizing claims about purifying philosophical language of metaphysics. As Jürgen Habermas noted, the collection of essays thus served an ambivalent double purpose: “In summing up a triumphant progression, they are intended at the same time to signal its end.”²⁴ Analogous qualifications and

¹⁹ Richard Rorty, *The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method* (1967; repr., Chicago, 1992).

²⁰ Spiegel, “The Task of the Historian,” 2.

²¹ Gustav Bergmann, “Two Types of Linguistic Philosophy,” *Review of Metaphysics* 5, no. 3 (1952): 417–438, here 417, 419.

²² Richard M. Rorty, “Introduction: Metaphysical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy,” in Rorty, *The Linguistic Turn*, 1–39, here 9.

²³ *Ibid.*, 33.

²⁴ Jürgen Habermas, “Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn,” in Habermas, *On the Pragmatics of Com-*

ambivalence can be detected among intellectual historians who adopted and adapted the language of the “linguistic turn.”

Martin Jay was one of the first to usher the expression into the domain of history proper with his 1982 essay “Should Intellectual History Take a Linguistic Turn? Reflections on the Habermas-Gadamer Debate.” As in Rorty’s case, Jay’s use of the term contained within it an element of critical questioning, as is indicated by the essay’s title. That questioning was borne out in his careful exploration of the plurality of contemporary philosophical investigations of language. Indeed, his piece aimed principally to distinguish between several “linguistic turns” in order to determine which paradigm might prove most fruitful to intellectual historians. Thus, while pointing, at the outset, to a generalized interest in the “question of language,” Jay insisted that “linguistic turns . . . may take very different directions.”²⁵ These directions included: first, ordinary language philosophy inspired by Wittgenstein; second, the “very different” path taken by Saussurean linguistics; and third, a “very different linguistic turn,” namely the German hermeneutical tradition. The latter—which Jay further subdivided into the existentialist tradition (represented by Hans-Georg Gadamer) and the Critical Theory tradition (taken up by Habermas)—was the main focus of his essay.

Importantly for Jay, then, there was no *single* linguistic turn. Indeed, the critical force of his essay depended on this very point. After indicating certain parallels between respective linguistic theories, he rejected the viability—and indeed the desirability—of a Gadamerian “fusion of the horizons.”²⁶ His analysis of these differences left open the space for critical evaluation and ongoing argument. It refused uniform pronouncements and unreflective endorsement. Thus, while the philosophies under discussion by Jay were distinct from those that concerned Rorty in 1967, both authors shared a desire to question the coherence, decisiveness, and indeed desirability of a definitive disciplinary “turn.”

While posed by Jay in 1982 as an open-ended prospect, by 1987 the “linguistic turn” had, according to John Toews’s often-cited article “Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn,” already taken place within the field of Anglophone writing on European intellectual history. In the wake of that shift, Toews discerned a shared problematic among some rather sharply distinguished (in both senses of the word) figures: Martin Jay and Dominick LaCapra; Keith Baker, J. G. A. Pocock, and Quentin Skinner; Allan Megill and Mark Poster. While Jay’s essay was a work of analysis, Toews’s (as befitting a Hegel specialist) is a work of synthesis. To put it in more vernacular terms, one splits, while the other lumps. Toews thus claims that “although no easily discernible, common position emerges,” the authors grouped together in

munication, ed. Maeve Cooke (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), 343–382, here 345. Rorty’s future work pursued the post-metaphysical project by appealing to “postanalytic” or pragmatic means.

²⁵ Martin Jay, “Should Intellectual History Take a Linguistic Turn? Reflections on the Habermas-Gadamer Debate,” in Dominick LaCapra and Steven L. Kaplan, eds., *Modern European Intellectual History: Reappraisals and New Perspectives* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1982), 86–110, here 106. See also Carla Hesse, “The New Empiricism,” *Cultural and Social History* 1, no. 2 (2004): 201–207.

²⁶ Jay, “Should Intellectual History Take a Linguistic Turn?,” 106. Habermas has recently seemed more open to the idea of fusion in his discussion of the “linguistic turn” in philosophy; Jürgen Habermas, “Hermeneutic and Analytic Philosophy: Two Complementary Versions of the Linguistic Turn?,” *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 44 (1999): 413–441.

his essay can “be seen as participating in a common discourse.” Their commonality lies, in his view, in a shared effort to understand the difference and dialectical unity of “meaning,” on the one hand, and “experience,” on the other.²⁷ In seeking to comprehend this “common discourse,” Toews was, of course, doing his job as the writer of a magisterial review essay. And he was also participating in the very trend that he describes. For, as he goes on to claim, one consequence of the “linguistic turn” was “a focus on ‘discourse’ as an organizing term for conceptualizing and practicing the history of meaning.”²⁸ Toews, in other words, appeals to the framework of “discourse” in order to explain what these authors all shared.

The conceptions of discourse that Toews details are, however, quite distinct. First there is a Foucauldian archaeological conception articulated by Mark Poster, of which Toews is quite critical. In this guise, discourses are “impersonal, anonymous, ‘objective’ systems of rules” that ultimately construct “experience.”²⁹ Then there is the concept elaborated by exponents of early modern Anglo-American political theory (Skinner, Pocock), whose focus was on reconstructing linguistic contexts in order to better understand authorial speech-acts. Toews is somewhat more partial to this school, which seemed to cast discourse as more dynamic than static in its provision for creative reappropriations and individualized linguistic performances. Or, as he remarks, this model “implies the communicative context of an intersubjective community of free individuals.”³⁰ Finally, there are histories that trace the trajectories of a specific problematic, such as Martin Jay’s account of “the discourse of totality” in Western Marxism. While approving of Jay’s refusal to reduce contextualization to intertextuality, Toews finds the work lacking in its limited effort to relate individual authors’ lives (their “experiences”) to their works.

Toews’s account of the “linguistic turn” is thus structured by a suspicion of what he views to be the dangerous excesses of textualism. He wonders, specifically in reference to Dominick LaCapra’s critiques of reductive contextualization, whether “the theory of linguistic density and complexity of texts, contexts, and their apparently circular relationships” has “outrun its possible utility.”³¹ The “linguistic turn” in this guise is a dead end. It is thus unsurprising that Toews worries in his conclusion about a new form of “reductionism,” and indeed “a new form of intellectual hubris”: that of the “wordmakers who claim to be the makers of reality.”³² By foregrounding “experience” as irreducible to a purely discursive frame, he aims to keep that hubris in check.

The terms of Toews’s argument about the linguistic turn are familiar and have been the subject of a fair amount of critical commentary, including by authors cited in the piece.³³ But there are two historical points that might be made regarding this

²⁷ Toews, “Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn,” 882.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 889.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 890.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 892.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 886.

³² *Ibid.*, 906.

³³ Martin Jay, “The Textual Approach to Intellectual History,” in Jay, *Force Fields: Between Intellectual History and Cultural Critique* (New York, 1993), 158–166; Dominick LaCapra, “History, Reading, and Critical Theory,” in LaCapra, *History and Reading: Tocqueville, Foucault, French Studies* (Toronto, 2000), 21–72, here 57–64. For some of Toews’s most recent reflections, see John E. Toews, “Manifesting, Producing, and Mobilizing Historical Consciousness in the ‘Postmodern Condition,’” *History and Theory*

pivotal essay. First, in casting the linguistic turn as part of a “common discourse,” Toews’s essay played a productive, rather than merely descriptive, role. In other words, it both helped to consolidate the apparent coherence of the “turn” and issued a set of normative judgments about the epistemologies he associated with it. Few subsequent pieces of writing on the topic can forgo its citation, even though the quite sizable corpus under review was relatively circumscribed to the field of modern European intellectual history (with some somewhat marginalized American exceptions). For example, the essay notably drew no connection between the intellectual historical “linguistic turn” and contemporaneous historical interest in either anthropology (Clifford Geertz’s name does not appear) or feminism.

Second, Toews’s concluding appeal to generational logic articulated this “common discourse” with a presumptively shared experience. He figured “intellectual historians of the younger (post-1968) generation” as particularly implicated in the shift. Seeking to restore a balance “lost in recent oscillations between opposing reductionisms,” he called on his contemporaries “to recognize and examine the recent turn away from experience as a specific response to particular events and developments in the history of experience.”³⁴ Toews appealed to the model of the “generation” in order to hold the strains of “discourse” and “experience” together in his own account. The suggestive correlation between “events . . . in the history of experience” and this generation’s “common discourse” of the linguistic turn remained unspecified. He left it for other historians to speculate on those epistemological, social, and political connections.

European intellectual historians thus played an important early role in both introducing and critiquing a variety of questions and methods now associated with the “linguistic turn.” But the consecration of the phrase as a shorthand for what was increasingly framed as a profession-wide wave of revisionism and epistemological crisis took several more years to catch on. According to Peter Novick’s *That Noble Dream*, for example, intellectual historians raised new epistemological questions that paralleled other critical interpretive interventions—from Geertzian anthropology to critical histories of gender and race. For Novick, however, these parallel—occasionally intersecting but as often conflicting—moves did not constitute a general and generalized “linguistic turn.” Indeed, the central narrative of Novick’s book is one of divergence and fragmentation, not convergence—a kind of “fall” into disciplinary

48, no. 3 (2009): 257–275, here 266–267. Both Jay and LaCapra have also, more recently, tackled the intellectual history of “experience”; see Jay, *Songs of Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a Universal Theme* (Berkeley, Calif., 2005); LaCapra, “Experience and Identity,” in LaCapra, *History in Transit: Experience, Identity, Critical Theory* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2004), 35–71. Other significant interventions include Joan W. Scott, “The Evidence of Experience,” *Critical Inquiry* 17, no. 4 (1991): 773–797; John H. Zammito, “Reading ‘Experience’: The Debate in Intellectual History among Scott, Toews, and LaCapra,” in Paula M. L. Moya and Michael R. Hames-García, eds., *Reclaiming Identity: Realist Theory and the Predicament of Postmodernism* (Berkeley, Calif., 2000), 279–311.

³⁴ Toews, “Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn,” 906, 907. Not all intellectual historians concurred with Toews’s synthesis. For example, two years later, in an essay in the *AHR*, David Harlan highlighted the strong *divergences* between the Cambridge school and poststructuralist approaches to language; Harlan, “Intellectual History and the Return of Literature,” *American Historical Review* 94, no. 3 (June 1989): 581–609. Donald Kelley, meanwhile, expressed skepticism about the newness of the question of language for intellectual history—and hence about what was purported to be “a turn”; Kelley, “What Is Happening to the History of Ideas?,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 51, no. 1 (1990): 3–25.

anarchy and anomie—as his final chapter, titled “There Is No King in Israel,” so clearly intimates.³⁵

By the end of the decade, however, debates surrounding the crisis of materialist explanation in modern European social history also came to be described in terms of a “linguistic turn.”³⁶ As contemporaries often noted, the radical transformations of 1989 reinforced this connection and may have contributed to a new conception of that turn as a distinct event—a watershed moment in the history of the discipline of history.³⁷ As Michael Geyer and Konrad Jarausch noted in their preface to a special issue of *Central European History*, “History had come unstuck from all sorts of framing devices that historians had devised in order to nail it down.”³⁸

Linkages between revisionist, post-Marxist histories and a critical interest in language were, of course, not new. In 1980, a skeptical editorial in *History Workshop Journal* described how “for some time now linguistics—or an appeal to its authority—has been widely used to challenge materialist theories of knowledge.”³⁹ And in an influential 1981 review of François Furet’s landmark revisionist text *Rethinking the French Revolution*, Lynn Hunt drew parallels between Furet’s reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Derrida’s account in *Of Grammatology*.⁴⁰ (Furet later denied the connection, and for many Derrideans, the feeling was mutual.)⁴¹

Hunt pursued similar parallels in the 1989 introduction to her *New Cultural His-*

³⁵ Novick thus wrote in his final chapter: “By the 1980s more and more practitioners were reluctantly concluding that even by the most generous definition, history no longer constituted a coherent discipline; not just that the whole was less than the sum of its parts, but that there was no whole—only parts.” Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity” Question in the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge, 1988), 577.

³⁶ For one example of a genealogy, the term travels from Toews’s article to Spiegel to Joyce to Stone and Samuel. Spiegel, “History, Historicism, and the Social Logic of the Text in the Middle Ages”; Patrick Joyce and Catriona Kelly, “History and Post-Modernism,” *Past and Present*, no. 133 (November 1991): 204–213, here 208; Lawrence Stone, “History and Post-Modernism,” *Past and Present*, no. 135 (May 1992): 189–208, here 190; Raphael Samuel, “Reading the Signs, II: Fact-Grubbers and Mind-Readers,” *History Workshop Journal*, no. 33 (Spring 1992): 220–251, here 222. For further examples of this articulation, see Lenard R. Berlanstein’s review article “Working with Language: The Linguistic Turn in French Labor History,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 33, no. 2 (1991): 426–440. See also the essays in Berlanstein, ed., *Rethinking Labor History: Essays on Discourse and Class Analysis* (Urbana, Ill., 1993).

³⁷ The editors of *History Workshop Journal* claimed: “The idea of a progressive socialist history has been seen by many to be thrown into question, not just by events in the communist East, but also by developments within academic studies in the West . . . scholars now often turn to theory—predominantly literary theory—for answers to larger questions, rather than to the historical archives.” “Editorial,” *History Workshop Journal*, no. 32 (Autumn 1991): v. One might note that in German, the historical transformation associated with reunification and the “linguistic turn” are both described as a *Wende*.

³⁸ Michael Geyer and Konrad H. Jarausch, “The Future of the German Past: Transatlantic Reflections for the 1990s,” *Theory, Practice, and Technique*, Special Issue, *Central European History* 22, no. 3/4 (1989): 229–259, here 229. As the editors explain, the volume was based on a conference that was held in October 1989, but authors were given time after the events of November to revise their contributions. Jane Caplan’s piece, a sensitive exploration of different strands of post-Marxism and poststructuralism, did not rely on the trope of the “linguistic turn.” She was, in fact, suspicious of how, when framed as a “battle,” “more exacting definitions and distinctions may go by the board.” Caplan, “Postmodernism, Poststructuralism, and Deconstruction: Notes for Historians,” *ibid.*, 260–278, here 260.

³⁹ “Editorial: Language and History,” *History Workshop Journal*, no. 10 (Autumn 1980): 1.

⁴⁰ Lynn Hunt, review of François Furet, *Penser la Révolution française*, *History and Theory* 20, no. 3 (1981): 313–323. In a 1989 review article on the historiography of the French Revolution, Sarah Maza figured her reading of Furet’s relationship to poststructuralism as “much indebted to Hunt’s”; Maza, “Politics, Culture, and the Origins of the French Revolution,” *Journal of Modern History* 61, no. 4 (1989): 704–723, here 708 n. 12.

⁴¹ Christofferson, *French Intellectuals against the Left*, 266. On the limitations of Furet’s theory of

tory anthology. She juxtaposed—without, however, synthesizing—a series of approaches: (a) post-Marxist political histories; (b) Michel Foucault's genealogies; (c) Geertzian anthropology and Annales-style histories of *mentalité*; (d) literary theory; and (e) gender history. Hunt did not, at the time, use the trope of the "turn" to describe the shared foundations of cultural history. Furthermore, she argued that some trends exercised more force than others, with anthropology's influence "reigning supreme" and Foucault's "anti-method" and agenda remaining "idiosyncratic."⁴² The influence of literary theory (meaning the largely French thinkers who came to be associated with "literature departments" in the United States), she claimed, had, until that point, remained mostly the preserve of intellectual historians. The field is represented in the volume by Lloyd Kramer's essay on Hayden White and Dominick LaCapra, whose respective approaches, as Hunt underscored, differed significantly: "the former emphasizes unity; the latter, difference."⁴³

With the dissemination of the term, however, debates surrounding revisionist political histories and critical histories of gender and race, as well as those in intellectual history, came to turn around it—and to become collapsed and confused. The "turn" was increasingly described as something that historians should or should not take, as if it were a road or a means of transport (leading off, especially when conflated with poststructuralism, into an implicitly *wild* unknown). Framed by scare quotes that implied an unspecified citation and ironic distance, references to this turn became increasingly commonplace in historiographical essays. In the 1989 volume of *Central European History*, Thomas Childers described German historians as "caught on a conceptual roundabout, uncertain whether to . . . take the 'linguistic turn' into uncharted territory."⁴⁴ In the often-cited "Is All the World a Text?," Geoff Eley claimed that only "a relatively small number of historians" had, like Joan Scott, "taken the train to the end of the line, through the terrain of textuality to the land of discourse and deconstruction." This poststructuralist train was not exactly a bandwagon. And while Eley endorsed "the basic usefulness and interest of poststructuralist theory," he nonetheless described "the rest of us" as "partly there for the ride, partly curious to see where it goes, and not at all sure we'll stay very long at the destination."⁴⁵ The "turn," in other words, was becoming part of a disciplinary spatio-temporal imaginary.

language, see Mark Poster, "Furet and the Deconstruction of 1789," in Poster, *Cultural History and Postmodernity: Disciplinary Readings and Challenges* (New York, 1997), 72–107.

⁴² Lynn Hunt, ed., *The New Cultural History* (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), 10. Writing at almost the same moment, Allan Megill largely concurred with her assessment of Foucault; Megill, "The Reception of Foucault by Historians," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 48, no. 1 (1987): 117–141.

⁴³ Hunt, *The New Cultural History*, 15.

⁴⁴ Thomas Childers, "Political Sociology and the 'Linguistic Turn,'" *Central European History* 22, no. 3/4 (1989): 381–393, here 381.

⁴⁵ Geoff Eley, "Is All the World a Text? From Social History to the History of Society Two Decades Later," in Terrence J. McDonald, ed., *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996), 193–243, here 214. The essay was originally delivered as a paper in 1990 at a conference at the University of Michigan and first appeared as CSST Working Paper #55/CRSO Working Paper #445. American historian Joyce Appleby took the vehicular metaphor to its logical extreme—the car wreck: "After historians made that last turn marked 'linguistic,' they ran into some dangerous curves. Scholarly vehicles were totaled; avenues of inquiry left in disrepair"; Appleby, "One Good Turn Deserves Another: Moving beyond the Linguistic—A Response to David Harlan," *American Historical Review* 94, no. 5 (December 1989): 1326–1332, here 1326. Roger Chartier gave the metaphor a different and more positive valence

Despite the ludic tone of Eley's proclamation, the debate over *whether* to take this "train" or "turn" was quite fierce, not least in the pages of the British journal *Social History* (of whose editorial board Eley is a member). Such debates were, in fact, as much about the purported turn's identity (and indeed coherence) as about whether historians should get on board. There were, in other words, multiple trains, and they did not lead in the same direction. In revisiting these exchanges not only between advocates and critics but also *among* purported advocates, we get a firm sense of important and politically salient differences between them, especially with respect to the future of Marxism.

Reactions to Gareth Stedman Jones's revisionist history of Chartism spurred the debate. But there were significant methodological and epistemological differences between Stedman Jones and other self-proclaimed proponents of the "linguistic turn." For some, such as Patrick Joyce and James Vernon, Foucault's critical rethinking of "the social" itself was an indispensable point of departure.⁴⁶ Stedman Jones, by contrast, argued vigorously against what he believed to be Foucault's excessive weight and influence (which, it will be recalled, Hunt's introduction had denied): "If a linguistic approach to history is to be further developed, it is important to refuse this identification. The 'linguistic turn' did not begin with Foucault, nor did it—nor does it—in any sense depend upon Foucault's version of what it meant. Foucault's theory was only one of many possible variants of a linguistic approach."⁴⁷ In his view, Foucault's writing remained overly indebted to Marxist narratives and categories (the bourgeoisie, in particular), even as he took distance from them. For Stedman Jones, "the implications of 1989" were clear: historians needed to "assess and move on from the unsorted debris left by the death of Marxism."⁴⁸

Against starker pronouncements, Eley and *Social History* editor Keith Nield argued for nuance and complexity—and against a wholesale abandonment of Marxism. Taking Patrick Joyce as their main target, they sought to split some of the opposing camps. Rejecting an "all-too familiar simplification" ("an undifferentiated 'Marxism' is assumed to be 'past' in some irretrievable and unlamented way"), they reaffirmed

by invoking Michel de Certeau's figuration of Foucault's theories as akin to a car driving along a cliff. Importantly, for Certeau, what lay over the cliff was *not* pure discursivity, but rather a non-discursive space where "the usually reliable foundation of language is missing." Certeau, "Micro-Techniques and Panoptic Discourse: A Quid Pro Quo," in Certeau, *Heterologies: Discourse on the Other* (Minneapolis, 1986), 185–192, here 189. See also Chartier, *On the Edge of the Cliff*. For another analysis of these metaphors, see Sewell, "Language and Practice in Cultural History." In debates around Subaltern Studies, the problem of poststructuralism was framed in terms of multiplicity and incommensurability—hence the metaphors of attempting to ride "two horses at once." Gyan Prakash, "Can the 'Subaltern' Ride? A Reply to O'Hanlon and Washbrook," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 34, no. 1 (1992): 168–184.

⁴⁶ James Vernon, "Who's Afraid of the 'Linguistic Turn'? The Politics of Social History and Its Discontents," *Social History* 19, no. 1 (1994): 81–97.

⁴⁷ Gareth Stedman Jones, "The Determinist Fix: Some Obstacles to the Further Development of the Linguistic Approach to History in the 1990s," *History Workshop Journal*, no. 42 (Autumn 1996): 19–35, here 21. See also Roger Chartier's response, in which he denies Stedman Jones's description of him as "a follower" of Foucault; Chartier, "Why the Linguistic Approach Can Be an Obstacle to the Further Development of Historical Knowledge: A Reply to Gareth Stedman Jones," *History Workshop Journal*, no. 46 (Autumn 1998): 271–272.

⁴⁸ Jones, "The Determinist Fix," 32–33.

Marxism's historical and intellectual plurality.⁴⁹ At the same time, they warned against the flattening of "postmodernism" into a "seductive and spurious singularity."⁵⁰

The problem, of course, is that the phrase "linguistic turn," especially when preceded by a definite article, lends itself to homogenization. The fields and methods of inquiry that became grouped under the moniker had distinct trajectories—at the level of institutions, networks, and publications, as well as intellectual influences—and different agendas, although they did on occasion intersect. To return to our prior example, Toews's review concentrated on a circumscribed set of intellectual historians. It did not register how questions about "discourse" and "experience" were under discussion in other domains, such as European social history, feminist history, or Subaltern Studies.⁵¹

For example, William Sewell and Joan Scott each published essays that directly addressed the relationship between "experience" and discourse, taking *The Making of the English Working Class* as their point of departure. Sewell's essay pointed to what he viewed as the unsustainable theoretical weight that E. P. Thompson's book placed on experience as the crucible of working-class identity. He argued that Thompson's narrative lacked a necessary and parallel account of transformations in "class discourse" (transformations that he describes in terms of structural shifts).⁵² If Sewell supplemented Thompson's account in order to make it more theoretically coherent, Scott's essay privileged analysis. It raised questions about the coherence of class as a category of identity, and hence of the experience that Thompson posited as its ground.⁵³ Scott's and Sewell's essays thus worked in different directions. But what their arguments shared—in contrast to Toews—was a pointed questioning of experience as a coherent concept or category in historical writing.

Also writing in 1988, Rosalind O'Hanlon drew a parallel between debates surrounding the category of experience in Thompson's work and presumptions about identity, experience, and recovery in the writings of the Subaltern Studies school. In a powerful review essay, she deconstructed presumptions about the unicity of experience and its autonomy in ways that paralleled Scott's critique of Thompson. O'Hanlon's critical account of Subaltern Studies, while informed by thinkers such

⁴⁹ Geoff Eley and Keith Nield, "Starting Over: The Present, the Post-Modern and the Moment of Social History," *Social History* 20, no. 3 (1995): 355–364, here 356.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 363.

⁵¹ Toews did discuss parallels between trends of new historicism, the social history of ideas, intellectual history, and social history in a later essay, but he was hesitant about grouping them together under the term "linguistic turn." Indeed, he remarked at one point, with respect to the influence of Geertzian anthropology, "For historians this turn to interpreting the past in terms of a process of reconstruction based on cultural units as systems of signification has often been conflated in both revealing and confusing ways with what is sometimes called the 'linguistic' turn." John E. Toews, "Stories of Difference and Identity: New Historicism in Literature and History," *Monatshefte* 84, no. 2 (1992): 193–211, here 196.

⁵² William H. Sewell, Jr., "How Classes Are Made: Critical Reflections on E. P. Thompson's Theory of Working-Class Formation," in Harvey J. Kaye and Keith McClelland, eds., *E. P. Thompson: Critical Debates* (Philadelphia, 1990), 50–77. Sewell's article first appeared as CRSO Working Paper #336 (University of Michigan, July 1986).

⁵³ Joan Wallach Scott, "Women in *The Making of the English Working Class*," in Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York, 1988), 68–90. My point is not to suggest that Toews should have known about or cited this work, which was published after his own. It is instead to indicate both the echoes and the differences between these parallel discussions.

as Raymond Williams, Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, Antonio Gramsci, Toril Moi, and Gayatri Spivak, was not cast in terms of a presumptive opposition between discourse and experience. Nor did she reduce these thinkers to a shared position or movement. She rather drew on their resources in order to raise questions about the Subaltern Studies project, namely its implicit effort to restore the autonomy of subaltern experience.⁵⁴

Joan Scott eventually brought these parallel discussions together in her well-known 1991 article "The Evidence of Experience," in which she discussed historians' recourse to "experience" as a foundational category. Naming Toews as one example among several, Scott questioned the broad framework opposing language and experience on which his account was based. Rather than reasserting the autonomy of the linguistic over and above an "irreducible experience," she interrogated the oppositional (and homogenizing) terms in which Toews had cast the debate.⁵⁵

Written in part as a response to Scott, Kathleen Canning's 1994 essay "Feminist History after the Linguistic Turn" echoed Toews's title, and to some extent his argument, especially with respect to "experience." At the same time, Canning claimed the autonomy—and even precedence—of *feminist* history's "linguistic turn" from that taken in intellectual history, which had its origins in "the influence of Foucault, Derrida, and/or Lacan."⁵⁶ Feminist history's "linguistic turn" was thus, for Canning, distinct from rather than dependent on poststructuralist theories, of which she remained suspicious. In a double move, she both questioned the "turn's" coherence and reasserted a discourse/experience opposition. She thus wrote: "the linguistic turn' (like the term *postmodernism*) has become a catch-all phrase for divergent critiques of established historical paradigms, narratives, and chronologies, encompassing not only poststructuralist literary criticism, linguistic theory, and philosophy but also cultural and symbolic anthropology, new historicism, and gender history."⁵⁷ While questioning the coherence of the "turn," Canning nonetheless reasserted the opposition between "discourse" and "experience" that Toews used to characterize

⁵⁴ Rosalind O'Hanlon, "Recovering the Subject: Subaltern Studies and Histories of Resistance in Colonial South Asia," *Modern Asian Studies* 22, no. 1 (1988): 189–224. O'Hanlon's subsequent arguments with Subaltern Studies were more pointed. With David Washbrook, she would go on to figure the "anti-foundationalist" strain in Subaltern Studies as insufficiently attentive to class and capital, and hence as politically compromised—i.e., as "the bad conscience of liberalism." O'Hanlon and Washbrook, "After Orientalism: Culture, Criticism, and Politics in the Third World," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 34, no. 1 (1992): 141–167, here 166. See also Prakash, "Can the 'Subaltern' Ride?" In her account of Subaltern Studies in Latin American history, Florencia Mallon was more measured in her assessment of the tensions between a Gramscian focus on hegemony and subaltern experience, Foucauldian accounts of the microphysics of power, and a Derridean focus on the instability of meaning. Following Prakash, Mallon described these tensions as politically and intellectually productive rather than disabling. Notably, these authors, while focused on the relationship between Marxism and anti-foundationalism, do not use the rhetoric of the "linguistic turn." Mallon, "The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies: Perspectives from Latin American History," *American Historical Review* 99, no. 5 (December 1994): 1491–1515.

⁵⁵ Scott, "The Evidence of Experience," 788.

⁵⁶ Kathleen Canning, "Feminist History after the Linguistic Turn: Historicizing Discourse and Experience," *Signs* 19, no. 2 (1994): 368–404, here 370. It is worth noting the institutional connections here. The original version of Scott's essay "Historicizing Experience" was presented at the same 1990 conference where Geoff Eley first presented "Is All the World a Text?" Canning's response, meanwhile, appeared initially as a working paper in the same series, minus the titular reference to Toews: Canning, "Contesting the Power of Categories: Discourse, Experience, and Feminist Resistance" (CSST Working Paper #83/CRSO Working Paper #479, University of Michigan, 1992).

⁵⁷ Canning, "Feminist History after the Linguistic Turn," 369.

intellectual history's "linguistic turn." She sought, by contrast, to identify mediating terms (the body, agency) as a way beyond this presumptive opposition. Vacillating between deployment and disavowal, Canning's usage exemplified historians' ambivalent relationship to the epistemological questions the "turn" supposedly entailed. By the mid-1990s, the term had become routinized—oddly meaningful despite (or was it because of?) its ambiguousness. In a sense, the disciplinary fixation on the "turn" can be seen as a fetish in the psychoanalytic sense. It simultaneously acknowledged *and* disavowed epistemological challenges and strenuous arguments, thus overcoming and containing a perceived threat.⁵⁸

THE POINT HERE IS NOT TO recycle old debates, but rather to highlight the gaps and fissures that existed at the very moment that this decisive turn was supposed to be happening. Historians have nonetheless continued to use the language of the "turn" and figured it to be both a general and a generational event. As Eley recalled it in 2005, "In the world of historians, this was the much vaunted 'linguistic turn'—a general discursive shift in the rhetoric and practice of the profession from 'social' to 'cultural' modes of analysis."⁵⁹

Indeed, recent accounts suggest that the shift became "hegemonic."⁶⁰ The claim may seem surprising, given that, as Spiegel notes as an aside in her presidential address, "the actual number of historians actively engaged with these questions was probably relatively small in comparison to the field as a whole."⁶¹ Spiegel nonetheless asserts here—and elsewhere—that the impact of the "turn" was so broad-based and significant as to have radically modified the kinds of claims that all historians are now prepared to make. Citing Sewell, she reads the recent "revisionist" turn away from semiotic analysis and toward questions of practice and agency as demonstrative of this prior prominence. In a sense, these newer developments are supposed to prove the previous moment's (albeit now fading) "hegemony."⁶²

Given the diversity of the trends associated with the linguistic turn as well as the constantly contested character of its reception, Spiegel's invocations of the first person plural possessive pronoun "our" and her repeated references to a collective "we" of historians are at once striking and significant. "We all sense that this profound change has run its course," she remarks. And further: "we need some explanation of how and why this sea change in history occurred." The goals of her analysis, then,

⁵⁸ Sigmund Freud, "Fetishism," in Freud, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. James Strachey, 24 vols. (London, 1961), 21: 147–157, here 154.

⁵⁹ Eley, *A Crooked Line*, 125.

⁶⁰ The introduction to the *AHR* Forum on *A Crooked Line* thus describes how, by the late 1980s, "Many, if not most, of [social history's] practitioners had turned to cultural history, which soon achieved hegemonic status"; *American Historical Review* 113, no. 2 (April 2008): 391–392, here 391.

⁶¹ Spiegel, "The Task of the Historian," 3 n. 5.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 3. Sewell figures the publication of Hunt's 1989 volume as a marker of cultural history's "hegemonic position." Sewell, *Logics of History*, 48. Neither Sewell nor Spiegel elaborates on their usage of hegemony as a way to describe the "turn's" trajectory. It is worth recalling the genealogy of the term offered by post-Marxist theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in the 1980s. They drew implicit historical parallels between the "postmodern" present and hegemony's emergence in Gramsci's work at another moment in which Marxist historical narrative was in crisis. Drawing on Foucault, they argue that hegemony emerged to "fill a hiatus that had opened in the chain of historical necessity." Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London, 1985), 7.

are simultaneously retrospective and prospective, as she hopes to “offer some insights into what remains valuable as we move forward into a new era of historical concerns.”⁶³ Her account of the historiographical past is therefore marshaled toward a vision of the historiographical future. She thus signals the topics that have been put on the agenda of history’s future (into which we have now moved): questions of economy and technology; diaspora and displacement; empire, territoriality, and the transnational. It is difficult to argue with Spiegel’s assessment of these current trends. But how should we understand the relationship between thematic shifts and theoretical or epistemological reorientation?

It is important to underscore that Spiegel positions herself as favorably disposed to the “semiotic challenge” and as anxious to preserve some of its insights for future historical practice. Structured analytically and metaphorically by a generational model, her speech at once indicates a waning interest in the “linguistic turn” and traces the afterlife of her cohort’s contributions. On the one hand, she suggests that their work is done, now that “the ‘semiotic challenge’ has been addressed, absorbed.” On the other, she signals the importance of preservation, the need, at the very least, to “appreciate and employ what poststructuralism has taught us.”⁶⁴ But does her narrative of generational supersession work against rather than toward that end?

A model of successive and specific historical “generations” is at the heart of Spiegel’s analysis. Remaining within a Euro-American frame, she correlates the radical epistemological questioning of postwar (French) philosophy with the ineffable sense of loss specific to the second post-Holocaust generation. The connection, she argues, is not directly causal, but a displacement, or “alchemy,” exemplified in the thought of Jacques Derrida. Derrida’s insistent assertions of unstable origins, present absences, and impossible wholes thus exemplify, in her view, “an entire generation’s understanding of the wreck of history attendant upon the war and the revelations of its horrors.”⁶⁵ This is in many ways a provocative analysis, especially given the skepticism with which historians so often treat Derrida’s thought (when they treat it at all).⁶⁶ The argument is, however, difficult to assess, in part because Spiegel never clearly explains *who* belongs to this generation and why. Even if we accept “post-Holocaust” as a chronological marker (although questions might be raised about this, too), its status as a generational demarcation is more fraught. How are we to map the contours of the “generation[s]” formed by “the event” not only chronologically, but also geographically? Even scholars who focus specifically on Holocaust survivors and their children worry over the importance of drawing careful distinctions along the lines of age, nationality, and experience.⁶⁷

⁶³ Spiegel, “The Task of the Historian,” 3, emphasis added.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 10–11.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 8. For a brilliant account of the multiple factors—at once institutional, religious, philosophical, and political—that influenced the “young Derrida,” see Baring, *The Young Derrida and French Philosophy*.

⁶⁶ For a discussion of historians’ vexed relationship to Derrida, see Ethan Kleinberg, “Haunting History: Deconstruction and the Spirit of Revision,” *History and Theory* 46, no. 4 (2007): 113–143.

⁶⁷ Susan Rubin Suleiman, “The 1.5 Generation: Thinking about Child Survivors and the Holocaust,” *American Imago* 59, no. 3 (2002): 277–295. On the difficult chronology of when the Holocaust, as such, was “known,” particularly in the French context, see Samuel Moyn, *A Holocaust Controversy: The Treblinka Affair in Postwar France* (Waltham, Mass., 2005); Henry Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, Mass., 1991). See also Tara Zahra, *The Lost Children: Reconstructing Europe’s Families after World War II* (Cambridge, Mass., 2011).

Spiegel's account is likewise notable for the starkness with which it adopts not only a generational, but also a distinctly Euro-American frame. She focuses on how the metaphysical concerns of the post-Holocaust generation intersected with political and institutional developments, especially in the United States. She thus suggests elsewhere that "it is worth noting how tied to the experiences of a single generation these transformations appear to be."⁶⁸ Here again, her argument parallels that of Sewell, and in certain ways Eley's *A Crooked Line*. And she indeed draws on their generational analyses as evidence for her case.⁶⁹ For Spiegel, the rise of the "linguistic" and/or the "cultural" turn can be explained by a generational convergence between "post-Holocaust" metaphysical concerns, on the one hand, and the more directly political, economic, and institutional trends traced by Sewell and Eley, on the other. How can we historically assess this recent "turn" to a generational account of historiography itself?

In a 1973 essay, "The Historical Problem of Generations," Alan B. Spitzer wrote: "Each generation writes its own history of generations."⁷⁰ His exploration of this problem was marked by self-awareness, as he invoked at the outset a proliferation of work on "generations" in the wake of contemporary student revolts. Spitzer drew on an earlier set of discussions, going back to the 1920s, on the usefulness of the generation as a category of historical analysis. That earlier debate had included the likes of sociologist Karl Mannheim, who sought to refine the concept, and historian Lucien Febvre, who questioned its explanatory power.⁷¹ In other words, the notion of generation in history is tied to a distinct intellectual and political history. Pierre Nora, for example, locates the advent of "generational consciousness" in and with the historical rupture of the French Revolution, and he depicts it as a decisive, and constitutive, moment in specifically French historical consciousness. In citing these moments, Nora thus asserts that "generations are powerfully, perhaps even primarily, fabricators of *lieux de mémoire*, or mnemonic sites, which form the fabric of their provisional identities and stake out the boundaries of their generational memories."⁷² Featured in a book devoted to French national "realms of memory," the claim is intended to be performative: it seeks to create what it describes—including the construction and consignment of the "generation of 1968" to the space of memory.⁷³

Generational arguments are not only a powerful way to carve up historical time. They also reassert the boundaries of collective identity, not only in specific times, but also in specific places. As a result, the construction of a "generation" cannot be assumed as self-evident: it is a productive, rather than merely descriptive, concept. For some time, history, as a discipline, was supposed to be internally riven and scat-

⁶⁸ Spiegel, "Revising the Past/Revisiting the Present," 18.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁷⁰ Alan B. Spitzer, "The Historical Problem of Generations," *American Historical Review* 78, no. 5 (December 1973): 1353–1385, here 1353.

⁷¹ On the history of proliferation of thought about "generations" in this period, see Robert Wohl, *The Generation of 1914* (Cambridge, 1979).

⁷² Pierre Nora, "Generation," in Lawrence Kritzman, ed., *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past* (New York, 1996), 499–531, here 526. See also Hans Jaeger, "Generations in History: Reflections on a Controversial Concept," *History and Theory* 24, no. 3 (1985): 273–292.

⁷³ On the stakes of this "generational" account of May 1968 in France, see Kristin Ross, *May '68 and Its Afterlives* (Chicago, 2002).

tered in multiple directions—in part as a result of the innovations (or incursions) that came to be associated with the “linguistic turn.” But recent accounts of the past historiographical generation (those presumed to have participated, in one way or another, in the “turn”) strikingly reassert community. Does this narrative consign that once-troubled past to history in order to reassert the coherence and comity of the discipline in the process?⁷⁴

The historiographical “generation” dovetails conveniently with a coherent conception of historiographical “turns.” It presupposes collective new beginnings as well as eventual endings. In its wake, space is made for new “turns,” now that, according to Spiegel—and others—the postwar revisionist moment is “effectively over.”⁷⁵

In order to explain this now-passed postwar moment of historical revision, Spiegel draws on Michel de Certeau’s account of how “historiography separates its present time from a past.”⁷⁶ This model of the “historiographical operation” is taken from his now-classic work *The Writing of History*, which was first published in 1975. The book has a complex relationship to the thematics of memory, loss, and death that Spiegel aims to historicize. As she explains, he articulates the death and ritual mourning of the past with a vital present and future. For Certeau, then, “‘to mark’ a past is to make a place for the dead, but also to redistribute the space of possibility.” Historiography uses “the narrativity that buries the dead as a way of establishing a place for the living.”⁷⁷ An analogous logic underlies the aim of Spiegel’s address: by describing and explaining a temporal and historiographical scission, its narrative arc is supposed to make room for younger historians by historicizing the recent historiographical past.

But even as it describes this generational movement, Spiegel’s argument indicates the impossibility of creating sharp chronological (and methodological) ruptures—not least in her own (re)turn to Certeau as guide. She thus rejects an absolute break between the historical past and future, and suggests that the insights of “postmodernism” cannot be “so easily jettisoned.”⁷⁸ And indeed, Certeau’s own account of historical writing highlights a similar difficulty. He forcefully challenges models of discrete periodization, even as he describes the logic implicit in the “historiographical operation.” In his view, the past’s intelligibility in terms of distinct moments or periods is based on procedures of selection. The apparent coherence of those moments remains fragile, however, as the return of what he describes as repressed “shards” and “remainders” can always “discreetly perturb the pretty order of a line of ‘progress’ or a system of interpretation.”⁷⁹

Revisiting some of the crucial early moments of writing about the “linguistic turn” can help us recall some of those remainders to the surface. The complex debates that

⁷⁴ For a related discussion, see Geoff Eley, “Peace in the Neighborhood,” *Left History* 12, no. 1 (2007): 111–125.

⁷⁵ Spiegel, “Revising the Past/Revisiting the Present,” 3. The argument is first elaborated in Gabrielle M. Spiegel, “Orations of the Dead/Silences of the Living: The Sociology of the Linguistic Turn,” in Spiegel, *The Past as Text: The Theory and Practice of Medieval Historiography* (Baltimore, 1997), 29–43. For a parallel critique of this logic of “entombment,” see Sylvia Schafer, “Still Turning: Language, ‘Theory’ and History’s Fascination with the New,” forthcoming in *differences* 23, no. 2 (2012).

⁷⁶ Michel de Certeau, *The Writing of History*, trans. Tom Conley (New York, 1988), 3.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 100.

⁷⁸ Spiegel, “The Task of the Historian,” 11.

⁷⁹ Certeau, *The Writing of History*, 4.

took place in the 1980s and 1990s—about discourse and subjectivity, or the relationship between “linguistic” structures, agency, and experience—show that there was no *singular* “turn.” These discussions did not occur once and for all, in an orderly logic of progression and supersession, or uniformly across the discipline. To take another example, the chronologically contemporaneous theoretical and methodological ferment associated with Subaltern Studies figures unevenly and problematically in European historians’ retrospective accounts of the “linguistic turn,” despite certain shared attributes, Marxist revisionism, and a concern with symbolic representation among them. Eley thus writes: “this South Asian historiography both presaged and paralleled the course of the ‘linguistic turn’ in the West.”⁸⁰ The assessment is provocative because it posits parallelism and indeed priority to “post-colonial” historiography, rather than reasserting the rhetoric of temporal delay that figures such as Dipesh Chakrabarty have so powerfully critiqued.⁸¹ Eley does not posit incommensurability between these histories (he notes, for example, a shared Gramscian heritage), but he nonetheless presents the “linguistic turn” as a specific moment in Euro-American historiography, not as a cross-disciplinary trend.⁸²

If historians have returned to these questions of late, it is because they are as concerned about history’s future as they are about its past. Sewell’s *Logics of History* is exemplary in this regard. In the chapter titled “The Political Unconscious of Social and Cultural History,” he strongly states his goal: “to revive some of the lost virtues of social history without abandoning the tremendous intellectual gains attendant upon history’s linguistic turn.”⁸³ This is an engaged history, both politically and personally: the future of the discipline—and his relationship to it—is at stake.

Sewell construes a linguistic theory of the social to be the shared epistemological basis of “cultural history”—and the principal source of its rupture from “social history.” In order to map future directions, he reconstructs the political effects of Euro-American historians’ linguistic epistemologies in the postwar decades. His narrative traces two parallel paths in order, in the end, to suggest a causal relationship between them. His “internalist” account of this recent history is a truncated prosopography, in which he groups himself together with Lynn Hunt and Joan Scott. Without sidelining his own contributions, Sewell argues that “the rapidity of the rise of cultural history in the 1980s and the widening of the epistemological fissure dividing it from social history were disproportionately fueled by developments in women’s history.” Here he credits feminism, the “critical and deconstructive historical analysis of central cultural categories—sex and gender,” with helping “to radicalize and energize cultural history as a whole.”⁸⁴ This is, however, an ambivalent attribution of credit, given Sewell’s subsequent critique of the political limitations of cultural history (and especially its linguistic epistemology).

⁸⁰ Eley, *A Crooked Line*, 146. This argument is more difficult to make with respect to Latin Americanists’ appropriation of the subaltern model.

⁸¹ Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*.

⁸² For a forceful critique of the logic of incommensurability and its political implications, see Manu Goswami’s contribution to the *AHR* Forum on Eley’s book: Goswami, “Remembering the Future,” *American Historical Review* 113, no. 2 (April 2008): 417–424. She here elaborates on arguments set forth in Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space* (Chicago, 2004).

⁸³ Sewell, *Logics of History*, 23.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 47, 48. For a contrasting account of the recent history of historiography, see Scott, “History-Writing as Critique.”

Sewell's social and structural account recapitulates arguments by Fredric Jameson (hence the reference to the "political unconscious") and David Harvey—they themselves first formulated, it should be recalled, in the 1980s—on the historical convergence of postmodernism, post-Fordism, and neoliberal ideology.⁸⁵ Following their analyses, he writes: "I think it is essential to recognize that the cultural turn was also fueled, in ways we were essentially unaware of, by a secret affinity with an emergent logic of capitalist development."⁸⁶ According to Sewell, history's turn to language and culture misrecognized late capitalist logics of history. In his generational analysis, "1960s rebels" misread their historical moment: they attacked a "collapsing Fordist order" when their actual target should have been the emerging "order of globalized flexible accumulation."⁸⁷ In this melancholic narrative, the "turn" was politically well-intentioned, but ultimately misguided.

In order to restore clarity to historical—and political—vision, Sewell calls for a (re)turn to social science: "Critical awareness of the potential complicities between contemporary forms of capitalism and a purely cultural history seems to me an essential condition of clearheaded and efficacious epistemological, methodological, and practical work in historical studies today."⁸⁸ A number of historical and political assumptions are written into this call, not least that his generation's "linguistic turn" produced what he describes as a "purely cultural history" and that its practitioners were blind to this complicity.⁸⁹ Sewell's narrative ends up minimizing the history of dissension in social theory and historical practice, even though their implicit and explicit political effects were chief differends in those debates. Like Spiegel, he seeks to preserve some of the theoretical and critical insights generated in past decades. But by turning the "turn" into a shared generational event or moment, Sewell also suggests that it is a time whose time has come—and gone. We are collectively urged, instead, to write histories of late capitalism's present that understand deeper (structural) logics rather than misreading (or, worse, perpetuating) its surface cultural effects.

SEWELL THUS OFFERS US a cautionary tale about the dangers of untimely thinking. His call for disciplinary reorientation in the present assumes periodization, generational unity, and implicit world-historical movement. But does this narrative hold together? What happens to this story when the presumptive methodological, generational, and global coherence of the "linguistic turn" is contested? The evidence, when examined closely, suggests that the "linguistic turn" was not a coherent moment. It cannot be conceived as the intellectual property of a single historiographical generation or consigned to a collective past.

It is unclear, for example, how feminist analysis coincides with Sewell's claims of generational cecity. According to his account, feminism's focus on the historical con-

⁸⁵ David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford, 1989); Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," *New Left Review*, no. 146 (1984): 53–92.

⁸⁶ Sewell, *Logics of History*, 62.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 62.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

stitution of sex and gender lent cultural history political energy, but it also entailed a radically linguistic—and hence critically limited—epistemology. The “micro” focus of histories of gender and sexuality (and in particular, those influenced by Foucault) were, he suggests, ill-equipped to address broad structural economic and social change. For Sewell, an emphasis on the plasticity of cultural categories is politically symptomatic rather than analytically trenchant.⁹⁰

This view of feminist history and theory is not only inexact, it is politically limiting. Consider how a focus on gender and sexuality helped to establish the historical and historiographical significance of feminized consumption alongside masculinized production.⁹¹ Today, feminist analyses, and especially those that draw on Foucauldian accounts of governmentality, provide signal insights into the contemporary dynamics of consumption and capitalism, neoliberalism and globalization. While by no means unified by a single position or approach, such work demonstrates how gendered constructions of agency, desire, and sexual victimization are integral to the contemporary restructuring of markets, state sovereignty, and international order.⁹² What is more, it helps to illuminate what anthropologist Elizabeth Povinelli has

⁹⁰ On the link between Foucauldian microphysics and the eclipse of structural analysis, see *ibid.*, 59. On the eclipsing of “the social” by a focus on “culture and gender,” in the case of *History Workshop Journal*, see *ibid.*, 65. Daniel Rodgers pursues an analogous line of argument about the divisive effects of microanalyses of power, including by feminists, as part of a broader dynamic of social fragmentation in America; Rodgers, *Age of Fracture* (Cambridge, Mass., 2011). For a critique of this elision, see Samuel Moyn, “Studying the Fault Lines,” *Dissent* 58, no. 2 (2011): 101–105, here 103. In a parallel argument, Nancy Fraser has suggested a “perverse, subterranean elective affinity” between feminism and neoliberalism; see Fraser, “Feminism, Capitalism, and the Cunning of History,” *New Left Review* 56 (March–April 2009): 97–117, here 108.

⁹¹ For how Sewell’s own recent reflections on the history of consumption register this insight, see William H. Sewell, “The Empire of Fashion and the Rise of Capitalism in Eighteenth-Century France,” *Past and Present* 206, no. 1 (2010): 81–120. Some of the landmarks in the Euro-American field include Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005); Victoria de Grazia with Ellen Furlough, eds., *The Sex of Things: Gender and Consumption in Historical Perspective* (Berkeley, Calif., 1996); Jennifer M. Jones, *Sexing La Mode: Gender, Fashion and Commercial Culture in Old Regime France* (Oxford, 2004); Kathy Peiss, *Hope in a Jar: The Making of America’s Beauty Culture* (New York, 1998); Katherine Pence and Paul Betts, *Socialist Modern: East German Everyday Culture and Politics* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2008); Erika Diane Rappaport, *Shopping for Pleasure: Women in the Making of London’s West End* (Princeton, N.J., 2000); Mary Louise Roberts, “Gender, Consumption, and Commodity Culture,” *American Historical Review* 103, no. 3 (June 1998): 817–844; Judith R. Walkowitz, *City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London* (Chicago, 1992). On the colonial and global dimensions of consumption, see Timothy Burke, *Lifebuoy Men, Lux Women: Commodification, Consumption, and Cleanliness in Modern Zimbabwe* (Durham, N.C., 1996); Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan, *Scattered Hegemonies: Postmodernity and Transnational Feminist Practices* (Minneapolis, 1994); Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Conquest* (New York, 1995); Alys Eve Weinbaum and the Modern Girl Around the World Research Group, *The Modern Girl around the World: Consumption, Modernity, and Globalization* (Durham, N.C., 2008).

⁹² Notable contributions from the field of political theory, sociology, and anthropology include Özlem Aslan and Zeynep Gambetti, “Provincializing Fraser’s History: Feminism and Neoliberalism Revisited,” *History of the Present* 1, no. 1 (2011): 130–147; Suzanne Bergeron, “Political Economy Discourses of Globalization and Feminist Politics,” *Signs* 26, no. 4 (2001): 983–1006; Elizabeth Bernstein, *Temporarily Yours: Intimacy, Authenticity, and the Commerce of Sex* (Chicago, 2007); Wendy Brown, “American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratization,” *Political Theory* 34, no. 6 (2006): 690–714; Brown, “Neo-Liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy,” *Theory and Event* 7, no. 1 (2003): 1–19; Lisa Duggan, *The Twilight of Equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy* (Boston, 2003); Michel Feher, “Self-Appreciation; or, the Aspirations of Human Capital,” *Public Culture* 21, no. 1 (2009): 21–41; Janet R. Jakobsen, “Perverse Justice,” *GLQ* 18, no. 1 (2012): 19–45; Rosalind Morris, “Failures of Domestication: Speculations on Globality, Economy, and the Sex of Excess in Thailand,” *differences* 13, no. 1 (2002): 45–76; Aihwa Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception:*

recently described as the distinct “grammars” of temporality—orientations toward futurity as well as civilizational rhetorics of “pastness”—that structure the differential distribution of neoliberalism’s, or what she refers to as late liberalism’s, global effects.⁹³ In sum, it is crucial to recall that such feminist analysis remains a vital historical and political resource.

The temporalizing logic of turn talk forecloses these critical possibilities rather than creating new horizons. It implicitly consigns still-vibrant analytic resources to a periodized posterity and politically compromised epistemology.⁹⁴ What is at stake here is not the positive or negative legacy of a purported “linguistic turn,” but the usefulness and disadvantages of such fetishized “turns” for history’s life. If narratives of generational supersession represent analytical and political foreclosure, what kind of horizon does the re-membling of this past open up?

Here again, feminist analysis remains salient, not least because feminists have examined the at once epistemological and political limits of “generational thinking.” Histories of feminist “generations” or “waves” regularly grapple with questions of temporality: how to articulate past achievements, present-day urgencies, and visions of an alternative future. Should the new challenges in the present be understood as a sign and symptom of past or current failures? As Judith Roof has noted, “generational” models of feminist history ironically remain beholden not only to an oedipalized and reproductive conception of family, but also to a linear conception of historical time. In recasting historical temporality, Roof suggests that “generations” no longer appear as the most accurate or productive framework for articulating past, present, and future: “In a paradigm where history, governed by linear time, becomes the cause of ensuing events, the concepts of originality, pioneer, tradition, and precedent make sense. But if we challenge the very notions of time and history that ground these ideas, *generation* becomes an insignificant term in the creation, re-creation, sharing, and proliferation of feminist knowledges.”⁹⁵ Thus “generational thinking” may limit the proliferation of knowledge *tout court*, not least by consigning the critical resources of feminism to a chronologically and politically exhausted moment.

Most pressing now, as we proliferate histories of our present, is the need to unsettle rather than confirm what appear to be increasingly sedimented narratives. Genealogical analysis is particularly helpful for doing this. In one sense, there is a family resemblance between genealogy and generational thinking, at least when kin-

Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty (Durham, N.C., 2006); Lisa Rofel, *Desiring China: Experiments in Neoliberalism, Sexuality, and Public Culture* (Durham, N.C., 2007).

⁹³ Elizabeth A. Povinelli, *Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism* (Durham, N.C., 2011)

⁹⁴ Indeed, the proliferation of new turns recalls Walter Benjamin’s ironic assessment of ever new aesthetic movements in Weimar Germany, such as Expressionism and New Objectivity. In his view, they ended up reproducing the very commercial logics that they supposedly critiqued: “Expressionism exhibited the revolutionary gesture, the raised arm, the clenched fist in papier-mâché. After this advertising campaign, the New Objectivity . . . was added to the catalogue.” Walter Benjamin, “Left-Wing Melancholy,” in Benjamin, *Selected Writings*, vol. 2: 1927–1934, ed. Marcus Paul Bullock, Michael William Jennings, and Gary Smith (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), 423–427, here 424.

⁹⁵ Judith Roof, “Generational Difficulties; or, The Fear of a Barren History,” in Devoney Looser and E. Ann Kaplan, eds., *Generations: Academic Feminists in Dialogue* (Minneapolis, 1997), 69–87, here 86. See also Robyn Wiegman, “Feminism’s Apocalyptic Futures,” *New Literary History* 31, no. 4 (2000): 805–825.

ship relations are naturalized and universalized.⁹⁶ But when viewed as a critical technique for mapping relations (and non-relations), genealogy reveals the construction and constriction of generational ideas. While overtly engaged in and by questions of the present, it does not seek to discipline thinking toward a singular historiographical future.

In reading the entrails of recent debates, we can see the composite character of the centaur known as the “linguistic turn.” Following Paul Veyne’s proposition, one cannot make true or erroneous statements about such animals.⁹⁷ Rather than seeking to uncover the beast’s hidden nature, we have seen how it came into being—as both myth and fetish. The linguistic turn—and other purported “turns”—might be better understood not as historically inevitable disciplinary trajectories, but as specifically located, imaginatively cast, at once multiple, overlapping, and dynamic constellations. In this astrological rendering, there is also space for “untimely thinking,” or what Walter Benjamin, citing Friedrich Nietzsche, called a “star without atmosphere.”⁹⁸

⁹⁶ See, for example, David Schneider’s pathbreaking and controversial critique of the genealogical presumption in anthropology in Schneider, *A Critique of the Study of Kinship* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1984).

⁹⁷ Paul Veyne, “Foucault Revolutionizes History,” in Arnold I. Davidson, ed., *Foucault and His Interlocutors* (Chicago, 1997), 146–182, here 176. For Veyne’s discussion of the ambivalent status of centaurs in Greek and Roman mythology, see Veyne, *Did the Greeks Believe in Their Myths? An Essay on the Constitutive Imagination*, trans. Paula Wissing (Chicago, 1988), 54–57.

⁹⁸ This was Benjamin’s characterization of Charles Baudelaire’s relationship to the Second Empire; Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” in Benjamin, *Illuminations: Essays and Reflections*, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York, 1968), 155–200, here 194. The citation was of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” in Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, ed. Daniel Breazeale (Cambridge, 1983), 57–123, here 97. And, with reference to Heraclitus, see Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* (Chicago, 1962), 67. For a recent discussion of the political possibilities of “untimely thinking,” see Gary Wilder, “Untimely Vision: Aimé Césaire, Decolonization, Utopia,” *Public Culture* 21, no. 1 (2009): 101–140.

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From Optic to Topic: The Foreclosure Effect of
Historiographic Turns

GARY WILDER

IN THE FIELD OF HISTORY, we are now witnessing the untimely return of elements of the “doctrinal realism” that Hayden White identified with the legacy of Leopold von Ranke: documentary evidence, descriptive particularism, and “explanation by narration” in the service of a reconstructive history of “what actually happened.”¹ Most striking about this development is that a return to descriptive realism and archival objectivism has actually *followed* what were supposed to be the epistemological breaks initiated by the so-called linguistic and cultural turns in historiography. Given that academic history in the United States has always been built upon a realist foundation and that empiricism is entrenched as the disciplinary default, a professional backlash against the theoretical challenges associated with them is not surprising.² But insofar as conventional historical practices were indeed challenged by them, we might ask if there exists a connection between history’s current retrenchment and the turns themselves. Has the discourse of discrete and completed turns functioned to foreclose certain kinds of questions from being posed or debates from taking place? The real historical significance of the linguistic and cultural turns may thus lie less in specific instances of historiographic innovation to which they are supposed to refer than in their persistent and pernicious afterlives.³

In retrospect, we can see that the analytic openings that were created by the linguistic and cultural turns have been foreclosed through a process of domestication whereby new optics were transformed into routine research topics that reaffirmed traditional historiographic assumptions. Even some proponents of these turns con-

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¹ Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore, 1973), 163–190.

² Georg G. Iggers, *New Directions in European Historiography*, rev. ed. (Middletown, Conn., 1984); Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge, 1988); Donald R. Kelley, *Frontiers of History: Historical Inquiry in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven, Conn., 2006); Martin Bunzl, *Real History: Reflections on Historical Practice* (London, 1997). Even the new social history, of course, sought to establish objective historiography on an even firmer realist, because positivist, foundation. See François Furet, “From Narrative History to Problem-Oriented History,” in Furet, *In the Workshop of History* (Chicago, 1984), 54–67.

³ Cf. the story that Kristin Ross tells about how 68ers in France later disavowed, by rewriting, their past and those events. Ross, *May ’68 and Its Afterlives* (Chicago, 2002).

tributed to such foreclosure effects through discourses about completed turns, a new methodological consensus, and professional reconciliation. Moreover, because the linguistic turn conflated positivist social history with structural analysis more generally, and because it tended to restrict “theory” to poststructuralism, its advocates often marginalized history informed by critical *social* theory. Against these developments, critical historians should reclaim both the linguistic turn’s demand that historians confront fundamental epistemological questions self-reflexively and Marxism’s longstanding concern with systemic, long-term, and macrosocial analysis.

This is not meant to be a comprehensive overview of the state of history today. Most of the examples are drawn from my own field of French history. The aim is not to indict individuals but to draw attention to embedded assumptions and tendencies within history as a professional space and a disciplinary formation that encourages certain habits and choices among its practitioners. The fact that counterexamples of innovative and insightful work can be invoked for any of those tendencies does not mean that such tendencies do not exist. Rather than defend or condemn a specific historiographic turn, the task is to explore the intellectual and institutional work that the idiom and narrative of “turns” often performs.

A NUMBER OF HISTORIANS WHO participated in the linguistic and cultural “turns” have written about their experiences.⁴ From their accounts emerges a familiar narrative of the historiographic turns that begins with the development in the 1960s of the “new social history,” which challenged a traditional historiography that sanctified official sources, political elites, short-term events, and descriptive narrative. This triumphant social history was then gradually challenged by a constellation of critics associated in different ways with what became known retrospectively as the linguistic turn. By the 1980s, social history was largely displaced institutionally by various strands of work collected under the rubric of cultural history.⁵ During this period, debates across the disciplines unfolded over fundamental epistemological questions regarding the relationship between the world we confront, the categories with which we attempt to think that world, and the worldly forces in relation to which these categories emerged. Critics in numerous fields sought to counter the limitations of realism, positivism, and functionalism. Various linguistic turns, cultural turns, and

⁴ The original panel was “Historiographic ‘Turns’ in Critical Perspective,” American Historical Association Annual Meeting, January 2010. Recent reflections on experiences of the turns include Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, eds., *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture* (Berkeley, Calif., 1999); Dominick LaCapra, “Tropisms of Intellectual History,” *Rethinking History* 8, no. 4 (2004): 499–529; Gabrielle Spiegel, “Introduction,” in Spiegel, ed., *Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Turn*, new ed. (New York, 2005), 1–31; Spiegel, “The Task of the Historian,” 2008 AHA Presidential Address, *American Historical Review* 114, no. 1 (February 2009): 1–15; Geoff Eley, *A Crooked Line: From Cultural History to the History of Society* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2005); William H. Sewell, Jr., *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago, 2005); and Joan W. Scott, “History-Writing as Critique,” in Keith Jenkins, Sue Morgan, and Alun Munslow, eds., *Manifestos for History* (New York, 2007), 19–38.

⁵ See Eley, *A Crooked Line*; Sewell, *Logics of History*, 1–80; and Furet, “From Narrative History to Problem-Oriented History.” For the sake of this argument, I often lump together the linguistic and cultural turns, fully realizing that more space would be required to do justice to their many differences.

historical turns unfolded in different ways, at different rates, and with different implications across the human sciences.⁶

My own graduate education in the 1990s was shaped directly by innovative research that was associated with the linguistic turn in history, the historical turn in anthropology, the cultural turn in colonial studies, and the postcolonial turn in the humanities. Nevertheless, the talk of turns then circulating in the academy was confusing. This was partly a function of the time lag that attended the cross-disciplinary borrowing that fueled many of these turns.⁷ Precisely when many historians were turning to Clifford Geertz's symbolic anthropology in order to elucidate deep mental structures underlying supposedly coherent cultural systems, many anthropologists were developing a radical critique of their discipline's holistic concept of culture. And just as many anthropologists were discovering Marc Bloch's and Lucien Febvre's *mentalités*, Fernand Braudel's historical structures, Eric Hobsbawm's primitive rebels, and E. P. Thompson's working-class communities, many historians had already rejected structural history, reclaimed "the event," challenged the conception of agency underlying resistance theory, or criticized the voluntarism and determinism underwriting the tendency to essentialize idealized communities. Moreover, a sector of cultural anthropology embraced archival research just when many historians associated with the linguistic and cultural turns questioned the possibility and desirability of conventional historical reconstruction. If the cultural turn in history and the historical turn in anthropology roughly coincided, each implicitly raised critical questions about the other.

Such competing tendencies also existed among historians who turned away from social history. At a certain general level, those who identified with the "turns" became increasingly mindful about the non-transparent relationship between thought and being and began to reorient historical research away from facts and explanation to meaning and interpretation. But "linguistic turn" and "cultural turn" were terms of convenience that often conflated incompatible intellectual currents. Insights about the constitutive power of language or the ways that discourses mediate sub-

⁶ Richard Rorty, ed., *The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method* (Chicago, 1967); Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato, eds., *The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man* (Baltimore, 1970); White, *Metahistory*; Dominick LaCapra and Steven L. Kaplan, eds., *Modern European Intellectual History: Reappraisals and New Perspectives* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1982); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1983); George E. Marcus and Michael M. J. Fischer, *Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences* (Chicago, 1986); James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds., *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* (Berkeley, Calif., 1986); Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, eds., *Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look* (Berkeley, Calif., 1988); Lynn Hunt, ed., *The New Cultural History* (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Margaret R. Somers, *Does Social Theory Need History? Reflections on Epistemological Encounters in the Social Sciences* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1989); Nicholas B. Dirks, ed., *Colonialism and Culture* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1992); Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley, and Sherry B. Ortner, eds., *Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory* (Princeton, N.J., 1994); Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York, 1996); Terrence J. McDonald, ed., *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996); Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); George Steinmetz, ed., *State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1999).

⁷ On the "contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous," see Reinhart Koselleck, "History, Histories, and Formal Time Structures," in Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (New York, 2004), 93–104, here 95, 99; Koselleck, "Neuzeit: Remarks on the Semantics of Modern Concepts of Movement," *ibid.*, 222–254, here 232, 239, 246; and Koselleck, "'Space of Experience' and 'Horizon of Expectation': Two Historical Categories," *ibid.*, 255–275.

jectivity and shape social life led some historians to overturn the conventional notions of individuality, intentionality, agency, and causality upon which traditional historiography depended. But they led others to reaffirm these very concepts, often through histories of marginalized actors whose subjectivity was purportedly reconstructed and experience valorized.⁸

In sum, “linguistic turn” and “cultural turn” are ambiguous analytic categories that have often obscured and excluded much of what they sought to clarify or embrace. But the problem goes beyond semantics or the poor referential fit between the term “turn” and what it purported to describe or understand. What the talk of turns missed or meant is less important than what it did and does. The question we need to ask is whether the discourse and logic of “turns” helps or hinders us in the crucial task of writing critical history that is at once empirically grounded and theoretically self-reflexive.⁹

IF THE TROPE OF “TURNS” WAS often analytically incoherent, it was nevertheless historically intelligible. The diverse currents and interests assembled under their rubric were motivated by a shared desire to rethink the methods and assumptions of social history. Yet this set of potentially radical interventions seems to have left us a legacy of historiography that now often embraces uncritical aspects of narrative event history, empiricist social history, and depoliticized cultural history. Is there a relationship between this analytic regression and the very logic of the turns?

Recollections by our senior colleagues tend to invoke “the turn” as something they took or made in a coherent and decisive gesture that distinguished between unambiguous alternatives and that demarcated a before and an after.¹⁰ William Sewell, with disarming honesty, confesses that “making the cultural turn was . . . an exciting but also profoundly troubling step for an adept of the new social history . . . taking this step amounted to a sort of conversion experience—a sudden and exhilarating reshaping of one’s intellectual and moral world.”¹¹ These quasi-mythic nar-

⁸ See, for example, the debates about discourse, experience, subjectivity, and agency in LaCapra and Kaplan, *Modern European Intellectual History*; John E. Toews, “Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of Meaning and the Irreducibility of Experience,” *American Historical Review* 92, no. 4 (October 1987): 879–907; Joan Wallach Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York, 1988); Gabrielle M. Spiegel, “History, Historicism, and the Social Logic of the Text in the Middle Ages,” *Speculum* 65, no. 1 (January 1990): 59–86; Joan W. Scott, “The Evidence of Experience,” *Critical Inquiry* 17, no. 4 (Summer 1991): 773–797; Laura Lee Downs, “If ‘Woman’ Is Just an Empty Category, Then Why Am I Afraid to Walk Alone at Night? Identity Politics Meets the Postmodern Subject,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35, no. 2 (April 1993): 414–437; Joan W. Scott, “The Tip of the Volcano,” *ibid.*, 438–443; the dialogue among Sonya O. Rose, Kathleen Canning, Anna Clark, Mariana Valverde, and Marcia R. Sawyer published as Rose, “Gender History/Women’s History: Is Feminist Scholarship Losing Its Critical Edge?,” *Journal of Women’s History* 5, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 89–128, here 115–120; Kathleen Canning, “Feminist History after the Linguistic Turn: Historicizing Discourse and Experience,” *Signs* 19, no. 2 (Winter 1994): 368–404; Geoff Eley, “Is All the World a Text? From Social History to the History of Society Two Decades Later,” in McDonald, *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences*, 193–243.

⁹ Throughout this essay, I use “self-reflexive” to refer to arguments that attempt to account for their own conditions of epistemological possibility; it does not refer to writing that is autobiographical or self-referential.

¹⁰ See the contribution to this forum by Judith Surkis.

¹¹ William H. Sewell, Jr., “The Political Unconscious of Social and Cultural History; or, Confessions of a Former Quantitative Historian,” in Sewell, *Logics of History*, 22–80, here 42.

ratives implicitly invoke a process of collective effervescence. For Émile Durkheim, we might recall, such heightened ritual states signal ruptures with the everyday, when profane practices turn into sacred experience and create openings for revolutionary systemic change. Conversely, in Durkheim's account, this effervescent sociality simultaneously functions to reaffirm group solidarity and demarcate boundaries—precisely by obscuring rather than illuminating the underlying social forces that constitute these heightened experiences.¹² We might say, then, that however contentious they might have seemed, these effervescent turns ultimately functioned to integrate diverse historians within a more coherent professional community.

Because the talk of turns objectified “social history” as a singular package, the turn away from it was often wholesale. The positions associated with one generation of historians at a particular time and place thus came to stand for social history *as such*. Critics tended to equate social history, social science, social theory, and Marxism. They often conflated positivism, social determinism, vulgar materialism, and structural explanation.¹³ Because any of these terms were seen to imply all the others, to challenge one often meant rejecting the whole package. This led many proponents of the linguistic and cultural turns who opposed the positivism of social history to turn away from supposedly outmoded social scientific frameworks that focused on social logics, enduring forms, and deep structures. Historians who accepted the critique of foundationalist metanarratives, realist epistemology, and empiricist methodology were often also led to discount the study of long-term and large-scale historical processes. In the name of contingency, particularity, and difference, structural analysis and societal explanation were increasingly discouraged.¹⁴

An understandable fear of reductionism led many anti-positivist historians then aligned with the turns to accept a reductive understanding of Marxism as a vulgar form of economic determinism and teleological historicism.¹⁵ Whether sympathetic to or critical of the turns, historians during this period often came to associate critical theory exclusively with poststructuralism.¹⁶ This despite the fact that dialectical

¹² Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (New York, 1965), 236–255.

¹³ See Patrick Joyce and Catriona Kelly, “History and Post-Modernism,” *Past and Present*, no. 133 (November 1991): 204–213; Bonnie Smith, *The Gender of History: Men, Women, and Historical Practice* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998); and Smith, review of Sewell, *Logics of History*, *H-France Review* 7, no. 91 (August 2007): 372–374.

¹⁴ For example, Lynn Hunt, “Introduction: History, Culture, and Text,” in Hunt, *The New Cultural History*, 1–22; and Joyce and Kelly, “History and Post-Modernism.” On the inability of cultural history to address adequately issues of material and spatial inequality, see Barbara Weinstein, “Developing Inequality,” 2007 AHA Presidential Address, *American Historical Review* 113, no. 1 (February 2008): 1–18. This difficulty is exemplified in the *AHR* Roundtable that was inspired by that essay, “Historians and the Question of ‘Modernity,’” *American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (June 2011): 631–751.

¹⁵ See François Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution* (Cambridge, 1978); Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley, Calif., 1984); Keith Michael Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1990). For examples of historical studies that engage productively with Marxism on questions of culture and consciousness, see William H. Sewell, Jr., *Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848* (Cambridge, 1980); Jacques Rancière, *The Nights of Labor: The Workers’ Dream in Nineteenth-Century France* (Philadelphia, 1991); and Patrick Joyce, *Visions of the People: Industrial England and the Question of Class, 1848–1914* (Cambridge, 1991).

¹⁶ The reduction of “theory” to poststructuralism and the bracketing of both social theory and Marxism are exemplified by the otherwise important journal *History and Theory*. See the essays collected in Brian Fay, Philip Pomper, and Richard T. Vann, eds., *History and Theory: Contemporary Readings* (Oxford, 1998).

Marxism challenged any attempt to think contingency and systematicity apart from one another; it provided a framework for analyzing historically specific structures, forms, and logics that at the same time attended to contradictions, crises, and processes of transformation. From the Marxian perspective, the dominant schema of turns seemed to offer a false choice between either doing work that was anti-positivist and self-reflexive or doing work that was concerned with the deep structures and logics that characterize distinct social formations.¹⁷

Since the late 1990s, the discourse of decisive turns has been joined by what we might call an “after-turn” discourse. Both sets of stories figure the linguistic turn as punctual, past, and complete, as if the kinds of epistemological debates about producing history that were provoked by the turns could actually be resolved.¹⁸ Since theory as such was often reduced to “poststructuralist linguistic turn,” the purported end of the linguistic turn also signaled to many that the need for theoretical debates among historians was obsolete. Historians, we were told, could now return to their proper historical task of reconstructing, narrating, and interpreting the past.¹⁹ They could integrate the useful or unavoidable cultural and linguistic innovations or insights into a more nuanced and technically accomplished history that would be able to represent more fully the multiple dimensions of social life and historical experience.²⁰ Especially troubling has been a tendency among some former “turners” and their sympathizers to concur in consigning these turns to the past in order to invoke a new methodological synthesis. One effect of this after-turn discourse has been to reorient debate away from epistemological disputes about the production of historical knowledge in general, and toward particular empirical disagreements about topics among specialists.²¹

Somewhere between the making and the ending of turns, a disciplinary consensus emerged as certain elements of recent innovations were selectively domesticated and others forgotten. It is remarkable that even as professional history has turned away from many of the insights of these turns, there are few historians who would reject

¹⁷ For important non-economistic readings of Marx, see Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* (Cambridge, 1968); Bertell Ollman, *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society* (Cambridge, 1971); David Harvey, *The Limits to Capital*, new and updated ed. (New York, 2007); Derek Sayer, *The Violence of Abstraction: The Analytic Foundations of Historical Materialism* (London, 1987); Moishe Postone, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory* (Cambridge, 1993); and Etienne Balibar, *The Philosophy of Marx* (New York, 1995).

¹⁸ See Surkis, this forum.

¹⁹ Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, *Telling the Truth about History* (New York, 1994).

²⁰ See Joyce Appleby, “The Power of History,” *American Historical Review* 103, no. 1 (February 1998): 1–14; Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, “Introduction,” in Bonnell and Hunt, *Beyond the Cultural Turn*, 1–32, here 9–10, 25; Lynn Hunt, “Where Have All the Theories Gone?,” *Perspectives on History*, March 2002, 5; Spiegel, “The Task of the Historian”; Michael Roth, “Ebb Tide,” *History and Theory* 46, no. 1 (February 2007): 66–73; Spiegel, “Introduction”; William H. Sewell, Jr., “The Concept(s) of Culture,” in Sewell, *Logics of History*, 152–174; and Eley, *A Crooked Line*, 200–201.

²¹ This is evident in a recent online forum in which Laura Lee Downs, Herrick Chapman, Olivier Wieviorka, and Richard Kuisel comment on Philip Nord, *France's New Deal: From the Thirties to the Postwar Era* (Princeton, N.J., 2010), *H-France Forum* 6, no. 1 (Winter 2011). The participants debate how it was that the former Vichy officials could have played such an important role in the creation of the postwar welfare society, but none of them discuss in structural terms either Fordist capitalism or statist planning as transnational phenomena that cannot be grasped in terms of the political interests or ideological dispositions of French bureaucrats in the 1930s and 1940s. A framework that focuses on phases of capitalism and forms of state would immediately recognize underlying links among the statist and welfarist projects advocated by interwar social democrats, wartime proponents of the National Revolution, and postwar technocrats.

the turns outright. On the contrary, the mainstream of the discipline claims to endorse certain aspects of the linguistic and cultural turns (usually in the form of methodological techniques or research topics). A critique of historical realism has thus been recuperated for a neo-realist project of historical reconstruction that now promises to do a better job of getting things right by attending to multiple dimensions of social experience at the same time. The aim of traditional history, which Dominick LaCapra has incisively referred to as “the translation of archives into narratives,” resumes its privileged position.²² Joan Scott describes how historians’ “resistance [to theory] takes the form of superficial acceptance of the vocabulary of theory in the service of its domestication.”²³ She recounts that “even gender” quickly became “a handy label whose application reassured rather than disturbed us, turning questions into answers before they had even been asked.”²⁴ In precisely this way, historians employed the historiographic turns to expand the types of evidence and objects that could now be collected and interpreted without feeling compelled to question their frames and forms of historical analysis.

In general, history after the turns has paid more attention to the discursive dimensions of social life and to the power relations encoded in and enabled by them. But the shibboleth of determinism, which cultural historians had previously leveled against the old social history, was then turned against the newer semiotic sensibility; this allowed historiography to drift back to its perennial interest in rational actors, individual intentions, immediate causality, short time spans, and small-scale units of analysis. A populist impulse, retained from social history, often sanctifies ordinary people and everyday experience. Referential readings of texts are again valorized, and contextualization is treated as a technical rather than an epistemological problem.²⁵

Through a process that LaCapra has called “methodological scapegoating,” historical arguments that are not based on concretely observable evidence and that do not seek to answer questions in an empirical, reconstructive, or narrative manner are typically regarded as speculative, undisciplined, and outside the domain of recognizable and acceptable historiography.²⁶ If the assumption is that historians by definition analyze archival documents, then historians must be able to answer their questions with archival evidence. Such an equation often implies a certain understanding of actors, agency, and causality. Conversely, it means that questions that

²² Dominick LaCapra, *History and Its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2009), 36.

²³ Scott, “History-Writing as Critique,” 22.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 21.

²⁵ See, for example, Barbara D. Metcalf, “Islam and Power in Colonial India: The Making and Unmaking of ■ Muslim Princess,” 2010 AHA Presidential Address, *American Historical Review* 116, no. 1 (February 2011): 1–30; and Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, “An American Album, 1857,” 2009 AHA Presidential Address, *American Historical Review* 115, no. 1 (February 2010): 1–30; as well as “AHR Roundtable: Historians and Biography,” *American Historical Review* 114, no. 3 (June 2009): 573–661.

²⁶ Dominick LaCapra, “Is Everyone a *Mentalité* Case? Transference and the ‘Culture’ Concept,” in LaCapra, *History and Criticism* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1985), 71–94, here 73. A classic example of such scapegoating is Richard Kuisel’s AHR review of Kristin Ross, *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture* (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), which has been enormously influential for French historians concerned with the postwar period. Because Ross uses novels and film scripts as evidence for her argument, Kuisel declares that “historians can skip this book.” *American Historical Review* 101, no. 3 (June 1996): 859–860.

cannot be answered archivally are not worth asking, or that historians who operate in different registers are not doing legitimate history.

Once again, “theory” is objectified and relegated to introductions and so-called “think pieces” or segregated as a specialized object of study by intellectual historians. Historians are not expected to ask questions about the conditions of possibility of the historical knowledge that they are producing—about the genealogy of their categories and their embeddedness in the social worlds they purport to explain, about their own implication in their objects of study, and the relation between those pasts and the historian’s present.²⁷ Although historians often criticize theory for being overly abstract, they tend to abstract theory from its worldly entailments, as if it stands apart from history as something that can be used or applied.²⁸ As a result, scholars are often rewarded for presenting expert performances of archival methods in the service of foregone conclusions (for example, actual historical phenomena are more complex than theoretical abstractions often make them out to be; contingent events play important roles in historical processes; historical change is the effect of many determinants and not a single cause; ideology is never wholly convincing to everybody; state power is not absolute; plans are not fully implemented; discourses and practices do not always align; actions often have unintended consequences; actors do not always know what they are doing; historical phenomena and processes are often contradictory). Descriptive empiricism thereby masquerades as theoretical insight.

Ironically, another legacy of the turns is that empiricist historians (ever ready to denounce abstraction as ahistorical) and historians influenced by poststructuralism (ever ready to denounce systemic accounts as scientific explanation) share an allergy to structural explanation.²⁹ The former invoke historical complexity, and the latter

²⁷ Recent examples of histories that seek to relate past to present in a critical manner include Harry Harootunian, *History’s Disquiet: Modernity, Cultural Practice, and the Question of Everyday Life* (New York, 2000); Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, N.J., 2000); Walter Johnson, “Time and Revolution in African America: Temporality and the History of Atlantic Slavery,” in Thomas Bender, ed., *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley, Calif., 2002), 148–167; Ross, *May ’68 and Its Afterlives*; Carolyn J. Dean, *The Fragility of Empathy after the Holocaust* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2004); Herman Lebovics, *Bringing the Empire Back Home: France in the Global Age* (Durham, N.C., 2004); Joan Wallach Scott, *Parité! Sexual Equality and the Crisis of French Universalism* (Chicago, 2005); Rashid Khalidi, *Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America’s Perilous Path in the Middle East* (Boston, 2005); Greg Grandin, *Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York, 2006); Joan Wallach Scott, *The Politics of the Veil* (Princeton, N.J., 2007); Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton, N.J., 2009); Laurent Dubois, *Soccer Empire: The World Cup and the Future of France* (Berkeley, Calif., 2010); Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, 2010).

²⁸ Consider the “theory for historians” genre of writing, such as Jeffrey Weeks, “Foucault for Historians,” *History Workshop Journal* 14, no. 1 (1982): 106–119; Peter Gay, *Freud for Historians* (New York, 1985); Vanessa R. Schwartz, “Walter Benjamin for Historians,” *American Historical Review* 106, no. 5 (December 2001): 1721–1743; Callum G. Brown, *Postmodernism for Historians* (Harlow, 2005).

²⁹ See the critique of explanation and defense of description in the name of anti-positivist theory in Allan Megill, “Recounting the Past: ‘Description,’ Explanation, and Narrative in Historiography,” *American Historical Review* 94, no. 3 (June 1989): 627–653. Some notable exceptions that attempt to relate history’s concern with contingent events to critical social theory’s concern with deep structures include Thomas C. Holt, *The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor, and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832–1938* (Baltimore, 1992); Fernando Coronil, *The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela* (Chicago, 1997); Harry Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan* (Princeton, N.J., 2001); Neil Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization* (Berkeley, Calif., 2004); Manu Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy*

respect for difference; both can ignore social theory, discount Marxism, and revert to a new nominalism that similarly emphasizes description over explanation.³⁰ However unintentionally, the after-turn discourse creates the impression, which threatens to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, that we inhabit a post-ideological world of academic consensus.³¹ Such an orientation promotes the idea that the analytic dilemmas, theoretical debates, and institutional conflicts associated with the turns have been resolved. Underlying such claims about synthesis is the assumption that the purpose of theory is essentially technical: a means for refining research methods in order to reconstruct the past more accurately.

In sum, antipathy to theory, an allergy to intellectual discord, and a will to professional reconciliation often reinforce one another. It is not surprising that the proliferation of historiographic “turns” has corresponded to a decline in debates within history about fundamental epistemological questions. This is partly because once optics are reduced to topics, new turns can multiply without cost or stakes. These successive turns often enact on a smaller scale the drama of opening and foreclosure that occurred with the linguistic and cultural turns more generally.

Consider the trajectories of recent turns toward new international, transnational, and imperial histories. Cold War diplomatic historians have ambitiously reconstituted their field by internationalizing their inquiries. Work that had previously focused on bilateral relations among foreign ministers began to consider a wider range of agents on a broader political terrain that included non-state actors and international organizations. But by typically explaining macrohistorical shifts through policy decisions by individuals and organizations, this new international history has retained conventional methodological assumptions about evidence, agency, and causality.³² Other historians have rightly recognized the importance of producing what Christopher Bayly has called a “transnational history of ideas.”³³ But this urgent

to *National Space* (Chicago, 2004); Sewell, *Logics of History*; George Steinmetz, *The Devil's Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa* (Chicago, 2007); Andrew Sartori, *Bengal in Global Concept History: Culturalism in the Age of Capital* (Chicago, 2008).

³⁰ For an implicit affirmation of nominalism under the rubric of historical specificity, contingency, and complexity, see Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley, Calif., 2005). For a theoretically rigorous history that celebrates particularity and incommensurability, see Chakrabarty's theoretically rigorous *Provincializing Europe*.

³¹ Cf. the recuperation of French radical politics discussed in Ross, *May '68 and Its Afterlives*; as well as Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (Glencoe, Ill., 1960); Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, 1992); and, from a different perspective, Samir Amin, *The Liberal Virus: Permanent War and the Americanization of the World*, trans. James H. Membrez (New York, 2005).

³² Matthew James Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford, 2002); Mark Atwood Lawrence, *Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam* (Berkeley, Calif., 2005); Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge, 2005); Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005).

³³ “AHR Conversation: On Transnational History,” *American Historical Review* 111, no. 5 (December 2006): 1441–1464, here 1452. For examples of transnational intellectual history, see C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Malden, Mass., 2004); Benedict Anderson, *Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination* (London, 2005); Laurent Dubois, “An Enslaved Enlightenment: Rethinking the Intellectual History of the French Atlantic,” *Social History* 31, no. 1 (February 2006): 1–14; Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York, 2007); Sartori, *Bengal in Global Concept History*; Christopher L. Hill, *National History and the World of Nations: Capital, State, and the Rhetoric*

interest in reframing the networks and fields through which modern ideas have been produced, a move that could de-center Europe as the presumptive source of modern ideas, has also cleared the way for historians to reproduce, in this new transnational idiom, stories about a unidirectional flow of concepts from the West to the rest of the world.³⁴

A new transnational sensibility has led many place-based historians to resituate traditional objects of national historiography in global political-economic or geopolitical frameworks.³⁵ By analyzing what had been national topics through transnational optics, such work reminds us that an attempt to move beyond the limitations of national history paradigms has less to do with what one studies or where than with how one frames and treats an object of study. But the call for transnational history has also led historians to study international organizations, an important area of research, to be sure, but with existing methods that effectively confirm national historical frameworks.³⁶ Or, as Durba Ghosh argues in her contribution to this forum, paradigm-shifting work in black Atlantic and British imperial history has allowed a more traditional British history to reaffirm its global importance just as it was being

of History in Japan, France, and the United States (Durham, N.C., 2008); C. A. Bayly and Eugenio F. Biagini, eds., *Giuseppe Mazzini and the Globalisation of Democratic Nationalism, 1830–1920* (Oxford, 2008); Federico Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism: Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919–1945* (Durham, N.C., 2009); Yoav Di-Capua, *Gatekeepers of the Arab Past: Historians and History Writing in Twentieth-Century Egypt* (Berkeley, Calif., 2009).

³⁴ For example, David Armitage, *The Declaration of Independence: A Global History* (Cambridge, Mass., 2008); Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005); Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford, 2007).

³⁵ See, for example, Bender, *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*; Sven Beckert, "From Tuskegee to Togo: The Problem of Freedom in the Empire of Cotton," *Journal of American History* 92, no. 2 (September 2005): 498–526; Beckert, "Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American Civil War," *American Historical Review* 109, no. 5 (December 2004): 1405–1438; Walter Johnson, ed., *The Chattel Principle: Internal Slave Trades in the Americas* (New Haven, Conn., 2004). The *AHR* has supported this interest in transnational history by publishing and sponsoring fora such as "Transnational Sexualities," *American Historical Review* 114, no. 5 (December 2009); "The International 1968, Part II," *American Historical Review* 114, no. 2 (April 2009); "The International 1968, Part I," *American Historical Review* 114, no. 1 (February 2009); "Entangled Empires in the Atlantic World," *American Historical Review* 112, no. 3 (June 2007); "On Transnational History," *American Historical Review* 111, no. 5 (December 2006); and "Oceans of History," *American Historical Review* 111, no. 3 (June 2006). Writing this essay introduced me to innovative work published recently in the *AHR*, including Benjamin Lazier, "Earthrise; or, The Globalization of the World Picture," *American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (June 2011): 602–630; Cyrus Schayegh, "The Many Worlds of 'Abud Yasin; or, What Narcotics Trafficking in the Interwar Middle East Can Tell Us about Territorialization," *American Historical Review* 116, no. 2 (April 2011): 273–306; Sarah Abrevaya Stein, "Protected Persons? The Baghdadi Jewish Diaspora, the British State, and the Persistence of Empire," *American Historical Review* 116, no. 1 (February 2011): 80–108; Sunil S. Amrith, "Tamil Diasporas across the Bay of Bengal," *American Historical Review* 114, no. 3 (June 2009): 547–572; Alison Frank, "The Petroleum War of 1910: Standard Oil, Austria, and the Limits of the Multinational Corporation," *American Historical Review* 114, no. 1 (February 2009): 16–41; Francine Hirsch, "The Soviets at Nuremberg: International Law, Propaganda, and the Making of the Postwar Order," *American Historical Review* 113, no. 3 (June 2008): 701–730.

³⁶ For example, the renewed interest in the League of Nations. Keith David Watenpaugh, "The League of Nations' Rescue of Armenian Genocide Survivors and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism, 1920–1927," *American Historical Review* 115, no. 5 (December 2010): 1315–1339; Susan Pedersen, "Getting Out of Iraq—in 1932: The League of Nations and the Road to Normative Statehood," *American Historical Review* 115, no. 4 (October 2010): 975–1000; Pedersen, "Back to the League of Nations," *American Historical Review* 112, no. 4 (October 2007): 1091–1117.

eclipsed by histories of colonial societies.³⁷ On another front, scholars have traced non-national networks of circulation and sociability through histories of empires, regions, or oceans. Part of their value is to challenge nationalist assumptions about the normal units through which to understand modern history.³⁸ But this critical impulse is undermined if one *a priori* form (the national state) is replaced by another (empire) as the presumptive historiographic unit.³⁹

THE PROCESS OF DOMESTICATION and recuperation of historical turns has been especially pronounced in French history, which played such an important role in wider theoretical debates across the human sciences during the period of the turns, and particularly in French colonial history, which has enjoyed a recent surge in overdue interest. But if the imperial optic has created an opportunity to unsettle received interpretations of or approaches to French history, the turn to colonial topics, which are often treated in accordance with existing methods, frameworks, units, and periods, has also worked to reaffirm the territorial national history in relation to which these protocols were developed.⁴⁰

The language of analytic synthesis and professional reconciliation was employed in a special issue of *French Historical Studies* in 2009 commemorating the twentieth

³⁷ For Atlantic and imperial histories that challenge the priority of national units and invite us to rethink "Britain" from an imperial perspective, see Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge, 1996); C. A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780–1830* (Edinburgh, 1997); Antoinette Burton, "Who Needs the Nation? Interrogating 'British' History," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 10, no. 3 (September 1997): 227–248; Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Colony and Metropole in the English Imagination, 1830–1867* (Chicago, 2002); Kathleen Wilson, ed., *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660–1840* (Cambridge, 2006); Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose, eds., *At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World* (Cambridge, 2006); Durba Ghosh, *Sex and the Family in Colonial India: The Making of Empire* (Cambridge, 2006); Mrinalini Sinha, *Specters of Mother India: The Global Restructuring of an Empire* (Durham, N.C., 2006); Antoinette Burton, "Not Even Remotely Global? Method and Scale in World History," *History Workshop Journal* 64, no. 1 (2007): 323–328; Burton, *Empire in Question: Reading, Writing, and Teaching British Imperialism* (Durham, N.C., 2011). For work that employs empire to re-center Britain as an object and British history as a field, see Linda Colley, *The Ordeal of Elizabeth Marsh: A Woman in World History* (New York, 2007); Bernard Porter, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain* (New York, 2006); Maya Jasanoff, *Edge of Empire: Lives, Culture, and Conquest in the East, 1750–1850* (New York, 2006); Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, Conn., 2005); Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire and the World, 1600–1850* (New York, 2004); David Cannadine, *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire* (New York, 2002).

³⁸ For example, Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton, N.J., 2001); Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World*; Sugata Bose, *A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006); Engseng Ho, *The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean* (Berkeley, Calif., 2006); Thomas R. Metcalf, *Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860–1920* (Berkeley, Calif., 2008).

³⁹ See, for example, Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, N.J., 2010); Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (New York, 2004).

⁴⁰ For an earlier and fuller treatment of some of these themes, see Gary Wilder, "'Impenser' l'histoire de France: Les études coloniales hors de la perspective de l'identité nationale," *Cahiers d'histoire: Revue d'histoire critique* 96–97 (October–December 2005): 91–119, which is an expanded translation of Wilder, "Unthinking French History: Colonial Studies beyond National Identity," in Antoinette Burton, ed., *After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation* (Durham, N.C., 2003), 125–143.

anniversary of the bicentennial of the French Revolution.⁴¹ The editor's introduction affirms historiographic "eclecticism, pluralism, and . . . pragmatism" against interpretations based on "singular structural imperatives." The implication is that all structural arguments are necessarily singular and "monolithic."⁴² This implicit criticism of the mechanical materialism that once dominated Revolutionary scholarship is made explicit by Lynn Hunt in her contribution to the issue.⁴³ Against what she calls "Marxist" and "semiotic" interpretations of the Revolution, she calls for the study of "individual experience based on perspectives derived from recent research in neuroscience."⁴⁴ Beyond presenting liberal commonsense (about primordial conflict existing in the absence of constitutional states) as self-evident truth, Hunt thereby seeks to reestablish history as a study of biological selves possessing an empathic human nature and to reestablish immediate individual experience as the subject of history.⁴⁵ Despite her celebration of microhistorical analysis, she also cites the scholarship of Laurent Dubois and invokes "new research on . . . colonies" that allows us to reexamine "the French Revolution in a global context" as a supranational event.⁴⁶ But it is not at all clear how she would reconcile Dubois's concerns with global history, macroanalysis, the Atlantic world, and France as empire with the traditional method and framework that she advocates.⁴⁷

A piece by Dubois appears in that same special issue. With one simple opening sentence, he calls into question the assumptions, units, and frameworks upon which the whole field of French Revolutionary history depends: "The French Revolution was an Atlantic Revolution."⁴⁸ In his brief contribution, Dubois suggests some of the implications of this move to resituate and reconfigure the event that has served as the single most important source of collective identification and professional self-affirmation for historians of France. He argues that the "tendrils" of the revolution in Saint-Domingue "transformed life and thought, not to mention animated juridical struggles and cultural transformations" across the "circum-Caribbean," reaching from northern South America to the eastern United States.⁴⁹ And he writes: "the mass insurrection of the enslaved in Saint-Domingue transformed warfare, politics,

⁴¹ '89 *Then and Now*, Special Issue, *French Historical Studies* 32, no. 4 (Fall 2009). Rebecca Spang observes that the very idea of an issue on an anniversary of the anniversary is an example of French history's obsessive need to commemorate and mythologize the Revolution and its ideological need to pronounce the death of Marxism again and again. Spang, "Self, Field, Myth: What We Will Have Been," *H-France Salon* 1, issue 1, no. 3 (2009): 24–32.

⁴² J. B. Shank, "Is It Really Over? The French Revolution Twenty Years after the Bicentennial," *French Historical Studies* 32, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 527–530, here 529.

⁴³ Lynn Hunt, "The Experience of Revolution," *French Historical Studies* 32, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 671–678, here 671–673.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 672.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 673.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 671–672.

⁴⁷ Hunt also uses Dubois's attempt to overturn conventional French historiography for her own project to re-center French history in Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights: A History* (New York, 2008), 160–167. See the critique of this book by Samuel Moyn, "On the Genealogy of Morals," *The Nation*, April 16, 2007.

⁴⁸ Laurent Dubois, "An Atlantic Revolution," *French Historical Studies* 32, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 655–661, here 655. My point is not that Dubois inaugurated the field of Atlantic history, which had already been well developed by innovative historians of the early modern Anglo-American world, but that his Atlanticist approach to the French Revolution presented a profound challenge to conventional French historiography.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 658, 659.

and philosophical possibility when it led to emancipation in the colony in 1793.”⁵⁰ This is not simply a claim that studies of the French Revolution should also take account of events in Saint-Domingue. Nor is it even a statement about how these revolutions influenced one another. Rather, Dubois is refiguring and thus displacing the very distinction between them so that each “revolution” can be understood as a moment in a much broader, deeper, and integrated process of macrohistorical transformation. He argues that because “the Atlantic economy and the transformation of social and economic life that it propelled in some ways actually drove the Revolution,” everyday social and economic life in cities such as Orléans, Bordeaux, Nantes, and La Rochelle, as well as the intellectual history and political perspectives (thought circulating among salons, shops, and ports) of the Revolutionary period, can be adequately understood only through an Atlantic framework that attends directly to plantation slavery in the French Antilles. In short, he redefines the very meaning of “revolution,” “France,” and “Enlightenment” from the standpoints of empire, Atlantic political economy, and mass slave insurrection. He thereby identifies “an opportunity” to write a new kind of history that is “at once local and Atlantic, at once French and Caribbean.”⁵¹ From this perspective, it is not possible to agree with Dubois without fundamentally reconceptualizing French Revolutionary history, or even the history of France itself; his intervention requires a wholesale revision of research methods, topics, categories, contexts, and periods. Yet his contribution was included in this special issue of *French Historical Studies* alongside a group of essays that, as Rebecca Spang incisively observes, reaffirm the mythic founding event of a hexagonal national history.⁵²

Despite its potentially destabilizing intervention, Dubois’s work has been quickly embraced by the field of French history. We might wonder whether this is because of the analytic challenges that it poses to the national object or because it might help renew French Revolutionary studies by providing new terrain for an existing historiography. Historians can easily treat Dubois’s argument about the French Revolution as a global or Atlantic event as proof that the (continental) French Revolution did in fact inaugurate political modernity, internationalize human rights, and spread universal ideas around the world. Of course, such an interpretation misunderstands how his work demonstrates that the Revolution, politics, and ideas were not simply *French*. Or if they were, then “France” must mean something else altogether.

Consider the favorable review of Dubois’s work provided by the historian Jeremy Popkin, who clearly sympathizes with the call to reconsider the French Revolution in relation to the colonial Antilles. He does not seem to grasp Dubois’s argument that revolutionary republicanism and republican universalism must be dissociated from French metropolitan territory or ethnicity, that the former were forged on an

⁵⁰ Ibid., 659.

⁵¹ Ibid., 660.

⁵² Spang, “Self, Field, Myth.” Included in this issue is Philippe R. Girard’s carefully researched essay on Napoleon’s colonial policy toward Saint-Domingue after emancipation: “Napoléon Bonaparte and the Emancipation Issue in Saint-Domingue, 1799–1803,” *French Historical Studies* 32, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 587–618. However insightful, this “turn” to colonial history re-centers continental France as the subject of (even colonial) history and reaffirms conventional historical methodology: territorial national categories, narrative political history, methodological individualism, and archival fetishism.

imperial scale within an Atlantic system, that enslaved and colonized black actors actually elaborated their substance and significance, and that we can understand these processes only if we recognize republican France as an imperial formation rather than a national state. Instead, he mischaracterizes Dubois's central question as "did the French Revolution truly have a universalist message . . . or did the realization of freedom for those of African descent require separation from the metropole?"⁵³ Most tellingly, he writes: "One may also wonder whether the black soldiers who fought for the French in the 1790s did so out of a real sense of identification with a metropole most of them had never seen . . . one may wonder how fully committed the emancipated slaves in the Caribbean were to the notion of themselves as French citizens."⁵⁴ Dubois's central point, however, is not that these black revolutionaries were French-identified, but that they were real republicans enacting their rightful citizenship. When Popkin assumes that the pursuit of republican citizenship and political universalism requires an identification with metropolitan France, he reaffirms the idea that republican politics are isomorphic with French society or culture, which is the very equation that Dubois's work calls into question.

In Popkin's own illuminating study of the Haitian Revolution, a resistance to structural thinking leads him to discount an Atlantic approach to the eighteenth-century revolutions, to re-center France as their proper source, and to reaffirm narrative description based on archival evidence as the rightful task of the historian. He prefaces his book by explaining how George W. Bush's war in Iraq challenged his belief that "the great events of history were to be explained in terms of large impersonal forces . . . and that 'traditional' political history, with its emphasis on individuals, short time frames, and contingent events, was inevitably superficial." Proceeding from this belief that the existence of historical contingency is antithetical to macrostructural analysis and requires historians to focus on individual motives and immediate events, he decided to assume the role of a "pure" historian and write a "narrative political history." He thus undertook "the reconstruction of events" based on "certain assumptions about human psychology and on the dynamics of political conflict" in order to demonstrate that the abolition of slavery in 1793 was not "wholly explainable in terms of structural factors."⁵⁵ Once again we can see the assumption that structural analysis must imply mechanical determinism. A traditional narrative history of slave emancipation can certainly offer useful insights about contingent events, political motives, and individual psychology. But we should note here how empiricism is presented as theoretical insight: since structural factors cannot "wholly" account for abolition, we are instructed to turn away from the study of impersonal forces.⁵⁶ In this way, the real opening provided by an imperial optic is reduced to a conventional topic that can be treated in accordance with methods that discount the analytic framework that that optic offers.

⁵³ Jeremy D. Popkin, "Revolution in the Colonies and the French Republican Tradition," *French Politics, Culture, and Society* 25, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 95–107, here 97.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 105.

⁵⁵ Jeremy D. Popkin, *You Are All Free: The Haitian Revolution and the Abolition of Slavery* (Cambridge, 2010), x.

⁵⁶ We can also see how assumptions about politics and change in the present—if the start of a war is contingent, its real significance cannot be grasped structurally—inform assumptions about politics and change in the past, and vice versa.

Consider also the reception of Todd Shepard's *The Invention of Decolonization*, which many reviewers rightly praised as a carefully researched account of a crucial turning point in postwar French history whereby the loss of French Algeria defined the shape of the Fifth Republic.⁵⁷ But more fundamentally, it overturns the methodological nationalism that generally subtends French history by demonstrating how Algerian national liberation led France to "forget" and disavow its long imperial existence and reconstitute itself as a national state. This work takes as its starting point the actual existence of empire; French Algeria is treated as a juridico-politically integral part of the republic rather than as pure myth or ideology. The book thus invites us to reconsider in potentially far-reaching ways what we mean by the terms "French republic" and "republican France." It thereby challenges, however implicitly, deeply held assumptions among both liberal democrats with an enduring faith in republican universalism and anti-imperial proponents of revolutionary nationalism. It is remarkable that this study has been so broadly embraced without any corresponding debate. It certainly merits the attention of historians, but perhaps we need to wonder about the reasons for this uncritical acceptance. It seems likely that Shepard's work, which could easily be misread as using republican legality to call for a benevolent imperialism or to challenge the legitimacy of the Algerian national liberation struggle, will be as vulnerable to recuperation as Dubois's work has been.⁵⁸ In both cases, what should be an occasion for urgent contestation over fundamental categories has barely troubled the post-turn consensus.

The recent embrace of French imperial history has often been paired with a reluctance to treat empire as a category of analysis that would impel us to reconceptualize republican France in some fundamental way. Some historians who are understandably concerned that imperial history risks focusing too much on continental sources and actors have called for more local studies of colonial events and societies.⁵⁹ But they have often felt the need to do so by celebrating archive-based description, shying away from making bolder analytic claims, and treating France as a national state that possessed overseas colonies rather than as an integrated republican empire or imperial nation-state.⁶⁰ Others have undertaken ambitious studies of multiple sites across the French Empire. These have greatly increased our understanding of particular French initiatives by state and non-state actors over a

⁵⁷ Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2006).

⁵⁸ One review that does grasp the implications of this work is Joshua Cole's review of Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, *French Politics, Culture, and Society* 26, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 137–139.

⁵⁹ Gregory Mann, "Locating Colonial Histories: Between France and West Africa," *American Historical Review* 110, no. 2 (April 2005): 409–434.

⁶⁰ Mann argues forcefully for colonial historians to focus on local archives and to be suspicious of empire as an analytic category; *ibid.* Yet his incisive work on colonial Africa challenges the assumptions of methodological nationalism in deep ways. Gregory Mann, *Native Sons: West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century* (Durham, N.C., 2006). Examples of insightful "local" colonial histories that, however, do not thematize their own motivating categories (e.g., violence, empire, France) include Julia A. Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800–1904)* (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and Benjamin Claude Brower, *A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France's Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844–1902* (New York, 2009). Detailed "local" studies that illuminate rather than elide the question of empire include Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*; Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon* (New York, 2000); Laurent Dubois, *A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787–1804* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2004).

broader colonial field. But methodological nationalism—the assumption that the national state is the primary unit of historical analysis and the privileged explanatory matrix for historical phenomena—cannot be overcome through a process of addition or aggregation; starting with the empire as an analytic category is not the same as studying French national actors in the many places they happen to be.⁶¹ Alternatively, detailed studies of municipal policies toward colonial immigrants often clearly demonstrate the fundamentally imperial character of the French Third Republic. But works that treat these policies within a national history paradigm tend to understand administrative diversity, the existence of multiple legal types of French nationals, and bureaucratic governance as practical violations of republican universalism (how rights and laws are applied by individual bureaucrats) rather than as structural expressions of republican racism within an imperial political formation organized around multiple administrative regimes, legal pluralism, and bureaucratic governance.⁶²

Post-Revolutionary French history has been characterized by a contradiction between France as an actually existing imperial formation, on the one hand, and the territorial national categories that formed French self-understanding through the colonial period, on the other. Historians who continue to treat empire with those national categories risk reenacting that which requires historical explanation. Works that reconsider the category “France” from the standpoint of empire, including those by Dubois and Shepard, invite us to rethink a series of assumptions about the territorial national paradigm, such as the isomorphism among territory, people, and state; the symmetry between nationality and citizenship; the national state as a unitary juridical and administrative space; and the scale and composition of political terrains, public spheres, discursive communities, and intellectual fields.⁶³ Refiguring

⁶¹ On methodological nationalism, see Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences,” *Global Networks* 2, no. 4 (October 2002): 301–334; and Goswami, *Producing India*. For national historical approaches to the French Empire, see Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930* (Stanford, Calif., 1997); Eric T. Jennings, *Vichy in the Tropics: Pétain’s National Revolution in Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940–1944* (Stanford, Calif., 2004); J. P. Daughton, *An Empire Divided: Religion, Republicanism, and the Making of French Colonialism, 1880–1914* (New York, 2006); Edward Berenson, *Heroes of Empire: Five Charismatic Men and the Conquest of Africa* (Berkeley, Calif., 2010).

⁶² Clifford D. Rosenberg, *Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control between the Wars* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2006); Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universalism in France, 1918–1940* (Stanford, Calif., 2007). For accounts of immigration that begin with race and empire, see Maxime Silverman, *Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism, and Citizenship in Modern France* (London, 1992); Tyler Stovall, “The Color Line behind the Lines: Racial Violence in France during the Great War,” *American Historical Review* 103, no. 3 (June 1998): 737–769; Stovall, “Love, Labor and Race: Colonial Men and White Women in France during the Great War,” in Tyler Stovall and Georges Van Den Abbeele, eds., *French Civilization and Its Discontents: Nationalism, Colonialism, Race* (Lanham, Md., 2003), 297–321; Stovall, “Race and the Making of the Nation: Blacks in Modern France,” in Michael A. Gomez, ed., *Diasporic Africa: A Reader* (New York, 2006), 200–218; Elisa Camiscioli, *Reproducing the French Race: Immigration, Intimacy, and Embodiment in the Early Twentieth Century* (Durham, N.C., 2009). I have proposed a way of thinking about this problem in Gary Wilder, “Thinking through Race, Confronting Republican Racism” (paper presented at the Racing the Republic Conference, Center on Institutions and Governance, University of California, Berkeley, September 7–8, 2007).

⁶³ Examples of work that treats empire as an analytic optic and starting point rather than an empirical place or topic include Alice Bullard, *Exile to Paradise: Savagery and Civilization in Paris and the South Pacific, 1790–1900* (Stanford, Calif., 2000); Sue Peabody, *There Are No Slaves in France: The Political Culture of Race and Slavery in the Ancien Régime* (New York, 2002); Lebovics, *Bringing the Empire Back*

France as an imperial nation-state confounds conventional distinctions among national, transnational, and international phenomena.⁶⁴ And it overturns standard narratives about colonial vs. postcolonial periods by revealing that the challenge of cultural multiplicity for a democratic republic was an imperial problem that did not begin with decolonization and postwar immigration. The imperial republic was a cosmopolitan, if also heteronomous, space in which legal pluralism and disaggregated sovereignty were institutionalized in ways that can illuminate current debates over plural democracy in the French postcolony.⁶⁵

If research on the French Empire is to constitute a significant analytic “turn,” it needs to be focused less on the familiar fact that the republican nation-state exercised autocratic rule over colonized peoples than on how imperial history transformed the republican nation into a plural polity composed of multiple cultural formations, administrative regimes, and legal systems. It follows that the crucial question is not how France behaved overseas or how its subject populations experienced colonial rule, but how the fact of empire, including ways that colonial subjects reflected upon it, invites us to rethink, or to *unthink*, France itself as well as the global imperial order within which it has been embedded.⁶⁶ A genuine imperial turn among historians would not simply entail research on colonial topics but would mean turning the very category “France” inside out. But because a “turn” to French colonialism is long overdue and is agreed to be self-evidently important, the fact of turning supersedes the method of proceeding, and work on colonial topics is often uncritically endorsed.

This drift in French history to use empire to re-center a threatened national

Home; Dubois, *A Colony of Citizens*; Dubois, *Soccer Empire*; Frederick Cooper, “States, Empires, and Political Imagination,” in Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, 153–203; Cooper, “Labor, Politics, and the End of Empire in French Africa,” *ibid.*, 204–230; Emmanuelle Saada, *Les enfants de la colonie: Les métiers de l’Empire français entre sujétion et citoyenneté* (Paris, 2007); Camiscioli, *Reproducing the French Race*; George R. Trumbull IV, *An Empire of Facts: Colonial Power, Cultural Knowledge, and Islam in Algeria, 1871–1914* (Cambridge, 2009); Spencer D. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul: French Education, Colonial Ethnology, and Muslim Resistance, 1912–1956* (Lincoln, Neb., 2009); Jennifer Anne Boittin, *Colonial Metropolis: The Urban Grounds of Anti-Imperialism and Feminism in Interwar Paris* (Lincoln, Neb., 2010); and Miranda Frances Spieler, *Empire and Underworld: Captivity in French Guiana* (Cambridge, Mass., 2012).

⁶⁴ This is something I have tried to do in my own work as well; Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars* (Chicago, 2005).

⁶⁵ I am developing arguments along these lines in my current book project, preliminarily titled *Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, Utopia*. See also Wilder, “Eurafrrique as the Future Past of Black France: Sarkozy’s Temporal Confusion and Senghor’s Postwar Vision,” in Trica Danielle Keaton, T. Deneane Sharpley-Whiting, and Tyler Stovall, eds., *Black France/France Noire: The History and Politics of Blackness* (Durham, N.C., 2012), 57–87; Wilder, “Untimely Vision: Aimé Césaire, Decolonization, Utopia,” *Public Culture* 21, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 101–140; Wilder, “Response Essay,” *H-France Forum* 1, issue 3, no. 5 (Summer 2006), <http://www.h-france.net/forum/forumvol1/Wilder1%20Response.html>. Important work on contemporary France that questions the territorial national presuppositions of French studies includes Paul A. Silverstein, *Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation* (Bloomington, Ind., 2004); Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*; Charles Forsdick and David Murphy, eds., *Postcolonial Thought in the French-Speaking World* (Liverpool, 2009); Mayanthi L. Fernando, “Reconfiguring Freedom: Muslim Piety and the Limits of Secular Law and Public Discourse in France,” *American Ethnologist* 37, no. 1 (February 2010): 19–35; and Yarimar Bonilla, “Guadeloupe Is Ours: The Prefigurative Politics of the Mass Strike in the French Antilles,” *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 12, no. 1 (2010): 125–137.

⁶⁶ See Immanuel Wallerstein, *Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms* (Cambridge, 1991).

object is occurring at a moment of professional uncertainty and anxiety. The geographer David Harvey has identified a tendency under capitalism to neutralize crises of overproduction through a short-term “spatial fix.” Rather than such crises’ being resolved by restructuring production, old methods of production are simply extended over a wider geographic area. But spatial fixes cannot overcome internal contradictions because they do not transform the system that produced them; they merely defer necessary restructuring and reproduce the same contradictions on a larger geographical scale.⁶⁷ We might wonder whether the turn to colonial topics by French historians operates like a spatial fix for the discipline.

There has been much concern in recent years about a crisis in French history (and literature) departments as they face declining enrollments, diminishing enthusiasm, and administrative hostility. This decline is variously attributed to globalization, to students’ interest in transnational topics and their suspicions of Eurocentrism, to France’s own declining world status and significance, or to the fact that the locus of political dynamism and cultural creativity in the French-speaking world has shifted either to immigrant communities within continental France or to francophone communities outside of France.⁶⁸ Among some historians, this shift has generated anxiety, resentment, and nostalgia for a time when French history occupied a more prominent position in the academy.⁶⁹ Others have responded by turning directly to France’s overseas colonies as a topic of study. This superficial “turn” thus often functions to forestall a feared crisis in French history. We know that after the 1873 economic depression and following each of the two world wars, the prospect of national decline led policymakers in France to turn to its overseas colonies. Do scholars today risk making the same kind of gesture—scrambling for colonies to save the nation in the face of the declining fortunes of European history?

These examples are presented not to argue that more historians should turn to imperial or post-national history, but to illustrate the more general tendency among historians to foreclose analytic openings through a domesticating embrace that preserves traditional history.⁷⁰ The point is neither to exhort historians to be theorists or Marxists nor to suggest that there is no value in descriptive, narrative, or national

⁶⁷ David Harvey, “The Spatial Fix: Hegel, Von Thünen, and Marx,” in Harvey, *Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography* (New York, 2001), 284–311; and Harvey, “The Geopolitics of Capitalism,” *ibid.*, 312–344.

⁶⁸ For a diagnosis of this situation, see Tyler Stovall and Georges Van Den Abbeele, “Introduction,” in Stovall and Van Den Abbeele, eds., *French Civilization and Its Discontents*, 1–16. For a symptom of it, see Jan Goldstein, “The Future of French History in the United States: Unapocalyptic Thoughts for the New Millennium,” *French Historical Studies* 24, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 1–10.

⁶⁹ On the rise of colonial nostalgia in France today, see Achille Mbembe, “Provincializing France?,” *Public Culture* 23, no. 1 (2011): 85–119; Mbembe, *Sortir de la grande nuit: Essai sur l’Afrique décolonisée* (Paris, 2010); Mbembe, “L’Afrique de Nicolas Sarkozy,” *Le Messenger*, August 1, 2007; Mbembe, “France-Afrique: Ces sottises qui divisent,” *Le Messenger*, August 10, 2007. On American historians’ affective attachment to France as an object of study, see Laura Lee Downs and Stéphane Gerson, eds., *Why France? American Historians Reflect on an Enduring Fascination* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2009). On “historical transference,” whereby historians reproduce, or act out, in their work the tendencies about which they are writing, see LaCapra, “Is Everyone a *Mentalité* Case?,” 72–73.

⁷⁰ It is also important to note the analytic strengths of different subfields in which such general criticism does not apply. For example, Latin American history still frequently foregrounds political economy, Atlantic history typically focuses on regional scales and transnational formations, South Asian history often attends to the colonial genealogies of analytic categories and feminist history to processes of subject formation, etc.

history, but rather to challenge the common assumption that historians operating in different registers are not doing proper history.

WE MIGHT ALSO ASK WHETHER this conservative shift is related to professional anxiety about an academic crisis. The precarious state of national history cannot be separated from the precarious history of national states. One does not need to be a professional historian to recognize that we are living through a historical epoch marked by a convergence of large-scale structural transformations. These include the collapse of the Fordist compromise in the West, state socialism in Eastern Europe, and the Bandung development project in the South. This process of global capitalist restructuring and the consolidation of a neoliberal consensus has also corresponded to new imperialisms, resurgent religiosity, looming environmental catastrophe, and emergent forms of political identification, association, and governance on a planetary scale. This current round of globalization has revealed that the territorial national state flourished under particular historical conditions that are undergoing a decisive shift. It has also reminded us that the discipline of history, whose genesis was bound up with that national object, developed under those same conditions.

These momentous developments create enormous challenges and opportunities for thinkers who want to grasp an emergent future that is already now but, as Ernst Bloch would have said, is “not yet conscious.”⁷¹ This therefore should be a moment of great ferment for historians, supposed experts in epochal transitions who are especially well prepared to bring historical insight to bear on contemporary developments even as we can now rethink conventional historical narratives and conceptions of time in light of these profound changes. Within the discipline, the burgeoning interest in imperial, transnational, comparative, and global history is surely linked to these epochal developments. Yet our field has not been seized by the spirit of innovation, experimentation, and debate that such extraordinary times seem to invite and require. On the contrary, this appears to be a period of disciplinary retrenchment.⁷²

Joan Scott has diagnosed this troubling trend as an anti-theoretical “yearning for security and stability” among historians whose focus has turned back to “the objective empirical.”⁷³ She explains this recent “return to traditional disciplinarity” as a reaction to the radical challenge that poststructuralist theory posed to the very foundation of conventional historical scholarship.⁷⁴ While this certainly seems to be the case, we may also relate this conservative turn to our current upheaval. Instead of regarding these times as an opportunity for historiographic renewal, many in the field have responded defensively to the prospect of a general crisis within and beyond the academy that may threaten not only their paradigms and worldviews but their profession and positions.⁷⁵ As scholars who often study collective responses to rupture and upheaval, we historians should recognize this corporate retreat into a guild

⁷¹ Ernst Bloch, *The Principle of Hope*, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight, 3 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 1: 114–178.

⁷² On “archival fetishism,” see LaCapra, *History and Criticism*, 92.

⁷³ Scott, “History-Writing as Critique.”

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁷⁵ See, for example, Gordon Wood, “In Defense of Academic History Writing,” *Perspectives on His-*

mentality as a common response by social actors to an unstable present and an uncertain future. But we are not used to thinking reflexively about the historical developments that condition our own historiographic practices.

As the gap between experience and expectation widens, to use Reinhart Koselleck's formulation, it becomes at once imperative and difficult to grasp present shifts historically.⁷⁶ Doing so requires us to write histories of the present that attempt to understand these transformations genealogically, in relation to long-term historical processes of which they are a part, and proleptically, as if we were analyzing past history from a future standpoint.⁷⁷ Moreover, current transformations are not simply occurring *in* time, as if it were a neutral medium within which history unfolds; they are operating *on* time itself. An adequate history of the present must therefore also attend to the historicity of historical temporality—not just to change over time, but to changes in the sociohistorical constitution of time itself. This means that histories for and of our times cannot simply explain or interpret the past or the present; they must also directly examine the historically specific and dynamic relationship between past and present.

In his book *Conscripts of Modernity*, the anthropologist David Scott suggests that “morally and politically what ought to be at stake in historical inquiry is a critical appraisal of the present itself, not the mere reconstruction of the past.”⁷⁸ Speaking about the unexamined persistence of certain anticolonial research questions that were formulated by C. L. R. James in a previous era for a future that is no longer available today, Scott offers what we might read as a general warning for all historians: “the task before us is not one of merely finding better answers . . . to existing questions—as though [they] were timeless ones” but of reflecting on “whether the questions we have been asking the past to answer continue to be questions worth having answers to.”⁷⁹ He thus raises precisely the kinds of self-reflexive questions about writing history (today) that have been foreclosed by the post-turn consensus. If historical scholarship is to have any currency, he suggests, it must reflect critically on the aims of history, on the implication and investment of historians in objects of study, and on the complex, and ever-changing, relation between past and present.⁸⁰

While Scott presents a persuasive argument for rethinking historiographic practices in relation to the demands of our present, he does not say much about what a history for our actual present might in fact demand. In *Logics of History*, William Sewall relates recent trends in history-writing directly to contemporary social transformations. This is an exemplary work of self-reflexive and transdisciplinary history

tory, April 2010. Wood calls on academic historians to shift from analytic to narrative history addressed to a popular audience.

⁷⁶ Koselleck, “‘Space of Experience’ and ‘Horizon of Expectation.’”

⁷⁷ Fernand Braudel writes: “what would the explorer of the present-day not give to have this perspective (or this sort of ability to go forward in time), making it possible to unmask and simplify our present life, in all its confusion—hardly comprehensible now because so overburdened with trivial acts and portents?” Braudel, *On History*, trans. Sarah Matthews (Chicago, 1980), 36.

⁷⁸ David Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment* (Durham, N.C., 2004), 41.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 56, 209.

⁸⁰ Dominick LaCapra also calls for a “dialogic history” that explicitly addresses the relations between past and present as well as scholar and object of study. LaCapra, “History, Language, and Reading: Waiting for Crillon,” *American Historical Review* 100, no. 3 (June 1995): 799–828.

that uses Marxist social theory to link history's insights about events, meaning, and narrative to social science's insights about deeper structures and longer-term processes. Sewell tries to understand the rapid shift from social history to cultural history in the 1980s in relation to two deeper contradictions *within* social history. First, many social historians in the 1960s were oriented toward anti-establishment politics yet pursued populist histories of ordinary people with positivist methodologies borrowed from big science, which was itself implicated in the establishment order that these histories sought to contest. Second, politically committed social historians' interest in ordinary people's everyday experience used quantitative methods and structural frameworks that often ignored or erased the individuality, subjectivity, consciousness, and history-shaping agency that their work sought to reveal. At a certain point, Sewell explains, many of these historians attempted to overcome these contradictions by turning to a cultural history that substituted meanings, mentalities, and interpretations for facts, structures, and explanations.⁸¹

Sewell also asks how a hegemonic social history could crumble so quickly after the advent of cultural history with only minimal debate and resistance. He turns to political economy to explain why historians were so willing to abandon the methodological innovations and analytic insights associated with the study of society, social relations, and social structures. He writes: "the cultural turn was also fueled . . . by a secret affinity with an emergent logic of capitalist development" and notes that "the shift from Fordism to flexible accumulation lies behind the great wave of academic cultural turns in the 1980s and 1990s."⁸² For Sewell, the "potential complicities between contemporary forms of capitalism and a purely cultural history" are revealed by the fact that both have been equally invested in ignoring the role of structural determination in social life.⁸³ It follows for Sewell that "existing cultural or linguistic models have so far proved inadequate to the intellectual challenges posed by worldwide capitalist structural transformation."⁸⁴ He observes that "at the very time when particularly powerful changes in social and economic structures are manifested ever more insistently in our daily lives, we cultural historians have ceased not only to grapple with such structures but even to admit their ontological reality."⁸⁵ He warns that if historians hope to participate in "attempting to reclaim effective political and social agency from the juggernaut of world capitalism . . . I think we need to understand our own epistemological and political entanglements in world capitalism's recent social history."⁸⁶

We do not have to accept the particulars of Sewell's account to appreciate his ambitious attempt to demonstrate what a self-reflexive history might look like—one

⁸¹ Sewell, *Logics of History*, 1–80. Sewell observes that historians were turning against Fordism precisely when that order was already unraveling.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 62, 59.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 62.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 80.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 52.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 53. In an incisive commentary on Geoff Eley's *A Crooked Line*, Manu Goswami argues persuasively that "cultural history cannot account for the conditions of its own global emergence and resonance without recourse to the forms of historical totalization that it rejected in the reaction formation against social history." Goswami, "Remembering the Future," *American Historical Review* 113, no. 2 (April 2008): 417–424, here 422.

that historicizes historiographic practices in relation to our historical present.⁸⁷ Likewise, we may emulate his deep commitment to transdisciplinary inquiry that is at once historical, social scientific, and theoretical.⁸⁸ Nor can we afford to ignore his insistence that we address the analytic and political costs of a wholesale turn away from structural analysis, societal explanation, long-term processes and large-scale transformations, theoretical inquiry, dialogue with the social sciences, and engagement with Marxian social theory.⁸⁹

Crafting a history for and of our times will require us to move beyond the insidious logic of turns in order to reclaim the analytic space where history, social science, and critical theory once converged around large and pressing sociohistorical questions. That convergence often occurred through specific circles of intellectuals who inhabited what the historian Lucien Febvre called “that unexplored no-man’s land where the historian feels that he has no business, while the philosopher or sociologist thinks that it is up to the historian to venture there alone.”⁹⁰

The *Annales* project provides one important precedent. The work of Febvre, Marc Bloch, and Fernand Braudel has been associated with both the social history that was turned against and the cultural history that was turned to. These thinkers recognized that because society was an integrated totality, history would have to overcome arbitrary and obstructive divisions within and across disciplines. They insisted on a self-reflexive and anti-positivist problem-oriented history that refused to fetishize facts, appearances, and description. They directed historians’ attention to the production of space and posed fundamental historiographic questions about geographic scale. They also attended to both the temporal complexity of history and the historical production of time. Recognizing the interpenetration of past and present, they argued that present concerns had to inform historical inquiry at the same time that historical knowledge should engage present debates. Above all, they raised critical questions that resonated productively across the human sciences and that spoke to their conjuncture.⁹¹ In contrast, disciplinary history today is distinguished by a

⁸⁷ For non-Marxian approaches to historical self-reflexivity, see Koselleck, *Futures Past*; Dominick LaCapra, “History, Reading, and Critical Theory,” in LaCapra, *History and Reading: Tocqueville, Foucault, French Studies* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2000), 21–72, here 64–72; Gabrielle Spiegel, “Revising the Past/ Revisiting the Present: How Change Happens in Historiography,” *History and Theory*, Theme Issue 46, no. 4 (December 2007): 1–19.

⁸⁸ This work thus calls to mind Immanuel Wallerstein’s program for historical social science. Wallerstein, *World Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham, N.C., 2004), 1–22.

⁸⁹ See also the related call for a reconstituted “history of society” in Eley, *A Crooked Line*, 187–202; as well as Eric J. Hobsbawm, “From Social History to the History of Society,” *Daedalus* 100, no. 1 (Winter 1971): 20–45; and Goswami, “Remembering the Future.” Note that the critique of the linguistic and cultural turns from the standpoint of “society” developed by Sewell, Eley, and Goswami differs fundamentally from the call by Bonnell and Hunt for a renewed social history and historical sociology “beyond the cultural turn” that challenges the straw man of “reducing everything to its social determinants” and advocates “re-disciplinizing” the human sciences, which could return to their real task of producing “objective—that is, verifiable—comparable results.” Bonnell and Hunt, “Introduction,” 11, 26, 14.

⁹⁰ Lucien Febvre, *A New Kind of History: From the Writings of Febvre*, ed. Peter Burke, trans. K. Folca (New York, 1973), 39.

⁹¹ See Marc Bloch, *The Historian’s Craft* (New York, 1953); Febvre, *A New Kind of History*; Braudel, *On History*; as well as Iggers, *New Directions in European Historiography*, 43–79; Peter Burke, *The French Historical Revolution: The Annales School, 1929–89* (Stanford, Calif., 1990); François Dosse, *New History in France: The Triumph of the Annales* (Urbana, Ill., 1994); André Burguière, *The Annales School: An Intellectual History*, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Ithaca, N.Y., 2009).

proliferation of topical turns and a poverty of timely questions. Rather than celebrate methodological consensus, we need to seek an analytic synthesis that relates the epistemological challenge of the linguistic turn to the social structural concerns of the Marxian tradition. In this way, historians might produce work that is at once self-reflexive critical history and historically situated critical theory. Such commitments cannot be relegated to the past as discrete and completed events. They were not lessons to be learned but promises to be pursued through an ongoing process in which we question our questions, debate the stakes, and reflect upon the conditions of possibility of what we can know and why it might be worth knowing at this particular historical conjuncture as we craft histories of the present for the future that is already at hand as well as the one that we might want to create.

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The Kids Are All Right:
On the “Turning” of Cultural History

JAMES W. COOK

To situate this introduction, it will be useful to focus briefly on just what constituted the cultural turn.

Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt

RUN A FEW WEB SEARCHES FOR the term “cultural turn,” and you will begin to grasp the scope of an increasingly viral concept. In Google Books alone, you will find more than 100,000 citations, the bibliographic traces of the concept’s extended wandering.¹ Switch to the search engine at OCLC WorldCat, ArticleFirst, or ECO, and the numbers become less daunting, somewhere on the order of a few hundred hits. In these more specialized databases, however, the searchable content is limited to titles and abstracts. So what you are really seeing is the initial layers of a much larger conversation: the figurative tip of the bibliographic iceberg.²

What might the iceberg tell us? Most of all, perhaps, it provides a wide-angle view of the concept’s current ubiquity. In addition to Victoria Bonnell and Lynn Hunt’s 1999 volume *Beyond the Cultural Turn*, you will find thousands of recent books invoking “cultural turns” in a wide variety of scholarly contexts—from sociology to

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¹ Accessed March 9, 2012.

² Other useful benchmarks can be found in JSTOR and Project Muse: On March 9, 2012, a keyword search among history journals in JSTOR for the phrase “cultural turn” generated more than 600 hits. In Project Muse, which archives a shorter span of time, the same procedure on the same day generated more than 500 hits. At first glance, my approach here may appear contradictory: the application of older social historical methods (e.g., counting) to track the very mode that is often said to have supplanted those methods (“the cultural turn”). As we shall see, however, such hard-and-fast distinctions between the “social” and the “cultural” have often relied on misleading conceptual inventories. From Robert Darnton’s *The Business of Enlightenment* (Cambridge, Mass., 1979) and Janice Radway’s *Reading the Romance* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1984) to Richard Ohmann’s *Selling Culture* (New York, 1996) and Franco Moretti’s *Graphs, Maps, Trees* (London, 2005), there have always been major currents *within* the cultural turn that traversed the conceptual zero sums. I return to these currents below.

geography, Marxist theory to translation studies.³ You will also confirm the impact of this concept on our patterns of historical discourse. Since the early 2000s, it has figured prominently in hundreds of historical monographs, articles, and reviews; two AHA presidential addresses; at least three previous *AHR* Forums; and various fora in the *Hispanic American Historical Review* (1999), the *Journal of American History* (2003), *Cultural and Social History* (2004), and *Social Science History* (2008).⁴

Dig a bit deeper, though, and additional wrinkles begin to emerge. One involves the long list of seminal cultural histories in which the concept never appeared: from Natalie Davis's *Society and Culture in Early Modern France* (1975), Lawrence Levine's *Black Culture and Black Consciousness* (1977), and Carlo Ginzburg's *The Cheese and the Worms* (1982) to Robert Darnton's *The Great Cat Massacre* (1984), Jonathan Spence's *The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci* (1984), and Joan Wallach Scott's *Gender and the Politics of History* (1988).⁵ Nor did the concept achieve much currency anywhere in our discipline before the end of the last century—the very moment, paradoxically, when growing numbers of commentators began announcing our transition to something else, something now figured as subsequent to or “beyond” the cultural turn.⁶

What is at issue here, then, is not a ground-level concept, first developed in the process of *doing* cultural history, so much as a genealogical master trope, now increasingly used to *stand in* for cultural history. Defining the turn in this way does nothing to diminish its significance. In fact, the trope's recent arrival has been entangled with at least two major trends. Above all, it has signaled a growing desire to track the shifting contours of cultural history—and survey the larger whole. It has also suggested a willingness to step back and take stock, to begin a broader conversation about what “the turn” actually accomplished. Regardless of how we answer

³ Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, eds., *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture* (Berkeley, Calif., 1999).


⁴ Barbara Weinstein, “Developing Inequality,” AHA Presidential Address, *American Historical Review* 113, no. 1 (February 2008): 1–18; Gabrielle M. Spiegel, “The Task of the Historian,” AHA Presidential Address, *American Historical Review* 114, no. 1 (February 2009): 1–15; “AHR Forum: Geoff Eley's *A Crooked Line*,” *American Historical Review* 113, no. 2 (April 2008): 391–437; “AHR Forum: Revisiting ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,’” *American Historical Review* 113, no. 5 (December 2008): 1344–1430; “AHR Roundtable: Historians and Biography,” *American Historical Review* 114, no. 3 (June 2009): 573–661; “AHR Conversation: Historians and the Study of Material Culture,” *American Historical Review* 114, no. 5 (December 2009): 1355–1404; “AHR Forum: The State in South Asian History,” *American Historical Review* 115, no. 2 (April 2010): 405–483; *Mexico's New Cultural History: ¿Una Lucha Libre?*, Special Issue, *Hispanic American Historical Review* 79, no. 2 (May 1999); *Journal of American History* 90, no. 2 (September 2003): 576–611; *Cultural and Social History* 1, no. 1 (January 2004): 94–117, and 1, no. 2 (May 2004): 201–224; *Social Science History* 32, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 535–593. I myself invoked the concept on multiple occasions in James W. Cook, Lawrence B. Glickman, and Michael O'Malley, eds., *The Cultural Turn in U.S. History: Past, Present and Future* (Chicago, 2008).

⁵ Natalie Zemon Davis, *Society and Culture in Early Modern France* (Stanford, Calif., 1975); Lawrence W. Levine, *Black Culture and Black Consciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought from Slavery to Freedom* (New York, 1977); Carlo Ginzburg, *The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller* (Baltimore, 1982); Robert Darnton, *The Great Cat Massacre: And Other Episodes in French Cultural History* (New York, 1984); Jonathan D. Spence, *The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci* (New York, 1984); Joan Wallach Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York, 1988).

⁶ One good way to track this pattern is by running a JSTOR search for “cultural turn” in the *American Historical Review*. Interestingly, the very first hits are from 1999, the same year in which Bonnell and Hunt published *Beyond the Cultural Turn*. Three years later, the *AHR* editors were already using the phrase as an unexplained touchstone. See, for example, the introduction to “What's beyond the Cultural Turn?,” *American Historical Review* 107, no. 5 (December 2002): 1475.

Google Labs Ngram for the Phrase "Cultural Turn"

1930-2008, Books in English



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FIGURE 1: Google Labs "Ngram" for the phrase "cultural turn," 1930 to 2008. The larger data pool encompasses texts in English that were digitized by Google through 2011.

these questions, the very act of posing them has marked an important epistemological shift. Since the late 1930s, at least, cultural historians have positioned themselves as paradigm-busters: always challenging conventional assumptions, always pushing toward something new. The recent talk of turns, by contrast, has directed attention backward, toward more comprehensive conceptual inventories, new waves of self-critiques.⁷

One useful response is to track this burgeoning turn talk—its dominant narratives, assumptions, and insights. At this late date, however, it seems important to do more than simply rehearse the prevailing narratives or fill them with additional content. Indeed, what we increasingly lack is a clear and critical sense of how this trope has shaped conventional wisdom, and to what larger effects. For all the recent efforts at genealogical precision, much of the best work has assumed a metonymic equivalence between the trope itself (cultural turn) and the multi-decade phenomenon it

⁷ In recent years, this literature has become voluminous. In addition to the citations in fn. 4, see especially Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, *Telling the Truth about History* (New York, 1994); Bonnell and Hunt, *Beyond the Cultural Turn*; Richard Biernacki, "Method and Metaphor after the New Cultural History," *ibid.*, 62–94; Biernacki, "Language and the Shift from Signs to Practices in Cultural Inquiry," *History and Theory* 39, no. 3 (October 2000): 289–310; Miri Rubin, "What Is Cultural History Now?," in David Cannadine, ed., *What Is History Now?* (New York, 2002), 80–94; Peter Burke, *What Is Cultural History?* (London, 2004); Miguel A. Cabrera, *Postsocial History: An Introduction* (Lanham, Md., 2004); Dale B. Martin and Patricia Cox Miller, eds., *The Cultural Turn in Late Ancient Studies: Gender, Asceticism, and Historiography* (Durham, N.C., 2005); William H. Sewell, Jr., *Logics of History: Social Theory and Transformation* (Chicago, 2005); Geoff Eley, *A Crooked Line: From Cultural History to the History of Society* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2005); Robert M. Burns, ed., *Historiography: Critical Concepts in Historical Studies*, vol. 4: *Culture* (London, 2006); Daniel Wickberg, "What Is the History of Sensibilities? On Cultural Histories, Old and New," *American Historical Review* 112, no. 3 (June 2007): 661–684; Karen Halttunen, ed., *A Companion to American Cultural History* (Malden, Mass., 2008); Daniel T. Rodgers, *Age of Fracture* (Cambridge, Mass., 2011).

is now meant to reference (cultural history). Yet this assumption is shot through with potential problems. One is that it often produces a moving target: each new narrative tracks a somewhat different set of concepts. Another is the turn's propensity for semantic dodginess: sometimes standing in for entire spectrums of cultural approaches, at other moments referencing one particular approach within a larger spectrum.⁸ A third basic problem is the tendency to compress periodization, such that "turning" becomes synonymous with a generational rite of passage—most typically, from the new social history of the 1970s to the new cultural history of the 1980s.⁹

In this latter vein, especially, much of the work has produced unmarked forms of synecdoche, simultaneously compressing, flattening, and occluding a much longer conceptual history. On the U.S. side alone, it compresses at least four or five distinctive modes: from Depression-era advocates of a "cultural approach" such as Caroline Ware and Merle Curti; to Cold War-era champions of myth and symbol historiography like Henry Nash Smith, Leo Marx, and John William Ward; to key innovators of the 1960s and 1970s, including David Brion Davis, Warren Susman, Neil Harris, Herbert Gutman, Ann Douglas, Lawrence Levine, Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, and Nathan Huggins; to more recent waves of culturalists, for whom the new cultural history of the 1980s was already a conceptual artifact.¹⁰

Curiously, some of the most prominent recent commentators have ignored these longer trajectories, producing the rather odd and misleading impression that cultural history simply rose and fell—stopped *turning*—in the course of a single generation.¹¹ In so doing, they have also consolidated a new declension story: ambitious early

⁸ This distinction has typically played out as a series of semantic slippages between "a turn" (that is, of a single practitioner, or within a particular subfield) and "the turn" (encompassing an entire discipline). Yet these slippages carry very different methodological assumptions. By its very formulation, "a turn" pushes in the direction of multiplicity, with each practitioner (or subfield) "turning" in a variety of ways. "The turn," by contrast, conjures a broader epistemic shift, as well as a more normative set of assumptions about what the shift encompassed. My thinking here is indebted to Michael Warner's discussion of "a" versus "the" public in *Publics and Counterpublics* (Cambridge, Mass., 2002), 65–124.

⁹ This pattern is especially strong in the works cited above by Bonnell, Hunt, Eley, Sewell, and Spiegel—all "cultural turners" of the late 1970s and early 1980s who began their careers working in other subfields.

¹⁰ For a fuller portrait of this occluded history, see James W. Cook and Lawrence B. Glickman, "Twelve Propositions for a History of U.S. Cultural History," in Cook, Glickman, and O'Malley, *The Cultural Turn in U.S. History*, 3–57. See also Caroline F. Ware, ed., *The Cultural Approach to History* (New York, 1940); Henry Nash Smith, *Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth* (1950; repr., Cambridge, Mass., 1970); Joseph J. Kwiatt and Mary C. Turpie, eds., *Studies in American Culture* (Minneapolis, 1960); David Brion Davis, "Some Recent Directions in American Cultural History," *American Historical Review* 73, no. 3 (February 1968): 696–707; Leo Marx, "American Studies: A Defense of an Unscientific Method," *New Literary History* 1, no. 1 (October 1969): 75–90; Robert F. Berkhofer, "Clio and the Culture Concept: Some Impressions of a Changing Relationship in American Historiography," in Louis Schneider and Charles Bonjean, eds., *The Idea of Culture in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, 1973), 77–100; Alan Trachtenberg, "Myth and Symbol," *Massachusetts Review* 25, no. 4 (Winter 1984): 667–673; Michael Denning, "The Special American Conditions," *American Quarterly* 38, no. 3 (1986): 356–380; Ellen Fitzpatrick, "Caroline F. Ware and the Cultural Approach to History," *American Quarterly* 43, no. 2 (June 1991): 173–198; Donald R. Kelley, "The Old Cultural History," *History of the Human Sciences* 9, no. 3 (1996): 101–126; Barry Shank, "The Continuing Embarrassment of Culture: From the Culture Concept to Cultural Studies," *American Studies* 38, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 95–116; and Lucy Maddox, ed., *Locating American Studies: The Evolution of a Discipline* (Baltimore, 1999).

¹¹ See, for example, Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, *Telling the Truth about History*; Bonnell and Hunt, *Beyond the Cultural Turn*; Sewell, *Logics of History*; Peter Mandler, "The Problem with Cultural History," *Cultural and Social History* 1, no. 1 (2004): 94–117. Eley and Spiegel have adopted similar narratives of generational supersession, but with fewer declensionist overtones. See, for example, Eley, *A Crooked*

agendas later chastened by disappointments; mid-career conversion experiences subsequently tempered by disillusionment.¹² But what actually happened to all of those latter-day culturalists, those fourth- and fifth-wave practitioners for whom the cock-fights, carnivals, and cat massacres were part of their basic historical training?¹³ At the very least, it seems important to write these younger scholars into the family romance. In the process, however, we may discover something crucial: namely, that the much-debated “beyond” has been steadily unfolding all around us. One turn’s “future” is another turn’s “now.”

WHEN DID WE BEGIN TO SPEAK in “turns”? Interestingly, before the 1980s, the more specific figure of a “cultural turn” appeared precisely nowhere in the vast history archives of JSTOR. And over the next decade, it appeared only twice: first in a 1982 *Daedalus* essay by Martin Marty, and then again in a 1990 essay by Adelheid von Saldern in *International Labor and Working-Class History*.¹⁴ The scarcity of the phrase is intriguing: two lonely hits in roughly half a million pages, and this during the very period often described as “the turn’s” conceptual apex. Another key lesson involves the particular ways in which Marty and von Saldern formulated their turns. Neither author, that is to say, used the phrase as genealogical shorthand, to stand in for the history of cultural history. Nor did they employ it historiographically, to conjure the shifting methods of a particular group. At this point, rather, the turns in question referenced much broader shifts in twentieth-century religious practices (Marty) and mass politics (von Saldern). In both instances, the authors’ uses of the phrase seem almost accidental—as if they might just as easily have said “cultural watershed” or “cultural transformation.”

Extend the search another year or two, however, and the patterns begin to change. The very next hit from 1991 is an essay in the *Journal of American Ethnic History* by Kathleen Neils Conzen, in which she describes large numbers of “immigration historians” making the same “cultural turn” so evident “in many other areas of our discipline.”¹⁵ Within JSTOR, at least, this was the first published reference with clear historiographical overtones. Yet it pointed to a longer process: a turn now figured as fully active. In a 1993 review essay for *Labour/Le Travail*, Elizabeth Blackmar similarly referenced a “cultural turn in social history” familiar enough to be

Line, 200–203; and Gabrielle M. Spiegel, “Comment on *A Crooked Line*,” *American Historical Review* 113, no. 2 (2008): 411–413.

¹² Bonnell and Hunt, “Introduction,” in Bonnell and Hunt, *Beyond the Cultural Turn*, 11; Sewell, *Logics of History*, 23. See also William H. Sewell, Jr., “Crooked Lines,” *American Historical Review* 113, no. 2 (April 2008): 393–405, in which he laments “the shapeless bazaar” (403) of cultural histories produced in the turn’s wake.

¹³ My use of these terms is meant to reference some of the most widely influential studies of the 1970s and early 1980s: Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York, 1973); Davis, *Society and Culture in Early Modern France*; Darnton, *The Great Cat Massacre*.

¹⁴ Martin E. Marty, “Religion in America since Mid-Century,” *Daedalus* 111, no. 1 (1982): 149–163, quotation from 154; Adelheid von Saldern, “The Hidden History of Mass Culture,” *International Labor and Working-Class History* 37 (Spring 1990): 32–40, quotation from 32.

¹⁵ Kathleen Neils Conzen, “Mainstreams and Side Channels: The Localization of Immigrant Cultures,” *Journal of American Ethnic History* 11, no. 1 (Fall 1991): 9. This essay was a revised version of Conzen’s presidential address delivered at the April 1991 meeting of the Immigration History Society.

contrasted with previous modes of New Left scholarship, charged by its critics with evading politics, and finally defended by Blackmar herself as essential for understanding the broader dimensions of capitalist power.¹⁶ One year later, the British sociologist David Chaney stretched the concept further, describing a “cultural turn” irreducible to any particular topic, subfield, or discipline. Chaney’s point, in fact, was to cast this turn as a major development in late-twentieth-century social thought, one in which scores of new “culture concepts” were said to be rising and falling, competing and commingling.¹⁷

The point of rehearsing this lineage is not to suggest some longer teleology, each new hit pushing ever closer to common currency. Rather, what the hits begin to show us is the inevitably messy etymological process by which the trope first entered historical discourse. In her 1991 essay, Conzen put the term in quotation marks and cited the introduction to Lynn Hunt’s important collection *The New Cultural History* (1989). At this stage, though, Hunt had never actually used the phrase “cultural turn,” opting instead to frame her story as a series of localized debates within British Marxism, the French *Annales* group, and certain corners of U.S. intellectual and gender history. To the extent that Hunt even spoke of “turns” or “turning” in 1989, it was always to reference innovations figured as just prior to her target: the new cultural history. Thus, the “interest in language” exhibited by growing numbers of Marxists marked them as “turning” to something else—something other than the default “materialism” of an older “Marxist agenda.” But when such “interest” grew into something larger, something closer to a core concern, the same conceptual exemplars resurfaced (transformed) as new cultural historians.¹⁸

Early on, then, Hunt conjured methodological rites of passage: new routes *into* cultural history rather than a metonym *for* cultural history. Chaney, by contrast, presented his 1994 title *The Cultural Turn* as a self-conscious play on words. This figure, he explained, referenced no preexisting master trope, no widely employed catch phrase. Its specific intent, rather, was to pun on the somewhat earlier figure of a “linguistic turn,” here expanded to include a broader range of culture concepts (i.e., no longer confined to words and texts).¹⁹ When, exactly, this second turn emerged—or how it might have intersected its linguistic predecessor—remained unresolved in Chaney’s admittedly “provisional” framework. In the book’s opening pages, he simply noted that “it would not be difficult to put forward a thesis that the . . . recent focus on culture” was a further development of earlier work on “the nature and forms of language.”²⁰

¹⁶ Betsy Blackmar, “Building the History of Working-Class America,” *Labour/Le Travail* 31 (Spring 1993): 327. The impetus for Blackmar’s review was the publication of *Who Built America? Working People and the Nation’s Economy, Politics, Culture, and Society* (New York, 1989, 1992), a landmark two-volume collection written under the auspices of the American Social History Project. Her more specific reference to a “cultural turn in social history” (my emphasis) was not entirely unprecedented. See, for example, Raphael Samuel’s use of the same phrase in “Reading the Signs, II: Fact-Grubbers and Mind-Readers,” *History Workshop Journal* 33 (Spring 1992): 220–251, quotation from 226.

¹⁷ David Chaney, *The Cultural Turn: Scene-Setting Essays on Contemporary Cultural History* (London, 1994), 2.

¹⁸ Lynn Hunt, “Introduction: History, Culture, and Text,” in Hunt, ed., *The New Cultural History* (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), 1–22. For the references to “turns” and “turning,” see 4, 5, 7.

¹⁹ Chaney, *The Cultural Turn*, 2.

²⁰ One key reference point for Chaney was John E. Toews, “Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of Meaning and the Irreducibility of Experience,” *American Historical Review* 92,

Even at this juncture, however, there were growing indications of a more rigorous and expansive story. Key titles in this regard were Geoff Eley's "Is All the World a Text?" (1990) and Raphael Samuel's "Reading the Signs" (1991) and "Reading the Signs, II" (1992), all of which sought, quite explicitly, to push beyond the brief conceptual lineages of Hunt's volume.²¹ The point here is not simply that Eley and Samuel expanded Hunt's story with a number of additional seedbeds (such as the work of Antonio Gramsci), or that they tracked key innovations more systematically from high-level concepts to ground-level practices (such as the shifting editorial policies at *History Workshop Journal*, *Social History*, and the *Radical History Review*).²² Nor is it that their inventories of defining concepts issued from a much broader range of thinkers: Raymond Williams as well as Clifford Geertz; Philippe Ariès as well as Michel Foucault; Edward Said as well as Roger Chartier; Catherine Hall as well as Joan Scott.

It is also, more fundamentally, that Eley and Samuel engaged the concepts themselves with greater depth and comprehensiveness. On the central question of "discourse," for instance, Eley did not simply gesture toward Foucault. More ambitiously, he tracked the transatlantic reception of Foucault's work, explicated the "dispersed and decentered conception of power" that made the "discursive move" possible, and then argued for its broader utility as an "extraordinarily fruitful" way of "theorizing both the internal rules and regularities of particular fields of knowledge (their 'regimes of truth') and the more general structures of ideas and assumptions that delimit what can and cannot be thought and said." A few pages later, he returned to the concept, but this time to consider its broader effects on historiography. After Foucault, Eley cautioned, bedrock categories such as "class," "citizenship," and "society" could no longer be "assumed" or posited "objectively"—in "some unproblematic social-science sense." The more pressing issue, rather, was how each of these categories had emerged as "an object of theory-knowledge" or "a target of policy." What, in other words, were "the historically located methods, tech-

no. 4 (October 1987): 879–907. For a much fuller treatment of the concept's origins and shifting currency, see Judith Surkis's essay in this forum.

²¹ Geoff Eley, "Is All the World a Text? From Social History to the History of Society Two Decades Later" (CSST Working Paper #55, October 1990); Raphael Samuel, "Reading the Signs," *History Workshop Journal* 32 (Autumn 1991): 88–109; Samuel, "Reading the Signs, II." The original context for Eley's essay was the Working Paper Series sponsored by the Program in Comparative Study of Social Transformations (CSST) at the University of Michigan. The essay was then reprinted with minor revisions in a subsequent conference volume: Terrence J. McDonald, ed., *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996), 193–243. Samuel's essays first took shape as an editorial for *History Workshop Journal* 31 (1991). This seems to have provoked substantial disagreements among the editors, however, which led Samuel to revise and expand the essay into the much longer, two-part series. According to the notes for "Reading the Signs, II," Samuel intended two additional essays in future issues. By 1992, though, the larger plan seems to have shifted. As he explained in "Reading the Signs, II": "In order not to trespass further on readers' patience, or *History Workshop Journal* space, the third of these articles, which is about history and post-modernism, will be placed elsewhere" (246). As far as I am aware, the third and fourth parts never appeared, although some of these ideas can be tracked to Samuel's subsequent two-volume *Theatres of Memory* (London, 1994, 1998).

²² Despite the prominent position of turn-prone Marxists in Hunt's 1989 narrative, Gramsci was surprisingly absent. Nor did she cite many of the central figures in twentieth-century Marxist theory who were widely discussed on the British side, such as Georg Lukacs or Valentin Voloshinov. I note these patterns not to argue for or against any particular cast of characters, but to point out some of the surprising gaps that were built into the turn talk from the very beginning.

niques, and practices that allowed such . . . categor[ies] to be constructed in the first place"?²³

Samuel, too, had quite a bit to say about "discourse." But in his telling, the genealogical branches extended even further: first backward to the structural linguist Emile Benveniste, who had developed the concept of "discourse" during the 1930s; then forward a bit, to Foucault's *Birth of the Clinic* (1963), which "vastly expanded" Benveniste's concept by applying it "to all those classificatory and naming devices by which science and authority produce order out of chaos"; then laterally, to extended comparisons with morphology, deconstruction, semiotics, and hermeneutics (each of which, Samuel insisted, came with its own distinctive theories about how signs actually work); and then laterally once again, to a second round of comparisons with Marx, Gramsci, and Althusser (Foucault's "discursive formations" now functioning as "base and superstructure, theory and practice rolled into one"). Even here, however, Samuel was just warming up. With remarkable erudition (and over more than sixty printed pages), he quickly performed similar maneuvers on Ferdinand Saussure and semiotics; on Roland Barthes and mythology; on Jacques Derrida and deconstruction; on Clifford Geertz and symbolic anthropology; on E. P. Thompson and class; on Pierre Nora and sites of memory; on Carlo Ginzburg and microhistory—and on many, many others.²⁴

In retrospect, though, much of the fascination of these essays stems not simply from their breadth, depth, and clarity, but also from their lingering open-endedness. In both cases, to be sure, Eley and Samuel referenced a dizzying assortment of turns: some of them linguistic, some of them historic, some of them deconstructive or antireductionist, some of them situated more narrowly within intellectual, social, or gender history. "Important things," Eley noted, "were clearly at stake."²⁵ At the end of the day, however, both Eley and Samuel chose to represent these "things" with the capacious metaphors of "readings" and "signs," "worlds" and "texts." And in this sense, at least, their targets were always much larger than cultural history itself—new, old, or otherwise. More than origin stories for any particular field, these were conceptual inventories that spoke of turns (not turn), disciplines (not discipline), modes (not mode), unresolved possibilities (rather than consolidating agendas). Although clearly committed to the work of critical genealogy, both authors embraced multitudes and confessed the provisional status of their still-unfolding stories. Neither author, significantly, gave the slightest indication that the stories themselves might be coming to an end.

HOW, THEN, CAN WE EXPLAIN the very different sort of story first ventured in *Beyond the Cultural Turn*, a story now thick with overtones of obsolescence, specters of supersession? Why, in other words, this dramatic refashioning of the story itself: from the live and bracing debates of Eley and Samuel to the fixed and finished turn of

²³ Eley, "Is All the World a Text?," in McDonald, *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences*, 203–204, 217–222.

²⁴ Samuel, "Reading the Signs" and "Reading the Signs, II." Quotations from "Reading the Signs," 101, 106.

²⁵ Eley, "Is All the World a Text?," in McDonald, *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences*, 198.

Bonnell and Hunt? One obvious complication here is the frequent narrative overlaps. In an opening footnote, Bonnell and Hunt pointed to Eley as their principal touchstone.²⁶ They also made it clear that they were plowing much the same basic terrain. Back once again were Hayden White's *Metahistory*, Clifford Geertz's *The Interpretation of Cultures*, and Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*; French post-structuralism and British cultural studies; those turn-prone Marxists and the fourth-generation Annalists.²⁷

Much the same can be said about the narrative trajectories. Following Eley and Samuel, Bonnell and Hunt built their story around the "declining power" of "social explanation," more specifically the "tried-and-true materialist metaphors" central to much postwar historiography. Like Eley and Samuel, too, Bonnell and Hunt presented the 1980s as a critical tipping point, the watershed moment in which "growing numbers" of historians came to reject the very notion of culture as "reflective" or "epiphenomenal." Fundamental categories (such as class or political affiliation) now came to be understood "not as preceding consciousness or culture or language, but as depending upon them." The most basic forms of social life, they noted, "only came into being through their expressions or representations."²⁸

But whereas Eley and Samuel had presented these ideas as part of a rapidly unfolding story—still alive with "possibilities"—Bonnell and Hunt now recast them as a form of prior practice, a singular turn of "the last decades."²⁹ In the process, they also consolidated the larger narrative: first, by squeezing its complex history into roughly half a dozen pages; second, by distilling a heterodox range of cultural approaches into a core proposition (namely, that language and culture "shape" the social, that there is no social being "outside" of culture and language); third, by organizing the story around a rising and falling episteme ("the cultural turn"); and finally, by articulating "disappointment" with the more "radical" manifestations of this turn.³⁰ In one bold stroke, that is to say, Bonnell and Hunt simultaneously traced the turn's origins and regretted some of its impacts, assembled the family romance and declared the romance over.

There is more to be said about this narrative template: a fast-forming declension story in which the "cultural turn" arrives just in time to deliver its own eulogy.³¹ First,

²⁶ Bonnell and Hunt, "Introduction," 27 n. 4. This despite the fact that Eley did not actually use the phrase "cultural turn" in his 1990 essay.

²⁷ Ibid., 1–32, 27 n. 4; Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore, 1973); Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*; Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York, 1977).

²⁸ Ibid., 9.

²⁹ Ibid., 5.

³⁰ Ibid., 11. The contrast here with Hunt's earlier formulations was particularly striking. Consider, for example, the closing lines of her 1989 introduction to *The New Cultural History*: "For the moment, as this volume shows, the accent in cultural history is on close examination—of texts, of pictures, and of actions—and on open-mindedness to what those examinations will reveal, rather than on elaboration of new master narratives or social theories to replace the materialist reductionism of Marxism and the Annales school . . . Historians working in the cultural mode should not be discouraged by theoretical diversity, for we are just entering a remarkable new phase when the other human sciences (including especially literary studies but also anthropology and sociology) are discovering us anew . . . Someday soon, presumably, another E. H. Carr will announce that the more cultural historical studies become and the more historical cultural studies become, the better for both" (22).

³¹ Hunt's first published reference to "the cultural turn" came in her co-authored book with Joyce Appleby and Margaret Jacob, *Telling the Truth about History*, 221. The specific context was a passage

though, it is worth noting the expanding turn talk. Consider JSTOR once again. In the years immediately following Eley's and Samuel's essays, public invocations of the cultural turn remained quite rare. In 1993, there was a grand total of one explicit reference. And over the next half-decade, the aggregate curve remained relatively flat, ranging from no hits in 1994 to seven in 1998. In the years following Bonnell and Hunt, by contrast, the numbers began to spike quite notably, climbing from twenty-four references in 2000 to fifty-eight in 2003.³² These references, moreover, began to appear in a much broader range of journals, from *Renaissance Quarterly*, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, the *William and Mary Quarterly*, and the *Journal of Modern History* to the *Journal of African History*, the *Catholic Historical Review*, the *Journal of Military History*, and *Historia Mexicana*.

It was at this point, too, that scores of historians began to poach Bonnell and Hunt's title figure, invoking cultural turns in political history and diplomatic history, urban history and environmental history, Cold War studies and histories of consumerism.³³ To some extent, of course, such appropriations served to popularize the concept, transforming a previously marginal catch phrase into a ubiquitous touchstone. With each passing reference, however, the concept took on additional semantic baggage. Much of the new turn talk, in fact, pushed in very different directions: sometimes emphasizing the "vast dispersion" of cultural history said to be reshaping the larger discipline; sometimes complaining about the "contemporary

devoted to conceptual retrenchments, with E. P. Thompson once again serving as bellwether. In this case, though, the focus was not on Thompson's having "turned away" from socioeconomic "reductionism" during the early 1960s, but rather on the fact that he later "drew back from the more extreme post-modernist positions associated with the cultural turn" (here exemplified by his 1978 polemic, *The Poverty of Theory*). In five short years (1989–1994), that is to say, Hunt's broader framework for talking about cultural history had shifted quite dramatically: from public calls for theoretical "diversity" to a growing emphasis on theoretical zero sums; from a forward-looking process of conceptual "discovery" to backward-looking critiques of methodological "extremism."

³² One major source of this groundswell can be traced to the large numbers of reviews of Bonnell and Hunt. In 2002, for example, the editors of this journal commissioned not one, but three review essays, by Ronald Suny, Patrick Brantlinger, and Richard Handler, for a special feature titled "What's beyond the Cultural Turn?," *American Historical Review* 107, no. 5 (December 2002): 1475–1520. It is important to be clear, though, that Bonnell and Hunt were not solely responsible for expanding the trope's currency. In 1999, the trope also surfaced in at least four different articles: Craig Clunas, "Modernity Global and Local: Consumption and the Rise of the West," *American Historical Review* 104, no. 5 (December 1999): 1497–1511; Claudio Lomnitz, "Barbarians at the Gate? A Few Remarks on the Politics of the 'New Cultural History of Mexico,'" *Hispanic American Historical Review* 79, no. 2 (May 1999): 367–385; Christopher Sellers, "Thoreau's Body: Towards an Embodied Environmental History," *Environmental History* 4, no. 4 (October 1999): 486–514; and Shirley Wilton, "Class Struggles: Teaching History in the Post-modern Age," *History Teacher* 33, no. 1 (November 1999): 25–32. Other prominent invocations can be found in David F. Crew, "Who's Afraid of Cultural Studies? Taking a 'Cultural Turn' in German History," in Scott Denham, Irene Kacandes, and Jonathan Petropoulos, eds., *A User's Guide to German Cultural Studies* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1997), 45–61; Thomas Bender, "Politics, Intellect, and the American University, 1945–1995," *Daedalus* 126, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 1–38; and George Steinmetz, ed., *State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1999).

³³ See, for example, Ronald P. Formisano, "The Concept of Political Culture," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 31, no. 3 (Winter 2001): 393–426; Karina Urbach, "Diplomatic History since the Cultural Turn," *Historical Journal* 46, no. 4 (December 2003): 991–997; James Connolly, "Bringing the City Back In: Space and Place in the Urban History of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era," *Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 1, no. 3 (July 2002): 258–278; Richard White, "Afterword: Environmental History: Watching a Historical Field Mature," *Pacific Historical Review* 70, no. 1 (February 2001): 103–111; Robert Griffith, "The Cultural Turn in Cold War Studies," *Reviews in American History* 29, no. 1 (March 2001): 150–157; and Frank Mort, review of Matthew Hilton, *Smoking in British Popular Culture, 1800–2000: Perfect Pleasures*, *American Historical Review* 108, no. 1 (February 2003): 262–263.

dominion of cultural history” over this or that subfield; sometimes concluding, by extension, that cultural history constituted a methodological “imperialism.”³⁴ As Drew Gilpin Faust argued in one of the more eloquent variations on this latter theme, “What I have found so compelling about cultural history during my three decades in the profession is its emphasis on how historical actors construe their experience—how they see, define, and respond to their world. Thus for me the lens of culture or meaning filters every other dimension of experience, and cultural history takes on a kind of natural historical imperialism: Whatever else might be happening—politics, economics, technological change—happens to people who use their cultural assumptions and predispositions to interpret it.”³⁵

Ultimately, though, the most dramatic effect of Bonnell and Hunt’s volume was to spark new and competing master narratives from some of the discipline’s leading turners.³⁶ These narratives deserve more careful consideration. In virtually every case, they have generated broad and prominent review attention. In most cases, too, they have been fortified by the weight of personal experience. William Sewell’s *Logics of History* (2005), for example, is equal parts critical genealogy and intellectual autobiography, an often brilliant explication of the same methods that Sewell was centrally involved in developing.³⁷ Similarly, Gabrielle Spiegel’s eloquent 2008 AHA presidential address provides an unusually rich synthesis of the multiple currents of poststructuralism in historical practice—a synthesis bolstered by the fact that Spiegel was among the very first historians to deploy these challenging ideas as they migrated across the Atlantic.³⁸

Instructive, too, are the varying points of emphasis that have sometimes set these stories apart. Whereas some authors have run their turns through literary criticism, British cultural studies, or anthropology, others have focused on key developments in gender theory or subaltern studies. Whereas some have marked their debts to Geertz, Foucault, Williams, or Derrida, others have emphasized the epistemological overlaps that produced common modes of questioning. Whereas some have described their turns as sparked by a growing crisis (e.g., within the quantitative social history of the 1960s and 1970s), others have insisted that the crises themselves need to be understood in relation to much larger “macrosocial forces” (e.g., the global rise

³⁴ I am referring here to broader patterns of historiographical usage. For specific examples and quotations, see the remarks by David Hollinger and Drew Gilpin Faust in “Interchange: The Practice of History,” *Journal of American History* 90, no. 2 (September 2003): 589–590, 587, respectively; and Formisano, “The Concept of Political Culture,” 394.

³⁵ Faust, in “Interchange: The Practice of History,” 587.

³⁶ Important contributions here include Mandler, “The Problem with Cultural History”; Sewell, *Logics of History*; Eley, *A Crooked Line*; and Spiegel, “The Task of the Historian.” The larger cycle extends, as well, to a number of published reviews and commentaries commissioned in response to Bonnell and Hunt, Mandler, Eley, and Sewell. See, for example, the review essays by Suny, Brantlinger, and Handler in “What’s beyond the Cultural Turn?”; the responses to Mandler’s essay by Carla Hesse, Colin Jones, and Carol Watts in *Cultural and Social History* (April 2004); the reviews of *A Crooked Line* by Sewell, Spiegel, and Manu Goswami in the *American Historical Review* (April 2008); and the reviews of *Logics of History* by George Steinmetz, Dylan Riley, and David Pedersen in *Social Science History* (December 2008).

³⁷ Sewell, *Logics of History*, 22–80. See also Sewell, “Crooked Lines.” It is worth noting that Sewell’s generative role in this process was not limited to his own published writings. As some of the recent genealogies note, he was also a key participant in landmark theoretical seminars at Princeton (with Clifford Geertz), Paris (with Joan Scott), and Ann Arbor (with Geoff Eley).

³⁸ Spiegel, “The Task of the Historian.” See also Spiegel, “Comment on *A Crooked Line*.”

of neoliberalism).³⁹ And whereas some have inflected their turns as tales of retrospective disappointment, others have emphasized collective accomplishments, future possibilities.⁴⁰

No two turns, then, have pushed in precisely the same directions. Step back from the larger cycle, however, and certain echoes become apparent. Most striking, perhaps, are the recurring deployments of timeframe (1960s to the 1990s), setting (one or another corner of the European field), narrative arc (rise and fall), and authorial voice (the generational “we”). Striking, too, is the considerable extent to which the narratives have pivoted around mid-career “conversion experiences”—initially pursued with great “profit,” but ultimately passed through en route to something else. The point of noting these patterns is not to dispute their collective resonance. For those who “made the turn” in this way, it was clearly a profound and powerful process. The sheer volume of narrative redundancy, moreover, suggests the outlines of collective memories: a genealogical template in which large numbers of former turners have recognized (at least some of) their own trajectories.

We might wonder here, though, about the shaping power of standpoint. If we were to shift the disciplinary context, would it be possible to alter the plot lines and tell a very different sort of story (e.g., one unallied with a single generation)? How, in other words, has this retrospective template—this growing tendency to speak in an idiom of conversions, turns, and beyonds—shaped our broader sense of cultural history: of when it started, who it included, where it happened, and what it ultimately became? Are there other important turns lurking behind the generational “we”?

CONSIDER WHAT HAPPENS WHEN we shift the narrative frame to the field of U.S. history. At first glance, the broader patterns here are not easily disentangled from their European counterparts.⁴¹ We could point, for example, to the roughly contemporaneous interests in subaltern thought and ritual that informed both Natalie Davis’s *Society and Culture in Modern France* (1975) and Lawrence Levine’s *Black Culture and Black Consciousness* (1977). Or the parallel efforts to unpack dominant categories of collective identity in Joan Scott’s *Gender and the Politics of History* (1988) and David Roediger’s *The Wages of Whiteness* (1991). Or the shared sensitivity to shifting modes of urban perception that guided Judith Walkowitz’s *City of Dreadful Delight* (1992) and John Kasson’s *Rudeness and Civility* (1990). Or the growing emphasis on transnational circulation that began to crystallize in Paul Gilroy’s *The Black Atlantic* (1993) and George Lipsitz’s *Dangerous Crossroads* (1994).⁴²

The specific innovations driving these projects, moreover, were never confined

³⁹ The term “macrosocial forces” comes from Sewell, *Logics of History*, 22–80.

⁴⁰ On the whole, Bonnell, Hunt, Sewell, and Mandler have fallen more squarely into the disappointment camp. Eley and Spiegel, by contrast, have emphasized greater accomplishments and possibilities in recent scholarship.

⁴¹ Cook and Glickman, “Twelve Propositions for a History of U.S. Cultural History.” The next few paragraphs build upon portions of that essay.

⁴² Davis, *Society and Culture in Modern France*; Levine, *Black Culture and Black Consciousness*; Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History*; David R. Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (London, 1991); Judith Walkowitz, *City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London* (Chicago, 1992); John F. Kasson, *Rudeness and Civility: Manners in Nineteenth-Century Urban America* (New York, 1990); Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and*

to a single quadrant. A case in point is Geertz's landmark essay "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture" (1973), which appeared in dozens of subsequent studies by Europeanists and Americanists alike: from Sewell's *Work and Revolution in France* (1980), Darnton's *The Great Cat Massacre* (1984), and Hunt's *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (1984) to Rhys Isaac's *The Transformation of Virginia* (1982), Roy Rosenzweig's *Eight Hours for What We Will* (1983), and Susan Davis's *Parades and Power* (1986).⁴³ But Geertz was hardly exceptional in this regard. Indeed, one could easily track similar patterns of cross-talk via Foucault on discourse, Gramsci on hegemony, Said on Orientalism, Theodor Adorno on the culture industry, Mikhail Bakhtin on carnival, Walter Benjamin on the *flâneur*, Benedict Anderson on imagined communities, and Judith Butler on gender-as-performance—all key concepts that regularly traversed the U.S. and European fields.⁴⁴

This does not mean, however, that the turns in question simply mirrored one another. On the European side, for instance, there was a much earlier set of engagements with the cultural dimensions of "empire," a pattern deriving at least in part from the pathbreaking scholarship of postcolonial intellectuals such as Frantz Fanon, Léopold Senghor, Aimé Césaire, C. L. R. James, and Stuart Hall.⁴⁵ On the U.S. side, by contrast, we can trace a much wider range of research around "market

Double Consciousness (New York, 1993); George Lipsitz, *Dangerous Crossroads: Popular Music, Postmodernism, and the Poetics of Place* (London, 1994).

⁴³ William H. Sewell, Jr., *Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848* (Cambridge, 1980); Darnton, *The Great Cat Massacre*; Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley, Calif., 1984); Rhys Isaac, *The Transformation of Virginia, 1740–1790* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982); Roy Rosenzweig, *Eight Hours for What We Will: Workers and Leisure in an Industrial City, 1870–1920* (Cambridge, 1983); Susan G. Davis, *Parades and Power: Street Theatre in Nineteenth-Century Philadelphia* (Berkeley, Calif., 1986). As early as 1980, Ronald G. Walters noted this trend in "Signs of the Times: Clifford Geertz and Historians," *Theory and Social History* 47, no. 3 (Autumn 1980): 537–556. Four years later, Daniel Joseph Singal jokingly described Geertz as cited "so often . . . it has become something of a professional embarrassment"; "Beyond Consensus: Richard Hofstadter and American Historiography," *American Historical Review* 89, no. 4 (October 1984): 998. This does not mean, however, that cultural historians absorbed Geertz in precisely the same ways. See, for example, Roger Chartier's and Robert Darnton's heated debates from the same period: Chartier, "Texts, Symbols, and Frenchness," *Journal of Modern History* 57, no. 4 (December 1985): 682–695; Darnton, "The Symbolic Element in History," *Journal of Modern History* 58, no. 1 (March 1986): 218–234.

⁴⁴ In 1989, for example, Hunt described the resonance of Foucault's work among her fellow Europeanists as "undeniably tremendous"; *The New Cultural History*, 9. Yet the pattern was hardly restricted to Hunt's own field. Indeed, for much of the next decade, Foucault was a regular presence in scores of U.S. histories, including Michael O'Malley's *Keeping Watch: A History of American Time* (New York, 1990); Eric Lott's *Love and Theft: Blackface Minstrelsy and the American Working Class* (New York, 1993); Elizabeth Lunbeck's *The Psychiatric Persuasion: Knowledge, Gender, and Power in Modern America* (Princeton, N.J., 1994); Gail Bederman's *Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880–1917* (Chicago, 1995); George Chauncey's *Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male World, 1890–1940* (New York, 1994); Michael Meranze's *Laboratories of Virtue: Punishment, Revolution, and Authority in Philadelphia, 1760–1835* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1996); and Kathleen M. Brown's *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1996).

⁴⁵ For general introductions to this long-running body of work, see Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley, Calif., 1997), especially 1–56; and Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley, Calif., 2005), especially 33–55. Also helpful is Bill Schwarz's interview with Stuart Hall, "Breaking Bread with History: C. L. R. James and *The Black Jacobins*," *History Workshop Journal* 46 (1998): 17–32. For much fuller treatments of the recent work on empire, see the contributions to this forum by Durba Ghosh and Gary Wilder.

cultures” and “cultures of consumption”—a genealogy that goes back at least as far as the pioneering scholarship of Warren Susman, Neil Harris, John Kasson, Jackson Lears, Karen Halttunen, Richard Fox, Roland Marchand, Daniel Horowitz, Kathy Peiss, Jean-Christophe Agnew, Michael Denning, and Ann Fabian.⁴⁶ Over time, of course, these field-specific strengths have tended to collapse and cross-pollinate. But in so doing, they have also reflected their local contexts. Thus, much of the foundational work on U.S. empire has positioned itself as an explicit rejoinder to “American exceptionalism.”⁴⁷ And much of the best work on European consumerism has tended to cluster around studies of “Americanization” or the Eastern Bloc—topics that simply are not thinkable in the same ways on the U.S. side.⁴⁸

The most striking contrasts, however, can be found in the respective roles played by “class” and “race” in each context. In the European turn narratives, class has long operated as the central category of analysis. In most cases, Europeanist accounts single out the Marxist historiography of Eric Hobsbawm, E. P. Thompson, Christopher Hill, and Raymond Williams as foundational. They draw intellectual lineages from the political revolts of the late 1960s to the renewed interest in “history from below” during the 1970s. Above all, they trace the origins of a new cultural history to the pivotal moment when many social and labor historians began to doubt the deterministic power of structures and conditions.

On the U.S. side, by contrast, it is simply impossible to tell this story apart from race.⁴⁹ Here again, Levine’s *Black Culture and Black Consciousness* is instructive.

⁴⁶ Warren Susman, *Culture as History: The Transformation of American Society in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1984); Neil Harris, *Humbug: The Art of P. T. Barnum* (Boston, 1973); John F. Kasson, *Amusing the Million: Coney Island at the Turn of the Century* (New York, 1978); T. J. Jackson Lears, *No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880–1920* (New York, 1981); Karen Halttunen, *Confidence Men and Painted Women: A Study of Middle-Class Culture in America, 1830–1870* (New Haven, Conn., 1982); Richard Wightman Fox and T. J. Jackson Lears, *The Culture of Consumption: Critical Essays in American History, 1880–1980* (New York, 1983); Roland Marchand, *Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 1920–1940* (Berkeley, Calif., 1985); Daniel Horowitz, *The Morality of Spending: Attitudes toward the Consumer Society in America, 1875–1940* (Baltimore, 1985); Kathy Peiss, *Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in Turn-of-the-Century New York* (Philadelphia, 1986); Jean-Christophe Agnew, *Worlds Apart: The Market and the Theater in Anglo-American Thought, 1550–1750* (Cambridge, 1986); Michael Denning, *Mechanic Accents: Dime Novels and Working-Class Culture in America* (London, 1987); Ann Fabian, *Card Sharps, Dream Books, and Bucket Shops: Gambling in 19th-Century America* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1990).

⁴⁷ Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, eds., *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham, N.C., 1993); Penny M. Von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1997); Mary A. Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915–1940* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2001); Amy Kaplan, *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture* (Cambridge, Mass., 2002); Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2006).

⁴⁸ Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, Calif., 1993); Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997); Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley, Calif., 2000); Heide Fehrenbach and Uta G. Poiger, eds., *Transactions, Transgressions, Transformations: American Culture in Western Europe and Japan* (New York, 2000); David F. Crew, ed., *Consuming Germany in the Cold War* (New York, 2003); Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005); Jonathan R. Zatlin, *The Currency of Socialism: Money and Political Culture in East Germany* (New York, 2007); Katherine Pence and Paul Betts, eds., *Socialist Modern: East German Everyday Culture and Politics* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2008).

⁴⁹ The major exception here is Eley, who devotes more than ten pages of *A Crooked Line* to the early work on race and empire by Stuart Hall, Paul Gilroy, Ranajit Guha, and Gayatri Spivak (138–148). In part, this is because Eley’s is the only Europeanist genealogy to reckon with the Birmingham Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies and the Subaltern Studies Group. For more recent studies of race

Initiated during the mid-1960s, as Levine himself was actively involved in the U.S. civil rights movement, *Black Culture and Black Consciousness* espoused many of the same basic assumptions as the work of the British Marxists. Much like Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class*, Levine's epic study of "Afro-American folk thought" was a "history from below" that sought new ways of conceptualizing "resistance." Like Thompson as well, Levine figured culture as a repertoire of "resources"—rituals, traditions, and customs through which an oppositional politics persevered. For Levine, however, these innovations emerged from a somewhat different set of commitments. As Walter Johnson has noted, the strong rhetorical emphasis on "self-determination" in *Black Culture and Black Consciousness* had obvious affinities with the civil rights politics of the late 1960s.⁵⁰ And the "determinisms" against which Levine framed his arguments generally came in the form of psychoanalytic theories of victimization (e.g., Stanley Elkins's somewhat earlier description of the antebellum slave plantation as a "total institution").⁵¹

We can extend this line of comparison to the more discursive modes of analysis that began to flourish during the 1980s. On the European side, one of the earliest efforts in this regard was Gareth Stedman Jones's *Languages of Class* (1983), an important but controversial study that generated enormous discussion among the British New Left.⁵² Although Jones's work was cited widely by U.S. labor historians, it would be difficult to argue for a strict parallelism—in part because the often contentious debates around class and culture never achieved the same centrality in U.S. circles.⁵³ If we shift the focus to race, however, the patterns look very different. Only three years after the publication of *Languages of Class*, Michael Omi and Howard Winant's landmark study *Racial Formation in the United States* (1986) performed a similar deconstructive maneuver by describing race (a category that had long been understood as self-evidently tied to physiology) as an ideological construct traceable across shifting patterns of discourse. Over the next decade, this new way of thinking

and empire by Europeanists, see Kathleen Paul, *Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1997); Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830–1867* (Chicago, 2002); Sonya O. Rose, *Which People's War? National Identity and Citizenship in Wartime Britain, 1939–1945* (New York, 2004); Heide Fehrenbach, *Race after Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America* (Princeton, N.J., 2005); Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars* (Chicago, 2005); Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2006); Rita Chin, *The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany* (New York, 2007); Rita Chin, Heide Fehrenbach, Geoff Eley, and Atina Grossman, *After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2009).

⁵⁰ Walter Johnson, "On Agency," *Journal of Social History* 37, no. 1 (Autumn 2003): 113–124.

⁵¹ Stanley M. Elkins, *Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life* (Chicago, 1959). For helpful context on these questions, see Lawrence W. Levine's autobiographical preface to the 30th Anniversary Edition of *Black Culture and Black Consciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought from Slavery to Freedom* (New York, 2007). It is important to be clear here, as well, that Levine's work was part of a much broader wave of landmark African American cultural histories that included studies by John Blassingame, Nathan Huggins, Sterling Stuckey, Albert Raboteau, Deborah Gray White, Charles Joyner, and Nell Irvin Painter (among many others). This rich body of work, much of it by African American scholars, is yet another important subfield occluded by the recent turn talk.

⁵² Gareth Stedman Jones, *Languages of Class: Studies in English Working Class History, 1832–1982* (Cambridge, 1983); Eley, *A Crooked Line*, 9.

⁵³ For examples of Americanist reactions to Jones's work, see Michael H. Frisch and Daniel J. Walkowitz, eds., *Working-Class America: Essays on Labor, Community, and American Society* (Urbana, Ill., 1983).

about race quickly became a sign of the times, extending from Alexander Saxton's *The Rise and Fall of the White Republic* (1990), Tomás Almaguer's *Racial Fault Lines* (1994), and Kathleen Brown's *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs* (1996) to Neil Foley's *The White Scourge* (1997), Philip Deloria's *Playing Indian* (1997), and Robert Lee's *Orientalists* (1999).⁵⁴

These examples illustrate some of the dangers of our turn talk, the vast expanses of major scholarship behind the generational "we." But the dangers are hardly unique to the U.S. field. Shifting the frame to Latin American history, for instance, reveals a very different conception of "the social" (here grounded in "dependency theory"), politics (focused more explicitly on U.S. imperialism), and key works in cultural history (almost none of which appear in the footnotes of the leading European and U.S. creation stories).⁵⁵ Shift the frame again to the fields of late ancient and medieval history, and the debates look different still: this time, pivoting around the ritual-centered analyses of innovators such as Peter Brown, Caroline Walker Bynum, and Miri Rubin.⁵⁶ Even here, though, we are still seeing only part of the larger picture.

LET US SHIFT THE FRAME one last time, but now to the somewhat later waves of culturalists that arrived after the 1980s.⁵⁷ These cohorts have occupied a rather odd genealogical position. Again and again, the specific moment of their training has been described as the historiographical apex of the turn.⁵⁸ In many cases, too, they

⁵⁴ Alexander Saxton, *The Rise and Fall of the White Republic: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth-Century America* (London, 1990); Tomás Almaguer, *Racial Fault Lines: The Historical Origins of White Supremacy in California* (Berkeley, Calif., 1994); Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs*; Neil Foley, *The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture* (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); Philip J. Deloria, *Playing Indian* (New Haven, Conn., 1997); Robert G. Lee, *Orientalists: Asian Americans in Popular Culture* (Philadelphia, 1999).

⁵⁵ See, for example, the debates that run from William H. Beezley, Cheryl English Martin, and William E. French, eds., *Rituals of Rule, Rituals of Resistance: Public Celebrations and Popular Culture in Mexico* (Wilmington, Del., 1994); to Florencia E. Mallon, "The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies: Perspectives from Latin American History," *American Historical Review* 99, no. 5 (December 1994): 1491–1515, and Stephen H. Haber, "The Worst of Both Worlds: The New Cultural History of Mexico," *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos* 13, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 363–383; to Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, eds., *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.–Latin American Relations* (Durham, N.C., 1998); to the essays by Susan Deans-Smith, Gilbert M. Joseph, Eric Van Young, William E. French, Mary Kay Vaughn, Susan Migden Socolow, Claudio Lomnitz, and Stephen H. Haber in *Mexico's New Cultural History: ¿Una Lucha Libre?*, Special Issue, *Hispanic American Historical Review* 79, no. 2 (1999).

⁵⁶ See, for example, Martin and Miller, *The Cultural Turn in Late Ancient Studies*; Rubin, "What Is Cultural History Now?" Key texts here include Peter Brown, *The Making of Late Antiquity* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978); Caroline Walker Bynum, *Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women* (Berkeley, Calif., 1987); and Miri Rubin, *Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture* (Cambridge, 1991).

⁵⁷ This would include my own cohorts, first during my years as an undergraduate major in European cultural history at Princeton University from 1984 to 1988, and then as a UC-Berkeley Ph.D. student in U.S. cultural history from 1990 to 1996.

⁵⁸ See, for example, Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, *Telling the Truth about History*, which cites publication statistics as evidence of the cultural turn's expansion (219). In "The New Empiricism," *Cultural and Social History* 1, no. 2 (May 2004): 201–207, Carla Hesse makes a similar point, arguing that cultural history was transformed during the 1980s and 1990s from "a minor (albeit highly prized) sideshow into the main event in the big tent of the historical profession" (204). In Hesse's version of events, however, this claim is not attached to a declensionist narrative.

have found themselves depicted as a kind of motor: the graduate-student groundswell driving the turn's expansion. Sewell, for example, describes the late 1980s as the watershed moment when cultural history became the discipline's "major growth area," attracting "the best students in the major centers of graduate training." Along with other key indicators (such as Hunt's 1989 volume), these swelling ranks of culturalists mark a kind of apotheosis in Sewell's narrative, the pivotal moment when cultural history "usurped definitively the hegemonic position achieved by social history only a decade earlier."⁵⁹

For the most part, though, these narratives have had little or nothing to say about what the "students" actually produced. To the extent that they cite any recent scholarship (that is, beyond the early 1990s), it has typically come in a single bundled footnote.⁶⁰ And comparatively, at least, the retrospective narratives have imagined the immediate past as strangely uneventful: a long and placid epilogue to the "bracing debates" of the 1980s. This sequence, however, elicits a number of lingering questions. One involves the longer history of the "students." Did their own trajectories simply replicate those of their teachers? And if not, what difference did it make to enter the mix sometime *after* the new cultural history—in its epistemic and professional wakes? If one cohort's turns found their expression in mid-career conversion experiences, what about those for whom many of the very same ideas, texts, and debates were methodological starting points, the more mundane stuff of first-year graduate syllabi?⁶¹

These questions require more than a mere extension of chronology. As Eley has observed in one of the few acknowledgments of generational diversity, those trained in the years following the "overheated polemics" of the 1980s have been "markedly less excited" about rehashing the older "battles." And with distance, he suggests, there have been new "possibilities" for creative thinking. Whereas the first waves of turners may have felt the need to maintain "the programmatic advocacy of one authorizing form of theory against another," the more recent cohorts have been some-

⁵⁹ Sewell, *Logics of History*, 48.

⁶⁰ See, for example, Bonnell and Hunt, *Beyond the Cultural Turn*, 32 n. 31, where they thank Sara Maza for drawing their attention to the importance of recent work on material culture by Leora Auslander, Ken Alder, and Jennifer Jones. For exceptions to this pattern, see Eley's frequent references to "younger historians" and "younger people" in *A Crooked Line*, 158, 201, 202. For other genealogies that similarly track the shifting boundaries of cultural history beyond the mid-1990s, see Peter Burke, "Afterword: Cultural History in the Twenty-First Century," in Burke, *What Is Cultural History?*, 130–143; and Jean-Christophe Agnew, "Capitalism, Culture, and Catastrophe," in Cook, Glickman, and O'Malley, *The Cultural Turn in U.S. History*, 383–416.

⁶¹ We might wonder as well about the "macrosocial forces" that have sometimes driven the supersession narratives. In Sewell's story, especially, it is precisely the inability of cultural turners to respond intellectually, methodologically, or politically to the shifting tides of "world capitalism" that has sealed the field's obsolescence. In his telling, the turn emerges as a story of expiring paradigms, its practitioners fated to think in national, Fordist, and discursive terms at a moment when the larger forces of world history were pushing toward "flexible accumulation," "global circulation," and the need for "a more robust sense of the social" (80). This sequence makes sense, however, only if we accept two basic premises: first, that the turn itself was a bounded generational experience that began in the 1960s; and second, that those who followed in its wake were somehow numb to the social, economic, political, and cultural changes unfolding all around them. Indeed, by this logic, the "students" of Sewell's story function as a kind of lost generation: simultaneously raised on anti-apartheid movements, global proxy wars, NAFTA, IMF protests, Google, and YouTube, yet strangely unable to develop a mode of historical questioning resonant with their "macrosocial" environment. As I try to demonstrate below, much of this argument is belied by major trends *within* cultural history over the past two decades.

what freer to combine and revise, to create their own sorts of “hybrids” across the older methodological “antinomies.”⁶²

We can note these distinctions without dodging the accompanying critiques. In our current political conjuncture, especially, it is hard to argue with Eley’s suggestion that “even the most fervent” culturalists would do well to pay more attention to the “widening extremes of social inequality.”⁶³ Nor would most current practitioners disagree with Sewell’s central contention: that the expanding “juggernaut of world capitalism” requires something more than a “purely” discursive mode of questioning.⁶⁴ Methodologically, moreover, who would argue with Peter Mandler’s recent call for closer attention to the macro-level “throw” of the texts and discourses we cite as “dominant”?⁶⁵ Or Spiegel’s wise suggestion that we recast the cultural itself as a more fluid field of “semantics,” each new “repertoire” of signs regularly remade and “put to work” by ground-level actors?⁶⁶

So far, so good. But what of the related efforts to yoke these critical impulses to tales of supersession, the collective quest for something “beyond”? We might wonder again: beyond what, exactly? Beyond the early struggles to establish language, imagery, and perception as the very stuff of historical analysis? Absolutely. Beyond the older “antinomies” that pitted cultural against social, micro against macro, subjectivity against structure? One can only hope. Beyond a “radically” or “purely” discursive mode of questioning now said to dominate “current practice”? Well, maybe not so fast.

This putatively “radical” form of culturalism has been accused of many crimes. It threatens to “obliterate the social.” It “displace[s] our gaze from the poor and powerless.” It fosters tedious conversations about “how little we know and how little we can say.” Sometimes it even shares a “secret affinity with an emergent logic of capitalist development.”⁶⁷ It is a specter, moreover, that is said to have appeared in many guises. On some occasions, it has conjured methodological excess: a turn pursued too far.⁶⁸ But it has also referenced absence: an undertheorized “cultural stud-

⁶² Eley, *A Crooked Line*, 201. Spiegel, too, has made an effort to demonstrate the shifting theoretical positions on the question of semiotic determinism. See, for example, her comments on Pierre Bourdieu and Andreas Reckwitz in “Comment on *A Crooked Line*,” 411–412.

⁶³ Eley, *A Crooked Line*, 198.

⁶⁴ Sewell, *Logics of History*, 52, 62, 80.

⁶⁵ Mandler, “The Problem with Cultural History,” 96–97.

⁶⁶ Spiegel, “Comment on *A Crooked Line*,” 412.

⁶⁷ Bonnell and Hunt, *Beyond the Cultural Turn*, 11; Sewell, *Logics of History*, 52; Mandler, “The Problem with Cultural History,” 94; Sewell, *Logics of History*, 62. In a 2003 roundtable in the *Journal of American History*, David Roediger noted (and argued against) a similar set of declensionist rhetorics on the U.S. side: “At the least, the perception of a wholesale move toward cultural history, or even cultural studies, has mattered greatly in conditioning how U.S. historians see their field and its problems. The field’s ‘turn’ is actually variously described, usually by detractors—toward the literary, toward the postmodern, toward the ‘mantra’ of race, gender, and class, toward the linguistic, toward the subjective, as well as toward the cultural. Often a lament is registered also for what has been lost: the political, the economic, the solid. I have my doubts as to the empirical validity of such claims . . . To the extent that political economy survives . . . at all, it often does so in works that are fully alert to cultural history and theory.” “Interchange: The Practice of History,” 586.

⁶⁸ This metaphor of excess is often set in opposition to one of methodological emaciation: a figurative “thinning of the social.” For examples, see William H. Sewell, Jr., “Whatever Happened to the ‘Social’ in Social History?,” in Joan W. Scott and Debra Keates, eds., *Schools of Thought: Twenty-Five Years of Interpretive Social Science* (Princeton, N.J., 2001), 209–226. Here again, though, the “thinning” metaphor works only if the story ends in the mid-1990s.

ies"; an empirically thin "postmodernism." Follow the citations backward, and the picture becomes still murkier. In many cases, these claims arrive without footnotes. In others, the claimants cite each other.⁶⁹ In still others, we find grab bags of titles, with landmark discursive studies such as Gail Bederman's *Manliness and Civilization* (1995) and Ann Stoler's *Race and the Education of Desire* (1995) lumped together with hybrid sociocultural histories such as George Chauncey's *Gay New York* (1994)—more than half of which explores the social, political, and commercial institutions that shaped the very terms of sexual discourse.⁷⁰ Even these sorts of arguments, however, are belied by the longer cycle.

If we go back to the earliest genealogies by Hunt, Eley, and Samuel, we find a more measured series of portraits. In each case, that is to say, the authors were quick to emphasize that "most" of the early turners (themselves included) had stopped well short of an unalloyed "sign reading."⁷¹ Pull the story forward, and we discover a similar set of caveats. Spiegel, for example, has regularly emphasized the limited currency of "semiotic determinism"—both in prior practice and in current trends.⁷² Much the same can be said about Carla Hesse, who has argued for at least three basic trajectories of cultural history: one composed of "neo-idealists" (such as Keith Baker), who contend "that there is nothing—or nothing knowable—about human experience outside of language"; a second, "poststructuralist" camp (exemplified by Joan Scott), which has challenged "the assumption that discursive formations are the product of self-conscious, rational individuals"; and a third, considerably larger group (including Hesse herself) who continue to believe that "the social and cultural [are] mutually constitutive," that "text and context need to be understood on an equal footing and not as background and foreground."⁷³

Refreshing in this schema are its glimmers of reciprocal benefits. Rather than insisting on conceptual zero sums, Hesse describes tough but "productive" debate, an increasingly "sophisticated" methodological discourse. Refreshing, too, is her acknowledgment of dissonance—the simple fact that turners could disagree. At first glance, this may seem entirely obvious, especially in a lore cycle so often characterized by combat. For the most part, though, this combat has been figured as fights between turners and their others, insiders and outsiders, true believers and the unconverted. And in this respect, they have often fostered succeeding monoliths: a

⁶⁹ See, for example, Bonnell and Hunt, "Introduction," 31 n. 30, which cites Sewell; or Sewell, *Logics of History*, 79, where he cites Bonnell and Hunt.

⁷⁰ Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization*; Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's "History of Sexuality" and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, N.C., 1995); Sewell, *Logics of History*, 48 n. 28. I am thinking here of parts II and III of Chauncey's brilliant study, where he spends more than two hundred pages embedding the discursive figures from part I ("fairy," "trade," "wolves," etc.) in a series of densely detailed social, commercial, and political contexts; *Gay New York*, 131–354.

⁷¹ See Samuel's decidedly ambiguous conclusion to "Reading the Signs, II," in which he describes semiotics as "a wonderful tool, and a splendid provocation to historical reflection and research," but then goes on to insist that "the historical record cannot be read only as a system of signs, however useful that might be" (245). In similar fashion, Eley described his own position in 1990 as resolutely "intermediate": at once "accepting" of "the basic usefulness and interest of poststructuralist theory," but also aware of its "real costs"; "Is All the World a Text?," in McDonald, *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences*, 214.

⁷² Spiegel, "Comment on *A Crooked Line*," 409. See also Spiegel, "The Task of the Historian," 2–3, 3 fn. 5; and her editorial comments on Joan Scott's "Evidence of Experience" in Gabrielle M. Spiegel, *Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Turn* (New York, 2005), 200.

⁷³ Hesse, "The New Empiricism," 205, 206.

one-dimensional social giving way to an equally flattened cultural, a new cultural history supplanted by a vaguely defined beyond. What Hesse helps us to see, by contrast, is more of the ground-level diversity that has often made “the cultural” such a stimulating disciplinary location—a turn, in short, never reducible to a single methodological trick.

What, then, has this dissonance produced? On the U.S. side, much of the best recent work has tended to cluster in precisely those areas described as “absent,” “impoverished,” or “neglected” by the turn talk. Think, for example, of the growing attention to circulatory patterns (or, if you like, Mandler’s “throw”) developed by George Lipsitz on global hip-hop, Nan Enstad on working women’s consumption, Kirsten Silva Gruesz on Latino/a writing, Martha Sandweiss on western photographs, Brent Edwards on black internationalism, Meredith McGill on serial fiction, Penny Von Eschen on state-sponsored jazz tours, David Henkin on the postal system, Scott Casper on the commercial book trade, and Konstantin Dierks on Atlantic letter exchanges.⁷⁴ Or the long-running debates around appropriation, ideology, and counterpublics (in a nutshell, Spiegel’s “semantics”) pushed forward by Miriam Hansen on silent film, Robin Kelley on African American youth cultures, John Kuo Wei Tchen on Asian American performers, Michael Warner on early modern periodicals, John Stauffer on radical abolitionism, Philip Deloria on Native American film directors, and Joanna Brooks on black authorship.⁷⁵ Or, perhaps most strikingly, the recent waves of turn-savvy studies of slavery, labor, mass production, consumerism, and global capital developed by Kathy Peiss, Amy Dru Stanley, Walter Johnson, Lendol Calder, Sven Beckert, Janet Davis, Michael Zakim, Elizabeth Cohen, Barry

⁷⁴ Lipsitz, *Dangerous Crossroads*; Nan Enstad, *Ladies of Labor, Girls of Adventure: Working Women, Popular Culture, and Labor Politics at the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1999); Kirsten Silva Gruesz, *Ambassadors of Culture: The Transamerican Origins of Latino Writing* (Princeton, N.J., 2002); Martha A. Sandweiss, *Print the Legend: Photography and the American West* (New Haven, Conn., 2002); Brent Hayes Edwards, *The Practice of Diaspora: Literature, Translation, and the Rise of Black Internationalism* (Cambridge, Mass., 2003); Meredith L. McGill, *American Literature and the Culture of Reprinting, 1834–1853* (Philadelphia, 2003); Penny Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004); David M. Henkin, *The Postal Age: The Emergence of Modern Communications in Nineteenth-Century America* (Chicago, 2007); Scott E. Casper, Jeffrey D. Groves, Stephen W. Nissenbaum, and Michael Winship, eds., *The Industrial Book, 1840–1880* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2007); and Konstantin Dierks, *In My Power: Letter Writing and Communications in Early America* (Philadelphia, 2009). My brief inventories here are far from complete. At best, they represent fleeting snapshots of subfields in motion. I would also emphasize that they do not encompass a full range of current concerns in U.S. cultural history. Because I am responding to specific critiques within the turn narratives, I have necessarily left out major areas of scholarship that have figured less prominently in those narratives—e.g., the larger body of excellent work on space/place, empire, and borderlands (all of which similarly complicates the social/cultural divide). See, for example, Pekka Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett, “On Borderlands,” *Journal of American History* 98, no. 2 (September 2011): 338–361. Finally, it is worth noting that many of the titles in this paragraph could be slotted into more than one of the conceptual categories. Lipsitz’s *Dangerous Crossroads*, for example, exemplifies all three. For parallel attention to patterns of circulation in recent European cultural histories, see, for example, Adrian Johns, *The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making* (Chicago, 1998); and Pascale Casanova, *The World Republic of Letters* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004).

⁷⁵ Miriam Hansen, *Babel and Babylon: Spectatorship in American Silent Film* (Cambridge, Mass., 1994); Robin D. G. Kelley, *Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class* (New York, 1994); John Kuo Wei Tchen, *New York before Chinatown: Orientalism and the Shaping of American Culture, 1776–1882* (Baltimore, 1999); Michael Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics* (Cambridge, 2002); John Stauffer, *The Black Hearts of Men: Radical Abolitionists and the Transformation of Race* (Cambridge, Mass., 2002); Philip J. Deloria, *Indians in Unexpected Places* (Lawrence, Kans., 2004); and Joanna Brooks, “The Early American Public Sphere and the Emergence of a Black Print Counterpublic,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 62, no. 1 (January 2005): 67–92.

Shank, Walter Friedman, Scott Sandage, Charles McGovern, Sarah Igo, Jane Kamensky, Sarah Stein, Seth Rockman, Bethany Moreton, Stephen Mihm, David Suisman, Alexis McCrossen, Lawrence Glickman, Samuel Zipp, Brian Luskey, and Andrew Zimmerman (among many, many others).⁷⁶

Perhaps the most familiar of these examples is Walter Johnson's *Soul by Soul* (1999), a widely influential history of antebellum slavery published the very same year as Bonnell and Hunt. At first glance, Johnson's core subject (the domestic U.S. slave trade), narrative arc (the transposition of human beings into chattel), and repertoire of sources (including probate inventories and tax records) suggest little that can be described as strictly or obviously cultural. The slaves in his story do not spin tales, tell jokes, or sing more than a few short verses. The only institution that receives much attention is the slave market itself.

Look a bit closer, though, and the boundaries begin to blur. A case in point is the list of "double-entry" slave sales that opens his second chapter. For much of the twentieth century, historians might have analyzed these long columns of names, dates, and prices through a strictly quantitative lens—or by some criterion of economic necessity. Historiographical debate might have turned on the bottom-line question of the slave trade's profitability—which in turn might have been used to construct much larger arguments for or against the "inevitability" of the Civil War. In Johnson's hands, by contrast, the quantitative data reveal more subtle personal

⁷⁶ Kathy Peiss, *Hope in a Jar: The Making of America's Beauty Culture* (New York, 1998); Amy Dru Stanley, *From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market in the Age of Slave Emancipation* (New York, 1998); Walter Johnson, *Soul by Soul: Life inside the Antebellum Slave Market* (Cambridge, Mass., 1999); Lendol Calder, *Financing the American Dream: A Cultural History of Consumer Credit* (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Sven Beckert, *The Monied Metropolis: New York City and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850–1896* (New York, 2001); Janet M. Davis, *The Circus Age: Culture and Society under the American Big Top* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2002); Michael Zakim, *Ready-Made Democracy: A History of Men's Dress in the American Republic, 1760–1860* (Chicago, 2003); Lizabeth Cohen, *A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York, 2003); Barry Shank, *A Token of My Affection: Greeting Cards and American Business Culture* (New York, 2004); Walter A. Friedman, *Birth of a Salesman* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004); Scott A. Sandage, *Born Losers: A History of Failure in America* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005); Charles F. McGovern, *Sold American: Consumption and Citizenship, 1890–1945* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2006); Sarah E. Igo, *The Averaged American: Surveys, Citizens, and the Making of a Mass Public* (Cambridge, Mass., 2007); Jane Kamensky, *The Exchange Artist: A Tale of High-Flying Speculation and America's First Banking Collapse* (New York, 2008); Sarah Abrevaya Stein, *Plumes: Ostrich Feathers, Jews, and a Lost World of Global Commerce* (New Haven, Conn., 2008); Seth Rockman, *Scraping By: Wage Labor, Slavery, and Survival in Early Baltimore* (Baltimore, 2009); Bethany Moreton, *To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009); Stephen Mihm, *A Nation of Counterfeiters: Capitalists, Con Men, and the Making of the United States* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009); David Suisman, *Selling Sounds: The Commercial Revolution in American Music* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009); Alexis McCrossen, ed., *Land of Necessity: Consumer Culture in the United States–Mexico Borderlands* (Durham, N.C., 2009); Lawrence B. Glickman, *Buying Power: A History of Consumer Activism in America* (Chicago, 2009); Samuel Zipp, *Manhattan Projects: The Rise and Fall of Urban Renewal in Cold War New York* (New York, 2010); Brian P. Luskey, *On the Make: Clerks and the Quest for Capital in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York, 2010); and Andrew Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South* (Princeton, N.J., 2010). This long list necessarily flattens a wide range of issues: production and consumption; slavery, industrial labor, class formation, and entrepreneurship; contract theory, commodification, market research, and urban planning; currency speculation and the culture industries. It seems to me, however, that much of this recent work is bound together by a common impulse: to think across the conceptual zero sums, to think commerce and culture, markets and meanings, together. My own efforts in this regard include *The Arts of Deception: Playing with Fraud in the Age of Barnum* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001) and "The Return of the Culture Industry," in Cook, Glickman, and O'Malley, *The Cultural Turn in U.S. History*, 291–317.

motives. In recording their day-to-day transactions, slaveholders simultaneously “make themselves” and make their “social worlds.” In writing to relatives about “making a start” in the slave market, they “translate” the “productive and reproductive labor of their . . . slaves into images of their own upward progress.” And in computing the “necessity” of individual purchases, they do more than simply respond to the structural pressures of an increasingly far-flung trade. More accurately, Johnson argues, slaveholders “objectified” these “desires into necessities,” thereby “giving cultural meaning to the economy in people upon which their lives (or at least their livelihoods) depended.”⁷⁷

Johnson makes good here on one of the central promises of the 1980s: namely, to push beyond “topics,” to reimagine the cultural itself as a more capacious field of “meaning-making.”⁷⁸ But he also does quite a bit more than this. Consider his central figure, “the chattel principle.” First invoked by J. W. C. Pennington (a former Maryland slave who became a prominent northern abolitionist), this “principle” operates on many different levels in *Soul by Soul*. On the one hand, it is very much a discursive formation that crystallized some of slavery’s most troubling and essential questions. How was it possible to transpose human beings into fungible commodities? What did it mean to create an entire category of personhood that could “be disrupted as easily as a price could be set”? The fact that Johnson begins with Pennington’s words signals our entry into a world of ideas, values, and perceptions—a world in which much of the historical drama will occur precisely “between” the lists of prices.⁷⁹

But not *just* ideas, values, and perceptions. Indeed, at many other moments, Johnson demonstrates with devastating clarity that Pennington’s “principle” was perhaps the ultimate material condition, a vast system of structural constraint. Driving his larger story are far-flung chains of commodification: from non-elite drivers to wealthy buyers and sellers; from the modest coffles of the Upper South to the large urban clearinghouses farther “down the river”; from the thousands of daily sales that devastated black lives to the further transposition of those lives in white wills, gifts, and estate sales; from the property’s initial form as a “person with a price” to its subsequent fungibility as collateral or start-up capital.⁸⁰

This hybrid mode of questioning points to a related form of capaciousness: namely, the multiple meanings of “market” that permeate *Soul by Soul*. In many instances, Johnson uses this term to describe a macro-level system, historically visible through its aggregate numbers, crop cycles, legal conventions, and distribution networks. At other times, though, he employs the same term to conjure a more nebulous set of pressures, at once constitutive of, and shaped by, the values, goals, and assumptions of those who built the larger system. In so doing, he draws our attention to a series of historical structures that were always inextricably doubled: institutional as well as ideological; material as well as semiotic; economic as well as discursive;

⁷⁷ Johnson, *Soul by Soul*, 83–86.

⁷⁸ See, for example, Hunt’s 1989 “warnings” about the need to move beyond a “cultural history defined topically” that might “degenerate into an endless search for new cultural practices to describe, whether carnivals, cat massacres, or impotence trials”; *The New Cultural History*, 9.

⁷⁹ “Between the Prices” is the title of Johnson’s second chapter.

⁸⁰ See especially chaps. 2, 3, 4, and 6 of *Soul by Soul*: “Between the Prices,” “Making a World out of Slaves,” “Turning People into Products,” and “Acts of Sale.”

macro as well as micro. The book's most riveting dramas, however, play out in still another sort of market: the notorious New Orleans clearinghouses that served as the final entrepôt. Yet even here, among the chains, pens, and auction blocks, Johnson pushes for greater historical complexity, multiple ways of seeing. Consider, for example, one of the book's most important conceptual passages:

The slave trade did not begin or end in the same place for traders, buyers, and slaves. For slaves, the slave trade was often much more than a financial exchange bounded in space and time. A slave trader's short-term speculation might have been a slave's lifelong fear; a one-time economic miscalculation or a fit of pique on the part of an owner might lead to a life-changing sale for a slave . . . Comparing the sources produced by those on different sides of the bargain makes it clear that "a slave sale" was not a single thing which one could view from three different sides and sum into a whole . . . Rather, like a web of unforeseen connections, the morphology of a sale depended upon the point of departure. Time ran differently depending upon where you started the clock.⁸¹

Following Bonnell and Hunt, it might be tempting to describe this as "beyond": the decisive methodological juncture at which commerce and culture, structure and meaning, finally collapse. There are, however, a number of basic problems with such a reading. One is that Johnson developed this mode of questioning during the early 1990s, at the very moment (or so we have been told) when the new cultural history was falling into its "radically discursive" rut. Another is that Johnson was never making this up from scratch. Indeed, if we go back to the 1995 dissertation on which *Soul by Soul* was based, his citations point to a more interesting set of mergers: key theoretical texts on "the social life of things" intermixed with legal history articles; landmark works on antebellum slavery by Eugene Genovese, John Blassingame, James Oakes, and Barbara Fields side by side with seminal studies of market cultures by Karen Halttunen, Jackson Lears, Jean-Christophe Agnew, and John Kasson.⁸² In retrospect, at least, it is easier to track the cross-currents. Agnew, for example, was among the first U.S. historians to feature the work of Karl Polanyi (whose seminal writings on "embeddedness" reverberate through much of *Soul by Soul*). Much the same might be said about Halttunen's uses of Norbert Elias, Georg Simmel, and Erving Goffman—all important early theorists for opening up the "performative" dimensions of class.⁸³

The other key point is that Johnson was never working in a vacuum. Push beyond slavery, in fact, and many of his central moves begin to look like broader ground-

⁸¹ Ibid., 14.

⁸² Walter Livezey Johnson, "Masters and Slaves in the Market: Slavery and the New Orleans Trade, 1804–1864" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1995), 1–12. The theoretical work on the "social life of things" came from anthropologists Mary Douglas, Arjun Appadurai, and Igor Kopytoff. See Appadurai, ed., *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective* (New York, 1986).

⁸³ There were, of course, additional precedents for these moves—some explicitly footnoted, others merely echoed. We might think, for example, of Joan Scott's 1988 essay "A Statistical Representation of Work: La Statistique de l'industrie à Paris, 1847–1848," much of which anticipates Johnson's against-the-grain readings of double-entry slave sales. Or Elizabeth Cohen's *Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919–1939* (New York, 1990); James Livingston's *Pragmatism and the Political Economy of Cultural Revolution, 1850–1940* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1994); and Ohmann's *Selling Culture*, all of which share Johnson's concern for tracking new forms of "subjectivity" within the structures of capitalism. Or Bederman's *Manliness and Civilization* and Brown's *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs*, both of whose non-linear narrative structures (and close attention to competing subject positions) parallel Johnson's "thrice-told tale" of the antebellum slave market.

swells, part of an always unfinished cultural that has continued to migrate and stretch, adapt and provoke. This still-unfolding process can be seen in the work of Stanley, Calder, Sandage, Kamensky, Rockman, Glickman, and Mihm—all recent historians of capitalism for whom signs and structures are deeply interwoven, never the stuff of conceptual zero sums. Or the growing interest in circulatory systems that cuts across Lipsitz's records, Sandweiss's photographs, Edwards's novels, Von Eschen's jazz tours, and Dierks's letters. Or the explicitly hybrid approaches to commodity chains that run through Enstad, Zakim, Shank, Stein, Moreton, and Zimmerman. Or the increasingly materialist studies of representation that connect McGill's newspapers, Casper's books, Igo's opinion polls, Zipp's blueprints, and my own work on black celebrity and the politics of global positioning.⁸⁴

Should we read these recent developments as cultural history's swan song? Its reinvigoration? The latest phase of its imperialist plotting? Such rhetorics of supersession ultimately reinforce the very same synecdoches I have sought to disrupt throughout this essay. So let us conclude here not with competing futurology (new "beyonds" for the same tired turns), but rather, with a series of broader suggestions for rethinking the debate itself.

First, we should keep in mind the long-running plasticity of cultural history, a notoriously capacious category that has *always* entailed a mobile, unfinished project. Before the new cultural history of the 1980s, there were dozens of older culturalists that pushed in a variety of competing directions. In a major review essay from 1968, self-identified practitioner David Brion Davis sought to familiarize his *AHR* readers with "recent directions in American cultural history." But at *that* point, Davis was summing up the myth and symbol scholarship that had first emerged with the American studies movement. Push back another decade or two, and one finds Caroline Ware's *Cultural Approach to History* (1940), a landmark edited collection (sponsored by the AHA) that included some of the era's most innovative historians. In Ware's hands, however, this "approach" was something different yet again: an explicitly "bottom up" mode of historicizing built upon the anthropology of Franz Boas.⁸⁵ Moving forward, then, we would do well to stop thinking in terms of superseding fashion cycles: a singular turn that simply rose and fell, supplanted and faded.

This leads to a related suggestion about parameters: the need to think more carefully—and capaciously—about what cultural history *now is*. The importance of this project hit home for me in a recent query from a colleague. "How," this colleague wanted to know, "is *Soul by Soul* cultural history? I just don't get it." We might respond here that Johnson spent much of the past two decades jointly appointed in an American studies program; or that many leading historians of slavery and capitalism have explicitly praised *Soul by Soul* for its strategic mixtures of commerce and culture, structural constraints and competing subjectivities; or that this sense of Johnson's accomplishment was shared by the American Studies Association, which awarded *Soul by Soul* its annual book prize in 2000. Johnson's citations, moreover, have often included scores of leading culturalists: Stuart Hall, Joan Scott, Michel de

⁸⁴ My current book project explores the first waves of African American artists, intellectuals, and political activists to strategize their circulation in relation to global markets, 1770–1930.

⁸⁵ Davis, "Some Recent Directions in American Cultural History"; Ware, *The Cultural Approach to History*; Cook and Glickman, "Twelve Propositions for a History of U.S. Cultural History," 5–29.

Certeau, Judith Butler, James C. Scott, David Roediger, Robin Kelley, Werner Sollors, Kathleen Brown, Joseph Roach.⁸⁶ At the end of the day, though, these point-by-point responses miss the larger problem. Wouldn't we *expect* cultural history to change over time? Why, then, cast it retrospectively as a singular bag of tricks: a fixed and finished turn somehow frozen in the Reagan era?

Finally, we would do well to reconsider the semantics of our turn talk: our tendency to speak of *the* turn to culture. Key innovations, it is often said, began locally but traveled widely. Meanings were made. Signs proliferated. Categories were deconstructed. In the process, whole blocks of major subfields—slavery, labor, capitalism, empire, borderlands, diplomacy—recalibrated, transformed. In many respects, it is an appealing family portrait (an entire discipline said to have sharpened its epistemic foundations), but one also prone to certain distortions. Most obviously, it misses those who were already practicing cultural history well before the 1980s.⁸⁷ But it also misses the *reciprocal* dimensions of turning to culture: the inevitable exchanges with other fields, the manifold pushbacks from other quadrants.

We have heard relatively little, in other words, about the multidirectional process by which cultural history itself—in the very act of turning—became more pluralistic in its methods; more omnivorous in its sources; more precise about causality; more attentive to competing theories of power; more open to numbers and networks; more sensitive to limits on agency, resistance, and self-fashioning; more focused on the interplay between meanings and markets, representational practices and policymaking; more ambitious in tracking global systems of capital. Some of the most sophisticated work in these areas has come from latter-day culturalists trained sometime *after* the new cultural history.⁸⁸ But it is hard to see this conceptual traffic if we

⁸⁶ Much the same could be said about virtually any of the titles referenced in the final pages of this essay. Consider Rockman's award-winning labor history of early Baltimore, *Scraping By*. Much like *Soul by Soul*, Rockman's work is wonderfully alive to both the structural and discursive dimensions of his subject. Above all, he shows us antebellum capitalism's "systemic dependence on . . . multiple, simultaneous, and overlapping forms of inequality" (10). Indeed, his larger point is to develop a conception of "class" based less on shared "cultural" traditions (in the Thompsonian mode) than on constrained "choices" and shared forms of "subjugation." This does not mean, however, that Rockman is antagonistic to the methods and concerns of cultural history itself. Rather, he returns again and again to the "rhetorical tools" deployed in public debates about the city's political economy, the ventriloquized "voices" used by newspaper editors to promote commercial development, the "implicit racial or ethnic coding" running through the jobs ads, the multiple "perspectives" and "perceptions" of different categories of workers. For Johnson's citation patterns, see Walter Johnson, "Inconsistency, Contradiction, and Complete Confusion: The Everyday Life of the Law of Slavery," *Law and Social Inquiry* 22, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 405–433; and Johnson, "The Slave Trader, the White Slave, and the Politics of Racial Determination in the 1850s," *Journal of American History* 87, no. 1 (June 2000): 13–38. For characterizations of Johnson's work, see Agnew, "Capitalism, Culture, and Catastrophe," 401–405; Rockman, *Scraping By*, 7, 273 n. 15.

⁸⁷ This oft-neglected group encompassed some of the most sophisticated historians of the twentieth century. A short list on the U.S. side would include Caroline Ware, Constance Rourke, Merle Curti, Henry Nash Smith, Leo Marx, John William Ward, David Brion Davis, Alan Trachtenberg, John Cawelti, William R. Taylor, Warren Susman, Neil Harris, Robert Toll, Daniel Rodgers, Ann Douglas, John Kasson, Nathan Huggins, Lawrence Levine, Paul Boyer, John Blassingame, and Carroll Smith-Rosenberg—all *turners* to culture before the 1980s. The other missing group here, of course, is *non-turners*: the large numbers of skeptics who have never had much to do with cultural history.

⁸⁸ For telling recent examples in the U.S. field, see Beckert, *Monied Metropolis*; Zakim, *Ready-Made Democracy*; McGill, *American Literature and the Culture of Reprinting*; Sandage, *Born Losers*; Igo, *The Averaged American*; Stein, *Plumes*; Jessica M. Lepler, "1837: Anatomy of a Panic" (Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 2008); Eric Slauter, *The State as Work of Art* (Chicago, 2009); Moreton, *To Serve God and Wal-Mart*; Zipp, *Manhattan Projects*; Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa*; Scott Reynolds Nelson, *A Nation*

continue to speak of one-way streets: a turn that never learned, converted but never changed.

It may be too late now to hope for a history of cultural history that is entirely free of turn talk. But perhaps we can think our way forward by recasting the larger enterprise: as *turns*, not turn; as *turning*, not turned. A turn, in short, figured with much the same basic dynamism we routinely ascribe to our larger discipline. A more compelling cultural turn: beyond the generational we.

of *Deadbeats: An Uncommon History of America's Financial Disasters* (New York, forthcoming). See also Johnson, "On Agency," and Brooks, "The Early American Public Sphere and the Emergence of a Black Print Counterpublic," as well as the "agenda" essays by James Cook, Nan Enstad, and Phillip Deloria in Cook, Glickman, and O'Malley, *The Cultural Turn in U.S. History*, 291–382.

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AHR Forum
Another Set of Imperial Turns?

DURBA GHOSH

The border where generations meet is always an area of turbulence.

Ranajit Guha

DEPENDING ON WHICH SCHOLARS you ask and in which subfields of history you read, the “imperial turn” and its close cognate, the “new imperial history,” are either in decline or just emerging.¹ The “imperial turn” is often defined as a turn from the study of domestic or national history toward a study of empire, thus complicating the presumed territorial, cultural, and political boundaries between empires and nations. The “new” imperial history pits itself as a revision of the “old” imperial history, and focuses on culture, gender, and race rather than high politics, the economy, or military expansion. Both terms are used sparingly, however (even by the contributors to a recently published reader on the subject), and there is far from complete agreement about what each represents.²

While there are diverse fields in which one might trace an imperial turn or attempt to explain the newness of imperial history, scholarship in British imperial history provides a particularly rich example, in part because debates on how to study empire and how to measure the impact of imperial history on British history have long been the subject of vigorous disagreement.³ Moreover, the institutionalization of imperial history in the British academy makes it unusual in comparison to other

This article originated as a conference paper given at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in San Diego in 2010, which was followed by a subsequent presentation to the Department of History at the University of Utah. I am especially grateful to my fellow panelists, Jay Cook, Judith Surkis, and Gary Wilder, particularly Judith, who read far too many drafts. Ray Craib, Tom Metcalf, Emma Rothschild, and Robert Travers were early readers of this essay, followed by anonymous reviewers for the *AHR*, Maria Fernandez, Sara Pritchard, Marina Welker, and Wendy Welford, all of whom made it a much stronger piece. Mistakes and omissions (of which there are many) are entirely my own.

¹ Antoinette M. Burton, ed., *After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation* (Durham, N.C., 2003); Stephen Howe, ed., *The New Imperial Histories Reader* (London, 2010); Kathleen Wilson, ed., *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660–1840* (Cambridge, 2006). I contributed an essay to the Wilson volume.

² Stephen Howe, “Introduction: New Imperial Histories,” in Howe, *The New Imperial Histories Reader*, 1–16, here 9; see also I. Gerasimov, S. Glebov, A. Kaplunovski, M. Mogilner, and A. Semyonov, “In Search of a New Imperial History,” *Ab Imperio* 1 (2005): 33–55.

³ Other historiographical essays on British imperial history include David K. Fieldhouse, “Can Humpty-Dumpty Be Put Together Again? Imperial History in the 1980s,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 12, no. 2 (1984): 9–23; A. G. Hopkins, “Back to the Future: From National History to Imperial History,” *Past and Present* 164, no. 1 (1999): 198–243; Stephen Howe, “The Slow Death and Strange Rebirths of Imperial History,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 29, no. 2 (2001): 131–141; Richard Price, “One Big Thing: Britain, Its Empire, and Their Imperial Culture,” *Journal of*

national historiographies.⁴ Although it is important to be both critical and mindful of the Europe-centered focus of the word “imperial” in the naming of the imperial turn and the new imperial histories, there is little denying the powerful hold that the European modern, or “hyperreal Europe,” has had on the founding and institutionalization of the discipline of history.⁵ Many scholars have noted that the new imperial history does a great job of telling us about Britain—England and Scotland in particular—but it is relatively less informative about Africa, Asia, or Latin America.⁶ Rather than mark this as a failure or declare the end of the imperial turn, we would do well to examine where future imperial turns might take us, particularly as we imagine a way to decolonize historical scholarship from its Europe-centered moorings. Gary Wilder’s essay in this forum suggests a different lineage for the imperial turn in France’s historiography, and there are other historical subfields that have turned toward thinking about their empires. Thus there are many more ways in which we might construct genealogies about the nature of imperial turns, the newness of imperial history, and their relationship to what are called “new imperialisms.”⁷

The British imperial turn has been the product of many historiographical changes over the last century, and in the last several decades it has engaged other historiographical turns—the global, the postcolonial, and the archival. From the height of Britain’s empire in the late nineteenth century (then considered a “new imperialism”) to our current moment, imperial history in Britain has shifted from the study of the British Empire toward world and global history in which the structuring effects of European colonialism are accorded less centrality than they once were. In tracking tensions between liberal and Marxist historiographies on empire, disagreements be-

British Studies 45, no. 3 (2006): 602–627; Shula Marks, “History, the Nation and Empire: Sniping from the Periphery,” *History Workshop Journal* 29 (1990): 111–119.

⁴ British imperial history also has the unique distinction of having institutionalized imperial history in four named professorial chairs in Britain: the Vere Harmsworth Professor of Imperial and Naval History and the Smuts Professor of Commonwealth History at Cambridge; the Beit Professorship of Commonwealth History at Oxford; and the Rhodes Professor of Imperial History at Kings College, London.

⁵ Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, N.J., 2000).

⁶ Ania Loomba, Suvir Kaul, Matti Bunzl, Antoinette Burton, and Jed Esty, “Beyond What? An Introduction,” in Loomba, Kaul, Bunzl, Burton, and Esty, eds., *Postcolonial Studies and Beyond* (Durham, N.C., 2005), 29; Price, “One Big Thing,” 604; Durba Ghosh, “Gender and Colonialism: Expansion or Marginalization?” *Historical Journal* 47, no. 3 (2004): 737–755.

⁷ See, for instance, Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge, 2008); Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel, eds., *Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire* (Bloomington, Ind., 1998); Stephen F. Dale, *The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals* (Cambridge, 2010); Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910* (Berkeley, Calif., 1995); Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, eds., *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham, N.C., 1993); D. C. B. Lieven, *Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals* (New Haven, Conn., 2001); Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge, 2005); Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter C. Perdue, eds., *Imperial Formations* (New York, 2007); Louise Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley, Calif., 1998); Jun Uchida, *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945* (Cambridge, Mass., 2011). For the growing scholarship on a post-9/11 U.S. “new imperialism,” see David Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (New York, 2003); Greg Grandin, *Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York, 2006); Harry Harootyan, *The Empire’s New Clothes: Paradigm Lost, and Regained* (Chicago, 2004). *Radical History Review* 95 (Spring 2006) was devoted to the theme of “New Imperialisms.”

tween social and cultural historians, and differing views on the scale at which we should think about empires, we can see how one might write the histories of an imperial turn that goes global while being attentive to the states of exception to the norm that are produced from marginal, feminist, subaltern, and minority perspectives.⁸ While proponents of the imperial/postcolonial turn attempted to radically transform historical methodologies by engaging in close reading, questioning the symbolism of language, and exposing archival texts to deconstructive techniques, this move was strongly challenged by some imperial historians, who claimed that their methods were based wholly in archival research and empiricism rather than “theorizing.” One might look to feminist and queer studies approaches to reading archives as a kind of archival (re)turn that requires close reading of marginal perspectives as well as deep and thorough archival research.

The debates within the imperial turn in British studies have been suggestively described as a “family quarrel.” “In my view,” writes Stephen Howe, “the ‘family’ of [the new imperial history] is large, quarrelsome, and perhaps quite dysfunctional; while some members seem not to talk to one another at all.”⁹ We might gender this family metaphor and imagine the generational tensions between gray-haired patriarchs, younger matriarchs, and an unruly group of interdisciplinary graduate students, postdoctoral fellows, and untenured faculty setting off on a long road trip in an overstuffed minivan (the “kids” in the title of James Cook’s essay in this forum). This conflation of familial dysfunction with academic hierarchies evokes the phrase that Ann Laura Stoler used to encapsulate intimacy in colonial communities: “tense and tender ties,” a term with which we might think as we follow the generational shifts, shared ground, and disagreements in scholarship on the British Empire.¹⁰

If one of the thrusts of this forum is to mark a shift in historical methodologies through the specter of generational change, it may be equally important to note that these battles within the imperial turn are largely battles within a shared political project—anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism—with disagreements about the value of different disciplinary methodologies.¹¹ Many of the male elders who trained or taught imperial history in Britain developed their liberal opposition to empire as members of a wartime and postwar generation of men who did compulsory military service in such places as North Africa, Rhodesia, Kenya, and Malaya or lived through the Suez Crisis in 1956.¹² The experiences of the “founding fathers” were different

⁸ On the productive nature of the margins, see Homi Bhabha, “DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation,” in Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* (London, 1990), 291–322; Walter D. Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (Princeton, N.J., 2000). The state of exception has been fruitfully explained by Giorgio Agamben in *State of Exception*, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago, 2005). The idea of exceptions and empire is worked through in Ashley Dawson and Malini Johar Schueller, eds., *Exceptional State: Contemporary U.S. Culture and the New Imperialism* (Durham, N.C., 2007); Julian Go, *Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present* (Cambridge, 2011).

⁹ Howe, “Introduction: New Imperial Histories,” 9.

¹⁰ Ann Laura Stoler, ed., *Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History* (Durham, N.C., 2006), chap. 2.

¹¹ See the growing body of histories authored by Niall Ferguson, whose robust defense of the British Empire as a lesson for contemporary American policy departs from this lineage: *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (New York, 2003); *Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire* (New York, 2004).

¹² I am speaking of John Gallagher, Ronald Robinson, Peter Marshall, Eric Stokes, and Thomas Metcalf, respectively. See Wm. Roger Louis, “Historians I Have Known,” *Perspectives*, May 2001; Peter

from those of the “matriarchs,” who also trained in imperial history, as well as post-colonial, feminist, and cultural studies.¹³

As Judith Surkis writes in her contribution to this forum, “a genealogical counternarrative can keep multiple strains of critical interrogation open for the historiographical future.” All of the essays in this forum challenge the presumption of closure that is offered by “turn talk,” and the marking of time, progress, and completion that it represents. My own compressed and selective genealogy is not intended to demonstrate past coherence but rather to argue for future possibilities, particularly in remaining critical of imperialism and its hegemonies. Although some historians of empire believe that history is an empirical and dispassionate discipline that can be “detached and apolitical,” studies of imperialism have in fact been profoundly shaped by political moments of colonialism that call for ongoing scholarly critique.¹⁴

IN BRITISH HISTORY, IMPERIAL HISTORY is often said to have begun with the publication in 1882 of John Seeley’s *The Expansion of England*, a series of lectures that were intended for undergraduates at Cambridge University. The book, which was coincident with Britain’s “new imperialism” and the “scramble for Africa,” was aimed at expanding the political history of domestic England by encouraging historians to study the history of Britain’s empire as part of a British political tradition or “Greater Britain.”¹⁵ Seeley’s lectures marked a turn toward imperial history (which included

J. Marshall, review of David Cannadine, *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire* (New York, 2001), *Reviews in History*, June 2001, <http://www.history.ac.uk/ihr/Focus/Empire/reviews/marshall2.html#1>; Thomas R. Metcalf, *Forging the Raj: Essays on British India in the Heyday of Empire* (Delhi, 2005), 5–6. In the interest of full disclosure, I should state that I was a Ph.D. student of Tom Metcalf.

¹³ Ronald Hyam, “The Study of Imperial and Commonwealth History at Cambridge, 1881–1981: Founding Fathers and Pioneer Research Students,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 29, no. 3 (2001): 75–103. Hyam’s “founding fathers” are distinct from those I have identified. Among the “matriarchs” are contributors to the groundbreaking edited volumes produced in the 1990s: Antoinette Burton, ed., *Gender, Sexuality, and Colonial Modernities* (New York, 1999); Nupur Chaudhuri and Margaret Strobel, eds., *Western Women and Imperialism: Complicity and Resistance* (Bloomington, Ind., 1992); Julia Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda, eds., *Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism* (Charlottesville, Va., 1998); Claire Midgley, ed., *Gender and Imperialism* (Manchester, 1998); Ruth Roach Pierson and Nupur Chaudhuri, eds., *Nation, Empire, Colony: Historicizing Gender and Race* (Bloomington, Ind., 1998). For further reading, see Margaret Strobel, *Gender, Sex, and Empire* (Washington, D.C., 1994); Philippa Levine, ed., *Gender and Empire* (Oxford, 2004); Angela Woollacott, *Gender and Empire* (Basingstoke, 2006). Intellectual autobiographies by two important figures in this field show how central the emergence of feminist history and critical race theory was to transforming imperial history: Antoinette Burton, “Imperial Optics: Empire Histories, Interpretive Methods,” in Burton, *Empire in Question: Reading, Writing, and Teaching British Imperialism* (Durham, N.C., 2011), 1–23; Catherine Hall, “Introduction,” in Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Colony and Metropole in the English Imagination, 1830–1867* (Chicago, 2002), 1–22.

¹⁴ John Darwin puzzles: “it seems unlikely that we will be able to take a detached and apolitical view of Europe’s empire-building for a long time to come . . . It may be an age before we regard it more coolly as a phase in world history”; Darwin, *After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405* (London, 2008), 23, 25.

¹⁵ J. R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures* (London, 1883). Seeley’s text is often cited as an originary moment in the field of British imperial history: Catherine Hall, “Introduction: Thinking the Postcolonial, Thinking the Empire,” in Hall, ed., *Cultures of Empire: Colonizers in Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries—A Reader* (Manchester, 2000), 1–33; Howe, “Introduction: New Imperial Histories”; Karuna Mantena, *Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism* (Princeton, N.J., 2010), 46–48; Kathleen Wilson, “Introduction: Histories, Em-

the study of the American colonies) at Cambridge; it was not until after World War II, however, that the subject of the empire was formally added to the undergraduate history curriculum, motivated in part by the return of ex-colonial officials as the decolonization of Britain's colonies began.¹⁶

A two-part undergraduate course known as "The Expansion of Europe from the Fifteenth Century to the First World War" was developed after the Second World War by several scholars at Cambridge, including Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, because they felt that the undergraduate reading list was too narrowly focused on Britain and its "white" settler colonies (Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States).¹⁷ The authors of the well-known article "The Imperialism of Free Trade," Robinson and Gallagher went beyond Seeley's definition of the British Empire and urged that all of Britain's colonies be included in the study of imperial history. "The conventional interpretation of the nineteenth-century empire continues to rest upon study of the formal empire alone," they wrote, "which is rather like judging the size and character of icebergs solely from the parts above the water-line." Thus they called for an understanding of the particular ("submerged") histories of each region that the empire had engaged politically and economically through the long nineteenth century, including Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and the different nations of Asia.¹⁸ When Robinson and Gallagher wrote their magnum opus *Africa and the Victorians* (with the support of Alice Denny), they focused on the political and economic history of different regions of Africa, offering an explanation of historical change that emerged from the colonies rather than the metropole.¹⁹ Although they did not use the language of marginality, an examination of the proto-nationalist movements in African territories was crucial to their analysis, giving the history of colonized Africa a new kind of importance in generating historical change—a feature that was missing in Seeley's vision of "expansion," which presumed that Britain was at the center.

"The Expansion of Europe" integrated emergent scholarship on what was then called "extra-European history" in the United Kingdom and would later be called "area studies" in the United States. The course focused on Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America—the "rest" to Europe's "West"—and promoted the idea that the history of colonized areas needed further study if scholars were to gain a better understanding of the history of Europe and its colonialisms.²⁰ At the time, a colleague at Cambridge, E. H. Carr, a Marxist historian of the Soviet Union, noted derisively that the new syllabus did nothing to radically alter the average under-

pires, Modernities," in Wilson, *A New Imperial History*, 1–26. The most detailed is Duncan Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900* (Princeton, N.J., 2007), especially chaps. 4 and 6.

¹⁶ Hyam, "The Study of Imperial and Commonwealth History at Cambridge."

¹⁷ These colonies included many indigenous peoples whose lives and histories were subsequently erased in the process of colonial conquest.

¹⁸ John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser., 6, no. 1 (1953): 1–15, here 1.

¹⁹ Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, with Alice Denny, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism* (London, 1961).

²⁰ For more on Robinson and Gallagher's influence on the field of imperial history and area studies in Britain, see Wm. Roger Louis, "Introduction," in Robin W. Winks, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 5: *Historiography* (Oxford, 1999), 38–41.

graduate's sense of history as a universal idea emanating from a putatively liberal and Western tradition that put Europe firmly at the center of historical change. "The candidate," Carr sneered, "is not invited to know anything of countries with an important and well-documented history like China or Persia, except what happened when the Europeans attempted to take them over."²¹ In observing that history also existed in areas that had not come in contact with Europe, Carr astutely marked an elision within this school of British imperial history, an imbalance in historical scholarship that Eric Wolf and others would subsequently address.²² Carr's comments further marked a cleavage between the universalizing claims of liberal and Marxist critics of empire, a disagreement that continues to surface in debates between historians who attempt to imagine how a history of Africa, Asia, or Latin America might be written without Europe as a referent.²³

The Robinson and Gallagher thesis contested widely accepted accounts about the expansion of the British Empire by critics of empire such as J. A. Hobson, who influenced Marxist critics such as V. I. Lenin. Hobson felt that the free trade and anti-expansion liberalism of the mid-Victorian era had been abandoned by the late Victorians in favor of "economic imperialism." His sense of betrayal in the rupture between mid- and late Victorian liberalism was not shared by Robinson and Gallagher, who noted that throughout the nineteenth century, even when liberal leaders professed to oppose imperial expansion, they abetted it in times of crisis that were generated by local politics, economic depressions, and geopolitical rivalry.²⁴ They challenged Lenin's totalizing thesis on the relationship between monopoly capitalism and imperialism, and demonstrated that free-market liberalism could drive the expansion of capitalism into colonial monopolistic activity.²⁵ In leveling their criticisms against turn-of-the-twentieth-century thinkers such as Hobson and Lenin, Robinson and Gallagher argued from a position as Cold War democratic socialists, concerned as much about Soviet-style authoritarianism as about American imperialism, particularly in the aftermath of the Marshall Plan, the American response to the Suez crisis, U.S. involvement in the Korean War, and the growing tensions of the Cold War.²⁶ *Africa and the Victorians*, published in 1961, was a cautionary tale against the

²¹ E. H. Carr, *What Is History?* (London, 1961), 151.

²² Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley, Calif., 1982); Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston, 1995).

²³ Patrick Wolfe, "History and Imperialism: A Century of Theory, from Marx to Postcolonialism," *American Historical Review* 102, no. 2 (April 1997): 388–420. An argument for a "post-Eurocentric," "post-Marxist" historiography is John T. Chalcraft, "Pluralizing Capital, Challenging Eurocentrism: Toward Post-Marxist Historiography," *Radical History Review* 91 (Winter 2005): 13–39; Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, "New Ways in History, 1966–2006," *History Workshop Journal* 64, no. 1 (2007): 271–294.

²⁴ J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism* (1902; repr., Ann Arbor, Mich., 1965); V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916; repr., New York, 1933). For one of the best accounts of the development of "imperialism," see Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Theories of Imperialism*, trans. P. S. Falla (New York, 1980). The Robinson and Gallagher debate is well encapsulated in Wm. Roger Louis, ed., *Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy* (New York, 1976); George Shepperson, "Ronald Robinson: Scholar and Good Companion," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 16, no. 3 (1988): 1–8.

²⁵ For a critical analysis of the imbrication of liberalism with empire, see Andrew Sartori, "The British Empire and Its Liberal Mission," *Journal of Modern History* 78, no. 3 (2006): 623–642.

²⁶ Ali Mirsepassi, Amrita Basu, and Frederick Weaver, eds., *Localizing Knowledge in a Globalizing World: Recasting the Area Studies Debate* (Syracuse, N.Y., 2003), tracks the shift from funding and scholarship in area studies to global or international studies and its close relationship to the United States' geopolitical aims.

liberal approach taken by the United States, which professed anti-imperial ambitions as it simultaneously provided economic and military aid to various areas of the world. Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny (who was American) were wary of U.S. foreign aid that was offered in the hope that it would promote democracy among people living under undemocratic regimes. These canonical historical arguments about empire were a form of political critique in the early 1960s, written in response to the political imperative of witnessing the rise of a “new empire” (the United States) by those who hoped to learn from the lessons of the “old” one (the United Kingdom).²⁷

Over the years, the “Expansion of Europe” course at Cambridge has been significantly revised, and it is no longer as focused on Britain and Europe as it used to be. In 2009 it was renamed “Empires and World History from the Fifteenth Century to the First World War,” and the content was modified to cover world (rather than extra-European) history from a global perspective. It incorporates the study of different empires in order to fill the gap that Carr diagnosed: there are units on the Ottomans, the Qing, imperial Japan, and Russia.

As part of this shift in pedagogy, multiple and overlapping empires are presented as having existed simultaneously and having competed with one another from the early modern period onward. The revised course complicates the image of European expansion by thinking in global and transnational terms and promises to be more inclusive, more capacious, and, as Antoinette Burton frames it, a potential way of “getting outside the global,” away from a Eurocentric focus.²⁸

This is not your father’s world history—a field that was widely excoriated a generation ago for its universalist presumptions about historical progress emanating from Europe. This “new” world history is increasingly shaped by our urgent need to understand and historicize our own globalized condition from the perspective of many locals.²⁹ As in much current writing on globalization, the new global/imperial history presumes a de-centered narrative in which there was no one driving force but rather multiple and unmanageable systems, processes, imaginaries, and contingent events that pushed a diversity of nations, empires, and communities, and their subjects, in different directions.³⁰ The impulse behind this newest iteration of world history offers agency, subjectivity, and history to those who participated in a global

²⁷ Louis, “Introduction,” 40. For a recent exposition of America’s experiments with empire during the Cold War, see Charles S. Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors* (Cambridge, 2006), pt. 2: “America’s Turn,” 141–284.

²⁸ Two versions of an essay by Antoinette Burton offer a way to break out of the dominance of history produced from Europe and the United States: “Getting Outside of the Global: Repositioning British Imperialism in World History,” in Burton, *Empire in Question*, 275–292; and “Getting Outside the Global: Re-positioning British Imperialism in World History,” in Catherine Hall and Keith McClelland, eds., *Race, Nation and Empire: Making Histories, 1750 to the Present* (Manchester, 2010), 199–216. See also *Two, Three, Many Worlds: Radical Methodologies for Global History*, Special Issue, *Radical History Review* 91 (Winter 2005).

²⁹ See Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, “Bodies, Empires, and World Histories,” in Ballantyne and Burton, eds., *Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters in World History* (Durham, N.C., 2005), 1–15; A. G. Hopkins, ed., *Global History: Interactions between the Universal and the Local* (New York, 2006); C. A. Bayly and Isabel Hofmeyr’s remarks in “AHR Conversation: On Transnational History,” *American Historical Review* 115, no. 5 (December 2006): 1441–1464; Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, “World History in a Global Age,” *American Historical Review* 100, no. 4 (October 1995): 1034–1060; Kevin Grant, Philippa Levine, and Frank Trentmann, *Beyond Sovereignty: Britain, Empire and Transnationalism, c. 1889–1950* (New York, 2007).

³⁰ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s *Empire* (Cambridge, Mass., 2000) and *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (New York, 2004) constitute an imaginary for a new global order; for

economy and ecumene, and it fundamentally destabilizes the longstanding binaries of subjection and dominance in a range of historiographies between metropole and colony, core and periphery, and, perhaps most important, Europe and non-Europe.

Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper's *Empires in World History* and John Darwin's *After Tamerlane* urge us to compare empires within a larger time and spatial frame than the nineteenth and twentieth centuries so that the history of Europe's colonization of the rest of the world does not stand in for all of imperial history.³¹ In the opening pages of their weighty volume, Burbank and Cooper provide a reason for their expansive treatment of colonial history, offering a numerical comparison: "Whatever was new or old about European colonialism in the nineteenth century, it was, from a historical perspective, short-lived: compare roughly seventy years of colonial rule over Africa to the Ottoman empire's six-hundred-year life span."³² The "seventy versus six hundred" invites numerous counterexamples, which might be too easy a response given the volume's ambitious scope.³³

Darwin goes beyond the exemplary statistic and compares the longevity of different empires to index their impact. When he asks, "But if empire is 'normal,' why has its practice by Europeans aroused such passionate hostility—a hostility still strongly reflected in most of what is written about the subject?" he situates European empires alongside a panoply of other empires and argues that empire is a structure of our collective history.³⁴ When Tamerlane's empire ended in 1405 after three centuries of Timurid rule, a competition was unleashed between Asian and European empires in which the dominance of the latter was temporally limited to about a hundred years. In contrast to Britain, whose empire devolved quickly after World War II, Darwin reminds us of the comparative "success" of the Qing's nearly three centuries of rule. Even though the Qing were supplanted in 1912, their territories conform to those of modern China.³⁵ These numerical comparisons help to situate particular histories of empire, but they raise the question of whether the impact of empire can or should be quantified in numerical terms.³⁶

Somewhat narrower in chronology than Darwin or Burbank and Cooper, but in the tradition of thinking globally and imperially, is C. A. Bayly's *Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914*. Through chapters in which he tracks conjunctures between a dizzying range of territories, Bayly shows that the global spread of major modern developments such as industrialization, technology, the study of religion, liberalisms, racialisms, and the classification of social hierarchies was a product of a global mod-

criticisms, one might see Julian Bourg, "Empire versus Multitude: Place Your Bets," *Ethics and International Affairs* 18, no. 3 (2004): 97–107.

³¹ Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, N.J., 2010); Darwin, *After Tamerlane*.

³² Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, 21.

³³ Although Germany had only a brief history of colonial activities, scholars have long used it to explain the country's trajectory toward state-sponsored racism in the twentieth century. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (London, 1951); Eric Ames, Marcia Klotz, and Lora Wildenthal, eds., *Germany's Colonial Pasts* (Lincoln, Neb., 2005); Shelley Baranowski, *Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler* (Cambridge, 2011); Lora Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire, 1884–1945* (Durham, N.C., 2001), especially chap. 5.

³⁴ Darwin, *After Tamerlane*, 23.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 496.

³⁶ A. G. Hopkins, "Accounting for the British Empire," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 16, no. 2 (1988): 234–247.

ern in the nineteenth century, one that was generated as much by what occurred in non-European parts of the world as by events in Europe proper.³⁷ Bayly explains the emergence of modernity as a global process rather than one that emanated uniquely from Europe, a shift in emphasis that grants the force of historical change not only to the center (Europe) but to the margins (non-Europe).³⁸

By stressing the need for connections beyond the empires of Europe, Bayly, Burbank and Cooper, and Darwin offer the possibility that global historical change emerged from non-Western and formerly colonized territories whose histories were outside the narrative of the "expansion of Europe." This new global history minimizes the importance of modern European colonialisms over a long chronology and across the globe. A global history built from imperial history thereby edges away from the presumption that studying the impact of European colonialism on culture, subjectivity, and history is crucial to understanding the modern world; rather, it presents empires in general as constitutive of modernity. In the move from imperial to global history, the question of that impact seems less important than it once was, even in the past work of Bayly, Burbank and Cooper, and Darwin.³⁹

The following titles explicitly examine the connections between British imperial history and global history while keeping the structural forces of empire in play as they rely on postcolonial and cultural forms of analysis to read sources and human subjects.⁴⁰ These books are not explicitly comparative, but they share a commitment to thinking of imperial networks as an important vehicle for circulating, mobilizing, and subverting the effects of European colonialisms and hegemonies. In their more modest frames, they convey a sense of why the "imperial" matters, and they suggest how an imperial turn might resist the temptation to go global. This is by no means a

³⁷ C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Malden, Mass., 2004); see especially chaps. 1, 2, 5, and 7–11.

³⁸ See the responses to Bayly's book in *Victorian Studies* 48, no. 1 (2005): Jan Nederveen Pieterse, "The Long Nineteenth Century Is Too Short," 113–123; Gauri Viswanathan, "The State of the World," 124–133; C. A. Bayly, "Reply," 134–145.

³⁹ C. A. Bayly is the author of the influential monographs *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770–1870* (Cambridge, 1983) and *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870* (Cambridge, 1997). Frederick Cooper is the author of *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge, 1996) and *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley, Calif., 2005). John Darwin is an expert on African decolonization, having written *Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World* (New York, 1988); *The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate* (Oxford, 1991); and *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970* (Cambridge, 2009).

⁴⁰ This scholarship breaks apart the metropole/colony dyad to produce other models. For a seminal essay that analyzes "metropole and colony in a single analytic field," see Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in Cooper and Stoler, eds., *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley, Calif., 1997), 1–56. An earlier version appeared in *American Ethnologist* 16, no. 4 (1989): 609–621. See also Mrinalini Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: The "Manly Englishman" and the "Effeminate Bengali" in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Manchester, 1995). Other models for understanding imperial networks that study multiple colonies within a single domain include Tony Ballantyne, *Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire* (London, 2002); and Philippa Levine, *Prostitution, Race, and Politics: Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire* (London, 2003). See also David Lambert and Alan Lester, eds., *Colonial Lives across the British Empire: Imperial Career in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, 2006); Alan Lester, *Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth-Century South Africa and Britain* (London, 2001); Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, eds., *Empire and Globalisation: Networks of People, Goods and Capital in the British World, c. 1850–1914* (Cambridge, 2010); Kerry Ward, *Networks of Empire: Forced Migration in the Dutch East India Company* (Cambridge, 2009).

complete list, but these works are illustrative of the diversity of scholarship being produced at the intersection of world or global history with the imperial turn in British studies.

Sugata Bose's *A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire* and Thomas Metcalf's *Imperial Connections* focus on Indian subjects who worked and traveled across imperial sites in the Indian Ocean, from East Africa to Southeast Asia. In Bose's account, Indians such as Rabindranath Tagore sought pan-Asian connections that existed beyond and in spite of the hegemony of the British Empire.⁴¹ In Metcalf's account, the nineteenth-century Indian Ocean can be understood through a study of British colonial subjects and territories throughout the region, as Indian soldiers, officials, and migrant workers spread imperial ideas, practices, and structures across an oceanic expanse even as they began to articulate nationalist and anti-colonial aims.⁴² Bose and Metcalf work from India outward, examining how the British Empire's reach was both contested and consolidated by the mobility of subjects from the Indian subcontinent.

Others have shown how empire produced historical subjectivities that complicate the divide between colonizers and colonized. Clare Anderson's study of convicts and other subalterns across the Indian Ocean demonstrates how widespread and deep were the effects on non-elites of Europe's colonial activities and territorial contests.⁴³ Linda Colley argues in her biographical narrative of the life of Elizabeth Marsh that those who were considered colonizers lived unstable, unpredictable lives. Marsh is a kind of accidental tourist, both a heroine and a victim, and her relationship to Britain and its empire, however tenuous, is reinforced through her travel across imperial circuits.⁴⁴ Emma Rothschild's *The Inner Life of Empires* uses the history of an imperial merchant family to convey an understanding of the history of eighteenth-century globalization, examining the family's conflicting attitudes toward slavery, capital, and the rapid fluctuations in their global fortunes. Rothschild shows how the lives of elite British families were entangled with the lives of subalterns, such as Belinda, a servant/slave whose subjectivity is framed by the changes in the family's colonial fortunes.⁴⁵ In the spirit of a more inclusive world history, these monographs have subjects whose emotions, sentiments, lifeworlds, and sexualities are part of a complex narrative that is embedded within family structures and economic systems that were produced by colonialism and colonial activities.⁴⁶

The global history of Anderson, Bose, Colley, Metcalf, and Rothschild is no-

⁴¹ Sugata Bose, *A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006). See also Rustom Bharucha, *Another Asia: Rabindranath Tagore and Okakura Tenshin* (New Delhi, 2006).

⁴² Thomas R. Metcalf, *Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860–1920* (Berkeley, Calif., 2007).

⁴³ Clare Anderson, *Legible Bodies: Race, Criminality and Colonialism in South Asia* (New York, 2004); Anderson, *Subaltern Lives: Biographies of Colonialism in the Indian Ocean World, 1790–1920* (Cambridge, 2012). I am very grateful to Clare Anderson for sharing the latter manuscript with me in advance of publication.

⁴⁴ Linda Colley, *The Ordeal of Elizabeth Marsh: A Woman in World History* (New York, 2007); see also Maya Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World* (New York, 2011), which was published as this piece was being revised.

⁴⁵ Emma Rothschild, *The Inner Life of Empires: An Eighteenth-Century History* (Princeton, N.J., 2011). I am very grateful to Emma Rothschild for sharing the manuscript with me in advance of publication.

⁴⁶ See Ballantyne and Burton, *Bodies in Contact*; Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, eds.,

ticeably “microhistorical” rather than “world-historical,” following individuals across different regions, colonies, and national imaginings. By working at a smaller scale of world history, Anderson, Colley, and Rothschild are able to situate questions of gender, culture, race, mobility, and subjectivity more centrally. This method—evocative of a desire on the part of feminist and subaltern historians to recuperate the subjectivity of those who are less visible—enables these scholars to conduct archival and prosopographical research that is mindful of structures within empire and the subjects who were produced by empire.⁴⁷

As one arm of an imperial turn, this scholarship is at methodological cross-purposes with the above-cited work of Bayly, Burbank and Cooper, and Darwin. Both groups of historians are working to destabilize Europe as the source of historical change, but rather than “de-centering empire,” Bose, Metcalf, Anderson, Colley, and Rothschild “re-center empire” and reinstate British colonialism as the dominant force in shaping individual subjectivities.⁴⁸ They keep the hegemonies of modern European colonialism in play as a part of global history; in the process, they offer a critique of the overlapping histories of globalization and colonialism and gesture to the costs of disaggregating the two.

The imperial/global turn presumes that empires were a product of global history rather than a driver of it, and that modern empires are an effect of global capitalism rather than an institutional or cultural project specific to the colonizers. The idea of privileging capital over colonialism has had a resurgence in recent years, particularly in thinking about how to historicize globalization.⁴⁹ In “Historicizing the Global, Politicizing Capital: Giving the Present a Name,” Geoff Eley expresses optimism that with “Europe” no longer dominating the academy, we might now be able to move away from a Europe-centered narrative that emanates from wage labor and the industrial revolution and begin thinking of how studies of slavery might produce a different historical narrative of capital and colonialism. In response, Antoinette Burton notes the presumptions behind Eley’s periodization of a post-1989 and post-9/11 era of globalization, and Sanjay Subrahmanyam comments on the absence of China and India from Eley’s vision. They argue that such new histories of globalization unintentionally reaffirm the place of Europe as the central point of reference.⁵⁰ When Burton, in a footnote, observes that “the debate about Europe and

Moving Subjects: Gender, Mobility, and Intimacy in an Age of Global Empire (Urbana, Ill., 2009); and Bonnie Smith, ed., *Women’s History in Global Perspective*, 3 vols. (Urbana, Ill., 2004–2005).

⁴⁷ Conversations with Emma Rothschild and a workshop organized by Clare Anderson at the University of Warwick have enabled me to think this point through more clearly; notably, both cite Carlo Ginzburg as an important influence.

⁴⁸ Durba Ghosh and Dane Kennedy, eds., *Decentring Empire: Britain, India, and the Transcolonial World* (Hyderabad, 2006).

⁴⁹ P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688–1914* (London, 1993); Shigeru Akita, ed., *Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism, and Global History* (Basingstoke, 2002); Magee and Thompson, *Empire and Globalisation*; Darwin, *The Empire Project*. Two works that examine the overlapping relations between capitalist and colonial discursive transformations are Ritu Birla, *Stages of Capital: Law, Culture, and Market Governance in Late Colonial India* (Durham, N.C., 2009); and Manu Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space* (Chicago, 2004).

⁵⁰ Geoff Eley, “Historicizing the Global, Politicizing Capital: Giving the Present a Name,” *History Workshop Journal* 63, no. 1 (2007): 154–188; Antoinette Burton, “Not Even Remotely Global? Method and Scale in World History,” *History Workshop Journal* 64, no. 1 (2007): 323–328; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Historicizing the Global, or Labouring for Invention?,” *ibid.*, 329–334.

postcolonialism may yet find its most fertile ground in discussions about globalization and global history," she reminds us that postcolonial critique should not be jettisoned in the imperial turn toward global history.⁵¹

For historians who work within global historical frames, balancing the histories of the parts of the world that were once colonized against the histories of those that did the colonizing is a daunting project that requires ongoing revision. As Micol Seigel trenchantly points out, it is hard to escape the constraints of a Europe-focused narrative. She despairs that postcolonial critics may have insufficiently theorized the impossibility of overcoming the dominant narratives of world history: "Dipesh Chakrabarty urges scholars to listen for histories outside the logic of capital, while Ashis Nandy supports 'ahistorical' constructions of the past, Ranajit Guha resists 'Reason,' and Walter Dignolo calls for macronarratives that begin from Aníbal Quijano's concept of coloniality . . . History's affinity for narratives makes these approaches difficult."⁵²

THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN THE imperial turn and postcolonial studies has not always been a smooth one. Among some historians, postcolonial studies has gained a reputation for being insufficiently careful about historical facts, empiricism, and archives. In conjunction with feminist, queer, and Subaltern Studies, however, it offers important methodological strategies for conducting archival research, particularly when it comes to understanding the productive place of exceptions, margins, secrets, and anxieties in solidifying colonial regimes.

According to various genealogical accounts, postcolonial theory (and studies) draws from fields as diverse as literary criticism, poststructuralism, Subaltern Studies, feminist historiography, and anthropology. From the generative work of Frantz Fanon, C. L. R. James, and Aimé Césaire in the middle of the twentieth century to the work of scholars such as Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak, and Walter Dignolo near the end of the century, the field of postcolonialism has positioned itself as critical of European colonialism and its role in producing scholarship that depicts non-Europe as backward, uncivilized, primitive, hypersexualized, and violent.⁵³ Postcolonialism has had a dramatic but uneven influence in the humanities, and some scholars have expressed concern that resistance to colonialism has become marginalized as a side issue.⁵⁴ Indeed, several academics identified by others as "postco-

⁵¹ Burton, "Not Even Remotely Global?," 327. For an opposing view, see Isabel Hofmeyer's remarks in "AHR Conversation: On Transnational History," 1444. See also Revathi Krishnaswamy and John C. Hawley, eds., *The Postcolonial and the Global* (Minneapolis, 2008).

⁵² Micol Seigel, "World History's Narrative Problem," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 84, no. 3 (2004): 431–446, here 434.

⁵³ Good introductions include Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley, and Sherry B. Ortner, eds., *Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory* (Princeton, N.J., 1994); Leela Gandhi, *Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction* (New York, 1998); Henry Schwarz and Sangeeta Ray, *A Companion to Postcolonial Studies* (Oxford, 2000); Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, eds., *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader* (New York, 1994); Robert J. C. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Oxford, 2001).

⁵⁴ Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks, "At the Margins of Postcolonial Studies: Part 1," in Fawzia Afzal-Khan and Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks, eds., *The Pre-occupation of Postcolonial Studies* (Durham, N.C., 2000), 3–23. The questioning among practitioners dates to much earlier: Anne McClintock, "The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term 'Post-Colonialism,'" *Third World and Postcolonial Issues*, Special Issue,

lonial scholars" have expressed some nervousness about what being postcolonial means. They suggest that it may be time to move beyond the colonial and imagine new scholarship that is fully decoupled from Europe's centrality to definitions of "colonial," in terms both of governance and of the production of knowledge.⁵⁵ Although some historians are reluctant to admit to sharing ground with "theorists" of any stripe, postcolonial theorists and traditionally defined imperial historians do have a goal in common: both groups are working to decolonize scholarship by moving away from the grand narratives of "Europe." One might note that global historians such as Bayly, Burbank and Cooper, and Darwin share this ambition as well, although they rely on a different scholarly apparatus.

By 1996, according to Dane Kennedy, postcolonial theory in its many forms had already transformed literature departments, but it had done little to shake the edifice of "imperial history" as it was practiced in Britain or in journals such as the *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*.⁵⁶ Kennedy proposed a collaborative intersection between postcolonial studies and imperial history, bringing cultural history and discourse analysis together with empirical research on empires. His plea was heeded by some historians and roundly dismissed by others.⁵⁷

The "family quarrel" between British imperial history and postcolonial studies was brought out into the open when the five-volume *Oxford History of the British Empire* was published in 1998–1999. Many reviewers noted the scant attention it gave to postcolonial scholarship or historical methods that relied on methods of analysis drawn from feminism, Subaltern Studies, critical race theory, or cultural history more broadly.⁵⁸ David Armitage, one of the contributors to the volume on the eighteenth century, noted that the volume on historiography was representative of "imperial historiography in its pre-postcolonial mode," and that it "celebrated Gibbon, Macaulay, and Seeley as the precursors of the field. Throughout, Sir Keith Hancock,

Social Text, no. 31/32 (1992): 84–98; Ella Shohat, "Notes on the 'Postcolonial,'" *ibid.*, 99–113; Arif Dirlik, "The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism," *Critical Inquiry* 20, no. 2 (1994): 328–356; Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures* (London, 1992).

⁵⁵ See Loomba, Kaul, Bunzl, Burton, and Esty, "Beyond What? An Introduction."

⁵⁶ Dane Kennedy, "Imperial History and Postcolonial Theory," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 24, no. 3 (1996): 345–363; see also Antoinette Burton, "Thinking beyond the Boundaries: Empire, Feminism and the Domains of History," *Social History* 26, no. 1 (2001): 60–71; Mrinalini Sinha, "Historia Nervosa or Who's Afraid of Colonial-Discourse Analysis?" *Journal of Victorian Culture* 2, no. 1 (1997): 113–122; Wolfe, "History and Imperialism."

⁵⁷ For recent claims that postcolonial studies has lost its importance in imperial history, see, for instance, Matthew Connelly, "The New Imperialists," in Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin W. Moore, eds., *Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power* (New York, 2006), 19–33, here 21; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Imperial and Colonial Encounters: Some Comparative Reflections," *ibid.*, 217–228, here 222, 225, 226. See also Connelly's remarks in "AHR Conversation: On Transnational History," 1450–1454.

⁵⁸ Antoinette Burton, review of Andrew Porter, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 3: *The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford, 1999), and Winks, *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 5: *Historiography*, *Victorian Studies* 44, no. 1 (2001): 167–169; Alison Games, review of Nicholas Canny, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 1: *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford, 1998), and Peter J. Marshall, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 2: *The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 1998), *Reviews in American History* 28, no. 3 (2000): 341–350; Howe, "The Slow Death and Strange Rebirths of Imperial History"; Dane Kennedy, "The Boundaries of Oxford's Empire," *International History Review* 23, no. 3 (2001): 604–622; Douglas M. Peers, "Is Humpty-Dumpty Back Together Again? The Revival of Imperial History and the *Oxford History of the British Empire*," *Journal of World History* 13, no. 2 (2002): 451–467, especially 464–466.

Sir Reginald Coupland, Ronald Robinson, and Jack Gallagher are the most frequently cited giants of imperial history. Almost as often, Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault, and Edward Said appear to be its most menacing nemeses.”⁵⁹

The *Oxford History* emphasized the grand narratives of empire, focusing on political, economic, and military history, with chapters defined by colonial territories such as Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Antipodes; the volumes on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries focused on Ireland and the thirteen colonies. The organization and choice of topics seemed to suggest that traditionally defined (old) imperial historians wanted no part of newfangled historiographical innovations. A chapter in the historiography volume, “Disease, Diet, and Gender: Late Twentieth-Century Perspectives on Empire,” lumped together recent historical turns toward science, gender, and domestic consumption on the assumption that they would be fleeting concerns in comparison with the longstanding history of imperial history in Britain that started with Seeley.⁶⁰

Most important, the *Oxford History* projected an air of scholarly detachment in favor of a long-established tradition of British imperial history. As Wm. Roger Louis noted with a tone of finality in the foreword that appeared in all five volumes, “Though the subject remains ideologically charged, the passions aroused by British imperialism have so lessened that we are now better placed than ever before to see the course of the Empire steadily and to see it whole.”⁶¹ Louis did not explain whose “passions” were “aroused” or who the “we” were who were “better placed . . . to see the course of the Empire steadily,” but if the five weighty volumes were intended to be definitive or comprehensive, they instead generated more revisions.⁶²

The subsequent declaration of a “new imperial history” drew in substantial ways on the dissatisfaction with the original volumes of *The Oxford History of the British Empire*. In Kathleen Wilson’s definition, the new imperial history focused more on cultures of empire and on language, and was dependent on poststructuralist ideas in which discourses, narratives, and representations were as important as material “realities.”⁶³ It distinguished itself from the “old” imperial history by putting less

⁵⁹ David Armitage, review of Winks, *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 5: *Historiography*, *Economic History Review*, n.s., 54, no. 1 (2001): 195–196.

⁶⁰ Diana Wylie, “Disease, Diet, and Gender: Late Twentieth-Century Perspectives on Empire,” in Winks, *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, 5: 277–289; Louis, “Introduction,” *ibid.*, 1–42.

⁶¹ Wm. Roger Louis, “Foreword,” in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, all five volumes, vi–viii, here vii; see also Darwin, *After Tamerlane*, 23–25; and Felipe Fernández-Armesto, “Imperial Measures: Grand Delusions in Defining the Dominators of the World,” *Times Literary Supplement*, September 24, 2010, 8–9.

⁶² The editors subsequently commissioned a companion series to examine issues that had not been fully addressed in the chronologically organized volumes. William Beinart and Lotte Hughes, eds., *Environment and Empire* (Oxford, 2007); Robert Bickers, ed., *Settlers and Expatriates: Britons over the Seas* (Oxford, 2010); Phillip Buckner, ed., *Canada and the British Empire* (Oxford, 2008); Marjory Harper and Stephen Constantine, *Migration and Empire* (Oxford, 2010); Kevin Kenny, ed., *Ireland and the British Empire* (Oxford, 2004); Levine, *Gender and Empire*; Philip D. Morgan and Sean Hawkins, eds., *Black Experience and the Empire* (Oxford, 2004); Deryck M. Schreuder and Stuart Ward, eds., *Australia’s Empire* (Oxford, 2008).

⁶³ Wilson, “Introduction: Histories, Empires, Modernities”; see also Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose, “Introduction: Being at Home with the Empire,” in Hall and Rose, eds., *At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World* (Cambridge, 2006), 1–31; Hall, “Introduction: Thinking the Postcolonial, Thinking the Empire”; Howe, “Introduction: New Imperial Histories”; Kathleen Wilson, “Old Imperialisms and New Imperial Histories: Rethinking the History of the Present,” *Radical History Review* 95 (2006): 211–234.

emphasis on the role played by trade, commerce, warfare, and treaties in bringing about an imperial world. By moving away from the well-known big questions about the British Empire, the new imperial history reframed the scholarship through a new focus on subaltern, minority, feminist, and postcolonial perspectives. This dovetailed with the views of historians who were working from the perspective of Britain's colonies, particularly those associated with the Subaltern Studies Collective, a group of scholars of South Asia that was formed in the mid-1970s. For those in the subaltern school and in the new imperial history, writing "small" history or the history of many fragments has become an important way to challenge older imperial histories that claimed to be comprehensive.⁶⁴

A brief detour through some of the scholarship that was inspired by the Subaltern Studies Collective can show how it relates to imperial history in Britain.⁶⁵ Although scholars influenced by Subaltern Studies and the new imperial history share a commitment to making the story of marginal subjects more prominent in explaining the emergence of dominant and hegemonic practices, they have distinct goals and distinct audiences. Those who work from within the new British imperial history have argued forcefully that empire mattered greatly to Britons and was constitutive of Britain's domestic history. This interest in challenging the domestic parochialisms of British historiography was not shared by Subaltern Studies scholars, whose audience was initially other South Asianists in India and elsewhere.

The members of the Subaltern Studies Collective initially defined themselves against histories of South Asia written from "colonialist" and "nationalist" perspectives. They rejected the "bourgeois-elitist" perspective of the dominant narratives of history-writing and those works' exclusive focus on the political history of colonial officials and nationalist leaders; instead, they urged a turn toward the "non-elite" and the "subaltern."⁶⁶ The collective is often described as having taken a postcolonial turn in the mid-1980s when the historian Ranajit Guha and the literary critic Gayatri Spivak collaborated to produce a reader of important articles from the first six volumes of *Subaltern Studies*.⁶⁷ Scholars who were critical of the collective's approaches decried the fading importance of Marxist approaches to history in preference to poststructuralist strategies and questioned whether "Europe" had become a more

⁶⁴ In "A Small History of *Subaltern Studies*," Dipesh Chakrabarty writes that Subaltern Studies was imagined as histories that "privilege the idea of the fragment over that of the whole or totality"; in Chakrabarty, *Habitations of Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies* (Chicago, 2002), 3–19, here 18, citing Gyanendra Pandey, "In Defense of the Fragment: Writing about Hindu-Muslim Riots in India Today," *Representations* 37 (Winter 1992): 27–55; Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, N.J., 1993); and Shahid Amin, *Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura, 1922–1992* (Berkeley, Calif., 1995). See also Madhavi Kale, *Fragments of Empire: Capital, Slavery, and Indian Indentured Labor in the British Caribbean* (Philadelphia, 1998); Ranajit Guha, *The Small Voice of History: Collected Essays*, ed. Partha Chatterjee (Ranikhet, 2009).

⁶⁵ The collective's interventions reached historians in other fields. See the contributions to the *AHR* Forum in *American Historical Review* 99, no. 5 (December 1994): Gyan Prakash, "Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism," 1475–1490; Florencia E. Mallon, "The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies: Perspectives from Latin American History," 1491–1515; and Frederick Cooper, "Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History," 1516–1545. The collective's last publication appeared in 2005, and a workshop at Princeton University titled "After Subaltern Studies: Early Career South Asian Studies" was held during the Princeton South Asian Studies Conference, April 27–28, 2012.

⁶⁶ See Ranajit Guha's modestly titled manifesto "On Some Aspects of Historiography of Colonial India," in Guha, ed., *Subaltern Studies I* (New Delhi, 1982), 1–8.

⁶⁷ Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, eds., *Selected Subaltern Studies* (New York, 1988).

central concern than the agency and subjectivity of subalterns themselves, and whether the global success of the scholars who were part of the collective had muted some of the radical interventions that the group championed.⁶⁸ Scholars speak of “early” and “late” Subaltern Studies, with the two collections of selected essays from the edited volumes marking the shift from the study of Indian peasants, workers, and non-elites to the construction of colonial forms of knowledge, particularly archival knowledge.⁶⁹ But the “early” and the “late” were not fully closed off from one another; indeed, it was through the careful reading of archival fragments and vernacular sources and the close parsing of texts that members of the collective demonstrated how scholars could use literary analysis to inscribe fragments of subaltern consciousness where one might have presumed that there was little evidence of subaltern activity or action.⁷⁰ Although social historians were anxious about the loss of subaltern voice, agency, and consciousness that might come with a postcolonial turn, the collective’s engagements with postcolonial studies offered the possibility that “voices from below” might be recuperated and recast outside a frame of liberal historiography that was defined by disciplinary norms proposed by European colonizers.⁷¹

Anxieties about the influence of these other turns—cultural, postcolonial, linguistic—were shared among those who were critical of the historical methods proposed by the Subaltern Studies Collective and by the interventions of the new imperial history. In recent years, some historians of empire have initiated a new turn, arguing that the linguistic and cultural turns in its postcolonial avatar were ahistorical, indifferent to historical change, and prone to “story plucking,” “time flattening,” and “leapfrogging” in narrating historical events.⁷² The challenge to an imperial/postcolonial turn and its reliance on discursive analysis came from scholars whose work remained resolutely autonomous, self-consciously based in “empirical” evidence. In this body of work, there are frequent calls to return to demonstrable “facts,” such as the economy, trade deficits, and import-export balances.⁷³

⁶⁸ See Ramachandra Guha, “Subaltern and Bhadrakal Studies,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 30, no. 33 (August 19, 1995): 2056–2058; Jim Masselos, “The Dis/Appearance of Subalterns: A Reading of a Decade of Subaltern Studies,” *South Asia*, n.s., 15, no. 1 (1992): 105–125; Tirthankar Roy, “Subaltern Studies: Questioning the Basics,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 37, no. 23 (June 8, 2002): 2223–2228; K. Sivaramakrishnan, “Situating the Subaltern: History and Anthropology in the Subaltern Studies Project,” *Journal of Historical Sociology* 8, no. 4 (December 1995): 395–429; David Washbrook, “Orientalism and Occidents: Colonial Discourse Theory and the Historiography of the British Empire,” in Winks, *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, 5: 596–611.

⁶⁹ The terms “early” and “late” are used by Tirthankar Roy, “Questioning the Basics”; Chakrabarty, “A Small History of Subaltern Studies”; Ranajit Guha, ed., *A Subaltern Studies Reader, 1986–1995* (Minneapolis, 1997).

⁷⁰ Two essays exemplify a historical method that is attentive to popular and community discourses and subjectivities: Ranajit Guha, “Chandra’s Death,” in Guha, ed., *Subaltern Studies V* (Delhi, 1987), 135–165; and Shahid Amin, “Gandhi as Mahatma: Gorakhpur District, Eastern UP, 1921–22,” in Guha, ed., *Subaltern Studies III* (Delhi, 1984), 1–61.

⁷¹ Among the critical essays are Sumit Sarkar, “The Decline of the Subaltern in Subaltern Studies,” in Sarkar, *Writing Social History* (Delhi, 1997), 82–108; Rosalind O’Hanlon and David Washbrook, “After Orientalism: Culture, Criticism, and Politics in the Third World,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 34, no. 1 (January 1992): 141–167. Responses include Gyan Prakash, “Can the ‘Subaltern’ Ride? A Reply to O’Hanlon and Washbrook,” *ibid.*, 168–184; and Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Radical Histories and Question of Enlightenment Rationalism: Some Recent Critiques of *Subaltern Studies*,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 30, no. 14 (April 8, 1995): 751–759. The essays are reprinted in Vinayak Chaturvedi, ed., *Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial* (New York, 2000).

⁷² Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, 17–19.

⁷³ For instance, Andrew S. Thompson attempts to measure the impact of the empire on different

In 2006, Richard Price announced: "The imperial turn is unlikely to suffer the same fate as the linguistic turn."⁷⁴ He distanced the imperial turn from the excesses of the linguistic turn and its professed attachment to literary criticism, continental theory, and postcolonial criticism and suggested that imperial history was grounded in archival evidence, rigorous argument, and material concerns rather than culture or language.⁷⁵ Price seems to reject Spivak's (Derridean) deconstructionist mode of analysis and Saidian (Foucauldian) discursive analysis to remind us that British history's method is empirical, imperial, and systemic, in contrast to French interventions in history, which are based on "theory." In Price's account, the imperial turn is its own scholarly approach, building on a set of analytic practices with their basis in British universalisms such as free trade, liberalism, possessive individualism, and the rule of law.

This recent critique of the role of postcolonial studies in the imperial turn has inspired a numbers-driven or empirical archival methodology that relegates the interdisciplinary possibilities of postcolonial studies to the sidelines, especially the role of margins or the fragment as a generative source of historical change. One might cite Bernard Porter's ruthlessly empirical *Absent-Minded Imperialists*, which details how little Britons cared about empire at its height in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Through a meticulous search of textual sources produced in Britain, Porter argues that the presence of empire barely registered in the reading material of a broadly construed reading public, thus challenging the claims of new imperial historians such as Catherine Hall and Kathleen Wilson, who have argued that a widespread imperial culture in Britain produced popular support for colonial expansion.⁷⁶ Porter's book is provocative, and he clearly defines the opposition: postcolonial literary scholars, cultural historians, and others who take a shoddy approach to archival work that is inattentive to numerical evidence.⁷⁷

In response to Porter's work, the literary scholar Lee Sterrenburg generously noted: "Historians often count things; they pay attention to the numbers. We in literary studies and cultural studies often do not keep track of the numbers. But we sometimes write as if we do."⁷⁸ While Sterrenburg presupposes that "we in literary studies" and other non-archivally based fields do not share a concern with archival

categories of British citizens in *The Empire Strikes Back? The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (Harlow, 2005).

⁷⁴ Price, "One Big Thing," 602. According to the Google N-gram chart in James Cook's essay in this forum, 2006 was the year in which the imperial turn spiked.

⁷⁵ Price presumes the prior existence of the linguistic and cultural turn for the production of the imperial turn, but Bill Sewell notes that his own "conversion" as a young faculty member at Chicago was influenced by Bernard Cohn and Ron Inden, anthropologists who worked on India. William H. Sewell, Jr., *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago, 2005), 42.

⁷⁶ Bernard Porter, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain* (Oxford, 2004); Hall and Rose, *At Home with the Empire*; Kathleen Wilson, *The Island Race: Englishness, Empire and Gender in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 2003).

⁷⁷ Critical reviews occasioned an extended response from Bernard Porter, "Further Thoughts about Imperial Absent-Mindedness," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 36, no. 1 (2008): 101–117; and a subsequent response by one of his interlocutors, John Mackenzie, "'Comfort' and Conviction: A Response to Bernard Porter," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 36, no. 4 (2008): 659–668.

⁷⁸ Lee Sterrenburg, "Significant Evidences and the Imperial Archive: Response," *Victorian Studies* 46, no. 2 (2004): 275–283, here 277. Porter approvingly cited this passage in a response to his critics.

research and empiricism, his image of what historians do effaces the value of studying the margins, those in the minority, and those less numerous.⁷⁹

The question of numbers and “keeping track,” or maintaining an account book of colonialism, invites investigation, particularly if we think of history’s growing distance from the numbers-driven, quantitative turn in political science and some branches of sociology.⁸⁰ Arjun Appadurai’s 2006 book *Fear of Small Numbers* examines the peculiar importance that small numbers take on in our social anxieties: there may be one terrorist flying on Christmas Day with explosives in his underwear, but he then becomes a cipher for a nationwide lack of trust between a majority and a minority population.⁸¹ Appadurai’s paradigm explains how small numbers can produce disproportionate anxieties; his ratio can also help us understand how historical anxieties produced from the social margins of empire manifest themselves in the texts of colonial archives. (The definition of colonial archives need not be limited to texts; it could easily be expanded to include advertisements, films, posters, museum pieces, and children’s books.)⁸² If archival deficiencies are an obstacle to understanding those who were less important in history, Appadurai’s model transforms the problem of archival material from a situation of lack to one of profusion and proliferation.

Calls for empiricism in the imperial turn have moved us toward an archival turn, something that has received a great deal of attention in colonial studies.⁸³ The charge that some historians are too lazy to visit archives is a standard refrain among those who are unmoved by the interventions of the cultural, linguistic, and imperial turns.⁸⁴ In a study of colonial India that was published in 2000, Richard Eaton noted that a majority of the research on India is conducted in a few archives. “Indeed, the 1980s and 1990s saw a sharp drop from levels of earlier decades in the number of historians who applied for support or permission to conduct research out in the *mufassal*—that is, in district archives, local libraries, private collections, zamindari records, and so

⁷⁹ On the continuing richness of the margins in imperial history, see Sameetah Agha and Elizabeth Kolsky, eds., *Fringes of Empire: Peoples, Places, and Spaces in Colonial India* (Delhi, 2009); Harald Fischer-Tiné and Susanne Gehrmann, eds., *Empires and Boundaries: Rethinking Race, Class, and Gender in Colonial Settings* (New York, 2009).

⁸⁰ See Mirsepassi, Basu, and Weaver, *Localizing Knowledge in a Globalizing World*, 7–8. Wasserstrom reminds us that statistically driven history never emerged in the way it was once imagined; “New Ways in History,” 282.

⁸¹ Arjun Appadurai, *Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger* (Durham, N.C., 2006).

⁸² See especially John M. Mackenzie, *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880–1960* (Manchester, 1984); Mackenzie, ed., *Imperialism and Popular Culture* (Manchester, 1986); Timothy Burke, *Lifebuoy Men, Lux Women: Commodification, Consumption, and Cleanliness in Modern Zimbabwe* (Durham, N.C., 1996); Annie E. Coombes, *Reinventing Africa: Museums, Material Culture, and Popular Imagination in Late Victorian and Edwardian England* (New Haven, Conn., 1994); David Ciarlo, *Advertising Empire: Race and Visual Culture in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge, Mass., 2011); Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York, 1995), chap. 5: “Soft-Soaping Empire: Commodity Racism and Imperial Advertising,” 207–231; Christopher Pinney and Nicolas Peterson, eds., *Photography’s Other Histories* (Durham, N.C., 2003); James R. Ryan, *Picturing Empire: Photography and the Visualization of the British Empire* (Chicago, 1997).

⁸³ Antoinette Burton, ed., *Archive Stories: Facts, Fictions, and the Writing of History* (Durham, N.C., 2005); Burton, *Dwelling in the Archive: Women Writing House, Home, and History in Late Colonial India* (New York, 2003); Carolyn Hamilton, Verne Harris, Jane Taylor, Michele Pickover, Graeme Reid, and Razia Saleh, eds., *Refiguring the Archive* (Cape Town, 2002); Thomas Richards, *The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire* (London, 1993).

⁸⁴ Howe, “Introduction: New Imperial Histories,” 3.

forth. Most ended up in London, and a few in national or state archives in India, studying colonial records that were then subjected to discourse analysis.”⁸⁵ Eaton suspects that historians of colonialism are getting soft; we used to be hunters and gatherers, “visiting the Indian hinterland,” but now we find ourselves sitting in arm-chairs in America or Britain “theorizing about texts.”⁸⁶ Matthew Connelly has expressed similar dismay about the lack of archival scholarship behind particular kinds of scholarly work: “When I work in the archives of the World Bank or the World Health Organization or the Ford Foundation, I find myself virtually alone (and wondering whether all the professed interest in ‘political economy’ in the cultural studies field is sincere).”⁸⁷ There is a whiff of archival machismo combined with disciplinary gatekeeping in Eaton’s and Connelly’s criticisms, but if historians did indeed welcome literary critics or cultural studies scholars into the archives, would our place in the academy as the hunters of “facts” be undermined?⁸⁸

The centrality of archival research is an important problematic for all historians, but particularly so for those of us who rely on archives that were created by a colonial government. Many of us read “against the grain,” mining the archives for knowledge that no one else has found, producing evidence of lives lived in the past that demonstrates something new and original.⁸⁹ In rejecting the grand narratives of great men and their voluminous archives, much of the historical scholarship “from below” claimed its moral authority (and staked a claim to extreme forms of archival labor and prowess) from a position of absence: there were fewer documents on women, slaves, subalterns, children, and the disabled, and we found them. I am among those who regularly feel archivally superior (and, yes, even macho) because of my ongoing suffering in archives across India, where dust, a lack of air-conditioning, and frequent power outages are obstacles to research.⁹⁰ Against the challenges of archival deficiency, some of us have become archival swashbucklers.

The archival turn can be its own kind of closure, consolidating historians’ access to “facts.” But by examining how the archival turn draws from the imperial/postcolonial turn, and by considering the possibility of another set of imperial turns, we can resist this closure and return to archival research in a new spirit of interdisciplinary engagement and robust empiricism.

Archives are growing in importance to literary scholars, postcolonial critics, and anthropologists who work on European colonialisms. Two recent critical analyses were authored by scholars of literature who are historically minded: Betty Joseph’s

⁸⁵ Richard Eaton, “(Re)imag(in)ing Otherness: A Postmortem for the Postmodern in India,” *Journal of World History* 11, no. 1 (2000): 57–78, here 73; this sentiment was echoed by Price, “One Big Thing,” 608.

⁸⁶ Eaton, “(Re)imag(in)ing Otherness,” 73.

⁸⁷ “AHR Conversation: On Transnational History,” 1453.

⁸⁸ Carolyn Steedman, *Dust: The Archive and Cultural History* (New Brunswick, N.J., 2002).

⁸⁹ The idea of “archival fetishism” has been analyzed through a gendered lens by Antoinette Burton, “Archive Stories: Gender in the Making of Imperial and Colonial Histories,” in Levine, *Gender and Empire*, 281–293.

⁹⁰ See Dinyar Patel’s four-part series on Indian archives and libraries in the *New York Times* blog *India Ink*: “In India, History Literally Rots Away,” March 20, 2012; “Repairing the Damage at India’s National Archives,” March 21, 2012; “India’s Archives: How Did Things Get This Bad?,” March 22, 2012; “The Parsis, Once India’s Curators, Now Shrug as History Rots,” March 23, 2012, <http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/author/dinyar-patel/>.

Reading the East India Company and Anjali Arondekar's *For the Record*.⁹¹ When we read those works alongside Ann Stoler's *Along the Archival Grain*, which is framed as "an ethnography of the archive," we start to see that how a colonial state maintained its archives makes a great deal of difference to historians' practices.⁹²

Joseph, Arondekar, and to a lesser degree Stoler build on Gayatri Spivak's now decades-old expression of concern with the archives in an essay from 1985, "The Rani of Sirmur: An Essay in Reading the Archives," in which she examined a moment in one woman's life, arguing that it was only when the woman became an object of concern for the colonial state that she was able to be recorded in the archives.⁹³ It was an important seed for Spivak's arguments in "Can the Subaltern Speak?," a canonical text in feminist and postcolonial studies in which she contends that the colonial archive was the voice of the liberal-imperial state and that it should be used with some caution in the quest for subaltern subjectivities.⁹⁴ Spivak's essay challenged one of the key tenets of Ranajit Guha's goal in founding Subaltern Studies, which was to unearth subaltern consciousness that was neither elite nor official; Guha called subaltern subjectivity "autonomous," an idea that was later revised (in conversation with Spivak's intervention) to consider the ways in which the subaltern or insurgent was produced as a historical subject by the colonial archives.⁹⁵

In spite of Spivak's pessimism, the search for the female subaltern has continued. Joseph begins from the proposition that there are silences and gaps in the East India Company's archives that require careful reading. She challenges Spivak's occlusion and erasure of gendered subjects, arguing that "the partial and fragmented appearance of women can provide the occasion for a new telling that ushers in a new subject of history."⁹⁶ Joseph works from the assumption that if one reads carefully, there are silences to be excavated, subjectivities to be retrieved, and patterns of gendered domination to be discovered in the colonial archive.

Stoler and Arondekar go in a different direction, emphasizing the voluminousness of the colonial archive. "The official documents of colonial archives like the Netherlands Indies," Stoler notes, "are so weighted with fixed formats, empty phrases, and racial clichés that one is easily blinded by their flattened prose and numbing dullness."⁹⁷ Archival excess is never fully contained by the logic of the colonial state: in Stoler's detailed ethnography of one archive, she is struck by "how

⁹¹ Betty Joseph, *Reading the East India Company, 1720–1840: Colonial Currencies of Gender* (Chicago, 2004); Anjali Arondekar, *For the Record: On Sexuality and the Colonial Archive in India* (Durham, N.C., 2009). Both build on the work of Richards, *The Imperial Archive*.

⁹² Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton, N.J., 2009); see also Nicholas B. Dirks, "Annals of the Archive: Ethnographic Notes on the Sources of History," in Brian Keith Axel, ed., *From the Margins: Historical Anthropology and Its Futures* (Durham, N.C., 2002), 47–65.

⁹³ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "The Rani of Sirmur: An Essay in Reading the Archives," *History and Theory* 24, no. 3 (1985): 247–272.

⁹⁴ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?," in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, eds., *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Urbana, Ill., 1988), 271–313.

⁹⁵ Ranajit Guha had anticipated some of Spivak's interventions in "The Prose of Counter-Insurgency," in Guha, ed., *Subaltern Studies II* (Delhi, 1983), 1–42. The Spivakian turn was most deeply felt in the essays by Gyanendra Pandey, which culminated in *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India* (Delhi, 1990). For an exposition of Subaltern Studies' engagements with their critics, see Chakrabarty, *Habitations of Modernity*, chaps. 1–2. See also Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present* (Cambridge, Mass., 1999), chap. 3.

⁹⁶ Joseph, *Reading the East India Company*, 3.

⁹⁷ Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*, 23.

much of what was collected was made irrelevant to what state officials decided, both to what they acknowledged they could do in practice and what about the Indies they claimed to know.”⁹⁸ Stoler rightly refuses to distinguish between the different values placed on the archive in historical, anthropological, and literary scholarship, noting that “the broader social life of an archive” makes it an important constitutive fact in both culture and history. She demands that the archive be seen not as a bank or a place of “extraction” or excavation, but as constitutive of a larger set of social relations that it can never fully contain.⁹⁹

In the spirit of Stoler’s ethnography, Arondekar asks: “Can an empty archive also be full?” and she examines the process by which sexuality—ordinarily repressed by the colonial state—permeates the archive at multiple levels.¹⁰⁰ Situating herself at the intersection of queer and postcolonial studies, she conducts a close reading of Victorian advertisements and manuals for dildos made of “India rubber,” noting that “late nineteenth-century pornographic texts are plentifully available (albeit in ‘locked cupboards’ and ‘private cases’). Yet such plenitude eschews any simple turn to the rhetorical mystifications of presence and facticity.”¹⁰¹ Arondekar’s challenge to facticity is suggestive of how archival plenitude might be calculated, particularly when it relates to a subject that is rarely the subject of history. Her primary focus is the “open secret” of homosexuality, but one might expand it further to encompass all the other open secrets that are embedded in the archive, but that are uncountable and unaccountable to a singular source of information.

The plentiful archival evidence of marginal populations animates Elizabeth Kolsky’s argument in *Colonial Justice in British India*. She begins from the study of a population that is often at the margins of colonial society: “poor whites,” who were insufficiently European to join the ruling classes. One might think that a marginal population would not have produced many records, but Kolsky discovered quite the opposite. She found an abundance of court cases documenting the crimes of a marginal population of poor or “mean” whites whose archival presence proliferated in spite of their small numbers. By reading an enormous number of court cases, criminal complaints, legislative documents, and official memoranda, she demonstrates how legal codification in India, imagined as a cornerstone of the putatively rational and emancipatory rule of law that underpinned British rule there, circumvented the liberal claims behind empire.¹⁰² Her arguments build on Giorgio Agamben’s claims about the generative power of exceptions: although codification was intended to promote a rationalized bureaucracy for administering justice, it was based on a large number of exceptions authorizing a colonial rule of difference that became normative.¹⁰³

The idea of a voluminous archive of the margins, exemplified by Stoler’s and Kolsky’s research, rather than one that is hard to access or somehow inadequate to

⁹⁸ Ibid., 29.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 45.

¹⁰⁰ Arondekar, *For the Record*, 1. See also Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s “History of Sexuality” and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, N.C., 1995); Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley, Calif., 2002).

¹⁰¹ Arondekar, *For the Record*, 99.

¹⁰² Elizabeth Kolsky, “Conclusion,” in Kolsky, *Colonial Justice in British India* (Cambridge, 2010), 229–233.

¹⁰³ Agamben, *State of Exception*.

the task of writing a well-researched historical monograph or dissertation, is a relatively new idea. Notably, this archival turn originated with scholars whose imperial turn is invested in postcolonial ways of reading, in gender and sexuality studies, and in following the minutiae of court cases, catalogues, and archival indexes. One might be tempted to classify the archival turn as a return to empiricism, as is encouraged by Price, Porter, Eaton, and Connelly, but it is not in the spirit of the arguments that we see in the work of Stoler, Arondekar, and Kolsky. This archival turn relies on strategies of “theorizing about texts,” while doing a lot of gathering at the same time.

ONE STRIKING FEATURE OF THE series of turns that the historiography on empires has taken is the focus on the profusion of information, the spread of knowledge, people, cultures, and practices across networks that are both global and imperial. In the multiplicity of these turns, in the imperial turn’s turn toward globalization, toward postcolonial studies, and toward the archive, there is a great deal of information that is unmanageable by a single actor.

As the other essays in this forum argue, using the language of the “new,” “after,” and “beyond” to describe historiographical turns seems premature. My compressed and selective account of British imperial history since the late nineteenth century to the present might seem parochial, particularly for historians working in other fields in which the coordinates and concerns of imperial turns are quite different. But since 9/11, drawing lessons from the late-nineteenth-century British Empire and applying them to the emergent American empire has become an important theme among historians of empire.¹⁰⁴ If we are to remain critical of colonialism’s new guises, or what Harry Harootunian has suggestively called “the empire’s new clothes,” we must continue to be self-reflexive about our current imperial moment, one that was born of our shared historical legacies and historiographies.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ Calhoun, Cooper, and Moore, *Lessons of Empire*; Go, *Patterns of Empire*; Eric Hobsbawm, *On Empire: America, War, and Global Supremacy* (New York, 2008); A. G. Hopkins, “Capitalism, Nationalism and the New American Empire,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 35, no. 1 (2007): 95–117; Hopkins, “Lessons of ‘Civilizing Missions’ Are Mostly Unlearned,” *New York Times*, March 23, 2003, 5; Stephen Howe, “Afterword: Transnationalisms, Good, Bad, Real, Imagined, Thick and Thin,” *Postcolonial Studies and Transnational Resistance*, Special Issue, *Interventions* 4, no. 1 (2002): 79–88; Dane Kennedy, “Essay and Reflection: On the American Empire from a British Imperial Perspective,” *International History Review* 29, no. 1 (2007): 83–108; Timothy H. Parsons, *The Rule of Empires: Those Who Built Them, Those Who Endured Them, and Why They Always Fail* (Oxford, 2010). As this essay was going to press, an opinion piece appeared in a major American newspaper: Kwasi Kwarteng, “Echoes of the End of the Raj,” *New York Times*, April 17, 2012, A25.

¹⁰⁵ Harootunian, *The Empire’s New Clothes*; see also Sharad Chari and Katherine Verdery, “Thinking between the Posts: Postcolonialism, Postsocialism, and Ethnography after the Cold War,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51, no. 1 (2009): 6–34.

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AHR Forum
Comment: Not Yet Far Enough

JULIA ADENEY THOMAS

IN THE SUMMER OF 1984, just as the translation of Jean-François Lyotard's *The Postmodern Condition* proclaimed that "the status of knowledge is altered as societies enter what is known as the postindustrial age and cultures enter what is known as the postmodern age," an older historian living on the North Carolina coast tried to teach me to surf cast.¹ At one point, despairing of my fishing skills, she steered the conversation to history and said rather wistfully that she longed to transfer all of her knowledge directly to me so that I would be able to carry on where she left off. Much to my retrospective embarrassment, I scoffed. I dismissed even the desirability of such a transfer, declaring, with all the wisdom of one year of graduate school, that the framework of knowledge, the questions posed, and, most of all, the progressive narrative embraced by her generation were passé. Contemporary theory had upended her epistemological assumptions and modes of representation, replacing them with a fierce, self-reflective knowingness about the discursive and contingent character of all practices. This older historian, born in 1899, had combined service in the Roosevelt administration and journalism with historical research, most particularly into the ideas behind the American Revolution with her book *George Mason: Constitutionalist*, in print since 1938.² History for her, if grasped firmly by right-minded political leaders, could have a teleological drive: progress was possible and cumulative; fascism had been defeated, civil rights promoted, prosperity attained. Likewise, historical knowledge could be progressive and cumulative; more could be added, but both what counted as knowledge and how it should be represented remained self-evident. In her America, the angel of history faced determinedly forward into brightness, leaving the debris behind him. For me, splashing in the waters of the postindustrial, postmodern age, interested in Japan, educated not only after her time

¹ Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, 1984), 3. I make my brief foray into autobiography fully aware of the contested status of experience as a basis for history and its uncertain alliance with forms of left and feminist historiography. For an excellent discussion, see Martin Jay, *Songs of Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a Universal Theme* (Berkeley, Calif., 2006).

² Helen Hill Miller, *George Mason: Constitutionalist* (New York, 1938). The structure of Miller's experience gave plausibility to her liberal New Deal optimism as well as to the optimism of later social historians as part of what William Sewell describes as "the great worldwide postwar capitalist boom. So-called 'Fordist' or state-centered capitalism, with its fundamental pact between big business, big labor, and big government, its standardized mass production, its Keynesian steering of the economy, its fixed exchange rates, and its global guarantee by United States military power, had produced, or at least seemed to have produced, a graspable, predictable, and steadily progressing form of society." William H. Sewell, Jr., "Crooked Lines," *American Historical Review* 113, no. 2 (April 2008): 393–405, here 399.

but after the intellectual gains and political disappointments of the 1960s and 1970s, after the introduction of Gramscian complications into Marxian paradigms, Foucault's conception of discursive structures, feminism and gender studies, Said's critique of Orientalism, and much else besides, her faith in history seemed the equivalent of Druidic ritual, strangely beautiful in its mysteries but lacking contemporary traction. Plus, I was young and primed for oedipal gestures.

Now, although rueful about my ungenerous tone, I still believe I was right in my general understanding: times really were changing. Historiography was undergoing what Geoff Eley would later describe as "the huge tectonic shift from social history to cultural history."³ Both the content and the form of knowledge were in contention. Looking back, I wish I could recast that conversation more gently, but I would still say that the discipline of history itself has an eventful history responsive to other disciplines and changes in the world. I would also suggest that history evinces losses as well as gains and, more perversely, often witnesses the two transmute into one another, the gains of one generation looking like losses to the next. The older historian's bright narrative had material, political, and epistemological foundations that seismic forces inside and outside the academy had undermined by 1984. This narrative's crumbling certainty had been washed out to sea along with those elusive fish. It could not be reeled back in.

Like me, but a few years later, all four contributors to this forum came of age as historians in the wake of the variously denominated "turns." Judith Surkis describes these turns as "a rapid succession of historiographical moments" seemingly initiated by "the linguistic turn" and "followed by the cultural and the imperial, and more recently the transnational, global, and spatial turns." However, the shared experience of these contributors counts for little. Their essays diverge sharply over the nature of the changes in historical practice over the last forty years and what they mean for the discipline today, what has been lost and what has been gained, and who is to blame. Judith Surkis dispels the linguistic turn into an airy chimera, contending that there was no turn. Gary Wilder believes in the reality of the turn from social to cultural history, but like Surkis argues that "turn talk" has authorized "analytic regression." These two dark visions are counterbalanced by brighter views. Durba Ghosh plots imperial history's several pivots, landing us, she argues, back in the archives with modestly enhanced tools for textual analysis and broader categories of personhood. Only James Cook portrays the turns as fully productive and far from over, even now definitively altering our approaches and the objects of our scrutiny, our understanding of power, agency, and resistance.

In short, the stakes of this forum are both empirical and prescriptive. Empirically, did something happen to transform historical understanding, and if so, is it over? Prescriptively, was what happened productive, and how best are we to proceed? This is fascinating stuff. Along the way, we meet a menagerie of animals, a drove of transportation devices, a catalogue of pirouetting perspectives, some popular songs, and an array of emotions from dismay to optimism. As commentator, I take it as my brief to map these responses, asking, most importantly, what interests each narration serves. If history is, as Reinhart Koselleck suggests, in league with the future, then

³ Geoff Eley, *A Crooked Line: From Cultural History to the History of Society* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2005), xii.

it is fair to interrogate each position for the future possibilities it might authorize.⁴ I will then rotate toward “the environmental turn,” neglected by this forum and by most sophisticated recent historiography, the absence in the midst of all that is present.

WEARING HER BRILLIANCE BOLDLY, French historian Judith Surkis does battle against “the linguistic turn,” insisting that it is inexact and “politically limiting” to use this concept in the way that William Sewell, Gabrielle Spiegel, Lynn Hunt, and others have done. Indeed, the whole idea of “the linguistic turn” is, in Surkis’s striking metaphor, a monster akin to Paul Veyne’s centaurs. Just as nothing true or false can be said about the digestive system of centaurs, nothing true or false can be said about “the linguistic turn,” a composite phenomenon presented, she claims, as a homogeneous, monolithic, generational moment, but actually a false, retrospective construct that rejects postwar revisionism and asserts a collective new beginning suspect in its “coherence and comity.” At stake most especially for Surkis are the contributions of feminist scholarship currently being consigned to a “periodized posterity and politically compromised epistemology” by Sewell and others. To defend feminist insights, Surkis wants to dispel the illusion of “the turn” by freeing us from the concept of linear time where it is lodged. Here she joins Judith Roof in “challeng[ing] the very notions of time and history” and undermining “concepts of originality, pioneer, tradition, and precedent.” The rigidly supersessionary “generational thinking” of beginnings and endings, beholden to tropes of familial reproduction, needs to be replaced with a concept of “genealogies” where recuperation is never foreclosed. In this way, the still-salient “critical resources of feminism” will not be consigned “to a chronologically and politically exhausted moment.” “A genealogical counternarrative,” Surkis tells us, “can keep multiple strains of critical interrogation open for the historiographical future.” She therefore pleads for a radical version of “untimely thinking” that rejects the possibility of loss. She proposes, in effect, an owl of Minerva that can take off from the same bough over and over again, spreading its wings in sunlight as well as shadow, as though options were never lost to time.

Surkis’s essay is engaged and compelling, yet it leaves me shaking my head. I remain unconvinced that we invoke a monstrous shibboleth when we speak of “the linguistic turn.” As already revealed in the tale of my fishing fiasco, I believed that great intellectual changes were afoot in the mid-1980s. But it is neither my experience that informs my disquiet nor a desire to downplay scholarship attuned to sexuality and gender. Rather, what perplexes me is Surkis’s understanding of eventfulness. By her implicit strictures, to attain the status of a real event, “the turn” must evince three characteristics: concision, homogeneity, and uniformity. She speaks of “the concise movement that a ‘turn’ is supposed to describe.” Further, she is troubled by the range of disputes, nuances, and ambiguities, concluding that “the complex debates that took place in the 1980s and 1990s—about discourse and subjectivity, or the relationship between ‘linguistic’ structures, agency, and experience—show

⁴ Reinhart Koselleck speaks of history’s “anticipatory content” in “On the Need for Theory in the Discipline of History,” trans. Kerstin Behnke, in Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts* (Stanford, Calif., 2002), 1–19, here 5, 7–8.

that there was no *singular* ‘turn.’”⁵ Third, pointing to the varying tempos and concerns in arenas such as subaltern studies, she shows that discussions constituting the “supposed” linguistic turn “did not occur once and for all, in an orderly logic of progression and supersession, or uniformly across the discipline.” These criteria puzzle me. “Linguistic turn” as a phrase may indeed be misleading if it conveys a crisp *volte-face* followed by consensus, but the same is true of terms such as “French Revolution” that also mask a welter of actions and impulses. The scholars involved in the turn, the very ones she cites, would be the last to say that they had executed a precise military-style maneuver or that it had been anything other than argumentative and uneven. Indeed, the turn’s lack of concision, homogeneity, and disciplinary uniformity is hardly in contention. But do these characteristics, rightly discerned by Surkis, disqualify it as an intellectual event?

It is here, with the concept of “the event,” that we need to pause for a moment. The question of whether or not the linguistic turn—described as the progenitor of all the other turns—existed, whether it is a mythic centaur or a true lion, is crucial to this forum. The nature of our quarry must be discerned; we can hardly go hunting otherwise. On this issue, Martin Jay’s distinction between run-of-the-mill occurrences best understood through contextualization and those rare phenomena called “events” that “radically upend their contexts” is particularly illuminating.⁶ Had all the texts of that time been fully comprehensible through the intentions of the actors as “communicative *acts* dependent on the conventions and usages of their day,” then they would have been easier to read and analyzable by the means proposed by “Quentin Skinner, J. G. A. Pocock and their colleagues in the so-called Cambridge school of intellectual history.”⁷ Had Surkis discovered that the linguistic turn had been articulated in uniform fashion simultaneously by historians in every corner of the field, she would have excavated not a transformation but, in Foucault’s terms, the regularities of a well-established epistemic regime. The work on linguistic structures, agency, and experience would then have constituted not a “turn,” but a development; not a transformation, but a continuation.

Events, on the other hand, are altogether different creatures. Quoting Claude Romano, Martin Jay argues that events cannot be “submitted to a horizon of prior meanings” but “are themselves the origin of meaning for any interpretation, in that they can be understood less from the world that precedes them than from the posterity to which they give rise.” They break with patterned regularities and escape their context to be “world-establishing,” “inaugurating their own history” instead of being the product of history.⁸ If we make this distinction, at least for heuristic pur-

⁵ It may be helpful here to distinguish between the linguistic turn and the cultural turn, as Gabrielle M. Spiegel elegantly does: “Whereas linguistic turn historiography proclaimed culture as a self-enclosed, non-referential mechanism of social construction that *preceded* the world and rendered it intelligible by constructing it according to its own rules of signification, cultural history never abandoned a belief in the objective reality of the social world, and thus might more profitably have been labeled sociocultural history.” Spiegel, “Comment on *A Crooked Line*,” *American Historical Review* 113, no. 2 (April 2008): 406–416, here 409, emphasis in the original.

⁶ This phrase is one that Jay quotes from French theorist Claude Romano. Martin Jay, “Historical Explanation and the Event: Reflections on the Limits of Contextualization,” *New Literary History* 42 (2011): 557–571, here 564.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 577, emphasis in the original. This essay begins with a lengthy discussion of the Cambridge school’s position and the subsequent debates over their stress on context.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 564.

poses, we must use criteria other than those proposed by Surkis for asking whether the turn occurred. We should ask not if it was coherent, but if it altered what we took to be real. We should ask not whether it was logical and uniform, but whether it produced new objects of inquiry and new ways of talking about them. By these criteria of eventfulness, it seems to me that the profession did, in fact, experience a major event. By the 1990s, we were not as we once were. We continue to live and to work in the turn's wake.

ONE MAY DISAGREE WITH SURKIS'S contention that there was no turn, as do I and the other contributors, and still share her anxiety that doors are closing on rigorous self-reflective practices. Wilder, closest to Surkis in his outlook, shares her dismay at current trends. Calling on historians "to ask questions about the conditions of possibility of the historical knowledge that they are producing—about the genealogy of their categories and their embeddedness in the social worlds they purport to explain, about their own implication in their objects of study, and the relation between those pasts and the historian's present," he instead finds "antipathy to theory, an allergy to intellectual discord, and a will to professional reconciliation." Although he provides footnotes replete with titles exemplifying best practices, he judges the field to have turned away from "the turn" to banal complacency. Fascinatingly, he castigates not those anti-turners or the diehard Rankeans who have always been dismissive about the value of theorizing, but the turners themselves for the enforced pall of politeness, this apoliticized "peace in the neighborhood."⁹ Exactly who these retrograde former proponents are remains obscure, since he insists that he does not wish to name names.¹⁰ Wilder's primary desideratum, different from Surkis's, is to recover and defend the insights of social history and dialectical Marxism, which, he claims, were rejected wholesale by the linguistic and cultural turns.¹¹ He insists that "crafting a history for and of our times will require us to move beyond the insidious logic of turns in order to reclaim the analytic space where history, social science, and critical theory once converged around large and pressing sociohistorical questions." Like Surkis's, his is a recovery mission, an effort at pre-turn recuperation.

Wilder's voice is passionate and his goals are clear and bracing, yet his essay strikes me as divided against itself. Its tale of dissipated intellectual vigor is at odds with its many references to vibrant, accomplished work such as Todd Shepard's *Invention of Decolonization* and Jeremy Popkin's *You Are All Free*, and to efforts, such

⁹ Frequently mentioned in this company, though largely neglected in this forum, are Lawrence Stone, "History and Post-Modernism," *Past and Present*, no. 131 (May 1991): 217–218; Bryan D. Palmer, *Descent into Discourse: The Reification of Language and the Writing of Social History* (Philadelphia, 1990); G. R. Elton, *Return to Essentials: Some Reflections on the Present State of Historical Study* (Cambridge, 1991). Less extreme within this group is Richard J. Evans, *In Defense of History* (New York, 1997).

¹⁰ Wilder, however, pointedly distinguishes among the turners on some scores. For instance, he writes: "Note that the critique of the linguistic and cultural turns from the standpoint of 'society' developed by Sewell, Eley, and Goswami differs fundamentally from the call by Bonnell and Hunt for a renewed social history and historical sociology 'beyond the cultural turn.'"

¹¹ While Wilder contends that "because the talk of turns objectified 'social history' as a singular package, the turn away from it was often wholesale," others have described the relationship between social and cultural history as "more dialectical than merely sequential." Editor's introduction to "AHR Forum: Geoff Eley's *A Crooked Line*," *American Historical Review* 113, no. 2 (April 2008): 391–392, here 391.

as Sewell's, to combine the cultural turn with social history.¹² Wilder is surely right that among "turners" and younger scholars, there are some who long for "a new nominalism," promoting a methodological positivism and an "archival fetishism" more concerned with topics than optics. The desire for "the consolation of a truth in the past which cannot be questioned" can be overwhelming even for so subtle a theorist as Roland Barthes, who, in the wake of his beloved mother's death, poignantly sought that perdurable truth in photography.¹³ Yet the wealth of references that Wilder provides suggest that his story could have been told differently, clearing new ground for histories of society built on the foundation of the turns' insights. Wilder's story of the cultural turn's strong-armed rejection of social history followed by the profession's rejection of even the turn's self-critical posture leaves us mired in longing for an irretrievable golden age of social history without recourse.

BY CONTRAST, DURBA GHOSH PORTRAYS imperial history's broad concurrence today as heartening. She masterfully charts its several reorientations through engagements with "other historiographical turns—the global, the postcolonial, and the archival," in order to argue that the imperial turn has been produced by and generated other historiographical developments. Contra Surkis and Cook, she sees these turns as explicitly generational, with "tensions between gray-haired patriarchs, younger matriarchs, and an unruly group of interdisciplinary graduate students, postdoctoral fellows, and untenured faculty setting off on a long road trip in an overstuffed minivan." Although concerned that generational "turn talk" might foreclose self-reflection, she ultimately embraces familial affinities, arguing that current scholarship feeds on the generative energies that transformed the profession in the 1980s and 1990s. If Ghosh now proclaims a "return to the archives," this is not a retreat to some prelapsarian world before the turns. Rather, she portrays a regained archival adventurism by macho, swashbuckling younger scholars (playfully including herself) as overcoming the archive-versus-theory dichotomy in a new synthesis. Here a note of warning should be sounded. Talk of a "return to the archive" risks repeating the canard that "theory heads" had abandoned the high ground of dedicated research.¹⁴ This charge was mostly caricature. Rather than being for-or-against archival labor, central arguments were about the nature of archives, how they are constituted, what they leave out, and whether we could explore them "naked" in the manner of Geoffrey Elton or had to approach them mindful of our own positionality and commitments.¹⁵ Ghosh, building on the rearticulation of the nature of the archives by fem-

¹² Wilder argues that the reception of the books by Shepard and Popkin smoothed over their fundamental challenge to our understanding of events such as the "French Revolution."

¹³ It is in these terms that John Tagg describes Barthes's quest in *Camera Lucida* to find in photography the absolute guarantee of "a reality" even though it is a "reality one can no longer touch." Tagg, *The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories* (Minneapolis, 1988), 1.

¹⁴ Ghosh cites several imperial historians who have voiced concern about the abandonment of the archives, including Richard M. Eaton, "(Re)imag(in)ing Otherness: A Postmortem for the Postmodern in India," *Journal of World History* 11, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 57–78; and Matthew Connolly in "AHR Conversation: On Transnational History," *American Historical Review* 111, no. 5 (December 2006): 1441–1464.

¹⁵ E. H. Carr makes a mockery of historians who try to walk in the archives as "in the Garden of Eden, without a scrap of philosophy to cover them, naked and unashamed before the god of history." Carr,

inist and queer studies scholars such as Ann Stoler, Anjali Arondekar, and Elizabeth Kolsky, celebrates an “archival turn” that “relies on strategies of ‘theorizing about texts,’ while doing a lot of gathering at the same time.” Today she sees raucous comity, depicting the squabbling passengers in imperial history’s minivan as sharing a “political project—anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism—with disagreements about the value of different disciplinary methodologies.”

While Surkis and Wilder might label this comity a source of worry, a resistance to articulating higher stakes, Ghosh depicts it as contentiously productive. While Surkis and Wilder distrust generational “turn talk,” Ghosh discerns progressive family legacies. But while Ghosh maps an agreed-upon destination for imperial history’s road trip, Cook depicts “the cultural turn” as so explosively dynamic across such a wide spectrum of subfields that there can be no single endpoint. Indeed, he speaks not of “the turn” but of “the turns,” not of something we are “beyond” but of continuing, mutating energies feeding the field today. Nor are we locked in oedipal contests; indeed, we are not even “we” in a generational sense. “The kids are all right” precisely because they share their parents’ engaged style of self-reflective history, driven to understand past interactions and ideas with an expanding repertoire of analytical moves.

JAMES COOK, AFTER REVEALING the surprising paucity of references to the “cultural turn” before the late 1990s, examines the moment when the use of this phrase shoots skyward, precipitated most particularly by Victoria Bonnell and Lynn Hunt’s *Beyond the Cultural Turn*, which arrived not to praise “the turn” but to bury it. Cook points to this moment’s “dramatic refashioning of the story . . . from the live and bracing debates of Eley and Samuel to the fixed and finished turn of Bonnell and Hunt.” As his clever graft shows, the “declensionists” who tried to place “the cultural turn” in its coffin were the very ones who spurred it to life as a contentious concept. What followed the premature funeral was a spate of competing master narratives using this very phrase to excavate historiography’s recent past. These narratives tended to revolve around a certain “timeframe (1960s to the 1990s), setting (one or another corner of the European field), narrative arc (rise and fall), and authorial voice (the generational ‘we’),” and it is here, most especially, that Cook wishes to intervene in order to transform the story from one about “the turn” to one about continuing, multiple turns. He questions each element of this four-part template and revises the tight generational, subdisciplinary tale by opening it up to the present, broadening our focus away from Europe and European imperialism, rejecting the autumnal gloom of “an ending,” and embracing the scholarship of younger people who, far from rejecting the turn, are pushing it onward into new variants.

Looking at today’s scholarship, Cook demonstrates that on the ground level of history-writing, the dissonance spawned by the cultural turn has been enormously productive, leading to attentiveness to a whole range of circulating cultural forms,

What Is History? (New York, 1962), 21. See G. R. Elton, *The Practice of History* (London, 1967), and most especially his attack on the linguistic turn in *Return to Essentials*. See also Keith Jenkins, *On “What Is History?” From Carr and Elton to Rorty and White* (London, 1995).

including capitalism, neglected in earlier iterations of “the cultural turn.” Walter Johnson’s work on slavery, *Soul by Soul*, is singled out in this regard for revealing the ways the continuing turns combine discursive and economic analysis, allowing the mutual constitutiveness of the cultural and the social to emerge. In short, Cook takes up the challenge and the optimism of Eley’s still-unfolding story, suggesting not only that “it” is far from over, but that the widening ripples of the turns extend across the globe. In the manner of true events, one might say, the recent changes in historiography were “world-establishing,” creating hitherto unimagined spaces for exploration, inaugurating a history that cannot be buried, and giving us a future productively at odds with the past.

AN ENERVATING POLITESSE MAY HAVE descended in some quarters of the profession, but the voices in this forum evince no complacency. Instead, there is passion and intelligence in grappling with our position. Yet my own sense is that we still understand only dimly the forces reshaping our field and our world over the past few decades, and that these essays, broad and bracing though they are, are not broad and bracing enough. Perhaps, as Nietzsche noted in *Beyond Good and Evil*, “the greatest events and thoughts (and the greatest thoughts are the greatest events) are comprehended most slowly. The generations which are their contemporaries do not experience, do not ‘live through’ them—they live alongside them.”¹⁶ Alongside the turns analyzed here, a world-altering force has been emerging, one larger, more devastating, and more definitive even than the “contemporary flexible forms of capitalism” emphasized by Sewell: I speak of climate change—or climate collapse—and all of its related global transformations.¹⁷ Wilder rightly insists that we be mindful of “the conditions of possibility of the historical knowledge” we produce, yet the most fundamental of these conditions of possibility, the environment itself, has gotten short shrift from most of us. If we accept that historians need to be conscious of the material basis of the means of production—our own as well as past generations’—and that contemporary predicaments necessarily inform our understanding of the

¹⁶ Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Marianne Cowan (Chicago, 1955), 230.

¹⁷ William H. Sewell, *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago, 2005), 62. The older insistence on “capitalism” as the culprit in climate collapse has been disputed. For instance, Kenneth Pomeranz argues, “if one measures industrialization not by the market value of the output but by the quantities of land and people that become involved—probably more relevant criteria for environmental historians—then noncapitalist (or at most semicapitalist) regimes have presided over most of the spread of industrialization.” Pomeranz, “Introduction: World History and Environmental History,” in Edmund Burke III and Kenneth Pomeranz, eds., *The Environment and World History* (Berkeley, Calif., 2009), 3–32, here 8. For this argument, see also Robert B. Marks, “Commercialization without Capitalism: Processes of Environmental Change in South China, 1550–1850,” *Environmental History* 1, no. 1 (January 1996): 56–82. The phrase “climate collapse,” as opposed to “climate change,” is favored by David W. Orr, *Down to the Wire: Confronting Climate Collapse* (Oxford, 2009). The literature on climate change in general is vast. See, for instance, David Archer and Stefan Rahmstorf, *The Climate Crisis: An Introductory Guide to Climate Change* (Cambridge, 2010); Clark A. Miller and Paul N. Edwards, *Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001); Spencer R. Weart, *The Discovery of Global Warming* (Cambridge, Mass., 2003); Elizabeth Kolbert, *Field Notes from a Catastrophe: Man, Nature, and Climate Change* (New York, 2006); Paul N. Edwards, *A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010); WorldWatch Institute, *State of the World, 2010: Transforming Cultures—From Consumerism to Sustainability* (New York, 2010); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007*, 3 vols. (New York, 2007).

past, environmental consciousness makes exacting intellectual demands. This “new materialism” will produce new questions, new objects of study, and new types of evidence beyond those developed through the social, linguistic, cultural, and imperial turns.¹⁸

Understanding the history of our altered physical world will require us to readapt our magpie tendencies and steal some eggs from the nests of scientists. Such intellectual thievery marked prior turns. In the 1960s and '70s, social history was energized by the collateral disciplines of economics and sociology; then, with the linguistic and cultural turns in the 1980s and '90s, anthropology, cultural studies, and literary theory reoriented our outlook. Now it is to our more distant intellectual cousins in biology, chemistry, physics, and related fields that we must turn. We are currently devouring “the [natural] resources and services of 1.3 Earths. In other words, people are using about a third more of Earth’s capacity than is available, undermining the resilience of the very ecosystems on which humanity depends.”¹⁹ To understand how this unprecedented situation arose, we must reconsider what counts as a “fact,” what level of interaction requires analysis, how one narrates such a history, where one gathers evidence.²⁰ In its general silence on these matters, this forum accurately represents our discipline’s still-halting engagement with the monstrously difficult problem of how to execute an environmental turn.

One can be either pessimistic or optimistic about the likelihood of our meeting this radical challenge to our practices. Pessimistic because the difficulties of analyzing the organic and inorganic substrates of history dwarf the difficulties posed by reconfigured concepts of context and text. While we may be inching toward “a historiography that acknowledges both the social, contextual determinants of thought and behavior in the past and the mediating role played by language and culture in their functioning” in what Gabrielle Spiegel calls the “unified field theory” of history, accommodation more broadly between the competing realities of human social and cultural histories, on the one hand, and nature’s realities as described by science, on

¹⁸ I discuss Sebastiano Timpanaro’s phrase “the new materialism,” which appeared in *On Materialism* (London, 1980; orig. Italian ed. 1970), briefly in *Reconfiguring Modernity: Concepts of Nature in Japanese Political Ideology* (Berkeley, Calif., 2001) and at greater length in “Atarashii busshitsu shugi” (The New Materialism), the preface to the Japanese translation, *Kindai no saikochiku: Nihon seiji ideorogi ni okeru shizen no gainen* (Tokyo, 2008). Older Marxist explorations of the way that “materialism” might be expanded to encompass the environment include André Gorz, *Ecology as Politics* (Boston, 1980; orig. French ed. 1975); and Gorz, *Capitalism, Socialism, Ecology* (London, 1994; orig. French ed. 1991). For more recent work on the new materialism and politics, see Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, eds., *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics* (Durham, N.C., 2010), especially Jason Edwards, “The Materialism of Historical Materialism,” 281–298; Jane Bennett, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things* (Durham, N.C., 2010); and Mick Smith, *Against Ecological Sovereignty: Ethics, Biopolitics, and Saving the Natural World* (Minneapolis, 2011).

¹⁹ WorldWatch Institute, *The State of the World, 2010*, 4.

²⁰ Engaged work on this question of how environmental studies challenge historical practices has begun in earnest, but more must be done. My own modest attempts to articulate this problem can be found in Ian J. Miller, Julia Adeney Thomas, and Brett L. Walker, eds., *Japan at Nature’s Edge: The Environmental Context of a Global Power* (Honolulu, forthcoming 2012); “From Modernity with Freedom to Sustainability with Decency: Politicizing Passivity,” in Kimberly Coulter and Christof Mauch, eds., *The Future of Environmental History: Needs and Opportunities* (Munich, 2011), 53–56; and “The Exquisite Corpses of Nature and History: The Case of the Korean DMZ,” in Chris Pearson, Peter Coates, and Tim Cole, eds., *Militarized Landscapes: From Gettysburg to Salisbury Plain* (London, 2010), 151–168.

the other, is truly thorny.²¹ Science speaks in different temporalities with such concepts as the Anthropocene; produces different notions of agency with the interactions of entire species, chemically altered brains, and inorganic forces; and, even more cantankerously, insists on not making “normative statements,” manifesting an allergy to the very articulations of value and meaning rightly prized by engaged history. Science as science has nothing to say about the desirability of social justice or even of human survival. Engaging the sciences should not rekindle false dreams of history *being* a science. In remaining true to our calling, historians will find that our conversations with scientists often seem like very rough translations.

On the other hand, the possibility of optimism rests precisely on the theoretical mindfulness produced by the turns. In articulating competing ways of describing power, competing ways of understanding power’s agents and operations, and, ultimately, competing modes of creativity and resistance, the theoretical engagements within our profession, as Cook shows, have produced nimbleness of mind and flexibility of outlook.²² Thoughtful debates over representation and the limits of our capacity to comprehend totalities (while we yearn to do so) will aid us in addressing the new materialism. But they will, I think, be inadequate. The tectonic plates that shifted in the early 1980s are once again causing ruptures that cannot be “submitted to a horizon of prior meanings.” Neither recuperating the approaches of feminism or social history as they were before “turn talk” nor celebrating the fruits of these turns’ continuing productivity will be sufficient to understand the precarious state of our world. Only with a readiness to accept eventfulness, weather loss without consolation, and yet persevere in the spirit of willed, generous optimism can history constitute the new optic now required. In short, were I to return to the ocean—30 percent more acidic than it was at the beginning of the industrial revolution and, since 1950, depleted of 40 percent of the phytoplankton that produces much of our oxygen—the sharp decline in fishing stocks would make my feeble casting skills even more evident. But my understanding of the tensions between the hopes of human history and the determinations of our manifestly material nature have been sharpened, and I would come with new criteria for the formation of historical knowledge.²³

²¹ Spiegel, “Comment on *A Crooked Line*,” 410.

²² “Indeed,” as Geoff Eley says, “being a historian during the last third of the twentieth century has required learning to live with a condition of virtually continuous flux.” *A Crooked Line*, 8.

²³ Never in the last 300 million years has the ocean acidified at the current rate. See Bärbel Hönlisch et al., “The Geological Record of Ocean Acidification,” *Science* 335, no. 6072 (March 2, 2012): 1058–1063. On fish depletion, see Ranson A. Myers and Boris Worm, “Rapid Worldwide Depletion of Predatory Fish Communities,” *Nature* 423 (May 15, 2003): 280–283; Boris Worm et al., “Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Services,” *Science* 314, no. 5800 (November 3, 2006): 787–790, here 787.

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AHR Forum
Comment: Generational Turns

NATHAN PERL-ROSENTHAL

One generation goes, another comes,
But the earth remains the same forever

Ecclesiastes 1:4

THE TURN IS DEAD; LONG LIVE THE TURN. Just as early modern Europeans hailed a new king and in the same breath mourned his predecessor, the essays in this forum announce the turn's rebirth as they pronounce its epitaph. The authors offer compelling arguments for rejecting turn talk and the idea of scholarly generations on which it is based. As they observe, turns are often described in an almost religious language of conversion experiences and about-faces. This language reifies what came before and suggests that it has been decisively supplanted by another way of writing and thinking. The authors rightly reject this practice as more apt to foreclose thinking than to stimulate it.¹ At the same time, in somewhat contradictory fashion, they suggest that there are troubling developments occurring now in their respective areas of specialization. Wilder observes the formation of a "disciplinary consensus" that aims to blunt the force of innovative work on French imperialism. Cook and Surkis record the declarations by senior scholars that the cultural and linguistic turns are over. Ghosh notes a strand within the new imperial history that seems to ignore postcolonial historiography.

The authors' rejection of turn talk and their concerns about current scholarship are both rooted in the particular notion of historical generations that they embrace. In their articles, the contributors imagine generations as existing primarily in sequence, with each rising generation supplanting or superseding the earlier one.² This concept of generations has a long history: it was a common trope in Weimar Germany, and it is essentially the one that is peddled to us on a daily basis by Madison Avenue, with its continual refocusing on the pleasures and preferences of young

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¹ For the "foreclosure effect," see Gary Wilder's and Judith Surkis's contributions to this forum.

² Wilder does not state this point explicitly, but his account of Laurent Dubois's work expresses most strongly of all the idea that new approaches (in his case, an Atlantic-centered approach to the history of the French Revolution) must displace earlier approaches.

consumers.³ It is also embedded in the way that the senior scholars whom the authors cite as historiographic masters have described their own scholarly trajectories, linking their embrace of various turns to landmarks in their own autobiographies.⁴ If turn talk is indeed nothing more than a way to declare that something new has arrived to displace the old, then the contributors to this forum are right to dismiss it as barren and unhelpful.

However, the account of historiographic generation that underpins both the authors' rejection of turn talk and their anxieties about the future strikes me as somewhat counterintuitive and unsatisfying. There is another dimension to the familial metaphor of the generation that can be elided by focusing too narrowly on the drama of supersession. I am referring, of course, to the deep continuities between the old and the young that talk of generations implies. In its strongest formulation, this way of seeing generations denies the very possibility of supersession. One group of scholars must eventually give way to another in the natural course of events. But the rising group is formed by the passing one and is inculcated with their values and preoccupations. The passage from one to the other is at least as much a moment of continuity as of rupture.⁵ Indeed, the forum essays themselves embody this kind of non-supersessionist generational shift. The authors willingly employ the distinctive technical vocabulary of the cultural and linguistic turns, so that there is a genetic similarity in language and style of argumentation between their essays here and the writings of the earlier generation whom they critique.⁶

The contributors to this forum, tenured and training students in their own right, are now the older generation to a younger cohort, of which I am a member. That relationship offers the opportunity to reexamine the balance between continuity and disjuncture in scholarly generations. Reflecting on this new cohort, composed as it is of individuals who have not yet published their first books, means looking at unpublished dissertations. I will focus here on around twenty drawn from my areas of specialization, early modern Western Europe and North America. These selections, while necessarily personal and idiosyncratic, cover a wide range of regions and topics. Together they show a strong shift among younger scholars toward novel objects of study, the adoption of a shared mode of analysis based on practice and process, and a return to intensive archival research. These shifts are rooted in the particular intellectual and political context of the cohort's training, but they do not mark a caesura with the previous generation. Indeed, they suggest that a revised language of turns still has value as a way to articulate and analyze historiographic change.

³ See Peter E. Gordon, *Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010), 48–51; and Jackson Lears, *Fables of Abundance: A Cultural History of Advertising in America* (New York, 1994), 168–169.

⁴ For examples of this, see especially William H. Sewell, Jr., *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago, 2005), 40–45; Geoff Eley, *A Crooked Line: From Cultural History to the History of Society* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2005), 90–93. The process is well discussed in Cook's essay.

⁵ Two remarkable works that reflect on this process of intergenerational linkage in very different ways are Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, *Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory* (Seattle, Wash., 1982); and David Hackett Fischer, *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (New York, 1989).

⁶ The phrase "historiographic turn" is itself one of these markers: in ordinary speech, the noun "turn" is rarely used with adjectives that do not denote speed or direction (e.g., "fast," "right").

THREE TOPICS OR TYPES OF OBJECTS have attracted the interest of many younger early modernists: histories of communication, transportation, and material culture.⁷ Scholarship on communications draws on the increasingly rich history of the book, but applies its methods far beyond the codex and the classic questions of cultural history.⁸ The history of transportation has evolved from a topic of almost purely antiquarian interest into a vibrant theme of new research in a wide variety of geographic and temporal areas. In the early modern period, its most prominent manifestation has been a renewal of maritime history.⁹ Though these historians are asking questions drawn from outside the traditional history of transportation (especially labor, economic, and environmental history), they have rethought those problems in light of the centrality of transportation and its practicalities to the sea-centered

⁷ A fifth major area that has developed in recent years is the history of political economy. This includes such important work as Sophus A. Reinert, *Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy* (Cambridge, Mass., 2011); Jose R. Torre, *The Political Economy of Sentiment: Paper Credit and the Scottish Enlightenment in Early Republic Boston, 1780–1820* (London, 2007); Seth Rockman, *Scraping By: Wage Labor, Slavery, and Survival in Early Baltimore* (Baltimore, 2009); Paul Cheney, *Revolutionary Commerce: Globalization and the French Monarchy* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010); John Shovlin, *The Political Economy of Virtue: Luxury, Patriotism, and the Origins of the French Revolution* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2006); and Carl Wennerlind, *Casualties of Credit: The English Financial Revolution, 1620–1720* (Cambridge, Mass., 2011). Because its growth has been particularly precocious in the early modern period and its practitioners have mostly published monographs already, it is visible to the wider profession, so I do not focus on it here.

⁸ On the early modern history of the book, see especially Robert Darnton, *The Literary Underground of the Old Regime* (Cambridge, Mass., 1982); Darnton, *The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France* (New York, 1995); Roger Chartier, *Lectures et lecteurs dans la France d'ancien régime* (Paris, 1987); Anthony Grafton, *Defenders of the Text: The Traditions of Scholarship in an Age of Science, 1450–1800* (Cambridge, Mass., 1991); Ann Blair, *Too Much to Know: Managing Scholarly Information before the Modern Age* (New Haven, Conn., 2010). In the Anglo-American context, see, among others, Richard D. Brown, *Knowledge Is Power: The Diffusion of Information in Early America, 1700–1865* (New York, 1989); Robert A. Gross and Mary Kelley, eds., *An Extensive Republic: Print, Culture, and Society in the New Nation, 1790–1840* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2010); Richard B. Sher, *The Enlightenment and the Book: Scottish Authors and Their Publishers in Eighteenth-Century Britain, Ireland, and America* (Chicago, 2006). The theme of communications is important in a number of recent dissertations: Kenneth Bernard Loisselle, “‘New but true friends’: Freemasonry and the Culture of Male Friendship in Eighteenth-Century France” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 2007); Jeremy Caradonna, “The Enlightenment in Question: Academic Prize Competitions (*concours académiques*) and the Francophone Republic of Letters, 1670–1794” (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2008); Noah Chaim Millstone, “Plot’s Commonwealth: The Circulation of Manuscripts and the Practice of Politics in Early Stuart England, c. 1614–1640” (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 2011); Alejandra Dubcovsky, “Connected Worlds: Communication Networks in the Colonial Southeast, 1513–1740” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2011); Jessica M. Lepler, “1837: Anatomy of a Panic” (Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 2007); and Joseph M. Adelman, “The Business of Politics: Printers and the Emergence of Political Communications Networks, 1765–1776” (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2010). My own dissertation, Nathan Perl-Rosenthal, “Corresponding Republics: Letter Writing and Patriot Organizing in the Atlantic Revolutions, circa 1760–1792” (Columbia University, 2011), fits into this category as well. See also Jeremy Caradonna, *The Enlightenment in Practice: Academic Prize Contests and Intellectual Culture in France, 1670–1794* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2012).

⁹ See Niklas Erik Frykman, “The Wooden World Turned Upside Down: Naval Mutinies in the Age of Atlantic Revolution” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2010); Brian J. Rouleau, “With Sails Whitening Every Sea: Commercial Expansion, Maritime Empire, and the American Seafaring Community Abroad, 1780–1870” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2010); Denver Alexander Brunsman, “The Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2004); Charles R. Foy, “Ports of Slavery, Ports of Freedom: How Slaves Used Northern Seaports’ Maritime Industry to Escape and Create Trans-Atlantic Identities, 1713–1783” (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 2008); and Rachel Tamar Van, “Free Trade and Family Values: Kinship Networks and the Culture of Early American Capitalism” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2011).

early modern world.¹⁰ Younger scholars' interest in material culture has been spurred by work in two areas, the history of science and visual studies, that have moved rapidly from the margins to the center over the past generation. Much of the newest scholarship focuses on extra-European science, the environment, and knowledge-making through visual and material sources.¹¹

In working on these topics, the younger scholars all devote considerable effort to answering what one of them, Noah Millstone, calls the "pragmatic" questions: How does it work? How does it happen?¹² This can mean reconstructing the complex Atlantic and global processes that turned commodities into finished decorative objects, as in work by Zara Anishanslin and Molly Warsh. Or it may entail painstaking description of print, oral, and manuscript communication networks, as in work by Joseph Adelman, Alejandra Dubcovsky, and Millstone. It can even involve tracing the evanescent movements of maritime people, as Charles Foy and Niklas Frykman do. Each of these studies and others like them rest on a substantial base of archival research: there is no other way to gain an understanding of how, exactly, such sprawling, intricate systems of transportation, communication, and consumption functioned.

The forum authors offer sidelong acknowledgments of this new scholarship and express concerns about where the turn-in-progress is headed. Some believe that it represents a "new empiricism" or "new nominalism" spreading through the historical profession. Younger scholars seem to be taking positivist stances toward their sources and in some cases even believe themselves to be reconstructing the objective reality of the past. Wilder, Surkis, and Ghosh cast this development in supersessionist terms, as a rejection of the theoretical sophistication and focus on meaning that was characteristic of scholarship inflected by the linguistic and cultural turns.¹³

¹⁰ The important scholarship that influenced this new work includes Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston, 2000); Daniel Vickers, *Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630–1850* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1994); Daniel Vickers and Vince Walsh, *Young Men and the Sea: Yankee Seafarers in the Age of Sail* (New Haven, Conn., 2005); Margaret S. Creighton and Lisa Norling, *Iron Men, Wooden Women: Gender and Seafaring in the Atlantic World, 1700–1920* (Baltimore, 1996); Lisa Norling, *Captain Ahab Had a Wife: New England Women and the Whalefishery, 1720–1870* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000); Alain Cabantous, *La mer et les hommes: Pêcheurs et matelots dunkerquois de Louis XIV à la Révolution* (Dunkerque, 1980); Cabantous, *Dix mille marins face à l'océan: Les populations maritimes de Dunkerque au Havre aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles (vers 1660–1794): Étude sociale* (Paris, 1991); Greg Denning, *Mr. Bligh's Bad Language: Passion, Power, and Theatre on the Bounty* (Cambridge, 1992).

¹¹ See especially Zara Anishanslin, "Portrait of a Woman in a Silk Dress: The Hidden Histories of Aesthetic Commodities in the Eighteenth-Century British Atlantic World" (Ph.D. diss., University of Delaware, 2009); Molly A. Warsh, "Adorning Empire: A History of the Early Modern Pearl Trade, 1492–1688" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2009); Sarah Easterby-Smith, "Cultivating Commerce: Connoisseurship, Botany and the Plant Trade in London and Paris, c. 1760–c. 1815" (D.Phil. diss., University of Warwick, 2009); Kathleen S. Murphy, "Portals of Nature: Networks of Natural History in Eighteenth-Century British Plantation Societies" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2008); and Ryan Jones, "Empire of Extinction: Nature and Natural History in the Russian North Pacific, 1739–1799" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2008).

¹² Millstone, "Plot's Commonwealth," 36. See also Van, "Free Trade and Family Values," 14, for another key "how" question.

¹³ Wilder and Surkis emphasize the role played in this process by older scholars. These older cohorts have flattened and schematized the cultural and linguistic turns in order to reject a putative extreme constructivist position. The end result of this process, both suggest, is a movement toward a positivist "social scientific" framework.

Ghosh is the most inclined to celebrate what she takes to be a potentially salutary “archival turn,” yet even she is careful to warn her readers against uncritical positivism.

However, a supersessionist view of the new scholarship, at least in the early modern period, seems mistaken to me. The emergent work does not reject the preoccupations and insights of the previous generations. It executes instead two subtle but crucial shifts of emphasis in subject matter and approach. First, while the emergent scholars emphasize the study of acts or behaviors rather than discursive texts and statements, they do so not to reject the study of meaning but in order to give a different account of the relationship between acts and culture. The languages of practice, process, and networks that they each employ focus our attention on the power of habitual action and symbol-poor practices to create meaning. Second, in part because of the central role it gives to process and practice, this scholarship emphasizes the physical and social factors that constrained how early modern people made meaning in their everyday lives.

These younger scholars write about “material practices,” the “practice of politics,” and “cultural practice.”¹⁴ In one sense, “practice” for them is simply the antonym of principle or pure intellection: it signals their emphasis on analyzing culture through behavior. In a second sense, it indicates that they are talking in particular about repeated or habitual action. On a deeper level, they and many others use the term to denote what lies between pure constructivism on one side and hard-core methodological realism or materialism on the other. It seems to imply a belief that there is a mutually constitutive relationship between the social and the cultural.¹⁵ Equally important is what the younger scholars do not mean to signal by using the term: a desire to enter into the intricate debates over “practice” that have grown up around the work of French anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu.¹⁶

Practice offers a language well suited to discussing how meaning-making occurred through ordinary, habitual behavior. There is nothing novel in the thought that people make meaning through everyday life. This was a key insight of the *Annales* school nearly a century ago, and in various ways it has been a mainstay of social and cultural history ever since. In this respect, the emergent early modern scholars show deep continuities with the generations of cultural and social historians who came before them. Yet for cultural historians since the 1970s, who rejected the generalizing tendency of the classic history of *mentalités*, exceptional and extraordinary cases or moments were often taken to be the best route into the recesses of historical actors’ minds. The forum authors mention several exemplary interpretations in this mode, including Robert Darnton’s cat massacre, Natalie Zemon Davis’s *Martin Guerre*, and Carlo Ginsburg’s *Menocchio*. This model has been widely influential, though not unquestioned: the explanatory power of exceptional cases spurred im-

¹⁴ Quotations from Murphy, “Portals of Nature,” 19; Anishanslin, “Portrait of a Woman in a Silk Dress,” 32; Millstone, “Plot’s Commonwealth,” i.

¹⁵ For this formulation, see Carla Hesse, “The New Empiricism,” *Cultural and Social History* 1, no. 2 (2004): 201–207, here 206.

¹⁶ For examples of this sidestepping of the Bourdieu-centered debates, see Millstone, “Plot’s Commonwealth,” 35–36; and Easterby-Smith, “Cultivating Commerce,” 75. For capsule statements of some of these debates, see the essays in Craig J. Calhoun, Edward LiPuma, and Moishe Postone, eds., *Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives* (Chicago, 1993); and David L. Swartz and Vera L. Zolberg, eds., *After Bourdieu: Influence, Critique, Elaboration* (Dordrecht, 2004).

mediate debate, and a number of scholars partly moved away from it toward histories of ordinary occurrences.¹⁷

The early modernists of this younger generation are distinguished from earlier cohorts by their full—even exclusive—embrace of the everyday as a source of meaning. Networks of print and manuscript circulation, which are central to the projects of several of the emerging scholars working on political culture, are notable because they performed their political work over time rather than in a single, dramatic moment.¹⁸ Recent work in maritime history has similarly turned sharply away from exceptional cases, such as the Bligh mutiny, and focused increasingly on common, often repeated, practices: impressment, foreign travel, naval service.¹⁹ In histories of material culture, much of the new work has focused on chains of commodity production and exchange rather than the instant of purchase or consumption. This approach draws the eye away from the moment of exception, the instance of meaning-making at purchase, and toward the slow accretion of meanings as an object is made and traded from hand to hand.²⁰

The everyday practices at the center of these recent dissertations also seem, in many cases, to be surprisingly poor in symbolic meaning. This marks another important shift in emphasis from the previous generation of scholars. The classic cultural histories and the theorists on whom they drew, from Geertz to Foucault and Derrida, privileged the symbolic or semiotic dimension of culture. In practice, this meant that their analyses of actions and events gave pride of place to discovering the symbolic meanings encoded into actions. Such meanings were of course hidden, requiring deep excavation to make them yield their secrets. This method gave cultural history the form that we usually associate with it: close, deep readings of texts, richly contextualized. It also worked best with certain kinds of sources, notably ones that employed complex categories or rich description, which lent themselves to such analyses.

The younger scholars by no means reject close reading, but it is counterbalanced in their work by attention to how even seemingly symbol-poor practices can create meaning by instantiating social and intellectual relationships. Jeremy Caradonna's study of academic prize competitions in eighteenth-century France argues that the very act of participating in the competitions helped large numbers of individuals

¹⁷ On the idea of *mentalités* and its relationship to cultural history, see especially Dominick LaCapra, "Is Everyone a *Mentalité* Case? Transference and the 'Culture' Concept," *History and Theory* 23, no. 3 (October 1984): 296–311; and Robert Darnton, *The Great Cat Massacre: And Other Episodes in French Cultural History* (New York, 1985), 282–283 nn. 1–2. One could adduce many examples of the move back to cultural histories of ordinary behavior: one example that stands out is the wave of studies of consumption, for which in the late eighteenth century see especially T. H. Breen, "Ideology and Nationalism on the Eve of the American Revolution: Revisions *Once More* in Need of Revising," *Journal of American History* 84, no. 1 (1997): 13–39; Breen, "'Baubles of Britain': The American and Consumer Revolutions of the Eighteenth Century," *Past and Present*, no. 119 (May 1988): 73–104; John Brewer and Roy Porter, eds., *Consumption and the World of Goods* (London, 1993); and Colin Jones, "The Great Chain of Buying: Medical Advertisement, the Bourgeois Public Sphere, and the Origins of the French Revolution," *American Historical Review* 101, no. 1 (February 1996): 13–40.

¹⁸ See especially Millstone, "Plot's Commonwealth"; and Adelman, "The Business of Politics."

¹⁹ Brunsman, "The Evil Necessity"; Rouleau, "With Sails Whitening Every Sea"; Frykman, "The Wooden World Turned Upside Down." Frykman focuses on naval mutinies, which might appear to be exceptional rather than ordinary, but a central part of his argument is that these events were in fact quite habitual in the period he is considering and rooted in the ordinary life of sailors (the labor process) itself.

²⁰ See Anishanslin, "Portrait of a Woman in a Silk Dress"; and Warsh, "Adorning Empire."

become stakeholders in the Enlightenment. While not uninterested in the content of the prize submissions, Caradonna sees meaning (in this case, enlightened-ness) as being created more by the act of taking part than by any particular ideological position that a writer assumed.²¹ Sarah Easterby-Smith makes a somewhat similar point when she traces how the circulation of plants in wartime created “cosmopolitanism” among botanists. Maintaining international connections and continuing to circulate live plants and other botanica helped commercial nurserymen demonstrate their identities as scientific (and thus cosmopolitan) actors.²²

The use of networks as a concept and a category of analysis is the clearest manifestation of the younger scholars’ interest in the cultural content of relatively symbol-poor, everyday actions. Networks are the products of routine or even rote action, a type of behavior that by design lacks conceptual complexity and ambiguity.²³ Studying networks, moreover, often means having to depend on sources such as population records, manuscript catalogues, or business letters that are designed to avoid just the kind of richness and complexity that cultural historians have sought. Adelman, Dubcovsky, Foy, Millstone, Rachel Van, and Kathleen Murphy, working on topics ranging from American printers to enslaved sailors to East Asian merchants, all feature the term “network” in either their title or their chapter headings. This is just part of a broader, vertiginous rise of network talk throughout the entire profession: a keyword search for “network” within abstracts in history and allied disciplines, via Dissertation Abstracts Online, yields 3,705 individual dissertations. Of those dissertations, 48 are from before 1981; 497 are from 1981–1990; and 1,304 date from 1991–2000. A majority, 1,856 of the total, are from 2001–2012 alone.²⁴

Alongside their emphasis on habitual acts, the second innovative element of the younger scholars’ work is their heightened awareness of the physical and material constraints that shaped how early modern people fashioned themselves and their cultural worlds. This awareness is in part a result of the kinds of topics that have drawn their attention. Transportation in this period was highly sensitive to time, weather, and geography, among other factors. Communications were only as good as the medium of transmission—which in the early modern period, without telecommunications, often came down to transportation as well. These factors did not make meaning all by themselves, but the younger scholars emphasize how profoundly they affected the ways in which early modern people assigned meanings to acts. Jessica Lepler’s work shows how the inefficiencies of early modern information networks helped to spawn financial panics in early-nineteenth-century America. (In her work, indeed, the networks created to facilitate communications turn out to be a straitjacket in times of crisis.)²⁵ Kenneth Loisel notes how important the speed and frequency of correspondence were in creating the social meaning of letters in early

²¹ Caradonna, “The Enlightenment in Question,” esp. 12–13.

²² Easterby-Smith, “Cultivating Commerce,” 173–235, esp. 213–222.

²³ For a useful discussion of new research on the science of habitual action, see Charles Duhigg, *The Power of Habit: Why We Do What We Do in Life and Business* (New York, 2012), chap. 1.

²⁴ Accessed March 9, 2012. The ratios by decade are similar in the more tightly focused *America: History and Life* database. This database, which covers only American history, goes back to 1974 and has coverage through 2009. The results are 35 from before 1981; 86 from 1981–1990; 104 from 1991–2000; and 119 from 2001–2009.

²⁵ Lepler, “1837,” chaps. 2–3, esp. 60, 113–114.

modern Europe.²⁶ Ryan Jones notes that “ecological factors” (in his case, in the North Pacific) can help to explain “processes as diverse as human patterns of settlement and European ideas about empire.”²⁷

Restraints imposed by the physical world, however, are less significant to many of these scholars than the ways in which historical actors became stuck in webs of their own making. In a general sense, this is a very old idea, but its prominence in the interpretations of the younger scholars is striking. The scholarly and financial networks that Lepler, Easterby-Smith, and Murphy discuss all created closed communities that had the effect of limiting the intellectual and conceptual flexibility of those who participated in them.²⁸ Brian Rouleau’s work on American seamen abroad suggests that racialized thinking proved hard to escape even for those who traveled the farthest.²⁹ The new generation of scholars reminds us that habits are hard to shake, and that their power often stretches well beyond their usefulness. The specifics differ from field to field, but in each one there is a similar newfound respect for the limitations that historical actors and communities inadvertently create for themselves.

There are echoes of materialism and structuralism in the power that younger scholars attribute to social and physical constraints. The search for underlying patterns of action recalls the structuralist drive to discover frameworks of human thought and behavior. Foregrounding material constraints effects a diminution of individual agency similar to that of structuralist and materialist accounts: boats sink or float, and the drowned do not engage in discourse. Yet the new scholarship eschews the ahistorical, mechanistic formulations with which structuralism has come to be associated. The vocabulary of practice implies that social habits were a structure that constrained historical actors’ volition, but those structures are seen as the product of the actors’ own efforts. Similarly, the new scholarship does not resurrect the discredited conceptual framework by which material realities are bedrock and cultural construction is a light spume playing on the rocks.³⁰

WHY IS IT THAT SO MANY YOUNGER early modernists are turning in a similar direction? The question may turn out to be *mal posée*. If we follow the lead of the new early modern scholarship, it makes more sense to offer a descriptive account of the turn, emphasizing the “how” rather than the “why.” Since we are dealing with a turn still under way, moreover, it is far easier to observe *that* something is happening than to explain *why* it is occurring. We lack the distance we would need to offer a complete genealogy of the turn-in-progress. Let me nonetheless venture two guesses, one internalist and one externalist, about why so many younger scholars are making a

²⁶ Loiselle, “‘New but true friends,’” chap. 3.

²⁷ Jones, “Empire of Extinction,” 18.

²⁸ See citations above and Murphy, “Portals of Nature,” chap. 4, esp. 192–195.

²⁹ Rouleau, “With Sails Whitening Every Sea,” chap. 3.

³⁰ Claude Lévi-Strauss is usually cited as the key structuralist interested in universal frameworks; see, e.g., John Sturrock, ed., *Structuralism and Since: From Lévi-Strauss to Derrida* (Oxford, 1979), 4–5, 47–48. For a good discussion of the problem of generality in structural analyses, see Lucien Goldmann, “Structure: Human Reality and Methodological Concept,” in Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato, eds., *The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man* (Baltimore, 1970), 98–124, here 108–110.

particular turn. Internally, within early modern historiography, many of the most discussed themes during the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century were described primarily in geographic terms: the rise of Atlantic history, a resurgence of Mediterranean studies, the beginnings of global and oceanic history, even the history of borderlands.³¹ This way of thinking about a field, which grouped people and things by place, naturally led younger scholars to be curious about what kinds of ligatures bound together the individuals and objects so collected. Hence the shift toward themes that emphasized practices and processes of connection—and the study of networks in particular.

This cohort also had longer-term forces acting on it that may help to explain why it has proven receptive to the “how” and to histories of process and practice. These are scholars who entered graduate school between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s; most were born in the mid- to late 1970s or early 1980s. That means, in turn, that they were among the first to come of age in a post-Reagan, post-Thatcher, post-Soviet world, in which the dreams of revolution from both right and left (both socialist and Reaganite) had been somewhat deflated. As these future scholars were entering high school or college, they found themselves in an era of small-bore pragmatism about social and political problems. That atmosphere seems to be reflected in their relatively greater interest in concrete questions about how things happened.³²

Recognizing the intellectual and social milieu in which the new generation of scholars was formed, however, raises a question about whether the current turn is a historiographic “moment” as much as it is a generational shift. (Though they share a temporal frame, the metaphor of a “moment” is more inclusive than the idea of a generation, suggesting as it does that scholars at many stages and of many ages are adopting a new approach at the same time.) For instance, some of the most important new work that employs networks as a category has been done by senior scholars.³³ By the same token, histories of visual and material culture were well established before the rising generation of early modernists had entered graduate school.³⁴ Yet

³¹ See, among many others, Bernard Bailyn, *Atlantic History: Concept and Contours* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005); David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, eds., *The British Atlantic World, 1500–1800* (New York, 2002); Julia A. Clancy-Smith, *Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration, c. 1800–1900* (Berkeley, Calif., 2010); Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* (Malden, Mass., 2000); “AHR Conversation: On Transnational History,” *American Historical Review* 111, no. 5 (December 2006): 1441–1464. This “geographic turn” has also expressed itself in the form of numerous recent studies of cartography, including Paul W. Mapp, *The Elusive West and the Contest for Empire, 1713–1763* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2011); Neil Safier, *Measuring the New World: Enlightenment Science and South America* (Chicago, 2008); D. Graham Burnett, *Masters of All They Surveyed: Exploration, Geography, and a British El Dorado* (Chicago, 2000); and Jordana Dym and Karl Offen, eds., *Mapping Latin America: A Cartographic Reader* (Chicago, 2011).

³² I do not mean to suggest that this pragmatism was admirable or virtuous. It proved disastrous for crucial social programs and political institutions, from poverty relief to unions. Nor does nineties pragmatism characterize the personal politics of the scholars I discuss here. Another possible interpretation is that the interest in networks and processes reflects the declining power of social class as an organizing principle in both society and scholarship during those same years. For further discussion of the environment in which the younger cohort of scholars was reared, see the discussion in Daniel T. Rodgers, *Age of Fracture* (Cambridge, Mass., 2011), chap. 6.

³³ This includes David Hancock, *Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the Emergence of American Trade and Taste* (New Haven, Conn., 2009); and Pierre-Yves Beaurepaire, *L'autre et le frère: L'étranger et la franc-maçonnerie en France au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1998).

³⁴ See, among many others, Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley,

it is very possible for a turn to be simultaneously a moment and a generational shift if—as seems to be the case here—the impact of the new approach is most strongly felt among one cohort of scholars. For those scholars, the “moment” becomes one of their defining generational experiences.³⁵

What, then, of historiographic generation and the turn? At least in scholarship on early modern Europe and North America, neither one is as much a caesura as it might seem at first glance. Generational change is real, but it is often a gentle and even enriching process marked by substantial continuities rather than an abrupt dismissal of what came before. The new generation of scholars who are now entering the profession are turning in new directions, to be sure, but they are not rejecting the questions and preoccupations of those who trained them. The language of turns, recast within this generational model, has much to offer. It helps to name and to demarcate historiographical change—and so helps drive it forward—while also giving us a language for managing the passage of generations.

For the turn to be a useful concept, however, it ought to be redefined to embody two specific qualities. First, as Cook suggests at the end of his essay, we need to employ the language of turns prospectively, to describe and debate change that is ongoing or just beginning. Used retrospectively, as the contributors to this forum show, it risks becoming nothing more than a way of warehousing supposedly outdated concepts. Used prospectively, as a tool to bring into sharper focus trends that are under way or in the process of emerging, it can organize fields and help them advance. Second, turning has to be framed within a non-supersessionist account of generational change: as a process of reinvention and reformulation of what came before, not a wholesale replacement of it. The turn imagined as a sharp about-face can lead only to dead ends, to intellectually barren reversals and re-reversals. Turning conceived of as a more gradual process, however, offers us a much-needed language for intergenerational conversation within the profession. Used in this fashion, that is to say prospectively and dialogically, the vocabulary of turning is worth saving. We should appropriate the idea rather than reject it. That, after all, is what new generations have always done.

Calif., 1984), chap. 3; Pamela H. Smith, *The Business of Alchemy: Science and Culture in the Holy Roman Empire* (Princeton, N.J., 1994); Paula Findlen, *Possessing Nature: Museums, Collecting, and Scientific Culture in Early Modern Italy* (Berkeley, Calif., 1994); Robert Blair St. George, *Material Life in America, 1600–1860* (Boston, 1988).

³⁵ Alan B. Spitzer, *The French Generation of 1820* (Princeton, N.J., 1987), 14–16. I am grateful to Samuel Moyn for drawing my attention to this book.

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Featured Reviews

LAUREN BENTON. *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. xvi, 340. Cloth \$85.00, paper \$25.99.

The question “what is the geography of imperial power?” might seem, at first sight, to have a relatively straightforward answer that would rely upon the colors of the imperial map of the world and what they say about territories won, ruled over, and lost. There has been, however, an increasingly thorough interrogation of what might be meant by “geography” encouraged by spatial turns across the humanities and social sciences. As a result, what geography is now understood to be looks little like the favorite discipline of empire, and the territories marked on the map are revealed as only one of many possible representations. There has also been an even more extensive rethinking of imperial power and where we might look for it. The battle for empire has seen military and economic might challenged by the power of discourse, identity, and representation, then by disciplinary power, biopolitics, and embodiment, and, latterly, by increased attention to sovereignty. In her wide-ranging and thought-provoking new book, Lauren Benton has entered this terrain to argue that, viewed from the perspective of law, imperial sovereignty was “not at all consistent with the image produced by monochrome shading of imperial maps” (p. 2). Instead, it was characterized by a range of “uneven legal geographies” (p. xii) that she sets out to explore in detail through examination of European empires between 1400 and 1900.

This book is not, however, a study of the complexity of imperial power for complexity’s own sake, or designed to topple more singular versions of imperial history by demonstrating their inevitable simplifications of the past. Instead, the spatial variations in the relationships between geography and sovereignty that Benton uncovers—“a fabric that was full of holes, stitched together out of pieces, a tangle of strings” (p. 2)—are shown to have been generated by a pair of simple legal principles that were shared by European empires, but worked out in a kaleidoscope of different ways across space. The first principle was that subjecthood was portable: that Englishmen (or Spaniards) should be ruled

by English (or Spanish) law wherever they were. The second was that sovereignty could be legally delegated to others. Thus, the working out of the first principle across extra-European space meant “tracing pathways that became conduits for law and even corridors of jurisdiction” (p. 31). The second involved making “centres of delegated legal authority [that] produced irregular and only roughly concentrated zones of control around them” (pp. 31–32). Combined with the ways in which imperial subjects had to deal with the (it is tempting to say “real”) geography of rivers, mountains, coasts, islands, and oceans, and with the reenactment of legal rituals on the hoof in faraway places, this generated a jurisdictional geography of “corridors” and “enclaves.” It is this geography, rather than one of territories and their borderlands, that Benton argues characterized the geography of imperial sovereignty.

The attention to corridors has a watery geography of rivers and oceans. Benton addresses questions of imperial possession, particularly prior to the eighteenth century, in relation to the “distinctive legal geography” of “riverine regions” (p. 103). She argues that claims of sovereignty around the Atlantic were made at estuarine sites where rivers met the ocean and were then extended via up-river journeys. Thus, instead of a history of grand European claims over whole lands and the peoples who inhabited them by proclamation or settlement, Benton presents sovereign claims as fragile lines of flight along river corridors into uncertain interiors accompanied by troubled understandings of how far the Europeans making those journeys were the proxies for their sovereigns or could treat the people they encountered as subjects. As she puts it, “the resulting jurisdictional net was long and thin, spread along river corridors. Holes and tangles made it possible for legal actors to be inside the net at one moment and outside the next” (p. 101). There was, she argues, a set of “structural similarities” (p. 86)—from Africa to the Americas and across centuries and empires—that connected riverine regions and accusations of treason and betrayal.

These river corridors were where sovereignty was both most strongly asserted and most in question.

The spatial figure of the corridor is also used to transform understandings of oceanic space in early modern empires. Here the focus is on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and takes in both the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Attending to the movements of ships, Benton challenges the familiar notion of the ocean as an extra-territorial space over which sovereign claims could not be made. Instead she argues that the oceans were understood as crisscrossed by a tangle of jurisdictional corridors because "ships and their captains moved as delegated legal authorities along intersecting paths, extending corridors of control, in turn weakly or strongly associated with jurisdiction, into an interimperial sea space that could not be owned but could be dominated" (p. 161). This is underpinned by a significant re-reading of the maritime legal theory of Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius to argue that the latter was not simply the prophet of *Mare liberum* in the service of the Dutch Empire's commercial ambitions but also defended the Dutch capture of Iberian prizes by emphasizing the difference between an illegitimate maritime dominion and legitimate claims to jurisdiction over sea lanes. Indeed, prize law, the regulation of privateering, and the (selective) prosecution of piracy are used by Benton to demonstrate the differentiation of sovereignty at sea and the ways in which mariners of all sorts traced out jurisdictional corridors as they moved across the world's waters. She shows, therefore, how jurisdiction over the Indian Ocean's sea lanes came to be regulated by inter-imperial power politics as the Mughal Empire attempted to force European powers to control piracy, while in the Atlantic Ocean regulation was achieved through a complex network of prize courts operating across different empires according to a broadly shared legal regime. This was not quite the law of nations but rather "an international law of the sea as ■ complex tangle of jurisdictional strings" (p. 161).

The enclave geographies of sovereignty are more terrestrial, involving islands and uplands. Benton considers the implications of the expansion of penal colonization, particularly in island settings. In doing so she aims to put transportation to Botany Bay in the context of other empires' use of banishment, transportation, and exile, such as the Spanish system of *presidios*. She also traces a long history of association between European legal traditions of banishment and island destinations, and between those islands and forms of tyrannical rule. Rule over these colonies was delegated to the military governors who ran them. This system "depended on an understanding of sovereignty that authorized spatial exceptions to institutionalized restraints on the exercise of delegated legal authority" (p. 221). The "layered sovereignty" of empire meant that these regimes might operate under laws different from other places. Benton focuses on the penal colonies of the penal colonies, such as Van Diemen's Land and Norfolk Island (although she does not note that the latter's reforming governor in the early 1840s, Alexander

Maconochie, had previously been the first professor of geography at University College London). These were places of punishment for those who transgressed the laws of the places to which they had already been sent for breaking the law, and the relationships between subject, law, and sovereignty *had* to be different for these places to function as such. But this and other associated forms of delegated sovereignty, such as slavery and forced labor, that put the power of punishment in the hands of others created significant constitutional problems. Jeremy Bentham railed against Botany Bay's denial of the rights of the subject since not only convicts but emancipated convicts, settlers, and indigenous people were brought under what he saw as no legitimate form of law at all. More broadly, the militarized forms of delegated sovereignty that proliferated in these places raised the question of martial law, what William Blackstone, following Matthew Hale, called "in truth and reality no law, but something indulged rather than allowed as law" (quoted on p. 201). Its increasing use meant that these seemingly small spatial and temporal exceptions threatened to undermine the constitutional principles on which all imperial sovereignty was based.

The constitutional threat posed by exceptional spaces was also the outcome of the discussion of imperial hill regions. Benton follows James C. Scott in tracing a real and imagined association of upland regions with a relative lack, judged from the lowlands, of civilization and order. Mountains were "primitive areas with the potential to become increasingly, but never fully, modern . . . zones in perpetual transition." As such, their "kind and amount of law" would be matched to their degree of development, making sovereign functions something that "could be parcelled out and assigned to territories as they developed" (p. 225). These places then became polities and peoples that were simultaneously inside and outside imperial legal orders, holding forms of "quasi-sovereignty" (p. 226), which meant that the application of imperial law routinely required its own suspension. The key example for Benton is the Indian princely states, which numbered in the hundreds and covered more than a third of the area of nineteenth-century "British India." She demonstrates the proliferation of problems of sovereignty and law in and around them, and the contortions into which they threw imperial jurists. Quasi-sovereignty, or what some nineteenth-century jurists, in a remarkable prefiguring of Giorgio Agamben's theoretical terminology, called "bare sovereignty," produced repeated crises of imperial rule.

Taken together these studies of the geography of imperial law offer a serious and sustained challenge to histories that assume a teleological development of the territorial nation state as the assumed space of law and politics. Instead they suggest the pervasive and significant presence of overlapping, partial, and layered forms of sovereignty, and not just in empires, but in states too. Benton's arguments are ones that need to be reckoned with in our many discussions of the geography of imperial and political power and they give real sub-

stance to claims from social theory of the importance of sovereignty as an enduring and changing form of power.

Yet there are difficult questions to resolve here too. First, while it is refreshing to find a legal historian engaging so thoroughly and imaginatively with questions of geography, there are unresolved issues about how the abstract spatialities of law relate to the fuller and more material geographies of rivers, oceans, islands, and mountains. How far are those latter geographies (or environments) shaping the action? To what extent can they be discussed as socially constructed, and in what sense? In geography this has been engaged with in relation to the agency of the “more-than-human-world,” but that does not often also involve explicit attention to how that intersects with the sorts of manifestly human-made geographies of something like the law. Benton takes on the difficult task, which most geographers have shirked, of addressing both notions of geography, but it is not entirely clear what the outcome is.

Second, the question of agency is also raised by thinking about what moves this long-term, large-scale history along. Underpinning the historical accounts are notions of inter-imperial rivalry, intra-imperial conflicts, and changing relations between Europeans and others, and there are historical agents of all sorts making decisions. These, however, tend to resolve within the case studies into discussions within which the law takes on something of a life of its own as sets of spatio-legal relations pose structural problems that resolve in complex ways into other forms of law and geography. It remains unclear how the agency that is then attributable to the law itself in the making of this history relates to more long-standing questions of agency in relation to the colonizer and the colonized.

Finally, Benton’s challenge to the hegemony of the

imperial map and to the teleology of the territorial nation state is certainly to be applauded. She is also clear that, despite talk of states of exception and bare sovereignty, the theorizations of sovereignty produced by Carl Schmitt and Agamben are not sufficient to explain the historical geography of imperial sovereignty. Schmitt’s division of the world into a European zone of law and an extra-European zone of violence ignores how the latter was also filled with forms of law. Agamben’s invocations of Möbius strips and Leyden jars in an attempt to find a topological figure for sovereignty where the outside is simultaneously inside are too neat to be right. Instead, Benton offers a series of metaphors to try and conjure the geography her cases describe: a *mille feuille* pastry (borrowed from Henri Lefebvre), “a universe in which contortions like wormholes and black holes challenge our spatial imagination” (p. 287), a tangle of strings, a fabric full of holes, or “complex puzzles of negative and positive space” (p. 38). Most often she simply describes these spaces as “lumpy.” While all these metaphors are useful, the variety is dizzying, the differences between them are as significant as the similarities, and the difficulties of relating these metaphors to the workings of geography and law in practice are considerable. Benton herself notes a problem in finding spatial “concepts that migrate out of monographs, terms that become established parts of the social theory lexicon, or insights that claim the imagination of scholars across fields and become the starting points for new research” (p. 38). It seems clear that if we are off the map in our search for the geography of imperial power, we are also not yet quite sure where we find ourselves. It must be said, however, that *The Search for Sovereignty* is an impressive attempt to begin treading some radically new paths.

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AMANDA FOREMAN. *A World on Fire: Britain’s Crucial Role in the American Civil War*. New York: Random House. 2011. Pp. xxxix, 958. \$35.00.

Amanda Foreman’s book is a timely publication during the Civil War’s sesquicentennial. It appears amid a flood of monographs, films, and interactive media that reconsider the war from different perspectives. For example, the American Library Association and National Endowment for the Humanities’ “Let’s Talk About It: Making Sense of the American Civil War” focuses on the war’s impact on Americans. This program is designed for town hall-style discussions in public libraries. Its readings, selected by Edward L. Ayers, encourage conversations about how people chose which side to support; how the war enabled some Americans to cross traditional boundaries of race and gender; what the battle of Shiloh was like for its combatants; how the pivotal battle of Antietam changed the war; and

how the Emancipation Proclamation affected African Americans.

Reflecting a shift in scholarship toward “global” thinking, other studies of the war highlight its reach beyond the nation’s borders. New work has compared the Civil War era to other periods of national unification, such as the Risorgimento of the Italian states and the creation of the German Empire. The U.S. slave states, in particular, have been compared to other slave-holding regimes—most of which gave up slavery through far less violent processes—and to other nations coping with military conquest through selective memory of the reasons for their defeat. Americans’ wartime interactions with foreigners through diplomacy, trade, and migration have been traced. Such transnational work has

emphasized, for example, the mutual influences of American and European liberal reformers of the mid-nineteenth century, giving new significance to President Abraham Lincoln's claim that the Union stood for "the whole family of man." Scholars have also illuminated how the war affected world history, from its impact on international law and methods of warfare on both sides of the Atlantic to its consequences for the global cotton trade in Asia.

World on Fire is a big book, partly because it thoroughly recounts the Civil War as both U.S. and transnational history, providing a battlefield-level description of the conflict and showing how civilians across the Anglo-American world reacted to the war's news. It begins with a survey of antebellum U.S. politics and Anglo-American relations, emphasizing the critical role of slavery's expansion west of the Mississippi in the war's outbreak. The British government did not really mind American slavery after the abolition of the African slave trade, except when the issue of U.S. territorial expansion threatened Oregon and Canada. British cultural diplomacy helped smooth over potential conflicts, such as the visit of the effusive Prince of Wales in 1860 (foreshadowing wartime British policy, if not popular opinion, the prince did not visit the South). Over some 700 pages the book then depicts the war, using familiar battles, political debates, and home-front tensions as context to demonstrate Britons' widespread involvement. The book ends with a very brief review of postwar Anglo-American diplomatic relations until the 1872 resolution of U.S. claims for damages caused by British-built Confederate warships, in particular the C.S.S. *Alabama*. The Reconstruction era perhaps lacked the divisiveness or drama of Britons' involvement in the war itself. But Foreman might have explored the British role in postwar America, in light of experiences with post-emancipation society in the West Indies and issues of a racialized empire in India.

Foreman's interest in the Civil War, she reveals, was stirred when, while researching a previous book, she learned that Spencer Cavendish, the eighth duke of Devonshire, traveled with the Army of Northern Virginia in 1862. Charmed by its officers' *esprit de corps*, he became, as undersecretary of state for war, an advocate for the Confederacy in the British government. But more than showing how liberal Britons reacted to the Civil War, Foreman promises to show how they shaped it—their "crucial role."

There are two important narratives in the book. The first recreates the war through perspectives of nearly fifty British journalists, observers, and volunteers who experienced the conflict at first hand. Foreman seeks to treat each figure as the principal subject of the book in service of telling the story as both biography and history. Foreman's "history-in-the-round" approach brilliantly illustrates how the "British-American world of the Civil War" was "greater and more complex" than we have realized (pp. xxv, xxiv).

Many of the 2.5 million Britons in the United States when the war erupted, about ten percent of them in the

South, were simply trapped. Officially, British policy prohibited her majesty's subjects from fighting in the war, yet many did so anyway. Some were victims of ruthless recruiting practices, including outright torture, or the Union blockade. Others, especially Irish volunteers, perceived that fighting in America for either side could help the greater cause of liberating Ireland (the revolutionaries Thomas Francis Meagher and John Mitchel, back from banishment in Australia, fought against each other in the Civil War). Britons in southern cities were particularly vulnerable once the Confederacy began expelling British consuls from the region, while President Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus resulted in the imprisonment of a disproportionate number of British subjects in the North. Like the suspicion of the United States now prevalent in developing nations embroiled in civil war, Britain as a foreign superpower was suspected by both northerners and southerners at a moment of profound domestic insecurity.

Of course, some idealistic British immigrants enlisted enthusiastically. Foreman tells the story of the serendipitous Charles Culverwell, who came to America a month after the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, bringing his training as a doctor and his passion as an actor. He believed America would be "the land of freedom where equality was adored, favoritism abhorred" (p. 379). Obtaining a letter of introduction as a Union military surgeon from P. T. Barnum, Culverwell provided care for runaway slaves in Virginia and wounded soldiers in St. Louis. He then returned to Washington, D.C., to perform (using the name Charles Wyndham) in *Hamlet* opposite John Wilkes Booth. Meanwhile Culverwell's wife Emma moved to New York City, where their daughter died of cholera amid the New York draft riots. Culverwell served with General Nathaniel P. Banks in Louisiana in 1864 before accompanying soldiers driven insane by the Red River campaign back to New York. Disillusioned, he promptly fled to England, where he pursued a career as a comic actor; his experience in the Union darkened his ideals, if not his sense of humor.

Across North America, however, most Britons sympathized with or helped the Confederacy. Some ridiculed the Union, in the words of *The Times* of London's editor, John Delane, as "a so-called Power that can scarcely defend its capital against its fellow-citizens" (p. 150). Others wished, somehow, "for the universal abolition of slavery" and for Confederate independence (p. 462). Many, like Devonshire, simply found the South's "laudable cause of self-determination" more compelling than northerners' linkage of "the Union question" with "the slavery question," which he found "most perplexing" (p. 355). Ironically, Britons' confusion about what the North was fighting for foreshadowed many twentieth-century Americans' loss of memory about the Union cause. Yet, Foreman's book, if we take seriously the sympathies for the Confederacy she emphasizes among many British participants, challenges recent interpretations of the war following the appearance of James M. McPherson's *Battle Cry of*

Freedom: The Civil War Era (1988). The last generation of scholarship has tended to show the war as a contest between northern cosmopolitan liberalism—and abolitionism—and southern isolation. Outsiders during the war era did not see the conflict so clearly.

Foreman's second narrative describes the battle of words and memoranda fought among American and British diplomats and politicians over the crucial question of whether the British government would intervene in the war. The book's emphasis on pro-southern opinion suggests that a more popularly responsive British government under Lord Palmerston might have offered to mediate between the North and the South on the basis of Confederate independence. Foreman pays too little attention—only three pages (pp. 395–397)—to the popular surge in support for the Union because of the Emancipation Proclamation. Instead, she focuses on debates in parliament and the British cabinet over whether Britain had a disinterested responsibility to intervene against the “humanitarian crisis” unfolding in the United States; the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation seems to have contributed to this (p. 320). The book also recounts multiple situations in which British lobbyists suggested to Confederate representatives that a renunciation of slavery would virtually guarantee British assistance, but those offers were rejected. Foreman's book confirms that a dogmatic insistence on preserving slavery, even as it crumbled, doomed transnational southerners' claims to international affinity.

The South also profited from provocative U.S. naval actions that the Palmerston government could not ignore. The crisis stemming from the 1861 interception and boarding of the mail ship R.M.S. *Trent* in the Caribbean to arrest two Confederate diplomats is well known. But Foreman locates the *Trent* Affair in the context of Canada's nettlesome role in the Civil War: any Anglo-American dispute immediately implicated the huge British colony. Thus the extent of British mobilization in reaction to the *Trent* seizure makes for sobering reading. Steps included troop deployments to Canada, not only to defend the colony from U.S. invasion but also to conquer the state of Maine, and plans for ships to bombard cities from Boston to Long Island. Canada proved a liability for both countries throughout the war, a “border state” as pivotal as the Union's slave states for arms shipments and vigilantism and as a cell for Confederate terrorist violence in northern cities. As late as February 1865, British planners considered making a pre-emptive strike against the United States for its militarization of the Great Lakes region (p. 740).

Reflecting her emphasis on the crucial roles of important individuals in the war, who barely headed off a nineteenth-century battle of the Atlantic, Foreman explores the special relationship of Secretary of State William Seward and British minister Richard Bickerton Pemell Lyons. Lyons's assignment to Washington was a moderate promotion from his position with the British legation in Florence (the British Empire's most important posts were Paris, Vienna, and Constantinople). While Foreman credits Seward for persuading the Lin-

coln cabinet to apologize for the *Trent* Affair, he comes across as grandiose and tempestuous—perhaps as a result of Foreman's adopting Lyons's point of view. The book's title is an adaptation of Seward's warning to William Howard Russell, war correspondent for *The Times*, that war between the United States and Britain “would wrap the world in fire” and that only Britons would lament the result (p. 122). Lyons played a heroic role in maintaining peace by coaching Seward in how to respond to the complaints of Palmerston and British Foreign Secretary John Russell, and by preparing Whitehall for Seward's threats about the consequences of mounting British arms sales to the Confederacy.

Seward, along with the U.S. minister in London, Charles Francis Adams, and Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner, were the key advocates of Union policy. As an erudite if humorless friend of British abolitionists, Sumner especially helped sustain Britons' hope that the Union was against slavery, not merely for the nation-state. President Lincoln plays a minor role in the book, appearing as the butt of British newspaper cartoons and wailing over the newest Union casualty reports. Foreman's image of the president wringing his hands after the Union defeat at Fredericksburg and “repeatedly asking, ‘What has God put me in this place for?’” is a profile in pity, not power (p. 349). Admirers of Lincoln will be disappointed that this book implicitly diminishes his significance in the Atlantic world of his day. His fixation on his military commanders' shortcomings and the war's messy domestic politics, including the ambiguous proclamation freeing slaves “as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion,” did not gain Lincoln the attention Britons gave other American statesmen, at least until his assassination. Its shock caused *The Times* and other hypercritical British presses to confess their bias and at least temporarily salute him and the wage-labor democracy he sought to safeguard.

In the end, this book is mesmerizing, immersing the reader in the diverse participation of the British people in Americans' epic struggle. Yet in giving voice and agency to “competing points of view within a time frame that encompassed multiple simultaneous events,” the book perhaps succeeds too well (p. xxv). It does not clarify what, exactly, Britain's crucial role was in the Civil War. The arc of its narrative, however, allows that role to be surmised. Given the British government's refusal to intercede decisively on behalf of the Confederacy while tacitly allowing British businesses and merchants to supply the Confederacy with arms vitally necessary to maintain resistance to the Union—“60 percent of the Confederacy's rifles, 75 percent of her saltpeter, and 30 percent of her lead,” for example—Britons may be said to have prolonged the Civil War without changing its outcome (pp. 737–738). Surely that is a complicated lesson about imperial interventions relevant to global, not merely Anglo-American, history.

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Reviews of Books

METHODS/THEORY

KERWIN LEE KLEIN. *From History to Theory*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 216. \$39.95.

Kerwin Lee Klein's book is a series of linked histories of words descriptive of the domain of historical self-reflection: *historiography*, *theory*, *language*, *culture*, *postmodernism*, and *memory*. These histories, spanning the last hundred years or so, are informed by the author's sure grasp of source material that ranges across varied philosophical, historical, and social scientific terrain: Klein is as at home with W. V. O. Quine as Jacques Derrida, with Clifford Geertz as Saul Friedlander.

Chapter one recounts the rise and fall of *historiography*. Poor old *historiography*, for all its faults (most notably, a tendency in the wrong hands to impose a glibly progressive sheen to the history of historical practice) was, at its best, the glue that united methodology and philosophy of history in a properly historicized self-understanding. With its demise, historians are left with an unhistorical understanding of their own practice; further, that demise has even encouraged a pervasive anti-intellectualism within the mainstream of the discipline. There is perhaps some truth in this thesis; but Klein's own work, convincingly bringing together historical and theoretical understanding even after *historiography*'s apparent demise, somewhat undermines his claim that he is doing more than tracing the rise and fall of the word *historiography*. *Pace* Klein's explicit thesis, the loss of the word does not necessitate the loss of the practice. Perhaps this is why, although Klein regrets the passing of *historiography*, it is with little more than a metaphorical shrug. The conditions of possibility underpinning *historiography* have passed, and there is simply nothing that can be done about it.

Chapters two, three, and four work together, jointly covering the development of the theory of history (or the philosophy of history, or metahistory—for to name the subject matter is to take sides in the debates here described) from the early 1940s to the end of the twentieth century. Despite Klein's claim to novelty, these are, in the main, conventional narratives. We read about the carving out of a space for analytic or critical philosophy of history in the 1940s and 1950s, and of its subsequent irrelevance; of the seizure of this intellec-

tual space by an aesthetic, linguistic approach to history in the 1960s and 1970s—insisting that what historians study (culture) and what they produce (*historiography*) are both forms of text to be rigorously decoded—and of the development of this language fixated approach into the relativistic contortions of postmodernism.

The impassioned argument of chapters five and six provides a welcome counterpoint to the rather bloodless succession of linguistic rises and falls traced thus far. Klein traces the development of *memory* both within and outside the academy, finding that through this and related words, academic historians have gotten themselves thoroughly entangled in desecularized—or re-enchanted—modes of history. This re-enchantment of history via the Trojan horse of *memory* follows in the wake of two religious movements: the on-going reaction to the Shoah, as examined in chapter five, and the rise of a politicized Christian conservatism, as examined in chapter six. In that last chapter, Klein leaves the dusty world of scholarly journals and professional conferences, and serves up a gripping story connecting the 1980s epidemic of repressed memories of Satanic abuse, Christian Reconstructionist attempts from the 1960s onward to reestablish the United States as a fundamentalist Christian nation rather than a liberal democracy, and contemporary attempts to overcome supposed elitist anti-Christian bigotry by rereading and thereby reclaiming American public spaces. This is how *memory*, *remembrance*, *trauma*, and *repression* are deployed in contemporary culture; and it is into this territory that academic historians have blundered in their retreat from scientism and nihilism, producing the strange blend of postmodern theory and sacred language found in "trauma studies." Historians have fled into the primordial, warm embrace of *memory* seemingly without awareness that the critical, democratic, and cosmopolitan roots of their discipline are thereby under threat.

Klein is a liberal through and through—and not just in his antipathy to the impact of politicized religion on historical practice. Consider Klein's work as measured against Hayden White's well-known rhetorical schema of a historian's mode of explanation, mode of emplotment, and moral position. Klein seeks to explain the rise and fall of his keywords primarily by situating a word in the context of its time, thereby accounting for its "con-

ditions of (im)possibility." His narrative form is satire—historians caught in the changing conditions of their time—even where the subject of that narrative itself represents the world as progressive and romantic (historiography), or as fallen and therefore in need of a fundamentalist return to the beginning (memory). Above all, no matter how bleak things may look for the historical practice, Klein has a liberal's cautious hope for the future, since the one constant is change: "there will be new words."

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PERO GAGLO DAGBOVIE. *African American History Reconsidered*. (The New Black Studies Series.) Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2010. Pp. xviii, 255. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$25.00.

In this book, Pero Gaglo Dagbovie seeks to add a new paradigm that "focuses on the role, function, and meaning of African American history over time" (p. 11) to a "new black history," while taking a fresh look at a number of longstanding issues and problems such as the scholarship of teaching and learning that are essential to such a study. In search of a new black intellectual history, Dagbovie illustrates the popular and powerful notion articulated by the late John Hope Franklin: "every generation writes its own history." Divided into six chapters, the book offers a refreshing look at African American history from a number of different perspectives, each in its own way central to the author's purpose. For example, Dagbovie takes on the challenging task of unpacking the question, "What is African American history?" and all of the complexities that go along with such an intellectual undertaking.

These issues, of course, have real implications for the future study of African American history. In an especially insightful chapter on approaches to teaching and learning, Dagbovie observes that "African Americanists have not made many noticeable contributions, in terms of publications, to the important field of historical scholarship on teaching and learning" (p. 76). While I agree in the formal sense of scholarship, one could argue that organizations such as the Association for the Study of African American Life and History continue the enterprise started by Carter G. Woodson—whom Dagbovie treats extensively in this volume—that had at its center issues of teaching and learning.

This observation is important, for as Dagbovie makes clear in an equally illuminating chapter entitled "'Ample Proof of This May Be Found': Early Black Women Historians," African American female educators played a crucial role in both the creation and dissemination of African American history. In the process, Dagbovie explores the important, if often undocumented, contributions of African American female teachers, historians, and bibliophiles. Pointing to a deep intellectual tradition among black women educators, Dagbovie artfully chronicles the missionary zeal

and deep understanding of the political uses of the past many of these women exhibited in their work. Although not always professionally trained, black female novelists such as Frances Harper used history as a backdrop to advance racial uplift and inspire activism. Even more illuminating is the discussion of Progressive-era black women historians like Washington, D.C. school teacher Laura Eliza Wilkes, who published a monograph in 1919 exploring the military service of African Americans in the nation's early wars but found herself facing perceived sexism.

Dagbovie's treatment of the circumstances surrounding the discovery of an unpublished manuscript by Woodson demonstrates one of the greatest strengths of the book: the author's willingness to wrestle with the complex motivations and obstacles that have confronted and in many ways continue to confront historians of African descent. The desire to produce uplifting historical accounts while adhering to the academy's demand for scholarly detachment is a study in W. E. B. Du Bois's concept of double consciousness. Dagbovie reminds the reader that black scholars have had to balance "their radicalism with scientific scholarship and objectivity as well as their self-imposed social responsibility (as well that imposed by historical context) of representing and defending the masses of their people" (p. 79).

Throughout the book, Dagbovie illuminates two of the questions associated with African American history that go back to its mainstreaming in the 1980s: who owns black history, and who has a right to record and interpret it? In the process, he acknowledges some of the important challenges that go along with evaluating the historic mission and purpose of African American history as defined by early pioneers like Woodson, including how to make it relevant to the lives of the new "millennial" generation often chided for its lack of historical consciousness. In the final chapter, for example, Dagbovie explores the use of genocide as a framework for teaching African American history. At the same time, his re-examination of the literature on the polarizing figure of Booker T. Washington speaks to a longstanding debate among scholars about the virtues and failings of the so-called "Wizard of Tuskegee."

Such formulations and questions make the book a highly informative and engaging read. Rich and concise, it is praiseworthy scholarship and highly recommended.

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MICHAEL ROTHBERG. *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization*. (Cultural Memory in the Present.) Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2009. Pp. xvii, 379. Cloth \$70.00, paper \$24.95.

This book's fundamental insight is extremely important: that in many cases memory is not a zero-sum endeavor in which public attention to one historical event

necessarily detracts from public remembrance of other historical events. Rather, there can be synergies in which awareness of one event increases attentiveness to other, often only remotely related events. Michael Rothberg lays this out clearly and convincingly in the introductory chapter, which should be required reading for seminars on memory. The remaining eight chapters proceed roughly chronologically, focusing on books as diverse as Hannah Arendt's seminal *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) and Didier Daeninckx's detective novel *Meurtres pour mémoire* (1984), articles such as W. E. B. Du Bois's "The Negro and the Warsaw Ghetto" (1952) and Marguerite Duras's "Les deux ghettos" (1961), and films as varied as the pioneering cinéma-vérité *Chronique d'un été* (1961) and Michael Hanecke's tense thriller *Caché* (2005). Common to all is that they combine references to the Holocaust with analyses of colonialism, especially France's 1954–1962 war against Algerian independence.

This book resembles an anthology of essays, and it would transcend the limits of this review to attempt to discuss all of the eighteen or so works analyzed in depth, a few of which do little to advance the book's main theses or hinge on tenuous connections. A case in point for the latter would be Rothberg's link between *Caché* and the 1997 trial of Maurice Papon. As a regional police inspector in Vichy France Papon supervised the deportation of 1,600 Jewish children. Later, as chief of police in Paris, he ordered the October 17, 1961 massacre of Algerian protestors, during which the fictional parents of the Algerian protagonist in *Caché* were killed, providing the historical impulse for the film. As Rothberg demonstrates, memories connect both backward and forward in time, in this case from the 2005 film to the 1961 massacre, to the 1997 trial to the 1942 deportations; the latter two, if my viewing did not overlook them, are wholly absent from the film, while the 1961 massacre is merely implicit. Whether Hanecke himself made the Holocaust connection, or a contemporary French audience would have done so, is unclear. In any case, such bidirectional movements across time are combined with lateral connections between cultures to produce memory's "multidirectionality."

Rothberg's exegesis of these lateral connections begins with Arendt's "boomerang effect" linking European imperialism and Nazi genocide, and with Aimé Césaire's "*choc en retour*" in his booklet *Discours sur le colonialisme* (1950). These analyses ultimately lead to the second main argument of the book: that memory is entering a "transnational age" in which Holocaust studies are experiencing a "colonial turn." Publications such as those collected in A. Dirk Moses, editor, *Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History* (2008), are evidence of this phenomenon (p. 102). Rothberg's third argument emerges in the later chapters of the book: namely, that multidirectional memory operates across generations, with children linking their parents' experiences multidirectionally to other historical traumas.

Instead of going into greater detail about Rothberg's rich case studies—his examinations of André Schwarz-Bart, Charlotte Delbo, and Duras are especially cogent—I would like to extend his core insight about the potential for synergies between memories instead of competition. When does one apply and not the other? In other words, what determines whether one culturally and temporally distinct memory serves as a "screen memory" blocking out another, or whether a multidirectional synergy will occur (pp. 12–16)? The key here, to borrow a theoretical framework from Jürgen Habermas, might be that in a mindset of conventional morality where inflexible rules govern the realm of public recollection, memories are indeed competitive. In a realm of public discourse governed by postconventional, relativistic morality, however, memories can reinforce each other. Thus while the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. might have begun as a screen memory distracting from memories of genocide and slavery, it has ultimately fostered the creation of a National Museum of the American Indian and a National Museum of African American History and Culture.

Rothberg's epilogue describes the moment of a shift between memory paradigms when both exist side by side: the competitive model pitting victims against each other, and a multidirectional model in which "divergent memories converge," thereby opening up new opportunities (p. 311). He applies this both to the memories exhibited on the U.S. National Mall and to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. In the latter Rothberg shows how Israeli historian Benny Morris oscillates between conventional and postconventional moral paradigms in his application of Holocaust parallels to the contemporary situations of both Israelis and Palestinians.

Rothberg's insightful definition and explications of multidirectional memory based on the non-competitive, multivalent connections between Holocaust and colonial memories offers an important analytical tool that will open up productive lines of inquiry and understanding in the field of memory studies.

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DOMINIC SACHSENMAIER. *Global Perspectives on Global History: Theories and Approaches in a Connected World*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. vii, 331. Cloth \$90.00, paper \$32.99.

As is the case presently with all fields of learning, the practice of history is increasingly subject to the contradictory impulses of global modernity. The immediate objective of this book is to take stock of the state of "global history" in three societies: the United States, Germany, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Its broader ambition is "to bring back to the debating table some weighty problems surrounding the nature of historiography as a sociological phenomenon and epistemological endeavor" (p. 6). This aim reflects a new

global context in which the increased visibility of contending approaches to the past in different national contexts has complicated the practice of history. Dominic Sachsenmaier's approach is driven by hope in the promise of "global history" despite its many ambiguities. The book represents a valuable contribution to current discussions of history as a way of knowing and an intellectual discipline.

"Global history" as a field offers a strategically effective and challenging medium for raising comparative historiographical questions. Sachsenmaier's rare command of three important bodies of historiography makes him eminently qualified to undertake this task. No less important is his attentiveness to combining "global awareness with local sensitivity" as an indispensable interpretive premise (p. 6). Interest in "global history" has made for unprecedented historiographical commonalities across national boundaries. But meanings and practices differ from one national context to another, sometimes in contradictory ways. These alternatives need to be recognized in their own right if Eurocentrism is to be superseded by a non-hegemonic grasp of historical practice that is the promise of "global history."

Sachsenmaier identifies the United States as the location where the idea of "global history" emerged and has been most conspicuously successful in stimulating novel approaches and institutional innovations. He acknowledges that "it is impossible to clearly outline the parameters of 'global history' as a methodological school, an area of inquiry, or an interest in a certain period," but insists nevertheless that "it is perfectly justifiable to use the term as a marker for a wider academic trend which is actually much larger than the body of literature openly referring to the concept of 'global history'" (p. 72). Its novelty in the present context lies in its challenges to "methodological nationalism" (p. 25), "the spatial assumptions of nation-centered historiography" (p. 26), and Eurocentrism. The "global turn" appears in the spread of interest in extranational and border-crossing phenomena (p. 96). According to Sachsenmaier, "new, creative conceptions of space" do not distinguish global from world, planetary, transnational, translocal, or even comparative and international histories, but "global history—like many other terms—can be taken as shorthand for a larger academic trend in historiography" (pp. 78–79).

The chapters on Germany and the PRC explore how the concept of "global history" has sparked interest in these two national contexts, but has not been nearly as productive as in the United States. In Germany, preoccupation with national history leaves only a marginal space for the practice of "global history," although scholars have done historical work that stresses Germany's relationship to Europe. In the PRC, where interest in the world has been integral to the confrontation with Europe and North America since the nineteenth century, there has been progress toward the development of "global history," but here, too, it is entangled in national concerns and preoccupation with

questions of modernity and modernization. Some PRC historians are attempting to use "global history" to bridge the gap between national and world histories that have characterized the organization of the discipline in departments of history.

Sachsenmaier's expansive and diffuse understanding of "global history" enables him to claim for it a questionably broad territory of historical inquiry. The discussion would have been rendered more rigorous by a clearer distinction between "global history" as a subject that enriches our understanding of the past and as a method that characterizes the practices of contemporary historians. The latter would be applicable to historical work at any scale or on any subject, and has far more totalizing implications for the historical discipline. Unfortunately, Sachsenmaier disavows the epistemological implications of current practices despite the evidence for them in the book and, implicitly, in his expansive understanding of "global history."

Sachsenmaier rightly states that the trends associated with "global history" are not of passing faddish significance; "the global turn" in history is part of a larger "cultural turn" in consciousness of globality. That still leaves the reader wondering why the author chooses not to offer a more rigorous explanation of his choice of "global history" over possible alternatives that, by his own admission, would do equally well in capturing these new turns.

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DAVID PALUMBO-LIU, BRUCE ROBBINS, and NIRVANA TANOUKHI, editors. *Immanuel Wallerstein and the Problem of the World: System, Scale, Culture*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 263. Cloth \$84.95, paper \$23.95.

In our time, there is a problem with the world, and with our knowledge of it. The volume under review has the merit of most explicitly addressing this problem. To do so, the focus is placed on Immanuel Wallerstein, in whose work the "world" has been central for more than half a century. In a concise introduction, the editors identify two key issues that arise from Wallerstein's ideas. First, they credit Wallerstein with having introduced analysis at world-scale earlier than others, much before the more recent "globalization" debates, but also state that the question of the appropriate "unit of analysis" remains open and may require more nuanced answers than Wallerstein's world-systems theory can offer (p. 3). Second, they argue that Wallerstein's systemic and global approach, with its "fatal disrespect for culture, subjectivity, or difference, or agency, or the local" (p. 5), seems to leave little for the humanities to say. This, more precisely, is the challenge posed to the volume's contributors: to see whether the humanities can fruitfully relate to world-systems analysis today, and by doing so possibly regain more centrality in ongoing discussions about "the problem of the world."

This reader cannot help thinking that the issue is too narrowly defined, confirming the suspicion the editors themselves raise in the introduction. There clearly is a need for scholarship in the humanities to address “the world” from their angle, but even after reading this book there is little reason to think that world-systems analysis can be a resource toward that end. Several of the contributors seem to agree: Wallerstein provides a socio-economic analysis that leaves little space for culture. He offers a strong view on systemic determination that does not allow for contingency. He presupposes a “world” whereas the very constitution of the world might be the necessarily preceding question. That his work is being taken up despite these objections has more to do with self-doubt within the humanities than with the strengths of systems analysis. While there may be persistent diversity of cultural life, this may matter little for the way the world goes. Contingency itself, rather than merely being emphasized in opposition to social-science determinism, may need to be analyzed in terms of degrees and contexts. And the connectedness of human social life may have been demonstrated for too long historical periods to allow for serious doubts about the pre-existence of “world” to our actions.

The editors recognize that Wallerstein’s approach lends itself more to social-scientific than to humanistic analyses (p. 5). In responding to that challenge, however, they leave largely unexplored that which may be the most promising and original alternative: a humanistically inspired social science that is outside of Wallerstein’s own view but ideally suited to address the “problem of the world” with a focus on agency, interpretation, and creativity. The majority of the contributors discuss lacunae in Wallerstein’s approach that become discernible from the viewpoint of the humanities, including questions of law, ethics, and the possibility of critique. But very few of them try to remedy those shortcomings or, to use a different formula, to close the gap between world-systems analysis and the humanities.

To give one example each of a strong chapter and a missed opportunity: Neil Brenner’s exploration of “The Space of the World” provides an excellent criticism of “global territorialist” and “deterritorialization” studies, both of which are seen to work with too strong assumptions about the significance of territory in the contemporary world, and then sketches a program for a study of the “spatialities of social relations” (p. 102). In turn, Tani E. Barlow’s discussion of “The Event of Women and the Modern Girl” draws on highly interesting comparative research on the representation of women in the interwar period (1918–1939), but she frames her presentation with an overdrawn critique of what she calls “regionalism” in world history and an unhelpful recourse to Alain Badiou for conceptualizing “events” in world history. Barlow seems to have only reluctantly accepted the terms of her own comparative cultural research project (p. 163); had she done so more, she might have found that “events” have been conceptualized much more fruitfully, most importantly

by William H. Sewell, in the humanistically inspired historical-comparative sociology that, if it were more widespread than it is, could make world-scale analysis amenable to the humanities.

This book addresses a highly relevant topic, but it does not make use of the resources at hand to advance in its exploration. It is true that Wallerstein approached “the problem of the world” earlier than others, but even in his youth he was not the only one to do so, and others have advanced questions and topics more relevant to the humanities. David Palumbo-Liu recognizes that this is the case for Hannah Arendt, who discussed the problem of the world, of the risk of “worldlessness,” in her 1958 *Human Condition* as “a crisis of language and knowing,” as Palumbo-Liu puts it (p. 206). Brenner interestingly frames his essay by exploring Henri Lefebvre’s concept of *mondialité*, or “worldness” (pp. 103, 132–133). Closer to our present, one would expect Jean-Luc Nancy’s reflections on *mondialisation* and “the creation of the world” to be mentioned. There may not be much, there is certainly not enough, but there is more of a discussion of “world” in the traditions of the humanities than this volume, the above exceptions notwithstanding, recognizes.

Why Wallerstein then? One suspicion is that world-systems analysis holds the prospect of offering a critical angle on global developments that the humanistic emphasis on contingency and historicity no longer provides. This topic is explicitly and very fruitfully discussed by Bruce Robbins in the well-titled chapter “Blaming the System,” which confronts Luc Boltanski’s reflections on *Distant Suffering* (1999) with Wallerstein’s systemic approach (and could be extended using Boltanski’s recent *On Critique*), but it underlies many chapters and maybe the editors’ intentions. Robbins recognizes that the recent debate on “alternative modernities” (pp. 52–53) may be an intellectual site where such issues could be explored further, but this, too, is an observation to which there is no follow-up.

A final note on small but not insignificant matters: Kären Wigen calls for “incorporating indigenous voices into our work” (p. 152), but this group of U.S.-based scholars seems not to have fully recognized that the “indigenous” are already speaking—an exception being Palumbo-Liu’s discussion of Frantz Fanon. Barlow claims that “the event of women fits Badiou’s description of a universal singular (p. 59, my emphasis), suggesting the subsumption of a case under a category that, it seems, is at odds with the understanding of the humanities that the volume otherwise conveys. Nirvana Tanoukhi’s chapter centrally refers to an essay by Kwame Anthony Appiah (p. 79) but does not give the reference or even the title of this essay. In sum, this is a volume on a highly significant topic into the exploration of which editors and contributors could have invested more.

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COMPARATIVE/WORLD

JEREMY BLACK. *Fighting for America: The Struggle for Mastery in North America, 1519–1871*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2011. Pp. xvii, 470. \$39.95.

Few historians argue that the United States developed apart from the imperialist currents and power politics that have riven Europe for centuries, and Jeremy Black's latest work puts yet another nail in the coffin of American exceptionalism. Black presents a sweeping geopolitical history of the contest among Europeans to control North America, from the landing of Hernán Cortés on the coast to, somewhat surprisingly, the Treaty of Washington in 1871, with which the British finally acceded to the United States' "mastery" of the continent. Black has taken on an ambitious task. Yet he makes clear the utility of a long-term view in demonstrating the political and ideological nature of North American space, and the contingent process by which it is controlled.

Black sails quickly through events of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as "background" (p. 20). During these centuries, "North America" had not yet evolved into a coherent European construct, and hence Europeans could not contest the continent as a geopolitical entity. The meat of Black's argument thus begins with the Seven Years' War, by which time geopolitical notions about the North American continent loomed large. Black repeatedly emphasizes that North America's fate hinged upon events in other parts of the world. Wars in Europe always bore heavily on the imperial powers' motives and abilities overseas. Following his account of British victory in 1763, Black proceeds through the American Revolution, the Louisiana Purchase, the War of 1812, Latin American revolutions, Native American resistance movements, war between Mexico and the United States, and other pivotal events in North American history. Along the way he makes the case for a spatially and temporally broad geopolitical approach, tempered with the qualification that geography was never destiny. The United States increased its dominion and power only with the help of events that unfolded beyond its shores and beyond its control.

Black's greatest insight is his periodization. From his perspective, the 1860s, not the 1840s, were the most critical and unpredictable era in the international contest over the continent. Instead of granting the United States stable control over a sea-to-sea dominion, the nation's victory over Mexico in 1848 escalated the political debate over slavery and led to the Civil War. Had the political turmoil in Mexico during the 1860s been less severe, Black argues, or had it attracted more attention from across the Atlantic, Mexico may have taken advantage of the power vacuum created by the U.S. Civil War. Similarly, British intervention in the Civil War might have led to a southern victory. Instead, of course, the Union benefited from Britain's tenuous reluctance to intervene and thus had the strength to intimidate Emperor Napoleon III into withdrawing French forces from Mexico. Following the Civil War,

Russia effectively withdrew from North America and sold Alaska to the United States. Then Britain pulled out of most of its Canadian garrisons under the Treaty of Washington (1871). After three and a half centuries, the "North American Question" had ceased to be a transatlantic struggle among European powers (p. 350).

Black's effort to "reconceptualize 'American space' from an international perspective" (p. x) complements exciting new work by the likes of Paul W. Mapp and Amanda Foreman. Mapp's *The Elusive West and the Contest for Empire, 1713–1763* (2011) recasts the Seven Years' War, in part, as a geopolitical struggle to control the unknown American West, and Foreman's *A World on Fire: Britain's Crucial Role in the Civil War* (2010) documents the fragile nature of British neutrality during the Civil War. Although these books' arguments are in keeping with those of Black, they highlight a slight flaw of the book under review. The sweep of Black's study is not an unalloyed asset. His quest to cover a long time span sometimes seems at odds with his desire to emphasize simultaneously the contingent nature of events. He sacrifices narrative detail so that he can highlight the larger geopolitical structures at play over a long and complex period. But there is arguably no better way to highlight historical contingency than with detailed narrative. Foreman's book devotes roughly twice as many pages to the critical Anglo-U.S. relationship during the Civil War as does Black to his entire multi-century epic. Without the luxury of a detailed narrative, Black turns frequently to didactic, counterfactual discussion, "because such discussion helped frame the contemporary response to contingencies" (p. 393). As a result, the book reads a bit like an abridged textbook in places. Still, Black succeeds.

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JAMES SIMPSON. *Creating Wine: The Emergence of a World Industry, 1840–1914*. (The Princeton Economic History of the Western World.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2011. Pp. xxxvii, 318. \$39.50.

In 2009, the world produced 267.6 million hectoliters (1,013,632,575 gallons) of wine, resulting in the bewildering selection encountered in any well-stocked liquor store. This book is James Simpson's comprehensive analysis of the early stages of the modernization and internationalization of the wine industry that took place between the middle of the nineteenth century and 1914. Boldly venturing beyond the standard regional and national studies, Simpson scrutinizes the shifting dynamics of production and marketing from a global perspective.

The author's fluid writing style and the extensive use of tables and graphs prevent the abundance of hard data from being overwhelming, and the logical structure of the book adds to its readability. Part one opens with an examination of traditional European wine production on the eve of railway expansion and prior to the arrival of Phylloxera, the devastating vine disease.

Simpson focuses on France in his account of the industry-altering impact of Phylloxera, which destroyed the roots of virtually all European grape vines but spurred the development of scientific viti-viniculture. Experimental research led to vineyards replanted with European vines grafted onto Phylloxera-resistant American root stock. These hybrids produced higher yields, but only if chemicals were applied to combat other diseases. Louis Pasteur's breakthrough work on fermentation and the effect of temperature led to modern wineries with cooling systems that halted the fermentation process at the right time. The replanted vineyards and upgraded wineries were capital intensive but far more efficient and productive than the old ones.

Crucially, the scientific and technological breakthroughs made it possible to produce light, inexpensive, yet good wines in hot climates. The production of affordable wines in new supply zones such as the French Midi, Algeria, California, Australia, and Argentina allowed a mass market for ordinary wines to develop. In separate chapters, Simpson covers the specific market forces of each of these zones within the framework of the emerging global marketplace. Despite falling freight rates and improved infrastructures that made distribution over greater distances feasible, international trade in ordinary wines continued to be hindered by protective tariffs and by their spotty quality. In part two, Simpson analyzes Great Britain as a reluctant market for light wines. In a nation of beer and spirits drinkers, the creation of a mass market for wine was further hindered by the inability to prevent adulteration, fraud through mislabeling, lack of consistency, and high import duties. Quality products such as port, sherry, and the best Bordeaux wines remained ■ luxury affordable only to Britain's happy few.

Part three covers the establishment of regional appellations, classifications and branding, and mythical marketing (e.g., Dom Pérignon's creation of champagne). For each region involved in production, Simpson deconstructs the shifting levels of competition and cooperation among the economic factors that determined the profitability of the industry: growers, winemakers, exporters, importers, retailers, and consumers. The political strength of one interest group over another dictated the specific outcomes of these dynamics, with local and national government regulations, subsidies, and tariffs inevitably favoring one part of the commodity chain over another. Institutional innovations, including grower cooperatives and merchant associations, aided the development of protected regional appellations, such as claret, champagne, port, and sherry.

In part four, Simpson scrutinizes the locale-specific opportunities and challenges in California, Australia, and Argentina that led to different organizational structures and levels of vertical integration. California's wines only became a mainstay after early product instability and marketing failures forced a handful of merchants to band together in the powerful California Wine Association. Simpson's account of the impact of nineteenth-century immigration to the New World on

global wine production is fascinating. Australia's Anglo-Saxon beer drinkers caused the commodity chain of the country's trade in fortified red wines to stretch around the world to the British consumer market. Argentina, by contrast, benefitted from the influx of wine drinking Italian and Spanish immigrants who created a vast domestic market for light wines.

Statistics drive Simpson's narrative but also put it in proper perspective. In the five-year period 1909–1913, growers and producers worldwide brought 147.6 million hectoliters (559,090,909 gallons) to the market, an average of 29.5 million hectoliters per year. Despite all the changes and innovations in the industry over the course of the nineteenth century, the volume of wine produced in non-European countries (12.3 percent of global production) still paled in comparison with Europe's share of 87.7 percent. France and Italy produced 31.4 and 31.2 percent, respectively. Since then, annual worldwide production has grown ninefold, but, with many more nations competing in a volatile market, the top two's share had by 2009 dwindled to 17.56 and 17.38 percent. The ultimate strength of this book lies in the fact that Simpson treats the specific regional and national developments in the nineteenth century as integrated parts of an emerging global whole.

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JIMENA CANALES. *A Tenth of a Second: A History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2009. Pp. xii, 269. \$35.00.

This book offers an account of nineteenth-century observation and measurement in astronomy, physics, engineering, physiology, and psychology. Using a tenth of a second as a reference point, Jimena Canales traces attempts to conceptualize and measure short time spans. The book approaches the tenth of a second from two perspectives. It examines the techniques and practices of measuring, observing, and visualizing that were used to capture fractions of seconds as well as reflects on the meaning of this short time interval. Canales seeks to demonstrate the immense importance of the tenth of a second for nineteenth-century science and culture. According to her, the tenth of a second is constitutive of modernity (p. ix); her aim is to understand the tenth of a second as modernity (pp. ix, 14).

One pervasive theme throughout the book is the career of the "personal equation." Most chapters touch upon the question of how scientists dealt with the insight that different observers process sensory information differently. The book thus provides a fine account of how the conception of the personal equation traveled across disciplines, how it was being interpreted, and how reaction time studies along with new instruments and technologies were devised to better control the phenomenon.

The personal equation first became an issue in astronomy. Extending her own previous work as well as work by Simon Schaffer, Christoph Hoffmann, and oth-

ers, Canales examines the origins of concerns with the tenth of a second in debates about the personal equation. Canales charts the move from measuring the speed of sensation through reaction time measurements to interpretations of reaction time measurements as measurements of the speed of thought (chapters two and three). Machines for transit observations, the chronoscope, and photography opened up new ways of managing the problem of personal differences among observers that led to new experiments. But as Canales's account nicely shows, if we look closely at the debates surrounding the uses and merits of these techniques, we do not find a simple technological success story.

Chapters four and five demonstrate that these instruments and techniques had their own limitations and that the problem of individual differences in measurement could not be completely overcome. In particular, the diverse outcomes of transit observations created substantial controversy, and artificial transit machines could not settle debates. Were the discordant results due to the individuality of the observers? Were the instruments to blame? Were the phenomena themselves strange? Similarly, in the early days of photography and cinematography, these visualization techniques raised high hopes because they were thought to have the potential to overcome the limits of the eye, which cannot capture intervals shorter than a tenth of a second. But again, the apparatuses produced diverse outcomes. The different cameras that were used to capture the transit of Venus yielded different images, and the discrepancies could not be satisfactorily resolved.

The last two chapters take the story into experimental and theoretical physics. In chapter six, Canales argues that the development of new techniques of precision measurement in late nineteenth-century physics, notably interferometry, can best be understood as a response to concerns with the problem of personal differences and "personal error." Chapter seven charts the debate between Alfred Einstein and Henri Bergson about time and relativity. Canales demonstrates how contemporaneous concerns with precision measurement in physics and the psychology of perception drove these debates.

In my view, the book is strongest where it focuses on the actual practices and interpretations surrounding the personal equation and reaction time measurement. I am, however, less convinced by the larger claims in the introductory and concluding sections about the tenth of a second as constitutive of modernity or the sweeping statement that the tenth of a second was a driving force for twentieth-century "anti-positivist" philosophy and science studies. To me, the emphasis Canales puts on the tenth of a second appears seems oddly misplaced. This book really is a book about the career and repercussions of the personal equation, and as such, it is very intriguing.

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JESSICA B. TEISCH. *Engineering Nature: Water, Development, and the Global Spread of American Environmental Expertise*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2011. Pp. 260. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$27.50.

Jessica B. Teisch's book is a valuable survey of the global reach of American technical and entrepreneurial expertise in the decades around the turn of the twentieth century. Dreams of progress drew environmental experts and entrepreneurs to join, plan and oversee, or consult on mining projects, sugarcane plantations, and irrigated colonies in Australia, South Africa, Hawai'i, and Palestine. Linking Teisch's experts were California connections: official positions as city, state, or federal engineers, entrepreneurial projects in the San Bernardino Valley, and prestigious ancestors among the Forty-niners. Several modeled their contributions in California on observations made of India's irrigation systems and drew on British expertise, justifying the "global spread" claimed in Teisch's subtitle. Important also is Teisch's insistence that the expertise carried from California around the world was not merely technical, for it entailed a vision of progress that went "hand in hand" (p. 6) with racial subjugation.

Two uses of water connect the stories: water for mining and water for irrigation. British engineer Robert Maitland Brereton learned from experience with Indian irrigation systems the necessity of central ownership and administration. In the 1870s, he lobbied the U.S. Congress for a federal irrigation survey on behalf of California canal companies. George Davidson wrote the survey's report, traveled to India to examine connections among water systems, water users, and the state, and then returned to support California's creation of the office of state engineer in the wake of the disastrous choking of the Sacramento River by mining debris. William Hammond Hall got the post, and he later joined cousin John Hays Hammond in providing water for the mines and cities of South Africa. The brothers George and William Benjamin Chaffey built irrigation colonies in southern California and then Australia, which influenced the work Elwood Mead took up, assisting the development of similar settlements in Hawai'i and Palestine from his position as professor of rural institutions and irrigation at the University of California, Berkeley. Mead assisted in the failed attempts of the Hawaiian Home Commission to make Hawaiians more American by transforming them into yeoman farmers; Hammond was sentenced to death for treason by London's High Court for his role in an armed uprising against the Transvaal government.

The value of Teisch's book lies in its reach, in the colorful stories that embroiled technical experts and the far-flung and exotic locales to which they were drawn in their quest to remake both nature and society. Although the professional practice of engineering is one of Teisch's topics, it is often not clear what sort of engineering is under discussion. The timeframe of the book includes the important period of American engineering professionalization, in which engineers became

jealous of whom they allowed to carry the label and in which engineers moved increasingly toward formal and often scientific education and away from shop-floor and job-site training; Teisch describes instead a move in a somewhat opposite direction, away from “the scientist-engineer of the nineteenth-century” and toward the managerial expert of the twentieth (p. 24). “Scientist-engineer” more accurately describes a nineteenth-century practitioner from France or Germany than from the United States; Hammond, trained at Freiberg University, may legitimately bear such a label, but he is an exception.

Different kinds of engineers developed different identities and allegiances during this period: civil engineers had different connections with government and the state than did mining and mechanical engineers, for whom commercial and industrial connections remained most important, and only very few in any field became managerial experts. The difficulty may stem from Teisch’s reliance on the literature of environmental history rather than the history of engineering, citing environmental and western historians on the transformation of American engineering, for example, rather than making more use of Edwin Layton’s seminal study of engineering professionalization and public service, which appears only in the closing pages. Precision in identifying engineers and explaining why they were so identified would have strengthened an inherently interesting book.

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DAVID STEVENSON. *With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. xxi, 688. \$35.00.

How did World War I end, and why? Did the Allies win or did Germany lose? What brought about that outcome: military victory or collapse through attrition? If belief in victory faltered in Germany and among the other Central Powers (Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey), was this the fault of the Fighting Front or the Home Front (as nationalists and the defeated generals asserted almost immediately in Germany)? And what form did the war’s end take? Were the succession of armistices, and especially that of Germany with the Allies on November 11, 1918, the same thing as surrender? What relation did they bear to the treaties signed the following year? These are all fundamental questions, yet none has received the same attention as other classic questions posed by World War I: who or what started it, and why did it result in a new world war twenty years later?

Perhaps this is because World War I’s end in 1918 has been treated above all as a matter of military history. In practical terms, this emphasis has meant a focus on tactics and operations against the backdrop of a deadlocked battlefield. All too often this approach is situated within the framework of a single nation, as evi-

denced by a certain British historical obsession with how the British army “won the war.”

Stevenson’s magisterial study has changed the subject at a stroke. It applies an analytical framework of the sophistication self-evidently required to assess the origins and outcome of the war for the first time to the end-game itself, so providing answers to the questions above with a new cogency and clarity. Remarkably, this is the first history of the military events of 1918 to use the sources and languages of all four main contenders on the Western Front—Germany and France as well as the British Empire and the United States—and to view the fighting as the truly interactive business it was. Its also encompasses the other fronts, in Italy, the Balkans and the Middle East. Stevenson incorporates into his analysis logistics and intelligence—those unseen hands sustaining combat—and the even more vital conflict that took place on (and below) the oceans as Allied ships defeated the U-boat menace in the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean. Yet since like all wars, the Great War ultimately turned on will power (never enough on its own, but crucial to the winning mix of factors), victory was also shaped by the economic resources, social cohesion and political legitimacy that each camp variously disposed of. In short, by taking the turbulent last year of the war as his subject, Stevenson offers an interpretation of the preceding years and thus of the war as a whole.

Argued in precise prose but also able to produce the telling metaphor, the book deploys a powerful notion of a “race to the bottom.” Caught in the giant entropy of a war no one had anticipated, the winners managed to husband the essential resources and delay the process of decline sufficiently to gain the edge that determined the outcome. This entailed both the “learning curve” on the battlefield—that combination of hardware (tanks, aircraft) and tactics (counter-battery artillery fire, specialist assault units) that began to tilt the balance of advantage away from the defensive—and also the superiority in material resources enjoyed by the Allies (with the exception of defeated Russia) owing to their command of the oceans and access to the global economy. In the end, however, Allied tactics and battlefield learning were not sufficient to ensure victory.

As Stevenson notes, the defensive scramble mounted by the British and French against the spring offensive in 1918 sapped the German will to win at least as much as the subsequent Allied advances of the final “hundred days.” Behind both lay the relative Allied advantage in military equipment, economic resources, domestic living standards, and political legitimacy as wartime democracies came into their own.

The USA was the ultimate resource both on and off the battlefield. Counteracting entropy in 1918, it gave the Allies an unanswerable advantage. But as Stevenson shows in his compelling final chapter, the war’s conclusion came with a twist. If the British and French insisted on harsh terms that sought to make the armistice a total surrender, the Wilsonian vision of a non-punitive

and non-expansionist peace meant that the peace settlement proved to be anything but that.

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STEFAN GOEBEL and DEREK KEENE, editors. *Cities in Battlegrounds: Metropolitan Scenarios, Experiences, and Commemorations of Total War*. (Historical Urban Studies Series.) Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2011. Pp. xi, 239. \$124.95.

This collection seeks to bring into dialogue two fields that have experienced enormous change in recent years: urban history and the cultural history of war. While urban history and its institutional home, urban studies, have a reputation for nitty-gritty social history and demographics, the cross-pollination of cultural geography, anthropology, and spatial theory have changed the boundaries of "traditional" urban history and broadened its focus. Likewise, the study of warfare has ranged broadly across different methodological approaches in the past two decades, embracing cultural theory especially. The essays published here try to reconcile these transformed fields in the profession, with somewhat uneven results. Most of the essays provide useful and fresh approaches to their specific topics, and it is important to note that these essays represent a wide geographic area and multinational authors, for which the editors should be applauded. In their introduction, Stefan Goebel and Derek Keene write that the thematic focus of the book is threefold: "scenarios—experiences—commemorations" (p. 4), with an emphasis on war as a disaster in urban life that threatened notions of modernity and "civilization." However, there is another organizing dichotomy that may be more useful to readers; most of the essays focus either on the city as it is imagined in the twentieth century, or on the city as a locus of action and reaction to war, nationalism, and memory. Of these two strands, the second comes closest to fusing the themes of war and the city.

Contributors focusing on the city as imagined battlefield rely more heavily on literary and visual representations of the city, and interestingly, they find that cities do not have to be real to have power in shaping discourses of war. Susan R. Grayzel's work on the air war in Britain (chapter two), for instance, makes a persuasive argument about the ways in which H. G. Wells raised the specter of war in the city for Britons. His prescient writing about air raids before World War I and his interwar film about terror helped to construct a story about the ways in which war destroyed not just buildings but the foundations of civilization itself. Meanwhile, Eyal Ginio's contribution on the Ottoman city of Edirne explores the ways in which a city can be shaped by narratives of revenge, redemption, and cultural unity in the aftermath of war (chapter five). Ginio shows how the Balkan Wars set the stage for the national narratives following Gallipoli and the population exchanges of the 1920s. In fact, Edirne functioned as a

place for crystallizing many of the ideas and fears facing Ottoman elites. As with Grayzel's and Ginio's work, all the chapters that focus on the imagined city explain how the lines between real city and artificial construct become blurred with the onset of war and most especially in the memory of war. One of the important points the book makes is that historians need to probe those slip-pages.

Perhaps the most innovative contributions in this collection come with the examination of the ways in which the local reaction in a city shapes a larger national, imperial or global dialogue. Tim Cole (chapter eight), in a comparative study of Warsaw and Budapest, uses urban history methods to examine how these two metropolises reacted to and shaped the national policies of ghettoization during World War II. He incorporates cultural geography, social history, cultural studies, and political history to find that while each city had major differences in their ghetto stories, their decisions about how to construct those ghettos relied on remarkably similar negotiations with Jewish and non-Jewish populations. Cole's essay is a model of the kinds of integrated scholarship the editors aimed for in the book. Other important contributions to the thorny question of how local lives in urban centers react to international (and total) war come from Maureen Healy's examination of Viennese internal enemies (chapter seven) and Jovana Knežević's exploration of the role of rumor in wartime Belgrade (chapter six). Taken together these three essays bring the four cities to life and make the complexities of metropolitan settings during catastrophe quite apparent.

Finally, several of the authors address the broad question of remembrance of war, looking not only at commemoration but at the ways in which modern media try to forge connections between current events and those of the past. Goebel (chapter ten) and Lisa Yoneyama (chapter eleven) take two cities targeted by bombing during World War II, Coventry and Hiroshima, and pick apart the ways in which city leaders and other stakeholders helped make these cities into international symbols. The intimate decision making about what to replace, what to destroy, and what to highlight gave power to cities that had been rendered powerless by wartime destruction. However, in recreating their cities as international icons and symbols, urban leaders also risked losing their local identities and perhaps their local control.

Generally, this collection attempts to challenge the traditional divides in academic worlds and does so with great attention to the nuances of gender, nation, and local life. Scholars interested in the emergence of air warfare and bombing of civilian populations will find the book particularly interesting given the large number of essays that treat this issue, either as a central point or peripherally. Urban historians likewise will find the essays useful as a fresh way to conceptualize the ways in which war defines cities, through occupation, destruction, reorganization, and even prediction. The essays are all rather short, which leads me to assume that

many may have originated as conference papers, but several are excerpts from forthcoming books, so they serve as a nice preview of things to come.

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RONALD IAN HEIFERMAN. *The Cairo Conference of 1943: Roosevelt, Churchill, Chiang Kai-shek, and Madame Chiang*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company. 2011. Pp. vii, 199. \$45.00.

Allied forces assigned to the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater during World War II often felt neglected, caught up in what aggrieved British veterans still call "the forgotten war." The absence of a rich body of historical literature reflects this sentiment. Ronald Ian Heiferman's pioneering full account of the Cairo Conference of November 1943, attended by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, is therefore a welcome as well as an impressive addition.

The Cairo Conference's origins lay in Roosevelt's belief that some ego-stroking gesture was necessary to address Chiang's long-simmering resentment that he, and more generally the Chinese theater, were not being treated with appropriate seriousness. Cultural confusions abounded, but the root problem was structural and strategic. Chiang had long hoped that the major Allied effort against Japan would come through Burma, connecting the Allies with his isolated regime in Chongqing. The war would then be fought to victory in mainland China. The Americans gave some help but, fully aware both of the formidable mountain and jungle terrain and the inhibiting Japanese entrenchment in northern Burma, chose to fight their war against Japan in the Pacific. The Chinese effort, lamentably passive as it seemed to many U.S. observers, was valued simply as a "holding action" that kept the bulk of Japan's forces (Heiferman suggests one million men but some estimates are higher) locked up in China.

Heiferman's admirably comprehensive treatment and objective analysis, which brings a wide range of relevant personalities and causative factors into sharp focus, suggests a two-level conference. At the top we see a highly personalized "relationship" diplomacy—an art form favored both by Roosevelt and also by Madame Chiang Kai-shek on her brilliantly successful tour of the United States in early 1943. Roosevelt flattered the Chinese leader, promising full support for China's postwar ambitions and offering ingratiating critiques of British conduct.

At a lower level the leaders and military chiefs grappled with an operational plan designed by Chiang's U.S. adviser, Joseph Stilwell, to break down Japanese power in northern Burma. The Chinese would advance from the northeast with supporting action by Allied (mainly British) forces from the west. Both Chiang and Churchill felt obliged, in meetings with the watchfully suspicious Americans, to support the campaign in principle. Neither appears to have been sincere and pro-

longed bouts of shadow-boxing led inexorably to a stalemate. Chiang demanded, as an absolute condition of any Chinese action, a simultaneous British military advance as well as naval efforts in the Indian Ocean to frustrate any Japanese reinforcements. Churchill promised a British fleet in due course but would give no date. Surely, he argued, the numerically superior land forces at hand would suffice. But Chiang refused to compromise and then raised another hurdle, this time insisting upon significant increases in supplies delivered by U.S. planes over the mountainous southern approach to China. The Americans balked at the request, pointing out that there would in fact have to be a temporary reduction in existing schedules in anticipation of the buildup for the proposed Burma campaign. Eventually, the conference compromised and approved Operation Buccaneer, a less ambitious amphibious operation in the Andaman Islands aimed at gaining control of the Bay of Bengal. Roosevelt gave Chiang a pleasing communiqué promising the return to China of all Chinese territory occupied by Japan since 1895.

In the end, however, Heiferman's account leaves little doubt that the Cairo Conference was, except at the level of propaganda, a failure. For upon their return to Egypt after their intervening meeting with Joseph Stalin, which committed the western Allies to the invasion of France, Churchill was able to persuade Roosevelt that even Operation Buccaneer should be abandoned in deference to the now compelling needs of Operation Overlord. Roosevelt then had to explain this reversal to Chiang, who responded angrily, warning that Free China might not survive. He seized the moment to ask for a one billion dollar grant. Roosevelt refused. He had now lost faith in Chiang (though public cordiality was maintained) and began to cultivate more promising connections with the Chinese Communists. Thus everyone came out badly, even the British whose sense of euphoria in blocking action in the CBI theater soon faded as the Americans refused to endorse the alternative Mediterranean operations that Churchill had wanted all along.

As to the long-term consequences, Heiferman, noting Roosevelt's post-Cairo disillusionment and skepticism about Chiang's chances of postwar political survival, aptly emphasizes the dangerous political confusion that resulted from Roosevelt's failure to convey his transformed assessment to Vice President Harry S. Truman, or indeed to the American public (p. 168).

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STEPHAN FEUCHTWANG. *After the Event: The Transmission of Grievous Loss in Germany, China, and Taiwan*. New York: Berghahn Books. 2011. Pp. 240. \$95.00.

This is an arrestingly important work. It contains the complex reflections of a seasoned researcher on a key dilemma of the twenty-first century: how to pass on the meanings of historical trauma from generation to generation. The transmission of grievous loss will happen

anyway. The question is how to make this process both more artful and more meaningful, so that we may indeed move beyond the grief and grievance that is our legacy from the bloody twentieth century barely behind us.

Stephan Feuchtwang is uniquely qualified to write about this weighty subject; he has been engaging the comparative literature on history and memory for over four decades. Therefore, he has been able to add something truly new to the large corpus of scholarship that began with Maurice Halbwachs's explorations of collective memory and grew to encompass the works of Jacques Le Goff, Pierre Nora, and Patrick Hutton, just to mention a few of the researchers working in this field. Feuchtwang's questions go beyond memory and memorialization to the more subtle mechanisms through which different cultures pass on the experience of loss both in the public and in the personal realms.

His book honors distinctive voices, not the least being his own as a child refugee from the horrors of the Shoah. The grandson of the chief rabbi of Vienna (who had been accorded Jewish honors and official recognition when he died in 1936, before the horrors of Nazism totally engulfed his community and his country), Feuchtwang wrestles with the uniqueness of the Holocaust in a thought-provoking, comparative context. While other writers—most notably Ian Buruma in *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan* (1994)—also deploy a wide range of linguistic and analytical skills to reach across cultures, this particular researcher brings a depth of engagement that makes this book utterly unique. It combines interview work and field notes with an impassioned concern with how Jews, Chinese, and Germans continue to express an ambivalent relationship to historical trauma decades after memories are assumed to have been put to rest.

This book is unabashedly about apples and oranges, as it were. How can one possibly compare the murderous policies of the Shoah to the political consequences of China's Great Leap Forward, or the Nationalist Party's repression of a small band of leftists in Taiwan after 1949? The numbers themselves are incommensurate: six million Jews killed in Europe; thirty-six million dead from starvation and political repression in Mao's China; "only" 164 communist sympathizers disappeared in the small hamlet of Lukou. Feuchtwang gives us the figures, as well as the courage—and a methodology—to elicit shared meanings from totally different historical contexts. He makes subtle distinctions between targeted violence and politically motivated indifference to human suffering on a large scale. He is also careful not to use or assign the language of victimization to the different individuals whom he (and his research assistants in China, Taiwan and Germany) sought out. The goal is to listen and thereby create a framework in which strategies for the transmission of grief gain meaning across time and space.

In this project, Feuchtwang's own fieldwork from 1968 becomes a springboard for a return to Taiwan in 2011. Forty-three years later, the author is not only

much older but has been building an edifice of questions based upon extensive readings and interviews on the Chinese mainland as well as in Berlin. In China, Yang Jisheng's monumental study from 2009, *Mubei (Memorial Tablet)*, allows Feuchtwang to begin to fathom the weight of unassuaged loss that followed the great famine of 1958–1960. In Germany, the collection of interviews from the 2002 study entitled *Opa war kein Nazi (Grandpa Was No Nazi)* provides a base line from which more personal voices and experiences emerge, so that readers are brought into the intimate world of Berliners seeking to recover some sense of *Heimat* unsullied by Nazi memories.

Through the book's keen focus on disparate ways of "historical repair," the author manages to highlight both public policy changes as well the personal strategies that lead individuals to, literally, back into historical memories. As a result, we are able to envisage both victims and commemorators alike as "ghosts"—fragments of a lived experience that hovers on the edges of public remembrance, reminding us of what is still unspoken, singular as well as intimately familiar. It is, therefore, no poetic exaggeration to conclude (as Feuchtwang does) that each of us has become a site where ruins reign, where grief speaks mutely. On this terrain, the study of history meets its greatest challenge: to give voice to the unspeakable by listening to what lies buried in cultures and languages flung far from our own loss.

VERA SCHWARZ
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SARAH B. SNYDER. *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network*. (Human Rights in History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. x, 293. \$85.00.

Sarah B. Snyder brings together two debates—how to understand the rise of human rights movements and the fall of the Soviet empire—with a fresh look at the way human rights activism, unexpectedly unleashed by the inauspicious Helsinki Accords of 1975, hastened the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The book presents a detailed account of the two and a half years of negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that produced the Helsinki Final Act, an unlikely agreement among thirty-five nations that was originally conceived as a Soviet project to gain international ratification of postwar boundary arrangements and the principle of nonintervention, thereby protecting its sphere of influence. "If Helsinki is held, then I can die," Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev reportedly remarked, showing that the Soviet leadership regarded its initiative as crucial to national security (p. 24). Snyder draws on extensive archival research in the United States, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, supplemented by interviews with some of the principals, to produce an account that specialists will find a valuable addition to work by Padraic Kenney on the grass-roots revolutions of 1989 and

work on the history of human rights by Samuel Moyn (one of the series editors for the present volume). Snyder demonstrates how a combination of diplomatic wrangling and pressure from below wrested the agenda away from Soviet control and transformed an agreement about borders and sovereignty into a promise to allow international monitoring of internal human rights conditions. It was a promise of great consequence.

If Brezhnev hoped that the Helsinki process would forever enshrine Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger dismissed the whole enterprise as “meaningless,” in line with his realist doctrine: “No matter what goes into the final act, I don’t believe that the Soviet Union will ever do anything it doesn’t want to” (p. 32). Snyder carefully documents how both men were proved wrong as the Helsinki process took on a life of its own, surprising Soviet leaders and American cynics alike. Other international agreements such as the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights had been ignored. What made the Helsinki Accords relevant was a clause stating that CSCE members could exchange views on its implementation. That provision formally made human rights an international concern, and, as Snyder demonstrates, opened a political space that Western governments and non-governmental organizations on both sides of the Iron Curtain widened.

Kissinger did his best to make his prophecy self-fulfilling, sidelining CSCE to the point that U.S. diplomats yearned for instructions. He was eventually outflanked by the U.S. Congress, which frequently played a substantive role in making foreign policy during the 1970s. Legislators insisted on the creation of a joint congressional-executive Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe headed by Representative Dante Fascell (D-FL), a noted human rights advocate. The Fascell Commission kept a spotlight on human rights NGOs, political prisoners, and refuseniks during the years of Kissingerian neglect. Yuri F. Orlov, Anatoly B. Shcharansky, Yelena Bonner, and other founders of the Moscow Helsinki Group worked closely with the Fascell Commission to publicize violations. Helsinki monitoring groups sprang up in Poland and Czechoslovakia, becoming a network of grass-roots organizations.

President Jimmy Carter took up the issue out of the dual conviction that it was a moral imperative and would strengthen the Democratic Party with “ethnic” voters. He had campaigned against what he called Helsinki’s approval of the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe. Once in office, he found the accords useful for challenging the Soviets on their treatment of dissidents. Ronald Reagan similarly saw the CSCE as a stick to beat the Soviets with, then was surprised to find Mikhail Gorbachev increasingly willing to discuss human rights in exchange for cooling anti-Soviet rhetoric. Snyder narrates the Gorbachev policy of *glasnost* largely as the product of Western demands. However, she acknowledges that Gorbachev’s reforms had gone much further “than was required by external pressure” by the end of Reagan’s second term (p. 215).

The Helsinki Final Act endorsed international monitoring of the treatment of Eastern dissident groups and human rights activists, while encouraging a dramatic increase in their activities and launching Western NGOs such as Helsinki Watch that gave them a modicum of protection and kept the issue on the international diplomatic agenda. Václav Havel once flattered Helsinki Watch: “I know very well what you did for us, and perhaps without you, our revolution would not be” (p. 226). The Helsinki process, far from preserving the system Brezhnev thought would be his legacy, catalyzed the transnational network of human rights activists, their Western supporters, and reformers headed by Gorbachev into an unwitting coalition that ended the Cold War. When the Berlin Wall fell, to paraphrase Reagan hagiography, it was because they pushed it.

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JAMES SIEKMEIER. *The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 1952 to the Present*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 210. \$64.95.

This book is a welcome update to the history of Bolivian-U.S. relations. James Siekmeier argues that U.S. policymakers eschewed the use of force and instead opted for economic assistance to Bolivia because they believed it would be the most effective way to maintain positive relations. Likewise, Bolivian leaders understood U.S. concerns about communism during the Cold War and were active players in eliciting U.S. aid and crafting “workable compromises” with the U.S. government. As Siekmeier points out, recent comments by Bolivia’s President Evo Morales, who called upon South American leaders to oppose the Free Trade Area of the Americas, while tapping a deep well of resentment, overstated the influence that the United States exerted on Bolivia going back to 1952. Indeed, during the Cold War, Bolivia was mostly able to get what it wanted from the United States—particularly economic assistance.

Siekmeier’s book updates scholarship on Bolivian-U.S. relations in three ways. First, it takes advantage of more recent scholarship and declassified documents to examine foreign relations in the 1970s. Second, it does an excellent job of treating the cultural, social, and political transformation of Bolivia between 1952 and the present. Finally, this book gives perhaps the definitive word on the Bolivian Revolution and shows how that seminal event affected relations between the United States and Bolivia through the 1970s.

Particularly noteworthy is Siekmeier’s treatment of Victor Andrade Uzquiano, Bolivia’s ambassador to the United States at various times between 1944 and 1962. Perhaps more than any other recent scholar, Siekmeier emphasizes Andrade’s use of charm, knowledge of U.S. culture, and diplomatic skills to secure a near continual stream of aid to Bolivia during his time as ambassador and in the years subsequent to his tenure. Indeed, Andrade’s role cannot be understated, given that most key

players in Washington who knew him were positively inclined toward him. Siekmeier uses Andrade's example to show that a combination of anticommunist rhetoric and skillful diplomacy could have a lasting positive impact on Bolivia's relations with the United States. Other ambassadors and diplomats garnered less impressive results. Historians of U.S. foreign relations should emulate Siekmeier in focusing on particular diplomats during the Cold War and analyzing their skill sets and overall effectiveness.

That being said, Siekmeier could have strengthened his post-1970 analysis. Out of a two-hundred-page book, a sole chapter (the final one) is devoted to the last thirty years of a sixty-year history. This chapter has the feel of being added on in an attempt to bring the book up to the present. This may be due to the lack of primary source material compared to that available for earlier years. However, there are a number of bilateral events since the 1970s that could have been looked at in more depth. In his introduction, Siekmeier states that the book will analyze U.S.-Bolivian relations from 1952–1971, and it does so very effectively. However, readers may be somewhat disappointed with the post-1970s treatment.

This point aside, Siekmeier's up-to-date interpretation is a welcome and important addition to scholarship.

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ASIA

K. E. BRASHIER. *Ancestral Memory in Early China*. (Harvard-Yenching Institute Monograph Series, number 72.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center. 2011. Pp. xii, 470. \$39.95.

This book builds upon arguments that K. E. Brashier presented in his dissertation and offers several intriguing hypotheses, chief among them Brashier's assertion that early Chinese thinkers advocated something like "performative thinking": i.e., thinking that had an impact on the world outside the agent (p. 229).

Brashier's book adopts a two-pronged approach to the topic of ancestral rites. Parts one, three, and five focus on what members of the governing elite in late the Warring States period and Han dynasty wrote regarding ancestral rites and beliefs about the afterlife. The evenly numbered chapters offer ambitious arguments about social realities in early China. These latter chapters, however thought-provoking, tend to gloss over a host of methodological problems involving extrapolation from texts to classical-era situations.

I warrant that few if any early China specialists can say a great deal more about social realities in early China than Brashier, but he owes readers a fuller explanation about the difficulties involved in describing these conditions. Given the nature of existing documents, historians of the premodern era can only relate what people said and did, but not what they actually

believed. Many of the texts that Brashier employs do not reproduce or address the conditions prevailing among "people in general," their prescriptions applying only to high-ranking elites and sometimes only to the ruler. Most importantly, no "religious" sphere was cordoned off from sociopolitical life in China.

Unfortunately, Brashier does not always sufficiently substantiate his assertions. Were Brashier to better ground his hypothesis about "performative thinking" in the received and excavated texts, he would have had to detail the range of physiological operations entailed in "thinking" as described in these texts and consider whether that term captures the complex processes associated with activities of the "heart" (*xin*). He would also have to ascertain whether any evolution occurred during the long centuries under review in the texts' treatments of display mechanisms and cogitation. Some odd interpretative choices and notable lacunae further limit the force of his analysis. For example, Brashier arranges Buddhist texts alongside the earliest classics and collapses all of the texts into a single anachronistic continuum of early Chinese thought. Brashier moreover rather haphazardly assigns texts to particular schools, in spite of more definitive categorizations (e.g., the *Guanzi* to "philosophical Daoism," when the authoritative *Hanshu* 30 characterizes it as "military-strategic") (p. 266).

Some secondary works that Brashier cites seem not fully digested. For example, Brashier's citation of Jane Geaney misses one of her main points: that the absence of a strong reliance on inner-outer contrasts in the notion of the person in early China makes any talk of the "internalization of external moral codes" itself anachronistic. Moreover, the writings of Emile Durkheim and Claude Lévi-Strauss on "religion"—historical constructions reflecting a specific time, place, and ideological stance—cannot stand in for the whole of "Western" thinking on relations binding the living and the dead.

This is a good book and a lively read, but it misses being a great book. Let us celebrate, however, Brashier's substantial achievements. The term "structured amnesia" (p. 65) describing the gradual diminution of sacrifices to the dead over time is remarkably apt. In addition, part three, devoted to the "spectrum of beliefs" in early China, should be required reading for all students of Chinese history. With few exceptions, the translations are accurate. Thus, Brashier's book represents a welcome addition to the libraries of specialists and non-specialists alike.

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SOPHIE VOLPP. *Worldly Stage: Theatricality in Seventeenth-Century China*. (Harvard East Asian Monographs, number 267.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center. 2011. Pp. xi, 371. \$44.95.

With vigor and nuance, Sophie Volpp explores how sociocultural elites resorted to theatrical spectatorship to

contend with the pervasive social and cultural anxieties engendered by the commoditization of Chinese life in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Not only did theater assume a much more prominent place within the cultural practices among the leisured elite, but, more importantly, tropes of theatricality became part and parcel of the cultural critique deployed by champions of the theater and those who vigorously opposed it. In both cases, such rhetoric addressed itself to the growing permeability of social boundaries between the worlds of learning and commerce. In successive chapters, Volpp amplifies her readings of important literary texts—plays, poems, and essays—through the judicious contrast and dialogue with other late Ming and early Qing sources. She successfully reconstructs the social meanings of the multiple rhetorical uses of theatrical tropes in this period. Volpp contends that some segments of the elite developed particular forms of visual discernment in order to differentiate themselves from the vulgar arrivistes. These elites insisted on an aesthetic rooted in simultaneous absorption in and dispassion from the world of forms. In order to delineate that new aesthetic, Volpp inventively discusses figurations of acting, actors, and storytelling in the context of the rise of vernacular literary forms among the sociocultural elite during this period.

Chapter three presents a compelling addition to the body of interpretations of one the period's signature plays, the famed *Peony Pavilion* (1598) by the erstwhile scholar-official Tang Xianzu (1550–1616). In Volpp's reading, the play, often treated as the locus classicus for the cult of authentic emotion (*qing*), also represented an intervention in the uses of literary precedent. The school that dominated sixteenth-century politics and literary culture, the so-called Archaists, sought to rejuvenate literary discourse through transformative citation of literary practices current in earlier dynasties. By contrast, another school—clustered around men who championed a sophisticated literary authenticity over the emblematic display of standard learning—began to experiment with new forms, including drama, songs, and fiction. Setting the play against the copious anecdotal literature that made scholastic pedants the butt of jokes, this book demonstrates that Tang's signature play critiques the theatrical artificiality of the followers of Archaism.

Chapter four centers around a lesser-known play by one of the most idiosyncratic figures of the late Ming world of Chinese theater, Wang Jide (ca. 1542–1623). His lone surviving *zaju* play, entitled *The Male Queen*, was unusual in that it not only made the cross-dressing of a man as a woman its main topic but exploited the corrosive effects of visual and verbal impersonation on literary authority. The play is not so much concerned with those who might have an unauthentic relation to the past, but, through its attention to the visual and verbal simulation of the actor's gender, asks whether an uncomplicated relation to the historical past is in fact desirable. In an iconoclastic stance, the main protagonist declares himself to be superior to all precedents,

thus calling into question the authenticity of originals. In Volpp's interpretation, the play proposes a theatrical aesthetic of indeterminacy that thrives on playing with perspective and perception, positing that, to the trained eye, self-created latter-day simulacra are more valuable than the conventionally revered originals from the past.

Chapter five continues the investigation into the polyvalent figure of the actor in seventeenth-century China in order to explore the empathetic staging of a "homosocial homoerotics." The chapter examines a collection of 150 poems inscribed as colophons by a coterie of eminent statesmen and literary luminaries on an actor by the name of Xu Ziyun. For seventeen years, Xu was romantically involved with Chen Weisong (1625–1682), one of the most famous poets of the early Qing period. Volpp argues that these poems can be understood as part of a quest for distinction through "extraordinary feeling," both in terms of their declarative intensity and their refined male-male focus. In doing so, the book draws attention to empathy as an important facet of the cult of genuine emotion. Accordingly, poetic effusion on the literatus-actor liaison made the authors' feelings both an object of self-dramatization and of sophisticated spectatorship within Chen's circle.

Chapter six explores the changing literati representations of Liu Jingting, a storyteller, both as a historical figure and as a character in the Kong Shangren's (1648–1718) seventeenth-century play *Peach Blossom Fan* (1699). Volpp argues that Kong recuperated the verbal dexterity of the storyteller, thought by some to be a threat to the literatus, as an exemplary embodiment of the ideological flexibility necessary to reconcile oneself to the transience of dynasties as showcased by the contemporary Ming/Qing transition.

Hence, this work enriches our understanding not only of how the theater—both as a practice and as discourse—gained currency among seventeenth-century Chinese elites, but also of how theater generated a distinctive aesthetic that enjoined the forces of commercialization and the Buddhist rhetoric of detachment to recalibrate what it meant to engage with and to write within the world.

PATRICIA SIEBER
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HO-FUNG HUNG. *Protest with Chinese Characteristics: Demonstrations, Riots, and Petitions in the Mid-Qing Dynasty*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2011. Pp. xvi, 253. \$50.00.

This book is a welcome addition to the small group of English-language studies that attempt to discern patterns in recorded individual or collective breaches of the political and/or legal order in China's two last imperial dynasties. Besides providing numerous vivid vignettes of particular disturbances, Ho-Fung Hung endeavors to relate changing patterns of protest both to larger socioeconomic and political trends (growth of the market economy and "state centralization") and to Chinese "cultural schemas." He also proposes revisions

to allegedly Euronormative assumptions about changing patterns of protest.

Hung's argument runs as follows. The most readily available set of records suggests that mid-Qing "protests" happened in three discontinuous "waves": ca. 1740–1759, 1776–1795, and 1820–1839. In the first wave, "state-engaging" protests, mostly in quest of famine relief, predominated over "state-resisting" protests, the majority of which involved either expressions of resentment against the government (or individual officials) or objections to state interference with "illicit activities." In this phase, protesters often manifested a "filial-loyal" disposition, representing themselves as supplicants to the grace of an establishment that ruled on behalf of Heaven and maintained the will and the capacity to relieve popular hunger. In the second wave, "state-engaging protests" occupied a mere 17.1 percent of the recorded "protests," with "state-resisting protests" an overwhelming majority. The largest category of protests in this wave comprised those occasioned by government efforts to quell "illicit activities." Protests were more likely to be violent and may, in some regions, have been related to the subsequent outbreak of major rebellions, such as the White Lotus Rebellion (1796–1805). The growth in anti-state violence reflects decline in the perceived legitimacy of the imperial institution, tarnished by widespread rumors about the sexual adventures of the ageing Qianlong emperor. By the third wave, despite setbacks to the market economy and weakened central-government effectiveness, "reformist rhetoric" (p. 137) under Qianlong's son and grandson had restored popular trust in the monarchy. "State-resisting" protests now occupied a reduced majority (74.7 percent). Most of the protests still involved violence; "resisting crackdown against illicit activities" remained the largest subcategory. However, grass-roots folk trusted the emperor enough to have their representatives risk heavy punishment by seeking to appeal to the throne. This became something of a vogue in the third wave.

Such, for Hung, was the distinctively Chinese "early modern" "trajectory" of "protest transformation." If European protest was moving in linear fashion "from state-resisting to state-engaging" with the aid of the "emergent cultural schema of popular sovereignty" (pp. 173, 176), Chinese protest had made the transition, with the first wave, "from state-resisting [dominant in the period 1645–1739] to state-engaging," only to loop back to "state-resisting," while the mentality of "filial loyalty" made a comeback. It follows that the European trajectory "can no longer be seen as a universal and natural path applicable everywhere" (p. 173). Hung seeks to position his three-phase cycle as developmentally antecedent to China's post-Opium-War "reactive violence against the state"; he adduces this perceived continuity to support the view that Chinese modernity antedates the Opium War, having "started to crystallize in the eighteenth century" (pp. 173–174).

Although Hung does well in adducing sources missed by other authors (myself included) in his account of a

1748 demonstration in Suzhou, there may be issues of interpretation here and elsewhere in his book. Unfortunately, his practice of limiting his documentation to a list of sources at the commencement of each vignette makes it difficult to check any given statement for fidelity; I regret any resulting injustice in what follows. I have been unable to verify that an "anonymous pamphlet" circulated by "elites" (Hung's word, I stress) "reported that twenty-one grain merchants who refused to lower their prices were beaten to death by government runners" (p. 89). The provincial governor, at least, responding to the emperor's inquiry about an allegation that twenty-one "people" had suffered such deaths, appears to have interpreted the allegation as referring to his treatment of the rioters. He had, he claimed, had only the three ringleaders executed in this way, in accordance with the emperor's instructions, and had shown varying degrees of leniency to the rest (see *Shiliao xunkan* [1930–1931], vol. 29, section "di," pp. 54a–b; cf. *ibid.*, p. 57b). Does the historian's craft really lie in "get[ting] to the truth" like "a detective" and then serving the reader with a "reasonably accurate narrative" (p. 57) cleansed of all traces of engagement with the problematic sources? This reviewer feels on surer ground when the realities of "source" production are acknowledged, and when reasons for apparently bold inferences are shared with the reader.

There is much to admire in this book. The profiles of protest are interesting and lively, in a general way Eurocentrism is indeed to be opposed, and there is plausibility in the linkage of evolving patterns of protest with changes in the larger economic and political environment. The author's ambition to discern a meaningful pattern in the large, heterogeneous corpus of protest records is also praiseworthy and has produced results that merit respectful consideration in our future studies of Qing history.

HELEN DUNSTAN
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ETHAN ISAAC SEGAL. *Coins, Trade, and the State: Economic Growth in Early Medieval Japan*. (Harvard East Asian Monographs, number 334.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center. 2011. Pp. xii, 258. \$39.95.

This book revisits the topic of decentralization in Japan between the seventh and the sixteenth centuries. Ethan Isaac Segal agrees with the prevailing scholarly assessment of the period and sees Japan as gradually devolving from a centralized (proto) nation-state into some three hundred independent domains and then fairly quickly reuniting in a confederation of vassal domains under a single master. Segal contributes to this discussion by highlighting the role of money in the decline of the power of the state and the rise of local trade, markets, and agency.

The reason for the fragmentation was the wholesale transfer of land to temples and shrines, relatives, and clients to the extent that half the potential tax base was

in untaxed estates by 1200. As control, if not outright ownership, of land fell into the hands of estate managers and peasants, the capital lost its status as the major center of economic activity and province-level activity became more important, as indicated by the proliferation of Pure Land and Zen family chapels. The surplus created by new strains of rice and technologies gave the advantage to the peasants since taxes and rent were calculated in set units that were not revised to reflect the rise in productivity. The period of the latter middle ages through the sixteenth century can be seen as a competition between the farming and the military classes. And, as we know by the eventual commutation of goods, rice, and labor taxes to forty percent (in principle) of rice and the right of villages to self-government, the peasants won.

Segal identifies money as a major player in this larger pattern of fragmentation. While the imperial government claimed the exclusive right to mint coins, it could never mint enough, prevent counterfeiting, or control the coins' market value. Copper coins were brought from China, through formal and informal channels. Segal sees the massive shift in the economy in the late thirteenth century as caused by the constellation of improvements in weather, rice strains and agricultural technology, and shipbuilding in Japan. These factors complemented an influx of coins from China, which was minting massive amounts of copper coin in the Northern Song period (960–1127), a time of enormous increase in Chinese urbanization, industrial output, and population. The Japanese wanted coins, first and foremost, because they were easy to store and did not spoil and, secondly, because they were cheaper to transport, sometimes by as much as forty percent, than commodities heretofore demanded as rent or taxes. Even coins were expensive to transport, and, in response, bills of exchange or paper certificates emerged in long-distance and even local trade; costs were cut to fifteen percent. Segal places the onus of guaranteeing the certificates on the merchant looking for return business since the government did not, as it did in China, offer such guarantees. His analysis provokes questions about the role that estate managers, who frequently exerted their clout as they supervised local markets, villages, and temples and shrines, played in the process of guaranteeing these transactions.

Segal has established his credentials with this work. But, there are several things about the monograph that indicate questionable changes in the culture of academe. The book is well written, except for the ubiquitous split infinitive, which, of course, would bother only someone of my age and stodginess. But there are contradictory "codes" in the volume. The narrative's three-part structure (first, tell what you are going to discuss; two, discuss; three, summarize the discussion) and the large typeface make the book seem bigger than it should be. At the same time, the truncated footnotes, even in first citations, indicate that a smaller volume was desired (ostensibly, by the publisher). If, indeed, a larger volume were desired, the footnotes could be con-

siderably expanded. Certainly, the volume could support a larger index: "shroffing," which appears several times in the text, is not included. And, finally, Segal makes clear that the only western-language sources consulted were English, despite the increase in online access to foreign dissertations. This confirms a sense of insularity—even provinciality—at work in the United States. This is a bit unsettling, considering the increasing numbers of Americans descending on the triennial meeting of the European Association of Japanese Studies.

All things considered, I recommend this book, especially as a text for undergraduate courses. Segal refines our understanding of the importance of money and financial transactions during a critical period in Japanese history.

SYBIL ANNE THORNTON
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KÄREN WIGEN. *A Malleable Map: Geographies of Restoration in Central Japan, 1600–1912*. (Asia: Local Studies/Global Themes, number 17.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2010. Pp. xvii, 319. \$39.95.

If a key theme in the recent literature on Japan's pre-modern cartographic traditions has been the relationship between maps and the idea of nation, then the first thing to set Kären Wigen's new work apart is its focus on a single region. What does it mean, Wigen asks, that the modern prefecture (*ken*) of Nagano, a late nineteenth-century creation, occupies the same physical space as that of the ancient province (*kuni*) of Shinano, first laid out under the eighth-century Ritsuryō state. In terms of topography, Nagano is hardly a "natural" unit, and politically, the struggles of the sixteenth century left the area divided into a hodgepodge of administrative districts. How then did ancient Shinano re-emerge in the guise of modern Nagano?

Part of the answer is, of course, to be found in the spread, during the late Tokugawa period, of Nativist-inspired yearnings for a return to the "golden age" of imperial rule, before the rise of the warrior clans from around the twelfth century. Wigen discusses the importance of the idea of "Restoration" at various points throughout the text and reflects thoughtfully on the uses of the ancient in Meiji political culture. She also provides a fascinating overview of the local political struggles to which the 1876 decision to redraw the prefectural boundaries to match those of ancient Shinano gave rise (as late as 1948 residents of the southwestern part of the prefecture were still trying to have the decision reversed).

Wigen's main focus, however, is ultimately not the intellectual or political history of the mid-nineteenth century so much as the development, over a much longer span of time, of a series of six different methods for depicting and describing the region, each of which is the subject of a single chapter. Wigen begins with an analysis of the premodern tradition of "national maps" (*Ni-*

hon sōzu), which depicted the provinces as part of a larger geospatial system, and uses this to show how changing political and economic conditions led to shifts in the way Shinano's place in the archipelago was imagined over time. The second chapter examines the Tokugawa regime's practice of commissioning special maps (*kuniezu*) based on the boundaries of the ancient provinces in order to gain a comprehensive overview of basic conditions across an otherwise fragmented country. It offers close readings of the four surviving Shinano *kuniezu* and concludes by describing how versions of these maps had begun to circulate commercially in the nineteenth century, presumably thereby impacting popular consciousness. The third chapter takes up the development of modern mapping and considers how the old geographical unit of Shinano was eventually recast as Nagano using the new scientific techniques. The impression that one gets from these three chapters is that while the provincial map may have been malleable, it also had profound staying power. Wigen specifically takes up the question of continuity at the end of chapter three, engaging Thongchai Winichakul's influential *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (1994) to suggest that the shift to a modern mode of spatial representation in Japan was not nearly as abrupt or disruptive as it seems to have been in Thailand. To my mind, this insight could have been developed further in the fourth and fifth chapters, which take up the role of statistical compilations and geography texts in the modern construction of regions.

Rather than examine how Tokugawa practices of political arithmetic or local place writing may have prefigured what followed, Wigen instead portrays the modern statistical yearbook and geography primer as heirs to the classical (eighth-century) gazetteer (*fudoki*) tradition. This allows her to remain squarely focused on the ancient province (the standard referential frame for the gazetteers) and to reconnect her narrative to the theme of Restoration, but only at the cost of eliding some of the complexity that makes the Tokugawa-Meiji transition so useful for thinking about the onset of modernity generally. If the fourth and fifth chapters struck me as a missed opportunity in this regard, Wigen's final chapter, about the relationship of newspapers to regionalism in modern Nagano, offers a compelling portrayal of the dynamism of local society and the power of print capital during the Meiji period.

Overall, there is no question that this is a deeply original, thought-provoking book that will be read with great profit by anyone interested in Japan, or in developing a comparative perspective on practices of regional place making in the modern world. And, yes, as the back cover promises, the maps are indeed gorgeous.

DANIEL BOTSMAN
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DAQING YANG. *Technology of Empire: Telecommunications and Japanese Expansion in Asia, 1883–1945*. (Harvard East Asian Monographs, number 219.) Cam-

bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center. 2010. Pp. xvii, 446. \$49.95.

Scholars have long awaited the arrival of Daqing Yang's book, which does not disappoint in terms of breadth. Yang engages a variety of topics ranging from Meiji-era Japanese companies that engaged in laying cables between Japan and its colonies on the Chinese mainland, to the men that staffed the Ministry of Communications, to the technological issues bureaucrats hashed out in their journals, to internal policy debates. Yang even manages to weave in key discussions of the Imperial Diet and the story of how vast telecommunications projects were financed.

The tome is divided into four major sections covering the period from 1853 to 1945. Yang actually presents two stories simultaneously: the Meiji tale of the rise and expansion of Japanese telecommunications services (gloriously detailed in parts one and two), and a second narrative about telecommunications networks and how they were controlled during the 1930s and 1940s (developed in parts three and four). The second story ties more clearly into the larger thrust of the book regarding the cozy relationship between technology and empire and may deserve independent monographic treatment.

Yang notes the "material means of either building Japan's empire or holding it together are still largely taken for granted rather than being thoroughly investigated" (p. 5). His research examines the role and technology of telecommunications (telegram, radio, and phone) in Japanese overseas expansion: what he labels "techno-imperialism." As Yang underscores, techno-imperialism traces its genesis to at least the Meiji era and was not driven by the pursuit of technology alone but also constituted a system of institutions and individuals. For example, a Japanese official in 1937 Singapore was surprised that letters from Great Britain or the United States took mere days to arrive whereas letters from Japan took closer to a month. The transport systems were different; the former used airmail while Japan employed seaborne mail. The Japanese not only required advanced technology to power their empire, which they had, but also a coordinated communications policy "to fully realize its space-adjusting potential" (p. 279). The irony is that, as successful as Japan was in establishing a techno-empire, it was unable to maintain one. The infrastructure broke down due to the very manner in which Japanese rulers created and serviced the nuts and bolts of their imperial domain.

Yang delves into meticulous detail analyzing the official circles through which the Ministry of Communications entered China, Manchuria, and Southeast Asia. He also notes which modes of control officials exercised to keep these various telecommunication technologies tied into Japan. It was not just a question of control but also of addressing the constant conflict among several types of agencies—military, colonial, and civilian—that competed for control over communications networks. The foibles and fantasies of these networks stand as an allegory to the empire in general because Japan's

Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere was informal and lacked an institutional blueprint. Yang reminds us that “plans for the imperial telecommunications network in East Asia speak volumes about the nature of Japan’s new expansion in Asia” (p. 205).

Yang’s book opens and closes by highlighting the moment of Emperor Hirohito’s speech on August 15, 1945, when the Japanese monarch was essentially able to broadcast his voice into all corners of the empire due to the telecommunications networks that Japan had been developing since the early Meiji era. It is a fitting way to bookend the story because it demonstrates at once both the majesty of what the Japanese were able to achieve and also the scale of the system’s fragility.

Yang offers us a chance to gaze at the internal workings of empire and to admire myriad of wires, transistors, transformers, and other electronic filaments that made the whole apparatus hum. At times the tangle of the system can be a bit daunting but ultimately, by slowly and carefully tracing our route, the story reveals how empire truly operated.

BARAK KUSHNER
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MITHI MUKHERJEE. *India in the Shadows of Empire: A Legal and Political History 1774–1950*. 2d ed. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. xxxviii, 278. \$50.00.

In this book, Mithi Mukherjee boldly argues that Indian nationalism experienced a paradigmatic change in the twentieth century as Indians sought to redefine the concept of liberty. However, by highlighting the transient nature of this change, Mukherjee seeks to reveal the underlying pattern that structures chaotic multi-party politics in postcolonial India and reveal its imperial, specifically juristic, roots.

The shift at the center of Mukherjee’s narrative occurred through the efforts of individuals like Mohandas K. Gandhi who successfully articulated a particularly Indic notion of liberty. Based on the renunciative concept of *mukti*, this new notion challenged the desirability of a society governed by a legalistic understanding of the imperial state as the arbiter of particularistic communal demands. Mukherjee identifies this shift as the precondition for Indians to escape the British imperial system by permitting the conceptualization of a radical notion of liberty that did not require the imperial state. However, Mukherjee avers that this transcendence of imperial concepts proved to be temporary. After independence, Indian politicians returned to making special interest claims. In the process, these politicians implicitly reinforced the notion that the primary role of the central government is to arbitrate these claims in the style of the previous imperial government.

Just as Lawrence Rosen proposed that law reflects as well constitutes a wider universe of meanings (see Rosen, *Law and Culture: An Invitation* [2006]), Mukherjee points to the existence of patterns spanning the domains of law and politics in India. This recognition is an important contribution because it unites the

fields of legal and political history much more closely than previous writing on legal issues in India has done. Other authors (for one example, see Lata Mani, *Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India* [1998]) have written about the philosophical and social implications of the manner in which the supposed contradiction between cultural autonomy and women’s rights was discussed in British India, and on the centrality of law in the writings of British philosophers reflecting on empire (see, for example, Robert Travers, *Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth Century India: The British in Bengal* [2006]). Mukherjee’s book is unique because she suggests that law provided not only occasions for political organization and debate but the very model for politics in colonial as well as postcolonial India.

Mukherjee’s legalistic emphasis also points to the book’s greatest weakness. Was colonial law really the sole source of Indian liberalism and the liberal nationalism that it inspired? Christopher A. Bayly’s *Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire* (2012) points to several other sources of Indian liberal thought, such as religious speculation. Whether or not one agrees with Bayly regarding the liberating potential of liberalism, he certainly casts the net wider. By specifically looking at a limited number of cautious politicians, and somewhat arbitrarily excluding the more radical ones—the “Extremists”—from the story, Mukherjee may have made her task harder. One wonders whether liberal nationalism in India appears truncated with an excessive focus on arbitrariness rather than on political representation or social contract as a result of Mukherjee’s narrow definition.

A broader notion of nationalism would have allowed Mukherjee to take account of the political ideologies expressed during the rebellion of 1857, the demand for systematic consultation of “Hindustanis” made by Syed Ahmed Khan after that event, the many peasant and tribal rebellions which Ranajit Guha said denounced the trio of *zamindar-sahukar-sarkar* (landlord-money-lender-state), and the pan-Islamic movement of the late 1910s. The multiplicity of political ideologies undermines the claim that *mukti* was the only genealogical predecessor of radical nationalist claims to full sovereignty. Mukherjee fails to explain how other concepts, such as *azadi*, entered the political vocabulary of influential figures like Subhas Chandra Bose.

Mukherjee implicitly suggests that xenophobic territorial nationalism is a more natural political attitude than extra-territorial royalism. But loyalist pleas for royal justice need not necessarily have precluded more radical concepts of government based on popular consent—as students of the American War of Independence know very well. In order to understand the “loyalism” of *dalit* (lower-caste) leaders such as Babasaheb Ramji Ambedkar, we should pay greater attention to their concerns about the cooperativist view of society that Gandhi espoused. Ambedkar remained unconvinced when Gandhi denied the need for *dalit* political

representation and emphasized the importance and efficacy of self-reform and self-restraint by caste Hindus instead.

In sum, this is an important book, and it makes an important argument. Its strength lies in its conceptual clarity and innovativeness. This book will spark much fruitful discussion for South Asianists, those interested in legal and political analysis of British imperialism, and scholars interested in non-European liberalism.

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PARNA SENGUPTA. *Pedagogy for Religion: Missionary Education and the Fashioning of Hindus and Muslims in Bengal*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2011. Pp. x, 211. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$18.95.

Does education form the adult person? Does modern liberal Western education produce secularism in the non-West? If the answer to the former is "yes," as it was for both the colonizer and the colonized in nineteenth-century India, then it follows that the answer to the latter becomes complicated, because nationalist pedagogues of different religious and regional backgrounds could seek to inculcate their own preferred combinations of modern and religious identities. Parna Sengupta's book is about how Christian missionary education provided a model of religious education and how Indian educators turned this model to further their own notions of communal identity.

Beginning in the mid-eighteenth century in Britain as Methodism, the religious impetus reached the colony of India in the late eighteenth century as a desire to awaken and reform the Hindu masses. Missionaries in India, argues Sengupta, could be more innovative in their pedagogic techniques than back home because they had fewer controls on them and their mission was more challenging in a land of heathenism. The state, meanwhile, was torn between its colonial agenda and a notion of charity—and mass education, predictably, failed to take off. Modern education, from the beginning, came to be primarily "private" in India: missionary, vernacular, or "Anglo-vernacular."

The technology of modern schooling revolves around the textbook. Sengupta discusses the conflict surrounding textbook selection between John Murdoch, the founder of the Christian Vernacular Education Society, and Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar, author and publisher. Although primarily a Sanskrit scholar, Vidyasagar composed the Bengali primer *Barnoparichay* (1855). Murdoch insisted that textbooks carry a larger portion of evangelical material but the non-religious primers of Vidyasagar were more popular, even among missionary educators. In order to resolve this conflict, missionaries introduced "religion" as a separate subject in otherwise non-religious primary schools.

Modern pedagogy also involved using "object" les-

sons, a technique first introduced by the Swiss educator, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi. The primacy of sensory learning, to be followed by abstract ideas, was converted in its British, and then colonial, setting to explicitly moral and ideological lessons. Sengupta briefly describes this process, and then makes the argument that this Christian paradigm of the seemingly scientific approach was converted by *bhadralok* (gentlemen) reformers in Bengal to an upper-caste, Hindu paradigm. As British textbooks distanced themselves from the "other" of the colored heathen in the colony, the new Indian textbooks made the tribal or *adivasi* a metaphor for the "others" who were lower down in the social and religious scale.

The native teachers had to be civilized separately according to gender, and, apart from being made familiar with a dozen subjects, they were to learn appropriate behavior that approximated that of good (Christian) fathers and mothers. This ambitious task was made impossible by the rival claims of racial and ethnic hierarchies. Respectability, according to both the British and upper-caste Hindus, ultimately could not be taught but was "an inherent quality based on gender, caste and race" (p. 121). Yet, until the twentieth century, upper-caste women did not seek teachers' training and upper-caste girls were left without teachers.

Finally, we come to an argument about the differential construction of Hindu and Muslim subjects. The Bengali Muslim was constructed as "backward" twice over, once as poor and indifferent to modernization in the colonial mold, and second as practitioner of ignorant, non-Islamic practices. The result was that, since the colonial state preferred education to be private, and upper-caste Hindus had already taken up the mantle, *ashraf* (elite) Muslims did the same for poor Muslims and added religious teaching as an essential tool for the removal of backwardness. Muslim educators thus merely followed the model of Christian missionary schools in learning to educate and uplift simultaneously. The central role played by education—although the author rejects teleology—in the construction of separate political identities is clear. Had the Christian example of religion in education been different, the production of Hindu and Muslim identities in Bengal and India would have been less differentiated.

Unfortunately, the two chapters on textbooks and object lessons leave one eager for more discussion, as do the two on schoolteachers. The study of education in India needs more historical and ethnographic descriptions of teachers, classrooms, lessons, and textbooks. Sengupta has rich data and clear hypotheses; it is not entirely obvious why she cuts her discussions short (apart from being a succinct author) and also why she leaves her chapters unconnected to each other, like several essays conceptualized separately. This sense is heightened by the device of an introduction and a conclusion to sum up each chapter's arguments, with no reference to any preceding or following arguments. Still, this is excellent research, if a little bumpily pre-

sented. I am sure that in future books Sengupta will construct a more seamless narrative.

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HOWARD SPODEK. *Ahmedabad: Shock City of Twentieth-Century India*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 330. Cloth \$49.95, e-book \$41.95.

Howard Spodek's book is a lucidly written biography of India's fifth largest city, today with an estimated population of 4.7 million people. This excellent study is the culmination of a half-century of research on a city in which Spodek first lived in 1964 and to which he continues to return. Spodek's lovingly told yet critical assessment of Ahmedabad reflects his deep affection for the place and many of its prominent twentieth-century residents. Using Asa Briggs's model of Manchester as the "shock city" of Victorian England, Spodek both elevates Ahmedabad above its status as one of India's "second cities" and enriches Briggs's original analytical framework in a new context and period. While demonstrating that Ahmedabad has led urban trends in India, Spodek furthermore focuses our attention upon the contradictions, conflicts, and transitions with which we associate twentieth-century megacities worldwide.

This is a book that focuses squarely and intentionally on Ahmedabad's leadership, as well as on the public and private institutions that have shaped the city's highs and lows. For those interested in the more gritty and popular aspects of the city's history, Spodek's study can be read productively alongside Achyut Yagnik and Suchitra Sheth's *Ahmedabad: From Royal City to Megacity* (2011).

The book is chronologically organized into three substantial parts. The first and longest section, which focuses on the period from 1900 to 1950, is defined by the new politics brought by Mohandas K. Gandhi. Much of this section will not be entirely new to a reader familiar with Gandhi's life in Ahmedabad, the rise of Vallabhbhai Patel as a civic leader, and the work of the Majoor Mahajan (or Textile Workers' Association), founded by Ansuyaben Sarabhai. What is of great use for the uninitiated is Spodek's perspective on how the city's traditional civic elites gave way to a new generation of leaders in the early twentieth century, making the interests of the city's industrial workforce a defining feature of Ahmedabad's political fault lines in the period of nationalist struggle.

The second part, on the "Westernizing City—1950–1970," juxtaposes two kinds of leadership that dominated Ahmedabad's life in the three decades following independence. Spodek draws attention to the city's industrialist leaders, Ambalal Sarabhai and Kasturbhai Lalbhai, who promoted prosperity through sacrifice on the part of labor and benevolent philanthropy on the part of industrial elites. Alongside these luminaries, Spodek examines leaders who sought to jettison both the authority of the city's *mahajans* (or guilds) and the Gandhian industrial relations that had succeeded them.

Spodek's treatment of the charismatic leader, Indulal Yagnik, a Gandhian turned peasant organizer who took up regional and class politics in the 1950s, deserves special mention. Yagnik possessed both the oratory skill and the will to confront power that drew the population, whether middle or working class, into city politics. Tracing Yagnik's life in politics, Spodek demonstrates how nationalist alliances gave way to associations based upon language, caste, region, and religious communities between 1950 and 1970.

The final section, "Creativity and Chaos," is devoted to the transformations that have characterized Ahmedabad since the late 1960s. Here we learn about not only how party disputes compromised the city's institutions beyond repair, but also how communal violence became a norm of city life. As the crisis of the mill industry reached its conclusion in the early 1980s, the industrial institutions of the city failed to serve the stabilizing role that they had previously performed. Spodek highlights the emergence of a new ethos in the city forged by a subsequent generation of business leaders who purposefully steered clear of civic engagement. The result was a new civic attitude in Ahmedabad typified by the Gujarati phrase "*Maaray shun?*" or "What is it to me?" The purposeful disengagement of a new generation of Gujarati entrepreneurs was mirrored by public disillusionment and apathy, providing the context for the intertwining of crime syndicates and communal politics. Spodek demonstrates that the political and civic fragmentation of Ahmedabad's population prefigures disturbing trends that have been seen in other emerging megacities in India.

Whereas Manchester served as a model for the political and civic transformations that characterized the Victorian era, it may very well be that its twentieth-century counterpart is to be found not in the de-industrializing cities of Europe or North America, but instead in Spodek's dynamic Ahmedabad.

LISA TRIVEDI
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OCEANIA AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

CHRISTINE WRIGHT. *Wellington's Men in Australia: Peninsular War Veterans and the Making of Empire c. 1820–40*. (War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. Pp. vii, 243. £55.00.

The history of settler colonialism is an increasingly lively field, now boasting a journal, *Settler Colonial Studies*, and provocative schema such as James Belich's contention of an Anglo settler revolution in the early nineteenth century connected to technological and economic change. Christine Wright's welcome addition to the field also contributes to histories of Australia and the British Empire, and may perhaps best be situated in what Australian historian Peter Stanley terms "military social history."

Wright's book, based on her Ph.D. thesis, is an impressively researched prosopographical study of the

British army veterans of the Peninsular War who settled in the Australian colonies in the 1820s and 1830s, when there was a rapid expansion of free settlers alongside the continuing system of convict transportation. The Peninsular War, fought in Portugal and Spain from 1808 to 1814, was the latter stages of Britain and its allies' war against Napoleon. The British army had expanded sixfold during the generation-long struggle against revolutionary France, then Napoleon. At war's end there was massive demobilization, with the army reduced from 236,000 soldiers in 1814 to 81,000 in 1819; the navy's reductions were additional to these. Wright demonstrates that large numbers of young men who would not previously have been able to afford to purchase army commissions and promotions were able to raise their social status during the war—that is, if they survived it. Many of the officers who were put on half-pay retainers in the postwar years found that they and their families could not survive on half-pay in Britain's collapsed postwar economy; migration to the settler colonies became an attractive option.

These demobilized officers were drawn to New South Wales, partly because of its climate, partly because of the availability of cheap convict labor, and partly because of the generous system of land grants to military officers introduced in 1826. While this system (which obtained in Canada and the Cape Colony as well) was curtailed in 1831, army officers continued to receive special discounts on land correlated to their length of service. In the Australian colonies, the timing of the veterans' desire to emigrate was particularly significant. Frontier areas were being opened to settlers, and veterans could augment their grants to acquire large estates.

Peninsular War veterans in Australia established family dynasties, obtained magistracies, and garnered power and influence through their connections to army veterans in high places, such as New South Wales governors Ralph Darling and his successor Richard Bourke. These social networks provided incentives for migration and, in the colonies, helped to shape settlement locations (often near other veterans), marital patterns, and business connections.

Wright not only establishes the significant scale of the migration of Peninsular War veterans but also outlines their influence and impact in the Australian colonies, particularly through evangelical Protestantism and Masonic lodges. Veterans brought with them skills, learned during war, that were of great value in the colonial context: topographical surveying, sketching, drafting, town-planning, map-making, road-building, engineering, and medicine. Moreover, they augmented the intellectual elite with their interests in literature and art.

Part of the significance of Wright's study for Australian history is that she articulates the ways in which this substantial influx of army officers contributed to the militarist nature of mid-century Australian colonial society. Beginning with the British invasion in 1788, officers and the army largely ran the penal colonies. Peninsular War veterans dominated civil offices, from

governor to magistrate to Crown Lands Commissioner. Army officers also constituted the majority of garrison officers, Mounted Police, and penal commandants; thus they represented a close overlapping of civil and military authority and power, extending and entrenching the colonies' military culture.

This is a fine, engagingly written, and erudite study. Some scholars will see links to Zoe Laidlaw's *Colonial Connections 1815–1845: Patronage, the Information Revolution and Colonial Government* (2005), which examines networks across the mid-nineteenth-century British Empire. Wright's work differs in its focus on the Australian colonies, and its detailed and nuanced exploration of the veterans' impact on this one part of the empire. Wright shows us, in a clear and persuasive fashion, the scale of the migration of Peninsular War veterans to the Australian colonies, the significance of the army's half-pay system in making veterans eager and desirable colonial appointments, the veterans' ascension to colonial gentry status, and their shaping of colonial society in particular conservative, authoritarian, and militarist directions.

ANGELA WOOLLACOTT
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CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

KAREN A. BALCOM. *The Traffic in Babies: Cross-Border Adoption and Baby-Selling between the United States and Canada, 1930–1972*. (Studies in Gender and History, number 38.) Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 356. \$35.00.

Karen A. Balcom's new book is a groundbreaking historical study of the movement of children across borders. While studies of adoption, both domestic and international, have proliferated in recent decades, none goes as far as this one in documenting the process, the involvement of individuals, and the complicated contexts of immigration and family law, state and provincial autonomy, and federal agendas regarding transnational cooperation from the 1930s to the present.

Each of the six chapters begins with a Canadian example to initiate an analysis of the relationships across a border usually ignored in the literature on child circulation. Chapter one describes key female Canadian reformers of the 1930s and the networks they formed with counterparts in the United States. Chapters two, three, and four cover the years from 1945 to 1960; each uses an incident of exploitation, corruption, and violation of "best practices" to frame the story of embattled experts, defensive state and provincial officials, and federal agencies reluctant to challenge state/provincial rights on domestic matters. The last chapter discusses the persistent clash of baby markets, best practices, and legal oversight throughout 1954–1964. The conclusion suggests a direction for future studies of cross-border child transfers, potentially transcending the Euro-American concept of adoption.

The actors in Balcom's story include strong-willed

women whose arguments for reform confronted the patriarchal ideologies of government officials; these officials stymied efforts to “professionalize” child placement. Balcom extends this familiar story by comparing the histories of federal control over immigration and the criteria for citizenship in the United States and Canada. She shows that arguments by professionals for reform in both nations confronted the daunting obstacle of cultural and administrative restrictions on interpretations of identity and of kinship. These restrictions embodied nationalistic ideologies that blocked consensus on best placement across local, regional, and national borders. The ideologies to which she refers intertwined with perceptions of race and religion in the practices and policies that evolved in each country.

Balcom historicizes the role of race and religion in child placement, and examines the breakdown in consensus accompanying an imbalance of supply and demand. Chapter four, for example, explores the post-World War II transfer of Catholic children from Quebec to Jewish adoptive parents in the northeastern United States against the wishes of birth parents and the advice of professional social workers. In this and other chapters, Balcom points out that diverse parties circumvented standard best practices, challenging the significance of racial and religious matching: venal baby brokers found odd bedfellows in liberal advocates of nurture over nature, of race-blind placement, and of “rescue” as the justification for unrestricted placements. Furthermore, she portrays the external contexts that affected both illegal and legal child transfers, such as the U.S. civil rights movement and the claim of racial genocide, the Native American protest against removal of children, and the First Nations complaints in Canada about the placement of indigenous children in white families.

Balcom relates the controversies over racial, religious, and ethnic matching to the evolution of immigration laws in Canada and the United States. Her discussion of consuls and customs officers, passport regulations and documentation of status places adoption in the arena of border control institutions that reflect global politics. One knotty concern becomes clear: a child transferred illegally or semi-legally might lose all privileges of citizenship, subject to deportation regardless of her kinship ties. Although the bulk of Balcom’s data involves children moving from Canada to the United States, she mentions the opposite flow, which intensified in the late twentieth century when U.S. child placement experts deemed Canada desirable as a “racially tolerant” society.

The ostensible subject of this book is adoption (and its evil twin, baby selling), but that is misleading. Balcom uses child transfer to illuminate the problems of cross-border crossing of any sort. Individual parents (birth and adoptive), as well as individual children, do not dominate her history. Rather, she writes a history of enmeshment, in which every actor is a figure in a larger battle over individual and collective rights, over national policy versus transnational coordination, and

over the definition of “best interests” in a world of negotiable racial, ethnic, and religious identities.

In her almost month-by-month account, Balcom offers the reader a remarkably detailed history. She draws on a vast array of sources, from the personal letters of individuals who spearheaded reform to archival records of federal, state, provincial, and local agencies. If there is a fault in the book, it lies in the historian’s temptation to display data and to interrupt a powerful narrative with digressive references to missteps, misunderstandings, failed policies, and unenforced laws.

This book should appeal to a wide audience, including experts who continue to face the difficulties Balcom outlines, immigration officials who oversee the movement of children, individuals whose lives cross borders, and scholars who can find in the book a model of historical research, imaginative interpretive tools, and commitment to a topic whose importance will grow in the coming decades.

JUDITH MODELL SCHACHTER
Carnegie Mellon University

VERONICA STRONG-BOAG. *Fostering Nation? Canada Confronts Its History of Childhood Disadvantage*. (Studies in Childhood and Family in Canada.) Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. 2011. Pp. x, 302. \$85.00.

Veronica Strong-Boag’s book provides an insightful and sobering account of the development of alternative care for needy children in Canada. She painstakingly explores “the missteps and the detours of a century and more of child protection efforts by Canadians and their governments as they confronted the specter of children judged neglected, abused, deficient, and delinquent” (p. 3). Although she is careful not to generalize and to acknowledge that some disadvantaged children have prospered against the odds, the picture that emerges in this book is disturbing. Canadians have not fostered a nation committed to equality of opportunity for children and youth. Ultimately, Strong-Boag argues that such a nation is not possible unless and until Canadians embrace justice for adults: for poor and overwhelmed birth parents, foster and surrogate households, and overtaxed social workers.

Strong-Boag tells her story in seven chapters. First, she explores “the role of family and kin in the safeguarding of offspring” (p. 6) and the inequality of material resources that has undermined the attempts of many families to provide for children. Next, she examines the institutions for children that remain a significant component of Canada’s child welfare system. Her third chapter documents the rise of fostering as an alternative both to institutional care and to adoption from the late nineteenth century to the 1960s. The fourth chapter focuses on the period from the 1960s onward, with particular attention to the fate of Aboriginal children, removed from their birth families in unprecedented numbers in this decade. Her next chapter examines the experiences of adults who surrendered

their children, illustrating “how poverty has always made some adults susceptible to difficulties as parents and the loss of progeny” (p. 115). She pays careful attention to the ways in which discourses of blame have been particularly harsh with regard to unwed and single mothers, racialized mothers, the criminalized, and the disabled. The sixth chapter examines the discursive construction of fostering and the experiences of fostering parents, in particular the mothers who “as surrogates and amateurs have always struggled to be treated as more than inferior mimics of ‘real’ parents or ‘real’ experts” (p. 143). Finally, she turns her attention to children themselves and asserts that “it is hard to escape the sense of a recurring nightmare endured by many Canadian youngsters” (p. 173).

This book should be required reading, not only for historians of childhood, the family, and social policy but for the public in general. It documents in disturbing detail the structural inequalities and prejudices that have condemned too many children to live in poverty, with stunted opportunities for education and employment and without the love, care, and affection that all children deserve. While there are certainly inspiring stories of success told in the pages of this text, the “result of the courage and generosity of ordinary citizens” (p. 2) who opened their homes and hearts to needy children who were not their biological kin, Strong-Boag’s “sadness and anger” (p. 1) are palpable and overwhelmingly justified. Too many of us are indifferent to the fate of children society deemed (and deems) beyond rescue, and discourses of individual blame are increasingly applied, in a neo-conservative context, not just to supposedly inadequate parents but also to children and youth themselves. Strong-Boag’s book is history at its best. It is a wake-up call to Canadians to heed the failures of past efforts at child protection, to learn from their experience that “prevailing gender, class, and racial arrangements can unreasonably let down citizens” (p. 204), and to commit to a different future for their nation’s most disadvantaged children. As she pointedly reminds us, the poverty, disillusionment, and disenfranchisement of children are not inevitable, and “governments and Canadians can choose to do better” (p. 9).

LORI CHAMBERS
Lakehead University

ARTHUR PONTYNEN and ROD MILLER. *Western Culture at the American Crossroads: Conflicts over the Nature of Science and Reason*. (American Ideals and Institutions Series.) Wilmington: ISI Books. 2011. Pp. xiv, 412. \$34.95.

This book is a vigorous assault on relativism and its disastrous intellectual and social effects presented as a history of American thought. Although I agree with the views of Arthur Pontynen and Rod Miller in large measure, their text is deeply flawed. First, it is painfully redundant. By reiterating the same few assertions on

nearly every page, the authors exasperate even the most sympathetic reader.

Second, the authors’ overarching categories of “the classical-Judeo-Christian,” “the Anglosphere,” and “the modernist-postmodernist” are problematic not only in their conflation of the classical and the Christian but, more importantly, in their inclusion of a category (the Anglosphere) devoid of any intellectual content of its own and defined purely by its alleged tendency to follow tradition. Not only is it folly to place a mere preference for tradition on the same footing as two well-defined ideologies since traditions can differ radically, but the authors undermine their own association of the Anglosphere with a high regard for tradition by demonstrating conclusively that the Anglosphere’s intellectual class has abandoned its past allegiance to the classical-Judeo-Christian tradition for modernism-postmodernism.

Third, although this volume is marketed as a history of American thought and culture, it is nothing of the sort. Not only are the central figures—Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, Isaac Newton, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and G. F. W. Hegel—all European, but the authors make little effort to trace the precise ways in which the few American thinkers they discuss were influenced by, and departed from, these Europeans. Pontynen and Miller explore only the thought of select New Englanders—Jonathan Edwards, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey—drawing exclusively on Paul K. Conkin’s *Puritans and Pragmatists: Eight Eminent American Thinkers* (1968), a book extensively cited and quoted throughout the volume. Otherwise, the choice of subject matter is often eccentric, including the Marquis de Sade and buildings and paintings of dubious significance. There is almost no discussion of the various theologies of American denominations or of the political theories of the founders and no mention at all of any American Romantic other than Emerson, of any economist, or of most modern American intellectuals.

Fourth, there are far too few endnotes to support the large array of asserted facts, and these notes almost always refer to secondary sources. To some extent, a reliance on secondary sources is necessary in a work of this breadth, but the authors carry that reliance to extremes.

Fifth, Pontynen and Miller are imprecise in their use of certain terms. Newton is continually derided as “a deist,” even though the authors acknowledge that he believed God not only created the universe but sustained it, a belief that contradicts the fundamental tenet of deism. The authors also refer to “Puritans” and “Puritanism” far too late in the historical record, even using the latter term once (p. 30) in reference to nineteenth-century evangelical abolitionists.

These flaws are unfortunate because there is nobility in Pontynen and Miller’s advocacy of the free and responsible pursuit of objective truth tempered by the humble recognition that complete success in such an endeavor is impossible for mere mortals, and there is

wisdom in their argument that the postmodernists' complete denial of the existence of objective truth leads inexorably to violence and totalitarianism. If there is no such thing as objective truth, then all opinions are equally valid, and society becomes nothing more than a battleground between groups organized around similar preferences, eventuating in a victor who must rule by force alone. But although the authors' hearts are in the right place, that quality alone is insufficient in a work of this breadth. While Pontynen and Miller should be congratulated for aiming high in an age dominated by trivial, overspecialized works, the book's profound flaws weigh it down too significantly for it ever to take flight.

CARL J. RICHARD

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DAVID F. HOLLAND. *Sacred Borders: Continuing Revelation and Canonical Restraint in Early America*. (Religion in America Series.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. 286. \$65.00.

In this book, David F. Holland demonstrates clearly that not only have the American descendants of the Protestant Reformation continued to argue for *sola scriptura* (the sole authority of the Bible) and the effects such a principle ought to have on one's life, but they have also contentiously debated both who is rightfully an heir to this Protestant slogan and what counts as the scriptures to which they agree to submit. The subject makes for an engaging story—one that Holland narrates adroitly as he ranges from Puritans to Mormons, Unitarians, Shakers, and Transcendentalists—demonstrating that even as the leaders of these respective movements blazed diverse trails through the canonical borderlands, they nearly always did so with an overwhelming concern for the character of a God who speaks.

Focusing specifically on the intellectual contests for canonicity in early America, Holland begins by locating the ways in which some of the earliest Americans wrestled with the needs for and the problems of an open canon. Puritans, such as Thomas Hooker, were both "empowered and constrained" in their approach to the writings they deemed scriptures (p. 31). Though these early New Englanders resolved the question by declaring the canon closed, even the next generation was not convinced that they were correct. In fact, as demonstrated from the writings of prominent intellectuals like Jonathan Edwards, Thomas Paine, and Benjamin Franklin this "canonical pressure was chronic rather than acute" (p. 85). Evangelicals wrestling with the revivals of the eighteenth-century awakenings and desists alike explored these canonical borderlands.

As the colonial era gave way to the nineteenth century, Holland maintains, a "strictly closed canon" created the "interpretative space" necessary to allow "a particular idea of religious freedom" to flourish (p. 94). With Thomas Jefferson leading the charge, conservative and progressive theologians talked about the

canon. These conversations, based on a commitment to religious freedom, "opened the door for prophetic voices and placed an even greater onus on the canon's closure," making the paradox of a closed canon even more pronounced (p. 122). Such a contradiction only grew through the era of the U.S. Civil War, as Shakers, Mormons, Millerites, and Transcendentalists made significant contributions to the nation's history. As seen in the writings of Joseph Smith, Ann Lee, and William Ellery Channing, America's religious leaders "straddled the canonical border" (p. 166). As they dealt with the tension of a God who speaks to believers, these American originals fought for the character of this God.

As is often the case with intellectual history, Holland's fine study often leaves one wondering to what degree the ordinary members of a given Shaker, Mormon, or Unitarian community of faith concerned themselves with battles over the place of scripture in their respective traditions. Perhaps these "sacred borders" were barely sacred for the Mormon devotee migrating west with her family or the Millerite waiting expectantly for the second coming of his God. It is possible these believers were living out their faith simply in a world rife with contradictions. The extent to which the questions of canon mattered to such early Americans might be hard to trace in an analysis like this one, but this problem seems to be at least part of Holland's point as he strives, mainly successfully, to "enrich our comprehension of the human story" (p. 218).

In the end, this book offers an innovative and insightful look into both the geneses and evolutions of American religions and American history more broadly. Arguing that one cannot truly understand the history of American religion without considering canonical borderlands (p. 86), Holland reconstructs the ways in which some American believers ventured not only into a physical wilderness but also into sacred frontiers that their spiritual forebears had hardly expected but had fought diligently over—not because the words they spoke mattered, but because these people of faith knew that their God was one who speaks. Since divine words mattered, they needed to be heard and, as Holland deftly reminds his readers, sometimes fought over.

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ELIZABETH A. CLARK. *Founding the Fathers: Early Church History and Protestant Professors in Nineteenth-Century America*. (Divinations: Rereading Late Ancient Religion.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2011. Pp. x, 561. \$69.95.

In this book, one of America's foremost historians of the early church goes back to her roots. In the first sentence, Elizabeth A. Clark asks "How [did] the study of early Christian history and theology become instantiated as a discipline in four nineteenth-century Protestant seminaries?" (p. 1). Her answer takes readers on a brilliantly imagined, carefully organized journey through the minds and lives of six American professors,

spanning two continents and a century of scholarship. The founding of the disciplinary study of the church fathers, she finds, emerged only slowly, in a manner contingent upon international trends and national politics, but also the availability of books, the demands of teaching, and the idiosyncratic agendas of individuals—with on-the-ground factors weighing as much as the evolution of theology and historical inquiry. This is not your grandfather's intellectual history.

Methodologically, Clark's book continues the trajectory of her scholarship on history and historiography, incorporating elements of literary criticism and networking theory as well as elements of curriculum history and microhistory. Clark examines church history not only in the conception but in the enactment. Her subjects include Samuel Miller (1769–1850) at Princeton Theological Seminary; Henry B. Smith (1815–1877), Roswell D. Hitchcock (1817–1887), and Philip Schaff (1819–1893) at Union Theological Seminary; George Park Fisher (1827–1909) at Yale Divinity School; and Ephraim Emerton (1851–1935) of Harvard Divinity School. For each man, Clark reconstructs a rich and complex intellectual landscape, critically analyzing published and unpublished writings, class notes, personal and institutional libraries, textbooks, institutional trends, and biographical information. While six men do not a discipline make, Clark situates each within a broader context and ingeniously interlocks them in a chronological arc.

With these tools and materials in hand, Clark demarcates her investigation into three parts. First, she analyzes the “infrastructure” of church history, examining the institutional and material constraints that shaped Protestant Americans' exceptional historical orientation toward patristics (the study of early church writings). Second, the book explains how church history developed in America because of, and despite, the influence of German scholarship on the one hand and the development of the broader field of American academic history on the other. Third, Clark moves her focus to particular topics within church history: the rise of hierarchy; Roman Catholicism; asceticism, marriage, women, and family; and the meaning of St. Augustine.

So how was the historical study of the church fathers founded? Historians already understand the broad answer. As colleges and universities shifted from places to train ministers to centers of reasoned inquiry based on available evidence, theologians had to learn to think like historians. It is in the particulars of this transformation that Clark's book shines. These men were limited by their education, by the books at hand, by their institutions, and most of all by their beliefs. They recognized the threat of modern historical inquiry emanating from Germany, yet selectively incorporated that scholarship when it matched their denominational commitments. They sometimes shifted those positions on specific topics, such as the significance of Augustine or the nature of Mary, as events in their own day demanded. Yet they all sheltered the New Testament, in part or whole, from the full force of reasoned inquiry.

Taken as an individual, each professor had his own understanding of the meaning and purposes of history as it applied to patristics. Compared over time, the views of these men show a movement toward (but not into) our own age, in which nothing is, as they say, sacred.

If these findings might seem iconoclastic, Clark infuses the study with an uncharacteristically progressive narrative. “As builders of a discipline and of institutions,” she concludes, “the professors offered remarkable service” (p. 345). That service, she argues at several points, meant not only founding her discipline, but “pioneering” the development of graduate-level scholarship in the humanities in the United States. For all of their parochialism, she argues, these men achieved a noble victory.

This whiggish narrative orientation is surprising. Clark critiques the problem of narrativity within the professors' own works, dissecting their constructions of early church history around themes of Christian declension and progress. Given Clark's stature as a lifelong inhabitant of the cutting edge of the field, her enthusiasm is understandable on a personal level yet paradoxically old-fashioned as an historical argument. The second half of her claim—that nineteenth-century seminaries were pioneers of graduate-level humanities—is a stretch. Not only does it introduce problematic categories like “graduate-level” and “humanities,” but it raises questions of causation that this lovely study of six professors across a hundred years cannot answer.

In its creative methodology and deep analysis, however, this book contributes to historical scholarship within many fields. Understood within Clark's oeuvre, it delights.

BENJAMIN JUSTICE
Rutgers University

ANN OSTENDORF. *Sounds American: National Identity and the Music Cultures of the Lower Mississippi River Valley, 1800–1860*. (Early American Places.) Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 250. Cloth \$69.95, paper \$24.95.

In this book Ann Ostendorf attempts to detail how Americans hashed out their concerns over national identity in the early national and antebellum periods through contestations over music ways. Her central argument is that “the creation and consumption of ethnic music genres” functioned for early Americans as “a cultural mechanism through which safe encounters could be facilitated between previously unfamiliar people” (p. 172). She focuses on the music cultures of the lower Mississippi River Valley, considering that region central to the formulation of U.S. national identity because of its overlapping imperial histories and its much-acknowledged diversity during the period.

Music critics and consumers mined performance practices for raw material and created the ethnic labels and categories that Ostendorf contends helped them mitigate their anxieties that the musical cultures of the United States neither measured up to those of Europe

nor provided the new nation with a coherent and unifying national identity. Specific sites of musical production and provocation include, among others, the so-called “war of the quadrilles” waged between francophone *contre-danseurs* and anglophone country dancers in the wake of the Louisiana Purchase; the parlors of well-heeled Louisiana plantation families, where children of the elite received music instruction from German, Italian, and French immigrants; and the religious celebrations and traditions of Christian Choc-taws, enslaved African Americans, and European immigrants.

These are rich sites indeed, but the book’s analysis of them is often saddled with imprecise historical and conceptual framing. In what amounts to three chapters of introductory material, Ostendorf defines terms, delineates the scope of the study, and details the anxieties of cultural elites from Thomas Jefferson to Margaret Fuller. When Ostendorf begins to tackle the case studies, however, the motives and interests of the often-unnamed cultural commentators remain unclear. Throughout the study, the active agents of the processes of categorization and ultimate commodification so crucial to national cohesion are insufficiently described as “the population of the lower Mississippi Valley,” “the people,” “the public,” “witnesses,” and “the consumer” or remain concealed within passive-voice sentence construction (pp. 144–145). A more disciplined discussion of the emergence of public listening practices, the establishment of critical categories of value, and the circulation of music and musicians—such as that achieved by Daniel Cavicchi’s *Listening and Longing: Music Lovers in the Age of Barnum* (2011) for the mid-nineteenth century or Karl Hagstrom Miller’s *Segregating Sound: Inventing Folk and Pop Music in the Age of Jim Crow* (2010) for the early twentieth century—might have facilitated more sustained and productive close readings of musical production and consumption.

Although Ostendorf draws on a rich body of sources, including newspaper accounts of musical performances, travel writing, personal records, and sheet music among others, music and its sounds often take a back seat. The study’s emphasis on a vaguely defined group of critics leaves little room to consider how performers (who seldom carry the status of “cultural commentator” or “intellectual” in this analysis) and listeners might blend musical styles and draw from their varied contexts to achieve novel American “sounds.” Readers hoping to gain insight into the critical and musical contexts for the eventual emergence of performance idioms and industry genres such as ragtime, jazz, and blues—all of which can trace their origin to the Mississippi River Valley—will be disappointed, as will readers hoping for close analyses of period orchestrations and performances.

Throughout, the book is muddled in its conception and deployment of “ethnicity” and “race.” Although Ostendorf takes pains in her introduction to define and distinguish these concepts, she does not adequately ap-

propriate them for her purposes. Thus, her subsequent analysis tends to conflate many different varieties of “difference.” Instead of relying so heavily on twentieth-century concepts of ethnicity and discourses of “otherness,” she may have more fruitfully approached her historical actors as sincere readers of Sir Walter Scott and Josiah Nott and considered them in terms of the nationalisms and racisms of the period.

The book under review presents the argument and source material in ways that collapse historical transformations. It creates a composite picture of the early national and antebellum periods rather than situating musical culture within a more dynamic political and economic framework. This tendency leads to a series of puzzling claims in the book’s conclusion. Here, Ostendorf intimates that a “more forceful national culture,” with a more coherent and univocal national music, might have “been able to prevent the divisions threatening the United States in 1860” (p. 176)—a statement that will appear misguided to those engaged with the historiography of U.S. slavery, the politics of expansion, and the growing sectional crisis.

In short, early national music culture is a rich and generative topic that would have benefitted from a more precise conceptual framing and a more rigorous historical contextualization.

SHIRLEY E. THOMPSON

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BEVERLY C. TOMEK. *Colonization and Its Discontents: Emancipation, Emigration, and Antislavery in Antebellum Pennsylvania*. (Early American Places.) New York: New York University Press. 2011. Pp. xxiii, 296. \$39.00.

In this book Beverly C. Tomek describes a complicated network of antislavery organizations and individuals in antebellum Pennsylvania. She focuses on the role of colonization within this environment. Colonizationists promoted the settlement of blacks in Africa, including free blacks and blacks who were conditionally freed upon their agreement to move there. Contrary to the commonly held view that colonization did not constitute an antislavery movement, the author argues that “colonization, at least in Pennsylvania . . . was an antislavery movement and remained a key part of the antislavery landscape throughout the nineteenth century” (p. 1). Based primarily on the papers of leading antislavery organizations, Tomek examines a broad range of ideas within the movement.

The first chapter reviews the history of the Pennsylvania Abolitionist Society (PAS) up to 1817, the founding year of the American Colonization Society (ACS). Antislavery efforts in early Pennsylvania were motivated by various concerns, including moral objections to slavery and a fear of insurrection. Generally, abolitionists hoped to keep the colony’s black population small by limiting the importation of slaves; only gradually did they begin to concentrate on emancipation and, finally, on the uplifting of the black community. Early abolitionists embraced social conditioning in a

sincere quest to prove to whites that “free blacks would not destroy society” (p. 30). The fact that black leaders supported these efforts contributed to “fairly smooth race relations early on” (p. 31).

Chapter two examines the emergence of colonization as an increasingly acceptable approach to the problem of slavery. After around 1800, an increase in the black population, an economic slump, and scarcity of jobs contributed to a rise in racial animosity. By 1830, the ACS had become a major player within the antislavery movement. The colonizationists’ success stemmed in part from their ability to convince many northern whites that the growing numbers of poor and incarcerated blacks, racial mixing, and the possibility of blacks seeking revenge posed serious threats.

The next five chapters focus on five leading abolitionist figures in Pennsylvania to illustrate the range of motives and agendas within the colonization movement. Tomek explores Mathew Carey’s ideas and activities to show the connections between colonization and political and economic nationalism. Carey, a former PAS member, argued that colonization would benefit free blacks as well as white America. The humanitarian agenda of the ACS is examined through the ideas of Elliott Cresson. Reformers like him were drawn to the ACS by the organization’s promise to “free slaves and civilize Africa” (p. 95). They argued that colonization offered slave owners a safe way to get rid of their slaves while at the same time using the colony as a showcase of black potential. While many colonizationists held strong anti-black views, some, like Cresson, believed that blacks at least had the capacity for moral and intellectual advancement.

Tomek focuses on James Forten, a wealthy African American in Philadelphia, to examine the relationship between black abolitionists and gradualism, colonization, and immediatism. She shows that some African Americans initially supported colonization, largely because they saw it as offering opportunities for black leadership. However, by the late 1810s, most African Americans had developed a deep distrust of white colonization schemes, suspecting that the ACS aimed for forced removal. Out of black resistance to colonization emerged an interracial movement that called for an “immediate end to human bondage without the qualifying provision of removal” (p. 162).

Tomek’s final two case studies focus on Benjamin Coates, a white Quaker, and Martin R. Delaney, a prominent African American from Pittsburgh, whose schemes to establish settlements in Africa emphasized economic independence, racial uplift, and black leadership. The book concludes with the assessment of the successes and failures of gradualism, colonization, and immediatism up to the Civil War. Tomek shows that, in Pennsylvania, the three movements competed with each other for support and influence for most of the period under study.

The author notes at the outset that the book is a “study of ideas” (p. 17). Her use of case studies, including black and white men, helps support the claim

that the diversity of motivations within the antislavery movement was significant. However, the absence of the ideas of female abolitionists and their organizations, such as Lucretia Mott, the Grimké sisters, and the Philadelphia Female Anti-Slavery Society, all of whom receive virtually no mention, constitutes a gap in an otherwise detailed and complex study of antislavery motivations and agendas. Moreover, readers looking for insight into the views and activities of “average” citizens, including the ways in which the leaders’ and organizations’ ideas were received by the broader public, may be disappointed. Finally, the study would have benefited from more thorough contextualization. For example, one wonders how the large number of European immigrants that arrived in Pennsylvania in the antebellum period reacted to efforts to end slavery, including colonization, and how the nativist movement fit into the complicated network of antislavery organizations that the author describes. Despite these limitations, Tomek’s book constitutes an important contribution to the history of the nineteenth-century antislavery movement.

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JENNIFER HULL DORSEY. *Hirelings: African American Workers and Free Labor in Early Maryland*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2011. Pp. xvi, 210. \$45.00.

This book distinguishes itself from other works on the first generations of manumitted and free blacks by focusing on “the relationship between the early republic manumissions and the nascent wage labor system” on Maryland’s Eastern Shore from the 1780s through the 1820s (p. ix). *Hirelings* begins with a preface that reviews the scholarly literature on slavery, abolition, and wage labor in the Atlantic world, and an introduction that reviews the history of servitude, slavery, and emancipation on the Eastern Shore from the 1630s through the first spate of manumissions in the 1790s. From there, five chapters focus on “Work,” “Migration,” “Family,” “Dependency,” and “Community,” followed by another chapter that examines the deterioration of free black life after 1820. A conclusion meditates on the relationship between manumissions and the practices of free labor in the early republic, and then follows the history of commerce and labor on the Eastern Shore from the Civil War to the present.

As Maryland’s Eastern Shore emerged as a thriving grain belt in the 1780s, the disruptions of war, a rise in Quaker and Methodist antislavery activism, and the loosening of Maryland’s manumission laws led to an upsurge in the region’s free black population. By the 1790s, Eastern Shore slaveholders found themselves located uncomfortably close to the growing free black communities that stretched from Baltimore to Philadelphia, while searching for a more seasonal and varied work force. Slaveholders, balancing the possibility of slave escape with their need for a mixed labor force,

began manumitting slaves in unprecedented numbers. By 1820, thirty percent of the black population on the Eastern Shore had gained freedom from chattel slavery. While manumission provided freedom from slavery, the process of manumission also thwarted black aspirations for independence and autonomy. Slaveowners delayed manumission until slaves had passed their most productive laboring years while the terms of manumission kept slaves dependent on white planters.

The Eastern Shore's "mixed labor system" both blunted challenges to the larger system of slavery and structured the working lives of free people. Manumitted individuals worked grains at harvest, initially on short-term contracts but gradually on longer stints. While some freemen established businesses in the region's commercial towns, others became boatmen, teamsters, sawyers, and skilled craftsmen. Free blacks and their employers gendered grain production, and while some free women collected grains at harvest, others shunned agricultural labor to pursue traditionally female activities within the home such as spinning. With freedom and a mixed economy came the need for increased mobility. Like work, mobility took a variety of forms. Some free people followed seasonal work between town and country. Others sought greater opportunities in Baltimore and Philadelphia. And while some remained in those cities, many returned to the Eastern Shore to establish families and households.

Manumission was a prolonged, haphazard process that favored the interests of slaveholders while wreaking havoc on black families. Families frequently consisted of an amalgamation of free people, term slaves, and slaves for life, complicating efforts to create free and independent households. So did the realities of black freedom, which kept free blacks dependent on white employers. Laws required African Americans to obtain a license to market crops; vagrancy laws forced them to provide proof of employment; apprentice laws allowed officials to seize children; and the penal code encouraged corporal punishment and forced labor over incarceration. Material conditions and the prospects for greater freedom and independence dimmed considerably in the 1820s and remained that way through the Civil War. The resumption of grain production in Europe, the influx of German and Irish wage laborers, the great expansion of the domestic slave trade, economic boom and bust cycles, and heightened racial animosities combined to worsen the lives of free and enslaved blacks along the Eastern Shore.

This summary sounds familiar to historians of African American history, the early republic, and antebellum America because it is. Take for example, the central claim of chapter three, "Family." Dorsey argues that the process of manumission "divided family members between slavery and freedom." As a result, free blacks "worked to purchase freedom for spouses, children, and other family members left behind in slavery. Sometimes they succeeded, but often they did not. Families also negotiated other arrangements with slaveholders that allowed for reunification without

freedom. When all else failed, family members looked for other ways to show their connectedness" (p. 62). While this claim and others like it are sound and convincing, they are also common and conventional. As promised, the book "revisits key themes in the history of the early republic from the vantage point of former slaves and freeborn African Americans on the Eastern Shore" (p. xiv). And while this monograph provides a detailed picture of the mixed worlds of freedom and slavery, it does not appreciably challenge or modify the extensive historiography on the lives and labors of free and enslaved African Americans in the early republic.

JOHN CRAIG HAMMOND
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PAUL FINKELMAN and DONALD R. KENNON, editors. *In the Shadow of Freedom: The Politics of Slavery in the National Capital*. (Perspectives on the History of Congress, 1801–1877.) Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 248. \$49.95.

In this volume, editors Paul Finkelman and Donald R. Kennon examine how the presence of slavery in the District of Columbia influenced the city's social and political life as well as the national politics that took place within its boundaries. Although the volume suffers from the common fate of collections of essays in the unevenness of its contributions, it is an important addition to the literature on American slavery, especially to the extent that it examines the relatively unexplored local effects of the institution in the nation's capital.

One of the most informative contributions is A. Glenn Crothers's essay on the 1846 retrocession of Alexandria to Virginia. Crothers convincingly argues that one of the reasons that Alexandria's civic leaders lobbied Congress for retrocession, starting somewhat mutely in the 1820s but reaching a crescendo in the 1840s, was to protect both the slave trade and slavery in the city. This chronology matches developments on the antislavery flank with the growing congressional and extracongressional agitation to abolish the slave trade and slavery in the District of Columbia as the one area where the federal government had the uncontested (to the agitators) power to accomplish these objectives. Crothers also sketches a third chronology wherein the early economic promise of Alexandria, which initially had made civic leaders strong supporters of economic nationalism as well as vigorous proponents of the city's inclusion in the district, dissipated over time. Following economic downturns in 1819 and 1837, they "battened down the hatches" and adopted a much more cautious, regional perspective on the city's future. These three developments were, of course, reinforcing, which makes it somewhat dangerous to grant priority to any one rationale for the city's retrocession. Crothers details the multiple bases for retrocession, including the disenfranchisement that the citizens of Alexandria suffered as long as they remained part of the district, and yet he concludes that the "protection of slavery and the

slave trade lay at the heart of the campaign" (p. 168). A safer, and perhaps more interesting, course would have been to investigate the interconnections among the multiple motives for retrocession, including how disenfranchisement must have been especially galling to a group of people who enslaved another group of people.

Mary K. Ricks's essay on the *Pearl* escape attempt argues that the Underground Railroad in the District of Columbia organized the flight of the more than seventy slaves on the boat as a way to reinvigorate the debate over slavery and the slave trade in the district (p. 213). The evidence is suggestive, but her account differs substantially from that in Josephine F. Pacheco's monograph, *The Pearl: A Failed Slave Escape on the Potomac* (2005), which highlights the role that Daniel and Mary Bell played in the escape effort. This is not to say that Ricks's version is less credible than Pacheco's, but it certainly is less cautious. Ricks is on more solid ground in claiming that a very strong Underground Railroad network existed in Washington because of the city's location and its large, free black population, and that the network was ideally positioned to assist slaves in fleeing north to freedom. Her account of the political implications of the escape attempt is also very useful in situating the episode at the center of the narrative of American slavery (pp. 218–219).

One clear oversight in the second part of the volume is the lack of discussion of the prominent role that slaves played in building and maintaining the nation's capital. Perhaps, there was a shift of plans in this respect since Mitch Kachun's article on the changing ways that black Washingtonians have celebrated the abolition of slavery in the district reminds us of their role as (literally) city builders (p. 220).

The essays in the first half of the book cover the national politics side of slavery in the District of Columbia but are less interesting because they cultivate ground that has been tilled many times before. Jonathan Earle's and Stanley Harrold's pieces on *National Era* editor Gamaliel Bailey might be exceptions, but Earle and Harrold examine much the same ground between them. Those two articles as well as James B. Stewart's piece on Joshua Giddings and Susan Zaeske's essay on women's antislavery petitions also suffer from an overreliance on the contrast between a southern honor culture and a northern conscience society. Without denigrating the importance of Bailey's and Giddings' conversion experiences or the extent of violence perpetrated by southern congressmen, the comparison seems overdrawn.

However, Zaeske adds an important gender dimension to the congressional battles over the gag rule in explaining why southern congressmen were so upset by northern female antislavery activists. She also provides an insightful exploration of John Quincy Adams's defense of women's right to petition Congress. (By the way, Adams also defended slaves' right to petition Congress.) But the fact of the matter is that many northern congressmen were also upset by northern female anti-

slavery petitioners, as were many women in the North, as Alisse Portnoy demonstrates in *Their Right to Speak: Women's Activism in the Indian and Slave Debates* (2005). In addition, a number of southern and northern congressmen were unsettled by antislavery pleas regardless of whether they were signed by men or women. And, finally, with respect to Adams, his persistent failure to "remember the ladies" in his voluminous diary makes it extremely difficult to conclude, as Zaeske does, that he was a protofeminist who "opened the door to a radical refashioning of the polis" (p. 124).

David Brion Davis's essay on the transatlantic connections between the American and British antislavery movements is the most provocative essay in the first part of the volume. He introduces those connections (pp. 24–25) to explain why southern congressmen ostensibly overreacted to northern antislavery petitions (pp. 20, 33). As a "think piece," the essay fails to prove its thesis, but it is successful in drawing much-needed attention to the largely unexamined foreign policy dimensions of slavery in American politics.

As a whole, the volume succeeds in exploring many of the ways in which slavery influenced the development of the nation and its capital city. It also pushes slavery to the forefront of American politics during the seven decades between the construction of the District of Columbia and the beginning of the Civil War. It thus nicely complements a growing number of works with similar goals in mind.

DAVID F. ERICSON
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LORI LEE WILSON. *The Joaquín Band: The History behind the Legend*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 322. \$29.95.

In 1839 twelve-year-old John Rollin Ridge witnessed the assassination of his father, Chief John Ridge, in the turbulent aftermath of Cherokee removal. Rollin Ridge ultimately blamed Cherokee Chief John Ross, actively sought revenge, and killed one of Ross's men in the process. In the early 1850s he fled to California and found work as a writer. He identified with the mestizo Joaquín Murrieta and penned *The Life and Adventures of Joaquín Murrieta, the Celebrated California Bandit*; thus, according to Lori Lee Wilson's new book on the subject, began the history of the legend.

Murrieta has meant many things to many people since the 1850s. He was a thief and murderer; he was an honest man who turned to robbery because of rampant discrimination; he was a character who never existed, used to attach blame to a hoard of bandits in a lawless terrain. Some have even argued that he was not Mexican. California was also a popular destination for Chileans in the 1850s. In fact, the Chilean Nobel prize winner Pablo Neruda wrote a play in 1967 entitled *Fulgor y muerte de Joaquín Murieta, bandido chileno injusticiado en California el 23 de julio de 1953* (*Splendor and Death of Joaquín Murieta*). Neruda used the most popular version of the legend: the Joaquín who champi-

oned the maligned, oppressed, and exploited Hispanic population while exacting revenge on the despised *gringos*.

Wilson's book is not so much a retelling of the history as is a study of how the legend was made. She gracefully traces the evolution of the story through various biographies, like Walter Nobel Burns's *The Robin Hood of El Dorado* (1932), which was so successful that Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer studios made it into a movie. The historians who have written biographies throughout the decades struggled with misleading sources and have often relied on oral tradition. Some, like Frank Latta, interviewed the relatives of probable eyewitnesses in the 1930s. The use of oral tradition seemed to strengthen the version written by Rollin Ridge over 150 years ago. Within the Mexican community many old California families, including my own, have stories relating to Murrieta. (My grandmother kept an old frying pan that had been passed down, claiming that her grandmother had cooked Murrieta a meal in it.) This led Chicano historians during the 1960s and 1970s to treat Murrieta as a folk hero. The prominent activist Rodolfo "Corky" Gonzales even used Murrieta's heroic persona in his epic poem "I Am Joaquín," which in 1967 became an identity-transforming anthem to thousands of Chicano youth throughout the Southwest.

Wilson also looks at the early print media in California, and shows how news was often taken out of context. Reporters often relied on local stories for their information, borrowed and reconstructed evidence, and in the process, came out with misleading or inaccurate accounts. Wilson meticulously sifts through such accounts and unearths a myriad of fascinating characters. The intimate tracing of Joaquín's band and the people who hunted him brings to life the lesser-known trails and towns of old California.

Wilson looks at a variety of newspapers and their editors and how they used Murrieta to advance their own views on society. For example, the editors of the *Stockton San Joaquin Republican* and the *San Francisco Alta California* often wrote about Murrieta but never conducted investigative reporting. Their views were prejudiced, and they simply sought to use Murrieta's alleged crimes to sway public opinion against the Mexican population. Perhaps most interesting is a chapter on Francisco P. Ramírez, the young editor of the Spanish-language *El Clamor Público*. Ramírez was an outspoken critic of sanctioned abuse toward the Mexican community. Although he believed all criminals should be punished, he nevertheless understood that because of the fear caused by those such as Joaquín and his band, vigilantes often caught and hanged Mexicans without trial.

Wilson, according to her own admission, "chose to marginalize the story in order to feature the voices of sources I encountered" (p. 261). Drawing on secondary sources, she skillfully resurrects a history that is notoriously absent from the archival record. While many will continue to cling to the image of Murrieta that reso-

nates personally, Wilson's book finally puts into perspective how the contrasting views came about.

CARLOS MANUEL SALOMON
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MATTHEW WARSHAUER. *Connecticut in the American Civil War: Slavery, Sacrifice, and Survival*. (Driftless Connecticut Series/Garnet Books.) Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press. 2011. Pp. x, 309. \$29.95.

One of the pleasures of Civil War history comes from its multifaceted nature, as no matter the angle or approach to the crisis, compelling stories always emerge. Take Connecticut, for instance: as a relatively small northern state, far removed from the front lines of the devastation engulfing much of the country, Connecticut's role in the chaos of the 1860s has remained largely—some might say justifiably—obscure. In this book Matthew Warshauer convincingly, if unevenly, argues that to fully comprehend the impact of the Civil War—and its racial implications in particular—requires an understanding of the commitment of northern states like Connecticut to the conflict.

The strength of Warshauer's work lies in his recognition that while Connecticut's participation in the Civil War generated "an outpouring of support" that permanently transformed the state, "it would be a mistake to conclude that such dedication reflected any type of unified war sentiment" (p. 6). Politics take center stage throughout the narrative as the author ably details the always contentious battles between the state's Republicans and Democrats. An important pattern can be ascertained in the ebbs and flows of Connecticut's politics, whether in the heated wartime gubernatorial campaigns or in the failed effort to extend voting rights to African Americans at the war's conclusion. The commitment to abolition in Connecticut was fragile, accepted only grudgingly as part of the military strategy of restoring the Union. The tenuous Republican grasp on the state reveals that most white residents of Connecticut endorsed the war only if the conflict was defined in their interests, and not those of African Americans. This is not to say that the people of Connecticut did not "sacrifice," as Warshauer states in his title, but the tangled evolution of racial attitudes in Connecticut does indicate that the concept of sacrifice—as with so much of the Civil War's history—was paradoxical.

Despite the tentative nature of Connecticut's commitment to abolition, the state never faltered in its willingness to fight to preserve the Union. Almost half of Connecticut's white men between the ages of fifteen and fifty served in the Union military, and almost eighty percent of similarly aged African Americans enlisted as well. But numbers alone do not suffice to tell the whole tale, and Warshauer attempts to humanize the northern war machine by repeatedly updating the stories of several individual soldiers who faithfully chronicled their battlefield experiences. The difficulty of blending a co-

hesive narrative of the Civil War's military campaign with a strict focus on Connecticut's participation does challenge the reader's patience, however. The brevity of the work combined with the author's adherence to a strict chronological narrative too often results in a streamlined recounting of battles with occasional commentary from the Connecticut perspective. When compared to the sensitivity with which Warshauer engages with the issues of race and politics, his description of the war itself lacks animation.

It is to be expected that in a short book on a big topic that much of value will go unsaid. But the limitations of Warshauer's focus on Connecticut's political and military stories are apparent. There are many more stories to tell, and the author clearly recognizes this. Discussions of the African American experience both at home and in the field, Connecticut's economic growth, women's participation, the formation of aid societies, and in the war's aftermath, the evolving memory of the conflict—which ends, somewhat arbitrarily, in 1965—among others, are included, but never fully developed. This leads to occasional generalizations, as when Warshauer casually asserts that, by the time of the Civil War centennial, “black Americans were finally insisting on the completion of Civil War abolition” (p. 213). In a book premised on the nuance and significance of race as the central issue of the Civil War era, the broad dismissal of generations of activism, intended or not, is grating to read. While these flaws may have resulted from the calculation of timing the book's publication with the onset of the Civil War sesquicentennial, they are still regrettable.

These criticisms should be understood in context, however. Warshauer achieves his primary goal of reminding us that, now more than ever, it is imperative that we more honestly confront the reality of why the Civil War was—or was not—fought. As it turns out, the story of a state like Connecticut, while physically untouched by combat, is essential to a better understanding of the racial legacy of the conflict. Hopefully elaboration on the many important issues skimmed over here will come before the war's bicentennial.

BENJAMIN CLOYD

Hinds Community College

PATRICK Q. MASON. *The Mormon Menace: Violence and Anti-Mormonism in the Postbellum South*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 252. \$29.95.

“Mormonism is a living question in the United States . . . the ‘Mormon’ iron is red-hot”: so said John Morgan, leader of Mormons in the American South, in 1881. But the line could also be tomorrow's tweet.

A new generation of scholars, many from Mormon backgrounds and others interested simply in what Mormonism means, has come of age just as Mormonism has acquired unprecedented cultural and intellectual cachet. (Mormon studies courses have cropped up across the country and internationally, along with a few endowed chairs.) Mentored primarily by Richard Lyman

Bushman and Terryl L. Givens, these intellectuals study the cultures in which Mormonism thrives and those with which it collides. Following models like Givens's *The Viper on the Hearth: Mormons, Myths, and the Construction of Heresy* (1997), they assess the intersections of Mormonism with American and other cultures. The book under review seeks to assess the meanings and significance of anti-Mormon animosity and violence in the postbellum South.

Patrick Q. Mason has broken loose from insular Mormon-mindedness to explore particular types of southern violence and animosity. He tells “the story of how southerners . . . encountered and then countered the perceived Mormon menace in their midst” (p. 9), beginning with a gripping narrative of Parley P. Pratt, Mormon apostle and polygamist, fleeing unsuccessfully from Hector McLean, the estranged but still legal husband of Eleanor, who had lately become Pratt's twelfth wife. It includes courtroom drama, the culture of honor, and finally McLean's brutal, unpunished 1857 murder of Pratt near Van Buren, Arkansas. By telling this story, Mason means to highlight the “nexus of a number of powerful forces”—including Victorian morality, patriarchy, and notions of honor—all of which were violated by the peculiar institution of Mormon polygamy. Mormonism, as threat to what southerners held sacred, was subject to culturally approved violence.

Mason skillfully narrates stories of such violence and excavates their larger themes. Subsequent chapters recount Joseph Standing's 1879 murder in northern Georgia, where he was a Mormon missionary (afterward constructed into a “lustful lout” by much of the southern press), and then the story of Tennessee's so-called Cane Creek Massacre in 1884, which resulted in the deaths of two local Mormons, two missionaries, and the leader of the attacking mob. Mason necessarily relies on Mormon source material to craft these narratives, but he has mined the local, regional, and national press far more than previous scholars, and he is unusually attentive to what these events meant and how they functioned in southern minds. His narratives are richly contextualized and situated skillfully in light of Mormonism in Utah as well as legislative, executive, and judicial decisions in Washington, D.C., southern Protestantism, and gender relations.

Mormonism clearly contributed two forces to the nexus of powerful influences that Mason documents: proselytizing and polygamy. The combination of those forces brought the threat of Mormonism to the hearth of every southern home, where missionaries were perceived as “sexual predators” (p. 58). Mason explores the varieties of responses to Mormonism and shows how southern vigilantism, evangelism, and legislation worked, sometimes in league, to combat the menace even as southerners debated which method worked best. This analysis highlights how, in the wake of the Civil War, Mormonism catalyzed a southern shift away from states' rights toward willingness to employ coercive national power.

Mason taps the writings of southern pastors and the

press to expose the theological underpinnings of the Mormon menace. An astonishing number of pages were printed in the postbellum period to persuade southerners of Mormonism's heresies. Numerous writers were extremely anxious that Mormons were "deeply bent on propagandism" and that "great numbers are flocking to them" (pp. 120–121). What is missing from Mason's book is a corresponding chapter on the converts themselves. He features dozens of southern reports that accuse Mormon proselytizers of duping weak women and mentions a few instances of southern women converting, but readers never hear the voices of these women or get an assessment of their actual numbers to compare with the anxious reports. Patterns of conversions by location, gender, or socioeconomic situation are missing. Beginning with Eleanor McLean, women are largely acted upon in Mason's narratives rather than actors in their own right. Thus, an outstanding study of white male thought about caricatured Mormon men and southern white women lacks attention to the actual women whose bodies and minds were caught in the nexus of dueling patriarchies that Mason describes so well.

Even so, Mason's book models even-handed scholarship that is sensitive to both southerners and Mormons. It neither generalizes nor homogenizes its male subjects. Though less about Mormonism than American culture, this monograph makes a tremendous contribution to the vibrant field of Mormon studies. Moreover, given Mormonism's re-emerging cultural presence and the ongoing negotiation of its cultural boundaries, this is a timely work that is likely to endure as a significant and learned assessment of accommodation and compulsion within the dynamic "boundaries of American tolerance" (p. 194).

STEVEN C. HARPER
Brigham Young University

FRANK NINKOVICH. *Global Dawn: The Cultural Foundation of American Internationalism, 1865–1890*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2009. Pp. 428. \$49.95.

Frank Ninkovich's ambitious book focuses on those internationalist perspectives of the Gilded Age that provided the "cultural foundation" on which later American foreign policy was built. He is mostly interested in "elite" journals of opinion such as *The Nation*, *The Atlantic Monthly*, and *The Century* where liberal opinion makers worked out a distinctive set of ideas, attitudes, and assumptions. Though they presented a minority view in their own day, such journals "were carriers of a living body of ideas that would, over time, evolve and flourish in the larger culture and take political form in American globalism" of the twentieth century (p. 4). In looking beyond American borders for signs of progress or regress, Ninkovich's selected writers balanced a faith in universal human destiny with an increasing awareness of cultural difference. The concept of "civilization," which Ninkovich helpfully compares to "modern-

ization" in the mid-twentieth century or "globalization" in our own era, provided the framework for understanding development and progress. Among the book's merits is its elucidation of the conceptual complexity of "civilization," which could, depending on context, operate as "hierarchical or egalitarian, pacific or belligerent, Euro-American or global, faux-cosmopolitan or genuinely ecumenical" (pp. 18–19).

The book's ten chapters, organized both geographically and thematically, present an exhaustive (at times exhausting) discussion of Ninkovich's findings. The detail and richness of these chapters defy easy summary. After two preliminary chapters that establish key elements of the liberal internationalist orientation, Ninkovich examines how his opinion makers took the measure of regions and nations around the world. Other chapters grapple with how liberal internationalists understood the relative role of race and culture in explaining historical development. Ninkovich's arguments about racial thought will undoubtedly provoke the most discussion and debate among historians. He insists that his selected internationalists adopted a more egalitarian perspective on human capacity and equality than historians have generally understood. No consensus about the science of racial difference existed, and longstanding liberal beliefs in universalism and human equality endured even through the failures of Reconstruction, Chinese exclusion, and the dispossession of Native Americans across the Great Plains. Culture was more important than biology for explaining difference, which accordingly had to be considered as historical and temporary rather than natural and unalterable. Looking out at the world, liberal internationalists routinely identified religion (especially Islam) as the most intractable obstacle to "civilization."

Ninkovich's specific point about the dominance of cultural over biological explanations is well taken, though what practical difference this made is not entirely clear. Anti-racism and ethnocentric chauvinism have long coexisted, and a faith in the universal, predictable, and linear destiny of all humanity has often been used to justify all manner of oppression. Ninkovich recognizes the brutality of a choice between assimilation or extermination; the price of admission to global civilization was the "elimination of culture understood as blind adherence to tradition" (p. 164). He suggests that the racial perceptions of the liberal internationalists might improve their standing today. That is debatable. But what his intervention does quite well is to cast a more critical eye on our own era by pointing out the continuities between then and now. "In many important respects," he writes, "our contemporary grasp of the globalization process is not all that much further advanced than their understanding," and at times their discussions of "race and culture were far more holistic, and more candid, than corresponding discussions tend to be today" (p. 10).

The book raises far more issues than a short review can address. Among the most important is where the Caribbean and Latin America might fit into Ninkovich's

framework. While the heavy presence of Europe undoubtedly reflects his sources, his arguments about the causal power of culture might have pushed him to examine perceptions of regions where U.S. power was most pronounced. On a different tack, I found myself wondering what if anything was particularly liberal about this liberal internationalism. Without presenting a fuller political spectrum, it is unclear whether Ninkovich means liberal in a Hartzian sense or whether he means to delineate a distinctive worldview within Gilded Age America. At different points in the book, "liberal" seems to mean simply "elite" or whatever E. L. Godkin and *The Nation* thought. It also seems worth noting that Harvard University Press might have edited the book more carefully and eliminated several typographical errors (e.g., "modern" for modern, "1950s" for 1850s) as well as incorrect names (e.g., "Lewis Menand" for Louis Menand, "John Moreley" for John Morley).

That said, this is a work of impressive scholarship by a distinguished historian. Its meticulous research and broad perspective—and especially its probing insights about the causative power of culture and the limits of certainty in historical writing—ensure that it will help set the scholarly agenda for decades in Gilded Age diplomatic and international history.

LESLIE BUTLER
Dartmouth College

STEVEN A. RIESS. *The Sport of Kings and the Kings of Crime: Horse Racing, Politics, and Organized Crime in New York, 1865–1913*. (Sports and Entertainment.) Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press. 2011. Pp. xxiv, 446. \$45.00.

Horse racing occupies a curious place in American historical scholarship. It stands at the intersection of sport history, gambling history, and organized crime history—three fields that are not known for their exhaustive coverage in the literature. Today, horse racing is considered merely the poor cousin of casino gambling, but at one time it was incredibly popular among the American masses, a subject of intense interest for several elite groups, and the source of several immensely lucrative rackets. In this book Steven A. Riess charts the rise of horse racing in the United States from the end of the Civil War to 1913, subjecting this phenomenon to the academic inquiry it richly deserves.

The book is focused on three chief subjects: the ways by which New York City became the national center for horse racing in the United States in the years following the Civil War; the forces that combined to help it maintain its status at the apex of the American racing scene until a local outcropping of the national Progressive anti-gambling movement forced a cessation of betting in the early 1910s; and the reasons for and methods by which gambling, both illegal and legal, predominated during the period of racing's ascendancy.

Horse racing, Riess argues, was a truly national pastime in the period under study, one of the top three

spectator sports in the United States along with baseball and prize-fighting, the latter of which also has a history that intertwines legitimate athletics with crime and corruption. Any monograph-length study of a subject as potentially sprawling as horse racing needs boundaries, and since the New York area had the most tracks, the largest volume of racing, and the biggest concentration of media and gambling interests, the author's focus on New York is apt.

Riess's study fills a lacuna in historical scholarship by addressing horse racing as a popular diversion, elite fascination, and criminal vehicle. In the last, he largely uses Mark Haller's interpretive framework, emphasizing both the importance of horse racing wagering profits to criminal gambling syndicates, and the tremendous influence those syndicates exercised within urban political machines.

In his narrative, Riess alternates between chronological and topical treatments of the material, tracing the changes in New York racing from the colonial through antebellum eras, and much greater depth, the post-Civil War period, as elites consolidated their control over racing with the formation of the American Jockey Club and the construction of tracks like Brooklyn's Jerome Park. He considers many aspects of the changes in racing over the years, particularly the constant tension among track owners, off-track gambling interests, and anti-gambling reformers. Racing tried to put its own house in order as charges of corruption (not without merit) exploded in the 1890s, forming first the Board of Control and then The Jockey Club. Due to the virulent spread of off-track, unregulated gambling, attempts to purge racing of corruption ultimately proved futile, and anti-racing forces finally succeeded in ending all betting at New York tracks in 1910. The betting interests—and the politicians with whom they allied—were nothing if not tenacious, however, and racing and betting returned a mere three years later, having outlasted the reformist push.

Riess's chief strength is the exhaustive detail he is able to lavish on his subject. Drawing from a diverse selection of primary sources, including several sports weeklies, racing publications, and anti-racing material, he recreates both the texture of racing and betting in the period and the complex political and social connections among those who promoted racing, those who organized betting on it, and those who countenanced that betting in exchange for political support. Since this is not ground that has been trodden often by historians, he is to be lauded for his devotion to the topic and the primary resources and interpretive structures he was able to marshal to complete the study.

With the historical analysis of sport being a relatively young field, and that of gambling even younger, it is difficult to place Riess's work within a definitive historiographical schema. Rather, it is easy to see that his work may inspire future research, both into gambling and horse racing contemporaneous with his study in other geographical regions, and into the dramatic rise of horse racing nationally after the 1930s. This book

should stand as a model for future investigation; Riess has proven that sport and gambling yield a wealth of material for historical analysis.

DAVID G. SCHWARTZ
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SUSAN MILLAR WILLIAMS and STEPHEN G. HOFFIUS. *Upheaval in Charleston: Earthquake and Murder on the Eve of Jim Crow*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 340. \$29.95.

Susan Millar Williams and Stephen G. Hoffius have written an eloquent and highly readable narrative history of the Great Charleston Earthquake of 1886. Natural disasters, they contend, can reveal "dirty secrets" about the communities afflicted with them. Contest and conflict emerge among the ruins and, in the southern context, racial obsessions and violence influence the aftermath.

The authors certainly see the 1886 earthquake as a crucial turning point in South Carolina politics and race relations. Francis W. Dawson, editor of the *Charleston News and Courier*, becomes what can only be described as the hero of the piece. Hoffius and Williams render him as a forward-thinking community leader who longed to see Charleston emerge from the rubble of its past. They even view him as a racial progressive who worked to provide relief for the city's African American community in the wake of the devastating quake. The murder of Dawson, in a bizarre conflict with a neighbor, becomes for the authors a significant, and unfortunate, turning point in the direction of the city and the state.

The style may seem unappealing to many historians, if not to the general reader. Hoffius and Williams adopt the breathless tone of too many narrative histories. When describing the effects of the earthquake, they move rather quickly about town, with its effects described in snapshot fashion. Summaries of major historical change are often compressed in order to give more room to biographical material on the major characters.

Perhaps the most problematic element of the book has to do with how the authors deal with the development of Jim Crow. They rightly note that, in the early 1880s, the rigidity of South Carolina and the South's devotion to Jim Crow had not reached the state of "stiff conformity and radical rigidity" that it later attained. Most scholarship since C. Vann Woodward has emphasized the stutter-step development of the new system of racial control, and these authors follow suit.

Unfortunately, there are times when the authors come close to suggesting that the earthquake proved determinative for the definitive turn toward Jim Crow social relations. This is never baldly stated, although the events of the earthquake's aftermath and the murder of Dawson seem to coagulate in the authors' description of the rise of Tillmanism. Ben Tillman could be elected, we are told, "with Dawson no longer standing in his way."

This simplistic assertion ignores much of what we know about the rise of faux populism in the Deep South and, more specifically, the role played by the agricultural situation in Tillman's success. Other significant leaders did stand in Tillman's way, and it did not matter. Confederate heroes like Wade Hampton III even went down before the Tillman juggernaut. It is unconvincing to argue that the 1886 earthquake or Dawson's death had much of anything to do with this outcome.

This issue could certainly have been corrected with a resort to some of the wider historiography on Tillman, the 1895 constitution, and the rise of Jim Crow. While some (but not all) of the more important works on this period in South Carolina's history appear in the bibliography, they do not seem to have exercised much influence at all over the authors' interpretations of events.

Students of the era will also be taken aback by the authors' tendency to favor melodrama over analysis. Dawson does not work well as an agent of historical change, even a failed one. His Bourbon politics have to be placed in the context of post-Reconstruction South Carolina, where a struggle occurred between a paternalistic version of white supremacy and more virulent strains that would soon gain ascendancy. Given the realities of this context, Tillman rather than Dawson embodied the new path that South Carolina would take. It was a path that, as Jack Cell has argued, included both economic modernization and segregated social relations.

Those who relish a good historical yarn that presents the occasional obscure and interesting fact will enjoy reading this book. The authors know how to recreate the feeling and sense of an era. Sadly, they also encourage a simplistic interpretation of that era, one in which significant, but minor, variables overdetermine the shape and direction of the past.

W. SCOTT POOLE
College of Charleston

MARY E. FREDERICKSON. *Looking South: Race, Gender, and the Transformation of Labor from Reconstruction to Globalization*. Foreword by STANLEY HARROLD and RANDALL M. MILLER. (Southern Dissent.) Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 2011. Pp. xxiii, 302. \$69.95.

This collection of essays by Mary E. Frederickson attempts to demonstrate that the regionalized "New South model of industrialization" (p. 4) resting on "cheap labor, anti-unionism, and occupational segregation by race and gender" (p. 3) serves as the prototype for industrial modernity in today's "Global South."

As does her previous work, the book emphasizes "the importance of the South in American labor history, and the centrality of dissent within the South" (p. 2). In six chapters, Frederickson charts the social activism of southern workers, women, and African Americans who sought to challenge the rigid strictures of Jim Crow.

Frederickson uses this by now familiar approach to shed new light on some old questions. Revisiting the

Plessy case, she argues that Judge John Ferguson's 1892 upholding of Louisiana's segregation law can only be grasped in the "interracial, multiethnic, and heavily unionized context of New Orleans" (p. 14). Ferguson's ruling coincided with an interracial general strike that threw the city's elite into a panic and led Ferguson to impanel a grand jury to suppress the strike. Observing that the "labor unrest . . . seriously disrupted the order, stability, and peace that Ferguson craved" (p. 28), Frederickson suggests the judge imposed his desire for order on the city's racial system as well.

If *Plessy* "allowed race to divide the populace in the service of maximizing capital's power" (p. 32), female social reformers also found themselves divided by racial and class lines, even while they sought to renegotiate the position of women in the industrializing New South. The "organized sisterhood" of both black and white Methodist churchwomen, for instance, "raised questions about the social costs of industrial development" (p. 88), combatting child labor, convict leasing, and other social ills. As is well known, however, these women proved unable to bridge the racial divide when it came to questions of suffrage. But working women and their middle-class sisters often proved able to join forces to "speak to social and familial concerns" (p. 125) usually ignored by male-dominated unions and strike leadership, Frederickson argues in another chapter.

Turning her attention to southern textile workers, Frederickson points out that driven as they were by the desire to protect northern workers against runaway shops, organizing efforts "remained extrinsic to southern working-class society" (p. 143). In the 1920s and 1930s, only communists paid heed to the biracial politics of southern labor, an approach that did not really bear fruit until the arrival of the civil rights movement decades later. In one of her more original chapters, Frederickson looks at the growing presence of black production workers in the textile industry after World War II. Drawing on her interviews with black textile workers who lived through desegregation, she makes the startling discovery of a deeply rooted "informal work structure" (p. 164) and biracial subcontracting system inside southern mills, where labor historians have long presumed black workers rarely entered production jobs. To the contrary, the author shows that eighty percent of black workers "categorized as mill laborers actually held a wide range of jobs within the mills" (p. 161) throughout much of the twentieth century. "Black workers held positions in southern textile mills that required greater skill than southern industrial lore has recorded," she concludes (p. 162). Like oral historian Timothy Minchin, Frederickson recognizes that, by the 1960s, accustomed to industrial work but still relegated to second-class citizenship, black millworkers made up a critical mass in southern textile mills and proved "predisposed to collective action and union organizing" (p. 166). To the degree that a chapter of Frederickson's text represents a monograph-in-waiting,

it can be found in this largely untold story of black textile workers.

As Frederickson shows in the final section of the book, newly enfranchised black workers soon faced the pressures of globalization on the southern textile industry. Immigrant workers, outsourced jobs, and foreign investment have transformed the South over the past several decades, altering the region's political economy and disrupting its longstanding biracial social structure. The idea that the latter change might "signal the demise of the Nixonian southern strategy built on white resistance to white minorities" (p. 186) seems to be wishful thinking; as Frederickson concedes, "anger directed at immigrants and supporters of immigration reform is especially palpable in the South," although some of it comes from blacks as well as whites (p. 213).

At times, Frederickson's effort to connect her essays seems a bit forced, and the book can read like a collection of disparate, if fascinating, research projects that never quite came together. Although the final chapters attempt to link Frederickson's more traditional work in southern labor history to the "struggle of contemporary workers across the Global South to call attention to the human costs of industrial capitalism" (p. 8), the connections remain somewhat tenuous, and the analogy to New South industrialization (as opposed to capitalist development more generally) seems strained. To regard the New South as the "model" for today's global capitalism overstates the case.

ALEX LICHTENSTEIN
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ERIC J. MORSER. *Hinterland Dreams: The Political Economy of a Midwestern City*. (American Business, Politics, and Society.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2011. Pp. xvi, 266. \$55.00.

It might surprise one to pick up a history monograph published in 2011 and read a forceful correction of Frederick Jackson Turner's "Frontier Thesis." After all, multiple generations of historians have criticized Turner's ideas about westward development. What can be left to say that has not already been argued? Eric J. Morser's new book, which begins by recounting a series of visits Turner made to La Crosse, Wisconsin, in 1895, manages to provide us with yet another alternative to the frontier myth. Morser's specific target is the popular idea, strongly implied by Turner and still alive in the twentieth-first century, that the development of the American West occurred without any meaningful government involvement. Scholars of western cities like Richard Wade and William Cronon have already undermined the stories of Turner's hardy rural pioneers by proving that urbanization itself was central to shaping the American West. Morser seeks to extend the corrective in two ways. First, he demonstrates that government institutions, policies, and laws played a "critical role in the Midwest's commercial history before 1900" (p. xi). Second, he believes that smaller cities

such as La Crosse, Wisconsin, have been neglected by most historians. The result is an original story of the West that moves the role of the state from the periphery to the center, as Indian conflicts, commercial growth, working-class politicization, and female empowerment all occurred in a political economy actively shaped by federal, state, and local governments.

Morser organizes his study of nineteenth-century La Crosse thematically and chronologically, and each chapter reinforces his thesis of the neglected but important role of the state. This includes the prehistory and "founding" of La Crosse. Conflicts between explorers and Native Americans in the Old Northwest occurred in "a world shaped by the American state." Federally sponsored explorers such as Zebulon Pike and Steven Long argued that the land surrounding the upper Mississippi River valley was well suited to American settlement, and the War of 1812 assured Americans that the British presence in the West was over. The American state's refusal to treat Native Americans as legitimate peoples with clear and measurable grievances made Indian attacks, such as the 1827 Ho-Chunk massacre of a white family near Prairie du Chien, all but unavoidable in the contested terrain of the antebellum Midwest. La Crosse's "founding father," fur trader Nathan Myrick, also directly benefitted from the American state. Transportation projects such as the Erie Canal opened up the upper Midwest to settlement, and federal Indian treaties ensured that the West would be militarily conditioned for commercial investment. Morser plays these enabling actions against Myrick's own personal tale of courage and individualism. Other business leaders also thrived in no small part thanks to the state. Lumber merchants, largely responsible for stimulating La Crosse's early growth, took advantage of corporate laws that allowed them to spread investment risks and purchased land from a federal government eager to encourage the economic development of the West. Early railroad entrepreneurs like Thomas Stoddard, again aided by public investment, connected La Crosse to the emerging national network of railroads that became the spines of American industrial growth. The city's vigorous efforts at regulating railroads and building sustainable infrastructure, though not always successful, again demonstrate a dynamic local government.

The final two chapters move away from commerce and economic growth and into class and gender. Morser ingeniously reconstructs the rapid political rise of David Frank Powell, who won two mayoral elections in the 1880s as an explicitly pro-working-class politician. Powell was a colorful figure; he used his Indian ancestry and friendship with William "Buffalo Bill" Cody to amplify his local political celebrity. But what interests Morser is Powell's politics. He was a candidate of a third party, pushed for an eight-hour workday for city employees, and predated the emergence of Populists, Progressives, and a more active labor movement. If federal and state governments in Gilded Age America looked askance at labor problems, Powell's story demonstrates that local politics made space for such issues. Women in La

Crosse also lived in a legally circumscribed world, but state laws in the nineteenth century slowly evolved to allow for more economic and political freedom.

Morser's research into every nook and cranny of La Crosse's available historical sources is impressive. He utilizes city directories, Common Council ordinances, individual diaries, and newspaper articles. It may have been useful to approach La Crosse from a bit more of a comparative perspective, not because cities its size should be grouped together, but because we might get a better sense of the *degree* to which the state shaped economic growth. Morser successfully proves that the role of the state in westward development is present throughout the nineteenth century, but these assertions occasionally become repetitive and end up excessively bludgeoning Turner instead of being put to use in comparison with other places. That aside, this is a fine piece of scholarship. A great advantage to a case study of a single, smaller, city is the ability of the author to tackle multiple realms of city life. Morser also cleverly introduces each chapter with different individuals whose stories add color to the narrative and reinforce his thesis. Western historians will find the book engaging and lively, and urban historians will learn a great deal about a city they probably know little about.

JOHN M. MCCARTHY
Robert Morris University

S. PAUL O'HARA. *Gary, the Most American of All American Cities*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2011. Pp. x, 195. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$19.95.

Few American cities have reputations as bleak and notorious as Gary, Indiana. Wracked by chronic poverty, declining population, and high crime rates, Gary has become a national poster child for the harrowing impact of deindustrialization on modern America. In this slim volume, however, S. Paul O'Hara reminds us that Americans have not always viewed Gary as the epitome of urban collapse. Instead, he illustrates how popular perceptions of the city have changed over time to reflect deeper concerns about industry, modernity, and the course of the nation's history more broadly.

This craft of urban storytelling began as soon as Gary took root in Chicago's industrial shadow. U. S. Steel, the company that founded Gary as a production center in 1906, described its new community as a triumph of technology and the logic of capital. Others, however, viewed the city in very different ways. Many observers looked at it and saw an untamed frontier of boundless economic possibilities. Workers viewed the city as a place to forge a new sense of community in an industrial world. Progressive-minded reformers believed it provided them a wonderful opportunity to smooth the harsh edges of capitalism and help Americanize immigrants in the 1910s. What these visions shared was optimism, a hope for the nation's urban future that Gary seemed to embody.

Yet depictions of the city changed dramatically in the decades that followed. In the 1920s and 1930s, as Amer-

icans openly questioned modernity and industrialization in the wake of World War I, the rise of communist Russia, and the First Red Scare, they became concerned that worker unrest in Gary meant that their dream of social utopia had foundered on the shores of Lake Michigan. City folk certainly retained a sense of pride in their hometown's ethnic communities and local athletic heroes. Yet they could not overcome an emerging national narrative that Gary's best days lay in the past. By the 1950s and 1960s, outsiders spun new tales that increasingly rejected descriptions of the city as a dynamic urban hub and emphasized instead its steep economic decline. Commentators abandoned romantic visions of the city as a place of either industrial efficiency or frontier energy and focused on rising violence, white flight, ingrained racism, and urban decay. Even as many residents battled these stereotypes and trumpeted their city as an incubator of African American culture and opportunity, the national media arrived at a very different verdict: by the 1980s Gary was a failed city that offered gloomy lessons about the precarious state of urban America.

O'Hara's book ranges far and wide and is packed with colorful tales of Gary and its residents. His discussion of the vision that drove U. S. Steel to found the city in an effort to manage social conflict, for example, illuminates a larger tale of how progressive reformers tried to reengineer Gilded Age cities. At the same time, he populates his pages with a rich cast of characters such as Tony Zale, the tough-as-nails boxer who grew up in Gary and became middleweight champion of the world, and Karl Malden, a native son who labored in Gary's steel mills before making his mark as a Hollywood actor, that add a human touch to his story. Moreover, his call for scholars to view Gary and similar cities as fictive repositories of competing American dreams and nightmares offers a fresh way to approach urban history.

Although O'Hara sheds new light on how Americans looked at Gary, he does not always explain why their competing visions mattered or how, exactly, they may have transformed the city and its tortured history. He makes the intriguing suggestion, for example, that the story of Gary as a grand laboratory of progressive experimentation encouraged Great Society policymakers to channel money into the community during the 1960s. Yet aside from explaining how this money fueled an angry white backlash within the city, he says little about whether federal efforts actually remade the community. He leaves other questions unexplored. How, for example, did national perceptions shape corporate investment in Gary? Were these perceptions fair? And if not, what was life really like in the city? O'Hara's emphasis on urban storytelling is innovative. His tale would be more convincing with some concrete examples of how these narratives altered the lives of Gary's inhabitants.

Furthermore, although O'Hara does well to map the historiographical lineage of his project, his constant reference to the work of other scholars tends to obscure his own arguments about urban America. At the same time, his story of the imagined Gary often feels un-

moored from the material history of his subject. He spends little time exploring the physical layout of the community, how its geography shifted over time, or how these changing realities altered the attitudes and opinions of either Gary's inhabitants or outside observers. A few maps would have helped him bind together the fictive and material worlds he describes.

Ultimately, O'Hara's adventurous book raises more questions than it answers. Yet even with these weaknesses in mind, he offers an inventive way to talk about cities that should be of interest to students of American culture and urban history.

ERIC MORSER
Skidmore College

PHILIP VANDERMEER. *Desert Visions and the Making of Phoenix, 1860–2009*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 2010. Pp. xvii, 459. \$39.95.

As the recession prompts Americans to reassess their romance with suburban homeownership and become more aware of the links between urbanization and environmental sustainability, the city of Phoenix, Arizona, has become the focus of a considerable amount of attention. Books like Andrew Ross' *Bird on Fire* (2011) and Janine Schipper's *Disappearing Desert* (2008) explore the environmental tradeoffs and social dislocations that have resulted from building a sprawling, car-dependent city in a desert. Phoenix appears as a cautionary tale in many of the postmortems of the post-2008 housing market meltdown—its economy a symbol of the irrational exuberance of a society built on subprime mortgages and easy credit. It is a timely moment for a wide-reaching, perspicuous account of the history of this southwestern metropolis, and Philip VanderMeer has provided one. In this work, VanderMeer expands on his prior exploration of Phoenix's postwar history (*Phoenix Rising* [2002]), moving back to the first days of Anglo settlement in the 1860s to explore how and why a small, second-tier agricultural hub became a twenty-first century megacity.

The central actors in VanderMeer's story are the city's commercial and political elites, and their successive visions for Phoenix shape the book's narrative. Phoenix's desert location, as VanderMeer observes, has defined the city's character from its nineteenth-century beginnings, and elite citizens' responses to the desert—to tame it, overcome it, exploit it, or accommodate it—have formed an undercurrent to its economic and political order throughout.

This book adds to, and admirably complicates, the burgeoning literature on the urban West. Unlike other southwestern cities such as Santa Fe or Tucson, Phoenix did not have a Mexican past, and it had ceased to be a Native American settlement centuries before European contact. Phoenix's early Anglo settlers sought to tame the desert by building an extensive canal system, erecting commercial and residential buildings whose architecture had little regional inflection, and planting tens of thousands of trees; largely eradicated by postwar

growth, the trees of Phoenix are now starting to be restored, a full-circle development that only books of this temporal breadth can show. Phoenix also differed from other inland western cities in having an economy built first on agriculture and commerce, rather than mining or manufacturing, and it remained far smaller than its rivals for quite some time. In the postwar era, Phoenix's history diverged from that of other Cold War cities (including those it emulated, like San Diego). Although high-tech dreams shaped its economic strategy, the result was overly dependent on a few manufacturers and not built to last. A scholar of the urban West as well as of the Southwest, VanderMeer is able to draw out contrasts and parallels like these in perceptive ways.

An important contribution is the book's exploration of urban governance, particularly in the middle of the twentieth century. Building on the work of Amy Bridges and other scholars of the metropolitan Southwest, VanderMeer digs deep into the municipal reform movement of the 1940s and the political power structure that emerged as a result. This was not the typical "growth machine," VanderMeer argues, but instead was focused on making city government work more efficiently and effectively. Postwar growth in Phoenix did not always adhere to the classic postwar suburban story; highway construction came late to the city, for example, and subdivisions rose well before road infrastructure came to meet them. Surprising insights like this appear throughout the book.

No single volume can encompass every one of the many histories of a particular place, and VanderMeer has made a deliberate choice to focus on formal politics, planning, and economy. The pages, as a result, are peopled chiefly with middle-class elite Anglos for the bulk of the volume; minority groups only emerge in a significant way after their entry into electoral politics in the post-civil rights era. While Phoenix had relatively smaller minority populations than other western cities, and while the majority of its elected and civic leaders were men for most of the period covered, there seem to be some missed opportunities to trace the role of race and gender in the events and decisions VanderMeer describes, particularly before the 1960s. More focus on the individuals who made history—elites and non-elites alike—might have deepened our understanding of Phoenix's evolution.

Overall, this book delivers on its promises and presents an illuminating portrait of what Phoenix used to be, what it has become, and where it might go next. Scholarly urban biographies are too few and far between these days, and VanderMeer's accomplishment is that he takes the classic form and infuses it with new insights into the history of modern municipal governance, planning and infrastructure, and urban boosterism to show how Phoenix's desert visions became a complicated reality.

MARGARET O'MARA
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DONA BROWN. *Back to the Land: The Enduring Dream of Self-Sufficiency in Modern America*. (Studies in American Thought and Culture.) Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 2011. Pp. x, 290. \$24.95.

In this engaging book, Dona Brown explores the back-to-the-land movement in the United States from the late nineteenth century through the 1980s, with a brief epilogue that carries the story into the twenty-first century. The book is based upon extensive research in magazines and newspapers as well as the papers and published works of key authors and theorists. The author cites and draws upon an impressive array of secondary sources.

Scholars including David Danbom, David Shi, and Rebecca Gould have characterized some of the participants in the back-to-the-land movement as romantics who sought a simple life close to nature for moral, emotional, or spiritual reasons. By contrast, Brown convincingly argues that many early back-to-the-landers were motivated by economic considerations such as job security and food prices. They embraced a "'producerist' vision linking self-sufficient households, autonomous work, and personal independence" (p. 51) and believed that by moving back to the countryside Americans could resolve current social problems. Brown's stance complements others' work. It echoes Richard White's characterization in 1980 of back-to-the-land colonists in the Northwest as being profit-oriented, and it actually dovetails with Danbom's characterization, in *Born in the Country: A History of Rural America* (2006), of many back-to-the-land ventures as being economically motivated.

In the first part of the book, Brown considers the move to the countryside that accelerated during the panics of 1893 and 1907, peaked early in the 1910s, and faded by 1920. Brown ably assesses this movement from the perspective of both intellectual and social history. She describes the work of key writers including Bolton Hall, Gustav Stickley, and Peter Kropotkin. Socialists, progressives, immigrants, participants in the arts and crafts movement, Jewish community leaders, and single taxers all advocated movement from urban to rural America. Journalists and novelists also stoked enthusiasm for it. These writers included William R. Lighton, who described his move to a farm in the Ozarks in multiple essays and books, and muckraker Ray Stannard Baker, who penned a fictitious series of purportedly autobiographical accounts under the pen name of David Grayson. Brown skillfully uses letters written by readers in response to back-to-the-land articles and books to assess back-to-the-landers' interests and motives. The letters show that economic considerations, illness, stressful or boring urban work, and concerns about manly vigor impelled Americans to return to the farm. Although the first back-to-the-land movement waned by 1920, Brown ferrets out vestiges of agrarian sentiment in the 1920s. She shows, for instance, that real estate promoters in southern California appealed to buyers by emphasizing the rural qualities of large sub-

urban lots where occupants could plant large vegetable gardens, grow fruit trees, and raise chickens.

In the book's second half, Brown examines reincarnations of the back-to-the-land movement during the Depression and in the 1970s. Under the New Deal, government agencies promoted a modest return to the land, reflecting a popular belief in the land's potential to economically rehabilitate struggling industrial workers on part-time subsistence homesteads. Modifying the dour assessment of historians, including Paul K. Conkin, who have correctly argued that these New Deal projects lost money, Brown points out that many residents of the projects praised them—particularly those whose families remained there. At roughly the same time that the New Deal was building subsistence farms for part-time industrial workers, a small number of artists and professionals left the cities and moved to small farms in Vermont. Brown examines the writings of some of these migrants, including Samuel Ogden, Charles Morrow Wilson, and Helen and Scott Nearing.

While several historians have studied the back-to-the-land movements of the Progressive era and the 1930s, few scholars have studied the back-to-the-landers of the 1970s. Brown's scholarly assessment of this movement is a key contribution of the book. She points out that despite some obvious ties to the counterculture, this movement's participants also resembled earlier back-to-the-landers in some key ways. In an era when the cost of food made up a relatively small portion of the household budget and when the government's welfare programs created a safety net, they were less likely than their predecessors to be concerned about job security and less likely to move to the countryside in order to save money. But they did share their predecessors' desire for self-sufficiency and political independence. Despite these similarities they ignored most of the accounts and ideas of previous generations of back-to-the-landers aside from Ralph Borsodi and the Nearings. Thus, they deprived themselves of valuable lessons they might have learned from the past.

A curious omission in an otherwise thorough discussion is the eloquent and influential writing of Wendell Berry, whose accounts of his own return to the land have been widely read.

BRIAN Q. CANNON
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CHRISTINE SKWIOT. *The Purposes of Paradise: U.S. Tourism and Empire in Cuba and Hawai'i*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2010. Pp. 283. \$39.95.

Incomparable today, Cuba and Hawai'i were for many years "twin objects of U.S. desire," according to Christine Skwiot. Her brief, comparative, chronological study "is not about tourism, leisure, or consumerism as such" but instead takes on the harder task of connecting travel writing and tourism with the "political practices" of empire in Cuba and Hawai'i (p. 2). Borrowing selectively from cultural studies, Skwiot argues that travel writing in the nineteenth century and tourism in the

twentieth powerfully shaped not only how mainland Americans imagined Cuba and Hawai'i but also how elites ruled the twin paradises. This is a tall order for a book with just over 200 pages of text, but the results are original and interesting. Indeed, the study goes beyond the promise of its subtitle to analyze not only transient visitors but also expatriate communities and their complex, turbulent relations with local actors.

Skwiot asserts that beginning in the early 1800s American settlers in and visitors to the "fantasy islands" in the Caribbean and Pacific forged mythic connections to New England's past. Drawing on those origin myths, boosters of annexation attempted to show that the tropical islands were "American enough, civilized enough, republican enough, and white enough" to join the United States (p. 28). By 1898, Hawai'i met the criteria of civilization minimally (or perhaps proleptically) and became a U.S. territory, while the Platt Amendment (1903) kept Cuba at arm's length but also made it a less-than-sovereign state. Not content to remain in political limbo, annexationist elites in both places hoped tourism would seed white settlement and thus "improve" the population. American travel writers and tourism promoters pitched Cuba as offering "a lifestyle much like that of the Midwest but with cheaper land [and] a superior climate" (p. 75). In Hawai'i franchise restriction allowed the Anglo-Saxon elite, called *haole*, to dominate the indigenous and Asian majority and control discourse about annexation. Like their Cuban counterparts, these "neo-Hawaiians" hoped for an influx of white settlers that never came.

By the 1920s the "multinational agents of U.S. empire" had given up the pipe dream of creating white republics in Cuba and Hawai'i and accepted, even as they denied it, that the U.S. empire resembled the European colonial system and "that the tropics were places where whites ruled and recreated, not where they toiled and procreated." Elites created "new tourism regimes" dedicated to "private pleasure" and "catering to the rich and powerful" (p. 77). The opening of the Havana Country Club in 1912 and the development of Waikiki, near Honolulu, in the 1920s, symbolized the shift. Prohibition supported the new systems by giving an outward push to Americans seeking liquor, gambling, and prostitution.

The tourism regimes faced their own contradictions. Cubans identified tourism with corrupt, repressive dictators, first Gerardo Machado, later Fulgencio Batista. Prostitution became a metaphor for the island's submissive relation with the United States, providing Fidel Castro with a volatile issue. In Hawai'i, the alleged rape of a U.S. naval officer's wife in 1931 led mainland papers to declare that the islands had "become an unsafe place for white women" (p. 132). Reacting against the elite racism that the incident made manifest, Hawaiians voted out the traditional *haole* Republican elite and put Democrats in power for the first time.

The Cold War cemented the growing divergence between Hawai'i and Cuba. By the 1950s, as violent resistance to civil rights on the mainland provided the So-

viet Union with a powerful propaganda weapon, the United States saw "racial mixing" in Hawai'i in a new light. Statehood for Hawai'i would fortify U.S. policy toward Asia and show that Americans "accepted people of color as equals" (p. 187). Skwiot argues that favorable American press coverage of Castro's July 26 Movement before 1959 likewise served as proof of a genuine U.S. commitment to democracy in Latin America. But after the revolutionaries reached Havana—where they installed themselves in the Continental Suite at the Hilton—relations with the Eisenhower administration quickly deteriorated and killed U.S. tourism to the island.

Skwiot moves smoothly between Cuba and Hawai'i, but some readers may find that the wealth of detail makes the comparative argument difficult to follow at times. Others may wonder why the plantation economies that for so many years defined the main "purpose" of each paradise remain largely offstage. Yet the effort to connect tourism and empire pays off, as in Skwiot's apparently counterintuitive conclusion that in the matter of self-determination, the U.S. territory fared better than the semi-sovereign state: "For much of its history, the independent nation of Cuba enjoyed less political and economic autonomy and sovereignty in its imperial relationship with the United States than the annexed territory of Hawai'i did" (p. 209).

CYRUS VEESER
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ROXANNE WILLIS. *Alaska's Place in the West: From the Last Frontier to the Last Great Wilderness*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2010. Pp. xi, 186. \$34.95.

In this short book, Roxanne Willis attempts to unravel a crucial aspect of the history of the forty-ninth state and its relationship to the American West and the nation. Willis delineates her aims in broad terms, discussing how Americans have viewed Alaska as a "last frontier" and therefore ripe for economic development. At the same time, she insists that scholarly efforts to place the state within the framework of the history of the American West are misguided because Alaska is unique. This claim does not square with her title or the book's broad introduction; Willis's book is not primarily about Alaska and the West so much as it is about Alaska and the nation, and how that relationship has shaped the environmental history of both.

Alaska's environmental history has been closely tied to its economic development. Willis examines this connection in five case studies from the late nineteenth through the late twentieth centuries. In each of them, she probes the ways that development plans altered the landscape and changed how Alaska was seen by its residents and by outsiders. Her first example centers on the importation of reindeer from Siberia into Alaska in the 1890s, a scheme hatched by Sheldon Jackson, one-time missionary and later "general agent for education" in the territory. Jackson sought to feed what he believed were "starving" Eskimos and to build a commercially

viable reindeer industry. Thousands of reindeer were brought into the territory in the following years, but Jackson's hopes of transforming the lives of natives while creating a new enterprise foundered because of overgrazing, predation by wolves, the intermingling of reindeer with caribou, and resistance by indigenous peoples to herding. Jackson's aims, based on specific conceptions of people and the land, misread Alaska's social and environmental realities. This theme of misjudging the place and people is woven through each of Willis's case studies.

Another case study centers on the 1930s, when Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration decided to resettle approximately one hundred families from the seriously degraded cutover region of the upper Midwest to Alaska so that they could establish farms, raise crops, and begin anew. The scheme seemed wrongheaded to many, given the obvious challenges of such a short growing season. Willis reveals that the Matanuska colony enjoyed modest success, but the vision of the colony's founders proved naive in light of obstacles such as Alaska's distance from markets and its harsh climate.

Willis's subsequent three vignettes focus on grander projects. The Alaska Highway, initially conceived by boosters who hoped to reduce Alaska's isolation, came to fruition during World War II when threat of a Japanese attack (as well as an actual one in the Aleutians) elevated Alaska's strategic value to the nation. Willis details how construction of the highway caused considerable deforestation, dumping of construction materials, and killing of wildlife, and she labels the roadway "a collision course of waste and destruction" (p. 89). Still, her conclusions that the highway was an "engineering monstrosity" (p. 92) and "road to nowhere" (p. 93) are not well supported. Nor does she detail any of the "wartime projects [which] contributed more to Alaska's economy and infrastructure" (p. 93). The Rampart Dam was another project conceived of as a potential boon for the state's industrial growth because of its massive hydroelectric power potential. In the end, the dam failed to gain approval from the Department of the Interior and the Johnson administration, which were sensitive to the potentially severe environmental impact. Finally, Willis analyzes the building of the massive oil pipeline from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez in the 1970s. This controversial project involved local boosters, energy firms, environmentalists, Native peoples, and the federal government and drove support for passage of the landmark Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act in 1971.

Willis's case studies are thoughtfully done, although at times one wishes for more texture and detail. A missing element in the book is the role that Alaskans played in this history. Willis provides the point of view of officials like Senator Ernest Gruening and Governor Walter Hickel and of Native peoples, but she might have worked harder to showcase the vantage point of business people, workers, and other residents, especially Alaska's own environmentalists. Although the book can be criticized, it succeeds in drawing attention to the his-

torically and increasingly important place Alaska occupies with regard to current environmental and economic challenges. Willis shows that time and again the northernmost state has been a central stage for the country's debates involving the economy and the environment. In this new era of climate change, Alaska's place on that stage is certain to grow more visible.

MARK HARVEY

North Dakota State University,
Fargo

CYNTHIA M. BLAIR. *I've Got to Make My Livin': Black Women's Sex Work in Turn-of-the-Century Chicago*. (Historical Studies of Urban America.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2010. Pp. xiii, 322. \$40.00.

Cynthia M. Blair's beautifully researched book charts the changes to African American prostitution in Chicago from 1870 to 1930. She excels at showing how shifts in urban geography and business organization over the period affected the lives of black women sex workers.

Despite the first-person declarative in her title, Blair spends most of the book mapping the larger demographic trends in commercialized sex. In this way, her work more closely resembles social histories such as Walter Reckless's *Vice in Chicago* (1933) and Judith R. Walkowitz's *Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, Class, and the State* (1980) than more recent poststructuralist accounts. What voices Blair does recover she employs admirably, and her cultural analysis of Jack Johnson as a cafe owner adds new and subtle insights to the Johnson white slavery case, but Blair's greatest strength remains in showing how three distinct periods influenced trends in black prostitution.

From roughly 1870 to 1900, most prostitutes worked in the Levee, situated just south of the Loop. During this period, black women generally entered prostitution in their early twenties, worked in brothels, and left the business after a few years. Black madams played an important role in the Levee as cultural arbiters and visibly successful business women. After 1900, and with the move to the 22nd Street Levee, black women lost power. The age of the average prostitute rose, showing the decrease in social mobility for women employed in illicit enterprise. Furthermore, the number of black madams decreased as white male entrepreneurs took over running commercial leisure venues. When city officials closed the 22nd Street Levee in 1912, the black sex workers who had not already moved to the Black Belt relocated and integrated into the diverse leisure venues of the growing entertainment district. This move, however, coincided with a rise in organized crime, the increased importance of pimps, and the more stringent enforcement of racial segregation that ultimately led to the marginalization and criminalization of black women sex workers. Blair writes a compelling narrative, supporting her analysis with statistics, maps, and a few life stories.

For all these strengths, the book suffers from two no-

table weaknesses. Blair insisted but never adequately addressed why white men saw black prostitutes as more degraded than white prostitutes. This assertion dismissed the significance of class differences within prostitution. Women working in parlor houses had higher status than those working in back street cribs, whatever their race. Black women did earn less than white women of similar status, but Blair needed to examine how status differentials problematized racial dynamics across Chicago's red-light districts. Blair also played it safe in her portrayal of black anti-vice reform. Although she discussed the desire of black reformers to keep white vice out of the Black Belt, Blair did not analyze how this imperative complicated narratives about the African American fight for racial integration in public spaces. Accepting the truisms that black prostitutes were always more degraded and that black reformers always sought integration, she missed an opportunity to bring greater nuance to the historical understanding of race, gender, and reputability. By not challenging her own analytical categories, Blair did a disservice both to her book and to her readers.

A solid but analytically cautious entry into the historiography, Blair's book succeeds as a demographic and geographic study of Chicago prostitution. Blair's careful research makes *I've Got to Make My Livin'* a valuable addition for understanding shifts in commercial prostitution—white and black—at the turn of the century.

MARA L. KEIRE

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RUTH CROCKER. *Mrs. Russell Sage: Women's Activism and Philanthropy in Gilded Age and Progressive Era America*. Paperback edition. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2008. Pp. xx, 526. \$24.95.

Ruth Crocker uses the life story of philanthropist Margaret Olivia Slocum Sage to explore such questions as how women in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries constructed their public selves and the degree to which they influenced public policy. Olivia Slocum was born in 1828 and grew up in Syracuse, New York. Despite the fact that her father went bankrupt in 1841, she went to the best schools available, including Emma Willard's Female Seminary in Troy. She worked as a teacher and then as a governess until she became financier Russell Sage's second wife in 1869.

If she thought that marrying a millionaire would enable her to enter the upper echelons of New York society and spend money freely, she was very much mistaken. An associate of Jay Gould, Russell Sage made his fortune manipulating the stock market. He felt he owed nothing to society and found it difficult to spend the money he had made. The result was that compared to other Gilded Age tycoons and their families, he and his wife lived well but simply. Because she had no money of her own, the newly married Mrs. Sage had to confine her philanthropic activities to volunteerism, which in the beginning focused on "civilizing" the Indians and

serving as a lady manager and board member of the New-York Woman's Hospital.

Crocker argues that it was Sage's experiences as a self-supporting woman and volunteer that made her aware of the need to expand women's educational and economic opportunities. Toward those ends, she became a patron of the New York Exchange for Women's Work and the president of the Emma Willard School Alumnae Association Council. Because she believed that educated women should have the vote, she joined the woman suffrage movement and began holding parlor suffrage meetings in her home in the 1890s.

Olivia Sage's life changed when her husband died on July 23, 1906, and left her today's equivalent of 1.5 billion dollars to spend as she wished. She was almost eighty years old. She spent the rest of her life deciding how to give his fortune away. Crocker carefully chronicles her philanthropic activities, which included gifts to organizations involved in everything from religion and animal protection to education.

This book is as important for what it says about the actual practice of philanthropy as it is for what it says about Sage. Crocker is particularly masterful in teasing out the role played by lawyers, friends, family, and employees in deciding who would get a portion of Sage's wealth. She calls Sage's lawyer, Robert Weeks De Forest, "the gatekeeper" of the Sage fortune (p. 241). He was a proponent of systematizing the practice of donating money to worthy causes. Toward that end he served as president of the New York Charity Organization Society (NYCOS), a group of elite charity experts who served as a clearinghouse for judging the worthiness of various local charities and public service organizations. He encouraged Sage to pay the NYCOS to screen letters from individuals soliciting her help. And he helped her set up the Russell Sage Foundation, whose mission to improve social and living conditions in the United States was carried out by young social reform experts.

Always persuasive, tactful, and patient, De Forest used his influence to encourage or discourage Sage's interest in various good causes. He seems to have been unenthusiastic about both woman suffrage and advancing women's educational opportunities, preferring instead that she give money to schools like Yale, his alma mater. When he drew up the deed of gift to New York University in 1906, for example, he did not write it in such a way as to assure that women actually benefitted from the donated money. And while he did not oppose the founding of Russell Sage College, a vocational college for women in Troy, he did nothing to make sure that its future was financially secure.

While Crocker acknowledges that Sage was snobbish, ethnocentric, ambitious, and self-righteous, she emphasizes her altruism, her sense of stewardship, and the pleasure she got from being able to give away much of the money that her skinflint of a husband had hoarded during his lifetime. Crocker estimates that before Olivia died in November 1918, she had donated almost a billion dollars in today's money to worthy causes, and

she argues that the foundation that Sage created helped to establish the basis for American welfare state and the practice of social work. Well-written and thoroughly researched, this biography is a welcome addition to the history of women and philanthropy.

SYLVIA D. HOFFERT
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TANYA SHEEHAN. *Doctored: The Medicine of Photography in Nineteenth-Century America*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 202. \$74.95.

This book is the history of a metaphor—an extremely extended, far-reaching metaphor—and the title of the work precisely encapsulates its entire project. This is not a book about medicine at all, nor is it really about photography, unless, like Wallace Stevens, we hold that "what we said of it/became a part of what it is." But Tanya Sheehan's subject is the way in which the *idea* of photography was shaped by medical discourses and practices throughout the nineteenth century, and thus her study very appropriately concerns "what we said of" photography. As such, the monograph contributes as much to the history of ideas, or of language, as it does to the history of images; and while those histories obviously have numerous points of contact, the author is more overtly engaged in the contextualization of photography within a variety of social practices, than she is interested in reading specific images.

Sheehan defines the parameters of the project in her introduction: "The book explores the ways in which . . . medical metaphors and models helped shape the social identities of urban studio photographers and the cultural identity of portrait photography between the late 1850s and circa 1890" (p. 2). However, it is in the final chapter, and its focus on the afterlife of photography's medical metaphors, that Sheehan is most persuasive. The logic of chronology presumably demanded that "Photo Doctors and Pixel Surgeons: The Medicine of Photography in the Digital Age" follow on as a kind of coda to the earlier chapters, but it would have made for a more thought-provoking read to begin the study of the "cultural identity of portrait photography" in the age of televised plastic surgery, and, from our own moment in history, to explore the evolution of photography's still current metaphoric vocabulary. The chapter, which is also arguably the best written in the book, gives a startling reminder of the weirdness of contemporary American relationships to portraiture, aesthetic surgery, and bodily health, such that the beliefs and practices of nineteenth-century Philadelphians, who are the subject of the previous four chapters, seem far less bizarre by comparison.

Trade and popular literature of the mid-to late nineteenth century are rich with a variety of efforts to legitimize commercial photography. Claiming special status for the medical metaphor, Sheehan argues that "the authority to manipulate, diagnose, treat, and ultimately heal the body" (p. 3) was thereby somehow conferred

onto the field of photography itself. That is quite a claim, but the reader need not accept it as fully as Sheehan appears to in order to find this work fascinating for its local detail. By locating much of its study in the “geographical, commercial and cultural heart” (p. 14) of nineteenth-century Philadelphia, the book invites anthropological foray into the world of urban studio photography. The first four chapters are absorbing in their close and copious readings of events, meetings, social transactions, periodical exchanges, how-to manuals, and photographic practices, all of which are associated with the rise of portrait photography and its subsequent role in racial and social construction. Sheehan’s study of the blue light craze, in particular, and its supposedly beneficial and healing properties, leads to a persuasive consideration of the degree to which such practices contributed to the discourse of whiteness. Arguably less persuasive is the claim that merely by virtue of its “material resemblance” (p. 84) to “sitting under a studio skylight” (p. 85), photography was endowed with its own therapeutic powers. Still, there is plenty of evidence here to affirm an imaginative association between the two practices, which surely benefited portrait photography in its ostensive opposition to the “darkness and disease plaguing urban Americans” (p. 105).

“The idea that manipulating a body [through the technology of photography] is akin to a medical procedure” (p. 133) is, as Sheehan notes, strikingly unchanged throughout its one-hundred-and-fifty-year history. What we need, she adds, is more than a mere acknowledgement of “the metaphorical language and concept of ‘doctoring’ photographs” but rather an assessment of the “cultural work they have performed in history” (p. 134). In other words, what are the consequences of so enduring a metaphor?

This question appears not at the beginning of the book but instead in the last chapter, by which time the reader might hope to be somewhat closer to an answer, or even a clear argument, regarding the broader implications of the “cultural work” of metaphor. And while the text makes it easy to assent to the proposition that commercial portrait photography benefited from its association with medicine, that proposition is far less interesting than the multitude of details that its study brings to light.

JENNIFER GREEN-LEWIS
George Washington University

JENNIFER BUREK PIERCE. *What Adolescents Ought to Know: Sexual Health Texts in Early Twentieth-Century America*. (Studies in Print Culture and the History of the Book.) Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 237. Cloth \$80.00, paper \$24.95.

What, if anything, adolescents should know about sex is a question that has vexed educators for at least a century. Jennifer Burek Pierce’s book shows how sex education helped shape ideas about adolescence as a life stage. Moreover, says Pierce, these texts grew out of new views about young people as readers. Sex educators

believed that the printed word was the best way to reach adolescent audiences, and this required them to think of young readers in new ways.

Pierce also builds on Daniel T. Rodgers’s argument that, during the Progressive Era, the reform of American politics was part of a larger movement of politics and ideas throughout the Atlantic world tied together by trade and capitalism. Seeking to apply this thesis to sex education, Pierce explores the development of a transnational print culture dedicated to disseminating sexual health information to adolescent readers.

Pierce traces the beginnings of this transatlantic exchange to the work of French physician Alfred Fournier, whose fifty-page booklet *Pour nos fils, quand ils auront 18 ans* (1901) was the first effort to make science-based information about sexually transmitted diseases accessible to adolescent readers. At this time, Fournier not only had to resist opposition to teaching young people about sex, he also had to overcome fears about the physical and moral harms that might come to young people from the act of reading.

Pierce then turns her attention to the United States, where physicians discovered that once “secretive texts” could be used to prevent venereal disease while also earning a handsome profit. Fournier’s main champion in the United States was the physician Prince A. Morrow, who founded the American Society for Sanitary and Moral Prophylaxis in 1905. Fournier’s ideas were also brought to American shores through the various translations of Eugène Brieux’s play *Les avariés*, known in English as *Damaged Goods*. Realizing that “altruism required money,” the fledgling Connecticut Society of Social Hygiene spearheaded efforts to make English translations of the play available to American readers. The novelist Upton Sinclair eagerly accepted an offer to write a novelized version of *Damaged Goods*. In addition to showing the devastating impact of syphilis on young people, Sinclair’s version “documented the development of a print culture that made medical information available to common—and particularly young—readers” (p. 79).

Pierce shows that the most successful effort at turning sex education into a lucrative publishing enterprise was accomplished not by a physician but by former Lutheran minister Sylvanus Stall, creator of the internationally acclaimed Self and Sex book series. Stall set himself apart from other publishers by bringing a “minister’s point of view” to sex education, and by insisting that readers of different ages required separate treatises. Stall’s skill at marrying religion to modern scientific facts initially won him the praise of former Postmaster General Anthony Comstock, author of the eponymous Comstock laws that imposed severe restrictions on the dissemination of sex education literature in the United States. Yet even someone as tame as Stall eventually got into trouble with Comstock, partly because of content but also because of allegations by Morrow that Stall had plagiarized sections of Morrow’s *Social Diseases and Marriage, Social Prophylaxis*. Pierce uses the clash among Stall, Morrow, and Comstock to

illustrate that the success and suppression of sex hygiene texts in the early twentieth century had as much to do with disputed notions of copyright as it did with censorship, especially as the market for books aimed at a young audience became increasingly competitive.

Pierce concludes that "in promoting health through reading," publishers not only made money but "influenced the concept of adolescence as a cultural phenomenon, the acceptance of advances in science and medicine, and the ways these ideas made their way into print" (p. 180). Pierce attempts to connect her work to two theoretical constructs: Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, and Robert Darnton's work on the communication circuit and its influence on the field of print culture studies. Pierce's use of Kuhn's ideas is unconvincing: although Fournier was the starting point for an international exchange of ideas about sex education for young people, his belief that venereal disease was caused by germs rather than people or places was hardly "revolutionary." The author is more successful in extending Darnton's work on the communication circuit. Unlike the case in eighteenth-century France, however, in the network of early twentieth-century hygiene treatises, "the roles of author, editor, publisher, and promoter were all performed by the small entities and individuals who developed health texts for adolescent readers" (p. 185). Moreover, Pierce argues that when considering the communication path for literature aimed at children and adolescents, one needs to consider the role that parents, librarians, and other adults played in young readers' access to information. She convincingly demonstrates that "the modern practice of reading guidance emerged in connection with medical and reform interests in adolescent reproductive health, before it became the province of experts on children's literature, librarians and publishers" (p. 189). Pierce therefore makes a significant contribution to both our understanding of the history of sex education and the history of print culture in the early twentieth century.

HEATHER MUNRO PRESCOTT
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BELINDA A. STILLION SOUTHARD. *Militant Citizenship: Rhetorical Strategies of the National Woman's Party, 1913–1920*. (Presidential Rhetoric Series, number 21.) College Station: Texas A&M University Press. 2011. Pp. x, 303. \$45.00.

In a year when Occupy Wall Street protesters and Tea Party activists disrupted politics-as-usual in cities across America, Belinda A. Stillion Southard's account of feminist dissent in the early twentieth century seems especially timely. The book focuses on the National Woman's Party's (NWP) campaign for the federal woman suffrage amendment, a campaign that featured marches, demonstrations, and, at its most radical, a ritual burning of President Woodrow Wilson in effigy.

The study is written primarily for what Southard identifies as "the rhetoric and public address scholarly

culture" (p. x). The author characterizes it as "a study in [sic] the ways in which a disempowered group asserted its citizenship rights through a rhetoric of political mimesis" (p. 190). Historians should forge ahead through the first chapter with its somewhat dense discussion of the literature, to the more rewarding middle chapters, each of which deals with a phase of NWP political activism between 1913 and 1920. Southard makes extensive use of NWP papers and cites a wide variety of secondary sources. The result is a very detailed account of these bold and fascinating militant "actions." She begins with the National Woman Suffrage Parade of March 1913, providing fresh detail descriptions of the individual floats, based on contemporary reporting in the NWP publication, *The Suffragist*. The huge suffrage demonstration was designed to upstage Wilson's first inaugural parade. In Southard's words, it was a "mimetic enactment" of the parade and an episode that "forced woman suffrage into the sacred spaces of national politics" (p. 69). She then moves to the parades and demonstrations of 1916 which "allowed white women to adopt the authority of fully enfranchised citizens while also attracting publicity" (p. 106). As the campaign for suffrage dragged on and Wilson continued obdurate in opposition, the party's tactics became more radical, though inflected by wartime rhetoric and imagery. Southard devotes a chapter to the description and analysis of the marches between June and November 1917, when NWP activists staged protests as "Silent Sentinels," posed formally outside the White House in what the author labels "parodic performance." She devotes another chapter to the rallies of August 1918 in Lafayette Square, across from the White House, a public place sacred to the memory of American Revolutionary War heroes Lafayette and Rochambeau. The "Perpetual Watch Fires of Freedom" were ritual public burnings of President Wilson's speeches designed to ridicule the democratic promise overseas of a president who opposed democracy at home. "As soon as reports of a speech reached the women, they rang a liberty bell at NWP headquarters and marched to the park to set fire to a copy of the text . . . Three hundred NWP members marched to Lafayette's statue with an urn and copies of Wilson's speeches that promoted democracy in Europe. Page by page the women consigned Wilson's words to flames" (p. 165). Seven years of noisy opposition to the Wilson administration's policies culminated in February 1919, when NWP members burned the president in effigy. The author calls this the NWP's "most volatile and direct attack on the president" (p. 168).

Southard's study focusing on the rhetoric as well as the enactment of protest adds an important dimension to our appreciation of the more radical wing of the woman suffrage movement. This monograph demonstrates the rich possibilities of approaching social movement history not only through an analysis of the rhetoric of public addresses, but also through the interpretive lens of visual culture. If the book's written style is awkward at times, historians of the suffrage movement and

of political dissent more generally will nevertheless find this a useful study of how the National Woman's Party embraced public performance to protest the continuing disenfranchisement of half the people.

RUTH CROCKER
Auburn University

JULIA C. OTT. *When Wall Street Met Main Street: The Quest for an Investors' Democracy*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. 313. \$35.00.

It pains me to be fully truthful about the character of this volume, because I have long been an advocate of more involvement by historians in describing the evolution of the nation's financial services sector. Nonetheless, I feel an obligation to report that the title of this book is rather deceptive. It does not focus directly on the changing relationship between Wall Street and the small investor living on Main Street after all. Instead it overwhelmingly concentrates on the federal government's effort to sell war bonds to the general public from 1917 through 1920. That is a genuinely worthwhile project, and Julia C. Ott does a superb job in demonstrating the scale and scope of the massive effort. But why not indicate to readers the real subject of the text from the outset with a proper heading? I blame the editors as much as the author.

A somewhat similar promotional program had raised substantial sums from thousands of middling households to finance the North during the Civil War, but that earlier effort was largely undertaken by the private sector. The subsequent attempt, half a century later, was on a much larger scale and was sponsored by the federal government. The U.S. Treasury asked citizens to purchase war bonds, first, as a patriotic act and, second, as a sound and prudent financial decision. Government bonds, in large and small amounts, were marketed as an equal, or even superior, option to deposits in savings banks and the purchase of whole life insurance policies. The marketers left no stone unturned. The public outreach extended to a broad sector of the population—including minorities, women, and union members. The not-so-subtle message was that good citizenship included not only voting in elections but also participating directly in the capitalist system through the acquisition of governmental and corporate securities.

Prior to 1917 few households, beyond the genuinely wealthy, had owned securities of any type, whether stocks or bonds. The government's wartime marketing initiative was hugely successful if measured by the number of households (eighty percent nationwide) that invested in some type of government financial vehicle. When the fighting ended, the carryover in securities ownership extended to the purchase of a wider basket of publicly traded securities, including railroad and corporate equities.

But what exactly did Wall Street contribute to the so-called investor democracy movement? The answer is next to nothing. The elite leadership on the New York

Stock Exchange discouraged the solicitation of small accounts by the major investment banks and brokerage firms. The reasoning was that the general public was too unsophisticated to make wise judgments about stocks, and most experts doubted that small accounts, with their high administrative costs, would generate profits for most brokerage firms. That negative attitude moderated somewhat in the mid-1920s; but Wall Street was still dominated by the interests of the oligopolist investment banks that catered strictly to the upper classes at home and abroad. One exception to the general rule was AT&T; it attracted over half a million stockholders, many of whom were regular customers who had decided to make a modest investment in the firm. In another exceptional case, over two million households pooled their monies by investing in so-called investment trusts that owned a portfolio of publicly traded securities. Similar investment trusts had been listed on the London Stock Exchange since the late nineteenth century. Was Great Britain the true initiator of an investors' democracy?

While it is impossible to dismiss entirely the influence of the democratization propaganda of the 1920s in the United States, I doubt if those initiatives really had legs beyond the devastating impact of the 1929 Crash and the Great Depression. Citizens in all income brackets turned sour on the stock market in the 1930s, and that malaise continued throughout the 1940s as well. I would argue that the initial democratization movement had largely fizzled; it was only resuscitated in the 1950s and thereafter. The brokerage firm of Merrill Lynch and the unprecedented initiatives of Keith Funston, the new head of the New York Stock Exchange, played key roles in bringing middle-class investors into the equity markets. The subsequent emergence of open-end mutual funds and 401(k) retirement plans solved the problem of generating profits on small accounts.

In the concluding chapter, Ott becomes very much present minded. She asserts: "Faith in unfettered finance and the primacy of shareholder returns—dogma first promulgated by financial securities marketers in the 1920s—inspired the reckless securitization and regulatory laxity of the early twenty-first century" (p. 224). No doubt this faith was a contributing factor, but the author has probably exaggerated its overall impact. For my money, the best explanation of the underlying hubris that characterized the recent financial meltdown remains Karen Ho's *Liquidated: An Ethnography of Wall Street* (2009). Still, Ott does identify how it all got started nearly a century ago, even if the initial movement was largely aborted.

Finally, I wonder where this volume will find an audience. I suspect it will be overlooked by the relatively small niche of financial historians, and the detailed analysis may be too technical to appeal to the tastes of most social and cultural historians.

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BETH LINKER. *War's Waste: Rehabilitation in World War I America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2011. Pp. 291. \$35.00.

Scholarly interest in the social and political aspects of U.S. involvement in World War I has intensified recently with studies focusing on racial and ethnic minorities, the nature of coercive voluntarism, the influenza epidemic, veteran activism, and the memory of the war. Beth Linker adds to this growing literature with the first book-length treatment of disabled veteran rehabilitation policies and practices. Despite growing interest in disability studies generally and numerous works tracing the disabled European soldiers' journey home from the battlefield, scholars of the American war experience have largely ignored wounded soldiers. This oversight reaffirms the myth that the United States was "barely bloodied" during World War I, an inaccurate view that discounts 53,000 American combat deaths. Linker rightly shines the spotlight on the nation's 204,000 wounded soldiers, another largely forgotten group. Recent scholarly work pinpoints World War I as a pivotal moment for the modern civil rights movement, U.S. foreign policy, and state security practices. Likewise, Linker sees the war as a transformative period in the history of American health care. "[F]rom World War I onward, US veterans of war would benefit from a federally funded system of health care, a form of socialized medicine that the nation's civilians would be denied time and again throughout the twentieth century," she notes (p. 8).

Linker focuses primarily on policymaking, tracing the evolution of a recovery philosophy that put a premium on rehabilitating wounded soldiers into productive citizens and workers. Progressive-era medical and policy trends influenced the professionals charged with formulating federal veteran rehabilitation programs. First, many rehabilitation experts believed that an overly generous Civil War veteran pension system (which characterized old age as a disability for Union veterans) had drained the federal treasury and created a permanent class of government wards incapable of supporting themselves. Second, physicians founded specially designed hospitals for disabled children promising that rehabilitation therapy would save them from a lifetime of dependence on charity. Finally, the new workmen's compensation system standardized the benefits granted to workers with similar disabilities. Linker does a superb job tracing how these various strands of thought came together to establish a clear set of goals for rehabilitating disabled veterans. The new veteran rehabilitation system sought to remove the need for disability pensions, to imbue disabled veterans with the desire to hold a job and support a family, and to formulate a scientifically based care and benefits system that treated disabled veterans equitably.

Besides tracing the evolution of this new approach to treating wounded veterans, Linker also evaluates how these pioneers in federal rehabilitation services fell short. Rehabilitation administrators, doctors, nurses,

and therapists embraced the goal of "re-masculinizing" wounded men so that they had the drive to work and marry once they completed the proscribed period of rehabilitation. Yet these same experts persisted in treating disabled soldiers as children, requiring unquestioning compliance with the goals and methods that others chose for them. Caregivers proved adept at ignoring the reality that many wounded soldiers would struggle with life-long disabilities. "Rehabilitation officials made disability appear to be a temporary physical glitch, something from which men would fully recover with six months hospitalization and rehabilitation. But disabled soldier-patients and their bodies repeatedly defied such lofty and unrealistic thinking," Linker writes (p. 141). Creating a network of federally managed rehabilitative medical and vocational facilities did not lessen the cost of treating disabled war veterans. The new system instead put medical experts, not veterans, in charge of making decisions about how to spend the money Congress allocated for their care. Rather than giving disabled veterans pensions to pay for their own treatment (the model used in the Civil War pension system), rehabilitation officials spent the money constructing veterans hospitals and hiring medical experts.

Linker argues that these attitudes and practices are not just part of a distant past. In the introduction and conclusion she discusses the rehabilitation experiences of amputees from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Just as during World War I, the wounded soldier who today refuses to work diligently towards financial and medical independence "is considered a failure, not a hero," she notes (p. 1). Perhaps most important, the refusal to confront the permanent physical and mental trauma visited upon fighting men "creates the momentary illusion that there is no human cost of war—that there is no 'waste' in war" (p. 181).

This pathbreaking study opens up exciting avenues for future research. Linker focuses primarily on the experiences of amputees (only a small fraction of the disabled veteran population), while gas-related tuberculosis and re-occurring shellshock accounted for the majority of hospitalizations in the interwar period. The question of veteran resistance to federal rehabilitation policies, which Linker touches upon briefly, and debates over disability allowances deserves additional consideration. David Gerber's insight that veterans' social identities were more than a by-product of their interactions with the state underscores how little we know about the postwar personal lives of disabled veterans. Thanks to Linker, scholars can investigate these questions with a clear understanding of the motivations and methods that underpinned the nation's federal rehabilitation system for disabled veterans.

JENNIFER D. KEENE
Chapman University

KEITH WAILOO. *How Cancer Crossed the Color Line*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. 251. \$27.95.

Keith Wailoo offers a significant contribution to medical history, public health studies, and health policy debate. Wailoo examines the history of cancer in the United States and the subtext of race that accompanied cancer throughout the twentieth century. He effectively demonstrates the centrality of race in constructions of disease and provides a critical analysis of how constructions of race, which informed health policy, changed over time. He also criticizes cancer experts who easily perceived entire populations in terms of one racial category, ignoring the varied lived experiences within such groups. This critique runs throughout the book and serves as a constant reminder of the fluidity of racial and epidemiological categories.

Wailoo adopts a chronological approach and opens the book with an analysis of the early decades of cancer awareness. Understandings of cancer depended on ideas of vulnerability, and Wailoo demonstrates that white women in the United States were perceived as the most vulnerable citizens. Exacerbating a civilized versus primitive discourse, epidemiologists and others believed cancer targeted a "civilized" white population while simultaneously believing African Americans were immune to cancer because of their "primitiveness." Thus, cancer awareness initiatives were laden with racism and informed by eugenics.

By the 1930s, however, the notion of white vulnerability was increasingly indefensible. Data gathered as a result of reverse migration into cities with cancer surveillance programs complicated such ideas. The expansion of public health programs in later decades led to recording incidences of cancer within communities of color. Wailoo demonstrates how epidemiology offered various explanations of racial difference over time. Early theories of cancer and race rested on perceptions of biological differences of susceptibility and immunity, but by mid-century cancer became an egalitarian disease with differences framed by social inequality. As Wailoo notes, experts clung to the notion of uniformity within a racial category and the soundness of racial categorization as a science.

In an effort to better categorize cancer incidence, experts adopted the U.S. Census category "nonwhite." This category lacked biological meaning and became, as Wailoo describes, "a perverse strategy for tracking health" (p. 103) that would have implications for many more decades. Ironically, the failure of "nonwhite" to capture meaningful data ultimately gave rise to greater consideration of social differences in cancer data. Through two case studies, one of cervical cancer among Jewish women, and another on increasing rates of lung cancer, Wailoo demonstrates that epidemiologists began to consider how human behavior, such as sexual customs and smoking, contributed to cancer trends.

Within the context of widespread social protest during the 1960s, growing evidence of a cancer disparity indicated the need for racial equality with regard to cancer treatment and access to health care. Some Americans also challenged the idea of cancer expertise. In 1972, a team of researchers at Howard University

published findings indicating a sharp increase in cancer incidence within the black community. The researchers questioned why this dramatic data had escaped the notice of major cancer organizations including the National Cancer Institute and the American Cancer Society. Wailoo reviews the Krebiozen saga as another example of public sentiment challenging medical authority.

In the 1990s, epidemiologists revealed higher than average rates of prostate cancer in black men, cervical cancer among Vietnamese American women, and breast cancer among affluent and white women. By the end of the century, the public was attuned to discussions of race and cancer trends. Many Americans demanded better explanations for such cancer spikes within defined racial communities. However, as Wailoo notes, epidemiological spikes "are complex and illusive phenomena shaped by many social and biological factors" (p. 171). Although race had a more visible place in cancer discussions than earlier in the century, racial vocabulary remained limited and unable to explain such phenomena.

Wailoo calls for greater attention and consideration of race in historical studies and when developing contemporary health policy. A historical review of cancer in the United States demonstrates that race has been a constant subtext for discussions of cancer, but it has also been a malleable and fluid concept. Wailoo's history offers a blueprint for ways to consider disease and difference through a method that avoids the pitfalls of biological explanations. He instead insists that racial vocabulary be expanded to account for relationship among knowledge, power, and policy. This book is essential reading for all those interested in history and illness, and also those eager to re-theorize race and public policy.

KIRSTEN E. GARDNER
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San Antonio

JULIE BUCKNER ARMSTRONG. *Mary Turner and the Memory of Lynching*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 255. Cloth \$59.95, paper \$24.95.

Mary Turner was one of eleven black people killed near Valdosta, Georgia, between May 16 and 23, 1918, all in retaliation for the killing of a white landowner. Although hers was one of many lynchings during the period, Turner is especially significant because she was a woman, and because of the spectacular cruelty of her murder as described in the national press. According to Walter White's report, Turner was eight months pregnant, and after the mob had hung her from a tree by her feet, doused her with gasoline and set her on fire, they cut her unborn child out of her body, so that it dropped to the ground below, giving "two feeble cries" before someone crushed it under his heel. Then, the mob "rid-dled" Turner's hanging body with shotgun fire. As Julie Buckner Armstrong recounts, she is not the only author

to become "obsessed" by this horrific event, nor the first to be at times stymied in an effort to represent it.

Armstrong defines her book as "a case study of a story, not an event" (p. 14). Particularly because of its discussion of historical re-enactments, museums, and monuments, as well as the relationship of the memory of lynching to such events as demonstrations for the Jena Six, the book is an important contribution to history. Lyrically written, it connects an impressive array of literary, artistic, and popular sources in an effort to understand what lynching means to a variety of communities.

The first chapter describes newspaper and protest accounts as framed by the discourse established by the silent film *Birth of a Nation* (1915). Armstrong shows how local reports that Turner was killed for "talking back" in protest against the lynching of her husband became an opportunity to represent female heroism, noting the *Chicago Defender's* claim that black women stayed home from work in response (p. 46), but she establishes that most used the account to draw a parallel between lynchers and the German enemy in World War I. The centerpiece of the first chapter is White's visit to Valdosta and a close reading of his account, which was the first to refer to Turner's pregnancy, along with Armstrong's effort to evaluate the truth of the claim. The second chapter discusses both the Anti-Lynching Crusaders and efforts of black women artists and writers to represent Turner's killing through the discourse of respectability, often with the figures of Madonna and child. Armstrong argues that gender norms led Angelina Weld Grimké to shelve a draft whose main character fought back with violence in favor of the passive heroine of the story "Goldie," while Meta Fuller gave up on her sculpture *In Memory of Mary Turner* for similar reasons. The third chapter's argument is that the discourse of lynching shifted from "popular justice" as seen in *Birth of a Nation* to national disgrace partly through literary modernism's "rejection of genteel aesthetics" (p. 115). Armstrong's readings of Jean Toomer's *Cane* (1923), Anne Spencer's "White Things" (1923), and Oscar Micheaux's *Within Our Gates* (1920) demonstrate that modernists represented lynching as a rupture in both the nation and in language itself. The fourth chapter moves to the present with a discussion of the Moore's Ford Bridge lynching reenactment, the National Great Blacks in Wax Museum, the art of Kara Walker, and the poetry of Honorée Fanonne Jeffers. The two popular representations emphasize gory spectacle. "It'll make you want to turn militant," Armstrong writes that the hotel concierge told her when she mentioned the wax museum (p. 158). The exhibit he refers to adds a new detail to the Turner lynching, claiming that the mob "sewed cats into Mary Turner's stomach taking bets on which one would claw its way out first" (p. 160). Such an improbable and sadistic historical fantasy deserves more comment than it receives. Armstrong explains both this representation and the incorporation of a murdered unborn baby into the Moore's Ford reenactment as serving a therapeutic function.

The use of folklore scholarship or deeper research into oral history might have added yet another layer of interpretation.

This is a deeply personal book. The author began the project in Valdosta and encountered resistance from local whites. Armstrong discusses the emotional experiences of authors of literary works, and her own, commenting that she is surprised that more scholars of racial violence "have not taken similar first-person approaches" (p. 17). She refers to her whiteness and her childhood in Birmingham as shaping how she approaches history. "White Southerners frequently remind themselves to 'look away' as the song goes," she writes (p. 154). This tension between the wishes to look and to look away captures the nature of traumatic memory, and Armstrong's choice to represent her personal reactions creates a connection with the reader, although it can also be distracting. It is not an easy subject, Armstrong reminds us; she and others have struggled to avoid sterility, sensationalism, or sentimentality. Ultimately, this book succeeds in calling readers to connect themselves to the past, and the past to the present, demanding that we all become accountable to history.

REBECCA HILL

Kennesaw State University

TRACY A. THOMAS and TRACEY JEAN BOISSEAU, editors. *Feminist Legal History: Essays on Women and Law*. New York: New York University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 274. Cloth \$79.00, paper \$24.00.

Lawmaking orders the future, but history shapes the rule of law—and nowhere more so than in the legal rules that govern women and gender. That is the central point of this superb interdisciplinary collection of essays on history, law, and feminism that aims to contribute to "the imagining of a more liberatory legal system" (p. xi).

Feminist Legal History explores practice and theory, wrongs and rights, the legal construction of gender, and women's reconstruction of the law. It spans almost two centuries of experience, from the protests advanced by Elizabeth Cady Stanton against gender as a legal category to the signing by President Barack Obama of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. Thirteen essays address issues ranging from temperance and transportation law to marriage, reproductive rights, and sexual harassment; to legal aid and social work; to suffrage, military service, the GI Bill, and wage discrimination. The authors (legal scholars, historians, and sociologists) write of "micro-choices" made by men with "power women lack," as Reva Siegel notes in the foreword, and "micro-resistances" made by women with "phenomenal agency and creativity" (p. vii).

The essays reveal that the history of women's encounter with the law has been anything but a linear story of gradual progress from disfranchisement and coverture to equal rights. In an illuminating introduction, the editors Tracy A. Thomas and Tracey Jean Boisseau criticize the conventional account of enfranchisement, un-

derscoring the “uneven” and “complex” ways that the “law has responded to women’s assertions of social power” (p. 12). The collection offers a portrait full of “contradictions, inconsistencies, and tensions” (p. 13). And feminist legal theory, since its advent as an intellectual movement in the 1970s, has likewise unfolded as an argument, sometimes bitter, among exponents of liberalism, cultural difference, dominance, and postmodernism as rival frameworks for conceptualizing female subjection and visions of transformation. The editors deftly sum up debates over sameness and difference, the liberating and disempowering character of the legal system, and the jurisprudential construction of a “gendered subject.” The essays draw on a multitude of theoretical perspectives. But according to the editors, all adopt the “legal method of *deconstruction*” in examining codes of gender that underlie legal rules and legal rights (p. 25).

The collection is divided into two parts. Part one focuses on law’s effect on women, with essays by Richard Chused, Margo Schlanger, Leti Volpp, Melissa Murray, Jill Hasday, and Maya Manian. Part two focuses on women’s effect on the law, with essays by Tracy Thomas, Gwen Jordan, Felice Batlan, Lynda Dodd, Mae Quinn, Carrie Baker, and Eileen Boris. Such a division, however, runs contrary to a premise of much contemporary scholarship in legal history that law at once constitutes and is constituted by social experience and everyday strife. Part one opens with a piece by Chused that draws a line between the 1870s temperance activism of Ohio ladies—which spilled out from the streets to the courts—and the adoption half a century later of the woman’s suffrage and prohibition amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Part two closes with a piece by Boris that focuses on the right of equal pay as it exposes the blind spots in contemporary anti-discrimination law. Notably, both essays invalidate linear stories of progress, suggesting that the division between the theme of “Legalizing Gender” in part one and that of “Women’s Transformation of the Law” in part two obscures the very intersections between the choices of lawmakers in courts and legislatures and the resistance of women in public and private that take center stage in the collection.

It is the splendid essay by Boris on pay discrimination, gender, and race that distills the paradoxes of feminist legal history. Boris traces the efforts of Lilly Ledbetter, a floor manager in an Alabama branch of the Goodyear Tire Company, to secure equal pay by filing a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 1998 and pursuing it under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act all the way up to the U.S. Supreme Court. The story ends not with Ledbetter’s 2007 defeat in the Supreme Court but rather with congressional anti-discrimination legislation: the 2009 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. Yet Boris lays bare the limits of progress. She sets the apparent triumph of gender equity against the law of fair employment, focusing on contradictions in the rulings of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg. In particular, Boris juxtaposes Ginsberg’s

scorching dissent in *Ledbetter* with her silent agreement in *Long Island Care at Home v. Coke* (2007), where the Court denied the guarantees of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to home health-care workers, who are mainly women of color laboring long days for low wages.

The Obama administration has proposed new rules extending the FLSA’s reach to the home health-care industry. But the analysis offered by Boris testifies to the longer and deeper ambiguities marking the history of women’s aspirations for equality at law. “That Ledbetter conformed to the model woman of liberal feminism, a trailblazer in a male job, whereas the Jamaican immigrant home-care aide Evelyn Coke engaged in work conflated with unpaid labor of wives and mothers, and long associated with servile status,” Boris writes, “highlights the problem of which work and which women count in equity discourse” (p. 252).

AMY DRU STANLEY
University of Chicago

TIMOTHY R. BUCKNER and PETER CASTER, editors. *Fathers, Preachers, Rebels, Men: Black Masculinity in U.S. History and Literature, 1820–1945*. (Black Performance and Cultural Criticism.) Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 2011. Pp. ix, 272. \$49.95.

What is particularly daunting for editors of anthologies about black masculinity is selecting a variety of essays that are distinctive yet speak to each other on a meta-level. Timothy R. Buckner and Peter Caster’s new volume is largely successful in this regard.

The editors wisely position the relevance of this anthology within the presidency of Barack Obama. Placed between the scathing, spurious ramblings of Houston A. Baker, Jr., and the racist propaganda of the Tea Party and Birther movement, Riché Richardson claims that Obama has “shattered the conventional racial (and arguably racist) fantasy of manhood in the national imaginary as white” (p. 247). Thus, Obama as outsider, as one who challenges conventional definitions of leadership, has much in common with many of the subjects of this anthology. The “lasting power of racial caricatures” and their “co-optation in minstrelsy as a largely white imagination of blackness” binds many of the critics of Obama to past insults of black manhood (p. 4).

The essays follow an appropriate chronological progression. Jeff Forret examines the relationship between slave men, white southern notions of honor, and white masculinity in the antebellum South. He describes this as a process of negotiation in which black men reverted to the southern tradition of violence when their honor was threatened. The author’s consideration of slave men defending their masculinity within the context of white manhood demonstrates the interrelationship between the two racialized constructs. In the following chapter, Buckner discusses the middling position of black barber William Johnson, who interacted with both white and black communities in his Natchez barbershop. As a free man of color in the Deep South,

Johnson's life was regulated just a little less than a slave's, but the barber was also "essentially performing masculinity in ways usually reserved for white men" through his land ownership, hiring of black and white workers, and overall economic success (p. 45). Buckner demonstrates how Johnson "performed" black masculinity in a narrow self-determined way and often castigated mentees who did not follow his rules. The final antebellum essay by Erica L. Ball considers broader class definitions of black respectability among northern African American men. Not just determined by the religious sphere, the emerging black middle-class model of manhood Ball describes was inscribed in the northern black press and through literary societies.

Julius Bailey examines the role of the black minister in the nineteenth-century African Methodist Episcopal Church. In the middle of the century, both men and women led congregations and delivered sermons, but a consolidation of power by a contingent of black male ministers subsequently limited the role of black women. Two separate essays consider the career and racial politics of the influential nineteenth-century illustrator Thomas Nast. Fiona Deans Halloran demonstrates Nast's genuine sympathy for African American men in his Civil War and Reconstruction illustrations. A positive element of this, and the subsequent chapter is reproductions of Nast's original illustrations; thus, the reader can compare the authors' interpretations to the actual primary source documents. Halloran delicately describes Nast's genuine concern for African American men but also his presupposition of black inferiority. He doubted that black men could ever be the social or political equals of white men. Caster also considers Nast, but as a minor subject. Instead, he regards African American author Charles W. Chesnutt and his relationship to widespread racist caricatures in publications such as *Harper's Weekly*. Seeking to publish in such journals, which usually assaulted black men, Chesnutt attempted to subvert and overturn racist portrayals through his fiction; as a result, the talented author largely lost his writing career.

Simone Drake and Charity Fox each contribute individual chapters on the life and autobiography of Nat Love. Cowboy, train porter, and middle-class family man, Love bragged in his autobiography, *The Life and Adventures of Nat Love* (1907), that he was the original Deadwood Dick. Dick was the inspiration for highly popular dime novels in the late 1800s and was considered white. Literary scholar Drake reads agency into Love's autobiography, even if denying part of its historical credibility. She focuses not only on the text but on the photos accompanying it, which illustrate a visual rhetoric of self-assertion and self-definition. Fox reads the autobiography against the grain as a satirization of early twentieth-century idealized manhood. As cowboy or porter, Love claimed that he could perform all of the tasks that a white man could, and perhaps in a superior fashion.

The final chapters consider two giants of the early twentieth century: W. E. B. Du Bois and E. Franklin

Frazier. Colleen O'Brien looks at how Du Bois's 1909 biography of John Brown demonstrated cross-racial and cross-national patterns of revolution, while Malinda Elaine Lindquist reinterprets Frazier's sociological work, focusing on black family manhood.

The one complicating factor of this collection is how loosely the essays hold together. Individually, each of the chapters is formidable scholarship and begs for further research to be completed on the historical subject being discussed. But the parameters of time and discipline are perhaps a little too large for consideration in this study. As historians we have now moved to a phase of scholarship on black masculinity where topical and selective studies need to be completed.

GERALD R. BUTTERS, JR.
Aurora University

ANASTASIA C. CURWOOD. *Stormy Weather: Middle-Class African American Marriages between the Two World Wars*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2010. Pp. xiv, 196. \$35.00.

In her book, Anastasia C. Curwood argues that black middle-class and aspiring middle-class couples confronted public and private tensions as they aimed to make their marriages both personally fulfilling and politically useful to the broader goal of racial advancement. Curwood situates her study within the context of interwar cultural upheaval when black couples negotiated new sexual and marital norms, urban migration, the emergence of a "New Negro" ideal, and intraracial debates over the course African American marriages should take. While Curwood successfully lays out the new marital ideals that emerged during this time period, she is more interested in how individual husbands and wives navigated public expectations of private life, oftentimes in ways that contradicted one another's expectations. Arguing that the historical focus on African American racial struggles has overshadowed investigations of subjects' personal lives, she contributes to the existing historiography of modern American marriage and African American private life as she demonstrates "the heterogeneity of those lives" (p. 7).

Curwood effectively highlights the shift from turn-of-the-century African American marriages, marked by Victorian notions of decorum, to those of the post-World War I years, characterized by a more public discussion of sexuality and changing gender roles. Middle-class couples viewed their prewar unions in social and political contexts, with the communal goal of racial advancement placed above either partner's individual satisfaction. Men and women embraced a gendered order in which the male served as public voice and head of household while the female accepted her role as helpmate and domestic manager. In the aftermath of the war, with a new cultural frankness regarding sex, a growing focus on companionate marriage, and the emergence of mass culture, modern views collided with traditional expectations. Couples identifying with the New Negro ideal—"racially aware, militant, and fear-

less" (p. 32)—embraced the concept of unions marked by individual happiness and sexual fulfillment as distinct from those designed to serve primarily the goal of racial uplift.

Even among those who accepted the idea of a modern marriage, however, debates arose over the nature of the appropriate fulfillment of marital roles. Relying on the views and publications of labor leader A. Philip Randolph, sociologist E. Franklin Frazier, and novelist Jean Toomer, Curwood argues that the masculine ideal of the New Negro marriage firmly placed the husband as the dominant financial and emotional force within modern unions. However, many notable women, such as activist Amy Jacques Garvey, novelist Zora Neale Hurston, and lawyer Sadie Alexander embraced more active political and economic roles as they struggled to reconcile personal desire and financial necessity (especially during the Depression years) with the idealized version of wifehood. Curwood's evaluation of the varied and often contested understandings of gender highlights the disconnect between the publicly touted ideal and the private realities of New Negro marriages. For example, while Randolph, Frazier, and Toomer all advocated on behalf of masculine authority and underscored the importance of male breadwinning, each man relied—at one time or another—on the financial support of his wife. The dominance of the male figure was often tenuous at best.

Curwood accentuates this point through the investigation of her most unique and revealing sources: her paternal grandparents' written correspondence from 1935 to 1949 (the bulk of which comes from 1935 to 1937). The challenge, of course, is that she must rely primarily on one couple's correspondence. But her reading of the letters is nuanced and thoughtful, and she successfully situates James and Sarah Curwood in their time and place. In so doing, she effectively draws out the ways in which the Curwoods' relationship reflected the challenges of New Negro couples more broadly. Socio-economic class, education, skin color, regional affiliation, and family background contributed to the differences in her grandparents' expectations of what purpose their marriage might serve and what roles each partner might fulfill—even as they both identified with the ideals of the New Negro and the goal of racial uplift. The ultimately tragic end to their union points to the difficulty of negotiating public expectations in private relationships.

In her recognition of marriage as both a public institution and a site of private desires, Curwood relates the complex history of those who aimed to find personal happiness while recognizing the broader political implications of their relationships. In addition to her contribution to understandings of New Negro unions of the interwar era, Curwood's attention to the often uneasy relationships between the personal and the political, the private and the public, and the projected ideal and the lived reality provides an important understanding

of the many influences shaping intimate relationships and married life more broadly.

KAREN DUNAK
Muskingum University

REBECCA T. ALPERT. *Out of Left Field: Jews and Black Baseball*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. ix, 236. \$27.95.

Sports seem to tempt historians of other topics: after spending years writing about their so-called real subjects, some personal anecdote or manic fandom leads them to craft a history that uses sport as a window into something that they hope is of larger significance. For Rebecca T. Alpert, it was her mother's use of Jackie Robinson as a morality tale—which, she writes, "shaped my values as an American Jew" (p. 1)—that led her to write about the relationship between Jews and black baseball in the Jim Crow era. For the Brooklyn-born Alpert, Robinson, who lived in a Jewish neighborhood in Brooklyn, comes across as something of a Jewish folk hero. His wife, Rachel Robinson, learned to cook from neighbor Belle Malin, and close friends Sarah and Arch Satlow received a Christmas tree from the Robinsons who, knowing little about Jewish traditions, thought the couple did not have one because they could not afford it (p. 173).

Thus, Alpert quickly (and rightly) acknowledges in her introduction that Robinson's meaning in the Jewish imagination is far different from its acknowledged limitations in black reality. This book, then, is firmly rooted as a study of the connections among race, religion, and baseball in the first half of the twentieth century in the United States. Alpert's work includes substantial thought and research on the socio-economic roles of Jewish businessmen, activists, and an entire team of black Jews—the Belleville Grays—in the period of the Negro Leagues. Beyond the range of charming stories that she has unearthed, she offers excellent insights into how Jewish involvement in these leagues often perpetuated stereotypes, as Jewish owners and promoters, especially Ed Gottlieb, Syd Pollock, and Abe Saperstein (perhaps better known for founding the Harlem Globetrotters), were personified as the Shylocks of baseball, greedy and money-grubbing, as they executed their careful and successful business plans. However, she also contends that these figures applied Jewish beliefs of social equity to this arena, as well as capitalized on their financial resources in order to grow the black baseball industry within the national culture of oppressive segregation.

Alpert argues that Jews, while certainly whiter and more privileged than their African American counterparts in baseball, had a special understanding of discrimination that allowed them to play an instrumental role in both elevating the Negro Leagues and in helping desegregate the national pastime. Acknowledging that many criticized owners such as Pollock, who often emphasized black players' comedic and entertainment roles in various stereotypical—and racist—forms, she

also highlights the role of Jewish sportswriters, particularly Nat Low, Bill Mardo, and Lester Rodney of the communist *The Daily Worker*, in the quest for desegregation, complicating the more familiar stories of Branch Rickey's "great experiment" and the work of black journalists such as Sam Lacy and Wendell Smith.

To her credit, Alpert understands the tensions embedded in this precarious situation. Just as Pollack, Gottlieb, and Saperstein endured antisemitic slurs, and were accused—often rightly, and by journalists such as Smith—of caring only about financial self-interest, they employed language such as *shvartsers* (a Yiddish racial slur) to describe their black partners and players, as well as played up the vaudeville/minstrel element to encourage attendance. Alpert's descriptions of Pollack's "clown" teams, especially, do little to further the argument that these business dealings were embedded with the Jewish quest for social justice that she describes.

Alongside Adrian Burgos, Jr.'s *Playing America's Game: Baseball, Latinos, and the Color Line* (2007), which offers a more persuasive and substantial view on the desegregation of baseball in the United States, Alpert makes a contribution here that shakes up the Robinson/Rickey mythologies but still falls short of her stated objective to "understand Jewish efforts at social justice in a business that was defined and constricted by the black-white racial divide" (p. 34). In the end, she is unable to substantiate how the three figures on whom she focuses—Pollack, Saperstein, Gottlieb—had the grand impact she seems to think they did, and the degree to which they consciously connected their business in the black leagues to their religious beliefs remains particularly murky. Perhaps most telling is the significance she attributes to her beloved Robinson cultivating a relationship with Hank Greenberg. Both players refer to their brief conversation during a game in 1947 in their respective autobiographies, and Wendell Smith wrote about it. But while Alpert acknowledges that "the reality was much more complex," she declares that "the memory of this one encounter between Robinson and Greenberg remained central to the myth of black-Jewish relationships as seen through the lens of baseball" (p. 171), a statement that brings her book back to its initial starting point—her mother's Robinson fable—and makes one wonder how significant any of this might actually be.

AMY BASS
College of New Rochelle

WILLIAM J. MELLO. *New York Longshoremen: Class and Power on the Docks*. Foreword by RICHARD GREENWALD and TIMOTHY J. MINCHIN. (Working in the Americas.) Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 2010. Pp. xiv, 241. \$65.00.

Dock workers have historically played a strategic role in labor movements centered in major U.S. ports. William J. Mello correctly identifies the port of New York as the most significant of these from the 1930s through

the 1960s. His aim is to highlight two key issues for longshoremen in this port during this era: the postwar political limits imposed on labor, both formal and informal, that held their movement back; and how the struggle for control on the job had broader meaning because employment was a "right of citizenship" and therefore inherently a political, not just economic, issue.

The book provides a useful but quite limited narrative of labor relations within the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA). It is not a trade union history in the organizational sense, but more a history of work and social movements within the ILA and on the docks. The book extends from the era of corrupt leadership under Joseph P. Ryan in the 1930s and 1940s through the business union style of Thomas "Teddy" Gleason in the 1960s. Corruption on the docks, including organized crime figures in local leadership like Albert Anastasia and his relatives, characterized the Ryan era. The violence against rank-and-file leaders and workers was resisted by an initial left-wing, Communist Party (CP) oriented movement that had a substantial following. Mello does not view the left-wing leadership as dominated by the Communist Party, however, but sees it as relatively independent. This is a view that many labor historians have put forward, but it would have been useful if Mello had cited other relevant secondary labor history sources to add weight to his argument.

In the postwar era this movement within the ILA collapsed with the rise of McCarthyism on the docks and the blacklisting of leftist activists. But the situation with the ILA differed dramatically from its union counterpart on the West Coast, the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) centered in San Francisco under the leadership of Harry Bridges. McCarthyite attacks on the ILWU focused on Bridges's alleged Communist Party and CPUSA influence within the ILA. The ILA, however, was targeted because of the tactical alliance between leftwing activists on the New York docks and rightwing local leadership that was connected to corrupt activities but at war with the ILA's top leaders, particularly Ryan. The left in the ILA, without real power at the top of the union, became a far easier target, with job exclusion of suspected communists reinforced by a shift toward registration for hiring purposes in line with Taft-Hartley anticommunist provisions. On the West Coast, the ILWU had driven out the ILA in the 1930s, and with it corrupt, gangster-linked leaders connected to Ryan's East Coast operation. The ILWU had no need for such tactical alliances in Pacific ports, while the Left had a strong position in union leadership. The ILWU maintained control over hiring on Pacific Coast docks, while on the East Coast the ILA lost its influence over hiring through the new government-run Waterfront Commission.

The ILA's reputation for corruption and gangster violence has been a theme in American popular culture (in movies such as *On the Waterfront* [1954]). However, Mello seeks to go beyond this stereotype by focusing as

much on the intrusion of anti-union political forces in government who were supported by the employers as on the ILA leadership's criminal side. The use of government injunctions preventing strikes created an unlikely alliance of left-wing rank-and-file leaders and emerging anticommunist rank-and-file leaders that had some organized crime connections. This realist strategy is reminiscent of later reform movements in the 1970s and 1980s, such as in the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, that played corrupt leaders against each other.

The book presents a detailed narrative on contract negotiations, the use of injunctions when negotiations broke down, and the resulting strikes and work stoppages. Much of the fight on the union side involved the development of rank-and-file movements as an alternative to ILA officers who were viewed as compromising or selling out workers' interests. Leadership challenges form a major part of the book.

Wage rise disputes were always major issues, but Mello highlights the growing importance of job control in an industry where the shape up (temporary hiring of work gangs) was being transformed into a more permanent hiring system under government regulation and the control of the Bi-State Waterfront Commission. The Waterfront Commission sought to eliminate criminal infiltration of the ILA, but it also weakened workers' influence on waterfront jobs. This helped forge a level of unity within the ILA, as the Waterfront Commission was viewed as aiding New York Port employers and politicians who wanted a more malleable union. Job control included the issue of job preservation, which gave rise to the Guaranteed Annual Income (GAI) on the East Coast docks.

By the 1950s, the high level of strikes on the New York Port docks, which had spread to many East Coast and southern ports organized by the ILA, led the federal government under Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and finally Lyndon B. Johnson to initiate injunctions under the Taft-Hartley Act and to view these strikes as a danger to "the health and safety of the nation." Union locals and rank-and-file ILA members resisted the ILA leaderships' moves to trade the GAI and higher wages for fewer men on work gangs and a consequent steep decline in jobs.

The book does not mention Colin J. Davis's significant study *Waterfront Revolts: New York and London Dockworkers, 1946–61* (2003). While Davis provides substantial material on African American dockworkers in New York, Mello hardly mentions them. Mello also appears to have done no archival research for his book, although there is a list of published government reports. Several interviews were conducted but these are not listed in the bibliography, only in the notes. Most of the primary source evidence comes from the *New York Times* and from rank-and-file ILA newspapers.

This book is a useful reference on key issues in industrial relations on the New York Port docks, as well as details from ILA local leadership battles, contract negotiations, and work stoppages when negotiations

broke down. To go further, however, would have required far more substantial primary source research on this very important part of U.S. labor history.

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ALEXANDER J. FIELD. *A Great Leap Forward: 1930s Depression and U.S. Economic Growth*. (Yale Series in Economic and Financial History.) New Haven: Yale University Press. 2011. Pp. ix, 387. \$45.00.

Modern economic history, with its emphasis on rigorous quantitative methods, has moved almost entirely out of history departments into economics departments. The primary challenge for the cliometrician writing a book is to set aside the scientific prose and methodological focus that characterize the *Journal of Economic History* and to craft instead a compelling narrative or at least an arresting analysis. In this book, beginning with its provocatively Maoist title, Alexander J. Field offers the latter. He argues that the Great Depression years of the 1930s—not the war years of the 1940s—provided the necessary foundation for the post-war boom. Furthermore, he contends that the apparently stagnant years of the Depression were the "most technologically progressive decade of the century" (p. 15).

Field's argument rests on measuring total factor productivity (TFP). When economic outputs and inputs are accounted for, and inputs remain unchanged but output goes up, the increase can be attributed to TFP because of innovation and technological improvement. Field explains that from 1929 to 1941, total hours worked in the U.S. private non-farm economy stayed basically the same. Although capital input had declined, output was from thirty-three to forty percent higher. Field identifies this change as an indication of improvement in TFP. Field writes, "this empirical observation is one of the key findings of the book" (p. 7).

Field goes on to explain that it was activity during the Depression, not World War II, that caused major productivity gains. The war saw as many spillovers from civilian to military expertise as the other way around; moreover, the shift of workers and equipment into military production retarded growth in overall productivity. By contrast, microeconomic evidence suggests that the 1930s were characterized by considerable innovation and investment. During the fallow years of the Depression, firms plowed money into research and development, doubling such expenditures. Reaping benefits from the transition to electrification, advances in chemistry, new factory layouts, and the use of conveyer belts, U.S. factories became more productive. Communications and transportation infrastructure grew, with special emphasis on roads, tunnels, bridges, and other accommodations for automotive traffic. Street and highway capital in the United States increased by two-thirds between 1929 and 1948; almost all of the increase came before the war. Field notes that "by 1941 . . . the network of national routes that remains with us to this

day, although subsequently expanded and paralleled by the interstate system, was essentially complete" (p. 78). Road-building during the Depression (much of it by the Works Progress Administration) made possible the postwar boom in suburbanization as automotive travel and trucking expanded.

World War II, if anything, disrupted the pattern of expansion in place during the preceding decade; "progression toward full employment" was well under way by 1941, and "without the disruptions of the war" the levels of productivity reached in 1948 might have been reached in 1942 (p. 99). For a quarter-century after the war—"the golden age"—the U.S. economy reaped the benefits of increased productivity, including its new transportation network. The practices of "piggy-backing"—putting the cargo portion of a tractor-trailer on a rail car—and containerization linked road and rail networks. Integrated transport networks knit the nation together and made the economy more efficient overall. This golden age concluded by 1973. Field cautiously writes that, while many factors may have played a role, the end of the era of growth "coincides with a tapering off of gains from a one-time reconfiguration of the surface freight system in the United States" (p. 115).

Field's analysis of the Depression accords with the view that massive shocks to demand, originating in the financial sector, created the crisis. Discussing in passing the contrary notion that Herbert Hoover's efforts to prop up wages and Franklin D. Roosevelt's efforts to do likewise, as well as encourage unionization, were what made the Depression unendurable, Field remarks, "high rates of unionization and strong real wage growth coexisted with employment growth and a decent capacity utilization during the golden age" (p. 323, n. 23).

Considering our current plight in light of the 1930s, Field writes that the financial crises of the two eras have some similarities, both owing to the underregulation of banks and bank-like firms: "a failure to control, or really to be interested in controlling, the growth of leverage" (p. 257). He argues that financial reform in the 1930s "laid the groundwork for the resumption of a relatively smooth process of physical capital accumulation," and that if we wish to come out of the current unpleasantness on a similarly sure footing, it will require a similarly adequate regulatory response (p. 276).

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JAMES T. SPARROW. *Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. 336. \$34.95.

Scholars have often complained that American historiography has been narrowly defined by three topics: the American Revolution, the Civil War, and World War II. The last has captured modern attention, perceived as the "good war" and attended by the emergence of the United States as a world power and the roots of the subsequent "Cold War." After an initial

flood of reminiscences, official histories, and biographies through the 1970s, a period of revisionism occurred as part of the Vietnam "culture wars." More recently has come a mature and almost celebratory historical reconsideration of the "Greatest Generation." While there has been continuous and healthy attention to the "home front" during the 1941–1945 period, increasingly the theoretical focus has derived from the social sciences.

The forces and events of World War II that bore on different groups of Americans have received the attention of specialists and advocates for those groups: African Americans, women, labor, farmers, immigrants, and the poor. Their research has its origins in the official histories sponsored by the armed services at the behest of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. As additional documentary materials have become available and the analytical methodologies of the social sciences have developed, significant revisions have been made to the official histories of different ethnic and class groups. There has been an effort to generalize the disparate experiences of World War II through an analysis of the state, perceptions of the state by American citizens, and how the war changed citizen and state relationships. James T. Sparrow's new study operates in this arena.

Sparrow's work is informed by the writings of Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault on the formation of the state and the concept of the public sphere. He argues that the war provided an opportunity for the Roosevelt administration to overcome "the traditions of individualism and decentralized government that had conspired to thwart a centralized national state" (p. 8). The transition of the government from the New Deal to the war offered a transformative opportunity. From this Roosevelt's "task then was to obscure the statist foundations of public power while insinuating them into the thoughts and lives of the citizenry" (p. 49). While previous wartime expansions of government, in 1861–1865 and 1917–1919, had been temporary, this expansion was to be permanent. The mobilization and indoctrination of sixteen million servicemen and women and of home front war production workers assured the government's ability to condition the American people to a larger public sphere and state. While there certainly may have been New Dealers in the administration who indulged this perspective, it is doubtful that it, rather than winning the war and building a stable postwar peace, was Roosevelt's objective.

This book is a new rendering of Sparrow's doctoral dissertation and retains some of the characteristics of the latter. It has been enhanced with well-chosen photographs to emphasize specific conclusions. There are 839 dense end notes for the 260 pages of narrative. Some of the writing is mildly orotund, with some sentences running over sixty words. The source materials include a series of "morale" surveys conducted by the Office of War Information, including interpretations of volunteer "Morale Wardens." Sparrow also uses other sources of the "thoughts" of soldiers, workers, and

other Americans garnered by similar means. Whether these can be viewed as definitive of any political formulation is doubtful. Of the officers of the Roosevelt administration, Sparrow relies heavily on Henry Morgenthau at the Treasury Department and Harold Ickes at the Department of the Interior; neither seems to be particularly reliable on the subject of the president's wartime policies.

By the end of the war the American people—and more importantly, the electorate—had been converted to supporters of the new enlarged and dominant central government. Wartime tax exactions accustomed Americans to a large-scale government budget and to government presence through an expanding array of expectations and entitlements. While there was a brief return to a smaller federal government in 1946–1949, Korea and the Cold War revived the wartime “public sphere”—one that persisted through American involvement in Vietnam and the rise of Ronald Reagan.

Sparrow provides us with new insight into the revisionist history of World War II. He is perceptive in emphasizing the active role of President Roosevelt in setting policy and pursuing it through public pronouncements, fiscal policy, and publicity. At the same moment, the book seems a bit uncertain in the larger context of the diplomatic, industrial, and military efforts of the war. The notion that the government intended to use the war to build a new state also seems problematic. Certainly, as Alan Brinkley emphasized, it was the end of New Deal reform.

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MELISSA A. MCEUEN. *Making War, Making Women: Femininity and Duty on the American Home Front, 1941–1945*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 270. Cloth \$69.95, paper \$24.95.

During the past decade, popular histories such as Emily Yellin's accessible *Our Mothers' War: American Women at Home and at the Front during World War II* (2004) have contributed to broad understandings of American women's varied experiences of wartime mobilization. Public fascination with the rapid changes and continuities in American life immediately preceding, during, and following World War II remains palpable in commemorations such as the recent observation of the seventieth anniversary of the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor and the U.S. declaration of war. Into this familiar landscape of remembrance arrives Melissa A. McEuen's new monograph.

McEuen's cultural history draws heavily on wartime propaganda posters, publicity photographs, and mass-circulated advertisements. It builds on the insights of an earlier generation of scholars—among them Robert Westbrook and Leila J. Rupp—to establish the centrality of gendered and racial constructs of what many Americans apparently were fighting for in the 1940s: a homogenizing amalgam of what McEuen refers to as “cheesecake” values. Throughout the war, she argues,

“If keeping morale high seemed the ultimate priority on the American home front, then women's bodies would be put into service of the goal. And women everywhere would confront messages exhorting them to expend personal energy on their physical appearance for the nation's sake and their own” (p. 57).

Her study of prescriptive literature arising out of wartime crisis and mobilization—largely through analysis of the U.S. Office of War Information's exhortations and consumer ads in publications such as *LIFE* and *Ladies' Home Journal*—is literally and figuratively focused on women's physical attributes. She offers a feminist framework for exploring why many wartime women, especially those in their twenties and thirties, responded enthusiastically to prescriptive advice to create bodies that conformed to Hollywood ideals: “[T]hey needed to make themselves into something worth fighting for. If they did, their efforts would be noticed, therefore qualifying them as good citizens and team players” (p. 2). Here is a history of cultural possibilities, limitations, and artifice, which did not yield uniform responses from American women but nevertheless exerted powerful influences on the style and substance of their wartime lives.

The book is full of fascinating images, and the author's background as an historian of photography strengthens the work. Her eye for detail is apparent in discussions, for example, of Betty Grable, whose famed pin-up was just one suggestive element of the place of women's bodies in a militarizing nation. McEuen shows how U.S. Army instructors superimposed a grid over an image of the actress “to teach American soldiers map-reading . . . perhaps the most literal example of the official use of a woman's points, lines, and surfaces” (p. 134). Images with erotic appeal juxtaposed uneasily with wholesome girl-next-door portrayals in mass-produced photographs, illustrations, and advertisements that carried idealized messages to a mobile citizenry both at home and abroad.

As scholarship built primarily on sources produced in wartime, this book could have been strengthened with greater attention to chronology and narrative. The work is organized topically, with chapters devoted to women's cosmetics, the fetishization of female hands and legs, and wartime emphases on hygiene and clothing. But because of the book's organizational scheme, interpretive discussions of, for example, minority women's experiences with workplace discrimination are buried in lengthy considerations of personal appearance and consumerism. Fortunately, a more narrative arc appears near the end of the book, with a concluding chapter and epilogue that depart from the work's overall focus on physicality. These final pages probe the ways in which American wartime and immediate postwar culture prescribed altered sets of expectations for women's intellect and emotions, while carrying over themes of sacrifice and “agreeability.” Attention to these themes permits the author to conclude the book with some of its most provocative images, including analyses of

1940s-era American women as mothers and workers, lovers and revelers.

One of the questions that the author raises—but does not satisfactorily answer—is how feminist historians might respond to the present-day ubiquity of the term “the Greatest Generation.” McEuen seems to favor a broad-swath approach, suggesting, for example, that all American women of the 1940s participated in “the Greatest Generation.” But as the varied images in this work attest, some women, and some images of womanhood, were much more visible than others. Not everyone embraced dominant wartime cultural values of nationalism and patriotism. Thus for interpreters of that fascinating and complicated era, a challenging task remains: to read and understand documentary evidence that exists in places less prominent than those of the most highly touted visual images.

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KENNETH OSGOOD and ANDREW K. FRANK, editors. *Selling War in a Media Age: The Presidency and Public Opinion in the American Century*. Afterword by DAVID HALBERSTAM. (The Alan B. Larkin Series on the American Presidency.) Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 2010. Pp. xii, 278. \$44.95.

The book under review is a useful and timely volume that developed from the 2007 Alan B. Larkin Symposium on the American Presidency. The editors, Kenneth Osgood and Andrew K. Frank, present eleven meaty essays by an all-star cast of authors that includes seven former presidents of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations and final remarks by David Halberstam, who died soon after the symposium. Osgood and Frank should be commended for offering readers both a solid introduction and conclusion, which, to some degree, make up for the lack of an index and bibliography.

Spanning the period from the presidency of William McKinley to that of George W. Bush, only a few of the essays are based on archival research. But considering their originality and intellectual breadth, this does not represent a shortcoming. Andrew L. Johns sets the stage admirably, discussing how the concept of the “salesman in chief” (p. 1) developed in the period before McKinley and the problems of dealing with multiple audiences at home and abroad, and he worries about the lack of truthfulness in some presidents’ mas-saging of the facts.

The modern era began with McKinley, the first president who made managing the press a central feature in launching a war and battling for Americans’ hearts and minds. George C. Herring, while admiring McKinley’s skill, is distressed because “he established unfortunate precedents that would be employed time and again by his successors to defend dubious ventures” (p. 44). Woodrow Wilson certainly followed those precedents during World War I, armed with technological innovations such as motion pictures. In her essay, Emily S. Rosen-

berg explores his administration’s attempts at mass persuasion, censorship, and curbing dissent in a new “public relations state” (p. 63).

A generation later, Franklin D. Roosevelt availed himself of an even wider variety of innovations, including radio and “talkies,” first to move Americans toward intervention and then to support his strategies for the prosecution of World War II and the peace to follow. Mark A. Stoler explains how domestic politics influenced the way the president approached his public relations problems, sometimes compelling him to employ “duplicity” (p. 87) in his direction of the propaganda campaigns at home. Here the author reinforces the powerful argument made by Eric Alterman in *When Presidents Lie: A History of Official Deception and Its Consequences* (2004), which condemns such duplicity because of the impact it had on Americans’ understanding of international realities during the Cold War.

Robert D. Schulzinger complements this argument with his analysis of themes in major presidential speeches on the Cold War from 1947 to 1969. Here we see some development over time from hard-line depictions of the “enemy” to more nuanced approaches that held out the hope for accommodation. These new approaches were responses, in part, to the fact that the simple good and evil images no longer impressed Americans fearful about nuclear war.

Marilyn B. Young sees the consensus breaking down even earlier in her essay on the Korean War entitled “Hard Sell.” For a variety of reasons, many Americans, including those fighting the war, could not be convinced that they needed to stay in Korea after it became clear that the military forces were deadlocked. But because those who opposed the war were not organized, little was learned by the time the United States intervened in another Asian civil war.

Writing about the war in Vietnam, Chester Pach concentrates on President Lyndon Johnson’s failed 1967 Progress Campaign to respond to growing television news criticism. He lost that “living room war” (p. 191) because there was no way he could contend with the ample evidence that there was no light at the end of the tunnel in that costly conflict. David Halberstam’s “Worm’s-Eye View” that concludes the volume is a compelling personal account of another side of Johnson’s selling job, the attempt to silence honest journalists who were just reporting what they saw in Vietnam.

It would have been helpful to have a piece on Nixon, the media, and Vietnam. Instead the scene shifts to Ronald Reagan and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a public relations battle won by the Great Communicator. Paul S. Boyer demonstrates how Reagan sold his SDI and beat the Nuclear Freeze movement at its own game by convincing Americans that his was the road to peace.

In the last substantive chapter, Lloyd Gardner presents a searing critique of George W. Bush’s campaign to sell the second Gulf War, employing a public relations firm to help his new Office of Strategic Information combat the “reality based community” (p. 238). His

successful but deceitful approach to rallying citizens, among many others, is what concerns Robert J. McMahon in his conclusion. As he looks over the previous essays, he wonders whether it is possible for American presidents to be honest with the American people in a democratic system in which politics never has stopped at the water's edge.

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RONALD H. LIMBAUGH. *Tungsten in Peace and War, 1918–1946*. Reno: University of Nevada Press. 2010. Pp. xiv, 284. \$44.95.

Global mineral supplies are back in the news as Chinese demand for everything from rare earths for cell phones to copper for electrification consumes more world supplies. In 2005, the Chinese government cut international exports of tungsten in order to feed growing domestic demand for the heavy metal. Chinese steel makers celebrated, but American tungsten consumers faced shortages and high prices.

As Ronald H. Limbaugh reminds us in this insightful book, Americans have long struggled with how best to guarantee access to the minerals critical for modern technological society. Limbaugh also provides a valuable historical analysis of the broader issue of American mineral resource supplies between the two world wars.

Tungsten is classed among the “heavy metals,” a term that today often inspires fears of poisoned groundwater and cancer clusters. However, for most of its relatively short history as an essential commodity, tungsten was renowned for its ability to make hard steel even harder. Tungsten has the highest melting point of any of the metallic elements, making it an ideal alloy for machine tool bits used to cut other metals. At the Paris Exposition of 1900, the American efficiency expert Frederick W. Taylor famously demonstrated the power of a steel machine tool bit alloyed with tungsten to cut softer steels at white-hot speed.

This so-called “high-speed steel” became an essential material for new military and aerospace technologies. During World War I, tungsten steel was used in heavy artillery barrels and shells, as well as in the tough armor plate needed to resist them. On a less bellicose front, after 1909 the General Electric Company replaced Thomas Edison's old carbon-alloy light bulb filament with a tungsten version that generated more light and less heat.

As tungsten increasingly came to be seen as a vital natural resource, Americans noted that the global geological lottery had not endowed all nations equally. Pure tungsten is never found in nature; indeed, the alacrity with which the metal bonds with other elements is partly why it works so well as an alloy. The most common tungsten minerals are wolframite and scheelite, large deposits of which are found in China, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Canada. The United States' own holdings are sizeable if not abundant, primarily confined to a

handful of deposits in Nevada, California, Montana, and Colorado.

The question of global tungsten distribution and trade is a key focus of Limbaugh's book. First during World War I, and with even greater urgency in World War II, Americans debated how best to insure a steady supply of tungsten for war and peace. Should the government take steps to spur domestic production, or was the key to seek reliable international supplies for import? Complex political, economic, and technological factors nearly guaranteed that no easy answer would emerge.

To gain detailed insights into the domestic industry, Limbaugh focuses on the history of the Nevada-Massachusetts Company, one of the largest tungsten mining operations in the nation. Under the skillful guidance of Charles H. Segerstrom, a California banker who early on recognized tungsten's potential, the Nevada-Massachusetts survived for nearly half a century. In the process, Segerstrom became as skilled at dealing with politicians in Washington, D.C., as he was in competing with his fellow tungsten producers, and he emerged as one of the leading spokesmen for the industry.

Segerstrom and his colleagues never forgot how World War I briefly pushed tungsten prices to record highs that subsequently collapsed when the war ended, devastating many of the smaller new tungsten producers in the process. The Americans blamed Chinese producers who flooded the market with cheap wolframite concentrates that sold at a third of the domestic price. Segerstrom and others urged Congress to adopt protective tariffs to nurture a domestic industry. In the long run, they argued, domestic mines could supply future American needs and would be less vulnerable to interruption by wars or the decisions of capricious foreign governments.

While this predominately Republican protectionist argument had some merit, Limbaugh rightly notes that it also “embodied the xenophobic nationalism” of the time and was “at times more emotional than rational” (p. 47). The progressive and mostly Democratic internationalists countered that the call for tariffs was self-serving and hypocritical. Restrictions on trade would lead to higher prices for domestic users of tungsten and possibly spark destructive trade wars. Internationalists argued that American access to tungsten and other critical minerals was best guaranteed by free trade. It did not matter whether tungsten came from China or Nevada, as long as supplies were adequate to keep the nation's economy and military strong.

While protectionists had some success in the interwar period, in the long run New Deal internationalists predominated. With the renewed shortages of World War II, the Roosevelt administration adopted a two-pronged approach of seeking international supplies while also providing generous support for domestic producers. By the war's end, earlier tungsten shortages had turned into embarrassing surpluses.

In a brief epilogue, Limbaugh notes that while the emotional appeal of the “buy American” argument con-

tinues to this day, the decline of domestic mining has made the internationalist approach the default victor. However, when new calls for protectionist measures emerge again for various metals, as they surely will, Limbaugh's fine history of tungsten should be required reading for all involved.

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SHANE J. MADDOCK. *Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2010. Pp. xvi, 392. \$35.00.

The literature on nuclear disarmament and arms control is dominated more by scholars of international relations, political science, and peace studies than by historians. When historians have discussed arms control policies they have usually done so in the context of the study of the broader foreign policy of a certain administration or administrations. The list of books dealing with the history of American (or other nations') disarmament and arms control policies is not impressive, and for that reason the publication of Shane J. Maddock's book seemed to be a welcome event. In a way it is, but there is also something disappointing about it.

The book's subject is the history of nuclear non-dissemination and the resultant Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. This could be a very important book, if only because it is the first of its kind. Unfortunately, the author allows his strong revisionist approach to the study of U.S. foreign policy to carry him too far. Maddock tells of the attempts by American administrations—ranging from that of Franklin D. Roosevelt to that of Richard Nixon—to curb and then limit the spread of nuclear knowledge and weapons. However, what historians and scholars of arms control would interpret as a wish to reduce the risk of nuclear catastrophe that might result from the unrestricted spread of nuclear weapons, Maddock interprets in the context of decolonization. Maddock views the American policy of nuclear non-dissemination as an act of discrimination and deprivation directed against weaker states, thus subjecting them to nuclear apartheid.

Maddock distinguishes between "three types of nuclear states": the five recognized nuclear states, the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact who had access to, but did not possess, nuclear weapons, "and a large class of non-nuclear states who renounced their right to go nuclear" (p. x). The last type is the one subjected to apartheid and colonization. So who were the states subjected to the kind of regime once experienced by black South Africans? Among others we can find Japan, Switzerland, Sweden, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. Furthermore, the United States did the best it could to prevent France and even Britain from going nuclear. Decolonization? Even the argument that NATO was actually a framework for having nuclear weapons by proxy ("nuclear sharing") is dubious. One can easily argue that, on the contrary, Washington's

promise to provide a nuclear umbrella to its allies was a subtle way of preventing them from developing their own nuclear weapons, while leaving the actual decision to use nuclear weapons solely in American hands.

The term "nuclear apartheid" was coined by an Indian diplomat (p. 1), a statement coloring the whole issue with strong political overtones. Obviously, the Indian diplomat used the phrase in order to justify his government's decision to go nuclear despite the NPT, justifying the move as a measure of decolonization. Did that make the United States colonialist? Only in the same way that depriving Britain in the late 1940s and early 1950s from getting information that could allow them to develop their own nuclear project makes the United States colonialist.

Why is it so important to dismiss the book's reference to apartheid and decolonization? First, because as an interpretive tool it is problematic for the reasons mentioned above. Second, because in relation to the history of nuclear nonproliferation the reference only obscures the real meaning of both the term "apartheid" and the historical process that resulted in the Non-proliferation Treaty.

The book does reflect the attempts made by consecutive American administrations to maintain American nuclear hegemony and later dominance. One can certainly question the motives of American presidents in making the decisions they did, and when read from this perspective, as a revisionist history of American nuclear non-proliferation, the book provides a meaningful contribution to the study of American foreign policy. The problem is that Maddock carries his revisionism a bit too far, and his dedication to the idea of nuclear apartheid brings him to misinterpret moves and actions. One example is his attack of FDR and Harry Truman for assuming that nuclear secrets could be contained for a long time. Maddock argues that the two presidents wasted "opportunities to conclude a nonproliferation agreement at a time when enforcement would have been less complicated and before the growth [of the] Cold War rivalry between Washington and Moscow made such a treaty much more difficult to negotiate" (p. 12). First, negotiating a nonproliferation treaty during World War II seems a utopian endeavor by any criteria. Second, the real obstacle to the signing of the NPT during the Cold War was not the state of American-Soviet relations; it was alliance politics, in both camps, that significantly slowed down the progress toward the treaty.

Another example is that Maddock sees no role for Harold Stassen within the Eisenhower administration. However, the documents deposited in Eisenhower's presidential library and in U.S. national archives tell us that Stassen, almost single-handedly with the support of Dwight D. Eisenhower, brought change to American nuclear policy and made progress on arms control possible.

Still, this is an important book because parts of the above-mentioned arguments fall into the category of historians' debates. And it is so also because the book

forces the reader to rethink some of the issues discussed, and, if used carefully, it is a valuable source on the study of American non-proliferation policy.

Lastly, it is unclear whose choice it was, but the book's notes and citations are rather sparse. Long discussions go on without placing a citation that would allow the reader to track the sources of the author's arguments. Notes are an integral part of good research, and it is a pity that they are often missing where they are needed most.

DAVID TAL
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NAOKO WAKE. *Private Practices: Harry Stack Sullivan, the Science of Homosexuality, and American Liberalism*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 263. \$55.00.

The current debate over civil rights for gays, lesbians, and transgendered individuals demonstrates how far we have come as a nation. Sexual issues once considered too provocative for open discourse are now discussed routinely on news programs and in our legislative bodies. "Homosexuality in the twenty-first-century United States is highly politicized," writes historian Naoko Wake. "No matter what stance we take, the issue is something that must be openly confronted and that must be checked against our belief in justice, fairness, and equality" (p. 1). In this sense, while same-sex desires and sexual acts, as well as gender performances and identities that deviate from cookie-cutter expressions of heteronormativity, are far from celebrated in contemporary American society, homosexuality is no longer the unspeakable. This, of course, was not always the case, and the professional and personal choices that contributed to the silencing of sexual nonconformity in the early to mid-twentieth century are the subject of Wake's volume.

In the 1920s and 1930s, the anxieties and pleasures of modernity, in tandem with the intellectual excitement generated by the emerging theory of cultural relativism, encouraged some scientists to pursue the study of sexuality. Many of these scientists, including biologists, psychiatrists, and anthropologists, embraced a far wider array of sexual desires and practices as "normal" than did larger society. They argued that institutionalized homophobia contributed to various neuroses and sociopathic behaviors in individuals, especially men, who might otherwise have been fully functioning citizens. The catch was that these scientists were stuck in a multidimensional closet. They could neither openly articulate their beliefs about homophobia nor claim their own subjectivities as gay men and lesbians. The result was that by the 1940s, privately "liberal" scientists had lost control of the issue, and homosexuality became labeled a mental illness with disastrous results for countless Americans ever since.

One of these scientists was psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan. Wake's six chapters trace the emergence of Sullivan's personal and professional views regarding

homosexuality, the standard treatment for schizophrenia and homosexuality at Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital where Sullivan began his career, his reasons for leaving to establish a private practice, his tenure as the director of the Selective Service during World War II, and his postwar involvement in international mental health policy. Throughout this analysis is an ongoing discussion of the tensions between Sullivan's personal beliefs as a gay man and his professional assertions regarding homosexuality. Wake reveals an important shift in the nation's intellectual climate between the 1920s and the late 1940s and places Sullivan at the center of it. Whereas scientists in the earlier period celebrated differences of opinion as well as differences in sexual practices, by the outbreak of World War II, there was no longer room for ambiguity in either. Sullivan found himself administering the same homophobic policies that he had long blamed for causing mental illness. By the time Sullivan died in 1949, "He was a homosexual man rejecting homosexuality," with dire consequences for himself, the scientific study of sexuality, and gays, lesbians, and transgendered individuals across the globe (p. 168).

There are two points of concern with Wake's analysis. First, Wake is a careful writer, selective in her words and terminology. However, her use of "liberalism" lacks this precision. She uses "liberalism" to indicate the acceptance of homosexuals and other marginalized groups as worthy of inclusion in the national body. "Conservatism" is the opposite of this. But these are loaded terms. Wake's failure to consistently connect them to broader political events (she writes about "liberalism" in the 1930s without any mention of the New Deal, for example) is frustrating to say the least. Second, Wake hesitates to pass judgment on Sullivan's insistence that his and his attendants' sexual intimacy with patients as part of their treatment had therapeutic value. While Wake acknowledges that these practices did raise eyebrows, not until the penultimate page does she explicitly state that these practices were "exploitation" (p. 217), not merely problematic. Wake's insistence on a cool objectivity in a book about the dangers of such an approach is baffling. Perhaps a discussion of the era's medical ethics regarding doctor-patient relationships would have been useful in this regard.

These critiques are not meant to detract from the larger significance of this volume. Wake is a meticulous researcher, and her analysis of patient records, especially the transcriptions of interviews, is careful, nuanced, and intelligent. This book makes important contributions to our understanding of the history of science, particularly the field of psychiatry, the intellectual histories of homophobia and racism, and the emergence of sexual citizenship in the mid-twentieth century. It is a must-read for scholars interested in any of these topics.

CAROLYN HERBST LEWIS
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MARTIN WOESSNER. *Heidegger in America*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 294. \$90.00.

Much ink has been devoted to the life and thought of Martin Heidegger; there was probably no more infamous and controversial philosopher in the twentieth century. Arising as a notable critic of neo-Kantianism, Heidegger pioneered a brand of phenomenology that challenged Kant's Copernican revolution and simultaneously captured the sense of crisis that was widespread in Weimar Germany. What circumstances made Heidegger's transatlantic migration to the United States possible? This is one of the central questions that Martin Woessner addresses in his magnificent book.

Richard Wolin wrote a trenchant study of Heidegger's students, but Woessner has taken significant steps further by focusing on indirect recipients of Heidegger's thought. The result is a fascinating work of transatlantic intellectual and cultural history that is sure to prompt intellectual historians to take the phenomenon of intellectual and cultural reception more seriously.

Woessner's book has two explicit goals. First, "it attempts to narrate the genesis, the rise, and in some cases at least, the eventual fall of certain ideas in certain historical contexts—in this case, the philosophical writings of Martin Heidegger as they were encountered by readers and thinkers in the United States." Second, the book provides "a case study in the application of reception studies to the history of ideas" (p. 5). In pursuit of both goals, Woessner provides his own readings of Heidegger's thought, demonstrating that Heidegger embodied many different things to many different people. Although Woessner playfully proposes that Heidegger can serve as a kind of blank page on which the intellectual historian of reception can read the history of postwar America, his methods do not result in a postmodern "death of the author." Instead, Woessner draws on the intellectual legacy of Pierre Bourdieu to identify specific networks of recipients who packaged and repackaged ideas to suit epistemological, political, aesthetic, and financial ambitions of their own. Among the numerous Heideggers constructed and reconstructed by his readers, Woessner presents a history of the U.S. audiences who fashioned Heidegger as, "among other things, an ontologist, an existentialist, an anti-humanist, a proto-postmodernist, a phenomenologist, a theologian, a reclusive sage, and even a cultural critic" (p. 7).

Woessner begins with an examination of Heidegger's first American interlocutors: his first American students (i.e., Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, Sidney Hook, and Marjorie Grene), as well as former German students who became exiles in America during the 1930s and 1940s (i.e., Hannah Arendt, Herbert Marcuse, Günther Anders, Paul Oskar Kristeller, Hans Loewald, Karl Löwith, and Leo Strauss). Both groups had complicated relationships with Heidegger. None functioned as disciples. Instead, they all found things to be admired and discarded in his philosophy. None ded-

icated themselves to commentaries or exegeses on Heideggerian philosophy, but they fruitfully borrowed concepts and methodologies that they then transmitted to Americans in ways that made the influence of Heidegger hard to detect—a trend that the reader sees repeated by other Americans in nearly every subsequent chapter.

The next series of chapters proceed beyond classroom and student/teacher relationships to situate receptions of Heidegger in a variety of postwar American settings. Although Heidegger abandoned organized religion at a young age, for example, his work took shape against the background of crisis theology. Thus, his first American academic audience was composed of theologians animated by a desire to come to grips with the lessons of World War II. Similar issues involving modern nihilism and the sense of technocratic homelessness inspired both those who marketed Heidegger as an intellectual commodity (i.e., J. Glenn Gray, the general editor for his English translated works), as well as those who consumed the commodity (general readers of existentialism, as well as architectural critics of modernism and proponents of architectural postmodernism). For philosophers, the engagement may have been more technical, but the results could be equally idiosyncratic and creative. Both his analytic detractors and his continental supporters constructed competing caricatures of Heidegger in efforts to conduct larger debates regarding the proper relationships among science, metaphysics, and philosophy. With so many competing versions of Heidegger and Heideggerian philosophy, it is little wonder that numerous participants in the cultural wars of the 1980s and 1990s paradoxically were able to see his legacy as both a cause and an antidote for modern nihilism.

A gifted stylist, and talented historian, Woessner has produced a major study of Heidegger's reception in the United States. In addition to being of interest to intellectual and cultural historians, the book is sure to be of interest to scholars in the numerous academic disciplines that constitute Woessner's reception history.

THOMAS WHEATLAND
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GRACE ELIZABETH HALE. *A Nation of Outsiders: How the White Middle Class Fell in Love with Rebellion in Postwar America*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 386. \$29.95.

Grace Elizabeth Hale's recent book does a masterful job tying together disparate strands of postwar U.S. history to demonstrate both how the white middle class fell in love with rebellion and the consequences of that love. Combining deep and thorough research with close readings of influential cultural artifacts from Elvis Presley's televised performances and Jack Kerouac's *On the Road* (1957) to Tom Hayden's *Student Social Action* (1962) and Jerry Falwell's autobiography, Hale builds her account on the recent profusion of historical scholarship on both left and right politics in the United

States. Her most valuable contribution is to combine cultural, social, and political historical narratives across genres and political divides.

Beginning with J. D. Salinger's new model for white adolescent identity in *The Catcher in the Rye* (1951)—an identity combining the alienated individual with the outsider community—Hale traces the evolution of a generational (and racialized and gendered) sense of alienation from and rebellion against mass culture that quickly became the mainstream culture. The new outsider had deep roots in Romantic and bohemian subcultures, but only in the postwar era did it form the basis for a nearly universal adolescent identity with the idea of self-expression at its core.

Rock 'n' roll provided the perfect vehicle for the expression of estrangement from parental culture. Hale emphasizes the historical impact of blackface minstrelsy in providing the model for white, middle-class kids' interaction with rock 'n' roll. Nicely synthesizing scholarly interpretations of minstrelsy and the blues, she demonstrates how black music and blackface performance brought images of transformation and transcendence into rock 'n' roll. Hale argues that race—as received through blackface minstrelsy—was central to the new outsider culture, from Elvis to the Beats to the folk music revival that valorized a kind of performed authenticity as a vehicle for personal transformation. The outsider stance had no stable political direction, appealing equally to conservative rebels who followed William F. Buckley, Jr., civil rights workers, Students for a Democratic Society members, or Hunter S. Thompson whose brand of libertarianism “exemplified how the romance of the outsider produced an ambiguous politics” (p. 134).

After demonstrating the complex mixture of ideas and sensibilities that made up the outsider desire for transformation and transcendence, Hale, in her most original contribution, shows the outsider in action. Her chapter on the origins of the New Left places love and a shared emotional bond encapsulated by the romance of the outsider at the center of the student movement's political rise. The concept of participatory democracy intellectually fused Albert Camus and C. Wright Mills, but it arose from a sense of deep alienation and a desire for psychological independence, cultural power, and a right to self-expression. Without slighting the political and intellectual contributions of the student rebellion, Hale emphasizes how the movement emerged from a desire for “feeling real” (p. 180).

White romanticism for the outsider provided the foundation for a new politics, but it also created an impossible contradiction, one that black power exposed. From Elvis's swiveling hips to Norman Mailer's “The White Negro” (1957) to Freedom Summer, whites had depended on African Americans to be the outsiders. The resulting objectifying identification with black Americans reached a kind of peak with the “revolutionary blackface” (p. 221) of such groups as the Weather Underground, who framed their desire for self-invention and community around “the symbolic power of

blackness” (p. 223). The resulting politics was a dead end, not only because of the limited appeal of violence, but because it gave no place for actual African Americans to participate as equals—they had to remain as outsiders to serve the symbolic needs of white middle-class Americans. By racializing the concept of “the real,” whites kept for themselves the “privilege of self-invention” (p. 236), ultimately creating a new type of minstrelsy.

The final section of the book documents how the New Right, possibly even more than the earlier groups, arose from an outsider sensibility combining a desire for personal transformation with estrangement from modern American culture. Following both the New Left and the hippie counterculture, the New Right focused on alienation as an organizing principle for a community of outsiders, building their own alternative institutions and setting out to take over the Republican Party. Hale takes us from the hippie Christians of the 1970s to the founding of the Moral Majority in 1979 to Randall Terry's Operation Rescue in the 1980s and demonstrates how abortion became the central issue that linked both personal transformation narratives and the radical reorganization of fundamentalism toward political engagement. Importantly, unlike earlier postwar rebel groups, fundamentalist Christians in the 1970s overwhelmingly came from working-class and lower middle-class communities; they derived their moral power from their sense of themselves as aggrieved and oppressed victims of mainstream American culture. By the end of this era, the outsider stance was available to anyone for individual self-fashioning or group identity.

DEWAR MACLEOD

William Paterson University

CARRIE PITZULO. *Bachelors and Bunnies: The Sexual Politics of Playboy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2011. Pp. ix, 240. \$25.00.

Launched by Hugh Hefner on a shoestring budget in late 1953, *Playboy* quickly established itself as America's leading men's magazine. The 70,000 copies of *Playboy*'s first issue flew off newsstands, its monthly circulation leaped to nearly a million a month by 1959, and the magazine reached a peak audience of seven million during the early 1970s. *Playboy*'s features on stylish consumerism set a tone of high-living in a world of hectic hedonism, but it was the magazine's erotic pin-ups and centerfolds that guaranteed its reputation for risqué license.

Playboy's centerfolds generated prodigious sales, but they also attracted a welter of criticism. For moral crusaders the magazine was a font of dissolute impiety, while many feminists berated *Playboy* for what they saw as its rank sexism and degrading objectification of women. Carrie Pitzulo presents a very different portrait of the magazine and its iconic creator. For Pitzulo, *Playboy* was more complex than its critics recognized. Re-evaluating the magazine's treatment of womanhood, feminism, masculinity, monogamy, and romance, Pit-

zulo argues that *Playboy's* sexual politics were decidedly liberal and progressive, and were "more pro-woman, even quasi-feminist, than previously acknowledged" (p. 7).

Tracing the winding path of *Playboy's* development, Pitzulo scrutinizes the magazine's constructions of gender and the way these were not only constituent of, but actively contributed to, profound shifts in American sexual identities. Pitzulo concedes that elements of chauvinism were clearly detectable in *Playboy* in its early years. The magazine, she argues, reflected a broader climate of anxiety about the reconfiguration of gender roles and their attendant power relations during the 1950s, with articles that "criticized modern womanhood as emasculating and lamented the downtrodden American male" (p. 23). Nevertheless, Pitzulo argues that *Playboy's* sexual politics were always ambivalent and conflicted. Despite elements of misogyny, she contends, the magazine was characterized by a subtle, budding attitude that "encouraged sexual autonomy, expression, and pleasure for men *and* for women" (p. 25). This attitude, moreover, became more pronounced during the 1960s and 1970s as, Pitzulo argues, *Playboy* embraced a more politicized and socially aware outlook, and helped pioneer more egalitarian forms of gender and sexual relations.

Pitzulo explores the evolution and cultural significance of *Playboy* through a series of thematically and chronologically arranged chapters. Beginning with an account of the magazine's early years, she shows how Hefner crafted an editorial package that went against the grain of conformism and sexual conservatism prevalent in the 1950s by espousing a credo of "urbanity, liberal politics, style, love of leisure, and lack of familial commitment" (p. 18). There was, however, a misogynistic edge to this sybaritic agenda. Pitzulo demonstrates how *Playboy's* eulogy to the good life was accompanied by a fixation with contemporary notions of "womanization," which not only belittled women but cast them as actively undermining American men's status and self-confidence. Nevertheless, Pitzulo emphasizes the magazine's contradictory relationship with femininity.

Alongside its chauvinism, Pitzulo argues, *Playboy* also offered women possibilities for empowerment—particularly (and perhaps somewhat paradoxically) in its pin-ups and centerfolds. While feminist critics have traditionally lambasted *Playboy* for representing women as exhibits laid out before an objectifying patriarchal gaze, Pitzulo offers a revisionist perspective, arguing that the magazine offered a relatively positive image of postwar feminine sexuality. *Playboy's* pin-ups, she argues, challenged prevailing mores which emphasized women's sexual passivity, and instead provided images that "made female sexuality a joyous and normal experience" (p. 39) and offered an avenue through which women might claim "an autonomous sexuality for themselves" (p. 70).

Reviewing *Playboy's* heyday during the 1960s and early 1970s, Pitzulo shows how the magazine positioned

itself as an arbiter of sophisticated masculine consumption. But alongside its rampant materialism, *Playboy* was also a standard-bearer for an array of liberal causes such as civil rights and the emerging drug culture. And, while Hefner and his magazine were reviled by leaders of the developing women's movement, Pitzulo highlights the way the magazine took an especially progressive stance on women's causes, donating large sums to abortion rights organizations and daycare centers, and financially backing the American Civil Liberties Union's work on women's rights. While hardly a "feminist" magazine, therefore, Pitzulo convincingly demonstrates the conflicts and contradictions central to the *Playboy* universe. She shows that Hefner "was not the 'pig' that many critics have made him out to be" (p. 149).

In making her case, Pitzulo marshals a formidable array of absorbing primary sources. Close textual analysis of *Playboy* itself is supplemented by original interviews with Hefner and assorted editorial staff, as well as fascinating "behind-the-scenes" memos and correspondence from the magazine's archive. Eloquent and rich in empirical detail, her study gives an enthralling account of the way *Playboy* both molded and mirrored shifts in American culture and sexual politics during the mid to late twentieth century. It is sure to appeal not only to social and cultural historians but to a wide general readership.

BILL OSGERBY

London Metropolitan University

ERIN HATTON. *The Temp Economy: From Kelly Girls to Permatemps in Postwar America*. Foreword by NELSON LICHTENSTEIN. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 2011. Pp. xvi, 212. \$26.95.

The employment of American workers on a temporary basis has increased steadily in the past few decades. In 2010, as businesses emerged from the "Great Recession," temporary positions accounted for a quarter of all new private-sector jobs; this development raises fundamental questions about the future workforce. Will temporary jobs become the main model of employment in the economy? Will workers eventually have no job benefits or job security? In this short, engaging book, Erin Hatton explores the rise and evolution of temporary employment in the United States since World War II. Her study shows how a handful of firms popularized the hiring of "temps" and also challenged the common assumption that loyal, full-time workers were assets to businesses.

This story begins in the 1950s, when employment agencies like Kelly Girl and Manpower established themselves as leaders in the fledgling "temp industry." Like "first movers" in American business history, these agencies were innovative and pragmatic. Operating within the cultural environment of the time, they sent out mostly white, middle-class women to take clerical jobs, which helped the agencies convince businesses that temps were "respectable" employees who only

needed a little extra money. By targeting the nation's clerical sector, the agencies minimized opposition from powerful trade unions, who had shown little interest in organizing "pink-collar" workers. To build their workforces, they promoted the benefits of temping in popular women's magazines like *Good Housekeeping* and *Ladies' Home Journal*.

In the 1970s, as the business world grew more competitive, the temp industry expanded into new areas of the economy. The industry's marketing campaigns now suggested that temps could replace any full-time workers, even the most highly skilled professionals. Through advertisements in business and trade journals, temp agencies portrayed full-time workers as costly burdens, especially those who had employer-sponsored health insurance. The agencies encouraged business leaders to replace such workers with "semi-permanent" employees, which they alone could provide.

The strategies paid off. By the 1980s, the temp industry had staffed a wide variety of work environments from gas stations and factories to hospitals and law offices. It now sent out some 400,000 workers a day, or more than twice as many as it did ten years earlier. Some companies had outsourced entire departments to temp agencies, and thus shed all responsibility for providing workers with health care coverage and other job benefits. As Hatton emphasizes, there was nothing natural or inevitable about the industry's success. It was the product of aggressive marketing strategies that tapped deeply seeded anxieties and desires in the business world. It also reflected the declining power of many trade unions, whose strength had been sapped by the movement of production facilities overseas.

The industry continued to expand throughout the late twentieth century. Between 1980 and 2000, the number of temp agencies in the United States more than doubled, rising to perhaps 10,000. Industry leaders became giant, multinational corporations in these years, and even the federal government turned many full-time jobs into temporary positions. Yet as Hatton's closing chapter explains, the industry's future was unclear. By the turn of the century, an eclectic group of activists had mounted aggressive campaigns to limit the industry's growth. As the activists pointed out, businesses could remain flexible and make higher profits without eliminating full-time jobs. For all its success, the industry currently only accounts for two percent of the nation's workforce, or roughly 2.3 million people.

Compared to many studies of contemporary workers, this book is relatively thin and limited in scope. As the introduction notes, it is not about the temp industry's impact on the national economy, or temporary workers themselves. Yet even within its carefully delineated confines, the book seems short. Hatton should have explained how it complements and extends major studies of work and employment practices. Her references to Karl Marx and Charles Babbage seem perfunctory and incomplete, and several other prominent figures who explored the degrading effects of industrial development are all together ignored. More surprising is the

lack of attention to leading studies of the advertising business. The temp industry, this book might have stressed, relied on time-tested strategies to augment its products. Of less importance is the author's tendency to repeat herself, and even repeat the words of advertisers.

Such criticisms aside, this is a valuable and interesting study. Even the most popular labor and business history textbooks ignore the relevance of temporary workers in modern times and the nefarious ways that firms have exploited temps. Anyone interested in the plight of American workers and modern employment practices should enjoy this book. It draws on a wide range of primary sources, including many industry publications, court cases, and government documents, and it is easy to read.

JAMES P. KRAFT
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PETER EISENSTADT. *Rochdale Village: Robert Moses, 6,000 Families, and New York City's Great Experiment in Integrated Housing*. (American Institutions and Society.) Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2010. Pp. xi, 323. \$35.00.

This study is ultimately a disheartening book for those who still believe in the value and feasibility of racial integration, but an important and worthwhile one nevertheless. Peter Eisenstadt, editor of *The Encyclopedia of New York State* (2005), makes a convincing case that Rochdale Village—which, when it opened in December 1963, was the largest housing cooperative in the world and possibly the largest integrated housing development in the United States—is a story that deserves to be rescued from obscurity. Located on the site of the shuttered Jamaica Racetrack in South Jamaica, Queens, the third-largest African American neighborhood in New York City, this cooperative housing development was home to nearly 5,900 families, roughly eighty percent of whom were white (overwhelmingly Jewish) and twenty percent of whom were black. Rochdale, Eisenstadt asserts, "was the perfect test case for integration, an integrated community with integrated schools, achieved (as many moderate organizations demanded) without busing, where (as some progressive and African American organizations insisted) black and white teachers lived and sent their children to school in the same community in which they taught" (p. 192).

There are reasons to quibble with this claim. South Jamaica had, by 1960, become increasingly poor, which enhanced the possibility that Rochdale's working- and middle-class residents would relocate if school quality declined or they felt their personal safety threatened. Residents were part of a limited equity cooperative in which they owned shares and could vote for project management but could not resell their apartments on the private market. Without deep roots in the new development or concerns about selling their homes at a loss, residents were able to move fairly easily. By the early 1970s, white families began departing in substan-

tial numbers, along with a smaller number of black families, and this experiment in integration evolved rather rapidly into “a stable, relatively inexpensive home for the upwardly mobile black middle class”—itself a valuable thing (p. 221).

The early part of the book explores the genesis of Rochdale as an unlikely collaboration between Abraham Kazan, the “utopian” head of the United Housing Foundation, which became the largest builder of co-operative housing in New York City, and the “anti-utopian” Robert Moses. The Rochdale project did not follow “the power broker’s” familiar script: it involved no human relocations (only horses from the racetrack), and Moses, at this point “a lion in winter,” held this project dear as “an answer to the many critics who charged him with being indifferent to civil rights and minority aspirations” (pp. 34–35). (Notably, Robert Caro does not mention Rochdale Village in his massive biography of Moses.)

Largely legitimate concerns with school safety and quality, as well as rising rates of crime, fueled the white exodus from Rochdale. Ironically, although Rochdale Village was created by a consortium of unions, many conflicts there revolved around the actions of organized labor, including protests over the lack of minorities hired to construct the development, an explosive strike by Rochdale’s security guards and maintenance personnel in 1978, and—most significantly—the 1968 strike by the United Federation of Teachers that pitted supporters of the largely Jewish teachers union against backers of minority communities who demanded greater control over local schools. The strike sparked escalating and enduring racial tensions throughout the five boroughs.

Eisenstadt is no disinterested chronicler of Rochdale Village, having lived there from 1964 (when he was ten) to 1973. His personal anecdotes enliven the historical narrative, and there is no indication that his account is slanted because of his personal involvement. Though for the most part well written, the book occasionally switches awkwardly from a serious tone to a conversational one and back again. Eisenstadt might have abbreviated some of the discussion of Kazan and Moses’s unlikely partnership and augmented his analysis of the broader lessons of this saga (though perhaps I am falling into the reviewer’s trap of asking why he did not write the book I would have written). One of the most insightful passages ponders the “blessing” and the “curse” of Rochdale’s opening in the 1960s, “the decade of both racial possibility and rage,” when hopes for racial harmony scraped against widespread concerns with growing crime and disorder. There are, of course, no definitive answers as to whether an earlier or later opening of Rochdale Village might have resulted in more durable integration. Whatever the case, Eisenstadt has performed a service to scholars of race, housing, and New York City by shedding light on this understudied case.

CHRISTOPHER BONASTIA
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City University of New York

DAYO F. GORE. *Radicalism at the Crossroads: African American Women Activists in the Cold War*. New York: New York University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 231. \$39.00.

ERIK S. MCDUFFIE. *Sojourning for Freedom: Black Women, American Communism, and the Making of Black Left Feminism*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 311. Cloth \$84.95, paper \$23.95.

The histories of the domestic Cold War and the twentieth-century African American freedom struggle have both been undergoing dramatic revision in recent years. Scholars of post-World War II politics and society have increasingly substituted a focus on contradiction and undercurrents of change for the traditional emphasis on consensus and conformity, while historians of race and reform have traced the contours of a “long civil rights movement” that reaches back to the prewar years and encompasses new groups and individuals. Further, a prodigious and influential scholarship examining the relationship between anticommunism and civil rights activism has directed attention to the racial foundations of postwar American politics. But, with few exceptions, that work has remained focused on the words and deeds of men, replicating political history’s longstanding presumption that American politics is gendered male.

Dayo F. Gore and Erik S. McDuffie both restore African American women to their rightful place within the radical black activist tradition. Gore explores the efforts of a network of women who worked within a communist milieu, mostly in Harlem, during the early Cold War years when some scholars have argued that McCarthyism had decimated the Left in general and the black Left in particular. McDuffie’s chronological focus is broader, encompassing the activism of black left feminists (using literary scholar Mary Helen Washington’s terminology) during the span of the Old Left, but many of these women make appearances in both texts. Despite these distinct periodizations, these books, both of which originated as dissertations within the New York University history department, share a basic concern to assert the significance of radical black women’s mid-century theorizing and activism. Their interventions and arguments are markedly parallel.

McDuffie and Gore both emphasize that their subjects refigured Marxist-Leninist theory through their lived experiences as black women to create a radical tradition that transcended the intentions and beliefs of Communist Party (CP) officials. Women such as Grace P. Campbell and Esther Cooper Jackson (for McDuffie) and Marvel Cooke and Vicki Garvin (for Gore) worked within the CP, in communist-affiliated or-supported groups such as the Harlem Tenants League and the National Negro Labor Council, and in broader coalitional formations such as the Cold War-era Sojourners for Truth and Justice, to foster black women’s survival and empowerment, to build their participation within radical movements, and to convince their male comrades of the significance of black women

as a revolutionary force. Both authors argue that black women in the communist orbit originated theories that integrated gender, race, and class as analytic categories long before women of color theorists made "intersectionality" a watchword in the late twentieth century. This is an argument that has also been advanced by Carole Boyce Davies, biographer of Claudia Jones; but while Gore and McDuffie both acknowledge Jones's contributions to Marxist theory, they insist that she must be placed within a broader community of radical black women who developed these ideas together, in their organizing as well as their writing.

Beyond the similarity of this central argument, the books share several other concerns and insights. Both authors investigate the ways that travel shaped their subjects' worldview and political orientation. In particular, McDuffie emphasizes that their journeys to the Soviet Union convinced a number of black women to join the CP, and he argues convincingly that, especially in the early years, their admiration for Soviet women's relative freedom made these sojourns a gendered experience, part of the production of a "black women's international" that fostered transnational identifications and collaborations. Both authors take issue with interpretations of black women's civil rights activism that frame them as simply behind-the-scenes grassroots activists or so-called "bridge leaders" and suggest that the communist milieu created some opportunities for women's formal leadership, even as they were also often limited by sexism and racism within the party. Finally, McDuffie and Gore both emphasize that radical black women influenced the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, tracing the ways that their ideas anticipated later feminist theorizing and outlining their direct support for such movements, for example, as participants in the "Free Angela Davis" campaign and as staff and contributors for *Freedomways* magazine.

Nonetheless, there are some significant differences in focus and interpretation. Most obviously, McDuffie's broader time span permits him to account for changes in black women's experience within the CP as the party's relationship to the American political scene shifted, while also demonstrating that they usually functioned as "outsiders within" the Left. Following about a dozen women as they moved into and sometimes out of the CP, he highlights their contributions to radical organizing in the earliest years of the Workers' Party, the breadth of their involvement in Depression-era initiatives centered around Scottsboro and consumer organizing, and their efforts during the Popular Front era to defend black women workers, to elect communists to public office, and to create radical organizations that promoted serious attention to their particular concerns as black women. McDuffie's discussion of the Cold War era is particularly strong in its treatment of the Sojourners for Truth and Justice, an organization created by black left feminists within and outside the CP that asserted their leadership in the African American freedom struggle and forged bonds with both black South African women and anti-racist white women in the

United States. Throughout he succeeds in refuting the view, still current among some scholars, that black activists were "duped" by a CP that used them for its own ends.

McDuffie's most sustained argument, that black women on the Left collectively created a radical theory that specifically highlighted their "triple exploitation" and asserted black women's "vanguard center" role, is persuasive for the wartime and postwar years, but some readers might be less convinced that these theoretical interventions were present from the beginning. The necessarily speculative nature of McDuffie's discussion of early black left feminists' street corner speeches or participation in tenant organizations, for example, sustains his position that they found within the communist milieu a productive site for reorienting radicalism around their own needs. Nonetheless, his repeated insistence on their articulation of a specific theoretical intervention struck me as unsubstantiated and possibly ahistorical, too reflective of current formulations.

Gore's focus on a specific time period allows a more fine-grained and in-depth assessment of the vigor of radical black women's activism and the quality of their leadership during what has been presumed to be the nadir of the early Cold War. While McDuffie also notes that black left feminists did their "most sophisticated work" (p. 22) during the Cold War years, he contends that they were "largely crushed and sidetracked" (p. 162) by anticommunist repression. Not so, according to Gore, who provides a coherent and compelling portrait of the ways that the domestic Cold War actually provided openings that fostered radical black women's "central role in sustaining radical resistance" (p. 2). Internal conflicts within the CPUSA as well as the need for new leadership as communist men were persecuted or went underground created opportunities for radical black women to staff emerging groups, debate revolutionary theories, and organize around new issues. Gore details black women's debates with black men and white women over the nature of gender and racial oppression and highlights the ways in which they shaped the labor feminism of the 1950s. In one especially fascinating chapter, she examines black women radicals' extensive organizing in defense of Rosa Lee Ingram, who along with her two sons was sentenced to death for the murder of a white sharecropper. While Ingram's case was also taken up by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Civil Rights Congress, Gore shows that when these organizations' interest flagged, African American women in and around the CP rallied to draw attention to the role of sexualized violence in racial oppression. Against McDuffie's interpretation of this Cold War era activism as limited by its "familialist" framing and its lack of forthright critique of gender and sexual norms, Gore emphasizes that radical black women in the 1950s rejected a politics of silence and advocated for black women's right to self-defense. More than McDuffie, she emphasizes the ways in which black women on the Left were able to exploit the contradictions of Cold War re-

pression to mount ever more radical challenges to the postwar liberal order.

In her conclusion, Gore quotes Esther Cooper Jackson, who plays an important role in both of these narratives: "A lot was happening . . . between 1950 and 1955" (p. 163). As these books reveal, radical black women made sure that "a lot was happening" throughout the period of the Old Left. McDuffie and Gore both demonstrate not only that black women were vital thinkers and activists within the Left, but also that these women must be reckoned with if scholars are to understand American communists' signal contributions to twentieth- and twenty-first-century political culture. The similarities in their treatments provide definitive evidence of the possibilities, constraints, and legacy of black women's radical work, while the differences give us access to a broader range of activists, groups, and issues. Together, these books go far to illuminate the ways that gender, race, and class intersected to shape the American Left.

ANDREA FRIEDMAN

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JEFFREY A. TURNER. *Sitting In and Speaking Out: Student Movements in the American South, 1960–1970*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2010. Pp. x, 347. Cloth \$69.95, paper \$24.95.

With his new work, Jeffrey A. Turner intends to redeem the American South—at least with regard to the region's image concerning student activism. Turner asserts that too much attention has been paid to campus activism in the North and West and not nearly enough emphasis has been placed on southern campuses. Although valiant in its intentions, Turner's book falls short of placing the southern student movement on par with those in other regions. That is not to say, however, that the book is not interesting or informative.

The monograph features a wide array of sources from many southern institutions. Turner dutifully consulted archival and oral history collections from the leading predominantly white universities in the region to construct the bulk of the book's narrative. For its discussion of black student activism, however, the study relies heavily on student newspapers at historically black institutions. Even if not intentional, the dearth of material on black activism is noticeable. Regarding secondary literature, the book looks mostly to scholarship that was available between 1960 and 2000, leaving a minor gap in the recent historiography of student activism. Turner explains that the book "took a long time to write" (p. ix), and that is sometimes the reason for such gaps.

The book's arguments, at times, outstretch the evidence provided. For instance, when discussing activism at the University of Florida, the book claims a "significant university movement" arose from a 1963 off-campus sit-in (p. 98). Unfortunately, the book does not provide much evidence that the two were directly connected. Further, the fact that the book only mentions

the university twice more in some fifty pages undermines the significance of the University of Florida movement. This points to another problem with the book; it conflates off-campus activism with on-campus policy changes. The book explains that students (mostly white) often pushed to change society off campus and were prevented from, or at least less likely to try, protesting issues regarding racial discrimination and the Vietnam War on their campuses until the late 1960s. Turner highlights the National Student Association to discuss some of the organizing that occurred around southern campuses and argues that role of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) has been overemphasized in the student movement. While one can readily concede that SDS has captured the attention of much of the past scholarship surrounding student activism, it would be difficult to deny objectively that SDS's reach extended farther than most student-centered organizations during the period.

Indeed, the book under review reveals the names of the minority of white students who pushed for desegregation in the South's colleges during the early 1960s. Even the author has to admit, however, the student movement to prevent desegregation was much larger and more effective, as it took federal rulings and military troops finally to desegregate some of the South's flagship universities. These desegregation rulings often occurred not because of the activism of students on campus but because of the negative light segregation cast on the nation during the height of the Cold War. The cadre of black lawyers and activists associated with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) should also receive credit. As Turner explains, "the white student activists of 1963 and 1964 owed a great debt to black students and community activists for providing organizing issues and tactical models" (p. 95).

In his redemptive effort, Turner has simplified the North in much the same way that some scholars have done the South. By North, the author refers to northern, midwestern, and northeastern campuses. Although the book claims that the South is at the epicenter of the social movements associated with the 1960s, much of the narrative is spent describing the distinct anti-radical nature of southern student activism. The fundamental question, then, is whether these students, who were limited by the confines of a conservative campus and community culture, effected significant and broad-sweeping change at their institutions in the way that students at Berkeley, San Francisco State, Columbia, or Cornell did? In spite of Turner's efforts, the answer is no.

The value of Turner's work, however, is the awareness it brings of student activism in the South. While ambitious, the book is perhaps too wide in scope to treat effectively the movements on campuses across the entire South. Although the book claims to feature a "bi-racial focus," it is still a story driven largely by the activities of white liberals with black activists playing a

side role. Also, noticeably absent from the narrative is attention to collegiate athletics, which may have filled out some of the discussion about desegregation. In spite of its shortcomings, those studying student activism will find Turner's work useful.

STEFAN M. BRADLEY
Saint Louis University

TIMOTHY J. MINCHIN and JOHN A. SALMOND. *After the Dream: Black and White Southerners since 1965*. (Civil Rights and the Struggle for Black Equality in the Twentieth Century.) Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 2011. Pp. x, 405. \$40.00.

Timothy J. Minchin and John A. Salmond provide a well-crafted synthesis of almost half a century of scholarship on race and rights in the American South, augmenting their story with fresh evidence from state archives, particularly letters to elected officials. Divided into thirteen chapters, the book begins where most works on civil rights end—enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965—and proceeds chronologically to the election of Barack Obama in 2008. Topics covered include the relatively quick integration of public accommodations in the South, including parks, buses, and stores, and a dramatic rise in black political power thanks to federal oversight of elections in southern states.

However, as scholars like Kevin Kruse, Joseph Crespino, and Matthew Lassiter have shown, black voting power and desegregated space proved less meaningful once white flight began to grip southern cities in the 1970s, moving educational and economic opportunities to ring suburbs far from urban black communities. Minchin and Salmond both show how in Montgomery, “the focus of commercial life shifted to the expanding suburbs” in Atlanta, meaning that many of the civil rights movement’s “victories” including the famous bus boycott “were undermined” (p. 185). White flight also led to white students moving out of predominantly black districts or, alternately, into private schools. Both phenomena adversely affected the remaining black students.

Rural areas tended to boast better records of integration than urban schools, but black farms struggled and rural populations declined overall; whites moved straight to sunbelt suburbs, and blacks moved to inner cities. Here, economics did much of the work once assigned to Jim Crow. Better jobs and better pay accrued to white workers and major corporations shied from relocating to black majority areas like North Carolina’s Soul City (p. 190). Although many hoped that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act might reverse such economic racism by quelling discrimination in private hiring, the “mechanisms” created by the act proved unable to “handle the dimensions of the problem” (p. 141). This became particularly true during the 1980s, when the Reagan administration recommended that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reduce its staff by ten percent and “required” that accusers in

discrimination charges “prove intent and not just that a firm has a lower percentage of minority workers” (p. 210).

Overall, Minchin and Salmond argue that much remains to be done before true racial parity is achieved in the American South, even as they acknowledge that the forces perpetuating inequality are private, decentralized, and difficult to legislate away. They find hopeful signs in the public acknowledgment of the South’s racist past, particularly its commemoration of civil rights as a positive contribution to “the heritage tourist industry” (p. 259). The rise of “atonement trials” bringing justice to black victims of racist violence—often decades after the crimes against them were committed—mark another positive development (p. 267).

Although much in this book will be familiar to scholars of the twentieth century, the authors do a good job of synthesizing the massive, diffuse literature on the topic—making it an attractive option for survey courses on civil rights or the post-World War II South. They make a novel contribution to the prevailing literature by underscoring the continued importance that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) played in implementing civil rights reform after 1965. Temporarily eclipsed during the direct action phase of the civil rights movement, the NAACP returned to the forefront of the battle for racial equality during the complex implementation phase of the story. Also new is Minchin and Salmond’s recovery of the Southern Regional Council’s recent history, a topic that has yet to receive sustained attention.

ANDERS WALKER
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LEIGH RAIFORD. *Imprisoned in a Luminous Glare: Photography and the African American Freedom Struggle*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 293. \$45.00.

In this book, Leigh Raiford takes an incisive look at photography and the anti-lynching, civil rights, and black power movements. Her goal is not just to illuminate the way these movements used photography for political ends but to show how they shaped the politics of photography and black visibility, with consequences that remain in force today.

Raiford focuses on three sites of struggle: the body, the eye (or spectatorship), and memory. Raiford begins with the anti-lynching campaign, a potent starting point. Lynching, a violent act compounded by trafficking in images of the murdered, put the black body in the foreground. Activists such as Ida B. Wells used lynching photographs as evidence at a time when words—particularly those of an African American woman—were not convincing enough to stop such murders. These horrific images played opposite other photographs employed by the movement that depicted black men such as James Weldon Johnson, who led the failed effort to enact a legislative ban on lynching, as professional and

respectable. Raiford then considers how audiences differing by gender, geographic region, and class saw lynching photographs. Bringing the analysis forward in time, Raiford discusses the powerful place these photographs have in black memory and looks at reactions to the recent exhibition first called "Witness" and then "Without Sanctuary."

Photographic images became even more central in the freedom struggles of the 1960s. Organizations such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) understood the power of photography and first used it as a corrective, presenting evidence of discrimination and violence in protests. Moving beyond this reactionary position, SNCC became more proactive, creating a photo agency within the organization and thinking about how to represent African Americans to themselves, not merely or solely to white Americans. One of the more notable examples of this change was the new visibility of forceful black women. Largely absent from the photographs of the anti-lynching movement, black women were at the center of protests in the 1960s, seen facing off against white police officers. Photographers in the movement often took their images from the front lines of the struggle. Battles over professional versus amateur and the ownership and use of equipment exemplified tensions within SNCC itself.

Raiford argues that the black power movement signaled an "emergent visibility" of African Americans, a new fascination and attraction particularly among whites. In the "society of the spectacle" of the 1960s, as Guy Debord theorizes, racialized bodies were necessary, and the iconic status of black men with guns met these expectations. Raiford traces how these images became incorporated into the Black Panther Party and then institutionalized, so much a part of the movement that it became impossible to understand the party without them. Activists attentive to this change began to recognize that the struggle had come to be one over the politics of representation rather than visibility per se.

This is a careful analysis, intent on destabilizing the indexical and iconic power we often attribute to photographs. Raiford employs a great deal of theory to expose how this fixity is built, reinforced, and transversed as she moves fluidly among theory, image, and historical circumstance. There is less attention, however, to historical argument, one that does not just expose the conditions of the past but reveals the move from one set of conditions to another. Part of this inattention is due to the depth of analysis Raiford brings to each historical moment. But it also derives from the author's commitment to give primacy to multiple interpretations. What we lose by this choice is an understanding of change that does not erase multiple interpretations but reveals the force attributed to certain interpretations at specific times. Raiford gives little attention to the increased number of images over time or how the meaning of still images changed in eras dominated by moving ones on television, movie, and computer screens. We confer iconicity to photographs by continuing to view them apart from other media. Raiford exposes the multiple con-

sequences of being "imprisoned in a luminous glare"—a phrase of Martin Luther King, Jr.—but does not explain why the scope of that glare has grown even as discrimination has become more subtle. These, then, are efforts to be continued. Raiford provides an insightful and necessary foundation to do so.

JULIA L. FOULKES
The New School

SIMON HALL. *American Patriotism, American Protest: Social Movements since the Sixties*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2011. Pp. 215. \$55.00.

Patriotism may indeed, in Samuel Johnson's familiar words, constitute the "last refuge of a scoundrel," but Simon Hall demonstrates its undeniable institutionalization as a protest strategy. Joining a growing historiographic movement, Hall repudiates the idea that U.S. protest culture evaporated after the 1960s. The author examines post-1960s grassroots social movements and concludes that they survived and thrived into the next decade and beyond. That he reaches this conclusion should come as no particular surprise when one considers the growing scholarship pointing to a continuation of 1960s-style goals, tactics, and ideologies in the putatively more conservative decades that followed. What is decidedly innovative, however, is that Hall considers not only movements such as gay rights and women's liberation that furthered the socially progressive goals of inclusion and egalitarianism, but also evaluates the activism of social conservatives from busing opponents to tax revolters to anti-abortion advocates. Among the many parallelisms Hall turns up are a preponderance of tactics and strategies lifted from the playbook of 1960s radicals and a propensity to play the patriotism card by invoking the American republic's founding ideals.

Hall's opening chapter establishes the dynamics of patriotism and protest in 1960s activism, arguing that far from descending into "bitterness and despair" and abandoning "an Americanism that they viewed as inherently flawed by sexism, racism, militarism and capitalist excess" (p. 6), the Left consistently invoked the country's fundamental democratic and egalitarian principles. Although this was most obvious in the civil rights movement and in groups like Students for a Democratic Society, Hall also documents the trend in less likely manifestations, such as within the antiwar movement (particularly in the case of Vietnam Veterans Against the War) and in the Black Panthers' appeals to the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence to legitimate revolutionary politics.

This sets the scene for Hall's five case studies of post-1960s social movements. In each chapter the author follows a consistent blueprint, leading with a salient vignette of patriotic protest in the gay rights, women's liberation, anti-busing, tax revolt, and anti-abortion movements, briefly elucidating the pertinent historical background, then analyzing each movement's links to the 1960s protest tradition and its appeals to patriotic

sentiments. This approach produces several unexpected revelations. The executive director of the Los Angeles Gay and Lesbian Center equated the gay agenda with that upon which the United States was founded, referring to the gay rights movement as “a patriotic battle of the highest order” to foster greater inclusiveness in the nation’s ideals of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 1970s tax revolt activists not only parroted 1960s protest tactics, burning assessment notices instead of draft cards, they also included veterans of the antiwar and black power movements among their ranks. Anti-busing activists appropriated rights language from the previous decade’s struggle for racial freedom and even, on more than one occasion, sang “We Shall Overcome” at their protests. Feminists mobilized the symbolic power of the Statue of Liberty and the Bicentennial to underscore the “200-year old promise” of “equality of opportunity” on behalf of the Equal Rights Amendment. They also used the Declaration of Independence’s “pursuit of happiness” clause to frame the case for abortion rights, a strategy, ironically, that they shared with anti-abortion activists, who argued that this “inalienable right” should be extended to “innocent pre-born human beings” (p. 132).

Such insights are provocative, but Hall sometimes undermines their potency by recounting a dense litany of corroborating examples to support his argument. Perhaps this is because he has diligently researched a bountiful set of archival sources and effectively integrated pertinent insights from the existing scholarship in the fields of social movement and recent U.S. history. His discussion of the gay rights movement cleverly makes use of archival materials from regional chapters of the Mattachine Society to establish that use of the language of Americanism to promote wider acceptance for homosexuals predated the Stonewall riots that are often positioned as “year zero” in popular accounts of gay liberation. Still, Hall would have benefited from allowing himself to theorize more about the larger meaning and implications of his argument rather than merely documenting that direct action protest continued after the 1960s and that activists often invoked the language of patriotism. In the brief conclusion, Hall finally allows himself the latitude for welcome speculation, contrasting progressives’ use of patriotic rhetoric to highlight “the gap between rhetoric and reality” (p. 142) with conservatives’ invocation of the nation’s past to turn back the clock of religious and moral values. Hall hazards the further conjecture that patriotic protest “probably” contributed to the “sharp divisions” (p. 142) in contemporary American politics by inflating rhetoric in ways that reduced room for compromise. This study represents a commendable addition to the literature on social movements and recent U.S. history, but it would have benefited from integrating more of these insights into the book’s main text.

BRADFORD MARTIN
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JOHN MCMILLIAN. *Smoking Typewriters: The Sixties Underground Press and the Rise of Alternative Media in America*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 277. \$27.95.

In *Smoking Typewriters*, John McMillian sets out to explore the significance and legacy of the underground press of the 1960s. McMillian argues that the numerous activist and countercultural weeklies and monthlies of the 1960s were central to building up the youth rebellion of the time; that in their organization and production they embodied a democratic spirit and seriousness of mission; and that they practiced a creative journalism that stood in sharp contrast to the mainstream media’s unquestioned societal assumptions. McMillian insists that historians of the era have underestimated the underground press’s significance.

McMillian is correct in championing the importance of underground papers to white youth activism in the 1960s. Through detailed studies of a number of underground papers McMillian demonstrates that these papers often arose out of small radical or “avant-garde” communities. Invariably, however, the papers did not just reflect those communities, but “accelerated the[ir] growth and development” (p. 37). Moreover, the existence of these papers, and their linkage through national associations—the Underground Press Syndicate and the Liberation News Service—helped to transform a sense of local radical or countercultural community into a sense of national community. In the words of activist Jerry Rubin, the underground press “define[d] an alternative community and . . . [gave] it a voice and a consciousness and an identity” (p. 72). Yippie leader Abbie Hoffman insisted that the underground press was the “visible manifestation of an alternative culture” and that it helped “to create a national identity” for activists (p. 189).

McMillian does a fine job of conveying a sense of the seriousness and integrity of some of the early efforts at building a radical media in the United States. It is hard, for example, not to be moved by the humility and earnestness of many of these young people as McMillian presents them. For example, he quotes Michael Kindman, founder of Lansing, Michigan’s *The Paper*: “We hope never to become so sure of our position and so unaware of our real job that we will concentrate merely on putting out a paper” (p. 50).

While McMillian successfully contrasts the underground press with mainstream journalism, he falls short in his understanding of just how deeply immersed the underground press itself was in dominant American culture. He acknowledges, for example, that the New Left, out of which the underground press developed, was “a largely white . . . and male-dominated movement” (p. 12), but he fails to recognize fully the implications of this fact. The underground press was not simply the province of young white men, but it reflected, in its mindset, an American white male perspective, even as it struggled to criticize and transform American society. We see this most clearly in how McMillian han-

dles the rampant sexism of much of the underground press, with its photos of nude women, crude sexual headlines, classified sex ads, and a sexual division of labor in the actual production of most underground newspapers. McMillian notes this phenomenon but dispenses with the need to analyze it deeply, preferring to apologize for it instead. Citing historian Beth Bailey's thinking on this sexism, McMillian asks us to see the underground press's sexually charged "words and images" as "alluring to youths," as celebrating "a pleasure ethic," and as valuing "authenticity." "Sometimes," concludes McMillian, radicals "simply reveled in making adults uncomfortable" (p. 125). Hugh Hefner and *Playboy* would pass this test. If the underground press was in any way "authentic" in its attitudes toward women, that authenticity lay only in its uncensored depiction of dominant white male society's actual understandings of women and sexuality. In short, the underground press here stood not in opposition to dominant American values, but only against the pretense of holding contrary values.

McMillian has produced a necessary work for those who would like to understand how the underground press contributed to the growth of the white youth rebellion in the 1960s; and he gives us, too, some sense of the texture of the times. Yet we cannot understand the underground press's full significance, or trajectory, or get a reasonably accurate feel for the period, unless we carefully explore not only those elements of the underground press which set it against American society in the twentieth century but also those elements that tied it to that same society. Unfortunately, McMillian has avoided this latter, more uncomfortable part of the story he sought to tell.

DAVID BARBER

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JONATHAN B. KRASNER. *The Benderly Boys and American Jewish Education*. (Brandeis Series in American Jewish History, Culture, and Life.) Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis University Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 498. Cloth \$95.00, paper \$39.95.

Scholars of American Jewish history and historians of American education share a common lament. Both consider that the work they do, regardless of their meticulous research, garners little attention or respect in the larger field of American history. Both believe that others in the historical profession see their work as narrow, antiquarian, and self-referentially parochial. Jonathan B. Krasner may feel the same way. In this study of Samson Benderly, he tackles a subject that speaks to two marginalized fields. It is hard to imagine that scholars outside of the two subgroups within the academy will ever notice this book let alone see it as contributing to larger conversations about American immigration, the construction of ethnic identity, the perceived crisis of urban youth in the Progressive era, and religion. The book will, I predict, do little to convince historians outside its two fields that Benderly ought to be considered

an important or interesting figure for early to mid-twentieth-century America.

First, who was Samson Benderly, and why does Krasner consider him a worthy topic for a biography? Benderly, a native of Palestine born in 1876 in the town of Safed, broke with the religious world of his parents and came to Baltimore in 1898 to study medicine. Shortly thereafter he turned his attention to what he, and many others, considered to be the dismal state of Jewish education in immigrant communities, not just in Maryland but throughout the United States. Benderly defined, over the course of his career, an educational vision that attributed primacy to language and, in the case of Jewish education, to Hebrew. The creator of and participant in a string of local and national institutions, including schools, summer camps, bureaus of Jewish education, and professional training institutions for teachers, Benderly brought Progressive-era ideas to bear on the particular problems associated with the Jewish schooling of America's several million Jewish children. All of his projects and those of his disciples, known as the "Benderly Boys" (who in fact included a few female acolytes), focused on the broad and deep problem of how these children, in the main offspring of East European immigrants, could learn to be both Jewish and American.

Benderly's followers wanted to create schools and school systems that blended the values, ideas, and tropes of two worlds, the American and the Jewish, articulated in modern Hebrew, a language in the process of development in the Jewish colonies in Palestine. Benderly and those whom he launched professionally, who went out to teach and administer Jewish schools and camps across the United States, had little doubt that these youngsters would become American, but they had no confidence as to what the Jewish content of their lives would be.

Krasner's Benderly and his boys faced two enormous challenges. The greater one came from the power of American institutions and culture to integrate immigrants and to usher them, linguistically in particular, into the larger society. Given the immigrants' (and more importantly their children's) relatively rapid movement out of the working class, in large measure through the vehicle of public education, Benderly confronted a tough job in trying to convince them that they ought to invest time, energy, and money into Jewish education. Benderly's other challenge came from within the Jewish world as he faced the opposition of traditionalists who did not trust Benderly personally and disliked his progressive ideas about education. Such critics had a different vision, one that did not want to harmonize the American and the Jewish. They saw that goal as a chimera, which if operationalized would be to the detriment of the Jewish part of the equation.

Within the universe of American Jewish history scholarship, this book will be a welcome, if minor, addition. That literature has long noted Benderly as a key figure, and its practitioners will be able to learn more about him and his followers. Scholars of American ed-

ucation may see this book as a contribution if they are interested in the flow of ideas from Progressives like John Dewey to ethnic communities. But these scholars would have been more likely to notice this book had Krasner spent any time looking at the language crises that ripped apart other immigrant groups. German communities, for example, divided profoundly between those who believed "Germanness" could be preserved in English and those who saw language and religion, language and ethnicity, as inextricably connected, asserting that only in the mother tongue could culture continue and thrive.

But Krasner's book, too detailed, too hermetically sealed in the inner developments of the Jewish world, and too devoid of a central analytic problem beyond the extent of Benderly's success, will do little to bridge the gap with which this review began.

HASIA R. DINER
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KEVIN M. SCHULTZ. *Tri-Faith America: How Catholics and Jews Held Postwar America to its Protestant Promise*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 256. \$34.95.

After World War II Americans learned that the democratic values of the United States were founded on the core beliefs of a plural tri-faith majority. By the end of the 1960s—as signaled by the publication of Arthur A. Cohen's *The Myth of the Judeo-Christian Tradition* (1970)—it had become much more difficult to defend the existence of an inclusive, broadly representative civil religion. Subsequently, the tri-faith norm, and the Judeo-Christian fundament upon which it supposedly rested, has been deconstructed as a wish-fulfilling construct of consensus historians, as an abstraction of sociologists who wished to diminish the reality of ethnic particularism, and as a Cold War ideology co-opted by the Religious Right. Kevin M. Schultz's new book asserts, to the contrary, that "tri-faith" was the principle of an interreligious movement that successfully challenged Protestant hegemony and created new liberties and rights for religious minorities.

Schultz tracks the rise of the tri-faith norm to its ascendancy in the Cold War and its persistence as an ideal, even under fire, well into the age of "the culture wars." According to Schultz, a major irony resulted from the institutionalization of religious pluralism: this caused the second disestablishment of American religion, resulting in a more secular state neutral toward all religions. This outcome was a wholly unintended consequence of those who advocated for tri-faith America. Since the 1970s it has led to the backlash against secularism characteristic of the Religious Right, which routinely invokes Judeo-Christian values to rally "co-belligerent" conservative evangelicals, Jews, and Catholics (p. 201).

The first section of the book, "Inventing Tri-faith America, Ending 'Protestant America,'" describes how belief in theological and civic parity between Protes-

tants, Catholics, and Jews became an article of civil religion in the United States. The protagonists of this narrative are the leaders of the National Conference of Christians and Jews (NCCJ), founded in 1928 to resist political nativism. As defined by the NCCJ, "Judeo-Christianity" had two distinct meanings: a theological one, emphasizing the Old Testament, and a civic one, promoting brotherhood, tolerance, and mutual goodwill. Both gained political and intellectual traction during World War II because religious pluralism was an anti-fascist initiative, but the civic component was particularly persuasive to agencies outside of the NCCJ.

By the end of the war, the belief in religious pluralism had become normative in the United States, and the second part of Schultz's study, "Living in Tri-faith America," examines the vicissitudes of this transformation in the national identity. Schultz's postwar narrative is influenced by Mark Silk's *Spiritual Politics: Religion and America since World War II* (1988), but whereas Silk's oft-cited book focuses on the fragility of religious pluralism and on the events that led to its fracture in the 1960s, Schultz describes a robust arrangement that provided a moral ballast for postwar liberalism and allowed the United States to differentiate itself from the USSR. Moreover, instead of fostering conformity and cultural homogeneity, as commentators since Will Herberg (*Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology* [1955]) have charged, the tri-faith arrangement actually bolstered religious communalism and provided a rationale for resisting assimilation. Schultz's analysis of how the differing religious traditions and historical experiences of Catholic and Jewish Americans shaped their attitudes toward the state and Protestant society intersects with Joshua M. Zeitz's *White Ethnic New York: Jews, Catholics, and the Shaping of Postwar Politics* (2007). Zeitz is trenchant in his attention to the many ways these Jewish-Catholic differences—over ideas of authority, dissent, community, and especially over anticommunism—eventually caused the breakdown of the liberal Democratic coalition. In contrast, Schultz simplistically credits the tri-faith ideal with bolstering liberalism. Schultz also mistakenly calls ex-communist Whittaker Chambers a convert to Catholicism, when in fact Chambers became a Quaker (p. 90).

A welcome balance of Schultz's book comes from its willingness to note that most proponents of religious pluralism had shortcomings of vision regarding race, even though they argued passionately for the protection of religious minorities. As Schultz puts the matter, "The very foundation of Tri-Faith America—the brotherhood of man under the Fatherhood of God—left no room for segregation . . . Yet many of these organizations chose not to insist on racial equality as part of their mission, as part of their call for 'brotherhood'" (p. 195). Nonetheless, Schultz sees tri-faith organizations as partially redeemed since they provided the religious idioms which civil rights advocates used to pronounce white Protestant monism dead.

Schultz's account of the rise of the Religious Right is

conventional, and his treatment of postwar Protestantism in general is less compelling than the rest of the text. The postwar period was rife with Protestant self-critique, especially of its own complicity in conformity and suburban megachurch diffidence. Niebuhrian realists, émigrés such as Paul Tillich, neo-orthodox prophets such as Gabriel Vahanian, liberals such as Daniel Williams and Henry P. Van Dusen, and up-and-coming stars such as Martin E. Marty and Harvey Cox wrote a great deal diagnosing the health of Protestant America, and Protestants were among the first to use the terms “post-Puritan” and “post-Protestant” to describe the transformation of the United States since World War II. The omission of these voices is unfortunate, since Schultz seems to dismiss their criticisms of mainline Protestantism as “bland” theological gruel (p. 80).

Throughout this impressively researched book, Schultz consults a host of sources, including much original archival work in the NCCJ’s files, but he could have augmented his study by paying more attention to the art and popular culture of the era. In contrast to cultural historians who have written on related themes in the postwar era, such as Michael Rogin and Alan Nadel, Schultz’s handling of movies is only cursory, and he neglects a rich vein of literature by major authors—Philip Roth, Bernard Malamud, Saul Bellow, Norman Mailer, Frank O’Hara, Flannery O’Connor, Mary McCarthy, and J. F. Powers—that would have complicated his assessment of Americanization and added a missing sensitivity to theological tensions between the three religions examined here. None of these complaints, however, should diminish Schultz’s achievement. He has written a compelling, often trenchant, book that enriches our understanding of the abiding promise of religious pluralism and the failures to agree on what it would resemble in practice.

JASON STEVENS
National Humanities Center

JAMES C. BURKEE. *Power, Politics, and the Missouri Synod: A Conflict That Changed American Christianity*. Foreword by MARTIN E. MARTY. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. 2011. Pp. xvi, 256. \$29.00.

The evangelical resurgence has become a standard theme of post-1960s American religious history. Corollaries include the growth of conservative Christian churches, the decline of more liberal groups, and (with the important exception of historically black denominations) a broader realignment along an axis that mimics the two-party system. The saga of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod (LCMS) stands as both a critical element in these narratives and a profound qualification of them. Like the better-known Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), the Midwest-oriented LCMS flipped from moderate to conservative control as the result of a concerted effort by a small number of dedicated activists. Unlike the SBC, though, the LCMS has not thrived so much as muddled along in the four de-

cades following the conservative takeover. James C. Burkee, who teaches at an LCMS-affiliated university, is well positioned to tell an insider’s tale that has larger resonance.

Burkee’s story of righteous intrigue centers on two major actors. Activist and uncertified minister Herman Otten, Jr., was a reckless, self-styled McCarthyite who got the ball rolling in the mid-1950s by attacking doctrinally suspect seminary professors. LCMS president J. A. O. “Jack” Preus was a Machiavellian schemer, the Richard Nixon to Otten’s Joseph McCarthy, who used and then sought to contain the conservative insurgents who had voted him into office. The LCMS liberals—or moderates, as they preferred to call themselves—come across as alternately self-righteous and hapless. Burkee neither dwells on their purported heresies nor probes the theological values of the conservative activists. The latter oversight appears to be the responsibility not of Burkee but of the actors driving a narrative that is “about more than just theology” (p. 4). The author, who seems to have no axe to grind, should be commended for his willingness to lay bare his denomination’s past. He calls his topic “modern church history writ large” (p. 2). More specifically, it is church history writ political.

The conservative triumph occurred during the 1970s, a decade usually seen as the turning point of the evangelical resurgence. Preus assumed the presidency in 1969, taking over a centralized denominational apparatus that moderates, ironically, had helped to construct. The purges came in waves. A particularly dramatic moment occurred in 1974, when most of the faculty and students from Concordia Seminary in Saint Louis left to create “Seminex” (Seminary-in-Exile). The conservatives had routed their most entrenched opposition.

Burkee has recovered an impressive array of sources that, combined with interviews, allows him to recreate the interpersonal dynamics of what amounted to an institutional power grab. Preus had his plumber, while Otten had a cache of tape recordings. As their relationship deteriorated, Preus kept a file on Otten labeled “Blackmail,” a reasonable rendering of the latter’s *modus operandi* (p. 164). The book’s shifting organizational nomenclature likely will confuse many readers. They should, however, come away with a keen sense of the personalities and emotions behind each parry and riposte. No Protestant denomination is immune to cloak and dagger games, but the LCMS is in a league of its own. While the laity—at least as Burkee portrays them—were hardly sympathetic toward elite liberal seminarians, they were not exactly inspired by the other side’s political machinations.

Burkee links the LCMS insurgency with the broader conservative Right. For example, he demonstrates how one’s stance on civil rights issues could function as a litmus test in a denomination that was far from welcoming to African Americans. Otten branded the many LCMS leaders who supported civil rights legislation as communist sympathizers, scarcely distinguishing theological critiques of the Social Gospel from ideological

critiques of liberal politics. "CONSERVATIVES UNITE!" declared one mid-1960s riff on a more famous manifesto. "YOU HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE BUT THE MISSOURI SYNOD!" (p. 75). Burkee mostly succeeds in situating the LCMS in a larger political context (despite confusing the dates of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts [p. 57]).

Burkee highlights a grand contradiction concerning the nature of conservative LCMS activism. LCMS conservatives routinely attacked moderates for supporting cooperation with more liberal Lutherans. Indeed, LCMS leaders before 1969 were increasingly attached to liberal Protestantism and progressive activism in general. Yet Otten and his peers were part of a conservative movement that was no less ecumenical in nature.

Despite the barriers to entry inherent in any denominational history, scholars of recent American religion and the culture wars will find this book to be useful for two main reasons. First, as Burkee suggests, his book expands the Christian Right beyond the usual Sunbelt suspects. Second, the LCMS story counters the standard narrative of unambiguous conservative ascendance. Nearly three million strong by 1972, the LCMS has since lost more than 500,000 members amid persistent feuding within its overwhelmingly conservative leadership. Not all conservative churches were growing during the evangelical resurgence.

STEVEN P. MILLER
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DANIEL K. WILLIAMS. *God's Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. viii, 372. \$29.95.

What is commonly known as the "Religious Right" has never existed as a singularly coherent, united political front. Competing factions, personalities, and agendas have long worked against such unity, but that lack of organizational oneness has not prevented conservative Christians from influencing local, state, and national politics. Nor have these factions prevented conservative Christians from becoming a dominant force—some might say *the* dominant force—within the Republican Party. Understanding and explaining how these competing factions and personalities worked to reshape the character and agenda of the GOP is the central objective of Daniel K. Williams's new book. Williams successfully meets that objective, thanks to his exhaustively researched, elegantly written, and thoroughly accessible national study of the "making of the Christian Right." The result is a book that broadens and complicates the narrative of Christian political influence in the twentieth century (and beyond) while contributing to the ever growing literature on the temporal, thematic, and motivational geneses of modern American conservatism.

Readers expecting heavy doses of Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, and James Dobson will not be surprised to find their expectations met. These three political figures

played critical, though sometimes conflicting roles in shaping conservative reactions to social, cultural, and economic changes from the 1970s through the early twenty-first century. The same readers will also not be surprised by the rich, detailed narrative of social conservative activism during the 1970s and 1980s, much of it connected to issues like school prayer, abortion, homosexuality, and feminism. Certainly, these were the years and the issues that most observers identify as the originating locus of the modern Christian Right, and Williams spends ample time on these matters. Yet, Williams also reminds us that evangelicals "gained prominence during Ronald Reagan's [1980] campaign not because they were speaking out on political issues—they had been doing this for decades—but because they were taking over the Republican Party. It was an event more than fifty years in the making" (p. 2).

This longer, national narrative is one of the book's key contributions. Williams devotes space to crucial moments like the 1924 Democratic National Convention, which split over Prohibition. Then rather suddenly, economic depression reshaped the nation's political discourse, while fundamentalist Christians temporarily receded into isolation. No longer leading the culture wars of the 1920s, many turned to premillennial dispensationalism, a theological school particularly noteworthy for an eschatology (end-times doctrine) that taught believers to anticipate heightened corruption and chaos as indicators of Christ's imminent return. This had the short-term effect of steering many fundamentalist Christians toward prophetic speculation and away from politics. That shift was redirected once again with the birth of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) in 1942. Quickly, the NAE flexed its political muscles and lobbied for broadcasting laws that were more sympathetic to evangelical preachers and radio hosts. As Williams traces the activity of the NAE through the next several decades, he simultaneously weaves state and local examples into a wider national narrative that stresses the importance of and impetus for change within the Republican Party.

Williams offers another contribution by trying to make terms like "fundamentalist" and "evangelical" less slippery and also less popularly synonymous. He not only notes that these terms carried distinctly different traits as far as theological priorities and political agendas were concerned, but also highlights the degree to which politically aware Christians sought to brand themselves as one or the other. More specifically, Williams shows how many Christian leaders, for public relations reasons, rejected the term "fundamentalism"—which was technically a simple belief in biblical literalism and inerrancy—in favor of "evangelical," which connoted, for many, moderation and reason. At the same time, self-identified (and typically shrill) fundamentalists like John R. Rice, Bob Jones, Carl McIntire, Billy James Hargis, and Jerry Falwell embraced the fundamentalist term while criticizing evangelicals who, during much of the 1950s, were less politically vocal and often willing to work with non-southern churches in

support of civil rights and racial integration. As Williams further explores the rise of evangelicals like Billy Graham and Bill Bright, he simultaneously explains why fundamentalists were increasingly marginalized by their own uncompromising, conspiracy laden, and racialized brand of anticommunism. Along the way, Williams builds a convincing, if possibly overstated, case that modern conservatism has been shaped by religion more than by any other factor.

Ultimately, this book tells a story with which all political historians should be familiar. The narrative is well-paced, richly detailed, and relatively balanced. Williams also deserves credit for emphasizing the life and work of Francis Schaeffer, whose influence among evangelical Christians—particularly (but by no means exclusively) on the issue of abortion—has been vastly underestimated by most historians. It is tempting to write still more about this deft study. Suffice it to say that this book, along with Darren Dochuk's *From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-Folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism* (2011), has done much to advance scholarly understanding of the dynamics between Christianity and conservative American politics.

SEAN P. CUNNINGHAM
Texas Tech University

SEAN P. CUNNINGHAM. *Cowboy Conservatism: Texas and the Rise of the Modern Right*. (New Directions in Southern History.) Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 2010. Pp. xvi, 293. \$40.00.

In recent years, the field of American political history has enjoyed an outpouring of new work on postwar conservative politics. The results have run the gamut from the brilliant to the pedestrian. Sean P. Cunningham's *Cowboy Conservatism* lands squarely in the latter category. Marred by a weak and unsupported argument, superficial secondary research, and wearying factual and interpretative errors, the book fails to advance our understanding of the modern Right or even Texas politics in any meaningful way.

The primary flaw is foundational. At its heart, this is not a book about conservatism or even conservatives; instead it seems like a reverse-engineered examination of the emergence of the modern GOP in Texas. Despite the title's promise, Cunningham neither explains "cowboy conservatism" nor Texas's role in the "rise of the Right." In fact, he does not seem very interested in the conservatives who built the party, or voters, or, with only a few exceptions, even politicians. In their stead, we, often in the passive voice, have nonspecific "Texans" (frequently without regard to racial, ethnic, or regional distinction) embracing the GOP because they had come to appreciate a "look"—the image of a conservative philosophy" (p. 5). At its heart, that is the argument of the book—unnamed "state and national conservatives" used cleverly packaged catch phrases to "build a viable and ultimately dominant Texas Republican Party." So, rather than real human actors forming

alliances, hustling for votes, or tending to the countless tasks of building a movement, Cunningham writes: "Texas politics . . . was defined by public perceptions that were shaped by the purposeful use of specific images and icons that, collectively, transformed the state's political culture and led to partisan realignment" (p. 4). The book, as they might say in Texas, is all hat and no cattle.

A secondary argument anchors the first half of the book. It goes something like this: the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas, initially thought by many to be the work of right-wing extremists, dealt a massive blow to the Texas Right that forced "extremism" into retreat. This, he explains, is one of the reasons that Lyndon Johnson defeated Barry Goldwater so easily in Texas. I can't imagine why we might need an alternative argument for Johnson's victory. It seems that the native son incumbent who had spent his career shoveling truckloads of federal cash into the pockets of both the rich and poor in Texas going up against one of the most embarrassingly weak national candidates of modern times might just be all the explanation needed. In fact, one might make the argument that when one considers the major down ticket election, the U.S. Senate race between George H. W. Bush and Ralph Yarborough (which Cunningham does not), the "extremists" did pretty well. Bush, running on a right-wing platform that Cunningham admits later made him sound like a "Bircher" (p. 72) polled eighteen percent higher than Goldwater. Bush, who lost, still won more Texas Republican votes than any other candidate in state history, including John Tower in his two prior Senate races and presidential candidates Dwight D. Eisenhower and Richard Nixon. Curiously, Cunningham only mentions that Bush outpolled Goldwater by "100,000 votes" (it was 176,771) and fails to examine this milestone in Texas GOP history.

Perhaps that is no surprise; throughout the book Cunningham ignores crucial moments in Texas history and important books in its historiography. Which is all the more strange when one considers that next to high school football, politics is the state's favorite blood sport. For example, despite his dependence on "populism" to help craft his argument, he offers no critical analysis of the movement in Texas nor of the work of Lawrence Goodwyn and Roscoe Martin. And when explaining the conflicts of the 1960s he fails to mention to work of Doug Rossinow, Ignacio Garcia, and Amilcar Shabazz, among others. Texas historians will spot many other gaps in the historiography.

Historians of conservatism will be equally disappointed; after two *pro forma* paragraphs in the book's introduction, Cunningham largely ignores important contributions except when he wants to use a particular phrase like "law and order" or "plain-folks Americanism." While certain texts are sprinkled through the footnotes, most of the time he simply cites the book and too often even neglects to include page numbers. Nowhere in the footnotes or the introduction is there a sustained attempt to explain how this study fits into ex-

isting debates over the origins, impacts, or importance of the rise of the Right.

Lastly, the book suffers from a number of simple mistakes that are largely the result of Cunningham's tendency to argue by assertion. Here is an all-too-typical example. When explaining the "ineptitude of Goldwater's strategists," Cunningham states that Goldwater "avoided Dallas and West Texas, areas arguably the most tightly connected to the western populist-conservative ideals he championed" (p. 64). But Goldwater did not avoid Dallas, nor did he avoid West Texas. On September 22, he campaigned in Odessa and Amarillo (where school had been called off in honor of the event) and the next day he gave a major foreign policy address to the American Legion in Dallas. Goldwater returned to West Texas seventeen days later and held huge rallies in Lubbock and El Paso.

The conservative movement in Texas was and is important to postwar American political culture. It certainly deserves a better treatment than this poorly researched, weakly argued, conservatism-as-catch-phrase effort.

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GREGORY A. DADDIS. *No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 334. \$34.95.

We all know, of course, why the United States lost the war in Vietnam. After soundly defeating the enemy's ill-fated Tet Offensive in 1968, the American military was denied victory by a biased, liberal press that turned the American public against the war and destroyed the political will of the country's civilian leadership. Or was it the pursuit of a flawed strategy of conventional warfare, seeking in vain to kill so many of the enemy that they would sue for peace, while ignoring the importance of winning the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese people by insuring their safety and prosperity? Or perhaps the war was "unwinnable" from the outset, given a corrupt and inefficient South Vietnamese government and army that could never win the support of their own people, let alone protect them.

Gregory A. Daddis, an army colonel and history professor at the U.S. Army Military Academy, would no doubt concede that an element of truth exists in these and other explanations as to why the United States lost in Vietnam, but he would be quick to add, as he does in his convincingly argued book, that we may never know the exact reasons for failure because the United States never succeeded in developing a reliable system for measuring success in the first place: what worked, what did not, and why? As Daddis notes in his conclusion, there are obvious parallels to America's current conflicts.

Focusing primarily on the U.S. Army, Daddis shows that failure to develop a system for measuring progress was not from lack of trying. During the entire period of

the army's involvement in Vietnam, from the advisory efforts in the early 1960s to the commitment of major ground forces in 1965 through the withdrawal of U.S. forces by 1973, the army made a concerted effort to collect data on the prosecution of the war. This effort was championed by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his computer-savvy, "whiz-kid" advisors, steeped in systems analysis techniques and believing that all problems could be quantified and thus resolved. From the outset, McNamara pushed the army to develop metrics for measuring and reporting progress in the war.

What resulted was a massive reporting system, from the lowest level commanders and advisors through channels to Headquarters Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). Daddis discusses the myriad reports and what they attempted to measure, but his account is no mere compilation of statistics. He examines the often vague and conflicting goals toward which the reporting system was directed, the role of senior MACV leadership in establishing those goals and metrics, and how that reporting system not only failed to measure progress but even proved to be counterproductive.

Perhaps most significant, the reporting system failed to measure what was most important in winning a counterinsurgency campaign. Daddis explains that the U.S. Army had an established counterinsurgency doctrine with which American officers were conversant, but that doctrine did not, arguably could not, provide the metrics for measuring progress in a specific case such as Vietnam. Besides, what needed measuring were complex political, economic, and cultural intangibles that did not easily lend themselves to quantification. The MACV staff fell back instead on conventional military yardsticks of progress, notably the ratio of friendly to enemy casualties—the infamous "body count," although Daddis emphasizes that the reporting system included far more data than just casualty statistics.

This reporting system was more than seriously flawed; it actually proved counterproductive in critical ways. The collection, collation, and presentation of the vast amount of data proved an overwhelming task, and therefore little time and effort went to analyzing what that data meant beyond the raw numbers. Thus the information flow was one way. Commanders and advisors in the field who struggled to provide the reports got little in return. Furthermore, the system contained no verification process. Pressure from higher headquarters for progress inevitably led to skewed reporting, such as inflated counts of the number of enemy soldiers killed or villages secured from enemy control, resulting in an overly optimistic assessment of progress at MACV headquarters. Such optimistic assessments could come crashing down, as occurred during the enemy's 1968 Tet Offensive.

This readable account addresses a largely ignored but important aspect of the Vietnam War. Daddis's research is excellent and his supporting citations extensive. His inclusion of soldier and junior leader accounts

adds the needed human dimension, showing the frustration of pursuing often vague goals with no clear indication of success while paying the price in blood. I highly recommend this book to soldiers, scholars, and the general reader who wants to understand why, to this day, there is no clear consensus as to exactly how or why we failed in Vietnam.

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Independent Scholar

LOUISE BARNETT. *Atrocity and American Military Justice in Southeast Asia: Trial by Army*. (Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia, number 64.) New York: Routledge. 2010. Pp. xiii, 278. \$130.00.

This is a painful but necessary read. Based on archives and published documents from judicial inquiries, Senate hearings, and military court trials, the author brings out in excruciating detail some of the atrocities perpetrated by American soldiers in the Philippines (1899–1902), Japanese defenders of Manila (1945), and American GIs in Vietnam (1968–1969). Louise Barnett also mentions recent incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Barnett emphasizes continuity rather than change. She sees a pattern of atrocious behavior that repeats itself whenever three conditions are met. First, the military institution forms a culture of its own based on hierarchical loyalty and horizontal solidarity among soldiers with a shared combat experience. Internal loyalties become more important than externally imposed humanitarian principles. Second, the soldiers operate in a foreign country with a culture and language different from their own. They find it difficult to distinguish between enemies and friends, and thus have a tendency to fear and loath the whole population as “gugs” or “gooks.” Third, commanders do not take seriously their obligation to make subordinates observe *jus in bello*; officers give ambiguous orders or do not have sufficient control of their subordinates.

Because these three conditions have been met in many of America’s wars, atrocities have become almost inevitable. So too has the tendency for the military hierarchy to cover up whenever there is a risk that atrocities may be disclosed, and to ensure minimal punishment for as few as possible of the perpetrators. Barnett’s account is full of pitiful, mediocre men, some of whom have made illustrious military careers in spite of having tortured or executed prisoners, women, and children in the places where they served. Barnett heaps scorn on these men by citing and analyzing the many ways they tried to avoid responsibility and cover their backs when testifying before a tribunal.

The two main villains in the account are Edwin Forbes Glenn (1857–1926) and Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964). The only real hero of the story is MacArthur’s nemesis, Tomoyuki Yamashita (1885–1946), whom Barnett describes with utmost respect. Yamashita was given command of the Japanese forces in the Philippines in October 1944, just before MacArthur’s landing in Leyte, too late and with too few means

of transportation to organize an effective defense. He tried to spare the population of Manila by ordering its evacuation, but MacArthur did not leave any exit route open. A Japanese naval commander decided to defy Yamashita’s orders and defend Manila to the end. Knowing they would soon die, the Japanese soldiers committed heinous crimes against the local population, who were caught between the entrenched Japanese and the approaching U.S. military. Some 100,000 people died. Yamashita did his best to prevent this from happening. Yet, he was considered responsible and quickly sentenced to death by an American military commission, and hanged in February 1946. If the “Yamashita standard” had been applied to the U.S. Army itself, then American commanders would also have hanged. Responsibility for My Lai would have been placed not only on the shoulders of William Calley but also on those who instituted the body count as a measure of military success.

Barnett is deeply knowledgeable about the material in the book. She has used a wealth of archival and published sources. Yet, in a strict sense this is not a historical account, but rather a comparative analysis of military justice in three different circumstances. The emphasis is not on the historical circumstances but on patterns repeating themselves. Much is made of the similarity between the war in the Philippines and the Vietnam War. One obviously significant common factor is mostly overlooked: guerrilla tactics. Most of the atrocities described were made in direct response to attacks by forces who did not wear uniforms. The combatants hid among the local population and relied on its support. The atrocities described in the Philippines happened in response to a surprise attack by guerrillas at Balangiga that killed a number of U.S. soldiers while they were having their breakfast. The Japanese troops in the Philippines also faced guerrillas. My Lai happened in the aftermath of the Tet offensive. Guerrillas aim to prevent any bonding between foreign occupants and locals. The surest way to realize this aim is to provoke the foreigners in ways that lead them to commit atrocities. Similarly, the surest way for an army of occupation to undermine its mission and reputation is to allow atrocities to happen. This is what Barnett calls “the McKinley doctrine,” with reference to the president’s speech about the Philippines on December 21, 1898. Although it has been systematically violated since then, the doctrine still holds.

Barnett’s study should be required reading at every military academy.

STEIN TØNNESSEN
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DAVID ZIERLER. *The Invention of Ecocide: Agent Orange, Vietnam, and the Scientists Who Changed the Way We Think about the Environment*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 245. Cloth \$59.95, paper \$24.95.

In this book, David Zierler explores the important, underresearched history of American use of chemical defoliants during the Vietnam War and scientists' protests against it. Zierler reveals how the United States' massive, unprecedented military use of herbicides intersects with and illuminates the general histories of the Cold War, postwar environmentalism, and international law and treaties along with the Vietnam War itself.

After a brief introductory chapter surveying history and historiography relating to Agent Orange (the primary defoliant used in Vietnam), Zierler offers chapters on the origins of the ecocide concept; the pre-Vietnam discovery, development, and use of chemical herbicides; the Kennedy administration's policies regarding conventional forces and counterinsurgency tactics to deter communist expansion, and the assumption that chemical defoliation offered a cheap, easy way to help defend South Vietnam from communist insurgents; the evolution of herbicidal warfare in Vietnam—"Operation Ranch Hand"—from its initial introduction in 1961–1963 through its massive expansion from 1964–1968 along with President Lyndon Johnson's Americanization of the war; the origins of scientists' general environmentalist and ecological concerns in postwar America, and the focusing of those concerns on herbicidal warfare; activist scientists' efforts to access information on Ranch Hand and survey actual sprayed zones in Vietnam, and the U.S. government and military's determination to prevent such access; and how activist scientists turned President Richard Nixon's international public relations gambit—belatedly ratifying the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical and biological warfare—against him by persuading domestic senators and foreign officials that herbicidal warfare violated the spirit of the Geneva Protocol, culminating in the United States renouncing herbicidal warfare.

Zierler's useful, interesting book contributes to various fields even beyond those listed above. In showing the postwar enthusiasm and exaggerated expectations for new chemical herbicides—much like that surrounding "the Peaceful Atom"—and the Kennedy administration's hope to use herbicide technology to win a war cheaply and easily, Zierler offers a classic vignette for the history of technology. His details regarding production statistics for herbicides, and the cooperation of Dow Chemical with its military and governmental partners to suppress negative information about Agent Orange from the 1960s onward, address business history. He powerfully illuminates the history of science, scientific professionalism, and the politics of science. Zierler's book also touches on many topics in passing and offers a wealth of interesting insights and unexpected connections. For instance, it is fascinating to learn that much of the concern over defoliation was driven by worries about human population growth, a key environmental issue later forgotten by governments and environmentalists alike, or that George F. Kennan, the early Cold War architect of containment doctrine, in

1970 "identified impending ecological doom as the pre-eminent security threat facing humankind" (p. 29).

The book's strength is also its main weakness. It would be a herculean task fully to address all the issues the book raises—particularly in a slender volume. Predictably, Zierler sometimes fails. The book overall, especially in certain chapters, has a breathless feel, jumping from topic to topic, barely touching one before moving on. Zierler sometimes writes for the cognoscenti rather than a more general readership. It helps if the reader already has significant background in the Cold War, postwar environmentalism, postwar technology, ecology, and international law, because some matters receive little explanation and might bewilder general historians of the twentieth-century United States, let alone other historians, graduate students, and, especially, undergraduates. This is particularly evident in the second chapter, on ecocide, which briefly mentions Bertrand Russell, Jean-Paul Sartre, the Nuremberg War Trials, Noam Chomsky, George F. Kennan, and Jared Diamond within the space of a few pages and paragraphs—before readers have any context regarding defoliation in Vietnam. The breathless feel is exacerbated by various avoidable editing errors.

Zierler labels the anti-defoliation scientists non-environmentalists, dutifully citing William Cronon in pointing out that they never envisioned a pristine Eden; but Cronon's critique of environmentalism never applied well to urban, anti-pollution, or anti-toxic environmentalism, which clearly predominated in America around 1970. Zierler acknowledges that Barry Commoner, definitely an environmentalist, blazed the trail on the defoliation issue as on atmospheric testing, and that the anti-defoliation scientists' successful campaign to prohibit herbicidal warfare under the Geneva Protocol depended on the swelling strength of broader antiwar and environmental movements. Moreover, biologist Arthur Galston's 2007 statement disclaiming environmentalism and disparaging environmentalists—with possibly self-serving hindsight (p. 18)—does not square with his intensely, classically environmentalist rhetoric before the Senate in 1970 (p. 154). Zierler somewhat mischaracterizes Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* (1962) as being just about DDT and the American environment, when Carson addressed all chemical pesticides and spoke universally enough that her book was translated into thirty-one foreign languages. Nevertheless, Zierler's study should prove interesting, important, and thought-provoking for readers from a wide range of scholarly backgrounds.

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Los Angeles

CHIA YOUYEE VANG. *Hmong America: Reconstructing Community in Diaspora*. (The Asian American Experience.) Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2010. Pp. xxii, 200. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$25.00.

Chia Youyee Vang takes up the question, "How do refugees build an ethnic community from scratch . . . when they arrive with almost no material resources but a long history of nation-building aspirations in their homeland?" The resulting book is a valuable addition to the study of U.S. migration and Asian American history. Through her focus on people who entered the United States as "refugees" rather than "immigrants," Vang provides a case study of an increasingly visible—albeit politically and administratively fraught—category of newcomers in America. That Hmong Americans have received little attention from Asian American historians (they are eclipsed in the scholarship on Southeast Asians by studies of Vietnamese and Cambodians) makes the book an especially welcome contribution.

Framed by her interest in the connections between homeland memories and practices with community building and changing identities in the United States, Vang's study begins in Asia and reviews the history of the Hmong and U.S. involvement in Laos during the Vietnam War. Although this is not the first study to link the expansion of American global power to U.S. immigration, the book establishes the history of Hmong Americans as an especially clear-cut case of U.S. militarism begetting the migration of displaced people across American borders. Since the early 1960s, the Central Intelligence Agency had organized members of minority groups in Laos into guerrilla units to fight a "secret war" against Vietnamese and Lao communists. Resulting in rural displacement and dependency on American forces, this intervention also gave rise to a refugee crisis following the U.S. withdrawal in 1973 and the rise of the Pathet Lao in 1975.

Describing the status and journey of a "stateless people" whose histories have been marked by wartime trauma and humanitarian sympathy, this monograph makes worthwhile contributions to the study of refugees in America generally and the Indochinese specifically. Vang, however, is chiefly concerned with portraying the distinctiveness of Hmong America. In addition to underscoring the unique circumstances prompting Hmong migration, she details how Hmong set themselves apart. For instance, ethnic leaders invoked their loyalty to Americans during the "secret war" to build social and political capital, pursue electoral politics, and work to secure passage of the Hmong Veterans' Naturalization Act of 2000, which exempted certain refugees from English-language and civics requirements in the naturalization process.

While Vang introduces the book as a study about refugees, she resists portraying her subjects as objects of pity and charity, emphasizing instead their agency and adaptability. Showing how Hmong Americans have utilized "both existing Hmong social-organization strategies and new resources available to them in the host country" (p. 2), Vang's approach is informed by recent directions in U.S. immigration history that attend to factors in the host and home countries to understand the newcomers' settlement and adjustment patterns. Her major topics of analysis—kinship networks, mutual

aid organizations, churches, traditions, gender roles, and homeland politics—tread familiar territory in U.S. immigration studies and suggest that, while Hmong arrived in the United States under unique circumstances, they can also be regarded as another group in a "nation of immigrants."

The book's strengths lie in its sketches of Hmong American organizational life in locations off the beaten track in Asian America, such as St. Paul, Minnesota; Wausau, Wisconsin; and Mohnton, Pennsylvania. Vang introduces us to organizations like the Association for the Advancement of Hmong Women in Minnesota and offers engaging discussions of beauty pageants, New Year celebrations, and Christian churches. She also shows these were highly organized, tightly knit communities that placed a premium on maintaining "Hmongness"—which she stresses is dynamic and flexible—while responding to the challenges of growth and fragmentation.

In using historical and sociological approaches, Vang shows versatility and broadens the book's utility across disciplines. At times, however, her focus on community building and internal politics causes the historical backdrop—so integral to the first portion of the book—to fall away, and she misses an opportunity to contextualize the Hmong American experience against developments in late twentieth-century America. Additionally, due to Vang's emphasis on ethnic institutions, the dominant perspectives in the book are those of community leaders and academics, and we hear little from ordinary Hmong. Finally, this reviewer wished Vang had brought a stronger interpretive voice to her materials. For example, in a discussion of a 2007 controversy over the selection of a China-born contestant for the title of Miss Hmong America in Minneapolis, she states, "Permitting a non-Hmong American to represent Hmong Americans seems to discredit [pageant organizers'] previous emphasis on Hmong Americanness. Some may interpret this as a sign that culture is fluid; however, such practice could be viewed as this group placing higher value on ethnic affiliation than American citizenship" (p. 121). Much of her analysis proceeds in this manner, leaving the reader unsure of the takeaway.

Such comments aside, this is an important and needed book that advances Hmong American studies, Asian American studies, and refugee studies.

SHELLEY S. LEE
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BETH BAILEY. *America's Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2009. Pp. xi, 319. \$29.95.

In this book, Beth Bailey examines the origins and development of the post-Vietnam all-volunteer force (AVF). It is no easy task to write the history of an institution as large, complicated, and contested as the United States Army, but Bailey has done so with intelligence, grace, and wit.

The patently unfair Selective Service System of the Vietnam War era made the AVF possible. Bailey shows

how libertarian thinkers in the Nixon administration, rather than respond to criticisms that the draft forced minorities and the poor to serve in disproportionate numbers by mandating a system of equal sacrifice, emphasized the importance of liberty over equality, individual freedom over citizenship. Moreover, Richard Nixon believed that the military should have to compete for its employees by offering better pay and benefits. As such, the administration aimed “to replace the logic of citizenship with the logic of the market” (p. 4). Here Bailey does well to recover the history of a long succession of commissions and task forces in a way that holds readers’ interest by situating it among broader trends in American life.

The new all-volunteer force could not divorce itself from the times, and whether policymakers liked it or not, they had to engage questions of equality—not of equal sacrifice, but of equal opportunity. As unemployment soared in the mid-1970s, civil rights advocates pushed the army to provide equal access for African American men, even as others claimed that the army’s recruitment of a disproportionate number of black men in the AVF’s early years—thirty percent in 1974—contributed to the army’s decline in “quality.”

Although the army’s advertising campaigns strove to “portray an Army that young men might want to join” (p. 45) and stressed that the army was “not about obligation, but about opportunity” (p. 87)—ads emphasized skills training and travel to exotic destinations, featuring beautiful women—by 1980 the market approach seemed to be failing. Dreamy promises of travel went unfulfilled as recruits experienced the cold reality of training to fight and kill; low morale, increased AWOL and desertion rates, widespread drug and alcohol abuse, and a surge in crime marked the army experience. It looked like the AVF experiment had failed. Against the backdrop of Americans held hostage in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. military seemed weak and unprepared. Because “no one expected to fight a war with a volunteer force” (p. 128), President Jimmy Carter reintroduced draft registration.

Bringing back draft registration extended the inclusion dilemma more directly to women at a time when grassroots battles raged over the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). When Congress pushed the army to shut down the Women’s Army Corps (WACs) and to open the military academies to women, the army prepared for the “inevitable” imposition of more women into its ranks. But the idea that the amendment might, if ratified, mandate that women be drafted soon became central to the debates over the ERA and led to its defeat.

Army recruiting turned around in the 1980s thanks in part to an embrace of research and systems analysis, another recession, and growing distance from the Vietnam War. The memorable “Be All You Can Be” advertising campaign—which offered a “road to college” that included up to \$50,000 for education—finally put the AVF on solid footing. But then the Cold War ended, prompting calls to scale back military spending.

Just as the nation went through a recession during which “downsizing” became a household term, the army began downsizing too, cutting loose even those who planned on long military careers. In the last two decades the army has continued to reinvent its image: first, in the 1990s, as a force for good, which offered equal opportunity, education, training, and produced upright citizens and employees; second, by the time the United States went to war in Iraq in 2003, as a trainer of highly skilled warriors.

Although the army, like most Americans, seems to have let go of the idea that military service should be an obligation of citizenship, Bailey ends with only a brief challenge for readers to consider the implications of so few doing the nation’s fighting. Here one wishes Bailey had explored the cultural (and moral) implications of manpower mobilization in more depth. The AVF makes it easier for the United States to go to war, she notes, because the overwhelming majority of citizens can go about their lives totally untouched by its horrors. What does that tell us about the state of American militarism and nationalism? Further, Bailey could have dwelled at more length on what this brand of militarism says about American masculinity, family values, and the actual experience of serving in America’s Army. To be fair, such questions may require book-length answers and should not, therefore, detract from Bailey’s impressive achievement.

MICHAEL S. FOLEY
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GRETA R. KRIPPNER. *Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. xv, 222. \$39.95.

Since it burst onto the streets in September 2011, the Occupy Wall Street movement has drawn attention to the way in which thirty years of corporate and federal policies have funneled the fruits of economic growth to the wealthiest while the income of “the ninety-nine percent” stagnated and their indebtedness exploded. How did this happen?

In this essential book, Greta R. Krippner identifies financialization—“the growing importance of financial activities as a source of profits in the economy”—as a prime culprit (p. 27). Beginning in the 1970s, U.S. financial institutions shifted away from funding the production of goods and services toward activities such as consumer lending and trading securities and derivatives. Meanwhile, non-financial corporations increasingly shied away from long-term fixed investments in plant, equipment, and research and development. Instead, they too diverted funds into finance. The result was a surge in investors’ returns, an explosion in the compensation of financiers and stock-incentivized corporate CEOs, and a far more volatile economy periodically besieged by financial crisis.

Krippner begins with simple yet powerful quantitative analysis. While in the 1950s and 1960s, financial sector profits ranged between ten and fifteen percent of

total profits, they have accounted for roughly thirty percent of profits since 1980, peaking above forty percent in 2001. While the manufacturing and service sectors exchanged positions as the leading employer during the 1980s, the percentage of the workforce employed in FIRE (financial, insurance, real estate) never has exceeded seven percent of the workforce in the postwar period, even as that sector gobbled up an ever-increasing share of profits. Among non-financial corporations, portfolio income (earnings from interest, dividends, and realized capital gains) shot up beginning in the 1970s, approaching fifty percent of non-financial corporate cash flow in 2000 (p. 36). In other words, firms like Ford and General Electric generated more profits from the interest they earned from lending to customers or engaging in financial trading than they did from the sale of products.

Why did the turn to finance occur? State policy played a pivotal role, Krippner argues, although “financialization was not a deliberate outcome sought by policymakers” (p. 58). Her nuanced account understands financialization as the “inadvertent result of policymakers’ attempts to extricate themselves from a series of political dilemmas” resulting from the eruption of inflation in the late 1960s and 1970s (p. 27). With inflation and then stagnation, policymakers confronted difficult choices about the distribution of limited resources. As inflation became endemic in the 1970s, the savings of small savers lost value in real terms, for Regulation Q of the 1933 Banking Act limited the rate of interest FDIC-insured banks could pay to depositors. Many could not qualify for new, higher-paying instruments that banks designed to allow large investors to evade Regulation Q. At the same time, the interest charged on loans to acquire essential components of the American dream (like cars, consumer durables, and houses) climbed.

With the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and decisions to remove barriers to foreign investment, Krippner explains, policymakers of both parties relieved themselves of the increasingly “unpalatable task” of allocating credit through direct regulation. Fluctuating interest rates now determined access to credit. Over the next three decades, Americans willingly paid higher interest rates and borrowed more than anyone imagined. So did their federal government. Under President Ronald Reagan, deficits exploded due to steep tax cuts and increased military spending.

The market failed to curb demand because when interest rates rose, they attracted capital from both financial and non-financial corporations across the globe. Credit never became prohibitively expensive. As capital flowed toward U.S. borrowers and “increasingly speculative” financial activities, asset prices soared. Successive financial bubbles, Krippner instructs, represented inflation transferred “from the nonfinancial to the financial economy—where it was not visible (or conceptualized) as such” (p. 103).

In the aftermath of financial deregulation, monetary

policy became policymakers’ only remaining tool. Alan Greenspan committed the Federal Reserve to maintaining low interest rates in order to buoy asset prices in the 1990s and 2000s. But all that cheap and plentiful credit inflated first the dot-com and then the subprime bubbles. True, many Americans witnessed their wealth multiply (at least on paper) as stocks surged and housing boomed. But these bubbles also encouraged them to spend—and to borrow—even more to make up for their stagnant wages. Beginning in 2007, trillions of dollars invested in homes, securities, and derivatives evaporated, but individuals and institutions still owe the money they borrowed to acquire those assets.

Krippner’s brilliant book reveals that the United States never resolved the fundamental question of the 1970s: what does a just economic distribution look like? Financialization merely papered over it with debt.

Will economic recovery require that we turn back from finance? Americans may face no more urgent question. This book provides an essential historical background for those who dare to pose it.

JULIA C. OTT
The New School

ANDREW L. YARROW. *Measuring America: How Economic Growth Came to Define American Greatness in the Late Twentieth Century*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 2010. Pp. x, 240. Cloth \$80.00, paper \$26.95.

Over the last two decades, historians such as Alan Brinkley, Elizabeth Cohen, and Robert Collins have documented how economic growth and rising standards of living became the centerpiece of American political economy after World War II. Both the political Right and Left made growth the focus of their policy prescriptions even as they fought over how to pursue that economic expansion and how to share its benefits. Andrew L. Yarrow links this more familiar policy story to cultural history, showing how economic growth became the sign and gauge of American “greatness,” supplanting older political ideals such as liberty or equality.

While acknowledging that the United States has long been associated with images of material abundance, Yarrow argues that discussions of growth in the postwar era had a significantly different character. Instead of being grounded in broad, general visions of rich natural resources or Yankee ingenuity, postwar growth was explicitly defined, quantified, and tracked through new economic statistics such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Moreover, the celebration of growth was tied to a dramatic rise in the cultural prestige and political power of American economists who (so it seemed) had the power to predict and direct its future course. The cultural narratives of abundance in the postwar era were thus suffused with a relatively novel form of discourse (national income accounting) and a newly prominent set of experts (economists).

Yarrow’s account proceeds topically rather than chronologically, examining the emphasis on economic

growth in various domains. He begins by describing how the pursuit of growth became a dominant focus for American economists in the middle of the twentieth century, anchored by national income accounting techniques that were developed during the interwar period. Yarrow then highlights the centrality of growth to postwar American political debates and the salient role of economists, most notably through the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA, established as part of the Employment Act of 1946). Much of this narrative covers familiar territory, but Yarrow is keen to emphasize the public face of policy history: how postwar American presidents increasingly used economic statistics to define the success of their administrations and how CEA economists became minor political celebrities, pushing the mantra of growth in congressional testimony, press releases, articles, and speeches.

These changes in political discourse were aided and reflected in other arenas. Yarrow describes the promotion of a "people's capitalism" by various business groups—ranging from the conservative National Association of Manufacturers to the center-left Committee for Economic Development—which, despite their differences, placed rising productivity and economic growth at the center of American identity as a liberal capitalist nation. In this vision, American economic expansion demonstrated the superiority of capitalism and its benefits to American workers, who would share in rising living standards and new technologies. (Surprisingly, though, Yarrow gives little attention to how labor unions championed a similar narrative.) Likewise, growth became, in Yarrow's terms, the "big postwar story" for American journalism through the early 1960s, as newspapers and magazines revamped their content to make economic and business reporting a prominent feature, complete with lavish charts, graphs, and tables and heroic stories about leading economists. Finally, Yarrow examines the changing depictions of the United States both in American international propaganda and in history textbooks and educational films. This discussion forms Yarrow's most original and striking example, as he shows how educational materials shifted from emphasizing political values to placing free enterprise and industrial productivity at the heart of the American experience.

In Yarrow's view the mid-1960s marked an inflection point in the cultural history of growth as critical voices from both the Right and Left gained new traction in challenging the dominant postwar narratives. The fragile coalition that had supported a loosely Keynesian, growth-centered liberalism fragmented as skeptics on the left dissected the flaws of the postwar consumer society and conservatives attacked government intervention. Meanwhile, persistent poverty and the economic crises of the 1970s undermined public confidence in America's economic might and thwarted expectations that growth would prove a panacea for social and economic ills.

Though Yarrow is largely successful at intertwining policy history with the history of public culture, the

book is not without its limitations. Despite Yarrow's title and the significance of economic statistics for his overall thesis, he gives little attention to the creation and calculation of these numbers. In fact, arguments about the proper conceptual basis for national income accounting date back to the very origin of these statistics in the wake of World War II and encompass many of the same issues that would resurface in later critiques. Statistics, far from being simple compilations of unquestionable economic or social facts, are equally a form of cultural discourse, and Yarrow's valuable addition to the history of the postwar United States would be strengthened by historicizing the measurement of "economic growth" itself.

THOMAS A. STAPLEFORD
University of Notre Dame

NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES. *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. xvi, 340. Cloth \$90.00, paper \$28.99.

In November 1978, President Jimmy Carter signed into law the Amateur Sports Act, which included recognition of the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) as an independent non-governmental organization (NGO). A little more than a year later, in response to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, Carter announced that the United States would boycott the Olympic Games scheduled to take place in Moscow in the summer of 1980 if the USSR did not halt its invasion and promptly withdraw. "No one in the administration made any effort to contact . . . USOC officials until after the President had determined his policy" (p. 107). Neither the Carter administration nor the USOC made a serious effort to consult the athletes who had trained for years in anticipation of the games. After deciding on a boycott, Carter sent Vice President Walter Mondale to demand that the USOC vote against sending a team to Moscow. The USOC meekly complied. During the Winter Olympics at Lake Placid, New York, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance astonished and infuriated the International Olympic Committee (IOC) by insisting that the United States was determined to boycott the Olympics as a way "to preserve the meaning of the Olympics for years to come" (p. 124). The National Olympic Committees of Great Britain, France, and Italy defied their governments and sent teams to Moscow, but Chancellor Helmut Schmidt buckled under intense pressure from Carter and pressured Germany's National Olympic Committee not to send a team. Schmidt prevailed by a narrow vote. Whether the Moscow Games were a success or failure is still debated. Nicholas Evan Sarantakes concludes, a little too positively, "There is no question that the boycott did damage, but the athletic competitions in Moscow themselves were worthy of their Olympic name . . . No one in Moscow . . . really missed the boycotters" (p. 226).

His narrative history of a weak president's worst moments begins with the chauvinist public response to the

unexpected Winter Olympics triumph of the young and inexperienced American ice hockey team and then moves back in time to sketch an outline of the history of the Olympics through the IOC's decision to award the 1980 Olympics to Moscow rather than to Los Angeles. Sarantakes traces the inglorious career of Lord Killanin, the least capable of the IOC's modern presidents. (Killanin's determination to resist Carter's demand for cancellation of the summer games was motivated in part by his awareness that he had failed to avert a number of boycotts before and during the 1976 Montreal Olympics.) Sarantakes examines U.S.-Soviet relations from the perspective of Washington, where an unpopular president, burdened by the Iranian hostage crisis, faced electoral challenges not only from Ronald Reagan but also from Edward Kennedy. In contrast to those who have studied the 1980 boycott controversy mainly from an American perspective, Sarantakes looks into the affair as seen from Moscow, where Leonid Brezhnev, seriously ill with cerebral atherosclerosis, faced considerable opposition to his policy of détente.

The great value of this study is the almost day-by-day account of the Carter administration as it thrashed about in search of an effective nonmilitary way to deal with the USSR's unexpected Afghan intervention. The efforts of Carter's special envoy, Lloyd Cutler, are detailed with less ironic comment than called for by Cutler's abysmal ignorance about the Olympics. Commenting on Cutler's demand that the IOC cancel the Moscow games, Sarantakes observes, mildly, that "it became obvious to Killanin that the American did not know what he was talking about" (p. 114). Sarantakes is similarly restrained in his account of the "fiasco" (p. 117) that resulted when Carter sent Muhammad Ali to Africa to rally support for the boycott. Ali's uninformed public statements did "significant damage to the credibility of his diplomatic mission" (p. 116). In a chapter entitled "Civil Wars," Sarantakes skillfully describes Carter's abortive efforts to persuade Margaret Thatcher and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to compel from the British and French National Olympic Committees the abject compliance that Carter received from the USOC. He does justice also to Schmidt's dismay at the Carter administration's attitude that NATO allies "should simply do as they were told" (p. 121).

Although the study is focused primarily on the American boycott of the 1980 summer games, there are also rather cursory chapters on the games themselves and on the Soviet bloc's absolutely predictable tit-for-tat boycott of the 1984 summer games in Los Angeles.

The research devoted to the actions and motivations of the Carter administration is excellent. The same cannot be said for the research devoted to foreign sources. On the whole, however, factual errors seem to be few and forgivable. Nineteen photographs with informative captions illustrate the narrative. The English-language bibliography is extensive. There is also a useless epilogue with paragraph-length accounts of the post-1980 careers of the principal actors. Readers interested in

whatever happened to Carter, Ali, et al. should look elsewhere.

ALLEN GUTTMANN
Amherst College

JEFFREY CRAIG SANDERS. *Seattle and the Roots of Urban Sustainability: Inventing Ecotopia*. (History of the Urban Environment.) Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press. 2010. Pp. xiii, 288. \$30.00.

What makes Seattle the "Emerald City"? To some the label merely refers to the abundance of evergreen fir trees in the vicinity, and to others it refers to the environmentally sensitive urban population that ranges from skiing, mountain biking, kayaking yuppies to tree-hugging, unshaven, eco-raiding hippie throwbacks. Jeffrey Craig Sanders clearly explicates and defends the proposition that Seattle residents are indeed environmentally sensitive and argues that the postwar environmental movement originated in such grassroots, local, political, and social initiatives as occurred in Seattle after World War II. How Seattle became green is the topic of his book.

The author describes several instances of urban activism and rising environmental awareness, beginning with a description of the effort to preserve Pike Place Market. The market had started as a viable commercial link between the agricultural hinterland and the urban population in the early twentieth century. By the post-World War II period, the market had declined in popularity and usefulness as agricultural areas fell to suburban development and urban residents shifted their shopping habits from specialty shops and stalls to the increasingly ubiquitous grocery stores and shopping centers. The increasingly dilapidated Pike Place became the target of urban renewal and development efforts, but urban activists seeking to preserve and restore the market's value as a Seattle cultural icon, viable commercial center, and tourist attraction thwarted the efforts to tear it down.

Next, the author explains the development of effective neighborhood activism in the Central District of Seattle through the Great Society's Model Cities program. Whereas the Model Cities program faltered and failed in many localities, in Seattle the program developed into a vibrant political organization that trained many young activists who went on to long careers in the city's political life. Another type of activism developed out of the efforts to control the future use of the decommissioned Fort Lawton as urban open space. Native American activists clashed with middle-class Audubon Society members in debates over the appropriate uses of open space, which were finally resolved in a compromise that allowed both groups to control portions of the location.

The last two chapters in the book describe counter-culture activism centered on urban agriculture and community gardens, recycling and urban homesteading with the use of green building and remodeling methods, and outreach and education efforts through newslet-

ters, symposiums, and community center and home-based demonstrations. These counterculture efforts created in Seattle a version of Ecotopia. The book's epilogue chronicles the failure of the 1993 Seattle Commons urban renewal plan. New Urbanism theories in support of small "urban village" dynamics lay at the heart of the plan for the area north of downtown and south of Lake Union. Resistance to the plan arose in the "decaying," low-rent, Cascade neighborhood, which would have been destroyed in the urban renewal plan. Seattle's tradition of neighborhood activism rose up as Cascade residents and other community activists organized efforts to thwart the grandiose Seattle Commons plan. The activists were successful in defeating the proposal (the Cascade neighborhood gained a "historical neighborhood" designation), but they could not stop the process of gentrification that came to the area, raising rents and "repackaging the counterculture urban sensibilities" of Ecotopia (p. 231).

This book takes the small district approach to urban history and urban studies. It looks at particular places, neighborhoods, and locations in Seattle and then mounts a convincing argument that the sum of these particular case studies allows the author to make pronouncements about the city at large, labeling its society and culture as identifiably green. The other approach to urban studies is the metropolitan or big-picture perspective, which gives an overarching view, as if from on high, and tries to identify cities and their people in the aggregate. From this view of Seattle one would see clogged freeways, typical urban sprawl, national sports teams, ferry culture (maritime urban commuters), industrial and postindustrial booms and busts (tied to companies such as Boeing and Microsoft), immigration and emigration patterns, and commercial trade links (Pacific Rim issues). In other words, a book about Seattle that took the metropolitan approach would look very different from this one, not better, just different.

This is a good book. It is well written, well researched, smart, and convincing. Readers will learn a lot about Seattle's history and its identity as an environmentally sensitive place, populated by many eco-friendly people.

MICHAEL F. LOGAN
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PHILIP MIROWSKI. *Science-Mart: Privatizing American Science*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. 454. \$39.95.

Part history of science, part intellectual history, and part diatribe against all things "neoliberal," Philip Mirowski's study delivers a dizzying kaleidoscope of arguments about scientific and intellectual life in the modern United States and is bound to provoke and stimulate historians of science, higher education, economics, and modern thought. Structured around the curious narrative device of Viridiana Jones, a fictive naïf science professor to whom Mirowski explains the ways of the world, the book argues that since 1980, scientific practice in the United States and around the globe has

been profoundly influenced by the economic doctrines Mirowski collectively calls neoliberalism. Encouraged to profit from science, academic and corporate scientists and government policymakers have turned away from the vital work of cultivating a science base and instead chased a false idol of commercialization that has eroded both our economy and our ability to produce knowledge.

Mirowski sets his argument within a historical framework, identifying three distinct regimes of science that have dominated over the past one hundred years. The first regime, which Mirowski labels with a Veblenesque nod the "captains of erudition" regime, began in the 1890s and persisted until World War II. This regime was characterized by the emergence of the modern research laboratory within the corporation. These corporate labs often predated and outperformed university laboratories, and government policy toward science was largely hands off. All this changed with the advent of the Cold War regime, ushered in during World War II and persisting until 1980. Corporations continued to invest in scientific research and development (R&D), benefiting from military contracts. Yet it was the federal government, primarily through military funding and control, that drove science policy and created the academic research scientist. The Cold War regime emphasized the importance of basic science as a force that could defeat the Soviet enemy, showcase the intellectual freedoms of the United States, and result in broad social benefits. Mirowski focuses most of his attention on the third "globalized privatization regime," identifying six trends that highlight the move to privatized science: deindustrialization, the rise of the internet, the strengthening of intellectual property rights, the restructuring and outsourcing of corporate R&D, the withdrawal of the state as science manager and patron, and the state's choice to draw back from providing advanced education (p. 114). Most problematic of all, under the globalized privatization regime the character of scientific inquiry itself was transformed as science became an instrumental route to profit.

Central to Mirowski's indictment of the globalized privatization regime is his attack upon neoliberalism, which he identifies as the economic doctrines of F. A. Hayek, specifically Hayek's contention that the marketplace is the best possible information processor. According to Mirowski, the most consequential feature of this idea is that it collapses the distinction between markets for goods and markets for ideas. The mechanism enabling this collapse, and the place where neoliberal rubber meets the road, is the "fortification" or strengthening of intellectual property rights, a key precursor to the commodification of knowledge and the privatization of science. Mirowski argues that contrary to Hayek, the market can also produce disinformation or ignorance. His case study is the biotech industry, where the post-1980 move away from in-house corporate R&D and academic health centers has led to the rise of subcontractor firms responsive to their paymasters rather than the scrutiny of scientific peer review. This men-

tality has even seeped into academic science, Mirowski argues. He points to the rise of university technology transfer offices that encourage professors to market their research and materials transfer agreements (MTAs) that inhibit the flow of scientific information.

Is the rise of privatized, globalized science anything other than a natural transition from the foreign policy pressures of the Cold War to the fiscal pressures of the 1970s? Mirowski acknowledges that the Cold War regime could not last forever, and even if he largely gives a pass to the military's midcentury dominance of science, his book is not nostalgic. Yet there is a whiff of conspiracy about his discussion of the all-powerful neoliberal economists. While he does propose a bounded working definition of neoliberalism at several points in his text, at other times the cast of characters and ideas identified as neoliberal can be sprawling. Earlier and more focused attention to the science base, a critical concept that flits through the narrative, would have made it easier to grasp what was lost amid the changes Mirowski describes. For most of the book, however, Mirowski delivers a thickly institutional history of ideas that shows scientists enmeshed with the commercial corporation, the state, and the university. His account of how the balances between each have shifted over time raises important questions that deserve continued discussion.

JENNIFER BURNS
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KEITH POMAKOY. *Helping Humanity: American Policy and Genocide Rescue*. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books. 2011. Pp. xi, 235. \$70.00.

Nobody really knows what genocide is, and often there is nothing any country can do to impede it, but somehow the United States has managed to respond to it as promptly and effectively as possible every time. This is Keith Pomakoy's peculiar and unconvincing thesis.

Pomakoy highlights five case studies of U.S. responses to genocide. The first is Cuba. He estimates that 170,000 civilians died in the 1890s during the war between the Spanish colonial regime and Cuban rebels, and that figure "make[s] this a large enough catastrophe . . . to qualify the event as genocide" (p. 15). The United States responded; the U.S. public contributed generously to Cuban relief efforts, and the McKinley administration eventually resorted to military force to oust the Spanish. But does the Cuban experience even belong in a book about genocide? It is not until 180 pages later that Pomakoy finally concedes "it is not clear" if the Cuban episode was genocide (p. 197).

Pomakoy also cites Japanese atrocities in the late 1930s and 1940s as one of the case studies. However, he admits Japan's actions did not really constitute genocide as we know it, because they "probably stemmed from simple cruelty rather than from ideology" (p. 132). As a result, his Japanese "case study" occupies less than two pages.

The slaughter of the Armenians by the Turks, and the

mass starvation of Ukrainian peasants by Joseph Stalin each merit a chapter. Although Pomakoy contends there was nothing the United States could have done to interrupt the Armenian genocide, Near East Relief, a private agency, raised over \$100 million for the Armenians. By contrast, if the U.S. government had lodged any protest regarding the Ukrainians, Moscow would likely have ignored it, and humanitarian relief would have been blocked, he maintains.

Pomakoy's chapter on the Holocaust is his least coherent. He veers back and forth between defending Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration for not helping Europe's Jews and insisting that the Roosevelt administration did aid them. U.S. immigration policy "may not have been pretty," he caustically asserts (p. 139), but if the United States had opened its doors, that action "would probably have resulted in an uncontrollable exodus of Europe's undesirables" (p. 136). Yet, almost in the same breath, he refers to "the myth of closed doors," asserting that "America accepted over 150,000 Jews from the Greater German Reich before the start of the war" (p. 134). In fact, reputable historians have calculated that only about 75,000 Jews from Germany (and later Austria) were admitted to the United States between 1933 and 1939. Pomakoy does not mention that over 100,000 slots in the quota for German nationals sat unused during that period.

Pomakoy's survey of the U.S. response to Nazi genocide in the 1940s is likewise problematic. He says Roosevelt "[did not] suspect Hitler's plan to kill millions until too late" (p. 133); in fact, Roosevelt publicly confirmed it in December 1942, when most of the six million were still alive. Pomakoy claims that the United States could not have pressured German satellites to release Jews because Germany "had the power to enforce its will upon the satellite states" (p. 126); but Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary did defy the Nazis and spare Jews at various junctures.

Pomakoy argues that bombing Auschwitz would have been a mistake. His reasoning is novel if nothing else: since Japan committed war crimes without having death camps, the Hitler regime would have killed some Jews even if its death camps were destroyed; and if the United States bombed Auschwitz, it would have felt obliged to bomb all the death camps, and doing so would have "prolonged the war" (p. 147). In other words, if they could not save everyone, they should not have tried to save anyone.

As for responding to the ongoing Darfur genocide and future atrocities, Pomakoy proposes a new strategy: the international community should negotiate with war criminals rather than punish them, since "any dictator worth his death squad knows that [bringing war criminals to trial] represents an ideal that the community of nations has been unable to approach. . . [F]ew perpetrators have found themselves on trial" (p. 202). He seems to be saying, in effect, that since few perpetrators have been brought to trial so far, there is no point in trying to capture and punish any others. A book about the history of U.S. responses to genocide is not required

to include policy recommendations; but since Pomakoy chooses to go down that road, one wishes he would have come up with something a little more creative.

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CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA

PHILLIP DEHNE. *On the Far Western Front: Britain's First World War in South America*. New York: Manchester University Press. 2009. Pp. xiii, 280. \$89.95.

Interest in World War I remains robust. Far more than with World War II, scholarship has focused on Europe. Phillip Dehne's book is another in a series of welcome studies that expand understandings of the Great War beyond Europe. Dehne makes clear his aims early: to "integrate the hitherto disparate histories of the First World War, particularly the economic war, with those of imperialism, dependency, and national identity" (p. 5). It is an ambitious agenda.

While the book's title suggests that this is a history of British interactions with South America, in truth it is not. It is a study of British communities in Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. Dehne begins with Anglo-German antagonism prior to 1914. Contrary to historians who have emphasized British fears regarding American trade competition, Dehne argues that worries about the spread of German commerce preoccupied the British before 1914. This unease was felt by those whose sense of superiority rested not just on their longstanding commercial and financial supremacy in South America but also on their conception of a Greater Britain. Thus when the war began, men such as Sir Reginald Tower, the British minister to Argentina from 1911 to 1919, were appalled at the hesitancy of London's response. Tower wanted a full-blooded prosecution of the war, which would entail driving German raiders from the seas, purging German employees from British firms, and dismantling German control in trades such as coffee and grains.

Lobbying from the periphery overlapped with the rivalry between the Foreign Office and the Board to Trade for control of the economic war and ultimately led to the establishment of the Foreign Trade Department (FTD) in 1915. The FTD represented the triumph of the Foreign Office. Its chief weapon was the Statutory Lists, designed to prohibit interaction with firms that were suspected of German ties. Dehne shows that the FTD relied heavily on the input of the British in South America for compiling the Statutory Lists. In the first flush of war enthusiasm, some Britons resident in South America hoped that the conflict might be the vehicle through which their supremacy could be enshrined permanently. This proved illusory due, in part, to the entrenched strength of German companies such as Bunge and Born, which controlled much of the Argentinean grain trade. But it was also due to a lack of cooperation. The Americans were unresponsive to British prodding, while the Brazilian, Argentinean, and

Uruguayan governments harbored doubts to varying degrees. Conscious of American half-heartedness and seeing little that would benefit their peoples in furthering British commercial preeminence, their compliance was tepid. With the armistice, the Statutory Lists were abandoned and the FTD was soon dissolved. Notions of a Greater Britain receded as the 1920s waned. By the 1930s, the British position in South America was a shadow of what it had been in 1914.

Dehne is right to observe that little has been written on imperialism, economics, and the war—at least recently. Certainly Marxist interpretations from V. I. Lenin onward remind us that this once was a flourishing area of disputation. On the whole, however, the book fails to convince. Economic historians will be dismayed by the cursory analysis of the mechanisms at work in shaping the trading patterns between Europe and South America, irrespective of the war. Political historians will observe that most of those in London who heard the tocsin described by Dehne were well down the ranks of the great. There is little in this account to suggest that the heavyweights of British economic and political life ever gave any sustained thought to the "Far Western Front" or to the economic war thereon. Historians of imperialism will cavil at an account in which interaction seems to be represented chiefly by the complaints of British merchants and traders. If the British in South America were solidly in the camp that advocated a war to the bitter end, there was a price to pay for this stance postwar, and that price was exhaustion. The City of London had never favored war that led to prostration. But Dehne ignores the City, and the role of the "gentlemanly capitalism" of P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins in economic war and at the periphery thus remains unexplored. Nor will historians whose concerns include national identity feel satisfied. Consideration of what it meant to be British in South America, and to believe in the idea of a Greater Britain, largely disappears after the opening chapters.

So does the book succeed? It does broach new ground, it does try to challenge timeworn verities about the war, and it does suggest the multiple ways in which such complex issues as imperialism, economics, conflict, and national identity need to be tackled. Yet conceptual ambition outpaces execution.

MARTIN HORN

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MELINA PAPPADEMOS. *Black Political Activism and the Cuban Republic*. (Envisioning Cuba.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 323. \$39.95.

This book is based on little-known sources about black political activism during the years of the quasi-independent Cuban Republic (1902–1958). Melina Pappademos relies largely upon extensive research into articles published in black as well as mainstream newspapers, both national and regional; documents generated by elite black social, cultural, and mutual aid

societies and their loosely organized national coalitions; and oral history interviews. She places her detailed study into an overarching interpretation of the primacy of patron-client relations in Cuban politics. Black clubs, which never dared to call themselves political because of the violent governmental response to autonomous black political power, managed to promote the distribution of resources to the tiny Cuban black elite, some of which was then redistributed to its followers in return for delivering black votes to their patrons. Pappademos admires the relentless ingenuity of these black leaders and their efforts to advance their social, economic, and cultural image. She recognizes, however, that the elite's role in empowering the marginalized and intensely exploited black masses was minimal, pointing out that it was only with the organization of the Cuban Communist Party and the labor unions it led among cigar, dock, transit, and sugar workers that the struggle for the rights of the black masses emerged in Cuba.

Understanding this book requires some background in the extraordinary history of Afro-Cuba. The transatlantic slave trade continued well into the nineteenth century, and the abolition of slavery ushered in thirty years of warfare that brought about Cuban independence. Slaves, former slaves, and free people of color at all military ranks, including many officers, played major roles in these brutal wars. Despite the international respectability of "scientific" racism, Cuba's first constitution (1901) granted full equality, including the right to vote, to all Cuban men. These often sham legalities have been embraced by ideologues of a "raceless" Cuba that persists in Cuban political thought. Racism remained prevalent in Cuban society during the early republican period, as evidenced by the devastating and unprovoked massacre of blacks in the bloody "race" war of 1912. Pappademos passes over this racist heritage too lightly in her effort to minimize its impact on subsequent black protest in Cuba. She unjustly criticizes the pioneering work of Aline Helg, *Our Rightful Share: The Afro-Cuban Struggle for Equality, 1886–1912* (1995).

The author avoids overreaching in her interpretation, but leaves us with some unresolved questions. The biggest one is whether the clubs she meticulously studied could actually be defined as "black political activism," as signaled by the book's title, or were instead mechanisms for the control and repression of "black political activism." Another important question concerns the author's use of the term "black." For Latin America, and Cuba in particular, the term "people of color" encompasses shades of skin color that were and remain important. Nor does Pappademos use the term "Afro-descendant," pointing out that the black elite in Cuba rejected everything African. I suspect they would have rejected the term black as well.

GWENDOLYN MIDLO HALL
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MARISELLE MELÉNDEZ. *Deviant and Useful Citizens: The Cultural Production of the Female Body in Eighteenth-Century Peru*. Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 235. \$55.00.

Scholars of the colonial Andes willing to write a history of the body in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries would find the endeavor difficult to accomplish as the experience of corporeality is elusive in the sources. Depictions of individuals are uncommon, and stereotypical faces populate paintings produced in the period. Dissections, surgeries, and embalming were performed regularly, but if detailed observations were written down, they have not survived. Diseases were rarely described and, if so, such descriptions are often opaque. Although society was normally imagined as a body (the king was the head and the Indians the feet), real bodies seem to have remained unexamined in diverse treatises and artwork. It is safe to say that this overwhelming silence continued in the early eighteenth century. In the later part of the century, however, we find evidence of concern for the body both visually and in writing. Although Peruvian examples do not abound as in Mexico, some of those surviving are especially rich.

In this book, Mariselle Meléndez argues that in the eighteenth century the colonial body was seen "as a type of cultural text constantly written by those seeking to consolidate power and control" (p. 7). This work is not properly a history of the body in colonial Peru, but an interrogation of discrete texts to elucidate how the female body was represented using the aforementioned conceptual premise. The example of a rebellious woman and three texts are each the subject of a chapter. First Meléndez examines the political body as represented in the insurrectional activities, trial, and execution of Micaela Bastidas, the wife of the famous Indian rebel Túpac Amaru. Next the author focuses on the economically productive body, as depicted in Baltazar Martínez de Compañón's *Trujillo del Perú*. Chapter three studies the religious body through a close examination of a history of the monastery of the Trinitarias Descalzas de Lima, written by Sor María Josefa de la Santísima Trinidad (1783). The fourth and final chapter studies scientific approaches to the female body through an analysis of articles published in the *Mercurio Peruano* journal, the voice of the patriotic Sociedad de Amantes del País, an association that epitomized enlightened thinking in late colonial Peru.

Mercurio Peruano is a well-known publication and has been studied by a number of specialists, and the Túpac Amaru insurrection has been the subject of countless essays and books. Micaela Bastidas, as Meléndez rightly asserts, has remained a figure of secondary importance. The numerous watercolors commissioned by Bishop Martínez de Compañón are now accessible on the internet and have received scholarly attention. The history of the Lima monastery is much less known. Meléndez's analysis is original due to a focus on the female body and its place within the renewed project of colonial control brought by Bourbon rule. The strength of

the book resides in the author's use of cultural and literary theory to draw interesting connections between Peruvian sources and investigations about the body in similar or comparable contexts in Mexico and in Europe. The book's theoretical premise is better achieved in the chapters on *Mercurio Peruano* and *Trujillo del Perú* than in those devoted to Micaela Bastidas and the Lima monastery. Meléndez makes intriguing observations about the salient role fear played in Bastidas's political activism and personal life but seems uncritical of Bastidas's deep authoritarianism. The chapter about the monastery's history does not show whether the experience of religious women in eighteenth-century Lima was exceptional or unique as compared to that of nuns living in earlier centuries. This book's most important contribution resides in the questions asked about a subject in Latin American history that is still in need of further research.

GABRIELA RAMOS
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JAMES A. WOOD. *The Society of Equality: Popular Republicanism and Democracy in Santiago de Chile, 1818–1851*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 2011. Pp. x, 333. \$29.95.

There was a time when the common people seemed to have no place in the historiography of nineteenth-century Latin American politics. Only elite groups and warlords, it was said, took part in the decision-making processes leading to the formation of national states, relegating their plebeian counterparts to the passive roles of retainers, cheering crowds, or mere cannon fodder. Thanks to a series of studies carried out over the past two decades, this has changed. Often inspired by the subaltern studies perspective, recent scholarship has shown that peasants, indigenous communities, craftsmen, the urban poor, even slaves engaged actively in politics, bringing their own agendas, engaging in skillful negotiations, and exhibiting remarkable familiarity with the ideological idioms of the time. And when this interplay crossed the line between peaceful dialogue and violent confrontation, as so often happened in nineteenth-century Latin America, non-elite actions conformed more to thoughtful calculation than to blind and aimless instinct.

James A. Wood's study fits squarely within this growing field of scholarship. Focusing on Santiago's artisan classes, he reconstructs their early politicization from national independence in 1818 to the 1850–1851 formation and demise of the association that gives the book its title. Restoring continuity and depth to a process hitherto known mostly in fragments, the author proves that the Society of Equality was actually the culmination of a tradition that can be traced to the earliest years of state formation. Wood convincingly labels this tradition "popular republicanism," in line with a phenomenon that has been identified for this period in other Latin American countries, not to mention the United States and Europe. As in those other places,

Chilean popular republicanism appealed to citizen rights, prominently that of equality, that formed the backbone of an ideology anchored to the principle of popular sovereignty. Artisans thought such rights were fair compensation for mandatory service in the "Civic Guard," which aided the national state in keeping public order. These claims, however, were hotly contested by elite groups who were wedded to more exclusionary visions of republicanism, not a rare occurrence in nineteenth-century politics worldwide. The resulting tensions and debates that traversed Chile's emergent public sphere shaped the plot that articulates the book.

Among the many strengths to be found in Wood's study, there are three I would like to stress: its originality, its meticulous research, and its sensitivity toward the wider social and political context in which Santiago's artisan politics were situated. Regarding the first, this early period of plebeian politicization has been covered only fragmentarily, focusing mostly on salient conjunctures such as the implementation of the liberal 1828 Constitution, the raucous elections of 1841 and 1846, or the short-lived experiment of the Society of Equality itself. Giving these highlights due credit, Wood places them in a sequence that retrieves the full historicity of the process, thereby recognizing the artisans as true political agents rather than mere occasional sidekicks to elite politicians. This rests fundamentally on the book's second major accomplishment: the painstaking coverage of primary sources, especially the period's underutilized political press, which enables the author to fill gaps in previous scholarship. Finally, and in welcome contrast to some working-class historiography, artisans are placed within the wider frame of national state-building and international political trends. In particular, the author is careful to flesh out the connection between artisan groups and young upper-class rebels who were inflamed by the European revolutionary wave of the 1840s, a connection that led directly to the foundation of the Society of Equality in Chile.

Amid these very substantial achievements, one criticism that could be leveled at Wood's work is his choice not to engage directly in debates regarding popular political agency issuing from Chile's "New Social History." It is true that Wood has explicitly restricted his analysis to artisans, a group not typically prominent in a historiography more inclined to concentrate on the rural and urban poor at large. All the same, it will seem odd to Chilean readers that names such as Gabriel Salazar and María Angélica Illanes should appear only fleetingly in a book devoted to popular politics. As evidenced by his bibliography, Wood is fully familiar with these authors; hence, it must be assumed that he deliberately chose not to enter potentially controversial terrain. This qualification notwithstanding, Wood has written a fine book that stands as a welcome contribution to the growing literature on Chile's non-elite historical actors.

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LESSIE JO FRAZIER. *Salt in the Sand: Memory, Violence, and the Nation-State in Chile, 1890 to the Present*. (Politics, History, and Culture.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2007. Pp. xvii, 388. Cloth \$84.95, paper \$23.95.

Lessie Jo Frazier's book on northern Chile is superb. The work centers on the study of historical memory by Chilean specialists within and outside the country. Frazier focuses on the province of Tarapacá, once the center of prosperity based on nitrate exports, roughly from 1880 to 1930. She ties what happened then and in the early Cold War to the more recent barbarities of General Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990). Frazier shows how the contest to establish the meaning of the presidency of Salvador Allende Gossens and the Pinochet dictatorship reflects a much longer tale about the abuse of state power in the province, and how memories of official violence have been sustained, erased, or modified to suit ideological objectives. Her work is a brilliant addition to the historiography of military regimes in Latin America and to traumatic events in twentieth-century Europe.

The events following Pinochet's coup against socialist President Allende in September 1973 are now well known: the armed forces proceeded to kill thousands, summarily imprison and torture tens of thousands, and drive hundreds of thousands out of the country. Frazier, however, situates this story in Iquique, Tarapacá's major city and a birthplace of the nation's Left. She combines methodologies from anthropology, history, and literary analysis to show how the regime distorted the memory and objectives of Allende's government, turning a declining Tarapacá into a bustling example of neoliberal development, complete with a new shopping center and privatized white beaches. She does much more, however. Having visited the region since 1991, she gathered stories from the city's abandoned residents and nitrate laborers. Interviewees recount their memories of the army's killing of a thousand striking miners and family members at the Santa Maria School in 1907 and again at San Gregorio in 1921, in the neighboring province of Antofagasta, and at La Coruña in 1925. Frazier also interviews people who had heard these horrific stories from their parents and so carried haunting memories into the present. She weaves patterns established in the past, drawing connections to massacres implemented by the military dictatorship. After freeing Tarapacá of "subversion" and establishing an "authoritarian democracy," Pinochet made Iquique his second home, a refuge from repression and Chile's declining industrial base. She reminds us, in a particularly moving chapter about the city of Pisagua, that for decades a variety of governments made use of the city's isolation and harsh sun to detain leftists and homosexuals without due process. Indeed, it was in this remote region that the bodies of torture victims were found in 1990, preserved by the climate and chemical features of the soil. This event undermined claims by Pinochet's supporters that the dictatorship had been

waging war against internal subversion. Images of these murders created a public scandal uncovering the regime's true nature.

Frazier goes further than other scholars by linking the economic policies of Pinochet to the contested memories that followed his rule. She demonstrates that the coalition government, the *Concertación*, continued the dictatorship's policies and avoided confrontations with those who had committed murder and torture. In its two-decade tenure, it replaced the popular demand for "justice" with the official pursuit of "reconciliation" so that the tortured and their torturers could get on with their lives. Tens of thousands of Chileans struggled to deal with what they had endured; some victims were shattered by their marginalization. Frazier is critical of psychology, even though she borrows some of its concepts. According to Frazier, Chile's "psychologism" has led to "the appropriation of psychological terms and practices as part of hegemonic state projects" (p. 219). Chileans have moved on to the consumerism and neoliberal class structure that Pinochet and the *Concertación* imposed and sustained. In general, I agree with her, the new order tends to relegate the role that class struggle played in forging Chile to that of an "anachronism" without representation.

Current President Sebastián Piñera's billionaire fortune bloomed under Pinochet's rule. And yet, a dissident subculture remains. Frazier acknowledges this and we must remember her book was published five years ago. Over the last two years, and especially since August, high school and university students have denounced the educational inequities that perpetuate Chile's rigid class structure, creating the largest mass protests since the dictatorship. The U.S. press gives them little notice, but the students have raised questions of justice and not reconciliation; they do not hide their admiration for the militants who came before them. Left-wing demands have always been central to democratizing Chile. The contest is not over.

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EUROPE: ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL

PETER HUNT. *War, Peace, and Alliance in Demosthenes' Athens*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. xiii, 317. \$99.00.

In this book, Peter Hunt addresses the questions of how classical Athenians felt about issues of war and peace and their relationship to other states, what motivated them to make the decisions they did in these areas, and the extent to which they were swayed by pragmatic rather than idealistic or moral reasons. Hunt squeezes everything he can out of the extant literary evidence, especially oratorical, philosophical, and political works, and also applies modern theories of international relations and interstate law to these questions. Because no actual political speeches survive from the fifth cen-

tury, Hunt takes as his main body of evidence the surviving speeches of the fourth-century statesman and orator Demosthenes, although he fails to consider Demosthenes' last speech, *To Philip's Letter* (11), of 340, which is a surprising oversight as it called on the Athenians to go to war against Philip II of Macedonia.

The book has eleven chapters: an introduction explains Hunt's thesis, the evidence on which he draws, and his theories to establish it. Each of the motives Hunt puts forward to explain the Athenians' attitude to war and alliance is treated in its own chapter. Chapter two, "Economics," discusses the role of economic considerations in making decisions; chapter three, "Militarism," examines Athens' militaristic culture; and chapter four, "The Unequal Treatment of States," considers the types of states with which the Athenians dealt and ideological considerations such as ethnicity and religion. Two chapters follow on how relationships within the home and society may be applied to foreign policy. Chapter five, "Household Metaphors," discusses how the roles of household members were used to frame foreign policy, and chapter six, "Defense and Attack," connects an individual's right of self-defense to that of the state if provoked or even to act preemptively. The next three chapters are all to do with modern conceptions of international relations and law: "Calculations of Interest" (chapter seven), "Reciprocity" (chapter eight), and "Legalism" (chapter nine). Chapter ten, "Peace," discusses general attitudes to peace and whether the people preferred peace over war (that the Greeks, unlike today, never talked of a time when warfare would be abandoned gives a clue). The final chapter is a brief conclusion.

I was surprised to see no mention of Hugo Montgomery's *The Way to Chaeronea: Foreign Policy, Decision-making, and Political Influence in Demosthenes' Speeches* (1983), which also uses Demosthenes' speeches to discuss the workings of the democracy and what motivated people to make decisions. A problem always with symbouleutic oratory, Hunt's main body of evidence, is that we have only Demosthenes' speeches, and then only some of them (Hunt describes the pitfalls of oratory on pp. 15–25). True, some of Demosthenes' speeches refer to other speakers in a particular debate, but we have no idea what those who proposed alternative policies and reasons or motives said.

At times it seems that Hunt's conclusions are not quite as novel as he wants to make out. Thus in chapter two, the existence of different perceptions of war among the rich and poor strata of society, with the former less in favor of warfare because they had to pay for it, is hardly a surprise. Nor is the conclusion in the third chapter that Athens' "militarism" (military service and ability) was a major factor that caused the Athenians to go to war. An argument advanced in the fifth chapter—that Athenians should be like the men of the household and not women or slaves when dealing with other states—also seems obvious; the orators' use of analogy here is bound up with the Athenian attitude to masculinity and a call to the men to emulate the heroic

deeds of their ancestors. There is always a danger applying modern theories and considerations to the ancient world, and parts of chapters seven, eight, and nine seem strained. Hunt makes good points, however, about the orators' use of the balance of power argument (e.g., pp. 168–180) and is right to accept that international law was a Greek invention (chapter nine).

Hunt's book demonstrates that Athenians were guided by a complex web of motives in their attitude to war and alliance, could make sophisticated decisions, and, further, that an orator like Demosthenes crafted the content of his speeches accordingly. His book makes stimulating and provocative reading. At the end of the day, however, I would say that Athens' "militarism" plus Athenian dependency on imported grain to survive (dealt with in the second chapter, in which Hunt draws the analogy with countries that today depend on oil to function) explain the Athenians' attitude to war and alliance more compellingly than applying modern theories to the ancient world.

IAN WORTHINGTON
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BEZALEL BAR-KOCHVA. *The Image of the Jews in Greek Literature: The Hellenistic Period*. (Hellenistic Culture and Society, number 51.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2010. Pp. xiv, 606. \$95.00.

In this book Bezalel Bar-Kochva studies the references to Jews in the literary remains of twelve Greek authors of the Hellenistic period (ca. 300 B.C.E. to the first half of the first century B.C.E.). They are Theophrastus, Clearchus, Hecataeus of Abdera, Megasthenes, Hermippus of Smyrna, Mnaseas of Patara, the Seleucid court scribe (or Seleucid propaganda bureau), Agatharchides of Cnidus, Lysimachus of Alexandria, Posidonius of Apamea, Timochares, and Apollonius Molon. The whole is rounded out by an introduction, a conclusion, an extensive bibliography, and a detailed index. Most of the chapters appeared originally as articles in Hebrew journals in Israel; they have been extensively revised for translation and publication here.

All of the texts discussed in this book appear in Me-nahem Stern's *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism: Volume 1* (1974), so they are well known to scholars. What Bar-Kochva has done is to provide an extraordinarily thorough, philologically detailed, and literarily sensitive analysis of each set of texts. Much of his work is devoted to source criticism because none of these texts is extant in its original form; our access to them is second-hand, courtesy of quotations and paraphrases in later texts (mostly Josephus's *Against Apion*). From these fragments the interpreter has to try to reconstruct the content and contours of the original works, now lost, and to determine how the various parts fit together. Bar-Kochva excels at this kind of analysis. Particularly impressive are his discussions of the chains of transmission of the three main libels (as he calls them) against the Jews: the charge that they worship an

ass and/or that they have a statue of an ass in their temple; the charge that they annually kill and eat a foreigner and/or sacrifice a foreigner as a religious ritual; and the charge that their ancestors were lepers expelled from Egypt. Each of these three charges occurs in a range of ancient authors, and Bar-Kochva disentangles their literary interrelationships with ingenuity and skill.

The general scholarly view is that the earliest Greek authors (late fourth through third centuries B.C.E.) had positive views of the Jews, even to the point of admiration. But in the second century B.C.E., after the Jews entered the rough and tumble world of Hellenistic politics, the positive views became negative and the admiration turned to scorn. In particular, Antiochus Epiphanes's attack on the Jerusalem temple in the 160s B.C.E. and the subsequent battles between the Seleucids and the Jews, and between Greek city-states and the Jews, provided fertile ground for anti-Jewish stories. These stories were then picked up and developed in Alexandria to serve the needs of the anti-Jewish groups there, particularly in the first century C.E. Bar-Kochva does not dispute the truth of this commonly accepted scholarly trajectory but observes that there are exceptions to these patterns and that we must allow authors to express their individuality. In particular he argues that Posidonius, an important intellectual of the first century B.C.E., admired the "original" legislation of Moses, but decried the subsequent developments in Judaism (including the Jews' construction of an independent state at the expense of their neighbors).

In sum, this is an immensely learned book by an immensely learned scholar, a work to be consulted by all future students of this material. Since the author is such a careful philologist, one wonders why he refers to "Jews" throughout the book. Surely in many passages, wherever a text is speaking about the ethnic group whose homeland is Judaea, "Judaeans" would be a better translation. The author also occasionally uses the terms "anti-Semitic" in connection with some Greeks (see p. 3, n. 1), and "orthodox" in connection with some Jews, but surely these anachronistic terms are best avoided, even in quotation marks.

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HENRIK MOURITSEN. *The Freedman in the Roman World*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. vi, 344. \$99.00.

Henrik Mouritsen's excellent study fills the need for an updated synthesis on Roman freedmen. The book covers the centuries between the Second Punic War and the early third century, though most of the evidence marshaled falls between ca. 60 B.C.E. and 100 C.E.: that is, from Cicero to silver-age Latin. Geographically, the cities strung along the western coast of central Italy form the "Roman world" that comes under scrutiny. Mouritsen deploys an impressive range of epigraphic and literary evidence; Roman law is invoked when necessary, though the skepticism reserved for legal evi-

dence in this volume is severe indeed. Mouritsen prefers epistolary to moralizing and fictional literature, as even the irrepressible Trimalchio recedes into the background. There is no doubting what anchors this presentation of Roman freedmen: urban inscriptions.

Mouritsen opens with a compelling demonstration of the way that Roman ideologies of slavery shaped norms of manumission. Natural slave theory was conspicuously absent in Roman culture. Roman ideology, rather, insisted that slavery denatured the victim: the *experience* of domination made a person servile and thus the object of robust prejudice. Manumission was supposed to benefit, selectively, those who were least damaged by the trauma of slavery. Roman manumission was unusually generous, in that certain forms conferred full citizenship. Yet the open character of manumission must be contextualized in light of the peculiarities of the Roman *familia*. The master became a paternal figure by giving social life to the deracinated slave. Mouritsen consistently emphasizes the informal nature of the patron's father-like powers, which were "only partly enshrined in law" (p. 56).

At the center of the book, in every way, is a lengthy chapter on the practice of manumission. Here Mouritsen brings to bear his deep understanding of the epigraphic record. As he argues, the astonishing volume of libertine epitaphs is not a trustworthy source of demographic evidence and it is no reflection at all of the frequency of manumission. Yet this awareness is the central tension of this book, for Mouritsen regularly describes manumission as "very common" (p. 141) and "unusually frequent" (p. 143), while elsewhere we hear that "only a minority of slaves were freed" (p. 194). Compounding this tension is the fact that there was no single type of "Roman freedman." Roman slavery was a highly segmented institution; Mouritsen admits that rural slaves had vanishingly small hopes of freedom, so his focus is on the cities. The analysis is not explicitly situated within a model of Roman slavery writ large, and in that sense it is a deeply empiricist work. Throughout this study, we are in the midst of the high aristocracy and their slaves, from Cicero's letters to the great *columbaria* of the senatorial elite. This crucial segment of the slave system had its peculiarities: extreme specialization, commercial integration, and an abundance of male slaves. These slaves are also the most visible in the inscriptions. Mouritsen de-emphasizes manumission by self-purchase, testamentary manumission, and informal manumission, as well as contractual labor services between patrons and freedmen, all of which figure prominently in the legal literature but find exiguous documentation in the epigraphic record. Yet, to offer one counter-example, a thick docket of actual legal cases preserved in the *Justinianic Code*, falling just after Mouritsen's timeframe, suggests that relations between patrons and freedmen were indeed highly contentious and operated in the shadow of the law, at least among slaveholders less illustrious than the Cicerones and Caesares (which is to say, the vast majority of them). Mouritsen argues against a purely "ra-

tional" use of manumission as an incentive for labor; while he presents an evenhanded case (explaining, for instance, that some slaves freed at a young age must have been manumitted on the brink of death), the account would be more convincing if it reckoned explicitly with the internal diversity of the slave system.

For Mouritsen, integration within the elite *familia* was the key to the freedman's place in society. He argues, persuasively, that the social ascendance of freedmen was a "sponsored mobility." The corollary is that wealthy, independent freedmen have been overestimated; Roman freedmen became wealthy because their position in the *familia* gave them access to capital and patronage. In a final chapter, Mouritsen sensitively argues that the valorization of familial bonds—rather than a subconscious urge to advertise freedom—lies behind the great mass of funerary epigraphy produced by the libertine classes.

This book is the first fully reliable synthesis of Roman freedmen, but it is more than that. It is a powerful intervention in ongoing debates over the scale and nature of Roman slavery. This study emphasizes the importance of cities, commerce, and the *familia*. Given the compelling use of the epigraphic record, it is an intervention that should prompt considerable reflection. Ultimately, what must be decided is the extent to which Mouritsen's image—Latin epigraphy's image—of "the" freedman in the Roman world is fully representative.

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ERIC ADLER. *Valorizing the Barbarians: Enemy Speeches in Roman Historiography*. (Ashley and Peter Larkin Series in Greek and Roman Culture.) Austin: University of Texas Press. 2011. Pp. x, 269. \$55.00.

In the speeches they craft for their historical agents, historians of Rome sometimes criticize Roman imperialistic and colonializing practices. Eric Adler's monograph is devoted to this phenomenon. In order to explore the range of anti-Roman sentiments expressed, he takes a comparative approach, pairing Sallust's *Epistula Mithridatis* with the speech of Mithridates in Pompeius Trogus (as preserved by Justin); the Hannibals of Polybius and Livy before both Ticinus and Zama (and the corresponding speeches of Publius Scipio and Scipio Africanus); and the Boudicas, and their implied respondents, of Tacitus and Cassius Dio (as preserved by Xiphilinus). The six main chapters follow the same format. For each historian Adler explains why we can read the speeches (and the one letter) as free compositions, analyzes the relevant text in detail, and discusses parallel passages in the historian's oeuvre. Each chapter ends with useful recapitulation.

Although close reading comprises the bulk of the book, Adler casts wide conceptual and methodological nets, taking into consideration "recourse to fetial law; administrative corruption; greed and plunder; gender and sexuality; the 'Noble Savage'; ethnic stereotyping; and senatorial *libertas*" (p. 4) and "the historicity of

speeches; the use of orations in historical works; the import of emulation in speech composition; the potential reasons for authors' inclusion of orations in their writing," as well as who among the historians are more critical and who less so, and how their chronological or ethnic circumstances influence their views (p. 5). An appendix contains all the texts in the original and in English. The book has endnotes rather than footnotes, with the attendant necessity of flipping back and forth to see whether or not more than a reference is being given. The English was proofread more carefully than the ancient texts; in the main body of the book the most consequential slips are *societatem*. *Ab* for *societatem*, *ab* (p. 27) and a passage of Dio that runs past what Adler apparently intended (p. 148).

In the introduction Adler raises a central difficulty: in the absence of any direct evidence, how do we know how a contemporary audience responded to these speeches? After cataloguing our lack of resources, he shifts ground and suggests that we can follow the historian's own emphases (such as repeated themes and correspondence between speech and narrative) and adherence to protocols laid out in ancient rhetorical handbooks. Further, "the very existence of arguments in [the speeches] that strike modern readers as trenchant and persuasive speaks to the power of these rhetorical creations" (pp. 13–14). These modes of evaluation seem problematic: Adler repeatedly (e.g., pp. 22, 46, 108) imagines ancient readers comparing the contents of speeches with knowledge of events gleaned from earlier narrative material, but those same readers probably knew their own past far better than we do and accordingly could assess any account by multiple measures. Historians had many reasons for making speakers report versions at odds with the narrative, and, as Adler notes (p. 12), gauging ancient responses from ours is highly subjective, even if, one might add, modern readings were univocal.

They are not. For example, Hannibal refers to "having power over Roman prosperity" (Polybius 3.63.4; quoted p. 66). Adler does not see him as an imperialist, but there is a case for that interpretation. Adler finds "an explicit link between Roman moral failings and the Republic's unjust colonial administration" in Cato's address to the Senate. I had to reread, multiple times, the passage quoted (Sallust, *Catiline* 52.19–22; quoted p. 30) before concluding that Adler is referring to *foris iustum imperium*. To put it quantitatively, Adler can identify as significant three words plucked from seventy-six but gloss over a five-word phrase in a thirty-three-word extract. How indeed can we know what the historians intended or ancient readers heard?

The book sits uneasily in its scholarly contexts. By topic, it is trendy, and by approach it could make good use of the past quarter century's excellent work on the ancient historians as literary artists. Adler knows the recent literature but gets little mileage from it. For example, he summarizes the work of Andrew Laird (*Powers of Expression, Expressions of Power: Speech Presentation and Latin Literature* [1999]) on direct and indirect

discourse (p. 8) but regularly records *oratio recta* and *oratio obliqua* without commenting on why the usage matters (e.g., pp. 53, 65, 74, 76, 99, 103, 132). In general the book would benefit from scholarship since the “linguistic turn” of the mid 1980s, but Adler relies on earlier scholarly views.

The final chapter contains a careful catalogue of conclusions, the most important of which may be that the original audiences must not have recoiled when their historians included speeches critical of Rome (pp. 168–169). Generally speaking, Adler has brought forward provocative subject matter, but one could wish that he had expanded our thinking more.

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RAYMOND VAN DAM. *Remembering Constantine at the Milvian Bridge*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 296. \$90.00.

Constantine's victory at the Battle of the Milvian Bridge in 312 C.E. is a famous episode in both the history of the Roman Empire and that of Christianity. In the usual overview, Constantine felt slighted when he was not made emperor by the other tetrarchs (or college of emperors) upon the death of his father Constantius in the summer of 306. His father's army hailed him as Augustus, and later Constantine received official recognition as Caesar (in the tetrarchy the title of a junior emperor). Constantine ultimately invaded Italy to fight Maxentius (another Caesar who was the son of a tetrarch and Constantine's brother-in-law). Their forces met at the Milvian Bridge outside Rome on October 28 of 312. According to the standard narrative, which follows the church historian Eusebius, Constantine had a vision of a cross in the sky and (in Greek) the message that translates into English as “conquer by this,” followed by a dream in which Christ appeared to him and commanded him to display the sign that Eusebius describes as the Greek letters Chi and Rho superimposed one on the other. Constantine had his troops put the sign on their shields, made a battle standard of it, and won the battle. A few months later in 313 Constantine and the Emperor Licinius issued a law, often called the “Edict of Milan,” that granted toleration for Christianity. Thus, the Battle of the Milvian Bridge stands as a “turning point” in the career of Constantine and in the history of Christianity (which would become the *de facto* official religion of the empire by the end of the fourth century). Because of the seeming importance of the battle, modern historians have explored motivations and explanations for this event (as well as the vision/dream) that accompanied it. For instance, the eighteenth-century Edward Gibbon saw Constantine's faith going through a slow development, while in the mid-nineteenth century Jacob Burckhardt perceived Constantine as a Machiavellian politician who used Christianity to build his power base. In this stimulating new book, Raymond Van Dam, no stranger to scholars of late antiquity, closely re-examines the primary

sources for the event and argues that many authors changed and “suborned” their texts and that Constantine manipulated his own narrative of these events in reaction to those changes. As the title suggests, this book is about the reception, descriptions, and memories of the Battle of the Milvian Bridge—which Van Dam argues do not always convey what actually occurred.

The book starts with a timeline that is distinctively in reverse chronological order (foreshadowing Van Dam's argument about the constructed memories of our sources). Chapter one suggests “the past did not generate fixed memories; instead, memories constructed a past” (p. 9). In chapter two, Van Dam surveys medieval and modern echoes of Constantine and the Milvian Bridge (ranging from Clovis, to the Donation of Constantine, to Benito Mussolini's march on Rome). Chapter three treats pagan views of Constantine (such as those of Zosimus and Julian) and then introduces the major church historians who treat Constantine (Eusebius, Evagrius, Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, and Rufinus). In chapter four, Van Dam develops the relationship between Constantine and the memory of the vision and battle as described in Eusebius's *Life of Constantine* (*Vita Constantini*). He suggests that “The account of the emperor's vision and dream in [Eusebius'] *Life* hence represented three distinct layers of particular circumstances: Eusebius' remembrance of Constantine's memories of events from long ago” (p. 57). The relationship between Constantine's memory and Eusebius's descriptions is developed further in chapter five, which stresses how Eusebius changed his story over the course of decades in the different editions of his *Ecclesiastical History* (*Historia Ecclesiasticae*). Chapter six argues that Constantine changed his memory over time and was influenced by Lactantius's description in his *Death of the Persecutors* (*De Mortibus Persecutorum*), the arch of Constantine, and the Latin Panegyric of 313. In chapter seven, Van Dam develops evidence from the poet Poryfrius, Constantine's interaction with the church over Donatism, the lost arch at Malborghetto, and the gigantic statue of Constantine in Rome, suggesting that “the emperor's memories about his vision, his dream, and the military standard were not a source for Eusebius' account but rather a consequence of hearing Eusebius' account of his monuments at Rome” (pp. 200–201). Chapter eight marks an end to the critical analysis of the sources, but it challenges the construction of a new “master narrative” because all these sources “had their own agendas, which they could promote,” and “the lesson should be the realization that our modern narratives are likewise constructed” (p. 219). In chapter nine, Van Dam presents an examination of Maxentius as an emperor trying to follow the principate model of the early empire to curry favor with the elite of Rome, but whose reign was the last gasp of that model. Finally, in chapter ten, Van Dam recalls the ancient Roman legend, preserved by Livy, of Horatio Cocles defending a bridge against an Etruscan invasion and hypothesizes that Maxentius may have been trying

to emulate Horatius's defense of Rome when he marched out against Constantine.

This book is well researched and written in a dynamic fashion. Van Dam clearly knows the primary and secondary sources well. Although he cites the anonymous *Origo Constantini Imperatoribus*, he does not develop analysis of this unusual source from the late fourth or early fifth century, which describes the battle without religious implications. Van Dam could have wrestled more explicitly (p. 12, n. 18) with the argument of Peter Weiss that Constantine had only one vision (in 310) and that all the sources were describing that. Although clearly influenced by postmodernism, Van Dam writes so well that he can snare the reader. He is surely correct that Eusebius changed his description of the event in different editions of his works. The point that Constantine's own memory was shaped by Eusebius, Lactantius, and other sources is provocative, and criticism of sources is always useful to historians. It is not impossible that Lactantius, who had survived Diocletian's persecution and may have been at Constantine's court at the time of the event as the tutor of Constantine's eldest son, was reporting the official court line about the battle when he wrote two to three years later. Lactantius's description of Constantine's sign may have been an attempt to describe the Chi-Rho, but it is also similar to symbols of late Roman solar monotheism. The similarity may have been deliberate on Constantine's part, as recently suggested by H. A. Drake. So, perhaps we should view the interaction between Constantine and the primary sources as more of an intellectual dialogue than Constantine borrowing from them. In conclusion, Van Dam's book is a fascinating exercise that will provoke its own scholarly dialogue for years to come.

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FLORIN CURTA. *The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, c. 500 to 1050: The Early Middle Ages*. (The Edinburgh History of the Greeks.) Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 2011. Pp. vii, 365. \$135.00.

This very learned and detailed investigation represents an advance in the field. Florin Curta has undertaken an ambitious and urgently needed study of a very difficult and controversial subject and historical era: "the emergence of the economic and social structures in Greece between c. 500 and c. 1050" (p. 8), and his book reflects wide-ranging reading and reflection. Curta has written extensively about ethnicity and demographic change in late antique and medieval southeastern Europe, and he knows the larger historical, archaeological, and numismatic contexts. While the paucity of written (literary and epigraphic) sources is one challenge, Curta introduces much valuable numismatic and sigillographic evidence, and the chosen chronological span is a reasonable one.

There are, however, some questions about other basics. The resulting synthesis of detailed information

about Greeks in what is today's mainland Greece and nearby islands gives little attention to Greeks in Anatolia. Who were Greeks, and what was Greece? Not all Greeks were located in mainland Greece or the Aegean islands. There is no entry in the large index for Armenians, even though they intermixed with Greeks in Anatolia and the Balkans.

Among the book's major conclusions are that an economic contraction began ca. 620 C.E. (p. 97); identities were much more fluid than previously imagined, as Curta discusses similarities and differences in archaeological evidence associated with a range of social and ethnic groups; ethnicity was a measure of the cultural distance between inhabitants of the Byzantine Empire and barbarians (p. 295); there is no evidence for continuity between sixth-century aristocrats in Greece and "military men of the late seventh century" (p. 231); militarization of aristocratic identity and values went hand in hand with competition for imperial titles (p. 231); and nevertheless ethnic boundaries were important (p. 290).

Curta consciously investigates arguably the most contentious topic of Byzantine historiography in the past sixty-five years: aspects (in southeastern Europe) of the origins, nature, and chronology of the Byzantine "theme" system (military corps and their military corps districts). That entails risks. He also touches on another venerable and highly (almost equally) contentious issue: the continuity or non-continuity of the Greek people and the Greek language. Curta believes political and ethnic factors have been much exaggerated in the history of the Greeks for that period (p. 10). Although the answer may require a military explanation, Curta does not demonstrate mastery of the latest research and conclusions in this contested sphere. There is no historical consensus on military and social institutions in this poorly documented era. Military structures are not necessarily synonymous or identical with economic and social ones.

Curta argues for a new interpretation that emphasizes the role of the army, especially for sixth and seventh-century evidence (p. 92). He believes coin hoards are related to military movements in the late sixth century, but he is not a military historian; there are difficulties here. He offers a hypothesis, not a conclusively proven fact. Byzantine military institutions are especially obscure. Curta needs to explain military dimensions of his broader hypothesis more explicitly. The presentation is too vague and does not fit the latest scholarly interpretations of the Byzantine theme system. The military institutional technical term *thema/themata* or "theme" may not have appeared until the early ninth century. Curta, however, argues for the emergence of the "theme" of Hellas in the Byzantine Empire in the late seventh century (pp. 110, 125). The book contains many useful maps but, with the exception of the first two illustrations on fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-century fortifications in Greece, there are no maps of putative military administration and related structures in the territories he chose to investigate (pp. 276–277).

Curta draws conclusions from the absence of military revolts in (southeast European) Greece, but that phenomenon is explicable because the military forces stationed there during the period in question were not as strong as those in contemporary Anatolia, and so were not likely to prevail in any civil war.

Curta makes some surprising choices of editions and omissions of works, which detract from the otherwise impressive bibliography and footnotes, and he criticizes older Greek historiography and ethnography from the 1950s and earlier, although many of these works have been recognized as obsolete for decades. Yet Curta's book is now essential reading, even though it will probably not achieve consensus on disputed topics. There is no comparable book. Some of the challenges could have been remedied through better organizing and presenting of conclusions, and by avoiding lengthy references to archaeological evidence in the body of the text, which break up the exposition. As it stands, the book is too complex for assignment in most classrooms. The picture is imperfect, but it may be unrealistic to expect more.

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PAUL J. E. KERSHAW. *Peaceful Kings: Peace, Power, and the Early Medieval Political Imagination*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. xvii, 313. \$120.00.

"After the end of Rome's control over its western provinces in the fifth century, thoughts of peace occupied many minds. This book is about the changing character of that engagement and its place in the formulation of post-Roman political ideas" (p. 1). With these words Paul J. E. Kershaw introduces the central theme of his important book: how ideas about peace shaped kingship and royal ideology during the early Middle Ages. While earlier generations of historians often assumed that endemic violence and warfare characterized the so-called Dark Ages, Kershaw demonstrates "the sheer pervasiveness of the theme of peaceful rulership across the early medieval period" (p. 269). Kershaw's study makes significant contributions to scholarship on early medieval political culture by historians such as Janet L. Nelson, Gerd Althoff, and Timothy Reuter, and it also adds to recent work on the neglected topic of medieval peacemaking by Nicolas Offenstadt and Jenny Benham.

Kershaw's methodology focuses on a select group of early medieval authors and their contexts, paying close attention to "the vocabulary and the grammar of authority, its concepts, symbols, and vessels of meaning, as signs of rule and authority in 'real time'" (p. 12). Chapter one lays out the four interwoven ideological strands about peaceful rulership in the early medieval imagination: Judeo-Christian sources (Scripture, liturgy, and especially the writings of Augustine), legacies of the Roman Empire and the *Pax Romana*, indigenous northern European traditions, and authors' individual perspectives. Kershaw rightly emphasizes the key figure of Solomon as the typological model of peaceful king-

ship, thereby establishing a theme that runs throughout his study. Chapter two surveys the post-Roman successor kingdoms and explores how individual rulers and their courts (Vandal, Burgundian, Ostrogothic, papal, Visigothic, Merovingian) invoked the ideology of peace to legitimize their regimes and win the support of Roman populations. "When we hear the earliest generation of post-Roman rulers speak to each other, they often speak . . . about peace" (p. 92).

Chapters three and four constitute the core of the study: the ideology of the *rex pacificus* in the Carolingian eighth and ninth centuries. Here Kershaw covers much well-known ground (e.g., the *Admonitio generalis*, mirrors of princes, Alcuin, Ermoldus, Hincmar), but his focus on the pervasive theme of peace yields new perspectives and insights. While the ideology of peaceful Solomonic kingship already circulated around Charlemagne, it was under his son Louis the Pious that it moved to the center stage of Carolingian political thought. The fifth and final chapter crosses the Channel to Anglo-Saxon England and includes discussions of Bede, the First English *Ordo*, and the Old English translations from the reign of King Alfred. In a brief conclusion, Kershaw considers the enduring legacy of this ideology of peaceful kingship for the German Ottonian and Salian emperors.

There is too little space in this review to do justice to the many strengths of Kershaw's stimulating book, so a few highlights will have to suffice. Kershaw writes with clarity, verve, and memorable bon mots, and his footnotes demonstrate an impressive command of the scholarship. While he offers many good discussions of well-known early medieval authors, just as fascinating are his investigations into less well-known texts, such as the north African poetry of Dracontius, Ennodius' *Vita* of St. Epiphanius, Pope Nicholas I's letter to Khan Boris, and Bishop Wealdhere's "letter close" to Archbishop Berhtwald of Canterbury. This latter source highlights an intriguing subplot of Kershaw's book that deserves further research: the "continued importance of bishops as diplomats and peacekeepers in the post-Roman west" (p. 243).

It is inevitable that one has a few criticisms for a book of such ambitious scope. I found myself wishing for a more thorough consideration of the influence of Roman imperial ideas about peace, not only of the bygone pagan empire, but also of contemporary Byzantium. More generally, Kershaw leaves unresolved the fundamental question of whether this pervasive ideology of peace had any real impact on the political behavior of kings or if it was a mere fig leaf to cover the tough realities of power politics. Here a more sustained analysis of diplomacy and peace treaties could have been helpful. Kershaw does offer discussions of specific treaties such as Andelot (587), Strasbourg (842), and Alfred's treaty with Guthrum (ca. 878), but they are rather brief. Likewise, his short account of late Carolingian diplomatic summits (pp. 209–212) is a missed opportunity, since these meetings frequently invoked the ideology of

pax et caritas amid high levels of competition and mistrust among kings.

In sum, Kershaw has written an important, learned, and thought-provoking book that should be of interest to all historians of early medieval kingship, political culture, royal ideology, and the post-Roman West.

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WENDY DAVIES and PAUL FOURACRE, editors. *The Languages of Gift in the Early Middle Ages*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. xv, 305. \$95.00.

Most of the contributors to this collection of essays have been meeting to discuss early medieval history for three decades. During that time the group has published, under the editorship of Wendy Davies and Paul Fouracre, a collaborative volume on *The Settlement of Disputes in Early Medieval Europe* (1986), another on *Property and Power in the Early Middle Ages* (1995), and, with several changes in personnel, the volume under review. Framed by Janet L. Nelson's introduction and Chris Wickham's conclusion, both of which are written on behalf of the entire group, nine substantive essays examine gifts in a wide range of early medieval settings, including Lombard Italy, tenth-century Iberia, Carolingian Francia, and Anglo-Saxon England as well as Latin Christendom, Byzantium, and the medieval Islamic world generally. The main focus is on gifts to God and churches in the Latin West or the Byzantine East, although several essays treat gifts to and from kings and other lay people. Eight essays concern textual representations of gifts and one investigates images of gift giving.

Almost all of the essays reinforce at least one of the general arguments explained in the introduction and conclusion: first, Marcel Mauss was right in arguing in his *Essai sur le don* (1925) that "gifts represented, and (as one would say now) participated in the creation of, a social relationship and that sales did not" (p. 246). Second, although "the whole point about gifts is that one does not know exactly what will be returned (or, often, when) . . . gifts remain a main element in the construction of social bonds" (pp. 258–259). Third, early medieval gift giving coexisted with other forms of exchange, notably buying and selling (p. 5), which was "in ideal-typical terms antithetical [to it]" (p. 245). Fourth, although "gift-exchanging oiled the wheels of power at all levels" (p. 249), Pierre Bourdieu's critique of Mauss underestimated the role of gifts in "the construction of social bonds" and exaggerated the degree to which gifts were manipulated by the powerful for the purpose of dominating others (pp. 258–259).

In "Giving to God in the Mass: The Experience of the Offertory" (chapter two), David Ganz uses a study of the texts associated with the offering of bread and wine at the altar during Mass to show that "the altar became a privileged setting for gifts to God and to his church, because it was also the setting for the commemoration of God's gift to mankind: the sacrifice of the body of

Christ which he had enjoined all Christians to share in" (p. 18). Ganz further argues that because gifts to churches also were made on the altar and therefore assumed the same status as offerings of bread and wine, the very large gifts that the rich made to churches were viewed with unease by early medieval writers, who worried that they disrupted the community that the Eucharist presupposed (pp. 31–32).

Through an analysis of donor images in Byzantine art with particular reference to mosaics at Hagia Sophia, Leslie Brubaker's essay, "Gifts and Prayers: The Visualization of Gift Giving in Byzantium and the Mosaics at Hagia Sophia" (chapter three) argues that, at its most explicit, the visual language of giving to Byzantine churches "frequently forms part of a process of supplication to divine figures, and presumes a counter gift." At the same time, however, she points out that "the counter gift, the granting of prayers, is there (as indeed elsewhere in society) not necessarily certain" (p. 61).

By comparing Bede's stories about early gifts to Wearmouth and Jarrow in his *Historia abbatum* (ca. 716) with two other texts describing gifts to the same abbeys, Ian N. Wood's "The Gifts of Wearmouth and Jarrow" (chapter five) identifies several contested features of gift culture in seventh- and early eighth-century Northumbria. Of particular interest is his finding that Ceolfrid, an early abbot of this twinned pair of monasteries, found ways of evading his "obligations of reciprocity" to his benefactors (p. 107). Rosemary Morris treats the theme of reciprocity from a different perspective in "Reciprocal Gifts on Mount Athos in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries" (chapter eight), which shows, inter alia, how the language of gift giving (e.g., the representation of the gift as having been "freely given") could be manipulated in such a way as to represent as gifts what were essentially sales (p. 183).

Fouracre, in "The Use of the Term *beneficium* in Frankish Sources: A Society Based on Favours?" (chapter four), argues that "the granting of *beneficia* should be understood in the wider context of gift exchange," because it promoted "social bonding" and the exercise of political power every bit as much as gift giving did (p. 65). In this respect, his argument—which merits much closer attention than a short review permits—is neatly complemented by Nelson's discussions of the gifts made at Charlemagne's annual assemblies in "The Settings of the Gift in the Reign of Charlemagne" (chapter six), where she maintains that "what was on display [at these gatherings] was not just gifts but the relationships they made and symbolized" (p. 146).

Whereas several of the contributors emphasize the element of uncertainty in early medieval gift giving, Wickham's exceptionally well-theorized study of the *launegild* in "Compulsory Gift-Exchange in Lombard Italy, 650–1150" (chapter nine) examines a type of transaction in which it was certain that a gift would be made in return for a counter gift. Defining the *launegild* as "a compulsory counter gift, without which a gift was invalid and could be revoked" (p. 194), Wickham rejects the plausible-sounding view that only gifts ex-

changed for a token *launegild* were veritable gifts, whereas a gift exchanged for a valuable one was essentially a sale; instead, he argues that the insistence on using “gift imagery for what were normally not very ‘gifted’ transactions” was a sign of how much importance the parties placed on invoking the “social relationships” associated with every gift made in return for a *launegild* (p. 215).

In “When Gift is Sale: Reciprocities and Commodities in Tenth-Century Christian Iberia” (chapter ten), Davies shows that of 2,140 property transactions from tenth-century northern Iberia (excepting Catalonia), 1,085 were recorded as gifts and 912 as sales (pp. 222–223, 235). This statistical breakdown offers good grounds for Davies’s argument that gifts were clearly distinguished from sales, that countergift was clearly distinguished from price (p. 225), and that these two radically different modes of exchange coexisted in the societies under consideration. The stark opposition between gift and sale is qualified, however, by her finding that “between these two poles . . . there were many different kinds of transaction” (pp. 229, 235).

Because the contributors to this volume contest many conclusions of previous writers on medieval gift giving, their own conclusions are likely to be controversial, particularly when they are explicitly or implicitly based on debatable assumptions about gift giving itself and about the interpretation of gift language. Nevertheless, even the book’s critics will readily acknowledge that the contributors’ learned, well-argued essays have done a great deal to reinvigorate the study of medieval gift giving.

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EUROPE: EARLY MODERN AND MODERN

ELISHEVA CARLEBACH. *Palaces of Time: Jewish Calendar and Culture in Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 292. \$35.00.

Elisheva Carlebach is a historian who succeeds in re-fashioning herself in every scholarly project she undertakes. In her first book she reconstructed the career of a zealous heresiarch pursuing Sabbatian deviants. Through the prism of his life and thought, she was able to offer a coherent picture of the controversies associated with the messianic figure Shabbetei Tsevi in the first half of the eighteenth century. In her second book, she plunged into the personal experience of Jews who converted to Christianity in early modern German lands, unearthing and describing systematically a vast conversion literature hardly examined by earlier scholars. In the present volume, she moves away from heretics and converts to explore an essential feature of normative Jewish life in early modern Europe, especially in central Europe: the Jewish calendar and instruction manuals (*sifre evronot*) for determining the calendar.

As Carlebach argues eloquently in this handsomely produced volume, calendars offer a rich source for Jew-

ish cultural history in their merger of personal, sacred, and civil time. When examined carefully, they reveal the obvious but also subtle tensions between the need for economic and political integration with the religious need for separation that marked Jewish life for centuries. With their proliferation in the early modern period due to the printing press, calendars also provide an excellent case study of the transformation of Jewish culture through the agency of print along with the stubborn persistence of written manuscripts often accompanied by colorful illuminations.

Carlebach is not the first to explore the history of the calendar in Jewish history. The early history has been studied by Sacha Stern (*Calendar and Community: A History of the Jewish Calendar, Second Century BCE–Tenth Century CE* [2001]) among others. But Carlebach is the only recent scholar of early modern Jewish history to devote an entire monograph to this subject and to demonstrate decisively how calendars illustrate and enrich our understanding of Jewish culture in this particular era. She surveys the place of calendars and their evolution in medieval Christian and Jewish societies, describes the politics of calendars surrounding the reform of the Julian calendar, and demonstrates how print transformed a relatively esoteric pursuit into a mass medium. Her chapter devoted to the various manuscript “stand-alone” books copied long after the first printing of Hebrew books is especially striking. She is particularly sensitive to the implicit messages in both text and illustration: the need to underscore the antiquity of the Jewish calendar, to express nostalgia for a lost past, and to polemicize and respond to tropes of Christian culture. Her chapters on the marking of Christian time in Jewish calendars and the recording of market and fair days amply demonstrate the embeddedness of her sources in the culture of northern Europe. She also demonstrates how calendars uniquely reveal forgotten Jewish practices and folkways such as the caution not to drink noxious water during the equinox and solstice.

There is little to criticize in this highly original book. One might have hoped for a more extended treatment of the relationship between calendar study and the larger Jewish engagements in the study of the natural world, astronomy, and astrology. Surely the pious study of the laws of calendration provided incentives to some Jews to pursue the study of the heavens, especially in early modern times. One might also quibble about the lack of clarity regarding the calendar’s reach. Was the explosion of Jewish calendar production a phenomenon of early modern Jewish culture as a whole or was it primarily restricted to German lands? Carlebach offers some examples of calendars and *sifre evronot* composed outside of Germany, but she focuses primarily on the German lands, and most of her examples, especially the artistic manuscript books, originated from there. Was there something in this particular Jewish community that generated such creativity in comparison with southern and eastern Europe? Since rabbinic culture in the German lands in the early modern period was

dwarfed by that of the Jewish communities to the East, the author's emphasis on German calendar production requires more explanation.

Carlebach's epilogue contains some tantalizing indicators of the importance of calendar study beyond the early modern era, particularly in the interventions of modern luminaries such as Lazarus Bendavid, Leopold Zunz, and Joseph Perl. Surely these pages invite future study of the entanglement of calendars with the concerns and ideologies of modern Jews. By excavating a vital source of Jewish creativity in the early modern period, Carlebach makes a major contribution to scholarship of this era. In this insightful and attractive book, she demonstrates once again her originality and freshness as a master historian who opens up new vistas of learning and provides new insights into the Jewish past.

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ARNOUD S. Q. VISSER. *Reading Augustine in the Reformation: The Flexibility of Intellectual Authority in Europe, 1500–1620*. (Oxford Studies in Historical Theology.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 240. \$74.00.

This learned and engaging book explores the reception of Augustine in the early modern world across confessional and geographical boundaries. It is divided into three main sections, which deal respectively with the production, circulation, and consumption of Augustine's texts. In the first part, Arnoud S. Q. Visser examines the conceptualization and production of the first three major editions of Augustine's *opera omnia*: the 1505–1506 Amerbach edition, the 1528–1529 edition supervised by Erasmus, and the 1576–1577 Antwerp edition produced by a team of Catholic theologians of the university of Leuven. As for the circulation of Augustine's texts, Visser chooses to address it by analyzing two specific sets of tools: indexes and bibliographies on the one hand, and anthologies and epitomes on the other hand. Visser's detailed and lively examination of these tools casts new light into how different readers read and understood Augustine. In the final part of the book, on the consumption of Augustine, Visser employs two different strategies. First, through a fascinating examination of how some readers (including Thomas Cranmer, Peter Martyr Vermigli, and William Laud) annotated Augustine's printed texts, Visser shows how Augustine's arguments were interpreted, re-framed, and modified to suit distinctive intellectual and theological agendas. In this manner, as Visser puts it, studying the appropriation of Augustine from the readers' perspective becomes an "exercise in intellectual ventriloquism" (p. 138) that illuminates important aspects of the political and theological debates in post-Reformation Europe. Second, Visser shows how Augustine was used in the early modern confessional and political debates by analyzing two case studies: the Baianist controversy in Catholic Leuven, and the Arminian controversy in Protestant Leiden.

In its author's intentions, the book has three main aims. First, it seeks to "systematically ground Augustine's reception in the history of reading and the material culture of books and manuscripts" (p. 6). Second, it seeks to show the complex role that Augustine's theology played in post-Reformation confessional and political debates. Last, Visser argues that by examining how readers received and, in some cases, recreated Augustine, we can acquire "a more advanced understanding of the uses of intellectual authority in the early modern period" (p. 7). Visser's book brilliantly carries out the first of its intended aims. Through an erudite, penetrating, and insightful analysis of both the printed editions and the manuscript notes on Augustine's texts, Visser successfully integrates manuscript culture and book culture and reassesses the role of humanist scholarship in the confessional polemic. In line with the scholarship of Irena Backus, Simon Ditchfield, and Anthony Grafton, Visser's book demonstrates that the confessional pressure did not hamper but indeed "actually promoted new scholarship, sharpened critical awareness, and refined philological and historical method" (p. 137). When it comes to the broader question of the reception of Augustine in the theological and political debates, however, the book leaves something to be desired.

Scholars of early modern religion and politics have long been aware of the great flexibility with which Augustine and other authorities were stretched to suit different confessional and political agendas, and certainly Visser's engagement with the reception of Augustine cannot be exhaustive, given the scope of his work. Nevertheless, some of the examples that Visser chooses could have been explored in greater detail. For instance, what Visser calls the "confessional neutrality" of the Leuven edition of Augustine cannot simply be explained by the commercial need of the publisher to produce an edition with a broad appeal, or by the "moderate Catholic culture" and the political situation of the Catholic Low Countries in the 1570s (p. 59). In addition to these factors, Visser could have provided a fuller examination of the specific theological debates within the Catholic community in the Low Countries. Also, in this part of his book Visser might have provided a more detailed discussion of the complex attitude that different constituencies of post-Tridentine Catholicism had toward Erasmus's philology and theology. The lack of attention to theological specificity returns in the part of the book devoted to explaining the different faces of Augustine as they emerged in the Baianist controversy. Visser argues that Cardinal Robert Bellarmine engaged with Augustine by emphasizing "Augustine's exemplary virtues as a saint and fighter of heresy" (p. 125), as opposed to Michael Baius, who, in response to the Protestants, emphasized Augustine's theology of grace. In reality, however, the relationship between Bellarmine and Augustine was much more complex than that: it involved the very core of the Jesuits' peculiar understanding of the relationship between grace and free will

with respect to the rest of the Catholic world. All this, however, should in no way detract from the value of the book, which makes an important contribution to the history of reading and the material culture of books and manuscripts and to the significance of the relationship between erudition and confessional polemic in post-Reformation Europe.

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ULINKA RUBLACK. *Dressing Up: Cultural Identity in Renaissance Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. xxi, 354. \$55.00.

Ulinka Rublack's handsomely produced book is the latest in a series of scholarly works on European material culture that focuses on clothing and costume. Rublack contributes a new and needed dimension to the dialogue on early modern dressing practices. What is interesting and valuable here is that the author focuses her attention not on Italian or French or Spanish or English clothing and costume, which have a rich scholarly history beginning in the late twentieth century, but rather on the lands of the Holy Roman Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which she identifies as Germany. This work is an important contribution and an expansion of current scholarship that exposes the sartorial crisis of identity experienced during the time from European contact with the New World to the Protestant Reformation and beyond, thus taking the reader further temporally than previous studies of pre-modern clothing and costume have done. It demonstrates a breadth of historical research with literary value and accessibility. Rublack employs a social-science approach that has value for historians. Copious images (156 full-color illustrations of paintings, woodcuts, lithographs, and photographs of costume, and even a 1611 dollhouse) grace the pages of each chapter and make for an elegant presentation. Those enamored of visuals will be gratified by the book's offerings.

But how to write about dress coherently, providing a sense of the meaning of self-representation in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, and of the sartorial effects of the internationalization of contact, without overwhelming the reader? The author's long introduction ranges widely from twelfth-century Italy to seventeenth-century France, and includes eighteenth-century England, the Ottomans, and the Japanese, before finally focusing on the Germanic peoples after the opening of the New World. Here Rublack, like other scholars of European material culture such as Raffaella Sarti (*Europe at Home: Family and Material Culture 1500–1800* [2002]), Jerry Brotton (*The Renaissance Bazaar: From the Silk Road to Michelangelo* [2002]), and Susan Mosher Stuard (*Gilding the Market: Luxury and Fashion in Fourteenth-Century Italy* [2006]), is overly broad, including too many facts, sources, and varieties of consumer goods for consideration. There are so many random (but interesting) connections initially

made without developing a clear thesis that a coherent line of argumentation can be difficult to discern. This is frustrating for a specialist. Rublack's conclusion that it had become possible in early sixteenth-century Germany "and in this society alone, to believe in the importance of images" (p. 28) is difficult to defend, given the nature of the evidence she presents.

Chapter two does narrow its focus to one contemporary compendium of images, Matthaus Schwarz's unique sixteenth-century *Book of Clothes*, which begins with painted depictions of a young Schwarz, first naked and then wearing various ensembles from youth to old age. Rublack claims that a new "very particular sense of personhood" emerges at this time and place, where urbane men began to compile books not only of European costumes but also of those worn in lands recently discovered by explorers. One wonders whether this was perhaps a way of containing and controlling a violently expanded consciousness by organizing people by location, occupation, and gender (not necessarily in that order) for their own personal delectation.

Chapter three addresses the conundrum of how newly Protestant clergy attempted to design a proper costume that would distinguish them sartorially from Catholic clerics. While Martin Luther opined early on that clothes should not matter at all, a few years later he sported a red cloak, and the city of Wittenberg presented him with precious cloth and a gown of "purpur" (p. 97). Admitting that images from printed popular propaganda targeted primarily the papacy, Rublack writes that "it was less clear . . . how Protestants themselves should think about clothes" (p. 91).

Chapter four moves to investigate the ways in which "national" dress for an as-yet unformed German state could be conceived (this in an area of Europe that was struggling to show refinement in clothes without falling into the so-called "effeminacy" of Italian, French, or Spanish courtiers) while still demonstrating cosmopolitan tastes. How did a German present himself as an honorable person without reaching too far back into his humble past? This investigation is interesting and engaging. Rublack's primary text is Hans Weigel's 1577 *Trachtenbuch* (*Book of Costumes*), but she deals with multiple sources. At one point the author problematically uses woodcuts from Wolfgang Lazius's 1572 overview of how various nations dressed (*De aliquot gentium migrationibus*) as simple illustrations for humanist Conrad Celtis's 1498 *Germania generalis*, which tried to craft a patriotic sense of what it is to be German, without explicating the images themselves.

Chapter five takes up German images of the exotic, or the "other" compiled by a range of sixteenth-century travelers, including but not limited to Christoph Weiditz's *Trachtenbuch* (*Book of Costumes*), and the unpublished costume book of Sigmund Heldt, which Rublack characterizes as "an unparalleled example of early European ethnographic observation" (p. 187). She includes an explanation of the complex structure of the Holy Roman Empire and its necessarily convoluted marketplace politics and practices. The reader is thus

thrust into various ancillary (albeit interesting) topics that are tangential to dress. Germans are pictured as fundamentally honest, non-judgmental citizens of a newly enlarged world. The author seems eager to portray them as virtuous participants in an expanded European consciousness that did not judge the “others” found in exotic cultures but rather portrayed them as dignified human beings worthy of respect. Here, Rublack neatly packages an emergent German-ness, proud of its past but scrambling mightily to find a more cosmopolitan future within the larger, more urbane European milieu that it hoped to join.

Chapter six focuses on the Behaim family of Nuremberg, specifically on two of three brothers (Friedrich and Paul) studying away from home in Altdorf and Leipzig whose letters home begged for cash, not only for beer but also to purchase new clothes. Rublack employs Steven Ozment’s *Three Behaim Boys: Growing Up in Early Modern Germany* (1990), correspondence reminiscent of Florentine Alessandra Strozzi’s letters to her exiled sons. But why devote an entire chapter to it, especially as chapter seven, on “Bourgeois Taste and Emotional Styles,” also draws on Behaim correspondence to describe long-suffering mother Magdalena’s urban shopping tastes? These two shortish chapters on consumption could have been combined to good effect.

The book concludes with a long and unwieldy epilogue that touches on at least a dozen new topics related to clothing, consumption, and the marketplace. Again the reader swims in too much information. Among other things, Rublack claims that sumptuary legislation has been woefully understudied (p. 265), a conclusion not borne out by current scholarship. Contemporary scholars have been writing about this and other aspects of the history of dress for over thirty years now, beginning in 1981 with Jacqueline Herald’s *Renaissance Dress in Italy 1400–1500* and continuing with Stella Mary Newton’s *The Dress of the Venetians, 1495–1525* (1988), Daniel Roche’s *La culture des apparences: Une histoire du vêtement, XVII^e–XVIII^e siècles* (1989), and my own *Dressing Renaissance Florence: Families, Fortunes, and Fine Clothing* (2002). In 2012 there is no doubt that clothing practice is a valuable area of historical study.

Rublack’s intended audience is not exclusively the student or focused historian of dress, costume, and material culture. She is apparently aiming at a larger readership that includes the interested layperson, who will be entertained and engaged by the frequent digressions she allows herself on topics ancillary to dress, and dazzled by the richness of her visual presentation.

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Urs App’s book offers an account of eighteenth-century European (mostly French) thinkers who wrote on the religions and philosophies of Asia east of the Indus River, particularly the attempt to fit Hinduism and Buddhism into an overarching history of culture. The seventeenth century had seen a certain amount of European engagement with Arabic and Persian texts, and by 1700 there was a Jesuit-fueled explosion of interest in China (especially Confucius). It was during the eighteenth century, however, that the degree of European engagement with Indian textual traditions saw the greatest growth, from almost nothing at the century’s beginning to, by its end, the work of William Jones and others on the connection between Sanskrit and Greek. App’s argument mirrors that of the Enlightenment tradition in European Indology that he reconstructs. Enlightened thinkers from Voltaire onward used Indian ancient texts to “relativize” Christianity as part of an emergent comparative history of religion; App sees Indology as playing a key role in the creation of a non-Biblical universal history. This, App argues, is what cleared the ground for the nineteenth century’s “modern” Orientalism, a set of specialist fields distinct from Christian theology.

The chapters are organized as a series of case studies of a range of authors, many of them armchair travelers reliant for their Orientalist learning on the publications of more specialized scholars (mostly missionaries). Such writers sought to fit the newly available Asian philosophical texts into speculative genealogies of culture, arguing, for example, that what we now term Hinduism was really an “exoteric” form of what we now term Buddhism, that some Chinese Buddhist texts were really translations from the Vedas, and so on. These “key-to-all-mythologies” arguments built upon and transformed a much older comparative tradition. The Christian tradition had, since the Church Fathers, looked for the “figures” of a primitive revelation (or *prisca theologia*) in pagan religions, as evidence of the truth of Christianity. Eighteenth-century freethinkers used the same comparative structure to draw the opposite conclusion that Christianity was a local variant on older Eurasian mythologies. This broad narrative, familiar enough in Enlightened historiography, is fleshed out at length through App’s chapters on Voltaire, Bartholomaeus Ziegenbalg and Mathurin Veyssi re de La Croze, Denis Diderot, Joseph de Guignes, Alexander Ramsay, John Zephaniah Holwell, Abraham-Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron, and Constantin Fran ois Volney. App returns to, and casts new light on, a set of questions that will be familiar to readers of Raymond Schwab’s *La Renaissance orientale* (1950), and of more recent studies by (among others) Roger-Pol Droit, Sylvia Murr, Will Sweetman, Ines G.  upanov, Raf Gelders, Brijraj Singh, and Guy G. Stroumsa.

App’s history of Orientalism is very much a history of ideas, in which there is little space given to the practices that make intellectual production possible. Indeed, App occasionally implies (e.g., p. xi) that reestablishing the intellectual framework for eighteenth-century In-

URS APP. *The Birth of Orientalism*. (Encounters with Asia.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2010. Pp. xviii, 550. \$79.95.

dology is intended as a counterweight to the recent efforts to place European Orientalist discourse into social, political, and geographic contexts (efforts that might be traced back to Edward Said's work). By remapping the intellectual context for some discussions of India's ancient past by some prominent European writers, App's book may well redress one imbalance in the field, but in so doing, this approach neglects much of the colonial travel and textual exchanges—or what Miles Ogborn has called “the geography of writing”—that made the work of Voltaire and the like possible. Moreover, to imply, as App appears to do at various points (e.g., p. 186), that such an intellectual history refutes, rather than complements, the sociological approach, is something that some readers may feel requires further methodological discussion to establish.

App's book immerses its readers in the world of Enlightenment comparative religion and casts important new light on eighteenth-century European speculations about ancient Asian culture.

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ALEXANDER C. T. GEPPERT. *Fleeting Cities: Imperial Expositions in Fin-de-Siècle Europe*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2010. Pp. xvii, 398. \$95.00.

World's fairs continue to attract considerable scholarly attention. Books about exhibitions tend to fall into one of three categories: deep analysis of a single exhibition; broad comparison of several exhibitions; or theoretical frameworks for analyzing the exhibition phenomenon. Alexander C. T. Geppert's book is a study of five imperial expositions in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe that blends all three approaches with mixed results.

Fleeting Cities begins and ends with broad theoretical suggestions. Drawing on cultural critics such as Georg Simmel, Werner Sombart, Henri Lefebvre, and Mikhail Bakhtin, Geppert conceptualizes exhibitions as “metamedia”: that is, “means of communication that encompass and incorporate other communicative technologies” including “medicalization, visualization and virtualization.” He also characterizes them as “knots in . . . a worldwide web,” “spaces of modernity,” or, in the words of late nineteenth-century German art historian Julius Lessing, “nodes in the course of history” (p. 3).

Exhibitions, Geppert observes, undermined both time and space by juxtaposing past and present, metropolitan and colonial. They were transitory—that is, they generally lasted only a year or so—but exhibited “frozen times” (p. 245) in that they offered snapshots of the societies being displayed, whether historical or contemporary. And yet, even though the majority of exhibition structures were planned for demolition after the event's closure, “this temporality did not hinder them . . . from acquiring meaning, founding traditions . . . [or] creating legacies” (p. 5). Another novel line of analysis is Geppert's claim that these exhibitions “resembled their surrounding metropolitan areas” and

were often considered “cities within the city” (p. 221). Moving beyond the theories of Lefebvre, Geppert shows that “expositions had a catalytic effect on the city in which they were held” (p. 222), especially on transportation infrastructure, architectural construction, and global image.

Compared to space and time, however, people get short shrift. Although Geppert usefully distinguishes between five different groups of actors—initiators, organizers, participants, reviewers and observers, and visitors—their roles and responses emerge as a *mélange*, and at times a cacophony, of voices and visions. In typical postmodernist fashion, no one person's views are privileged over those of any other.

But this fits Geppert's broader view of exhibitions. He writes about the last of the five exhibitions he covers, the 1931 Exposition Coloniale et Internationale held in Paris: “It is a general feature of the exposition medium that . . . every attempt to find any kind of unified meaning is fatally flawed” (pp. 194–195). This theme recurs throughout the study, which also discusses the Berliner Gewerbeausstellung of 1896, the French Exposition Universelle of 1900, the Franco-British Exhibition of 1908, and Britain's Wembley Empire Exhibition of 1924–1925. Geppert does not explain, however, why he chose these particular five exhibitions. And because some were international while others more limited, the comparison is at times uneven.

The most valuable case study concerns the Berlin trade exhibition of 1896, the only significant exhibition held in Germany during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Not that businessmen and industrialists did not try to organize a grander and more international event, but the first attempt in 1882 fell victim to Otto von Bismarck's “personal objections as well as a general lack of support on [the] part of the government,” and a second attempt, a decade later, was abandoned due to Kaiser Wilhelm II's “brusque intervention” (p. 19) and his concern that Berlin could not yet rival Paris. Yet this is a very unsatisfying explanation. Failure of vision seems to have played a role, as did “provincial fear” (p. 33) and Germany's “comparatively marginal position as an imperial power” (p. 36), but much more likely was Germany's lack of a cohesive national identity, even after 1871. Geppert does not explore this possibility, however, perhaps because he is so dismissive of the “standard argument” that “expositions . . . were central instruments in the making of ‘national identities.’” In fact, Geppert finds “identity” to be a “conceptually vague, highly charged and worn buzzword . . . unsuitable for stringent historiographical analysis” (p. 14).

Yet in a subsequent chapter on the 1900 Paris Exposition, he does not contradict one contemporary observer, who claimed that “the principle of nationality . . . underlies the whole conception” (p. 85). In fact, the issue of nationalism and national identity haunts this book in complicated ways. As Geppert astutely points out, the Franco-British Exhibition of 1908 was characterized by opposition between the two nations, yet it occurred in the immediate aftermath of the signing of

the Entente Cordiale and also implicitly pitted the two nations together “as racially similar rulers of their respective empires, in contrast to the indigenous cultures represented there in a supposedly faithful manner” (p. 133).

Still, one of the more important contributions of this book is to question the periodization of exhibitions. It is often assumed that there was a fundamental break after 1900. Geppert suggests instead that the medium’s apparent decline—which, in any event, is not borne out in attendance figures—had to do instead with a shift in its function, and therefore in the meanings ascribed to it. Yet even here there are contradictions, for he later writes that while “large-scale exhibitions continued” after 1900, “their classical period had come to an . . . end” (p. 100). Nonetheless, *Fleeting Cities* adds considerably to the literature on world’s fairs and opens up many new important areas of inquiry.

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MICHAEL S. NEIBERG. *Dance of the Furies: Europe and the Outbreak of World War I*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. 292. \$29.95.

One of the best-known supposed facts of modern history is that the people of Europe cheerfully and with little reflection embarked on a course of mass suicide in the summer of 1914. Ever since the seminal publication of Jean-Jacques Becker’s study of France, a generation of historians working on national and local case studies have been trying to contradict, complicate, and nuance this story, but their findings have not until now been brought together in a single, full-scale transnational study. Michael S. Neiberg’s book constitutes both a synthesis of the scholarly literature and a thorough investigation of potential source material, published and unpublished.

The idea of mass “war enthusiasm” always rested on a shaky empirical foundation. In part it was a propaganda construct designed to marginalize internal dissent and impress allies and enemies. In part it was an intellectual construct drawing on ideas from social psychology about mass irrationality, best exemplified in the work of Gustave Le Bon. After the war it became a tool of various political and personal agendas, as an alibi for liberal politicians, as a mobilizing myth for the extreme right, and as self-glorification for pacifist dissenters.

Neiberg reveals the more complex reactions among a range of mostly middle-class contemporaries, both men and women, the latter usually neglected in studies of this topic. In order to understand reactions in 1914 he looks back to a series of diplomatic crises that began in 1905 and reminds us that there was no obvious reason why people should have believed that the July crisis would not lead via brinkmanship to the same sort of negotiated settlement that all its predecessors had. That it did not was essentially the decision of a handful

of men in Berlin and Vienna. The result was for most of the European population a horrendous shock. Although nationalism was not an insignificant force in society in 1914, transnational identities of religion, occupation, intellectual affinity, and increasingly consciously internationalist movements such as feminism and socialism also mattered. It was the outbreak of war and the apparent defensive imperative to protect a way of life from an external enemy that generated nationalist sentiment. But Neiberg suggests that any re-imagining in terms of national unity proved too often to be a superficial *burgfrieden*, a temporary truce of the fortress that lacked substantive support. Even by the end of 1914, mass death and the onset of serious economic hardship in many countries were creating palpable discontent. This is not the standard argument of the illusions of 1914 giving way to disillusionment because Neiberg is skeptical that there was ever very much illusion.

This reviewer finds these arguments both congenial and convincing and therefore feels obliged to raise possible objections. Although the objection that this is revisionism for its own sake is unhelpful, it is important to remember there were some sparks that created the smoke of nationalist enthusiasm. A section of the European population, largely young, male, and from the upper social echelons does seem to have genuinely welcomed the prospect of war, and there were certainly individuals of both sexes and all classes who saw it as a release from peacetime frustrations. Furthermore, as the older classic studies of Roland N. Stromberg and Robert Wohl have shown, there was a very widespread positive response to war among artists and intellectuals. Many religious leaders saw a redemptive value in patriotic sacrifice as a reproach to materialism. It was even possible to view the war as useful catastrophe that would destroy the old order and usher in a socialist or nationalist millennium, the view of V. I. Lenin or Patrick Pearse. The relationship between these “ideas of 1914” and mass opinion remains unclear: they certainly did not cause the war, but they would play a role in shaping the way the war and the peace subsequently unfolded. The weight of Neiberg’s primary evidence is heavily toward French and English-language sources, including translations from other languages. There is potentially a problem here in that these “mature nationalities” may genuinely have been more pacific and less militant than others, even perhaps sated as established imperial powers. The version of German history that appears in English and French might in turn skew the record. Against this it should be said that most serious studies of Germany seem to confirm the limitations of popular enthusiasm.

There is an important corollary to this, which Neiberg identifies. One reason that almost all Germans after 1919 were so embittered by the accusation of war guilt is that they genuinely believed that they had gone to war reluctantly and for defensive purposes. This was not a false memory but an accurate one for most people. At the same time the Entente powers were correct in in-

sisting on primary German government responsibility for the war that had inflicted such devastation. The real irony of Versailles was that it was the combination of these two rights that made a wrong.

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WILLIAM PHILPOTT. *Three Armies on the Somme: The First Battle of the Twentieth Century*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2010. Pp. xiii, 631. \$35.00.

British and Australian historians of World War I have long perpetuated a tradition begun by British wartime commanders like Douglas Haig and Hugh Trenchard: concentrating on the British experience to the exclusion or denigration of that of other powers, in particular their French allies. William Philpott has studied the experience and evolution of the British, French, and German armies on the Somme, which he terms the first industrial battle of attrition and *materiel* of many to follow in two world wars. He concludes that the Somme, rather than the sacrificial and wasteful bloodbath that historical accounts often portray, in fact constituted an Allied victory. The French Army waged the Somme battle successfully, and under the tutelage of French General Ferdinand Foch, the British Army, bloodied but unbowed, developed into a capable fighting force. The mobilization of their empires assured them of the ability to continue this war of attrition. The German Army, by contrast, had smaller reservoirs of manpower and resources and suffered irreplaceable casualties and a blow to its morale from which it never recovered.

The author argues his interpretation in convincing detail and with attention to the battle and home fronts. Philpott acknowledges that attrition started at the battle of Verdun, which he labels the "prototype" (p. 92) and the "grotesque, co-dependent, conjoined twin" (p. 93) of the Somme. He praises Foch as the only general intelligent enough to conceptualize industrial war as a succession of prolonged attritional battles. He further credits the French Army with greater sophistication in the coordination of infantry with artillery and aviation, which the British Army would have to learn.

Philpott suggests that the initial sense of July 1 as an "incomplete success," because the British had broken into German lines if not through them, had a certain validity, despite the enormous casualties. The British offensives of early July, casualties notwithstanding, constituted "an essential stage in creating a professional army" (p. 231). The Western allies demonstrated their superiority in the defining feature of industrial battle—the power of artillery—and undermined German morale in the wartime struggle for moral ascendancy.

By September, the turning point of the Somme, the British Army had completed its apprenticeship and could best the "professional" German Army (p. 347). That Germany had lost the initiative was evident in the German High Command's retreat to the Siegfried Line, the aerial offensive against Britain, and, most critically,

the desperate resort to unrestricted submarine warfare. The British and French had crushed Germany's confidence in its military supremacy. Foch had developed his operational scheme of a succession of grinding offensives that he would ultimately coordinate to defeat Germany in 1918.

The book is a refreshing revision of traditional interpretations of the Somme, although the author's concentration on the Somme to the near exclusion of its prototype or twin, the battle of Verdun, does pose some problems. Philpott marginalizes the importance of Verdun and particularly of French General Philippe Pétain, who developed allied infantry tactics for modern industrial war at Verdun and who early advocated the intensive use of artillery and aviation to support infantry. The book's subtitle further creates a logical conundrum. If Verdun and Somme were conjoined twins, the former providing the occasion for the initiation of attritional warfare and the latter a fulfillment of the former, why should only one be labeled the first battle of the twentieth century and the other virtually ignored? The answer lies in Philpott's observation late in the book that the Somme was "the British Empire's first great modern battle" (p. 459). The British bore the brunt of the Somme offensive, and in a war in which the French led the coalition, Philpott asserts, a "professional" German army was defeated by the "dogged determination" of British imperial forces and the "professionalism" of the French (p. 503).

American readers might reasonably question such a broad assertion in light of later American participation in the conflict. One might also quibble with Philpott's application of the term "professional" to the German Army, as all the armies engaged in the conflict of 1914–1918 were conscript armies with a core of professional officers. The German Army was certainly qualitatively superior to its peers, but, as Philpott correctly emphasizes, attrition eroded that superiority, while the Allied use of masses of artillery, airplanes, and tanks negated quality. Overall, Philpott's fine book makes a strong case for his assertion that in the struggle between Europe's industrial empires in 1914–1918, the Somme, of "seminal significance" in the conflict, was its "attritional fulcrum" (p. 542).

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DAVID REDVALDSEN. *The Labour Party in Britain and Norway: Elections and the Pursuit of Power between the World Wars*. (International Library of Political Studies, number 50.) New York: I. B. Tauris. 2011. Pp. xxiv, 206. £56.50.

Socialists in the early twentieth century were often curious about their counterparts in other countries, seeking to learn from others' achievements in propaganda, organization, and policy. Historians, too, have made implicit comparisons between the fortunes of left-of-center parties, criticizing particular movements for their shortcomings or celebrating supposed cases of ex-

ceptionalism. More explicit attempts to write comparative histories of labor parties are less common. In this book, deriving from his doctoral thesis, David Redvaldsen adopts the comparative route to determine "what factors made for success for a Socialist party" (p. 1). The successful example here is the Norwegian Labour Party (referred to as the DNA), which came into office in 1935 and introduced a program of social reforms before the outbreak of World War II. Its experience is contrasted with that of the British Labour Party, which had gained two brief periods of minority government before a calamitous split in 1931 administered a setback to its electoral progress. The Labour Party in Britain spent the 1930s rebuilding itself, achieving a dramatic landslide in the 1945 general election.

The book is concerned primarily with the 1930s, explored through a series of electoral comparisons pairing the British general election of 1929 with the Norwegian election of 1930, 1931 with 1933, and 1935 with 1936. A paragraph on some aspect of a British campaign is followed by a paragraph on related elements in a Norwegian election, a rather mechanical approach that presents disorientating juxtaposition rather than encouraging reflective critique. It also underplays some fundamental differences between these two constitutional monarchies and their respective political landscapes. Norway enjoyed proportional representation and fixed-term parliaments; across Britain's predominantly single-member constituencies, the scale of the national vote often bore a very indirect relationship to the numbers of seats won, while the date of a general election was normally chosen by the ruling party.

The monograph is based on primary research, drawing mainly on campaign materials at a national level. It prioritizes propaganda over policy and electioneering over party organization, even though Redvaldsen recognizes in his conclusion that organization mattered, and that one of the DNA's advantages was its far greater density of membership across the country. The discussion concentrates instead on documenting the election campaigns, comparing literature issued and money spent. There are tantalizing glimpses of distinctive approaches, including the DNA's commitment to the spectacular in this age of rallies and theatrical mass politics. But a great deal goes unexplained, including—crucially—the nature of the opposition that each party faced.

Redvaldsen emphasizes an interest in rural votes as something both parties shared. Yet the differences were huge. Under the Norwegian constitution, he explains, two thirds of the seats were allocated to the countryside; fishing was a significant industry and the average farm was so small that the DNA could reasonably target farmers as the "little people" it pledged to represent. When describing the British Labour Party's approach, meanwhile, Redvaldsen tends to assume that rural voters were synonymous with agriculturists. In fact, the political challenges of the countryside for the British Labour Party were as much about distinctive political cultures and traditions and physical obstacles to

organization and campaigning as they were about targeting a specific minority of the workforce. My assumption would be that, in parts of Norway at least, terrain, population density, and regional identities and customs would also have required certain adaptations from the DNA. However, the focus on central party campaigning and absence of local case studies produces a highly generalized impression. It is particularly disappointing that there is no discussion of rural Scotland, where fishing was a major feature of some local economies and patterns of land use had rather more in common with Norwegian experience. One might well ask why the DNA could make a successful appeal in rural Norway when there was no Labour presence to speak of in Orkney and Shetland.

It is difficult not to regard the book as a missed opportunity, since there is so little available in English on the history of the Norwegian Labour Party. Most readers will be dependent on Redvaldsen's account for a basic understanding of the Norwegian side of the comparison and may find themselves floundering as they attempt to gain a clear picture of the party's identity and experience during this period. In his introduction, Redvaldsen offers a useful and succinct discussion of the methodological challenges of comparative history. But his decision to eschew a contextual treatment of the two political nations at the beginning of the book was unfortunate. One needs to know much more about what Labour and the DNA did (or did not) have in common in order to understand the importance of their respective strategies in shaping political outcomes.

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QUENTIN SKINNER, editor. *Families and States in Western Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 211. Cloth \$85.00, paper \$29.99.

At the end of World War II, Europeans feared that the family, as much as buildings, factories, and governments, was in ruins. In 1946, British-American writer Alice Bailey alerted the American public about "those peculiar and wild children of Europe and of China to whom the name 'wolf children' has been given. They have known no parental authority; they run in packs like wolves; they lack all moral sense and have no civilized values and know no sexual restrictions; they know no laws save the law of self-preservation." Apocalyptic fears about the extinction of the European family proved to be unfounded, but they do reflect a constant theme in postwar European history. Such fears have inspired constant appeals to the state and civil society to "protect" the seemingly fragile bonds of kinship. And while the family has certainly survived the past sixty-five years, today's families would probably be nearly unrecognizable to Bailey and her contemporaries.

This new volume edited by Quentin Skinner offers a synthetic overview of these transformations, with a focus on the changing relationships among families, states, and civil society since 1945. The collection con-

sists of a theoretical overview by David Runciman and eight national case studies. Most of the essays are based primarily on secondary literature rather than new archival research, but they provide a fairly comprehensive overview of major forces shaping European family policies over the past six decades, including changing patterns of female labor force participation, demographic trends and anxieties, reproductive politics, the influence of religion and secularization, and the rise of the neo-liberal state.

Many of the essays offer trenchant critical perspectives on both the history of the family and contemporary family policies in Europe. Sarah Howard highlights the ways in which France's much-vaunted "benevolent" family policy favors the wealthy and the middle class. Tony Fahey demonstrates that changing attitudes toward family, gender, and reproduction in postwar Ireland developed within the Roman Catholic Church rather than simply against it. Maria Ågren challenges the assumption that social entitlements or rights are a unique feature of postwar welfare states, offering a *longue durée* perspective on family policy in Scandinavia. Deborah Thom's essay on Britain highlights tensions between the mobilization of a sentimental ideology of family values by politicians and growing state support for free markets. Paul Ginsborg looks at the conflict between traditional Italian family structures and democratization. On the one hand, his essay echoes some of the outdated assumptions of modernization theory, namely that individualism and the nuclear family are automatically linked to democratization. On the other hand, he also notes that the Italian case demonstrates that there was no "automatic connection between industrialization and new family patterns," and that many of the most successful Italian enterprises are family-controlled to this day (p. 112).

The division of the book into national case studies has the advantage of underscoring the diversity of European approaches to family policy, but tends to understate the degree to which family life and policies have been shaped by forces and social movements that transcended national frontiers—including Second Wave feminism and the gay rights movement, the Roman Catholic Church, the rise of consumer societies, immigration, decolonization, and the Cold War. More explicit comparison to other parts of the globe (such as the United States, Asia, or Latin America) might also have highlighted what was distinctive about European family policies and politics during this period.

The absence of sustained treatment of immigration is particularly glaring, given that immigrant families have been so heavily pathologized by right-wing political movements over the past several decades. The contributors specifically miss the link between the unflagging pro-natalism of West European family policies in the postwar era and the underlying persistence of ethnic or racial conceptions of the nation. Adam Tooze thus argues that "Germany's current predicament highlights the fact that the reproduction of the German state in the most basic biological sense depends on the free

choice by men and women to marry and procreate" (p. 82). In truth, the reproduction of the German state only relies on the willingness of men and women to marry and procreate to the extent that immigration is rejected as a solution to demographic imbalances.

The Cold War also makes only a brief cameo appearance in this volume. Tooze is the only contributor who analyzes the impact of the Cold War and the collapse of communism on family policies, arguing that a unified Germany gradually integrated former East German policies in support of working mothers into its own social welfare system. This more general absence raises the basic question of why Eastern Europe is excluded entirely from the volume. The very diversity of the cases included challenges the notion of a coherent "West European" model of family-state relations. While Cold War ideology certainly defined the evil of East European (and Nazi) totalitarianism in terms of the alleged absence of "private" family life in socialist societies, recent work has demonstrated that "private" family lives not only flourished in everyday life under late socialism but were actively promoted by socialist regimes looking to shore up their own flagging popular support. Without denying what was distinctive about East European family policies, it would be as revealing to compare the relationships among family, state, and civil society in Poland and Ireland or in Czechoslovakia and France as it is to compare Italy and the Netherlands. In any event, the family was certainly one of the primary objects of Cold War conflict, and the existence of the socialist "alternative" in the East shaped West European family policy more than these essays generally acknowledge.

Several essays could have benefitted from more explicit engagement with recent literature on the history of gender and sexuality in Europe. The authors tend to think about the history of the family primarily in terms of state policies affecting women and children. Men, however, also belong to families, and in the past six decades, state policies and civil society have dramatically shaped and transformed norms of masculinity and fatherhood. Likewise, heterosexuality generally appears to be a transhistorical norm in these articles. While several contributors (such as Howard) productively analyze public attitudes and public policy debates about gay adoption and marriage, the role of the state and civil society in reproducing heterosexuality is generally absent. Finally, some authors tend to treat the "public" and "private" spheres as real spaces rather than historically or discursively constructed ideals.

These issues aside, this volume could serve as helpful reading for undergraduate or graduate courses on the European family, and it offers useful contextual and historical analysis for anyone who seeks to understand the debate that continues to rage around the family in present-day Europe.

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WARREN JOHNSTON, *Revelation Restored: The Apocalypse in Later Seventeenth-Century England*. (Studies in Mod-

ern British Religious History, number 27.) Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press. 2011. Pp. xxi, 290. \$99.00.

Although there have been many books and articles published in the last two decades on apocalyptic expectations in Restoration England, there has not been a substantial overview of the topic since Paul J. Korshin's "Queuing and Waiting: The Apocalypse in England, 1660–1750" in C. A. Patrides and Joseph Wittreich, editors, *The Apocalypse in English Renaissance Thought and Literature* (1984). Now Warren Johnston has written a book based on deep and wide research into the period and early modern apocalypticism in general. However, his wide reading in the secondary literature cohabits oddly with his insistence that apocalypticism in the late seventeenth century has been understudied and its importance underrated. Although this was true at one time, it has not been the case for many years.

Johnston's work focuses on the sectarian and political relevance of the apocalypse rather than the influence of the apocalypse on the literary and intellectual "big names" of the period. Newcomers to apocalyptic studies, particularly those without a Bible at hand, will benefit from his summary of apocalyptic scriptures, which summarizes the relevant texts in the Book of Daniel, Second Thessalonians, First John, and Revelation. An opening, densely footnoted chapter on "Conventions in Restoration Apocalyptic Interpretation" establishes that mainstream interpretation drew from the works of scholars Thomas Brightman and Joseph Mede. The dominant mode of thinking about the apocalypse was historicist, interpreting most of the prophetic schema as descriptions of the history of the church to the present day and extending to the near future; millenarian, expecting a thousand-year reign of the saints on earth after the second coming; and anti-Catholic, seeing the papacy as the destined enemy of true Christianity. Within this schema there was wide room for disagreement on particular issues, such as the exact timing of events or the role of the Turks. There were also minority viewpoints: "futurist," which assigned the fulfillment of most of the prophecies to the future, and "preterist," which claimed that the prophecies applied to the early church. None of this will be particularly surprising to historians of seventeenth-century apocalypticism, but Johnston's explication of the different positions is extremely detailed.

Three chapters deal with the apocalypse as used in Restoration radical nonconformity, moderate nonconformity, and Anglicanism respectively. Radicals drew hope and inspiration from the apocalypse in their plans to overthrow the Restoration government and inaugurate the reign of the saints on earth. Much discussion of apocalypticism in the period has focused on radicals, so Johnston's discussion of more moderate religious positions is very welcome. Moderate Dissenters, not sharing radicals' hopes for immediate overthrow of the Restoration order in church and state, drew hope from the apocalyptic prediction of the triumph of the saints, while not usually taking action to bring it about. An-

glicans, most prominently the Cambridge Platonist Henry More, were able to use the apocalypse to buttress the Restoration order by, for example, identifying the "two witnesses" in Revelation, slain for their proclamation of the truth, as Charles I and Archbishop William Laud.

Two chapters deal with the apocalypse in relation to major political events, the Popish Plot crisis and the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Both incidents saw wide use of the apocalypse primarily in an anti-Catholic context. The "Popish Plot," the alleged conspiracy of Catholics to assassinate Charles II, was placed in a framework of Catholic plots against the true church that fit into the apocalyptic scheme. The accession of the Catholic King James II had obvious apocalyptic implications, and the revolution of 1688 was interpreted as a literal victory over the Antichrist. Anglicans as well as Dissenters interpreted the revolution in apocalyptic terms. The last chapter carries the story to the end of the century, finding substantial continuity with the pre-revolutionary period but also innovations such as a preoccupation with William III as a new Constantine and a growing interest in how French affairs fit into the chronological scheme.

This book is the product of wide reading in what are mostly obscure sources. (The book's enormous bibliography of both primary and secondary sources will be a starting place for researchers for years to come.) Sometimes Johnston's overall thesis gets lost in the analysis of obscure pamphlet after obscure pamphlet, and readers will wonder to what degree these pamphlets were actually read and what influence they had on people's thinking. The primary sources listed in the bibliography are exclusively printed works. Research in manuscript sources, such as sermon collections and spiritual diaries, would have strengthened the book by showing more evidence of how apocalyptic statements were received.

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GERALD MACLEAN and NABIL MATAR. *Britain and the Islamic World, 1558–1713*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 335. \$65.00.

Early modern English attitudes toward Islam, toward Muslims, and toward non-Muslims living in the lands of Islam all varied inconsistently over time and according to particular historical and regional contexts. Gerald MacLean and Nabil Matar have extensively and insightfully analyzed these English perceptions, revealing much of their complexity yet also tracing overall patterns by period, region, topic, and genre. In so doing, they enrich our understanding of English cultural history as well as English engagements with the religions and peoples of major parts of the Islamic world.

MacLean and Matar broadly differentiate English interactions chronologically and for each of three spheres of "*Dar al-Islam*"—literally, the abode of Islam (p. 123). For the western region of North Africa, English

oral and published captivity narratives of piracy and forced or seduced conversion to Islam disproportionately fired the English imagination. Muslims and Islam in the Barbary Coast thus appeared most dangerous and threatening, even after 1640, when MacLean and Matar find a shift in English discourse from the oppressed victim to the heroic Christian captive. This transition also led to growing interest in English military conquest of the region.

For the Ottoman Levant, in contrast, the more sober and businesslike reports of merchants, diplomats, and consuls described a more tolerant Muslim society, although these accounts circulated less widely in England and thus had less effect on popular culture there. Still, the context of bloody Anglican-Catholic conflicts over theology and religious practice shaped English popular attitudes toward Islam, as well as toward the diverse Christian, Jewish, and other religious communities living in Islamic lands. In their efforts to find local allies against both Roman Catholics and Muslims, however, "English writers failed to recognize how fissured [Eastern] Christian communities were: Armenian, Coptic, Maronite, Melchite Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Syrian Nestorians" (p. 162). Further, compared to England and the rest of Christian Europe, many cultures and religions coexisted within the Ottoman Empire, following their faiths with little conflict or suppression. Thus, in order to claim suppression by Islam and the terrible Turk, English literature evoked the Crusades or biblical antiquity in portrayals of the oppressed lives of Jews and eastern Christians in this region.

For Safavid Iran and Mughal India, which MacLean and Matar discuss less extensively, English accounts from the precolonial period show more uncertainty about religious identities and greater interest in commerce. Here, the relatively centralized coordination of the East India Company and the profit motive, MacLean and Matar argue, made Islam and Muslims less abstractly threatening in the English imagination. Overall, the authors show how uninformed the English (including those actually living in Muslim lands) remained about the doctrines of the various Islamic sects, even the basic differences between Sunni and Shi'ite.

In much of this fine book, the authors concentrate on especially significant or representative themes and topics. In one particularly fascinating section, they analyze the diplomatic and personal correspondence of Queen Elizabeth I with Moroccan kings, including Sherif of Marrakesh Mulay Ahmad al-Mansur (reigning 1578–1603), with Ottoman Sultans, including Murad III (reigning 1574–1595), and with Murad's wife and the future queen mother, Sultana Safiye (deceased 1605/1619). The rhetoric and even format of these letters adds a personal flavor to relations between the states. Later English monarchs, however, paid less attention to Muslim rulers and vice versa, with ambassadors from each side often receiving relatively little notice.

MacLean and Matar devote their final chapter to the cultural significance in England of imports from the lands of Islam. Coffee initially appeared in English pub-

lic culture as Islamic and thus simultaneously tempting and dangerously foreign. Conversely, tobacco, originally imported by Europeans from the Americas, evoked similar attitudes in the Islamic world. Another section, "The calico wars," shows how this supposedly Islamic cloth, like other exotic material imports, entered English life through "importation, imitation, and invention, followed by domestication" (p. 214). The authors conclude by showing how the English assimilated Islamic turbans and Arabian horses. While, the effects of the small but growing number of Muslim people who began to live in England during this period do not receive much attention in this book, Matar has considered them in earlier works, most notably *Islam in Britain, 1558–1685* (1998).

Through masterful use of a variety of original sources, including plays, books, pamphlets, archival records, and illustrations, MacLean and Matar make an innovative and persuasive argument. They demonstrate the diversity and complexity of English perceptions of both Muslims and Islam during this vital period in the development of English culture and its early relations with the peoples and religions of the Islamic world. A variety of scholars, students, and general readers will learn much from this accessible and well-informed volume.

MICHAEL H. FISHER
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JONATHAN SCOTT. *When the Waves Ruled Britannia: Geography and Political Identities, 1500–1800*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. xvii, 227. Cloth \$90.00, paper \$32.99.

So much nonsense has been written about British insularity that Jonathan Scott's book comes as a welcome antidote. Too many historians mistake geography for destiny and fail to understand that insularity is a construct, no less powerful for being rooted in the minds of observers. Scott is fully aware of this pitfall and avoids geographical essentialism. He knows that the British discovered islandness late and have never really dissolved their identification with the continent to the east. The early modern period saw an intense struggle between insularists and continentalists, and these differences have never really been resolved, in part because an absolute distinction between islands and continents is unsustainable. Britain's geographical and historical identities have varied enormously over time, determined both by internal events and international conditions. Britons have located their mythic origins in various times and places, some quite landlocked, others watery.

Scott is dealing here with both imagined geography and myth history. He brings to his study a wealth of knowledge about the literature of the seas, exploration and travel accounts, cartography, geography, early marine science, sea fictions, and even the art of seascape. And, like his fellow New Zealander J. G. A. Pocock, he is familiar with Britain's Pacific as well as Atlantic leg-

acies. Scott is as much concerned with metageographies as with spatial reality. His knowledge runs wide as well as deep. Readers will learn that the sixteenth-century English believed themselves to be the heirs not just of Athenians but of Phoenicians and Carthaginians. From the Greeks they adopted what Scott calls "maritime orientalism," which contrasted the freedom of island and coastal peoples with the despotism of the continental empires, starting with the Persians. Yet there have been long periods when the British thought themselves to belong more to land than sea. Like all seagirt peoples who live on both sides of the tide line, their relationship to the oceans has been ambiguous. Their claim to be a maritime people, a notion that gained strength in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, deserves the critical treatment Scott provides.

How did Britain finally come to settle on a maritime identity in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? Scott's explanation is partly political and economic. The key turning point was the Civil War, which pitted a landlubberly gentry against seagoing merchants. The latter were encouraged by the example of the Dutch, a rival but also a model of seaborne empire. Britain was but one of several European coastal societies that developed a blue water orientation in the seventeenth century. At first it saw itself as archipelagic, but with Captain Cook's eighteenth-century discovery of isolated oceanic islands it began to see itself in analogous terms. The British turned their backs on Europe in the Napoleonic period, and the fantasy of a true island nation peaked in the early twentieth century. But in the wake of decolonization after 1945, Britain again became firmly tethered to Europe, defined by geographers as a continental, rather than an oceanic, island.

Historians familiar with conventional political history may have trouble following Scott's convoluted story. He manages to connect points in time, sometimes ancient and even prehistoric, that are not normally associated with one another. Maritime historians concerned with fisheries and blue water navies may also find themselves somewhat at sea in a study that is more concerned with ideas about the oceans than what actually went on in them. If Scott's temporal range is refreshing, so too is his geographical scope. He takes readers to New Zealand, which had its own version of maritime orientalism in its relationship with its continental other: Australia. What is missing, however, is an engagement with the recent conceptual literature about oceans, islands, and continents. Scott is familiar with Philip E. Steinberg's *The Social Construction of the Ocean* (2001), but he might have found additional insight in Martin W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigen's *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography* (1997) and Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell's *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* (2000).

Nevertheless, this book is a very welcome addition to a growing British historiography that is less landlocked and parochial and much more relevant to this global era, when the seas have again attained a cultural, economic, and political importance that they seemed to

have lost during the great era of continentalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Science has made the sea its final frontier, and there has been a move in both the humanities and social sciences toward the oceans. This is not just a revival of the old maritime history, one focused on fisheries and navies. The new marine history is less blue water than coastal in orientation and pays closer attention to that which connects rather than separates land and sea. The waters have been muddied, but we now have a clearer understanding of our terraqueous globe.

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STEPHEN CONWAY. *Britain, Ireland, and Continental Europe in the Eighteenth Century: Similarities, Connections, Identities*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 342. \$125.00.

Stephen Conway, already known for two excellent monographs on the domestic social impact of Britain's wars of 1739–1748, 1756–1763, and 1776–1783, episodes often evoking xenophobia and negative national stereotypes, here turns his attention to the positive contacts and affinities between the British Isles and continental Europe. He presents this study as a reaction against an orthodox insistence on British separateness and difference, citing H. E. Marshall's *Our Island Story* (1905) and recent attention to transatlantic and worldwide dimensions of British history; but most recent British historians, echoing a project of Irish or British engagement with the European Union, have urged the opposite and emphasized British cultural contacts or even indebtedness. To point this out is not to doubt the existence of continental connections; it is to highlight the methodological difficulties of weighing the alternatives.

Conway offers a necessarily selective approach, focusing on certain themes. His political scene is set by the constitutional legacy of the revolution of 1688, but for Conway this event did more to establish connections than to dictate divergence, a conclusion reinforced by an examination of foreign policy and those who conducted it. The notions of "the balance of power" and "the liberties of Europe" both had leverage. The French threat prompted not only a reactive sense of difference in the British Isles, but also a sense of involvement in the fate of a Europe threatened by French dominance. From an early date, contemporaries acknowledged that finance and trade were interconnected across Europe, however much transatlantic trade developed later. European manners (expressing the ideal of "politeness") were similarly shared in Britain and Ireland, not least by a copying of French models. Scientists and scholars addressed a European republic of letters. British and Irish Christians saw themselves as part of "a wider European Christian community" (p. 162). British merchants traded with Europe and British armies fought there far more than they did with and in the world beyond.

Yet in each area there were negative reactions. The Orange and Hanover dynasties were hailed by some but repudiated by others. The involvement in continental war and diplomacy that followed 1689 was matched by the emergence of an alternative "blue water" strategy of maritime self-sufficiency. French fashions in clothes and French food were condemned as well as imitated. Did material influences "make members of the elite and even middling ranks think of themselves as Europeans?" (p. 124), asks Conway; but he does not present evidence that the British and Irish in this period debated this question or reflected much on a reified "Europe." Notions of "popery," "tyranny," and "French fashions" were not facets of a single Europeaness. Occasional eighteenth-century schemes for a common currency, a common army, and a common parliament or diet loom large from a present-day perspective but were then impractical rarities. Among scholars and intellectuals, the decline of Latin as a shared language may have reduced the degree of international interchange seen in the seventeenth century. A common Christian hope did not prevent antagonism and even conflict not only between but within denominations, and since the Church of England was a church hardly represented on the continent, the potential for a sense of common cause, like that open to Catholics, was limited for Anglicans. Grand tourists often learned little of their host countries. Such evidence also features in this book, and for reasons of method a balance sheet is difficult to draw up: we should instead see exceptionalism not as a thing but an idea.

This is a careful, empirical book, preferring specific and quantifiable instances, especially in war, trade, and travel. It is full of fascinating evidence, widely culled from printed and manuscript sources, and is a salutary warning against ideas of British uniqueness. Although it presents areas of difference, it comes down on the side of Britain and Ireland having been "integral parts of Europe" (p. 2) engaged in a trend "to further European consciousness" (p. 135). But it might be doubted whether a positivist methodology best captures either affinity or distinctiveness: *mentalité* is a term mentioned only once; literature and the arts feature only briefly; politics appears more in discussions of constitutional history than political thought or law; and religion is dealt with in a separate chapter, handled in the same positivist tone. Conway has much interesting material to offer, but his can seem an external view that does not always capture the inwardness of things. He also concludes with the striking reflection that "links with the rest of Europe might have been more important for the Scots and Irish than for the English" (p. 294), a possibility that, if explored, might challenge the book's main thesis.

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JAMES G. PATTERSON. *In the Wake of the Great Rebellion: Republicanism, Agrarianism and Banditry in Ireland after*

1798. New York: Manchester University Press. 2008. Pp. vi, 202. \$84.00.

The Rebellion of 1803 occupies a strange place in most narratives of modern Irish history. On the one hand, the rebellion created one of the mythic set pieces of Irish republicanism, Robert Emmet's famous speech at the dock, which closed with a phrase memorized by generations of Irish students: "When my country takes her place among the nations of the earth, then and not till then, let my epitaph be written." At the same time, the rebellion has always seemed strangely isolated, a distant epilogue to the drama and violence of the 1798 Rebellion. It is not that recent scholarship has been silent on 1803: both Patrick M. Geoghegan and Ruán O'Donnell have published well-received biographies of Emmet in recent years. The biographical focus of these works, however, has meant that the popular links between the events of the 1790s and the Rebellion of 1803 have remained relatively unexplored. One of the chief virtues of James G. Patterson's well-researched monograph is that it makes significant strides toward closing that gap.

Rooted in a close study of the voluminous Rebellion Papers and the State of the Country Papers, this book charts the survival of popular radical political networks across Ireland after 1798. It is organized around three regional case studies, which illustrate the complex legacies of the United Irishmen and the Defenders in east Ulster, south Munster and Connacht, and south Leinster in the years following the failed rebellion. Patterson's close attention to the complexity of the local landscape in each of these settings allows him to challenge significant aspects of the established narratives of post-1798 Ireland. His strongest case is east Ulster, where the traditional view holds that Dissenters who had been active in the United Irishmen in the 1790s flooded into more conservative pan-Protestant associations in the aftermath of the sectarian tumult of 1798. While Patterson allows that some Presbyterians made this journey, his careful research shows that tensions between conservative Anglicans and Presbyterian radicals remained far too potent in Antrim and Down to talk about a simple Catholic-Protestant divide. Patterson's narrative features stories of men like Thomas Archer, a Presbyterian who deserted the militia prior to 1798 and fought with the republicans at the Battle of Ballymena. Using court records, Patterson reconstructs Archer's post-rebellion career as the leader of a Presbyterian Defender cell that remained active in the field for nearly two years after the republican defeat. Archer's anti-loyalist career suggests that there was widespread disaffection for the new conservative regime in east Ulster, feelings that would only dissipate through coercion, emigration, and, above all, time. By focusing on these hitherto ignored narratives, Patterson illustrates the complexity and instability that characterized the north of Ireland in the aftermath of the rebellion.

Patterson's examinations of south Munster and Connacht and south Leinster also suggest that radical

politics survived 1798 at a popular level, often coalescing with agrarian concerns and/or social banditry. A thin source base (particularly for south Munster and Connacht) means that his assertions often are more suggestive than authoritative, but that does not make his pioneering research less valuable. What Patterson shows is that radical political networks survived in places like Cork, Galway, and Wexford in hybrid forms, sharpening anti-tithe agitation, giving impetus to anti-state "gangs," and transforming reactive protest into more violent and aggressive expressions. In tracing the legacies of the United Irishmen into different forms of collective protest, Patterson's work persuasively calls for a reassessment of the politics of popular protest in pre-famine Ireland.

There are certainly problems here. As noted above, the thin source base for the material on Connacht and south Leinster makes Patterson's arguments for those areas more primers for future research than definitive readings. Moreover, the book could have used a more effective editor. The writing at times seems repetitive and the analysis is not as fully developed as it might have been. That said, this is a significant book based on impressive and pioneering archival research and will be required reading for anyone interested in late eighteenth-century and pre-famine Ireland. By showing the potent and complex ways that radical politics survived at a popular level throughout post-1798 Ireland, Patterson's study forces historians to reassess the roles played by sectarianism and agrarian protest in Ireland before the famine. These are important subjects and we have Patterson to thank for bringing them back to our attention.

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JOSEPH M. FEWSTER. *The Keelmen of Tyneside: Labour Organisation and Conflict in the North-East Coal Industry, 1600–1830*. (Regions and Regionalism in History, number 13.) Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press. 2011. Pp. x, 222. \$99.00.

This book is a fine example of the good old labor history. It tells the story of the growth of labor institutions, of how wage-earning men used workplace organizing to battle exploitative, monopolistic employers encroaching on their livelihoods until the occupation they pursued was eliminated. In this respect it is quite good, the product of a lifetime's labor of love by a knowledgeable enthusiast. In others, however, it leaves a lot to be desired.

Joseph M. Fewster recounts the battle for control between the principal merchants of Newcastle upon Tyne and the men (and boys) who rowed small boats loaded with coal out to merchant ships waiting in the estuary. The keels were necessary because access to the coal loading zones was blocked by tides, an undredged river, and a low bridge. The merchants, many of them mine owners and magistrates, combined to form the Hostmen's Company, which controlled local politics and, by

extension, the local economy. A significant proportion of hostmen became the "fitters" who negotiated with shipmasters and provided the keels. It was demanding labor requiring brute strength to row the tiny craft out and then to throw the coal, normally between twenty-one and twenty-two tons of it, into the holds of the larger colliers.

Keelmen, many of whom were Scottish migrants, signed annual bonds with the fitters. Petitions or other attempts to raise wages were met with the advice that keelmen should renegotiate at the "binding time." Fitters did not feel so bound and therefore lowered the wage rate or raised the minimum load to suit changing economic circumstances. The keelmen aired grievances ranging from payment in bad beer to the fitters' failure to abide by contractual agreements. Their limited weaponry included petitions, strikes, appeals for legislation, and, on a few occasions, destruction of offending coal-loading staithes. They did have advocates, most famously Daniel Defoe and most persistently the attorney Thomas Hardy, but the asymmetrical nature of the power relationship between keelmen and hostmen meant that the former enjoyed only occasional short-term victories.

Fewster supplies a detailed analysis, but while the title suggests a seventeenth-century component, the period between 1633 and 1699 is swept aside in a ten-page chapter. The narrative truly begins in 1699, when keelmen petitioned the hostmen for a means of support in cases of unemployment, sickness, and old age. The result was a charity, controlled by the hostmen and funded by keelmen, which built a hospital. Attempts at cooperation between the two groups foundered, and the subsequent century and a half saw conflict flaring between the impoverished keelmen and their wealthy employers. By the 1850s, however, the combination of railways, river improvements, and new harbors brought the curtain down on "the most turbulent section of the workforce on Tyneside" (p. 187).

Fewster's book illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of a focus on labor organizations. It shows how one local case study can highlight trends in the bigger picture, though the focus on conflict does lead to a somewhat fractured view as the narrative jumps from strike to strike. Admittedly not the type of continuous organizing the traditional historiography claims as constituting true trade unionism, nonetheless Fewster makes every effort to shoehorn the keelmen's attempts at organizing into a narrative arc from the "embryonic trade unionism" (p. 1) of the charity to a series of fighting, if fleeting, unions. A more productive approach would have been to see the charity as one element of the wider struggle to understand and solve the challenges facing keelmen, part of the multifaceted, phasic relationship between owners and wage earners.

Exhaustive research notwithstanding, many questions remain. How did the keelmen survive when the river was frozen or their occupation otherwise impossible to follow? What happened to the benefit society formed in 1788? Did it supplant the charity successfully,

and what proportion of the keelmen became members? Were the Scottish keelmen migrants, or did they move permanently to Tyneside, and what did that mean for them and their families? How and why did the fitters create and enforce the bonded-labor system? As a detailed study of the keelmen and their organizations this is a nice book, but much is still to be written on the people who pursued the occupation, their families, their cultures, and their outlooks.

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WILLIAM M. MEIER. *Property Crime in London, 1850–Present*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. Pp. 236. \$85.00.

Crime in Britain, in England, and, indeed, in London fell significantly in the late nineteenth century but increased enormously in the twentieth century, transforming Britain into a high-crime society in which the very ubiquity of criminality is accepted. William M. Meier's book examines the reasons for this transformation through a meticulous examination of six different types of crime: burglary, shopbreaking, shoplifting, confidence schemes, robbery, and drug smuggling. Its central argument is that crime increased because of expanding technological opportunities and the democratization of criminal activity to the extent that both professional and amateur criminals were able to indulge themselves within an infrastructure of institutions—remand homes, borstals, and prisons of various types—which nurtured an incipient criminality more than it discouraged it. New forms of crime flourished, and “‘Cool Britannia’ has created crime in its own image” (p. 167).

One of my insightful lecturers of yesteryear, John Marshall, used to say that “crime statistics are a suspect category of a suspect breed.” Indeed, they do indicate the number of offenses recorded and changes in the law and undoubtedly reflect the numbers of police and their vigilance. Despite the present-day concerns of Howard Taylor that crime statistics are to some extent created to justify the role of the police and to serve their self-interest by providing a new and growing area of work, Meier suggests that crime statistics are real, with burglary rising despite the declining trends of the late nineteenth century, and drug smuggling growing from practically nil in the 1950s to epidemic proportions in the late twentieth century (p. 5). However, he also emphasizes that the concept of the existence of a “criminal class” did not long survive the nineteenth century faced with the ubiquity of crime in which professionals and amateurs flourished. He is most certainly right about the rising evidence of criminal statistics but surprisingly does not offer the weight of statistical evidence normally marshaled in a book of this type (except regarding the postwar spike in criminal statistics [p. 110] detailed in chapter five). Instead, Meier is much more interested in drawing colorful evidence from criminal cases. Evidently, burglary bucked the trend of decreasing crime

during the late nineteenth century, with new technologies effectively countering doors, locks, and safes. This was demonstrated in the famous Cornhill Burglary of 1865, in which £6,000 of jewelry was robbed from a Milner “thief-proof” safe. The changing laws, including the Penal Servitude Act (1853), long sentences, and release on license, all served to change the nature of attitudes toward burglary. Many burglars felt that a constant life in prison did not prepare them for anything other than a return to burglary: “stone-breaking and oakum-picking, provided no practical training for finding work upon release” (p. 26). In the twentieth century, new technologies encouraged shopbreaking. The development of the motor car allowed the rise of the “motor bandit” and “smash and grab” raids on jewelers and other shops, which became the fashion in the late 1920s and all the rage in the mid-1930s. These events provoked the Metropolitan Police to introduce “Flying Squads,” fifty-two new motor cars equipped with wireless and manned by specially trained police officers. In Meier's treatment, working-class shoplifters, such as the “Forty Thieves” who preyed on West End draperies and department stores' specialized high-value furs, rub shoulders with the exclusively male confidence tricksters and conmen. There were cardsharps, or “broadsmen,” who lounged around first-class hotels waiting for “young men who had money to burn” (p. 101). In the internet age, this has evolved into email phishing scams.

There are problems in the balance of this book, as Meier relates broader criminal statistics to his specific examinations of criminal groups. Indeed, in some sections the author could—and should—have gone further. Some of his findings may stem more from police actions to deal with the worsening crime situation. Meier informs readers that he has omitted sex crimes, murder, violence, white-collar crimes, riots, and forms of deviance other than property crime, awaiting another volume, perhaps by the author himself (p. 7). Indeed, the prevalent crime of street betting and using betting houses is barely mentioned. Nevertheless, this book is undoubtedly a fine debut monograph.

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JOHN E. ARCHER. *The Monster Evil: Policing and Violence in Victorian Liverpool*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. 2011. Pp. xvii, 281. \$34.95.

John E. Archer provides a fascinating and detailed analysis of violence in its myriad forms in Victorian Liverpool. As such, his book is part of a wider interest in violence and the “civilizing process” that has produced a flurry of recent studies of juvenile gangs in Birmingham, Manchester, and Liverpool as well as broader examinations of the “underworlds” of the two major northwestern English cities. Such detailed local studies are a welcome addition to the important, but more general, scholarship on nineteenth-century violence by Clive Emsley, Martin J. Wiener, and J. Carter Wood.

After a relatively brief introduction to the distinctive development of Liverpool, its reputation as “the most immoral of immoral places,” and the growth of the Liverpool borough police, Archer comes to his central concern: violent crime in the city, to which he devotes eight of the book’s thirteen chapters. Given the distinctiveness of Liverpool—notably its docks (with their reliance on casual labor) and its proximity to Ireland—it would have been most surprising, he argues, if Liverpool had not been a violent place. The various forms of violence—male-on-male, female, domestic, sectarian, gang—are considered in detail, but the analysis rests on a thorough and judicious examination of quantitative and qualitative evidence, which is presented in a highly readable manner. As one might expect from his earlier work, Archer is rightly skeptical of recorded crime statistics as an accurate measure of actual crime, and he is fully aware of the difficulties in making meaningful assessments of changes in the incidence of violence in the longer term. The cases that Archer quotes often make for very grim reading. Nonetheless, he concludes that Liverpool appeared to share in the “English miracle” of declining violence in the second half of the nineteenth century. However, early twentieth-century Liverpool was still a dangerous place, with high levels of female violence and the persistence of vicious gang conflicts arousing particular concern. Indeed, he argues that in some parts of the city there had been no significant change in the levels of violence. Archer is also concerned with responses to violence, and, particularly in the conclusion, he draws attention to the relative leniency showed to certain violent criminals, including child killers, as well as the absence of media panic about pedophilia.

There is much in this book that will be of interest to the lay reader wishing to know more about the violent past of Liverpool and to the academic (criminologist as much as historian) interested in the changing incidence of and attitudes toward violent crime in the nineteenth century. There are, however, a number of weaknesses in the book. Archer gives perhaps too much attention to Liverpool’s reputation as a site of violence, and it is not clear if local citizens (and even the author) found pride as well as shame in its notoriety. As a local study, it would have been interesting to see how Archer understood his work in relation to Michael Macilwee’s analysis of crime in Liverpool or Joseph O’Neill’s study of Manchester’s Victorian underworld. More generally, and even more importantly, further attention could have been paid to the wider context. Archer is too good a historian not to be aware of the literature on violence in Victorian Britain and not to be conscious of the difficulties of comparing one town or city with another. Nonetheless, it would have been valuable to see a more sustained comparison of, for example, Irish violence in its various forms in Liverpool, Middlesbrough, and Wolverhampton. Similarly, the discussion of court attitudes toward male violence in the later nineteenth century would have benefitted from a comparison with

the work of Barry S. Godfrey et al. on gendered sentencing patterns.

Finally, there is a sense in which Archer is the victim of his ambition. The book’s subtitle refers to “policing” as well as “violence” in Victorian Liverpool. The latter is covered thoroughly and thoughtfully, the former less so. It would be unreasonable to expect a detailed analysis of the development of the local police, but more could have been said about changing police attitudes toward violence (at both upper and lower levels) and the way in which this impinged on the policing of violence in the city. The references to actual policing—or, more accurately, non-policing—of violence offer fascinating glimpses but require further detailed analysis and contextualization in the secondary literature. Despite these limitations, this is a well-researched and well-written book that will be of interest to a range of readers interested in the history of violence in one of England’s most notorious cities.

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BRENT E. KINSER. *The American Civil War in the Shaping of British Democracy*. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2011. Pp. 191. \$99.95.

This study addresses one of the most mythologized of subjects: the influence of the American Civil War on British politics. It centers on four “literary politicians”: Thomas Carlyle, Anthony Trollope, Walter Bagehot, and John Stuart Mill. Brent E. Kinser’s readings are lively and make some bold claims, but are let down by a poor grasp of context and a surprising inattention to language.

For Kinser, British attitudes to America fell into two broad camps. For “liberals,” “America was the ‘hope’ of a bright and democratic future,” while “conservatives” saw in the United States the “dangers of . . . democracy” (p. 6) and longed for its “abject failure” (p. 69). Secession inspired “elation” in “conservative journals,” which hoped that it would “quiet the voices for democratic reform in Britain” (p. 2); but with victory for the Union, “the time had come for the expansion of suffrage in Britain.” With the passing of the Second Reform Act in 1867, “the [British] working classes were now also to be ‘free’” (p. 48).

There is much myth and misconception here. The fiercest critics of democracy were men who saw themselves as liberals. They aspired to a form of government that was sensitive to public opinion, free from class interests, and respectful of personal freedom, and it was by this standard that democracy was found wanting. Nor was “conservative” opinion as hostile as Kinser believes. Disraeli thought democracy “eminently suited” to America, while *The Times* hailed the United States as Britain’s “proudest historical monument.” That secession “should be the end of the great American Republic” was “a prospect against which every friend of humanity and progress would gladly close his eyes” (quoted in Robert Saunders, *Democracy and the Vote in*

British Politics, 1864–1867: The Making of the Second Reform Act [2011], pp. 143, 153).

If the Civil War was held to have exposed the weaknesses of democracy, it does not follow that the Union victory showed democracy triumphant. The United States in 1865 had just emerged from four years of fratricidal bloodshed in which perhaps 600,000 Americans had died. As *The Times* asked its readers, was “not the fact that war was necessary . . . some slur on the representative system of the States?” (*The Times*, 6 April 1866, p. 8). With half the states under military rule, a president being impeached, and new conflicts brewing over Reconstruction, American democracy was hardly an object for emulation.

The idea that the Second Reform Act was a response to the North’s victory holds little water. Reform had its own, indigenous history in Britain, but Kinser’s grasp of the subject is unconvincing. The Third Reform Act is credited on one page with “the adoption of universal manhood suffrage” and on another with allowing “one in three British males to vote” (pp. 126, 163); neither is correct. A third attempt, dating universal male suffrage to 1914, is also wrong (p. 163). The 1859 reform bill did not “eliminate rural freeholders from the electorate” (p. 94), and Thomas Hare designed a system of proportional representation, not “plural voting” (pp. 94, 108). Above all, Kinser persistently conflates “democracy” with “representative government.” If “Disraeli had accomplished . . . the democratic reform of Parliament” (p. 124), it is curious that he should have told MPs that “We do not . . . live—and I trust it will never be the fate of this country to live—under a democracy” (18 March 1867, quoted in *Parliamentary Debates*, series 3, volume 186, column 7).

Such misconceptions reflect Kinser’s antiquated historiography. E. D. Adams, whose magnum opus appeared in 1925, looms worryingly large, while more recent scholarship, like the work of Duncan A. Campbell, is absent. Inevitably, this weakens Kinser’s capacity to put his authors in context. For example, Mill’s support for black enfranchisement in America did not “contradict” his “ambivalent attitude” toward an uneducated electorate at home (p. 133). For Mill, the issue was not whether the poor and ignorant should be barred from voting, but whether a distinction should be drawn within those classes on the basis of race. By contrasting their statements on “public opinion,” Kinser concludes that Bagehot “was clearly less anxious about it” than Mill (pp. 95, 107). Yet the two men used these terms in very different ways. Mill, in the passage quoted, refers to “collective mediocrity,” while Bagehot used it to mean an elite opinion to which the working classes “contribute almost nothing” (Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, ed. P. Smith [2001], p. 116). Their arguments were not so much in opposition as directed toward different phenomena.

Kinser makes bold claims for his authors: “no other figure . . . did more for the cause of democracy than Carlyle” (p. 14); Trollope “unmistakeably implies that [democracy] . . . must be accomplished in Britain” (p.

65); Carlyle, Trollope, and Bagehot all believed that “slaves must be included in the democratic fabric of the nation” (p. 102). Unfortunately, Kinser never explains what his authors understood by democracy. He takes for granted that, when Trollope praises “what America has done,” the author “of course . . . alludes to democracy.” He is then puzzled to find Trollope writing “I dislike universal suffrage” and “the tyranny of democracy,” a position he finds “conflicted” (p. 60). Bagehot, likewise, “has plenty to say in opposition to democracy,” but “his vision of the essential role played by public opinion . . . certainly seems democratic” (p. 117). Some of these paradoxes would have resolved themselves had Kinser thought more carefully about his terms.

The publishers are also at fault. The copyediting is slipshod, the bottom third of page 51 is chopped off, and the first chapter ends mid-sentence. For this, Kinser deserves an apology.

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SAM JOHNSON. *Pogroms, Peasants, Jews: Britain and Eastern Europe’s “Jewish Question,” 1867–1925*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. Pp. xi, 296. \$90.00.

The reception and settlement of Jews in the United Kingdom during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have been the subjects of considerable scholarly attention. As a nation wedded to free trade, the British were loath to restrict immigration of any kind, but Jews—or rather poor, Yiddish-speaking Jews from Russia, Poland, and Romania—were generally unwelcome, and the Anglo-Jewish leadership therefore did its best both to dissuade these migrants from landing at British ports and to send them on, as speedily as possible, to any other country that would have them (principally the United States). When, at last, an Aliens Act (1905) was passed by a Conservative government anxious to prove its populist credentials, the legislation (welcomed by the trade union movement) went unopposed by the London Committee of Deputies of British Jews.

This story is well known. What until now has been less understood is the manner in which East European Jews were depicted by the British media and by what one might term the intellectual opinion-forming classes. When news of anti-Jewish pogroms in Eastern Europe reached Britain there were, to be sure, lofty expressions of horror and disgust from the good and the great: letters to the press, donations of money to relieve the victims of these persecutions, even well-choreographed public meetings. Are scholars, therefore, to infer that these expressions of compassion tell us all we wish to know about how the British viewed the plight of Jews in Eastern Europe?

In her ground-breaking and admirably researched study of Britain and Eastern Europe’s “Jewish Question,” Sam Johnson supplies the depressing answer. Vi-

olent attacks upon Jews were rarely condoned, but they were habitually contextualized (as it were) within a wider and heavily racialized view of Jews and the Jewish world. Whether in the pages of newspapers or in the writings of the intelligentsia, no effort was spared to paint Jews in the darkest possible hues, as almost deserving of the disabilities from which they suffered.

Take the case of Romania, whose freedom from Ottoman oppression became an obsession in Britain during the 1860s and 1870s. Romanian nationalists were fiercely opposed to granting citizenship to Romania's Jewish inhabitants. Successive Romanian administrations comprehensively ignored the safeguards for Jews inserted (at the insistence of Benjamin Disraeli, Britain's Jewish prime minister) in the Berlin treaty of 1878. But the persistence of such discrimination was widely applauded in the British media. Without it, *The Scotsman* argued in 1877, the entirety of Romania would be "in the hands of the Jews." "The Jews are too clever for the [Romanian] Christians," the *Saturday Review* had argued the previous year. "They make money when the degraded Christians do not."

So Christians needed to be protected from Jews. And while violent attacks upon Jews needed to be condemned—and were—they also needed to be understood. It is true that the Russian pogroms that followed the 1881 assassination of Tsar Alexander II attracted widespread denunciation in the British press, but they did so partly because they were deemed—incorrectly and against all the verifiable evidence—to have been officially inspired, sanctioned, and organized. Quite simply, it suited the British mindset to be reassured that tsarist Russia was indeed a savage and barbaric place. There was sympathy for the Jews but also apprehension lest the pogroms force yet more of them to seek sanctuary in a British port. The economic boycott of Jews in Poland, sponsored in and from 1912 by the National Democratic party led by Roman Dmowski (an architect of Polish independence but also an unashamed anti-semiter), attracted remarkably little criticism in Great Britain. Indeed, the British establishment feted Dmowski and the doors of Whitehall were opened to him. In the opinion of the journalist and author Beatrice Baskerville (a self-taught Polish speaker), there were just too many Jews in Poland and they wielded too much economic power.

In the final chapter of her monograph Johnson distills all this evidence into a most perceptive scrutiny of the manner in which "the Jew" was imagined in Great Britain a hundred or so years ago. As she demonstrates, it was an imagining deeply affected by the crudest, racialized discourse. In the popular mind, the East European Jew was a religious outcast and an economic parasite. Johnson ends her investigation in the mid-1920s with the passage of draconian anti-Jewish measures enacted by the postwar governments of an independent Poland. The undoubted popularity of these laws does much to explain Polish collaboration in the Nazi extermination of Jews. But it also helps us understand why the appeasement of Nazi Germany attracted

so much support from virtually all sections of British society during the following decade.

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SAMUEL J. M. M. ALBERTI. *Morbid Curiosities: Medical Museums in Nineteenth-Century Britain*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. xiii, 238. \$99.00.

The museums referred to in this book's subtitle are those dedicated to anatomy and pathology, institutions that in present-day Britain have become endangered species, since the license required to display human organs can be difficult to obtain and the educational value of "wet" specimens to students and to the public has been called into question. The reputation of anatomy museums has also suffered from a tendency for commentators to focus on displays of human body parts as examples of a culture of medical paternalism or as sensationalist freak shows. The contrast between the importance placed on museums by nineteenth-century medical practitioners—some of whom spent lifetimes and fortunes collecting and preserving human material—and the limited attention given to them by historians of medicine is, as Samuel J. M. M. Alberti observes, remarkable, and the deficiency has only recently begun to be addressed. One difficulty is that to engage fully with their history, we must be prepared to view anatomical pathology collections from both cultural and medical perspectives: we must get over the shock of finding human body parts on display and ask how they came to be there and what purpose they served.

This is exactly how Alberti, who as director of museums at the Royal College of Surgeons in London is well qualified for his task, approaches the subject, considering the provenance of each individual specimen on the museum shelf. Fragmentation of the body, with all of its inherent problems, is a central theme, and Alberti emphasizes that a museum pot is not simply an object to be described (as if by a student in an examination) but a carefully crafted work that holds different meanings for the many observers who will encounter it during its career. The pot's meaning changes as it is rearranged, recategorized, and re-presented to meet the needs of the museum's clientele.

Professional and popular collections are considered together, an insightful approach that makes the shilling anatomy museums, so disparaged in some quarters, appear not so different from their grander institutional cousins. The craft of specimen preparation, a hitherto neglected topic, is treated in necessary detail. Only by understanding the techniques involved in creating a museum pot can we appreciate its dual status as a created artifact and a relic of bodily pathology. Throughout the book, Alberti reminds readers that it is possible to see each specimen as, among other things, a body part, a monstrosity, a typical example of disease, or a work of art. Each reading depends upon location (pregnant uteri were consigned to the pathology shelves), presentation, and history, as well as our own expecta-

tions. The point is well made that visitors to a museum did not always read its contents in an approved way; proprietors of anatomy museums usually insisted that their collections were educational, but visitor responses can be harder to pin down.

Alberti briefly describes the use of waxworks and other models—they were less important in Britain than in continental Europe—but the main emphasis is on human tissues. Developments within pathology are clearly key to understanding the vogue for medical museums, and the book benefits from an outline of contemporaneous trends in pathological science, though it would have been interesting to hear the author's views on why pathology developed as a separate discipline in the late nineteenth century, a development in which the medical museum was pivotal. The contribution of medical men to museums receives a refreshingly balanced treatment. The image of two medical knights, Charles Bell and Astley Cooper, potting up specimens before starting their day's work vividly recalls the hours of unpleasant toil that the making of a pathology museum entailed.

The nineteenth century was the heyday of medical museums, but no study would be complete without an account of their decline. A concluding chapter carries the story up to the organ retention scandals that led to the Human Tissue Act (2004). Many collections disappeared with the introduction of this new regulatory system, and as the section title "evolution or extinction?" suggests, those remaining faced hard times, because they needed a "high footfall" to prevent "encroachment" on their funding. The Royal College of Surgeons Museum has successfully adapted, but not all can follow the route of public engagement; some must still cater to the anatomical pathologists by whom and for whom they were assembled. Nineteenth-century claims, in the wake of the Anatomy Act (1832), that it was not possible to teach anatomy without a museum remind scholars of the special value of archived tissues at times when fresh material is difficult to obtain. Alberti succeeds in reaffirming the scientific, historical, and cultural importance of medical museums and provides an excellent introduction to this fascinating subject.

A. W. BATES

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THEODORE KODITSCHKEK. *Liberalism, Imperialism, and the Historical Imagination: Nineteenth-Century Visions of a Greater Britain*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 351. \$99.00.

This incisive study combines vivid biographical sketches with acute readings of texts to offer a nuanced and revealing portrait of liberalism's troubled marriage to the nineteenth-century British Empire. Theodore Koditschek has self-consciously, and effectively, chosen to occupy a space between high theory and microhistory; his focus on authors who, though mostly not great thinkers, were at once committed historians and figures in imperial administration proves consistently fruitful.

Although his attention to writers of history means that Koditschek has little to say about certain key theorists of liberalism and empire in the nineteenth century, such as John Stuart Mill or Richard Cobden, it is remarkable how many of the most significant ideologues and agents of liberal empire are captured by his rubric. The narrative is deftly woven to take up recurrent themes—imperial romance, "bordering," nostalgia—in unexpected and convincing ways. He includes several novelists—Maria Edgeworth, Sydney Owenson (Lady Morgan), Walter Scott—who, though not strictly historians, conceived of Britain's imperial mission in historical terms and, in Scott's case, greatly influenced the British "historical imagination" across the century and the empire.

Koditschek situates each of his authors biographically relative to the British Empire, noting that many saw themselves as outsiders to a core English society. His approach reveals the transimperial perspectives that often shaped the expanding empire. Anglo-Irish Protestant landlords and Scottish lowlanders carried their native preoccupations to their posts in India; the Bombay merchant and mathematics professor Dadabhai Naoroji used political economy to catalogue imperial exploitation and puncture the liberal myth of imperial benevolence, and once in London drew from the Irish example the lesson that Indians must gain seats in parliament if they hoped to get on the political agenda. The book manages to cover a broad range of figures, each with a satisfying degree of depth, thus providing a more textured account of liberal imperialism than is possible in studies of canonical political thinkers such as Uday Singh Mehta's *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (1999) or this reviewer's *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (2005).

Scott and Thomas Babington Macaulay prove central figures. Scott perfected a formula of imperial romance that attracted a variety of thinkers but that no others were able to use to such effect. The basic success of the incorporation of Scotland within Great Britain by the early nineteenth century meant that Scott could romanticize those who had resisted conquest without threatening or indeed even questioning the imperial settlement. Scott's imperial epics "provide a dress rehearsal for liberal Empire" (p. 33), with inhabitants of the conquered peripheries accepting the necessity of submission, while citizens of the triumphant metropole admire their no longer menacing courage and virtue and learn to accord them dignity, and some cultural autonomy, in the new union.

No such imperial romance was possible in Ireland, where Maria Edgeworth's own earlier attempts at "fables of union" (p. 28) had stumbled on the intransigence of the Anglo-Irish ruling caste and the hostility of the oppressed Catholic majority. In India, Scott's admirers among his many countrymen in colonial service, such as John Malcolm and James Tod, were similarly unable to pull off their efforts to co-opt Indian nobles into an asymmetrical union. The Bengali liberal Ram-

mohun Roy's more imaginative efforts toward imperial unity—what Koditschek calls his “global, even cosmic, bordering” (p. 94)—had him professing pride in being a subject of the empire even as he challenged the British to fulfill their hitherto empty promises of liberty for the colonized.

Scott's romance of union, so clearly faltering in the overseas empire, was displaced by Macaulay's “English middle-class romance” (p. 12), which yoked the progress narrative to an avowedly anglocentric universalism that invited the conquered to admire and aspire to English constitutionalism while it relegated them to the status of cultural and political children. But Macaulay's narrative was, if anything, less adequate than Scott's to the challenges of a global empire; readers in India and Ireland recognized this, even as Bengali *bhadralok* liberals such as Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay, R. C. Dutt, and Surendranath Banerjea attempted in various ways to radicalize Macaulayism while refusing its parochialism.

Macaulay's more complacent English public quickly retreated from his program of legal reform, extension of civil status, and the creation of a “collaborative bourgeoisie” (p. 226) in the colonies. As it became clear that the supposedly temporary despotism envisioned by James Mill and Macaulay was not laying the ground for political equality or self-government in the empire, English historians abandoned the liberal progress narrative in favor of more avowedly authoritarian imperial schemas and schemes. J. A. Froude, the most reactionary figure in the book, reconceived Greater Britain not as a beacon of liberty but as a bulwark of security, a “necessary perimeter” (p. 204) in uncertain times. Others turned to far longer time-frames of evolutionary history (Charles Dilke and Henry Maine) or to racial theories (Sir George Campbell and E. A. Freeman) to justify a “differential liberal vision” (p. 226) of political freedom at home—and increasingly for white settler populations—and despotism for non-white imperial subjects. The conversation became utterly one sided, with Indian liberals continuing, as Rammohun Roy had done, to take liberalism seriously even as they recognized its failures, while English liberals turned on the class they had created, charging them with inauthenticity and spinelessness. Imperial historians such as John Robert Seeley had little inkling of their colonial readership; they “did not so much silence the voice of colonial others as deafen British ears to the amplifying colonial sounds” (p. 341). Koditschek's rich account shows powerfully how contradictions internal to liberalism so readily issued in the racism or narrow culturalism of the post-1857 generation in England and in the thorough disillusionment of the colonial liberals whom it had shaped and then refused.

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Historical Monographs.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 304. \$110.00.

Several recent studies have traced the ebb and flow of John Ruskin's reputation as a social and political thinker in his own day and in the twentieth century. Stuart Eagles builds on previous work to argue that Ruskin's influence was most significant in its impact on public-spirited activists, both men and women, who engaged in broadly progressive civic and social reform from the last decades of the Victorian period up to World War I. Urging his followers to reject the ugliness of modern industrial capitalism, Ruskin offered instead a vision that celebrated the connectedness of art, nature, and human labor and that sought the dignity and well-being of laborers as the highest social goal. His slashing critiques of laissez-faire liberalism, especially “*Unto This Last*”: *Four Essays on the First Principles of Political Economy* (1862), enraged an audience that had come to regard competition in the free market as the key to British greatness. After 1870, however, Ruskin's social criticism found receptive readers as activists and thinkers at home and beyond—William Morris, Octavia Hill, J. A. Hobson, James Keir Hardie, Leo Tolstoy, Mohandas K. Gandhi, and Jane Addams, among others—proudly acknowledged his influence. Today he is cited as a prophet of ethical consumerism, environmentalism, and the sustainability movement.

The special strength of this study lies in its comprehensive and detailed portrayal of the “places and networks” (p. 3) where Ruskin's disciples met, conversed, and laid their plans for reformist projects dedicated to carrying out his holistic creed. From model farms to handicraft cooperatives, libraries, museums, and parks; from the National Trust to the University Extension movement and the nascent Labour Party, the practical results of Ruskin's ideas ramified through many areas of British life. Organizations that promoted Ruskinian reforms included the Guild of St. George, Toynbee Hall, the Charity Organisation Society, and the many Ruskin societies that sprang up in the 1870s and 1880s. Eagles's discussion of Ruskin's notorious project to recruit Oxford undergraduates to build a new road for the nearby village of Hinksey in 1874 is particularly informative. Though much mocked both at the time and later, this scheme was more than a quixotic attempt to teach privileged young men about the dignity of labor through digging and rock breaking. It was motivated partly by public health concerns (the need for a well-drained road had become apparent following a cholera outbreak), and a number of those who participated went on to become leaders at Toynbee Hall (Arnold Toynbee was an enthusiastic digger) and university settlements in Manchester and Glasgow.

Eagles identifies and delineates, though he does not fully analyze, a series of paradoxes that marked the relationship between the prophet and his disciples. Ruskin frequently dismissed the efficacy of his own writings—“The more I see of writing, the less I care for it,” he claimed (p. 60)—and it was a potent element in

STUART EAGLES. *After Ruskin: The Social and Political Legacies of a Victorian Prophet, 1870–1920*. (Oxford

his appeal that he called on his followers to undertake active reform efforts. Yet his distaste and lack of capacity for organizational work was partly responsible for the failure of some of the schemes inspired by his ideas. Eagles points out that “the Master” himself was at best ambivalent about some of the most successful projects carried out under his influence, for example, the university settlements. While Ruskin expressed pessimism about any effort to redeem modern urban society, urging his followers to save what could yet be saved of traditional rural life, disciples were driven to reformist ameliorative projects in those places where the ugliness and degradation produced by industrial capitalism were most apparent, in the slums of London, Manchester, Birmingham, and Glasgow. Similarly, while Ruskin described himself as a “violent Tory,” preached the virtues of hierarchy, and derided democracy, his works were hailed as transformative by the autodidact leaders of the nascent Labour Party, who welcomed the “freshness and vitality” (p. 207) of Ruskin’s “uniquely aestheticized” (p. 206) economic vision while cheerfully disregarding his scathing denunciations of parliamentary politics.

Eagles has produced a meticulously researched history of Ruskin’s audiences and the institutions through which they sought to put his ideas into practice. His chapter on the Ruskin societies, for example, provides a rich account, based on surveys of surviving lecture announcements, local newspaper accounts, and society minute books and library records, of the larger cultural fabric underpinning much Ruskin worship. These organizations emerged at a time when literary societies had become fashionable, and there were groups dedicated to William Shakespeare, Geoffrey Chaucer, Charles Dickens, William Wordsworth, and other literary greats. Yet the Ruskin societies were not mere conversation clubs: members acted as pressure groups, calling for reform and social welfare legislation in their localities. There are times when the abundance of detail in the book, especially the long lists of names and accompanying dates, may overwhelm the reader, and the focus on institutional membership can lead to some odd omissions. Surely one of Ruskin’s most effective disciples was the Liberal MP Sir John Lubbock, author of the Bank Holiday Act and the Ancient Monuments Protection Act, yet he appears nowhere in the text. Those criticisms aside, readers will find that this book presents an absorbing, persuasive, and well-substantiated case for Ruskin’s significance for modern British culture.

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LAURA TABILI. *Global Migrants, Local Culture: Natives and Newcomers in Provincial England, 1841–1939*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. Pp. x, 329. \$85.00.

This impressive book argues against the common popular and historical perception of traditional Britain as a homogeneous and closed society. In it, Laura Tabili contends that previous historians have been predis-

posed to find that immigrants, whether from Europe or the colonies, were excluded from communities because their studies focused on visible clusters of outsiders and flashpoints of conflict. In contrast, Tabili conducted a full survey of census enumerators’ books for South Shields (on the Tyne River, near Newcastle), compiling a complete list of all people born outside of England censused in the years under study. What she found in the census, through naturalization records, and in other contemporary accounts supports her contention that prior to the early twentieth century immigrants were well integrated and accepted within this English community. She argues that it was only the approach of Europe-wide conflict and discriminatory policies at the national level that led to the suspicion and exclusion of immigrants in the town. Although her focus is on the largely maritime community of South Shields, Tabili presents a convincing case that her findings are valid for a much wider swath of the nation.

In supporting her primary argument Tabili makes significant contributions to the historiography of migration in Britain. She completes the first detailed analysis of a German immigrant community in Britain, discovering that the majority of German-born individuals in South Shields were not members of the German Mission, which was the community’s most prominent feature. While the mission served large numbers of German mariners, it was supported by less than a third of the whole German population in 1901. This finding reflects Tabili’s data regarding immigrants of other nationalities, as well. Until just prior to World War I, even the Arab immigrants in South Shields, like those from other European nations, were dispersed throughout the town and prone to choosing native British marriage partners. The method of identifying all immigrants in the census also led Tabili to an important finding regarding Britons’ own migration patterns. Most immigrants in South Shields, she found, lived in households made up primarily of native-born Britons, and many of these were the children of British natives. Using children’s birthplaces, she traced individuals’ movements over a significant period of their lives and came to the conclusion that Britain in the nineteenth century was far more cosmopolitan than insular. Those who did not themselves migrate were living cheek-by-jowl with people who did. This, Tabili argues, “undermines views of . . . plebian and working-class Britons as isolated, unsophisticated and innocent of the world and its inhabitants” (p. 110). When she does discover exclusion and persecution of immigrants emerging in South Shields, she explains it in a rational context of global and regional politics rather than an ahistorical British xenophobia. In a global context, the migrants did not behave in surprising ways; the patterns revealed are similar to those in the rest of Europe in the same period. What is surprising is that they were in South Shields at all and that the evidence tells a story so different from the popularly understood narrative of British social history.

Tabili’s method means that at times (particularly in the earlier period of her study) she was working with a

microscopically small number of individuals. Her entire subject group only surpassed one percent of the town's population in 1891. At times in the text, it seems as if she names each immigrant individually, but it is hard to escape the feeling that this is an extraordinarily small number of people on which to base her conclusions. Her practice of including all people born abroad—even those with two British parents—in her sample raises questions about just how “alien” some of the immigrants would have appeared. After the midpoint of the book, however, closer examination of communities and legislation allow a convincing argument in spite of these misgivings regarding the sample.

Overall, this book is a very good example of modern social history. It is well, if sometimes densely, written, with many pleasing turns of phrase. Gender is integrated into the analysis not as a feminist exercise but as an important element of a story that is not complete without it. While demographic statistics are at its heart, it includes ample qualitative evidence to give flesh and life to those bones. It is a local study that never forgets that South Shields existed in a larger world, skillfully connecting global and local phenomena. Britons, Tabili argues, have a long history of accepting and incorporating outsiders in their midst, which she poses as an instructive lesson for modern British society as well as an admonition for historians to examine entire communities rather than fixating on highly visible, but singular, events.

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DAMON IEREMIA SALESA. *Racial Crossings: Race, Intermarriage, and the Victorian British Empire*. (Oxford Historical Monographs.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. x, 295. \$110.00.

Edward Gibbon Wakefield's advocacy of systematic colonization found many believers in Victorian Britain. Damon Ieremia Salea's thought-provoking study discusses how and why various reiterations became entangled with colonial policies of racial amalgamation. His particular focus is the significant role played by racial intermarriage and mixed-race offspring in the incorporation of New Zealand and its peoples into the British Empire.

Salea makes a compelling case for the broader imperial and transnational resonances of the local and regional as he explores the racial crossings that punctuated New Zealand's encounters with Victorian science and enterprise. At the same time, he challenges the “racial exceptionalism” thesis that describes New Zealand as a historical model for harmonious race relations. He shows the vitally constitutive role played by discourses, dissonances, conflicts, and practices surrounding race that moved across and within the “webs of empire.” When analyzing the frequently anachronistic usage of labels such as “Maori” and “Native,” Salea makes a compelling case for the choice of *Tangata Whenoa* (per-

son of the land) to refer to New Zealand's indigenous peoples. Contested nomenclatures and categories—whether *Tangata Whenoa*, *Pakeha*, half-caste, or European—prove crucial to the author's careful interweaving of indigenous, regional, and imperial narratives and the multiple identities that come under his lens.

The book frames the policies of racial amalgamation around the larger contexts of “imperial networks” and the “encounters in place” that occurred around race, political reform, and colonization. Early New Zealand boosters such as Patrick Matthew adopted the scientific language of “botanical grafting” of races to describe the best means for colonizers to adapt. Colonization projects launched by the Scots Company and the New Zealand Company from the 1830s developed this theme into plans for “racial amalgamation” that involved adjacent living spaces for white and indigenous races based on land acquisitions by the former from the latter, cemented by interracial “social alliances” undertaken along recognized axes of class and gender.

At the metropole, however, the rise of polygenism was creating new anxieties around the “tender ties” of racial crossings. If human beings belonged to different species, then mixing different races surely was analogous to crossbreeding species. Alarmed at the possibility of sterile offspring, the Anthropological Society of London vociferously attacked racial hybrids. Their opponents, including the Ethnological Society of London and the Aborigines' Protection Society, continued to argue that different human races could breed successfully since they had done so throughout history. The anthropologists were articulating in scientific idiom the same misgivings about undue proximity of indigenous groups and white settlers that Welsh and Anglican missionaries had already voiced about the racial “pandemonium” of early nineteenth-century New Zealand.

That supposed lack of order gave the impetus for mid-century templates of organized colonization, which developed and imposed racial taxonomies for settlers, indigenes, and in-between groups. In addition, the Colonial Office's concern about imminent extinction of aboriginal groups across the empire led it to support a project of racial amalgamation as its only solution. This project was largely inspired by the ideas of Herman Merivale, political economist turned mandarin, who advocated “the union of natives with settlers in the same community, as master and servant, as fellow-labourers, as fellow-citizens, and if possible, as connected by intermarriage . . . the only possible Euthanasia of savage communities” (p. 95). As suggested by Merivale's use of the term euthanasia, the seemingly humanitarian impulses underlying this project are, on closer scrutiny, deeply troubling.

While the stated aim of New Zealand's British officials was to ameliorate racial tensions via the amalgamation mission, in reality their concomitant intensification of colonization served to sharpen race disparities and heighten hierarchies, particularly around gender. Governor George Grey, for instance, claimed to be replacing the disorder of illicit unions with interventionist

policies that aimed at regulating the land holdings, civil marriages, and medical facilities afforded to those British subjects engaged in racial crossings and their mixed-race offspring. A number of legal suits ensued in which the rights of mixed-race children to hold lands through their indigenous mothers were jeopardized by the patriarchal inheritance code that colonialism introduced following the English model.

The book ends with an exploration of the wars of the 1860s as an opportunity for the state to reconfigure and extend policies and institutions that restructured intimate spaces and indigenous sociabilities. Yet, as Salesa's final pages show, it is important not to overestimate the reach of such instruments or to underestimate the capabilities of indigenous and mixed-race families, especially their women members, to resist and redirect colonial pressures that sought to transform their lives and identities. The book concludes with a brief exposition of the life of "half-caste" Maria Aminta Maning; though reared as a colonial lady, Maning's adult life and creativity revolved around her growing self-awareness as "mixed in mind." Salesa thus provides readers with a vivid reminder of the limitations of colonial hegemony and, indeed, of the conventional colonial archive.

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SANDRA TRUDGEN DAWSON. *Holiday Camps in Twentieth-Century Britain: Packaging Pleasure*. (Studies in Popular Culture.) New York: Manchester University Press. 2011. Pp. xii, 246. \$89.95.

For me, British holiday camps inevitably evoke the jaunty opening of "Tommy's Holiday Camp," a track on the The Who's 1969 rock opera album *Tommy*. Kicked off by a cheery (albeit sarcastic) "Good morning campers!," a greeting that would have been quite familiar to the band's British audience, the song mockingly holds out the promise of a never-ending holiday at Tommy's special camp, one ostensibly dedicated to training in pinball wizardry but ultimately aimed at inculcating mind- and soul-numbing conformity. Yet as Sandra Trudgen Dawson's history of these camps points out, to a number of people in twentieth-century Britain, holiday camps represented more than simply homogenized, repetitive, and excessively organized leisure. For the British government, the labor movement and Labour party, and the many campers who made repeated summer trips to them, holiday camps represented the promise of twentieth-century "progress" in a number of ways. By spending time at a Butlin's or Warner's camp, working-class Britons could begin to enjoy the leisure and relaxation previously only available to their middle-class and aristocratic fellow citizens; they thus would share in the full benefits of twentieth-century British citizenship.

Dawson traces the development of the camps from the interwar decades, a period in which the British government began to consider holidays as a significant component of workers' health and as a means of coun-

tering modernity's less salutary effects. In particular, she points to the passage of the 1938 Holidays with Pay Act as a turning point that provided the foundation for holiday camps' expansion. Leisure entrepreneurs such as Billy Butlin and Harry Warner were only too willing to build on that foundation, and, as Dawson demonstrates, they took full advantage of genres of mass culture (newspapers, magazines) to run advertising campaigns promoting the camps' atmosphere and activities. Dawson's discussion of these campaigns is particularly interesting, as she explores the camp owners' use of both reporters' and celebrities' descriptions of the holiday camp experience (many of the latter were or had been employees of the camps). Their endorsements, which continued well into the post-World War II period, suggested that the camps were places where working-class people could afford to enjoy luxuries unavailable to them at home and, of equal importance, would do so in a friendly, unpretentious, and democratic atmosphere in which they need not fear being patronized or intimidated. Judging by the high numbers of those who came back to the holiday camps, visitors agreed.

As Dawson points out, while we might expect the camps to have suffered during World War II, matters were more complicated. To be sure, camps were commandeered for troops, a form of state intervention that temporarily halted the typical camping holiday. However, they also were seen as a way of housing civilians—particularly women—working in war industries. Warner and Butlin thus were able to expand the number of camp sites, which in turn allowed them to grow their businesses substantially during the postwar years. Moreover, Dawson demonstrates the continuing link between the state's promotion of particular kinds of leisure and the holiday camps, since the former's promotion of cultural "uplift" (radio comedy, Shakespeare, ballet, and opera) was picked up by the camps' owners and incorporated into postwar entertainments. Her discussion of the 1950s and 1960s is a very rich one. Dawson reveals the ways in which the camps became increasingly lucrative and a significant sector of the British entertainment and leisure industry but also had to contend with labor shortages (in part, by hiring workers from former British colonies) and competition from the other holiday options chosen by British families (taking holidays abroad, staying at home, or pitching tents in temporary sites). Despite these challenges, the camps continued to play an important part in British cultural life, especially since their owners hired popular entertainers—Cliff Richard, Ringo Starr, Des O'Connor, to name a few—and images of the camps circulated in children's literature, novels, films, and song lyrics.

This very rich and well-researched study adds considerable depth to our understanding of twentieth-century British popular culture and leisure. In addition, Dawson suggests the important role of gender relations in helping to solidify the camps' appeal. By providing for all members of the working-class family, from meals to child care and after-dinner entertainment, Butlin

and Warner offered important alternatives to working-class wives and mothers, groups which the interwar state believed were sorely in need of relaxation. *Pace* Pete Townshend, while Dawson is fully cognizant of the repetitive and standardized nature of the camps' physical sites and routines, her oral histories provide persuasive evidence that holiday camps "packaged pleasure" in ways that appealed to the desires of many working-class British men, women, and children.

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FERGAL MCCLUSKEY. *Fenians and Ribbonmen: The Development of Republican Politics in East Tyrone, 1898–1918*. New York: Manchester University Press. 2011. Pp. ix, 282. \$95.00.

The demand for Irish self-government was represented at Westminster by a cohort of Home Rule/Irish Parliamentary Party MPs from 1874 until 1918, when they were largely swept aside by a Sinn Féin Party riding the tide of postwar plebiscitary national self-determination. The Irish Parliamentary Party's command of its constituencies was not based on a single dedicated organization but depended instead on a series of grassroots movements that were in fairly constant flux, might be at odds with one another, needed to be watched vigilantly, and frequently had to be manipulated for the greater good of the elite. This associational milieu became more crowded and more challenging in the last years of the nineteenth century, a development that justifies the chronological scope of Fergal McCluskey's book. The Fenians and Ribbonmen of the title refer to two modes of activism, corresponding more or less with two nationalist organizations of great interest to the parliamentarians and well entrenched at home and among the Irish abroad. Since the Fenians are identified with republican affairs, the book's focus is signaled by the reference to "republican politics" in the subtitle. The eastern part of County Tyrone, stretching outward from the western shore of Lough Neagh, was a well-known locus of republican activity throughout much of the twentieth century.

McCluskey focuses on republican politics primarily as the expression of a popular ideology. The thoughts of Antonio Gramsci and George Rudé on ideology are deployed interestingly at the beginning and conclusion of the book with a view to analyzing developments in Ireland. However, it is not easy to write a history book about abstract ideology, and the main body of this work consists of an account of the discourses and strategies of nationalist groupings over two turbulent decades. McCluskey's principal task is to explain how a republican minority group succeeded, after several false starts and setbacks, through its influence over Sinn Féin, in placing itself in the driver's seat at the general election of 1918. This is carried through coherently and dispassionately, but more in the style of an extended essay pursuing a theme than of a monograph methodically exploring the contours of a political world. The

argument of the book refers to a considerable extent to the wider national scene rather than just Tyrone and to that extent is based on deployment of familiar secondary information. In keeping with the essay-style treatment, the reader is presumed to be fully acquainted with every twist and turn of the national politics of the period. Those not so prepared will find themselves lost at many points for the sake of the relatively small effort that would have been required to provide them with the necessary signposts.

That the author has conducted very substantial research is evidenced by plentiful information about the place of Tyrone, and northern Fenians, in the national story. Police records, newspaper files, and private papers have been diligently worked to this end. However, this information is dispensed, as it were, on a "need to know" basis. The account of the sociopolitical structures within which local Fenians and Ribbonmen contended is neither methodical nor sustained. Thus, while individual Tyrone parliamentary elections feature at several points in the book, there is no comprehensive attempt to provide an overview of the dynamics of the county's constituencies. Lack of concern with this rather important aspect of political life is further suggested by the statement that "larger Catholic farmers and rural merchants" were "newly franchised by household suffrage in 1884" (p. 3). In fact, even tenants of middling-sized farms had obtained the vote in 1850, and the 1884 act considerably extended the electorate to embrace most heads of households, including small farmers and laborers.

Under the Local Government Act of 1898, elections to local councils occurred every three years. With mention on page eleven of a Fenian in Dungannon gaining frequent election to local office on a labor ticket, hopes are raised of an exploration of a little-visited arena of radical politics. In the event, there is scarcely an overview of the number of local authorities in the county. This deficiency is all the more surprising in light of the appointment in 1913 of the most prominent of the county's Fenians, Patrick McCartan, to the office of dispensary doctor, which was in the gift of his local political opponents. Surely an illuminating story must lie behind this. Even the information about the Tyrone Fenians is not marshaled and probed as it might have been. What did they typically do at meetings? Take orders or agree on tactics? Make financial contributions or expect money from America? Despite the restricted character of the questions posed by this book, and of the methodology pursued, this is a very welcome addition to the literature.

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ANDREW DAVID STEDMAN. *Alternatives to Appeasement: Neville Chamberlain and Hitler's Germany*. New York: I. B. Tauris. 2011. Pp. x, 308. \$99.00.

The discourse surrounding appeasement goes round and round but always returns to Neville Chamberlain. For seventy years Chamberlain has too often been the object of an historical game of pin the calumny on the donkey. He has been characterized as weak, naïve, cowardly, baleful, arrogant, and foolish. His attempt to avoid the human disaster of World War II, his protean policy of appeasement—which, as Andrew David Stedman demonstrates in this book, was never singular in its approach—has been pilloried. Contemporary critics and postwar armchair strategists have disparaged and reimagined every jot and spasm of Chamberlain's relatively short term in office (May 1937–May 1940). So, given appeasement's demonstrable failure to prevent World War II, is it necessary to weigh the merits (or demerits) of other paths not taken? Stedman certainly thinks so.

Stedman's title perfectly encapsulates the contents of his book. The historiographical debate concerning appeasement has been predicated on the assumption that viable alternatives to that policy existed. Stedman sets out to explore the validity of that assumption by investigating those posited alternatives. If such an investigation calls upon readers to consider counterfactuals, then Stedman is prepared to accept any criticism for this approach. It should be pointed out in his defense (if he needs one) that all standard critiques of appeasement are just as dependent on, in fact could not exist without, counterfactual claims.

In six chapters the author consecutively explicates various strategies for dealing with Nazi Germany in the later 1930s: isolation/pacifism, economic and colonial concessions, mobilization of the League of Nations, classic alliance diplomacy, massive rearmament, and threatening or executing preemptive war. Stedman employs contemporaneous statements advocating each of these policies drawn from parliamentary speeches, private correspondence, official documents, and newspaper copy. Then, in each chapter he evaluates the claims and considers whether, or to what extent, Chamberlain and his National Government considered these alternative policies. Stedman also tries to assess just how realistic these policies were in their given context. Overall, his chapters are clear and credible. At no point does he mock or denigrate those who held alternative policies, although he believes some of them (isolation and preventative war) were unlikely either to marshal a broad enough appeal in British society to be implemented or to have much chance of succeeding as real-world policies. It is unfortunate that in his chapter on rearmament Stedman does not make use of Joseph A. Maiolo's *The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939: A Study in Appeasement and the Origins of the Second World War* (1998) or G. A. H. Gordon's *British Seapower and Procurement between the Wars: A Reappraisal of Rearmament* (1988), two excellent sources that would have added depth to his overview and reinforced his argument.

Stedman's conclusion, simply put, is that no policy advocated by the critics of Chamberlain was likely to

have led to a better result. For those opposed to appeasement, "it was difficult to suggest a constructive, coherent alternative that he [Chamberlain] could have pursued" (p. 232). Adolf Hitler turned out to be a leader who could in no lasting way be forced off his course. Hitler could neither be appeased nor deterred, and he was always prepared to fight. It is almost impossible to imagine a scenario in which Hitler was cowed into quiescence. Since most critiques of appeasement are based on the premise that Hitler could have been "stopped," they are as unrealistic as appeasement itself. The only imaginable course open to Britain with a greater likelihood of a positive outcome was jettisoning any hope for peace in 1937 and turning Britain into a garrison state with a command economy and a censored press committed to inevitable war with Germany. What possibility existed for Chamberlain—for anyone—to have accomplished that?

Yet appeasement served a greater purpose. It established beyond a shadow of a doubt who was for war and who for peace, and landed the responsibility for World War II decisively on Germany's shoulders. This allowed Britain and its Dominions to go to war largely united, with a clear understanding of who the aggressor was and a sense that they were making sacrifices in a good cause. Stedman's book brings a clear eye to the debates surrounding British foreign policy in the brief Chamberlain era. He sketches out the contours of a more illuminating debate (for his chapters could all use further elaboration) that we can hope will follow on the heels of this valuable text.

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NATASHA VALL. *Cultural Region: North East England, 1945–2000*. New York: Manchester University Press. 2011. Pp. 178. £60.00.

When the Arts Council of Great Britain established its first regional boards in 1960, officials in London declared the Northeast of England to be a "cultural desert" (p. 1). Natasha Vall's book goes far in showing both the overwhelming inaccuracy of this generalization and the assumptions that contributed to its articulation. Vall has carved out a position for herself as an authority on the regional identity and cultural landscape of Newcastle and Northumbria and so has good standing from which to survey the scene. Thus equipped, Vall gives readers excellent context for her discussion of the tensions between those who sought to "polish the pitmen" and those who saw the vernacular culture of the people as itself worthy of celebration. Moreover, this study of the cultural policy of northeastern England fits well into the existing literature on northern regional identity, the influence of media in the formation of cultural identity, debates on the north-south divide, and the intersection of class and territorial affiliation.

Vall works chronologically, looking first at local radio broadcasting from the interwar years through the 1950s. This sets the stage well for her more detailed

examination of the establishment of Tyne Tees Television in 1959 and its contributions (or lack thereof) to combating the homogenizing aspects of southern—and American—broadcasts. A poet in her own right, Vall also brings an artist's point of view to her inquiries. This is particularly evident in the vivid portraits of many of the players in the struggle for ownership of northeastern culture, which are drawn with a particularly fine brush. In her chapters on Northern Arts (the regional board of the Arts Council of Great Britain) and on “artists and impresarios” between 1959 and 1979, we meet familiar figures, including the modernist poet Basil Bunting (*Briggflatts* [1965]) and Scott Dobson, author of *Larn Yersel Geordie* (1969). But Vall also introduces such lesser-known heroes of the arts wars as Connie Pickard, convenor of the Morden Tower poetry circle, who, together with Bunting and her husband, the poet Tom Pickard, was responsible for bringing Gregory Corso and Allen Ginsberg to Newcastle.

Vall is particularly adept at showing how artists in the Northeast adroitly played up the longstanding connections between a strong working-class identity and the resilient tradition of workers' cultural movements in the region, thereby making it easy to enlist the help of local Labour politicians. This was often an easy sell: Arthur Blenkinsop, Labour MP for Newcastle East and the first acting secretary for Northern Arts, had been, in his youth, a member of the People's Theatre of Newcastle. Ted Fletcher, a veteran of the Spanish Civil war and MP for Darlington, was a staunch champion of the cause of a local arts council for the Northeast. Indeed one of the most interesting aspects of Vall's book is the sense of the torch being passed from one generation of dogged cultural warriors to the next—but never far away from the thread of radical politics. For example, in the late 1950s Frank Graham, another veteran of the Spanish Civil War and a consistently active member of the Communist Party, was the publisher of *Larn Yersel Geordie* and the Geordie Beuks and an active proponent of workers' poetry and workers' theater. In the 1970s, Geoff Gillham helped found Newcastle's Live Theatre, only to leave in 1975 when, upon joining the Workers Revolutionary Party, he insisted that Live Theatre disband and devote all of its funds to working directly for the revolution. Peter Stark, director of Northern Arts in the 1980s, had his roots in community performing and the People's Theatre.

This inquiry into the cultural cohesiveness of the Northeast is all the more interesting given the concomitant lack of economic coherence that has dogged the region, a contrast that Vall exploits in her coda, arguing that if cultural mandarins, both south and north, had sought to use culture as a way of economically regenerating the greater Newcastle area to make it more attractive to investors and consumers, the result had been the establishment of a new industry based in culture itself.

I have one quibble: Vall assumes that her readers have at least a passing familiarity with many of the radio programs (*Wot Cheor, Geordie!*), songs (“Blaydon

Races”), television shows (*The Likely Lads*, the first season of *Auf Wiedersehen, Pet*), and other Northumbrian cultural references. In most cases this is quite reasonable, but for more general readers, particularly North Americans, or for those whose area of specialty is not the Northeast of England, a handful of detailed footnotes would have helpfully broadened the reach of an otherwise fine study.

ANDREA GEDDES POOLE
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MADELEINE DOBIE. *Trading Places: Colonization and Slavery in Eighteenth-Century French Culture*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2010. Pp. xv, 336. Cloth \$69.95, paper \$27.50.

Madeleine Dobie's book “explores the origins, modalities, and historiographical and ethical implications of the cultural invisibility of the colonial world in seventeenth and eighteenth century French culture” (p. 2). What emerges from this exploration is a better understanding of the connection between French colonization and slavery, for Dobie succeeds in illustrating quite effectively how the French colonies were either represented or ignored in works of literature and philosophy, while bringing to the forefront the ongoing concern among scholars about France's reluctance to confront its colonial past.

Dobie's central argument is that although the French Atlantic and Indian Ocean colonies had a significant and demonstrably transformative impact on France's economy and material culture, their existence registered very little in cultural representations. In essence, these colonies have remained relatively peripheral to the writing of French history. Why has this been the case? Dobie posits that while the French colonies were economically important to France, they remained culturally invisible because they were never viewed as an integral part of France. Indeed, France's discomfort with colonial society was such that discourses on colonialism and slavery were relocated and transferred to the Oriental world. Thus, it comes as no surprise that philosophers including Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Denis Diderot ignored colonial slavery.

To examine the lack of cultural representation, Dobie divides the book into three parts. Part one, “East meets West,” consists of three chapters that focus on the transposition of colonial slavery onto Oriental culture in the eighteenth century. Rather than attacking the enslavement of Africans in the Americas, European writers criticized slavery in the Orient and North Africa instead. Dobie gives the example of Montesquieu, who attributed the causes of slavery to political despotism and warm climates, and, like other writers such as Jean-François Melon, associated slavery primarily with the Orient.

While literature ignored black slavery, Dobie shows that France benefited economically from the tropical commodities it imported, including tropical hardwoods

that were used to make chairs, tables, and armoires adorned with Oriental motifs that resulted in the transformation of French furnishing styles. Photographs of these styles, including solid mahogany armories used in Bordeaux and Nantes, enrich the book. Likewise, the import of cotton and indigo had a positive impact on France's clothing and fashion industry, and occupied a central place in the *Encyclopédie* of Diderot and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert. In the end, Dobie attributes the pattern of effacement and projection to a lack of themes or images through which colonial society could be portrayed, the culture of slavery in the colonies, or perhaps the challenge of representation that the colonies presented. What should not be lost sight of, however, is that Europeans in the colonies were vastly outnumbered by blacks, believed that they were under siege, and responded with cruelty and naked racism. The absence of representation is therefore rooted in racism, and this Dobie seems to sidestep.

Part two, "Savages and Slaves," consists of two chapters dedicated primarily to the representation of Native Americans and Africans in seventeenth and eighteenth-century French culture. Here too, the literature is far more sympathetic to the indigenous peoples who "continued to occupy a central place in colonial narrative long after they had been removed from colonized territories, while enslaved Africans occupied a marginal position despite their growing numbers" (p. 131). Dobie rightly notes that the enslaved receive scant treatment in the early histories written by Jean-Baptiste Du Tertre and Jean-Baptiste Labat, and by French missionaries as well. And later works revolve mostly around relationships between Europeans and Native Americans. Such is the case with "Inkle and Yarico"—stories written between 1604 and 1830 that portray a love affair between a European and a Native American; *Cleveland* (1731–1739), a multivolume novel by Antoine-François Prévost that depicts interracial intimacy; and Voltaire's play *Alzire*, first performed in 1736, about a defeated Aztec people whose ruler converts to Christianity and urges his daughter to do the same and to marry the new Spanish governor.

In part three, "Liberty, Equality, Economy," Dobie constructs two chapters centered on liberal economic theory and charts the transition from silence to discourse in the late 1760s when the colonies and slavery belatedly became topics of representation and debate. She explains that the loss of territories in Canada and Louisiana triggered a re-evaluation of France's colonial policy wherein abolition became central to sustained economic interests. From this period down to the French Revolution, slavery, along with other aspects of colonial policy and administration, was explored in a variety of literary genres such that colonization was no longer a repressed cultural issue, and economic reasoning became a major focus of French antislavery writing.

Well written and intellectually engaging, *Trading Places* is a model of excellent scholarship. It makes a

significant contribution to the literature on slavery and colonialism.

BERNARD MOITT

Virginia Commonwealth University

MATTHEW SHAW. *Time and the French Revolution: The Republican Calendar, 1789–Year XIV*. (Studies in History: New Series.) Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press. London: Royal Historical Society. 2011. Pp. xiii, 189. \$90.00.

Matthew Shaw has two principal goals in this short study of the republican calendar introduced by French revolutionaries in 1793. The first is to challenge the dominant understanding of the calendar, prevalent among historians since the time of François-Alphonse Aulard, that the Jacobins adopted it mainly as an element of the dechristianizing campaign of the Year II. The second, more ambitious, is to attempt "a 'history of time' during the last decade of the eighteenth century" (p. 9). Shaw does not quite succeed in that second ambition. Indeed, in those sections of the introduction in which he attempts to establish a conceptual framework for that discussion, the prose is often convoluted and elusive, and the argument far from clear. But in his aim to explore the practical consequences and implications of the revolutionary calendar Shaw is much more straightforward and succinct, and his prose is often a pleasure to read. In the end one learns a great deal in this volume about the calendar and its cultural implications.

As Shaw notes, in Aulard's account "the calendar was the most antichristian innovation of the entire Revolution, potentially uniting a rather incoherent programme of popular dechristianisation with elite secularism and deism" (p. 45). Shaw proposes a broader context, observing that already in 1789 there were those who began to speak of "the First Year of Liberty" (p. 33). Rather than seeing it as the linchpin of dechristianization, one might better consider the calendar alongside the redrawing of the map of France, which led to the creation of the *départements* that we still know today, and the effort to rationalize weights and measures that produced the metric system.

The National Convention endorsed the idea of a republican calendar shortly after it convened and assigned the task to a commission headed by Charles-Gilbert Romme. Romme, a trained mathematician, sought input from other astronomers and mathematicians, including Joseph-Jérôme Le Français de Lalande, Gaspard Monge, and Pierre-Simon de Laplace. He found himself with time to devote to the calendar while imprisoned in the Château of Caen by federalist rebels for some weeks in June 1793. The commission delivered its report to the National Convention on September 20, 1793, as the young republic approached its first anniversary, and the deputies adopted it within two weeks. It was made effective retroactively, with the first day of Year I designated to have been September 22, 1792, the day on which the First Republic had been declared.

As Shaw notes, the National Convention initially adopted the new calendar (composed of twelve months consisting of thirty days each, and five supplementary days, which came to be known as *sans-culottides*), without naming the months. It is thus that the poet, Fabre d'Églantine, is sometimes credited with having crafted the republican calendar, for it was his committee that proposed the names of the months in a report dated October 24, 1793, which the National Convention quickly adopted. The names of the months were classical in inspiration: *messidor*, the month of harvest (June/July); *thermidor*, the month of heat (July/August); *fructidor*, the month of fruit (August/September). Most students of the French Revolution are familiar in some degree with this republican calendar. Fewer are aware that the National Convention also adopted a decimal clock, with each day divided into ten hours of one hundred minutes, each consisting of one hundred seconds. Indeed, on the day of his arrest (9 Thermidor Year II, which Shaw misidentifies as Year IV), Louis-Antoine-Léon de Saint-Just was carrying a decimal timepiece that he had purchased from the shop of A. Elyor, located in the Galerie de l'Egalité, formerly the Palais-Royal (p. 122).

As with the renaming of formerly royal buildings and squares, the introduction of the republican calendar was intended to contribute to the regeneration of the French people. In this goal, Shaw concludes, it was a failure. Decimal time was jettisoned by the end of Year IV. The calendar endured until 1806, so that the Louisiana Purchase is recorded in French documents according to the republican calendar. For just more than a decade, all government business was conducted and recorded according to the new calendar, but the degree to which daily life conformed to the reform is less clear. Shaw notes that departmental authorities adopted the new calendar with little protest, and committee meetings, court sessions, local markets, and Jacobin clubs all shifted accordingly. But no legislation ever mandated that individuals adopt the republican calendar in their personal lives, and many did not. It is commonly asserted that the peasantry by and large refused to accept the *décadi*, which replaced Sundays, but Shaw found evidence that some peasants chose to observe both, thereby gaining two extra days of rest in most months (p. 103).

While the republican calendar did not endure, it did leave a legacy. Those who sought to sustain the revolutionary tradition made reference to the calendar throughout the nineteenth century, most notably Émile Zola in the title of his best-known novel, *Germinal* (1885).

PAUL R. HANSON
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SARAH A. CURTIS. *Civilizing Habits: Women Missionaries and the Revival of French Empire*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. viii, 373. \$74.00.

This fine monograph is Sarah A. Curtis's second book. The first was *Educating the Faithful: Religion, Schooling, and Society in Nineteenth-Century France* (2000). In between, she co-edited a tome on identities in nineteenth-century France, and published a chapter and an article based directly on the material gathered for the current book. These publications and articles on other church issues positioned her well to bring this latest work to fruition.

The major foci of *Civilizing Habits* are the lives and works of three strong-willed female Catholic religious missionary leaders of the early nineteenth century and their interactions with indigenous peoples, church officials, local colonial authorities, Protestants, and Muslims. There are three core chapters for each of the protagonists: Rose-Philippine Duchesne, a founding member of the Religious of the Sacred Heart, who did her ministry in the Mississippi Valley; Emilie de Vialar, foundress of the Soeurs de Saint Joseph de l'Apparition, who worked in Algeria, Tunisia, Malta, and on the edge of the Ottoman Empire; and Anne-Marie Javouhey, foundress of the Soeurs de Saint Joseph de Cluny, who served in French Guiana and Africa. The chapters are replete with details on the women, the differing contexts in which they worked, and their struggles and achievements or lack thereof. Curtis's thesis is that these women were not only the beneficiaries of a transformation in the postrevolutionary church that allowed women to create active (as opposed to solely cloistered) religious orders; they were also major contributors to the "Second French [overseas] Empire," which actually began in the early decades of the nineteenth century when sisters in the active orders took their new ministry to "uncivilized" lands.

In committing themselves to spreading the faith, caring for the sick, and educating the needy, Duchesne, de Vialar, and Javouhey advanced the "civilizing mission" and helped restore the Roman Catholic Church by attracting significantly greater numbers of young women who wanted to do something meaningful with their lives and were pleased to do this under capable leaders who could navigate the limitations of their locales and challenges to their authority from local priests or bishops (often by taking advantage of new church regulations that allowed them to secure authorization for their orders directly from Rome). Indeed, the new women's religious orders (almost four hundred were founded in France between 1800 and 1880) became the dominant mode of French missionary activity. By the second half of the century, the sisters were "outnumbering male clergy (priests and brothers) three to two" (p. 7). While not a significant proportion of the French female population, these sisters were absolutely crucial to the French imperial enterprise—a fact fully appreciated by the contemporary French national government, but not by subsequent historians until now.

Civilizing Habits adds nicely to the pioneering work of Claude Langlois's *Le catholicisme au féminin: Les congrégations françaises à supérieure générale au XIXe*

siècle (1984), which first documented the huge increase in women religious and women's orders in nineteenth-century France. But while other historians have tended to focus on a single female missionary leader, this book studies three, following them to different ends of the French imperial reach in order to get a broader understanding of their impact. This ambitious objective is backed by research from thousands of the leaders' letters and from documents in nineteen different archives, including those in areas where Duchesne, de Vialar, and Javouhey cared for French and indigenous populations. Moreover, there is a very substantial secondary source base for this book from four intersecting areas—religious, political, gender, and colonial history—to tell the story in its multifaceted reality.

There are some stylistic speed bumps in the early pages of the book, and I wonder if Curtis could have actually spoken here of “zeal” in these sisters. Hélène de Chappotin (1839–1904), foundress of the Franciscan Missionaries of Mary, once noted that she had been bent on becoming a Joan of Arc for Henry V until she heard the Bishop of Natchez tell tales of “savages” who “knew neither Jesus nor Mary.” Evidence provided later in Curtis's text seems to support use of this helpful word. Further, I would have suggested removing references to the sisters as “shock troops” (p. 15) and their services being comparable to the “welfare state” of the twentieth century (p. 7). Lastly, additional context to some opening statements, such as finding the sisters' views “paradoxical” when they saw all people “equal in the sight of God . . . [but] only . . . [if those people fully accepted] a religion that remained bounded by European cultural assumptions” (p. 17), would have been helpful. Otherwise, the book is very well written and contextualized, and it is a valuable contribution to our literature on both the Roman Catholic Church and French imperialism.

SANDRA HORVATH-PETERSON
Georgetown University

M. BRADY BROWER. *Unruly Spirits: The Science of Psychic Phenomena in Modern France*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2010. Pp. xxvii, 202. Cloth \$85.00, paper \$30.00.

M. Brady Brower's book is a captivating history of French spiritism from the mid-nineteenth century to the interwar period. Spiritism represents an attempt, usually orchestrated by mediums in the setting of a séance, to contact the spirit world through table rappings, automatic messages, telepathy, the movement of tables and other objects, and the materialization of spirit forms. Inspired by the Fox sisters' experiences with rapping noises in their house in New York in 1848, spiritism first became popular in France in 1853. Unlike other works, such as John Warne Monroe's *Laboratories of Faith: Mesmerism, Spiritism, and Occultism in Modern France* (2008), which examine the topic primarily from a religious point of view, Brower investigates spiritism's relationship with the scientific community.

Instead of dismissing psychic phenomena as reflections of superstition, many philosophers, scientists, doctors, and intellectuals tried to ascertain their material reality and discover a physical explanation for them by means of a clinical, experimental approach. These individuals launched a new study of mental phenomena called “psychical research” and set up institutions and journals devoted to it. Brower demonstrates that in their search for a scientific basis for psychic phenomena, these scholars became very aware of the problem of subjectivity in both the medium and the observers. Their interesting debates, which Brower covers in depth, helped dismantle Victor Cousin's belief in a unitary self—a belief that had dominated French psychology for most of the nineteenth century. Psychical researchers discovered processes in the mind that were unseen and involuntary, undermining Cousin's method of introspection. In this way, these scholars paved the way for Freudian psychoanalysis, which came late to France, in the 1920s.

In 1857, Allan Kardec launched spiritism as a new religion, insisting at the same time that it was a science. After the establishment of the Third Republic in 1871, various groups began to examine more systematically the scientific basis of spiritism, reflecting the fact that the new government was promoting secularism and science partly as a way to legitimize its own existence. Anticlerical republican scholars aimed to gather solid scientific reasons to expose spiritism as a superstition, fraud, and menace to public health. In response, spiritists claimed they could use experimental methods to prove the soul's survival after death. Trying to be more objective, some scientists sought to apply scientific methods to psychic phenomena to further their own careers, encourage scientific progress, and help the public by offering socially useful knowledge. Of course, they also risked discrediting their careers by being associated with this suspect movement.

Many prominent intellectuals of the Third Republic, including Henri Bergson and Pierre and Marie Curie, were attracted to psychical research. Some promoted it actively. Pierre Janet was a philosopher, doctor, and psychologist, who believed that research into “mediumism” could shed light on the multiple selves that made up a subject and the problem of the unconscious, which was still poorly understood. In 1900, he, along with Charles-Robert Richet, who won a Nobel Prize in physiology, had a large role in founding the Institut psychique internationale, which later changed its name to Institut général psychologique. For the next thirty years, researchers tried to measure objectively the material aspects of psychical phenomena in order to eliminate the observers' subjective errors of perception and mediums' use of fraud. Their efforts intensified in the period after World War I, when interest in spiritism peaked as people sought messages from their dead loved ones. A new organization was founded: Institut métapsychique internationale. Richet served as honorary president. He and other scientists faced intractable problems. How could scientific controls be imposed on

mediums without alienating them or disrupting their work? How could scientists escape subjective mistakes in their observations and also reproduce their experiments with mediums? It seemed that the public and other scientists had to have faith in these scientific observers, who in turn had to have faith in mediums. Given the mediated aspect of psychic experiences, certainty remained elusive. In the end, neither the scientific community at large nor the skeptical public was won over to the enterprise.

As enthusiasm for psychical research ebbed in the 1920s and 1930s because of these epistemological impasses, Freudianism became more popular. Freudians countered the psychic researchers' and French psychologists' focus on doing objective experiments and embraced the problem of subjectivity, which now became an object of knowledge for the first time. The indeterminate nature of the subjective, which the psychic researchers had discussed at length as a problem, now became a way to deepen one's understanding of the individual and his or her unconscious. Brower does an outstanding job showing how French psychology developed from a philosophy of the mind to become a real science.

MARY PICKERING

San Jose State University

ELIZABETH CAMPBELL KARLSGODT. *Defending National Treasures: French Art and Heritage under Vichy*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2011. Pp. xv, 382. \$60.00.

Historians have understood for some time that Adolf Hitler and most other National Socialist leaders regarded themselves as men of culture and devoted an inordinate amount of time and resources to cultural matters—including art plundering. In this compelling and well-researched monograph, Elizabeth Campbell Karlsgodt shows that the leaders of Vichy also privileged cultural matters, with distinctive characteristics that grew out of a particular French tradition.

The notion of French cultural superiority lay at or near the heart of the Vichy ideology. Campbell Karlsgodt begins her book with a discussion of the term *le patrimoine*: patrimony, to be sure, but often an even more freighted word. For most Vichy leaders, the term applied to cultural heritage: artworks, antiquities, and historic landmarks, usually predating 1900 (p. 5). This *patrimoine artistique* that Campbell Karlsgodt explores became a focal point of Vichy policy and indeed formed part of the ideological foundation of the "National Revolution." Vichy officials, who understood the arts as the nation's last remaining comparative advantage, sought to place France's cultural heritage in control of the state, which in turn would protect and promote this heritage in a way that would restore the economy (tourism) and help the French "reclaim lost grandeur" (p. 103). Cultural policy, therefore, took center stage in Vichy, and high expectations were not uncommon, with con-

servative officials also seeing them as an "antidote to a wide-range of destructive social trends" (p. 5).

The reality is that Vichy officials spent most of their time contending with the crises relating to the German victory and the ongoing war, and cultural policy often entailed mitigating the damage. The example of the smelting of statues provides an apt example. Civic statuary had flourished in the nineteenth century, although many of the works lacked artistic merit. The Germans made demands on the French for raw materials, and rather than destroy church bells, Vichy officials turned to these bronze statues (p. 148). What is so striking is that the French undertook the selection and destruction themselves. Although this topic has been studied by a number of scholars, including Kirrily Freeman in a 2009 monograph, Campbell Karlsgodt, who carried out impressive archival research in Paris, Chambéry, and Nantes, adds an original analysis of what was destroyed and saved. The evacuation of artworks from museums to provincial chateaux and other repositories is also handled deftly.

Campbell Karlsgodt takes up familiar cases regarding art plundering and examines them from the French perspective. She is most intrigued by what museum professionals and cultural officials did when faced with an opportunity to integrate looted Jewish collections into the Louvre and other national museums. Her analysis reveals a strong element of opportunism on the part of French museum and state officials, but also a rationalization grounded in the nationalistic cultural policies of Vichy. The art collection of Adolphe Schloss, the object of intense competition between the Germans and the French, offers a key example. Vichy Prime Minister Pierre Laval helped broker a deal in which the Germans obtained 262 works, while the French obtained 49 paintings. Campbell Karlsgodt argues—with compelling evidence—that René Huyghe, the director of paintings at the Louvre, and Jacques Jaujard, the now legendary director of the French national museums, believed they were adding to the museum's holdings on a permanent basis. Although the episode has been treated by others, Campbell Karlsgodt adds new evidence countering official claims, which became part of the narrative in the postwar period, that Huyghe, Jaujard, and many of their colleagues pursued fictional acquisitions to keep the works out of German hands (pp. 215–216). She avoids the Manichean categories of resistance and collaboration and writes about her subjects with an appreciation of the complexity of their experiences.

In a similar vein, Campbell Karlsgodt explores the legacy of Vichy, noting continuities in many areas concerning culture and heritage. The urgency of the war, and especially the years 1940–1942, had created an excellent opportunity for the development of policy concerning cultural patrimony. Much of the subsequent postwar cultural heritage legislation extended the Vichy-initiated policies, thereby enhancing the state's control over cultural patrimony. In other areas regarding Vichy's cultural legacy, it was more a case of quiet

neglect (or even active repression). In the postwar period, for example, French officials gave the impression that all the recovered property that could be restituted had indeed been returned. This, as journalist Hector Feliciano first reported in the mid-1990s, was not true: some two thousand high-quality paintings, referred to by the acronym MNR (musées nationaux récupération)—had been held in trusteeship by the French state for decades. Campbell Karlsgodt again updates the story and adds an admirable critical perspective, asking “to what extent did anti-Semitism play a role in the long-term guardianship?” (p. 13).

Campbell Karlsgodt could have said more on the fate of real estate that was seized from Jews. At the same time of the MNR scandal in the mid-1990s, a parallel development occurred with regard to “Aryanized” Jewish real estate that had been declared heirless and that was now controlled (and sometimes inhabited) by friends of government officials. Campbell Karlsgodt offers insightful observations about the Mattéoli Commission on Holocaust-era assets but ignores the issue of real estate—which, granted, in certain instances would arguably not qualify as cultural patrimony.

Campbell Karlsgodt does a fine job with the historiography of Vichy, offering concise summaries of a rich literature and providing important information in a succinct manner. She also has a knack for explicating evocative moments, such as Marshal Philippe Pétain moving into the Louvre during the Battle of France in 1940 (p. 20), and for including telling statistics, such as the estimate that eighty percent of French art dealers sold works to Germans during the war (p. 227). While very impressive in terms of French sources, and this includes a range of archives, she pays inadequate attention to the German scholarly literature. Because she engages topics like “art as a negotiating tool,” which concern French-German bilateral relations, and German archaeologists in France, there are instances where a wider range of German sources would have been useful.

Overall this is a cogently argued, well-researched, and elegant book. The issue of art and cultural heritage provides a brilliant entrée into the history of France during World War II. Indeed, just as there was a generation of scholars who offered breakthroughs in the study of Vichy beginning in the 1960s, so now there is a “renaissance” focused on the cultural history of wartime France. Campbell Karlsgodt has made an important addition to this burgeoning literature.

JONATHAN PETROPOULOS

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SARA B. PRITCHARD. *Confluence: The Nature of Technology and the Remaking of the Rhône*. (Harvard Historical Studies, number 172.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. xvii, 371. \$49.95.

Since the late nineteenth century, a common response to military defeat has been for the vanquished to appropriate modern technologies while interpreting them in terms of longstanding cultural ideals (see Wolfgang

Schivelbusch's *The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery* [2003]). After humiliating collapse in World War II, postwar France undertook a vast set of engineering projects to reconstruct and modernize the nation, not only for practical purposes but also for compelling displays of renewed national glory.

Thus began the transformation of the Rhône in the four decades after the war. It had long been an unruly river, prone to flooding, so projects to manage it were hardly new. In 1921 the French state established a river authority, the Compagnie Nationale du Rhône (CNR), which during the interwar years led a public-private partnership to make improvements that would balance the needs of various sectors (navigation, agriculture, industry, hydroelectric power) as well as local, regional, and national interests.

In her fine first book, Sara B. Pritchard emphasizes that after the war more radical concepts of human intervention led to plans not just to manage the river, but to reconstruct it according to human desires. At a time when France was starved for energy, power production using “white coal” was given top priority. This led to the enormous hydroelectric project of Donzère-Mondragon carried out between 1947 and 1952, described by Pritchard in fascinating and lucid detail. Within forty years after the war, nineteen hydroelectric projects were built between Lyon and Marseille, as well as six nuclear power plants. At the same time the river waters were also tapped for increasing industrial and agricultural production.

The story arc of *Confluence* is one of strong postwar national agreement on rebuilding the Rhône, followed by gradual loss of confidence and consensus as competing interests grew stronger and as unintended consequences, especially regarding groundwater hydrology, became more evident. Pritchard carefully traces evolving views and priorities as embodied in different institutions and groups on the national, regional, and local scales.

In the late 1960s came the great postwar turn in the West—evident in so many areas of common life within just a few years—questioning the whole direction and scope of technological interventions in the world. From the 1970s on, increasing attention was given to rehabilitation measures promising to restore the “former Rhône” to higher ecological quality, renewed fish migration, and some modicum of aesthetic appeal. This new consciousness was expressed in “the path-breaking water law of 1992,” which declared that “water is part of the common patrimony of the nation” that needs to be protected, improved, and developed as a “useable resource” with respect to its “natural equilibriums” (p. 247).

As Pritchard points out, there is still plenty of room for conflict in this declaration. By the time it was pronounced, almost all the postwar projects planned for the Rhône had been completed. The main practical effect of new attitudes was to shelve an ambitious plan to build a modern connection between the Rhine and the

Rhône. Pritchard notes, however, that while the “high modernist” approach to rivers receded in France, it was thriving in the postcolonial world, often with consulting assistance from technical staff associated with the CNR.

Pritchard has done an enormous amount of archival research, especially in the holdings of the CNR, and has carefully assembled evidence involving multiple organizations, large and small, private and public, local and regional and national. This is primarily an institutional history but an exceptionally broad and deep one. French historians should pair Pritchard’s *Confluence* with Gabrielle Hecht’s acclaimed *Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II* (2009) as studies of postwar history, *tout court*: history of technology, yes, but with implications far beyond this supposed subfield.

Other obvious audiences are scholars in science, technology, and society (STS), and environmental historians. Pritchard spends an inordinate amount of space outlining the conceptual basis of her work with regard to these groups. While balanced and thoughtful, her discussion has an inside-the-academic-Beltway flavor, considering that the topic is of interest and importance far beyond them.

The main distinction between STS and environmental history is that the latter explicitly acknowledges the factor of time. *Confluence* presents a rich case study of a controversy, but even more it presents a story about time and the river. The story starts with beaten-down people imagining collective renewal in the vision of a river transformed into a great technological system. As they build their dream, they slowly realize that the system is as imbalanced and imperfect as they are. They come to the realization that they would like to have a second chance, to do it over again in a better way, but they can never step into the same river twice.

ROSALIND WILLIAMS

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LOTTE VAN DE POL. *The Burgher and the Whore: Prostitution in Early Modern Amsterdam*. Translated by LIZ WATERS. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. vii, 269. \$55.00.

More than a decade and a half ago, Lotte van de Pol published the large-scale study *Het Amsterdamsch hoerdom* (1996). Within the compass of some 350 pages, van de Pol surveyed and analyzed prostitution in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Amsterdam. The book, extensively and very favorably reviewed in the Dutch and German press, was widely, and justifiably, considered a “pioneering work.” Prostitution was, even at the time, a fairly well-studied phenomenon among social, feminist, and cultural historians. The book stood out, however, because of its exceedingly strong archival basis, the author’s intimate familiarity with the highs and lows of Amsterdam society, and her rigorously critical examination of several forms of documentation that included legal records, travel guides (such as the

eponymous *Het Amsterdamsch hoerdom*), pamphlets, and *belles lettres*. Just as valuable in the original was the lengthy and informed discussion (here still present in its essentials) of van de Pol’s principal source: the unusually complete run of Amsterdam *Confessieboeken* from 1585 to 1811. Out of these for the period between 1650 and 1750, van de Pol combed some 8,099 trials involving 5,784 individuals: 4,633 prostitutes, 898 bawds, and 253 male pimps, panderers, and landlords.

The Burgher and the Whore presents a shortened version of this magisterial contribution and has been somewhat rewritten for an English-speaking audience. This revision, in a crisp translation, streamlines a good deal of the original’s content but does not violate its integrity. While some findings now seem less fresh than they did when first advanced in 1996, others will continue to interest historians of prostitution, gender, women, and the early modern world more generally. It certainly deserves a wide readership among those who have no access to the Dutch original.

An enormous wealth of materials addresses prostitution. For Amsterdam, as van de Pol observes, these are “remarkably numerous and diverse, and they touch both image and reality” (p. 8). The skill with which van de Pol handles this prolixity is masterful especially at troublesome points of intersection. The lines between fictional and nonfiction sources are inevitably blurry. Take, for example, criminal records. Where would historians be without them? Yet, they are deceptively transparent. Qualitative and quantitative details abound in the confession books but require considerable elbow grease to extract and to evaluate. Van de Pol aptly characterizes the materials found in the confession books as “stories,” and she uses them to individualize and humanize the face of prostitution, as well as to construct a quantitative survey. She also employs them to illustrate how stories changed over time, thus allowing her not only to trace the emergence of differing attitudes toward prostitution but also to locate shifts in how authorities vigorously policed, carefully observed, or studiously ignored it. These sources additionally reveal the many locations where prostitution took place and offer a panoramic view of the underbelly of Amsterdam’s society. Because contemporaries considered Amsterdam “the ultimate city of whores,” a great range of fiction, as well as much fiction masquerading as travelogue and guidebook, treats the topic. Van de Pol leads us surefootedly through this “veritable labyrinth” (p. 12). Most notorious of contemporary publications on prostitution was the 1681 *Het Amsterdamsch hoerdom* that van de Pol uses not as a reliable *vade mecum* to the music houses and brothels but as a source most fruitful when read in conjunction with, and against, the confession books, pamphlets, laws, and fictional and real biographies or autobiographies. She accepts little at face value. She listens sensitively to stories people told (the prostitutes in the confession books, playwrights and novelists, and pamphleteers, for example) and shows how these, if carefully analyzed and precisely located within the broader sweep of Amsterdam’s

history, reveal the hidden, and the not-so-hidden, contours of prostitution.

Many findings in *The Burgher and the Whore* work for cities other than Amsterdam, yet the city itself and its peculiarities never disappear. The book is, therefore, about *Amsterdam* prostitution as much as it is about prostitution in *Amsterdam*. The city was a highly unusual urban environment. It was very large, it was diverse, it was affluent, it had a high percentage of women living alone, and it was a port supporting a large transient and seafaring population. To be sure, other great ports, like Antwerp or Hamburg, or urban conglomerations, like London and Paris, had some similar social and economic structures, but they were not identical to Amsterdam. Thus the face and reality of prostitution differed.

By anchoring Amsterdam prostitution within the city's larger social, economic, legal, political, and religious frameworks, van de Pol highlights critical points. Prostitution in the early modern world differed from prostitution later (or earlier). Even more strikingly, prostitution was big business; it formed a significant segment of the urban economy. In short, "prostitution made money go around" (p. 199) and contributed to a monetary circulation that virtually all eighteenth-century political economists regarded as the wellspring of true prosperity.

Van de Pol has produced a book that succeeds on at least two levels. It is a well-written, lively, accessible history that offers solidly based and appropriately illustrated analyses of the deeper ramifications of "sex for money" and "money for sex" in the early modern world. That prostitution is a business is obvious; that it was a major economic player and therefore involved a very large number of the respectable, the not-so-respectable, and the truly marginal are topics that have not received the attention they are due. Historians have pointed out the social, cultural, and gender implications of prostitution, but they have far less frequently considered it as a major urban institution as critical to the functioning of an entrepôt like Amsterdam as its Exchange or Bank. Van de Pol's ability to develop those larger implications marks *The Burgher and the Whore* as a sophisticated and exceedingly valuable contribution to the historical literature.

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EVA GILOI. *Monarchy, Myth, and Material Culture in Germany 1750–1950*. (New Studies in European History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. x, 422. \$99.00.

Eva Giloi's richly detailed study offers new perspectives on accepted wisdom as well as revisions of modern German historiographical verities in the light of monarchical material culture, specifically the "relics" or royal memorabilia donated or presented as gifts to the Hohenzollern rulers. The book's stated goal is "to plumb the meaning of German loyalism. Which aspects of

monarchy did collectors and consumers endorse . . . which competing royal myths did they create through their manipulation of dynastic goods?" (p. 5). Although the title indicates a German scope, the text actually focuses in great depth on the Hohenzollerns and Prussia, with comparative reflections on contemporary European monarchies, particularly Victorian Britain. Giloi uses material culture to reveal the relative distance or accessibility of a monarch to his subjects, based on the kinds of gifts, whether memorabilia or homemade, relics or baked goods.

Thoroughly researched in the archives of the Preussischer Kulturbesitz, particularly in remaining files documenting royal gifts and donations (many were lost in World War II) and contemporary collectors' journals, the chapters follow each nineteenth-century Prussian monarch in turn, linking the ruler's personality to consumer culture tendencies of his time. Giloi also examines the creation of Berlin's wonderful museum complex, from the royal *Kunstkammer* to the Neues Museum, from Schloss Monbijou to the Hohenzollern Museum. Formidable, influential curators such as Jean Henry, Leopold von Ledebur, and Paul Seidel receive sustained attention. Gifts were not always accepted, particularly when the objects were too intimate (reflecting bodily contact) or if the gift was too similar to existing inventory (yet another of Frederick the Great's snuff boxes). Giloi considers the dynamics of gift giving and political jockeying for position as givers angled for reciprocation, the monarch weighed the consequences of the response, curators sought to reshape museums, and a modern German nation was formed.

Acknowledging that this comes as no surprise, the author finds that the majority of gift givers came from Prussia itself, rather than lands that came under Prussian domination. She also shows that while nobility were predictably regular gift givers, middle-class donors increased, though Catholic donors did not, and the number of upwardly mobile Jewish donors increased even as the number of antisemitic donors grew. Overall, Giloi sees an "affective bond" generated between subjects and monarchs through relic gifts, with intimate objects or handmade gifts finding particularly positive reception during the reigns of Frederick Wilhelm IV and Wilhelm I (p. 141).

The book opens with a vignette describing the gift of one of Queen Luise's garters to a valued courtier, Sophie von Voss (p. 1). The garter's subsequent circulation among nobility and museums offers insight into the sustained popularity of two monarchs: Frederick the Great and Queen Luise. The garter was worn by the queen as she died, and the pathos of this story generated significance for an intimate but otherwise mundane item of clothing. The stories attached to objects, more than the objects themselves, determined their value as more and more teacups sipped from by monarchs, or handkerchiefs used by them, and autographs and signed photographs came on the collectors' market and were given as gifts. Giloi shows that the same kinds of relics found very different receptions over time and

could be used to tell quite different stories; they were therefore unstable platforms for nationalist or patriotic messages. Ledebur, the influential curator of the royal *Kunstkammer* after 1830, considered Frederick the Great's umbilical cord and a cloth bearing the sweat of the dying monarch's brow "gems" of the collection, and so they also appeared later in the Hohenzollern Museum, but the same objects were removed from the relic rooms of the Neues Museum in the years between (p. 151). Wilhelm I's sentimentality appeared to be much more in tune with the Victorian era than Wilhelm II's, and the persistent popularity of Queen Luise played a profound role in what Giloi refers to as the "Wilhelm-Luise dyad" (pp. 167–185), with Wilhelm I's strong domestic sensibility complementing a Luise cult that emphasized Germany's victim status even after the victories of 1870. Donations on anniversaries of Luise's life and death increased continually until World War I, paving the way, Giloi argues, for a vision of Germany as "a victim in need of rescue" (p. 324). Frederick's and Luise's popularity ultimately created "an iconographic compression that became toxic for their descendants as it gave them little room for diversion into alternate political symbols" (p. 333). In the author's terms, the Hohenzollerns' role in the development of German nationalism becomes more complex.

In a book focused on material, particularly visual culture representations of monarchical myths, it is particularly regrettable that the illustrations are poorly handled. Textual references to figures occur out of order, and in the first two instances refer to figures incorrectly. The majority of the images are more appropriately referenced, but this careless use of illustration creates easily avoidable confusion to the detriment of the main arguments, which themselves are sound and well supported.

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LISA FETHERINGILL ZWICKER. *Dueling Students: Conflict, Masculinity, and Politics in German Universities, 1890–1914*. (Social History, Popular Culture, and Politics in Germany.) Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 2011. Pp. ix, 296. \$75.00.

Lisa Fetheringill Zwicker's book is a useful reminder to historians of Germany that while the *Sonderweg* may no longer be in fashion, its impact can still be felt. She reassesses the view of German universities as bastions of conservative, antisemitic, and radical nationalist thought. There can be no doubt that all of these sentiments existed in German universities; however, through a thorough examination of university archives and student publications, both newspapers and pamphlets, as well as letters and memoirs, Zwicker convincingly proves that the standard view is in need of revision. She has done this by focusing on a fundamental aspect of student life in Germany: student fraternities and associations.

After an introduction outlining the historiography as

well as the resources, method, and intentions of the book, the author launches into a discussion of student life in Wilhelmine Germany. Students considered themselves to be the intellectual aristocracy of the nation and those with the economic means comported themselves as such. Friedrich Nietzsche's scornful account of student drinking and dueling was by no means unique. Zwicker demonstrates that there was more going on than Nietzsche and other critics realized. The admission of women and the increasing number of students from the middle class changed the dynamic of student life at universities. The author's examination of the *Burschenschaft*, the Corps, the Union of German Students, Jewish and Catholic fraternities or associations, and the Free Student associations reveal a lively and diverse student culture where the liberal idea of intellectual freedom held tremendous sway. Individual chapters cover the above-mentioned groups. The first two chapters cover the Corps and the *Burschenschaft*, the two oldest and most exclusive fraternities at German universities. Zwicker shows that the ritualized drinking and dueling associated with German fraternities were tied to notions of masculinity. The regulation of the duel was supposedly a matter of honor, but it was also a method of exclusion. Fraternities had contracts with other fraternities and determined which people were worthy of obtaining satisfaction. Women were excluded from this ritual, as were the vast majority of students with modest means. In this manner, the Corps and the *Burschenschaft* attempted to claim supremacy among students, a claim that did not go unchallenged.

The Union of German Students, Catholic fraternities and associations, and Jewish fraternities all vied for respect and influence on university matters. Perhaps the most important were the Free Student associations. These were students who did not belong to any fraternity and represented the plurality, if not the majority, of students at German universities. These groups all fought for and eventually won places on university student councils, although when and where varied. Jewish fraternities and Catholic fraternities and associations were particular targets of other fraternities at this time and are the subject of their own chapters. Chapter six looks at the limits of antisemitism in German universities. Zwicker argues that after a spike of antisemitic activity in the mid-1890s, this was not a driving issue for student groups. The memoirs of Jewish students and Jewish student publications do not make an issue of antisemitism, although it pervaded the experiences of Jewish students.

Chapter eight examines the academic *Kulturkampf* against Catholic organizations at universities. Dredging up the language of Otto von Bismarck's *Kulturkampf*, Catholic student organizations were banned on many universities because they were exclusionary and political, thus dividing the nation instead of uniting it. Moreover, critics claimed that Catholicism limited academic discourse and research. Zwicker identifies the default Protestantism of German university culture as well as the fundamental conflict between the ideals of liberal-

ism, including freedom of conscience, expression, and association, and liberalism's anti-Catholicism. The academic *Kulturkampf* produced the same results as Bismarck's. Catholic students became more united and more politicized because of the attack on their religion. Debates held within and among the various student groups generally had a democratic character. Zwicker proves convincingly that German student groups were more liberal and more democratic than the historiography has indicated.

There are two important strengths in this work. First, there is a careful recognition of the differences at the various German universities; not all universities were equally antisemitic or anti-Catholic. Second, Zwicker offers an insightful discussion of notions of masculinity and how groups who were excluded from dueling could offer a competing notion of masculinity. The account of student activism shows that not all German students were apolitical. The book also provides an interesting glimpse into the richness of student life at universities and through the occasional comparison to English and American universities at the time reminds readers that there was a good reason that so many from both of those nations decided to study in Germany.

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SCOTT STEPHENSON. *The Final Battle: Soldiers on the Western Front and the German Revolution of 1918*. (Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2009. Pp. xvi, 354. \$99.00.

The German revolution of 1918—if, indeed, it was a revolution at all—did not lead to a stable democracy, and the army was one of the centers of opposition to the democratic idea in the Weimar Republic. This is a bit of a conundrum, because the revolution started in the armed forces and they did not fight to stop the spread of the revolution, although in January 1919 the army did put down the Spartacist uprising with exemplary violence. Scott Stephenson attempts to explain this conundrum by closely examining the soldiers on the western front in 1918, their experiences in the last months of the war, their orderly march back home, and their role in the critical months of late 1918 and early 1919. As he states in his preface, the author is a former soldier who now teaches at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has great sympathy with soldiers, especially with the “front hogs” of the German trenches of 1918, and his empathy serves him well in describing how they felt and interpreted their experiences.

At the outset he makes an important distinction between the front-line troops and the rest. Although exhausted and tired, the front-line troops on the western front were still a powerful and well-disciplined force. For example, in the revolution the front-line troops did not remove their officers as did the majority of the German occupation units in the east. Front-line troops experienced the German revolution as a “chasm that sep-

arated those who served behind the line and those who had endured the terrible experience of service in the trenches of the Western Front in the last stages of the war” (p. 6). This division is at the heart of the book.

Stephenson begins his story in October 1918, with a chapter on the German soldiers on the western front in the last month of the war. He describes the soldiers' morale, their exhaustion, their isolation, their alienation, and the importance of camaraderie and cohesion in sustaining their fighting spirit. This chapter is a superb account of the psychology of the “front hogs.” In the next chapter he describes how this army, which was still willing to fight the enemy, was not willing to fight for the Kaiser against other German troops. The perspective shifts here to the officers at Spa, but Stephenson never loses sight of the men in the trenches. He notes that, ultimately, “by their unwillingness to fight for the monarchy . . . they became key agents in the revolution's first and greatest victory, the abdication of the Kaiser” (p. 108).

The next few chapters focus on how the army on the western front was brought home. The officers accomplished the difficult task of maintaining order during retreat through the force of their personalities and the soldiers' camaraderie (Stephenson uses the term cohesion) with enlisted men and their officers. This is an important revision of an older thesis put forward by Wilhelm Deist, who argued that the army simply dissolved after the armistice in 1918, with soldiers deserting as they returned home. Finally, in late November and December 1918, the troops arrived back in Germany, where the vast majority were demobilized in a relatively organized fashion. But not all of them were demobilized. Stephenson's examination of how the troops that remained were chosen, organized, and led, and the role they played in the last phases of the revolution of 1918 as a force for a certain sort of law and order in Germany, is one of the most interesting and perceptive parts of the book, especially as it is told largely from the perspective of the army, a perspective that is quite rare in modern German historiography. Unfortunately, the book ends there.

The book's strength and its weakness lie with the author's perspective. There is no better account of the soldiers' morale, of the efforts taken by the officers to sustain morale, and of the officers' mindset in the revolution in 1918. Yet that is not quite enough. To cite just one example: in his chapter on how the military put down the Spartacist uprising, “The Last Battle,” Stephenson offers what is ultimately a sympathetic portrayal of Captain Waldemar Pabst. Yet this same Pabst gave the order to murder Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, actively fought the Weimar democratic system throughout the 1920s, and contributed in no small manner to the end of Weimar and the rise of the Nazis. (It would have been interesting, for example, if the book had ended not with the Spartacist Uprising but with the Kapp Putsch.) It may very well be that what defined a good officer and an effective fighting force in late 1918—and certainly Pabst was an effective offi-

cer—was also inherently dangerous to the new democracy: in other words, that the problem was not the old but the new militarism. Even if there is no direct link from 1918 to 1933, there is some connection, and the author needs to reflect more on this. Stephenson has written a perceptive and interesting account of the history of the end of the war and the German revolution of 1918 from the soldier's perspective. The lack of a broader discussion of this perspective in the context of German militarism is a real pity.

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JULIA ROOS. *Weimar through the Lens of Gender: Prostitution Reform, Woman's Emancipation, and German Democracy, 1919–33*. (Social History, Popular Culture, and Politics in Germany.) Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 2010. Pp. viii, 314. \$70.00.

At first sight this work seems to be a conventional history from above about a narrow topic. Unlike Victoria Harris's *Selling Sex in the Reich: Prostitutes in German Society, 1914–1945* (2010), which focuses on the experience of sex workers themselves, Julia Roos is concerned with the changing regulation of prostitution from Wilhelmine to Weimar to Nazi Germany. But she offers much more. This book is a meticulously researched study of the factors behind the successful passage of the 1927 Law For Combating Venereal Diseases, undoubtedly the most important new hygiene law in the Weimar Republic, and one that contained the most tolerant prostitution policies in the West. It decriminalized prostitution, outlawed brothels, gave prostitutes better rights to work, and ended the double standard of sexual morality that held women alone responsible for the spread of venereal disease. Roos's ambitions, however, are larger. First, using the example of prostitution, she seeks to reassess the impact of the women's movement and its allies on the political left in transforming the old patriarchal order into a much more equal gender order. Like a number of recent studies by, for example, Atina Grossmann, Kathleen Canning, and this reviewer, she takes issue with the well-known negative judgments of the women's movement by historians such as Richard J. Evans, Renate Bridenthal, Claudia Koonz, Ute Frevert, and Karen Hagemann. Second, Roos boldly claims, as her title indicates, that only through the lens of gender can we truly understand why the Weimar project ultimately failed. Based on her close scrutiny of the battle to reform prostitution, she claims that liberalization mobilized "anti-democratic sentiments and opposition" and thereby significantly contributed to the rise of Nazism (p. 4). She argues that "conflicts over gender and sexuality were perhaps as important for the crisis and ultimate demise of the Weimar Republic as class antagonism and the bitter political divisions between Left and Right" (p. 8).

Roos supports her case with evidence from a very wide base of archival and published sources. Rather

than discussing gender as discourse, she approaches it as real and a powerful relationship and examines prostitution reform against the background of political and cultural change. Chapter one describes the regulation of prostitution in Wilhelmine Germany and the immediate impact of World War I. Sex workers' views towards regulation are set out in chapter two, which reveals them not as stereotypical passive victims or "degenerates" but as active participants in public debates. But their mobilization in the wake of the 1927 law provoked the moral right and led to vociferous demands for the recriminalization of prostitution. Chapter three examines the campaign by feminists, who joined forces with socialists and sex reformers, to reform prostitution, which culminated in the anti-VD law of 1927. Although Roos underplays the importance of radical feminists like Helene Stöcker by concentrating on the bourgeois women's movement and its Christian counterpart, this chapter nevertheless reveals a more complex and positive image of these women, who have often been dismissed as authoritarian and anti-individualist. Socialists' important role in improving the rights of sex workers is the subject for chapter four, which also discusses the overlap and differences between social democratic and communist activists. The conservative attempt to overturn the more liberal aspects of the 1927 law is the topic of the final chapter. Here, too, we see a deep split between conservative commentators and lawmakers and the Protestant and Catholic women's movement. The latter shared the liberal feminists' deep revulsion at the misogyny enshrined in regulationism. Toward the final years of the republic, however, their fear of a "moral degeneration" led them to support the backlash against the 1927 law and against "sexual bolshevism" in general, i.e. sex reform (including easier access to birth control and abortion). This played into the Nazis' hands and helped them win support among the middle classes.

It is a pity that a study on gender and prostitution lacks a proper discussion of important male players in the debate: customers of sex workers are given considerable attention in Regina Schulte's *Sperrbezirke: Tugendhaftigkeit und Prostitution in der bürgerlichen Welt* (1979) but are largely absent here; so is the predominantly male medical profession, which, as Lutz Sauerteig has shown in *Krankheit, Sexualität, Gesellschaft: Geschlechtskrankheiten und Gesundheitspolitik in Deutschland im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert* (1999), played a vital role in prostitution reform. These caveats, however, should not deflect from the very impressive achievements of this book.

CORNELIE USBORNE

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ANNA HOLIAN. *Between National Socialism and Soviet Communism: Displaced Persons in Postwar Germany*. (Social History, Popular Culture, and Politics in Ger-

many.) Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011. Pp. vii, 367. \$85.00.

Scholarship on the experience of displaced persons (DPs) in postwar Europe has expanded rapidly in recent years. New studies by the historians Gerald Daniel Cohen and Jessica Reinisch on the humanitarian and political context of the DP crisis complement a range of local histories and studies of particular national and ethnic groups within the refugee-haunted world of postwar Europe. Anna Holian's book is an outstanding contribution to this literature. Her transnational study of DP identity artfully merges the "shadow history" of DP life into the wider stream of postwar reconstruction and the emergence of the Cold War international order (p. 2).

This book endeavors to understand the ways that various DP groups—in this case Poles, Ukrainians, Russians, and Jews living in American-occupied Bavaria—came to understand the circumstances and conditions of their displacement. She focuses on DP elites, who formed an endless parade of committees and organizations intent on negotiating with the Allies and Germans on behalf of their national constituencies. While anticommunism and the recent memory of suffering at the hands of the Nazis were core components of their claims for reparations and other benefits, politics within the DP community were also suffused with tensions transported from prewar Eastern Europe. As Holian memorably puts it, "we need to be attentive to where displaced persons came from as well as where they found themselves and where they were going" (p. 26).

These nationalized DP narratives were both convergent and conflicting. Non-Jewish Eastern Europeans emphasized their opposition to and status as victims of Soviet communism, while Jews primarily stressed their experiences under the Nazi empire. DP anticommunism, which could serve to integrate the claims of various East European groups, also fractured over prewar debates about national minorities and the bloody ethnic conflicts in postwar Poland and Ukraine. While anti-communism was certainly common across the DP population after the early wave of mass repatriation, organized anticommunist groups were narrow, divided, and often dominated by nationalists with a wartime history of collaboration with the Germans. Many non-Jewish DP political groups were more or less openly antisemitic and came to resent the Allied and later West German recognition of Jews as particularly deserving of restitution.

Holian makes particularly effective use of records related to DP protests like the anticommunist march in Munich in April 1949 and a demonstration by Jewish DPs on Munich's Möhlstrasse a few months later. Here, the book highlights the very important links among the DP question, the growing self-assertiveness of German authorities, and the transformation of occupation policy as the Cold War deepened and Allied plans for West German sovereignty advanced. The argument that DPs need to be treated as important agents in the creation

of the postwar order in Cold War Europe is a particularly important contribution to a rich and growing literature.

One of the challenges that Holian faces in this book is assessing the relationship between DP elites and the millions of ordinary DPs who lived in and out of camps at various times after the war. Here, she is judicious and careful in how she uses evidence and draws a great deal from secondary literature to balance her claims. DP elites, she suggests, were "to an impressive extent" able to shape the debates within DP communities over repatriation to Eastern Europe (p. 87). While Holian helpfully discusses repatriation debates among Jewish DPs, here she focuses on non-Jewish Eastern Europeans. The development of an anticommunist anti-repatriation sentiment eventually began to influence not only DPs but also occupation and relief officials. This shift, which happened within the framework of early Cold War tensions, ultimately helped to make emigration, rather than repatriation, the cornerstone of DP policy.

These are useful insights, but they run the risk of overemphasizing the authority of DP elites. Despite determined opposition from Polish DP leaders, the unsubtly titled Operation Carrot in the summer and fall of 1946 convinced more than 80,000 Poles to go home by offering substantial material support. Some relief officials were convinced that the momentum might have continued but for the coming of an exceptionally hard winter. Occupation and relief authorities also gave anti-repatriation activists a gift when they allowed ill-considered "nationality screening" to take place in the camps that winter, terrifying Eastern European DPs who saw this as a step toward forced repatriation.

Historians working on DPs have always faced the problem of capturing the voices of refugees who had often survived terrible wartime experiences, living in places where they often did not speak the language, and waiting for a chance to go somewhere else. Holian's book does a great deal to help us understand the often subterranean politics of the DP world and to contextualize the DP experience within postwar German and European history. It is an impressive work and deserves a wide readership.

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CHRISTINA MORINA. *Legacies of Stalingrad: Remembering the Eastern Front in Germany since 1945*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Pp. x, 297. \$90.00.

Postwar Germany has struggled to deal not only with the genocide of European Jewry, but also with the extreme brutality that Nazi Germany unleashed against the Soviet Union, a campaign that killed some twenty-five million people. Although a large scholarly literature exists on German memories of the Holocaust, surprisingly little has been written on German attempts to confront the legacies of the war on the eastern front. In her comparatively broad and empirically rigorous book,

Christina Morina begins to address this lacuna by examining West and East German political discourses about the Nazi war against the Soviet Union from the immediate postwar years to the 1980s (she also includes an epilogue on reunited Germany).

Focusing on what she calls "political memory" (p. 2), Morina analyzes the various ways that leading politicians—chiefly Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt, Helmut Kohl, Walter Ulbricht, and Erich Honecker—discussed the war against the Soviet Union. While her book draws on some unpublished material from three archives, it is mostly based on published speeches and writings. Thus, the book provides a detailed account of official, public discourses about the past.

Morina makes three arguments over six succinct chapters. First, she suggests that both West and East German leaders instrumentalized and distorted the past by blurring historical "truth" and ignoring the "complexity" of the eastern campaign, above all concerning the involvement of the Wehrmacht in genocide and mass murder. Second, she argues that the wartime biographies of some of her protagonists shaped their political memories. She develops this argument most clearly for Walter Ulbricht (an antifascist agitator in Moscow), Willy Brandt (a resistance fighter in Norway), and Helmut Schmidt (a Wehrmacht soldier on the eastern front). Third, Morina argues that the competing politics and ideologies of the Cold War shaped memories of the eastern front among politicians in the two Germanys. Pushing in new directions Jeffrey Herf's argument in *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (1997), she posits that different political memories emerged in the two Germanys. While West German politicians gradually came to recall the genocide of European Jews and ignored Nazi crimes against the Soviet Union, East German politicians commemorated Nazi barbarity against Soviet citizens and downplayed the specificity of Jewish victimization. As the two Germanys developed rivaling positions toward the Soviet Union, they found it politically expedient to either remember or forget Nazi violence against Stalin's Russia.

The heuristic of "divided memory" is employed most thoroughly in a fascinating chapter on the political mediation of the memories of former Wehrmacht soldiers. In the Federal Republic, former soldiers recalled their wartime experiences on the eastern front as a time of great suffering, victimization, and bravery against the Soviet Union. These memories reinforced postwar narratives of German victimization and reprised negative perceptions of the Bolshevik enemy. In the German Democratic Republic, former soldiers also effaced their involvement in genocide by stressing their suffering and hardship. But their rendering of the myth of the clean, honorable Wehrmacht legitimated East Germany's cathartic transformation into an antifascist country under the Soviet Union's leadership. Soldiers wrote about their antifascist transformation on the eastern front, claiming that defeat at Stalingrad showed them the barbarism of war and imbued them with passion to

build a new Germany. In these accounts, the establishment of East Germany appeared as a progressive, desirable outcome of communism's victory over reactionary fascism. This memory occluded German responsibility for genocide and enabled "the collective redemption of the East German population" (p. 153).

Over the 1970s and 1980s, however, this divided memory started to loosen, as politicians such as Brandt, Schmidt, and Kohl began a "process of gradually opening public memory to the horrors of the Eastern Front" (p. 213). A similar shift also took place in East Germany among Socialist Unity Party politicians, church leaders, intellectuals, writers, and ordinary citizens, who now began to remember the genocide of European Jews. Yet, Morina does not discuss this change. Instead, her somewhat static discussion of East Germany during the 1970s and 1980s emphasizes Honecker's routinized commemoration of the war against the Soviet Union.

Morina has written a thorough political history of a little-studied topic. Her well-conceived comparison shows the impact Nazi violence had on the competing politics of divided Germany. Methodologically, her focus on political memory continues the longstanding interest among historians in highly public, official vectors of memory. She tends, however, to understand memory as something that is instrumentalized, leaving underexplored the deeper political, social, and cultural meanings of memory. Spanning nearly seventy years, her book will be of interest to historians of postwar German politics, the Cold War, and German-German relations.

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INGA MARKOVITS. *Justice in Lüritz: Experiencing Socialist Law in East Germany*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2010. Pp. 244. \$26.95.

In this absorbing, eloquently argued book, Inga Markovits takes us inside a vanished world. It is easy to forget today that less than twenty-five years ago the German Democratic Republic (GDR) appeared to be a historical perpetuity. Yet the East German regime disappeared virtually overnight in 1989 and with it an entire, perhaps not much lamented, way of life. For most people under any type of political regime, the courtroom is one of the places where they are most likely to directly encounter the power of the state. Even under state socialism, with its often totalizing claims on its citizens, the legal system offered some of the most direct experiences of state power in action. The author uses the court cases of ordinary East Germans to reconstruct both daily life under state socialism and the history of the GDR in action.

Markovits had access to a nearly complete collection of legal documentation from the small East German town of Lüritz, and she uses this material to recreate how Germans experienced East German law. Deftly navigating Germany's cumbersome privacy laws (which leave the book virtually without footnotes), Markovits reconstructs in fascinating detail the various domains in

which East Germans entered the legal system. Chapters on property law (yes, there was such a thing), labor law, family law, and criminal law form the core of the book. Framing these chapters are considerations of personnel and personalities, that is, who the judges were and what motivated them, and the degree to which the Socialist Unity Party influenced East German law. She also describes the “amazing dishonesty of the East German legal system,” which was simultaneously utopian and paranoid (p. 182).

This is not a book that has a single argument running through it, but rather one that allows a series of insights to emerge organically from the “thick description” (Clifford Geertz) of everyday legal encounters in the GDR. This style works remarkably well because it mirrors the episodic nature of the legal proceedings it considers, but it does make it somewhat difficult to encapsulate the book’s arguments in short form.

Two themes might serve to give a feel for the rich texture of the book. First, Markovits traces the transformations in East German law across the forty-year history of the regime, from the early period of communist takeover, when amateurish true believers dominated the bench (so-called People’s Judges hastily trained in party schools), to a period of more professionalized consolidation in the 1960s and 1970s, when most judges were university educated, followed by a brief period of cynical fatalism as the regime drew to a close in the 1980s. This trajectory, from sincerity to competence to cynicism, shaped the different ways individual litigants were treated over time. For instance, in the realm of labor law, the early years tended to see workers and unions arrayed against (state-owned) enterprises in labor disputes. Beginning in the late 1950s, though, “union functionaries participating in labor litigation in the Lüritz court increasingly argue not *for* the employee whose interest are at stake, but *against* him” (p. 57). In the 1980s, workers with grievances were increasingly represented in court by lawyers rather than their unions, which led to a shift away from considering labor disputes in terms of interests, mainly those of the state and the work collective, and toward considerations of rights.

According to Markovits, “legal formality depoliticizes an issue. . . Their professionalism protected the jurists in the courtroom against the bombardment with social and political demands to which all servants of the Socialist state were otherwise exposed” (p. 58). This points to the second theme that emerges clearly in the book: the tension between legalism and political instrumentalism that characterized the application of law in the GDR. One might be tempted to dismiss law altogether in a state like East Germany, to view it merely as one more venue for the overt application of state power. Markovits shows that this is too simplistic. Throughout the history of the GDR, law retained at least a limited capacity to shield individuals from the state, as well as to expose them to its coercive demands. It is crucial, the author contends, to understand the “dual role” of judges in East Germany as “jurists and

comrades” (p. 156). The system worked well when (but only when) judges were successful in both roles. The law was by no means apolitical in East Germany (if it ever is), but it did serve to formalize and regularize the otherwise capricious exercise of state power. In so doing, the law created a limited space for individuals to push back, sometimes with surprising success, against the demands of the state. Markovits’s surprising, illuminating, and often brilliant book thus offers a glimpse of a system often at odds with itself, trying (and largely failing) to reconcile the competing demands of legalism and utopian coercion.

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YAACOB DWECK. *The Scandal of Kabbalah: Leon Modena, Jewish Mysticism, Early Modern Venice*. (Jews, Christians, and Muslims from the Ancient to the Modern World.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2011. Pp. 280. \$35.00.

When, how, and why did Jewish modernity begin? These questions have occupied many Jewish historians, especially those interested in the Renaissance and early modern period when Jews, much like their Christian neighbors, struggled to come to terms with scientific discoveries, shifts from classical languages to the vernacular, new philosophical ideas, and the emergence of print culture. Many scholars of Judaism have been influenced by the thesis of Gershom Scholem, the renowned scholar of Jewish mysticism, that modernity was a rupture, an irreparable break with the past that is perhaps most evident in the mystical heresy of the messianic figure Shabbetai Tzevi in the middle of the seventeenth century. Shabbetai Tzevi and his followers developed a new redemptive paradigm and no longer viewed Jewish law as the fulfillment of divine will. He subsequently converted to Islam, and many of his disciples interpreted his conversion as a necessary component of his messianic vocation. Scholem viewed this episode as a critical moment not only in Jewish history, but also in European history more generally. While this last point is no longer taken seriously, his general view of history remains influential for many Jewish historians.

Yaacob Dweck challenges Scholem’s thesis in a novel way. He argues that Jewish modernity’s beginnings were much less traumatic, much more subtle and even arbitrary, and were not precipitated by a mystical heresy but by a failed movement against Kabbalah by the Venetian rabbi Leon Modena (Modena lived and wrote before the Sabbatian heresy). The refined and compelling story Dweck tells rests on the nexus of various components, all precipitated by Modena’s realization that the print revolution was being co-opted by advocates of Kabbalah who wanted to present Jewish mysticism as the default theology of Judaism. Modena was keenly aware of the dangers of print (e.g., the lack of control in regulating dissemination, editorial changes, censorship) and the relative safety of manuscripts, yet he also

understood that he lived in an era in which print was becoming a norm. Modena also witnessed the rise of Christian kabbalism and the diminution of philosophy as the metaphysical template of both religions. He drew his battle lines using two medieval classics in Jewish theology: Moses Maimonides's *Guide for the Perplexed* and the mystical classic known as the Zohar. Modena surmised, correctly, that the winner of this theological battle would determine Jewish thinking in subsequent generations.

Dweck convincingly argues that Modena's attack against kabbalists and kabbalism was three-fold: Kabbalah erroneously transformed the Zohar into a legally authoritative text; it created a "cult of personality" around Isaac Luria, an influential sixteenth-century kabbalist; and Modena attacked Christian Kabbalah, which he believed was being fueled in part by the availability of Jewish kabbalistic texts in print form.

This book is a learned, well-written, and forcefully argued narrative about Modena in particular and Jewish modernity more generally. Dweck makes a strong case that the germ of Jewish modernity can be found in this polemical, controversial, and ultimately unsuccessful Venetian rabbi who fought against print in part by keeping *Ari Nohem*, his polemic against Kabbalah, in manuscript, by daring to challenge the sacredness of the Zohar and arguably its most influential interpreter, Isaac Luria, and by trying to make his readers aware of the dangers of print even as he knew it was the way of the future.

While this is a thorough and well-documented study, there are a few points that Dweck could have developed further. For example, at the same time Modena desacralized the Zohar and thus Kabbalah, he denigrated Christian Kabbalah, deeming it illegitimate. If the Zohar was not authoritative, why was Christian Kabbalah invalid? Did his attitude toward Christian Kabbalah stem from concerns about the adaptation of Jewish literature by non-Jews? Would he have said the same of Thomas Aquinas's commentary on Maimonides's *Guide for the Perplexed*? Or did he in fact view Kabbalah as a uniquely sacred dimension of Judaism? From another angle, Elijah Delmedigo, an earlier anti-kabbalist whom Modena greatly respected, aided the Christian kabbalist Pico della Mirandola by providing him with a bibliography of kabbalistic texts and at least one kabbalistic work. This not only shows Delmedigo's extensive knowledge of Kabbalah but also his role in the development of Christian Kabbalah. Did Modena know about this when he repeatedly and approvingly cited Delmedigo in *Ari Nohem*? Finally, Modena not only frequently quoted the Zohar in his sermons but also wrote liturgical poems for kabbalistic rituals.

This all suggests that Modena's relationship to Kabbalah is more complex than *Ari Nohem* lets on. This speaks to an important distinction between Kabbalah as metaphysics and Kabbalah as culture and part of Italy's "civil Jewish religion" in the seventeenth century. Kabbalah had become such an integral part of Jewish life by that time that it could not be separated from the daily

lives of most Italian Jews. Given that, what was Modena really after? Perhaps Modena feared a kind of kabbalistic imperialism founded on the two pillars of the antiquity of the Zohar and the cult of personality of Isaac Luria. He did not want to eradicate Kabbalah. He wanted to control it. And here print culture plays a central role in his work, as Dweck astutely argues. Modena knew that print was already taking ideas away from their creators. The combination of kabbalistic imperialism and the emergence of the printed book was a "perfect storm" that Modena unsuccessfully tried to contain.

Finally, Dweck touches on but does not investigate a deep irony in terms of the reception of *Ari Nohem*. Modena's anti-kabbalism was a strident case for tradition, yet his work was not only rejected by most traditionalists in subsequent centuries but was most widely read and appreciated by reformers such as Abraham Geiger who struggled to rethink and often undermine tradition in the face of modernity. Dweck notes as much in his chapter "The Afterlife of *Ari Nohem*" but leaves it to the reader's imagination as to what this all might mean.

This is a strong and compelling book. Its revision of Scholem's thesis about Jewish modernity should be taken very seriously. Dweck has provided us with a complex work that requires readers to rethink the importance of Modena's experiment. *The Scandal of Kabbalah* reminds us that failures often contain the most evocative evidence for understanding the past.

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KATHERINE WENTWORTH RINNE. *The Waters of Rome: Aqueducts, Fountains, and the Birth of the Baroque City*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2010. Pp. x, 262. \$65.00.

This book is a groundbreaking study of the hydraulic infrastructure of Renaissance Rome that focuses on three papally sponsored aqueducts and their associated fountains. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, Katherine Wentworth Rinne deftly weaves art history, social history, and the history of technology into her detailed analysis of the role these structures played in the emergence of the early modern urban landscape.

By the sixteenth century only one of Rome's eleven classical aqueducts, the Aqua Virgo (Acqua Vergine), still functioned. The papally sponsored reconstruction of the Vergine (1560–1570) and the addition of two new aqueducts, the Acqua Felice (1585–1587) and Acqua Paola (1607–1612), provided the city with ample water supplies and contributed to a broader agenda of restoring Rome to its former imperial glory. Rinne sees this *renovatio Romae* as part of an overall strategy to restore the prestige and moral authority of the Roman Catholic Church in the face of challenges posed by the Reformation and the Ottoman Empire. More immediately, water became a tool of papal patronage, as charitable

"gifts" of water were bestowed upon monasteries, hospitals, favored cardinals, noble families, and members of the papal Water Committee.

The micro-topography of Rome and the impact it exerted on the city's hydrology lies at the heart of Rinne's study. The Tiber overflowed its banks catastrophically and repeatedly in early modern centuries, flooding low-lying areas. Since the aqueducts were gravity-flow systems, topography was also crucial to the distribution of their water. Rinne convincingly demonstrates that the splendid new fountains, designed by architects such as Giacomo della Porta, were not simply interchangeable pieces of public sculpture that could be erected anywhere in the city. The elevation of the specific site in relation to its feeder aqueduct determined the water pressure, and hence the splendor—or feebleness—of the jets of water. This in turn influenced fountain design. Piazza Navona, for example, had a high elevation and low water pressure, so its fountains were large pools whose imposing breadth compensated for their lack of height.

In spite of the best efforts of the Water Committee and engineers, not all went as planned. The limited precision of early modern surveying equipment meant that actual water pressures did not always conform to initial expectations. When the pressure was less than anticipated, entire piazzas had to be lowered so that sufficient water would flow into the new fountains. The Acqua Paola solved the problem of low pressure by drawing its water from a higher elevation than the Vergine and Felice. As a result, it was able to convey water to hilltop villa gardens and feed spectacular fountain jets, but on occasion it discharged its water with such force that fountain basins were shattered and broken conduits caused landslides. While the main focus of the book is on the aqueducts and fountains, Rinne also addresses related infrastructure improvements such as drains and street paving. Thanks to this ambitious program of urban renewal, Baroque Rome would emerge as a city that was cleaner and healthier than its medieval predecessor.

In addition to her analysis of the technological and artistic aspects of the new Renaissance fountains, Rinne examines their social impact on Romans of all classes. For wealthy cardinals and noble families, proximity to a civic fountain or the construction of private fountains became manifestations of elite status. As much as eighty percent of the water supplied by the new aqueducts went to private users, but some did trickle down to the benefit of ordinary citizens. Some private sponsors built semi-public fountains as a way of bolstering their own prestige while displaying the virtue of civic munificence. Further down the social hierarchy, industrial users such as fullers obtained their own specialized basins. Poor washerwomen, accustomed to plying their trade among the rough company of the riverbank, were provided with specialized basins and even a huge enclosed laundry complex. Drinking fountains refreshed citizens and pilgrims alike, while horses too had their own watering troughs. Rome's Jews, however,

remained at the margin both socially and hydraulically. In spite of its low-lying elevation, the ghetto did not benefit from the Acqua Vergine or Felice. The Jews did eventually receive a small allocation of Acqua Paola water, but not in proportion to their population.

The book's many maps and illustrations are beautiful, informative, and closely integrated with the text. They include depictions of the fountains (in modern photographs and early modern views of Rome), Renaissance technical drawings and modern analytical reconstructions, and a selection of early modern wall plaques recording hydraulic information such as flood crests, pipe levels, and fountain sponsors. Overall, *The Waters of Rome* is a fascinating study of the structural and social interrelationships that combined to create the early modern city's "intricate web of water connectivity" (p. 230).

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ALLISON SCARDINO BELZER. *Women and the Great War: Femininity under Fire in Italy*. (Italian and Italian American Studies.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2010. Pp. x, 271. \$80.00.

The approach of the one hundredth anniversary of the outbreak of World War I has stimulated scholarly and popular interest in its history. Many recent works have broadened knowledge of the war by shifting focus to other fronts, particularly those outside Western Europe, and by examining the experiences of average men and women who both willingly and unwillingly participated in the war. Allison Scardino Belzer's book is a significant contribution to this body of scholarship. A number of scholars have written about women's experiences in Italy during the war and its aftermath, but most of their work has not appeared in English. An exception is a chapter by Simonetta Ortaggi, "Italian Women during the Great War," which appeared in Gail Braybon's collection, *Evidence, History and the Great War: Historians and the Impact of 1914–18* (2003). In Italian, important research by Barbara Curli and Stefania Bartolini has uncovered, respectively, the stories of women in the workforce during the war years, and the contributions of women to war welfare work as nurses and Italian Red Cross volunteers. Belzer is well grounded in this scholarship and steps confidently into the existing stream of literature on gender and women's history, building her narrative and expanding upon or challenging earlier interpretation and argument with varying success.

Belzer's book describes both women's lived experience during the war and the public discourse about femininity and gender behavior that accompanied that reality. The latter is the focus of parts one and three of the volume. In these sections she asks what changes the war brought in expectations of the ideal Italian woman. Like many other works, Belzer maintains that as men's absence forced women to represent and defend their families in the public sphere "for the first time, Italian

society openly recognized that women were part of the nation" (p. 2). Female duty of sacrifice was "remodeled" (p. 35) to mean citizenship, and patriotism pulled women into volunteer work and charitable activity that was not new but recast as support for the war effort. What Belzer adds to the existing narrative are the voices of educated middle and upper-class women who asserted their views of women's civic responsibilities in writings and speeches.

A major contribution of the volume is the importance Belzer assigns to personal and prescriptive writings as the key to evaluating women's experience and essential to moving beyond "generic images" of women (pp. 10–11). Through careful reading of the multiple volumes of *Scrittura di guerra* compiled by Quinto Antonelli and others (1996), and exhaustive sifting through regional and national archives, Belzer has identified an impressive body of works by women that she uses throughout the volume. An appendix entitled "Notable Women Writers and Diarists" is a useful reader's aid as it identifies some forty women and their writings that appear in this work.

While Belzer makes numerous assertions about what did change in the ideals and the discourses surrounding femininity and gender during the war, many of her claims are not new and have appeared in the work of scholars such as Victoria de Grazia and Perry Willson. At times the arguments seem contradictory, and the evidence does not support them. What Belzer's arguments really demonstrate is the co-existence of continuity and change, and the impact of the war on the images and ideals of femininity in the 1920s, in what has been described by Giovanni De Luna as a "fracturing along multiple fault-lines" that involved a "plurality of models."

The most unique contributions of the book lie in the three chapters of part two, "Femininity in the War Zone," which uses women's own war stories to detail their lives at the front lines in northeastern Italy at Trento, which was "militarized rather than occupied," and Gorizia in Friuli, where territory shifted back and forth between Austrian and Italian troops until 1917 (p. 78). In some cases women were at the front because circumstances of class and timing trapped them there; in others women sought out the front lines and "chose to experience the war firsthand" (p. 85). The Italian government banned women at the front, but the military did not always enforce the order as they needed women's services, particularly as nurses but also as spies, guides, and couriers. Diaries of women caught in occupied areas provide evidence of fraternization with occupiers, and reports of crimes against women, but their authors "proved reluctant to philosophize about the war and their place in it" (p. 124). Belzer's book makes clear that women, like men, had "personal and patriotic motives" for being at the front and felt compelled to bear witness of their experiences in their writings (p. 10). Ultimately for both men and women in Italy as elsewhere, the lessons of war and the meanings

given to the conflict helped shape an entire generation (p. 105).

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PAWEŁ MACIEJKO. *The Mixed Multitude: Jacob Frank and the Frankist Movement, 1755–1816*. (Jewish Culture and Contexts.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 360. \$65.00.

Jacob Frank (1726–1791), a mystical heresiarch, vagabond, and charlatan, is one of the best known and most researched figures of Jewish Eastern Europe in pre-modern times. His picturesque adventures, mysterious life, charismatic personality, and mystical and kabbalistic speculations have attracted countless scholars. The scholarly literature on Frank and the Frankists, followers of the mystical movement he established, is vast and still growing. But because of the attractiveness of Frank's personality and the aura of mystery surrounding his life, an aura that he worked hard to create, research on him is full of dubious speculation, baseless theories, and pure flights of imagination. This makes a new, rigorous investigation of Frank and the Frankists both much needed and most perilous.

Paweł Maciejko's book is a successful response to this challenge. It both critically reviews the state of knowledge on the subject and provides a careful rethinking of many of the basic assumptions on Frank and Frankism, opening new, fascinating vistas and making important corrections.

The work Maciejko invested in the book is impressive. Not only did he examine nearly all the existing literature on the subject, but he also managed to find numerous new documents, some of them of prime importance. Based on close reading of primary sources in Hebrew, Yiddish, Latin, German, French, Italian, and Polish and secondary literature in several other languages, Maciejko arrives at a much more nuanced and dynamic understanding of Frank and the Frankist movement than did his predecessors.

Maciejko argues against the dominant perception of Frankism as essentially a political project that, disguised as a religious movement, "served as a vehicle of emancipation" (p. 263). Instead, he powerfully demonstrates the originality and importance of the religious aspect of Frank's ideas and, to a lesser extent, of Frankism. His analysis of Frank's syncretic Mariological theories, which merged the Roman Catholic cult of the Virgin Mary in its specifically Polish form of the Black Madonna of Częstochowa (where Frank was incarcerated for twelve years) with Jewish kabbalistic concepts of *Shekhinah* (god's omnipresence; grammatically feminine), is especially revealing. At the same time Maciejko shows how the Frankists' ideas developed into a political program during the declining years of the movement after Frank's death in 1791. He therefore convincingly argues against the distorted, one-sided image of Frankism as nothing more than a political project. Instead, he presents Frankism as a dynamic phe-

nomenon that changed over time in response to varying circumstances, suggesting that the most important ingredient in Frank's success was his flexibility, "the ability to adjust his teachings and actions to rapidly changing circumstances and needs and to the expectations of various and diverse audiences" (p. 264).

Another of the book's strengths is its broad contextualization of Frank and his movement. The book places Frank and his followers in the wider canvas of social and cultural developments of late eighteenth-century East Central Europe, both Jewish and Christian, showing and carefully distinguishing interactions, inspirations, structural similarities, and mere analogies among the various movements. Maciejko provides, for example, a colorful analysis of how charlatans such as Frank, Giacomo Casanova, and Josef Balsamo (Cagliostro) managed to function at the courts of Enlightened Europe. He also shows how Frank influenced and was influenced by others, where and when they met, and what the consequences of those specific encounters were. The author demonstrates equally good knowledge of Christian and Jewish contexts, which has not been the case with many studies in the field so far. Thanks to this, he arrives at several new and important discoveries, such as the existence of a surprising alliance of the Roman Catholic clergy and rabbinical elite in pushing the Frankists out of Judaism and into the arms of the Catholic Church.

The book's faults are rather minor. Though the study is very careful, Maciejko sometimes makes generalizations that are too sweeping. The most important example is a dichotomous division of the Jewish world into two antagonistic camps of Sabbatians and anti-Sabbatians, i.e., followers and adversaries of the heretical messiah Shabbetai Tzevi (1626–1676), that Maciejko at many places implies. Although he states that the early modern Jewish world clearly rejected such bipolar divisions, numerous figures are arbitrarily declared to be Sabbatian on the basis of the proximity of some ideas they expressed to those of Shabbetai Tzevi, but without strong evidence of their personal adherence. This is misleading, as it does not leave room for the structural similarity of separately developed ideas or for unintended influences when one accepts certain concepts without being aware of their origin. This was certainly the case for many supposed Sabbatians, who did not consider themselves as such, did not believe Shabbetai Tzevi was the messiah, were sincerely hostile toward many of his ideas and his followers, yet at the same time fancied some ideas developed in Sabbatianism.

At places, Maciejko's study is also uneven in challenging and accepting dominant opinions. While a new reading of many old assumptions is one of the most admirable strengths of the book, the author, quite characteristically for studies of sectarian, mystical, and splintering movements, too easily accepts questionable theses about the strength, extent, and influence of the subject under examination. This is the case when, for example, in his description of the scale of Sabbatian influence he relies heavily on the testimony of Jacob

Emden, whom he characterized as unreliable a few pages earlier, or when he suggests, without providing evidence, that the Frankist movement existed as late as the 1880s.

These minor reservations notwithstanding, Maciejko's groundbreaking book not only will become standard reading on Frank and Frankism, but is undoubtedly an important study of eighteenth-century Jewish-Christian relations in East Central Europe. *The Mixed Multitude* features impressive archival research and analysis, provides excellent context for Frank and the Frankists, and is both instructive and an engaging read.

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BRIAN PORTER-SZÜCS. *Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity, and Poland*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. ix, 484. \$55.00.

"It is permitted to take part in festivities and parties, but only those to which one could invite Christ," advised a Polish Catholic journal in 1929, clearly not relishing the carnival spirit of the roaring twenties (p. 66). Cited in this important new study by Brian Porter-Szücs, such a perspective on parties is suggestive of the argument that dominates roughly the first half of the book: namely, that Polish Catholicism, in spite of some very exceptional features, was also in many regards quite consistent with Catholic concerns across Europe and throughout the world. Working from a massive source base of religious journals, Sunday sermons, and episcopal pronouncements, the author shows very convincingly, in a series of carefully documented opening chapters, that the Polish Church followed fairly conventional Catholic lines—including some conventional divergence of opinion—concerning church hierarchy, human sinfulness (parties!), modernity and progress, and the dignity of the individual person.

While the Polish Romantics articulated highly heterodox ideas about the relation of Poland to Christianity, including the national theology of Poland as the Christ among nations, in fact most members of the nineteenth-century clergy and episcopate favored not only strict obedience to the church hierarchy but also civic obedience to the partitioning powers in Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Berlin. The reader becomes well-acquainted with many interesting and sometimes controversial Polish clergymen, including Zygmunt Feliński, the archbishop of Warsaw who could not support the insurrection of 1863 and ordered priests to stop singing patriotic hymns (p. 215).

In this study the crucial chronological turning points are not necessarily national occasions (like 1863) but rather important papal affirmations like Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* in 1891, Pius X's "Oath against Modernism" in 1910, Pius XI's *Mit brennender Sorge* in 1937, and John XXIII's Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s—that is, the same events and encyclicals that shaped Catholicism all over the world and not only in

Poland. Because the chapters of the book are organized thematically rather than chronologically ("The Church," "Sin," "Modernity"), each chapter retraces the course of Polish history from the nineteenth-century partitioned lands to postcommunist, twenty-first-century Poland. Reading these chapters sometimes feels a little bit like *Groundhog Day*, the movie, when one wakes up in the morning and discovers that it is *Rerum Novarum* all over again. Yet the point is taken: Polish Catholicism cannot be viewed altogether exceptionally but may be best understood in relation to the general history of Roman Catholicism, and the church itself was often concerned with matters much more strictly religious—like sin and modernity—than the fate of the Polish nation.

The second half of the book, however, suggests that there did eventually take place, in the twentieth century, a quite distinctively Polish melding of religious and national values. While Romantic national messianism lay largely outside the boundaries of what was acceptable to the church in the nineteenth century, the concept of *Polak-Katolik* (actually the title of a journal founded in 1906) gradually insinuated itself within those shifting boundaries in the twentieth century. In a series of brilliantly argued chapters ("Politics," "The Nation Penitent," "*Ecclesia Militans*," "The Jew," "Polak-Katolik," and "Mary, Militant and Maternal") Porter-Szűcs draws upon his rich source materials to construct a powerfully persuasive picture of Roman Catholic thought domesticating itself in twentieth-century Poland, while very carefully negotiating the boundaries of orthodoxy.

Porter-Szűcs allows for the possibility of a gap between public church teachings and the popular Polish Catholic sensibility, with the latter perhaps precociously integrating religious and national elements (even in heterodox fashion), while the church itself lagged somewhat behind and tried to maintain its doctrinal principles. The book relies largely on church sources, so it is difficult to infer the elusive factor of popular heterodoxy within different circles of lay piety. Yet, much that we know about religious symbolism from the nineteenth-century insurrections to the twentieth-century resistance to communism suggests that Polish nationalism was, to some extent, free-spiritedly inventing its own Roman Catholicism to suit its own national agenda, dating back to the extravagant formulations of Romantic messianism. In describing the perspective of the church itself, this study focuses on a more limited spectrum of publicly acceptable Catholic perspectives at any given historical moment.

Roman Dmowski's National Democracy was initially, in the 1890s, unpalatable to the church because its brand of Polishness seemed not only secular but socially Darwinian in its competitive sense of ongoing national struggle for survival. Porter-Szűcs describes the gradual convergence over the course of a generation between Roman Catholicism and National Democracy, culminating in the admiring front-page obituary for Dmowski in the Catholic journal *Przewodnik Katolicki* in 1939: "It

was he who first elevated the Jewish Question to the level of a political issue" (p. 328). One of the Roman Catholic scruples that separated the church from twentieth-century nationalism was the Christian injunction to love one's neighbor, and even one's enemy. Porter-Szűcs, whose important first book (published under the name Brian Porter) was titled *When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland* (2000), has now, to some extent, written the sequel about when modern Catholicism began to hate.

This story was by no means exclusively Polish, and dated back at least as far as the stimulus to conspiratorial thinking in Leo XIII's encyclical *Humanum Genus* in 1884, denouncing the Satanic conspiracies of the Freemasons. Half a century later (and perhaps especially after independence and the Polish-Soviet War) the Polish church included many who believed that Satan was operating through Freemasons, Bolsheviks, and Jews, promiscuously intermingled. According to the Dmowski obituary in *Przewodnik Katolicki*, "the hidden forces, the Masons and the Jews, the sworn enemies of Dmowski, spared no effort to make Poland as weak, as incapable of life as possible. Dmowski declared war on them" (p. 328). Porter-Szűcs argues that it took some time for Polish Catholicism to become comfortable with such unloving and unlovely rhetoric, but by 1939 it was fully acceptable, though not uncontested, within the church. During the interwar years Catholic journals sometimes urged the removal of the Jews from Poland, though the writers did not specify just how that removal should occur. Such sentiments later made it difficult for some Catholic Poles to come to terms with the Nazi Holocaust, which actually brought about the desired disappearance.

The book's attention to the communist and postcommunist period is also extremely interesting and original, especially given the premise that the postwar Polish church was not simply turning to a venerably established tradition of guiding the nation. *Faith and Fatherland* includes a fascinating study of militant Polish Marianism, an almost heterodox view of the Virgin Mary as an active warrior, the *Hetmanka*. Likewise barely orthodox was Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński's "theology of the nation," which attributed a particular Christian redemption to a collective entity rather than to individuals. It is immensely rewarding to examine the theology and leadership of Pope John Paul II in the context of the whole tradition of modern Polish churchmen, and the book offers useful perspectives for considering the contemporary post-communist phenomenon of right-wing Radio Maryja within the changing boundaries of acceptable Catholic discourse in Poland. This impressive and insightful new book by Porter-Szűcs might also be read with interest alongside such important recent works as Roman Koropeckyj's literary biography of Adam Mickiewicz, which explores the religious dimensions of Polish Romantic messianism, and Geneviève Zubrzycki's sociological study of post-com-

munist Catholicism and Polish nationalism, *The Crosses of Auschwitz*.

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GREGOR THUM. *Uprooted: How Breslau Became Wrocław during the Century of Expulsions*. Translated by TOM LAMPERT et al. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2011. Pp. xl, 508. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$35.00.

City monographs are a strange genre of history writing. They are nearly always labors of love, even more than are biographies, as one would be unlikely to devote years to and in a place one loathed. While there may be some social, cultural, or economic focus, a rigorous research design would surely require some comparison with other cities. Eschewing this, the historian stakes a great deal on the power of place. As a city's biography is fixed on the page, its author must convey the spirit of the book's subject to those who have not walked the same streets.

In the case of Wrocław (prior to 1945 the German city of Breslau), Gregor Thum and this reviewer share a deep fascination with his subject: caveat lector. But *Uprooted* should be of interest not only to our select club. This English translation follows German (2003) and Polish (2007) editions. The titles of those versions emphasized the city itself (*Die fremde Stadt/Obce miasto*). But for more distant readers, Thum has wisely chosen a title that highlights the people: those torn from their German homes in Breslau by the collapse of the German war effort, and those trying to make the pile of rubble that was left into a Polish Wrocław.

Breslau/Wrocław was hardly the only city destroyed by the war. But the significance of this case lies precisely in the question of a city's spirit, as suggested above. For in its first postwar decades Wrocław had no spirit, or none that could be admitted. What was German was rejected; the Polish version had shallow roots at best. Without a plausible *genius loci* guiding the story, Thum has a very difficult task before him: it is nearly as impossible to tell as the story that the first Polish settlers in 1945 tried to tell about their newly Polish home.

Uprooted is a study of that impossible story, and of how Breslau grew into Wrocław despite the ham-handed machinations of Polish communist leaders. The book is divided into three parts. The four chapters of part one document the takeover, settlement, and reconstruction of the city. Hundreds of thousands of Germans were expelled, and nearly as many Poles came to settle, or just to loot the ruins left behind. Meanwhile, mostly well-meaning Polish administrators tried to make sense of the alien streetscape, one that, even if whole sections had not been reduced to rubble and yawning facades, would still look unlike any Polish city. Thum evokes well the "pioneer" spirit of the first settlers and the helplessness of Wrocław's leaders as they tried to build institutions while fending off looters, Soviet soldiers, and their bosses in Warsaw. This social and political history has been told before, but no one

has assembled its parts together as well as Thum, making this book an essential handbook for anyone trying to understand the topography of this great Central European city.

Part two, with six chapters, is the heart of the book. Thum considers the "impermanence syndrome" experienced by settlers who felt powerfully the effect of the dotted line with which West Germans (and even *National Geographic*) marked Poland's Western border for decades. Given these deep uncertainties, one can hardly be surprised at the eager adaptation of myths about Wrocław's Polish past, and the determination to erase German traces from every wall and every gravestone. It would be easy to mark this as the desperation of an illegitimate government and a deluded society; Thum instead situates it within the needs of a time and a place, and skillfully narrates the peculiar twists those myths took. For example, he notes that most of the Baroque churches (for which Breslau was renowned) were rebuilt after 1945 with Gothic interiors because the ornate decorations had been destroyed, but that in any case the Gothic was deemed to be more Polish and ideologically acceptable. As an older style, it evoked the time of Polish control of Lower Silesia. This combination of expediency and ideology, for Thum, marks the entire postwar history of memory in Central Europe, exemplified in Wrocław.

In the final chapter, Thum shows how a new, invigorated Wrocław has emerged in the postcommunist era, building new bridges to a reimagined multicultural past. Here too it would be easy to poke holes in the tourist-friendly pastiche. But Thum recognizes that Wrocław's choices, again, are both conscious and historically determined. A touch of the saccharine creeps in now and then, as he recounts the city's emergence as the emblem of Poland's confident, youthful, forward-looking image. At the same time, *Uprooted* offers gentle cautions against those who would celebrate too much the Wrocław that is, at the cost of the Breslau that was. Thum has written a compelling contribution to our understanding of the culture and politics of communist Poland.

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MALGORZATA FIDELIS. *Women, Communism, and Industrialization in Postwar Poland*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. xiv, 280. \$90.00.

What kind of general conclusion can be drawn about women and industrialization if a retired Polish miner, Józef R. from Katowice, tells a history graduate student in an interview that he cannot recall any women working in the mines during the industrialization of Poland under communism (p. 163)? This is the first question that should be asked when analyzing Malgorzata Fidelis's pioneering and long-awaited book on women, communism, and industrialization in Poland. How can we connect individual experiences and social processes in

the complex transformation of Polish society brought about by industrialization? The book is based on a wide variety of sources such as the files of the women's section of the communist party and the trade unions. Fidelis also conducted nineteen interviews, recognizing the need for a different perspective on the past than that offered by party documents and newspapers. However, she considers these interviews to be "truth" rather than performances, and so we never find out how the various changing frames of collective memory influence the process of recalling past events, such as when Józef R. unexpectedly encountered a female miner in the darkness of the mine.

Nonetheless, this volume is a pioneering work operating at the intersection of two fields of inquiry. The first field is gender history, whereby women are regarded as a social group and the author aims to "restore agency to women" during this complex historical period (p. 4). The second field concerns the history of industrialization in communist Poland and how it was experienced by different groups of women. Some remarkable works have already been published on these topics, thanks to flourishing historical research outside Poland, but Fidelis's study is an outstanding attempt to connect the two fields of investigation to most Poles' hostility toward the leftist political project.

Scholarly interest in the communist-dominated countries of Central Europe has been informed by a framework established by sociologists and political scientists of the postcommunist transition who sought to identify winners and losers and to distinguish between those who had resisted and those who had complied with communism. Fidelis also works within this framework, pointing out that many women actually benefited from the Stalinist emancipation policy and should not be perceived purely as victims. The complex strategies of compliance and survival, sometimes narrated as upward mobility, are masterfully presented here.

The book consists of three well-selected case studies that cover three different historical experiences. It looks at three regions—Zyrardow, Zambrow, and Katowice—and two different industries, mining and textiles. Fidelis's analysis focuses on women's participation in these industries during the communist era. She also analyzes how the definition of women's work has changed over time. Interestingly, left-wing intellectuals in Poland—similar to their Hungarian, Czech, and Slovak counterparts—have tended to be more supportive of the traditional woman's role as nurturer than of the idea of expanding economic citizenship.

The inclusion of women into heavy industry fundamentally challenged gender relations, stirring resistance to attempts to modify patriarchal norms in Poland. From 1953 onward, women working in heavy industry were defined in the public discourse as "non-Polish." The same process happened in other Central European countries, where resistance to the Soviet type of emancipation and to communist efforts to transform these countries into producers of iron and steel led to strikes and ultimately to revolutions, as in Hungary.

With the state actively promoting women's employment, the terms double and triple burden were coined. As aptly described in the book, although paid employment granted women some agency, it also posed an additional psychological and emotional burden. Poland's communist transformation soon lost momentum, and there was a turn toward valuing women as mothers. As in other parts of Central Europe, women were driven from well-paid jobs in heavy industry both by economic necessity and as a result of new attempts by politics to regain control over women. This book reminds us of the consequences of using a national scope of analysis when analyzing a transnational phenomenon and of the difficulties of negotiating women's subject position amid the shifting frames of public memory. Fidelis gives a nuanced understanding of Poland's turn to the right in 1989 and the strength of anticommunist and pro-Catholic sentiments. In doing so, she explains why "gendered labor history" could not be written in Poland. So the fact that Józef R. mentioned that he could not recall women working in the mines should be the subject of study; maybe his forgetting was a form of resistance and agency.

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PAULINA BREN. *The Greengrocer and His TV: The Culture of Communism after the 1968 Prague Spring*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2010. Pp. xiii, 250. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$24.95.

Paulina Bren's book is a groundbreaking cultural analysis of everyday life under communism in Czechoslovakia after 1968. It is a compact, cohesive, and entertaining account of domestic TV soap operas' role as mediator between a firm but concerned regime and an obedient but wary population. Based on communist party and TV archives, communist newspapers, and secondary literature, Bren's study offers a new narrative of "normalized" (post-1968) Czechoslovakia after Prague Spring's "socialism with a human face" was irreversibly crushed by the Warsaw Pact invasion. She challenges the political tale of dissent and repression that is commonplace in the historiography despite its evident discrepancy with everyday life in all its banality. She rejects the victimization complex prompted by the armed intervention and instead casts post-1968 history along new lines. Bren introduces ordinary people as fully legitimate social actors, redefines Czech politics as an interaction between regime elites and the people (TV viewers), and questions the very essence of socialist rule.

The book's strength lies in Bren's subtle reinterpretation of the absence of events, which she does by centering her reflection on the social compliance that characterized 1970s Czechoslovakia. She proceeds chronologically and thematically, but also empirically, beginning with an analysis of the intellectual context of Prague Spring (chapter one) and then turning to the political purge, at all levels, of those who did not ap-

prove of the Warsaw Pact invasion, a purge, however, that the government carried out with restraint in TV circles so that the party would maintain sufficient expertise to pursue its enterprise of seducing the viewing public (chapter two). The author then analyzes how the official interpretation of the 1968 events as a moment of “hysteria” took shape (chapter three), and how the new socialist citizenry based on a “quiet life” was constructed in its place (chapter four). Bren shows broadcasters’ concern to remain popular (chapter five), and details the case of Jaroslav Dietl and of his numerous soap operas (chapter six). Finally, she discusses the gender and family discourse the regime attempted to promote through TV serials (chapter seven), and the socialist “self-realization” model as an essential tenet of the socialist way of life (chapter eight).

One of the most original parts of the volume is the personal story of Dietl, a prolific soap opera writer who created a number of serials popular at home and abroad (including in West Germany) on topics such as a family during collectivization, a motherly saleswoman in a supermarket, and a hospital drama. As Bren aptly shows, Dietl embodies the ambivalence of the purge/collaboration dialectic, the dilemma of the “solitude of oblivion” versus the “humiliation of recantation” (p. 57). Eventually, like most, he remained in TV after 1968 and continued distilling a message of social and political appeasement in his TV shows. Bren further broadens the issue of collaboration by raising again the critiques of Václav Havel’s appeal for “living in truth” and by questioning his failure to mobilize his fellow citizens, who seemed more interested in the path of socialist “self-realization” offered by the regime. She points out, by quoting Milan Šimečka, another prominent dissident, that the most interesting aspect of this model (little work, little pay, but social security, time, consumerism, a guaranteed standard of living) is that this “subjective state” was entered “voluntarily” (p. 93). Bren thus shows that people created their own “normalization,” that they actively co-defined what “normality” was supposed to look like under socialism.

By studying the impact these TV serials exerted on popular opinion, the nostalgic feelings they still arouse today, and the postmodern focus on consumerism that was already straddling the East-West divide, Bren demonstrates that post-1968 communist regimes had the potential to appropriate for themselves, instrumentalize, and embody national culture, social norms and values, as well as social expectations concerning everyday life; that they did manage to create if not a new man, then a society that functioned “normally”; and, last but not least, that this could be achieved without resorting to excessive physical violence. But this point can be taken further: Bren also establishes troubling continuities between the Stalinist 1950s, the reformist 1960s, the normalized 1970s and 1980s, and the post-communist period, not only in TV and political personnel, not only in individual life stories of intellectuals and artists,

but also in the long-lasting popularity of communist TV serials and communist artists.

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GAIL KLIGMAN and KATHERINE VERDERY, *Peasants under Siege: The Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949–1962*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2011. Pp. xix, 508. Cloth \$95.00, paper \$39.50, e-book \$39.50.

Peasants under Siege is an apt title for Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery’s comprehensive and interdisciplinary study of the Romanian Communist Party’s (PCR) thirteen-year offensive against its rural constituents. Beginning in 1949 and continuing to its declared completion in 1962, the PCR, like the Soviet party it emulated, sought to bring peasants and their villages, land, livestock, and livelihoods under its control. Early efforts at persuasion and coercion by an uncertain and apprehensive party in the early 1950s yielded to a much more systematic and sustained campaign from 1958 to 1962.

In 1998 Kligman and Verdery assembled an international research group of twenty scholars—anthropologists, sociologists, and historians—to fan out across Romania and conduct fieldwork, oral interviews, and archival research. Constantin Iordachi and Dorin Dobrinicu have recently published an edited collection of case studies based on this research (*Transforming Peasants, Property and Power: The Collectivization of Agriculture in Romania, 1949–1962* [2009]). That collection introduced scholars to the separate regional cases and previewed the themes that Kligman and Verdery tackle in *Peasants under Siege*: collectivization as a foundational act in the creation of the Romanian communist state and not an “auxiliary to industrialization and urbanization” (p. x), linking the change in property systems to the destruction of social relationships and “peasant notions of personhood” (p. 8), and challenging post-1989 narratives of peasant resistance and its effect on collectivization.

Kligman and Verdery are at their best when they turn their attention to the “pedagogies of power: technologies of rural transformation” (p. vi). Composed of three lengthy chapters that focus on the creation and deployment of organizations, cultural institutions, and techniques to transform the countryside and its inhabitants, as well as peasants’ responses to collectivization, this part of the book deploys the authors’ ethnographic prowess. They cull the oral interviews of their researchers, utilize their own fieldwork and findings, and pull from heretofore unused party and Romanian secret police archival sources. They uncover the myriad techniques, or “pedagogies,” utilized to persuade and coerce peasants into giving up their property and way of life. These included propaganda, contests, and mimesis. Party officials showed peasants exemplary model farms and the consequences of not joining: public humilia-

tion, arrest, deportation, and denunciation. Despite these techniques, peasants remained skeptical of the collectivization project and engaged in “counterpedagogies” to undermine the efforts of peasant cadres, party officials, and socialist youth. This meant not only spreading rumors about life in the collectives, and the imminent demise of communism, especially around the time of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, but also disseminating anti-regime slogans and composing and circulating folk poetry that mocked and discredited collectivization efforts.

When the second wave of collectivization began in 1957, the PCR had learned from its encounters with the peasants and utilized this knowledge to complete what it had started. The transformation of the countryside was not carried out by an impersonal state or a monolithic communist party but rather by poorly educated and trained party and Securitate (secret police) cadres. The counterpedagogies that cadres and the secret police encountered affirmed their perception of “enemies” in the villages and led to a sustained effort to undermine traditional village hierarchies, social relationships, and identities and to foment class war. What emerges from this discussion is that the cadres were simply overwhelmed with their task, received little guidance or support from the center, and replaced persuasion with coercion and intimidation. Kligman and Verdery richly describe how party cadres and the secret police neutralized the “rich peasants” (*chiabur*) by striking at their economic prowess and their status, honor, and familial relationships. Both collectivization drives had the effect of remaking rural social relationships and institutions, “overturning status hierarchies and the emergence of new ones, and the infusion of everyday life with politics” (p. 425).

The authors are at their best when discussing the complex web of cultural and social relationships and practices. While the politics of collectivization has its own chapter, high politics is not always well integrated into observations about the actions and understandings of local actors and cadres. More attention to the connection between high politics and local actors would have allowed readers to see how party leaders absorbed the lessons learned by party cadres and secret police and modified their policies. This would especially help to explain why Romanian party leaders embarked upon the second collectivization drive when Polish and Hungarian communists were rethinking and modifying their stance toward the countryside at the same time.

The authors persuasively argue in their conclusion that the process of collectivization shaped the Romanian communist state, as a contradictory ensemble of institutions, projects, and practices rather than as an organized actor. Collectivization brought the state, through its cadres, close to the rhythms of village life, its forms of sociability, and peasant notions of personhood. This encounter with the village modified the communist project and the party-state.

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EMILY GREBLE. *Sarajevo, 1941–1945: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Hitler's Europe*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 276. \$35.00.

Across much of the postwar socialist world, from Yugoslavia to China, millions of now middle-aged people know something about the provincial city of Sarajevo. What they know they learned from a 1972 film, *Valter Defends Sarajevo*, about a communist partisan leader who coordinated the antifascist insurgency in the city during World War II. The film offers a picture of the city as stubbornly, heroically defiant, and ultimately victorious against the German occupiers. In her book, Emily Greble cites the film's most famous line, in which a German spy sent to hunt Valter down is about to leave the city, having failed in his mission. Walking with another German officer in the hills, he gestures toward the city below: “Do you see this city? *Das ist Valter*” (p. 150).

Valter Defends Sarajevo was part of postwar mythmaking about Sarajevo's, and indeed Yugoslavia's, wartime past. It is a beautiful story, the kind one wants to believe. Greble does not allow us to keep it, but she gives us another one instead, rooted in careful archival research and rich with characters and anecdotes. The wartime city in her fascinating book is more conservative, even reactionary, than progressive, and its inhabitants are more anxious than visionary about its future. Her actors—ranging from Ustasha officials, to local Catholic, Muslim, Jewish, and Orthodox religious, political, and cultural elites—struggle to navigate the constantly shifting landscape of alliances and power constellations that emerge and as rapidly disappear during the course of the war.

In chronological chapters, she first introduces us to the city as it was on the eve of the war and just after the German occupation and creation of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) in April 1941. There followed the grueling winter of 1941–1942, characterized by extremely cold temperatures, widespread shortages, weak administrative coordination, the arbitrary and often inscrutable whims of the Ustasha regime, and an acute refugee crisis as ten thousand peasant refugees and orphaned children fled to the city from eastern Bosnia. With catastrophes mounting, a kind of turning point was reached whereat, Greble claims, many Sarajevans simply stopped taking the new regime seriously and sought to (re)establish and maintain control over their various communities using pre-existing—mostly religious—organizations and institutions.

After the Italian defection in early autumn 1943, the Germans sought to assert more control over the region and some Muslims, in an effort to create an alternative to the Ustasha regime, argued for the creation of a German protectorate. One byproduct of these negotiations was the creation of the largely Muslim Handžar SS Division, whose existence indicates that “there were at least four sides, perhaps more” in the civil war within the world war (p. 149). Greble's narrative then moves to the glut of atrocities and reprisals that characterized the last gasp of the NDH in Sarajevo, with arbitrary

arrests, torture, and execution a daily reality. At that late stage, the Ustasha regime had begun to view their one-time allies in the NDH, the Muslims of Bosnia, as a fifth column, and therefore yet another viable target for persecution. Finally, we are offered a snapshot of Sarajevo during and just after the Partisans took control of the city in April 1945. Their organizational capacity stood in sharp contrast to the Ustasha regime's increasing ineptitude. Although the chaos and confusion that reigned in Sarajevo during that spring did not cease immediately, the Communist Party's Central Committee was active disinfecting schools, setting up "mandatory vegetarian days" to preserve livestock (p. 234), rounding up anyone and everyone for reconstruction projects, and prosecuting suspected war criminals.

Grebble's book is engagingly written and full of fascinating detail. Her argument that "town leaders were able to protect the values and ideals associated with multiculturalism while acquiescing to some political and ideological demands at the national and international levels" is more convincing for the first part of the book than for the end, where the atmosphere evoked by the sources she cites is more one of pervasive fear, insecurity, and desperate attempts on the part of the various elites to isolate and protect individual confessional communities, regardless of the cost to their neighbors (p. 28). Grebble also argues that one of the greatest casualties of the war was confessionalism itself, which took a hit under the Ustasha regime that turned out to be the beginning of a process of slow, state-driven unraveling that would continue throughout the postwar period. Although the Ustasas and communists "disagreed on which part [of Sarajevo's traditional legacy] should be sacrificed—confessionalism or pluralism," Grebble writes, "the two were one in Sarajevo, and negating either meant . . . challenging Sarajevo's intangible essence, its civic consciousness" (p. 239).

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KEVIN M. F. PLATT. *Terror and Greatness: Ivan and Peter as Russian Myths*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 294. \$45.00.

How did Ivan IV become terrible and Peter I great? Kevin M. F. Platt answers this question through an innovative look at their representations over time. He argues that the two represent an important category in Russian historical understanding: "the ruler who is alternately lionized for his heroic, great achievements and condemned for his extraordinary violence and despotism" (p. 2). In this work of cultural historiography, Platt examines the historical processes that contributed to the development of interpretations that emphasized Ivan's terribleness and Peter's greatness (and sometimes vice versa). He argues that evolving interpretations of Ivan and Peter reflect "a deeper mechanism whereby they have served as crucial sites in Russian articulations of the relationships between coercion and social progress and between trauma and collective iden-

tity" (p. 3). Interpretations of Ivan and Peter took many twists and turns, all reflecting the ongoing attempt to define what it meant to be Russian.

Platt begins his study with the Napoleonic invasion, at the time when Nikolai Karamzin helped to establish the modern Russian historiographical tradition. Before then, Ivan IV was mostly known as a severe but pious ruler, a view largely propagated through legends and folk tales. In volume nine of his *History of the Russian State* (1821), Karamzin described Ivan as truly terrible, a bloodthirsty despot who engaged in sadistic deeds. While he did not view Peter in a wholly positive light, other early nineteenth-century historians and writers during the period between 1812 and the Great Reforms of the 1860s did. Alexander Pushkin, in his famous poem *The Bronze Horseman* (1833), generated one of the first and clearest interpretations of Peter and his era as combining both terror and greatness. Pushkin's Peter stood at the center of the debate between Westernizers and Slavophiles that dominated Russia in the mid-nineteenth century. Westernizers saw Peter as "the superlative hero of modernization and social progress," while Slavophiles viewed him as "the champion of harmful alien ideals and . . . the greatest enemy of the ancient truths of both Orthodox Christianity and Old Russian national culture" (p. 66).

Many writers and historians at the end of the nineteenth century focused on the fact that both Ivan and Peter played roles in the deaths of their eldest sons (Ivan killed his son, Ivan Ivanovich, in a fit of rage; Peter may have participated in the torture that killed his son, Aleksei Petrovich). Platt's insightful chapter on this subject analyzes two paintings well known to any student of Russian culture: Nikolai Ge's 1871 *Peter I Interrogates Tsarevich Aleksei Petrovich at Peterhof* and Ilya Repin's 1885 *Ivan the Terrible and His Son Ivan, 16 November 1581*. Both provoked controversy and outrage. Many viewers saw Ge's work as supporting Peter's decision to arrest his son and have him interrogated for treason against the state; others took Aleksei's side. Repin's painting, a bloody rendition of the 1581 filicide, provoked a full-blown scandal because of its violent content. These canvases initiated yet another comparison of the two tsars and their eras. The images were in dialogue with one another and generated healthy debates about each tsar's greatness, the trauma they inflicted, and the legacies of their respective acts. By the turn of the twentieth century, Ivan and Peter had become so firmly established as the alpha and beta of understanding Russian history that, according to Platt, it is "difficult to imagine any unifying logic informing the range of representations of Russia's first tsar and first emperor" in tsardom's last decade (p. 130).

Early Soviet historians inherited these interpretations and initially did much to change them. While Mikhail Pokrovskii attacked Ivan and Peter as individuals in works published in the 1920s, he praised their eras as historically progressive. It was in the 1930s and 1940s that "a drawn-out negotiation among party elites, cultural managers, writers, historians, and Soviet soci-

ety as a whole" took place in order to "master the Russian national past for the purposes of the present" (p. 193). The infamous *Short Course in the History of the USSR*, first published in 1937, reinvented Peter as the first Russian modernizer. It also presented a view of Ivan as the initiator of state consolidation, imperial expansion, modernization, and enlightenment, all policies that Peter continued. Although the *Short Course* did not entirely ignore Ivan's or Peter's violence, it did overwhelmingly present the two as great rulers. The culmination of this Stalin-era rehabilitation, as Platt notes, came in Sergei Eisenstein's uncompleted film trilogy *Ivan the Terrible*, which was significant because, in the author's innovative interpretation, the films brought "the affective foundations of greatness in the disavowal of terror" that had developed over a century to light (p. 233). Eisenstein grasped the myth of Ivan that had developed over time and made films that went "beyond historical allegory to offer an allegory of historical allegory" (p. 246).

This brilliant book is packed full of rich insights and important ideas. Platt's conclusion explains how Ivan and Peter continue to be important in post-Soviet culture. While historians such as Maureen Perrie and Nicholas V. Riasanovsky have written about Ivan's and Peter's individual impacts on Russian memory, Platt tackles them together in order to demonstrate how they have served as central symbols in the evolving construction of collective identity in Russia.

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DAVID SCHIMMELPENNINCK VAN DER OYE. *Russian Orientalism: Asia in the Russian Mind from Peter the Great to the Emigration*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2010. Pp. xi, 298. \$40.00.

VERA TOLZ. *Russia's Own Orient: The Politics of Identity and Oriental Studies in the Late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods*. (Oxford Studies in Modern European History.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. 203. \$99.00.

Even as studies of Russia's Asian expansion have proliferated over the last decade, the field remains in its conceptual infancy. Important empirical contributions, including these works by Vera Tolz and David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, continue to fixate on Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978) and its applicability to Russia. Tolz and Schimmelpenninck van der Oye highlight the importance of Russia's eastern periphery and Asia more broadly to imperial Russian culture and politics. Concepts of and relationships with the "East" emerged as critical measuring sticks for tsarist elites, uncertain of their place in a modern world. Both authors offer unabashedly sympathetic portrayals of scholars and writers characterized as "Orientalists," a term Tolz coined due to her belief that Said's work has unfairly tarred the term "Orientalist." Orientalists, for Tolz

and Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, sought to elevate Asia's status in Russia's imagination and politics and uplift its peoples and cultures to a place of respect not only in St. Petersburg, but also across the Western world. Their efforts, the authors argue, were unique in imperial Europe and foreshadowed the national rights that eastern minorities enjoyed in the Soviet Union.

Schimmelpenninck van der Oye's work proceeds as a series of vignettes of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century authors, missionaries, linguists, and intellectuals whose careers were intimately bound with "Asia," stretching here from the Ottoman Empire to the Caucasus to China. Tolz focuses more specifically on the late nineteenth-century Faculty of Oriental Studies at St. Petersburg University. Both authors argue that this faculty's prestige symbolized Asia's importance to the tsarist state as well as the educated public; Schimmelpenninck van der Oye notes that of St. Petersburg University's fifty-eight full professors, nine were housed in Oriental Studies. Both highlight these and other Orientalists of non-Russian ethnicity. Viktor Romanovich Rozen, the faculty's dean, was a Baltic German; his disciples, many of whom were raised on the empire's periphery, had mixed backgrounds that included French and Scottish blood. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye notes the Turkic Caucasian background of Protestant convert Mirza Aleksandr Kasimovich Kazimbek, who led the study of eastern cultures and languages in mid-nineteenth-century Kazan.

This non-Russian presence is striking, though the authors highlight it primarily as proof in itself of the uniqueness of Russian Orientalism. Rozen, Kazimbek, and others ostensibly brought sensitive views of Asia to Russians. One Orthodox priest in Schimmelpenninck van der Oye's work spent years in China ministering to a small group of Cossacks who served the Qing dynasty and wrote prolifically on the country with "relative sympathy" (p. 150). Tolz's Orientalists not only studied languages and manuscripts but also brought Buddhist Buryats and other minority peoples of tsarist Asia to St. Petersburg as "research assistants" in a two-way learning process. Others, including N. Ia. Marr, worked with small Caucasus minorities to assert national rights. Tolz sees a "particular kind of political and cultural space where there was no boundary between the 'East' and the 'West'" (p. 5). Both highlight the fluid physical borders between Europe and Asia in the tsarist empire, where Russian and Tatar peoples coexisted in cities like Kazan.

Schimmelpenninck van der Oye's stories highlight Asia's importance to obscure scholars and leading politicians and authors alike. Catherine the Great's seven-month tour of Crimea, accompanied by Western dignitaries, presented Russia's newly conquered territory as evidence of its status as a European empire over exotic Asian peoples in what the author characterizes as a typical Orientalist endeavor. By the nineteenth century, however, Western and Russian views of the East diverged. Aleksandr Sergeyevich Pushkin, who followed in Lord Byron's footsteps with his portrayals of

an exoticized east, increasingly viewed his "Asian" subjects, primarily Caucasus mountain peoples, as a symbiosis of European self and other and praised warrior honesty and bravery untainted by tsarist corruption and oppression. Pushkin, unlike Western authors, maintained a "deep respect for Asian civilization" (Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, p. 227).

Schimmelpenninck van der Oye's and Tolz's most effective arguments for Russian Orientology's uniqueness lies in the extent to which Asia became implicated in the relationship between the tsarist empire and the rest of Europe. To counteract national feelings of inferiority, Tolz's scholars strained to present Russian interaction with Asian peoples in a favorable light, contrasting with the cruelty of ostensibly more advanced Western states. Such a discourse presaged a late nineteenth-century movement to present Russia as a "unique symbiosis" of western and eastern peoples (Tolz, p. 58). Tolz argues that this language conditioned the actions of St. Petersburg's Orientologists, who became advocates for Asian minorities' political and cultural inclusion within the empire. Orientologists' guidance conditioned proto-nationalist movements across the empire. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye highlights a more complicated relationship after Russia's defeat by Japan in 1905, when Asia appeared to lurk everywhere for Silver Age authors and poets, primarily but not always as a threat. As Russia's place in the modern world grew ever less certain, the dangers of having mixed Europe and Asia became apparent. Andrei Bely facetiously credited continued cross-continental contact as having produced a "Mongol state" led by Romanov tsars (Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, p. 218). Alexander Blok saw contemporary Asia as a creeping threat to Russia's urban, European civilization but, as he steeped himself in Hindu and Buddhist thought, also as a path for an impotent regime and unstable country to reinvent itself. Other authors argued that Russians needed to awaken their Scythian blood, linking themselves to a fabled nomadic tribe who roamed the Eurasian steppe millennia ago.

Scholars of the Orient maintained a complicated relationship with the state, which supported their intellectual efforts but demanded "useful knowledge" to facilitate imperial rule. Implicitly drawing analogies to the post-9/11 era, Schimmelpenninck van der Oye and Tolz detail their protagonists' struggles to further their own scholarship independent of government priorities that focused on modern languages and imperial administration. Scholars nonetheless grew upset when their work was ignored by the state, and some moved between the two worlds. Nikolai Il'minskii went from the "anti-Islam" section of Kazan University to a chair in mathematics before assuming a position with the tsarist borderlands commission, where he formulated an educational system for steppe Kazakhs that would precipitate assimilation (Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, p. 137). The Society of Russian "Orientologists" (*Orientalistov*) declared itself "free from political goals" but readily participated in government expeditions (Tolz, p.

74). Tolz might have further pursued the complex relationship between tsarist state and society, but prefers to highlight scholars' positions as relatively autonomous actors seeking to destroy boundaries between East and West.

Both authors' engagement of Said draws them away from the nuances of their own work. In large part this is due to their characterization of *Orientalism* and subsequent postcolonial scholarship in their crudest forms. For Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, "Said's darker vision of Occidental contempt and fear of the Orient dominates thinking about the subject today" (p. 7). Both authors content themselves with arguing that their Orientologists' empathy and fascination with Asia at once renders them unique among Orientalists of their time and upsets the Saidian paradigm. Such arguments ignore Said's nuanced discussion of scholars of the East such as Gustave Flaubert in *Orientalism*. Neither systematically engages postcolonial scholarship. Tolz finds it sufficient to state that, "because the specific context of South Asia has so strongly shaped academic understanding of the issue, contemporary scholars have come to believe that, given the inherent inequality between colonizers and colonized, the two could not be genuine partners in the production of knowledge" (p. 132). Schimmelpenninck van der Oye represents eighteenth-century Moldavian Prince Dmitrie Cantemir's account of Constantinople's fall in 1453 and nineteenth-century artist Vasily Vasilyevich Vereshchagin's painting *The Opium Eaters*, among other works, as objective portrayals of the east, seemingly because they appear to the author not to condemn every aspect of Asian civilization.

To their credit, both authors offer counter-evidence to their views on Said and the uniqueness of Russian Orientology. Tolz notes that Vasily Vladimirovich Bartold, whom she lauds for his respect for Islam and collaboration with Central Asian Muslims for national recognition, "never wavered from the proclamation of the superiority of European epistemology over 'native' forms of knowledge" (p. 29). As he lauds Vereshchagin for seeing in the horror of war "no fundamental Saidian distinction between the European 'self' and Asian 'other'" (p. 91), Schimmelpenninck van der Oye quotes the artist's own view: "my main purpose was to describe the barbarism with which until now the entire way of life and order of Central Asia has been saturated" (p. 87). Even as Tolz seeks to correct Said through the Russian case, she proudly argues that the Palestinian scholar's ideas stemmed from critiques of Western imperialism and the arbitrary nature of boundaries between East and West that Rozen and others made decades earlier. Arab scholars, including Anwar Abdel-Malik, who inspired Said, absorbed Russian Orientalological thinking during their studies in Soviet Moscow.

It would nonetheless be a shame if the focus on Said obscures these works' overall value. Both make important cases for Asia as a central component of Russian culture, national identity, and political power. Russia's relationship with the "Orient" was complicated, to be

sure, even if neither author effectively makes a comparative case that it was more complicated than any other European nation. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye nonetheless shows a strong command of the links between Western and Russian intellectual thought on Asia. I am unsure whether Russian historians' continued engagement with *Orientalism* demonstrates Said's continued intellectual power, the lack of breadth of our own field, or some combination of both.

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TRACY DENNISON. *The Institutional Framework of Russian Serfdom*. (Cambridge Studies in Economic History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. xix, 254. \$99.00.

The second serfdom of Eastern Europe was little burdened with the manorial traditions of the medieval West. On the Voshchazhnikovo estate in Yaroslavl' province, legal subjugation proved to be a flexible institution, responsive to the entrepreneurial energies of the serfs. Only ten percent lived solely from agriculture. Rather, they were millers, traders, smiths, cobblers, glaziers, apprentices, servants, day laborers, and even factory owners employing their fellow serfs. Some lived off the estate year-round, while others were on seasonal contracts. Many were landowners, renting both their own land and communal allotments to each other and to residents of other villages. These serfs took in servants and hired laborers from the estate. They lent money to each other and borrowed from local merchants and landlords. Remarkably, a few serfs even owned serfs.

But local and St. Petersburg estate managers proved no less resourceful in generating income for the Sheremetev family. In addition to quitrents, communal dues, and traditional levies, many of the serfs of Voshchazhnikovo paid an annual income tax and a progressive annual asset tax. In turn, given the virtual absence of state authority in rural Russia, the Sheremetevs provided an extralegal framework for enforcing contracts and property rights to underpin the economic activities of their serfs.

Generalizations about Russian serfdom abound, and thoughtful analyses revealing the subtlety and variability of these tiny servile communities are few. The greatest strengths of Tracy Dennison's fine study are its description of the role of tolerably efficient credit, land, and labor markets in the local and regional economy and its examination of the nature of lord and serf interactions and negotiations. Drawing upon the interpretive framework, but not the methodologies, of Philip T. Hoffman and Jan de Vries, Dennison admirably demonstrates that serfdom on Voshchazhnikovo was not embedded in an immobile agricultural economy. Markets made it possible for the serfs to develop different resource allocation and risk-management strategies than have been observed elsewhere in Russia. Communal land mechanisms were far less important.

Serfs here were not subsistence-oriented or unduly risk averse, and landlords did not seek to impose attitudes of self-sufficiency. Serfs allocated their labor and capital and used credit reasonably well, reflecting a rationality well-described by economic theory. Therefore, Dennison concludes that it was primarily the lack of a formal legal framework supporting entrepreneurial activity—and not anything inherent in the practices of serfdom itself—that inhibited investment and constrained economic development.

With case studies, scholars often struggle to place their findings in a larger context. In attempting to provide this context, Dennison takes on a polemical tone that readers may find disconcerting. She imagines that a "peasant myth" persists in all studies of the Russian peasantry from Aleksandr Ivanovich Herzen and August von Haxthausen through Alexander V. Chayanov and Alexander Gerschenkron to contemporary scholars. But first, the serfs of Voshchazhnikovo were not peasants, in spite of their legal status, as Dennison herself repeatedly notes. Thus, her critique of Chayanov's work on a peasant economy rings hollow, as Chayanov expressly limited his analysis to peasant family farms in agriculture, and he readily admitted the albeit limited role of markets. How else could so many serfs have paid cash dues roughly the value of three-days of labor per week? Second, Dennison is not sensitive to the difference between a rural economy and the practices of serfdom, ascribing too much significance to serf owners' policies. Her attempt to "explain as much as possible . . . without reference to culture or geography" was ill-advised (p. 17). Climate and geography, disease and demography weighed heavily on the rural economies of pre-emancipation Russia, best evidenced by the fact that state peasants, subject to little or no manorial authority, had similar social and demographic characteristics as serfs.

The author's discussion of the rural commune reinforces much that is known. Communal governance, the redistribution of land, and conscription were all sources of conflict. The church was weak, assistance to the poor limited, and village solidarity rarely evident. Her analysis of household structures and the family economy, however, is less successful, as it relies heavily on tax censuses. The 1815–1816 and 1856 censuses were conducted in order to take into consideration the demographic impact of the Napoleonic and Crimean wars. The tax censuses of 1833–1836 and 1850–1851 were preceded by cholera epidemics and crop failures. In fact, all six of her observations reflect a substantial underregistration of the population under the age of twenty, even beyond what might be expected from war and disease. Dennison does not apply standard methods to correct this undercount, thereby undermining many of her demographic findings and calling into question her conclusions that servile social structures were to a great extent a function of landlord policies.

This study is well researched and thought provoking. The four chapters on market forces are outstanding. Ignore the notion of a "peasant myth" and take con-

clusions that exaggerate the role of serf owners' practices with a grain of salt. The result convincingly demonstrates a remarkable flexibility in the institution of serfdom in pre-reform Russia.

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SCOTT B. SMITH. *Captives of Revolution: The Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolshevik Dictatorship, 1918–1923*. (Pitt Series in Russian and East European Studies.) Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press. 2011. Pp. xix, 380. \$45.00.

Scott B. Smith's monograph is a welcome addition to the literature on the Russian Civil War. *Captives of Revolution* is a study of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRs) from the start of the civil war in early 1918 through its tortured attempts to find a place for itself in both the Red and White camps, the party's eventual collapse in 1920, and its shadow life in emigration. Smith builds his account upon archival materials from five central Russian archives and two major foreign collections, as well as the party's voluminous press and memoir literature.

Russia's February Revolution of 1917 led to a staggering expansion of political life in a welter of local, regional, and national bodies. Throughout much of 1917, the SRs could claim to be, by far, the country's largest political party. (As Smith notes, however, party politics was far from the only forum for political life.) The party had a heroic past as an opponent of the autocracy, most notably for its string of attempted and successful assassinations of tsarist officials. The SRs were firmly committed to revolution, but only in a responsible and proper form. When elections to the Constituent Assembly were held in late 1917, the SRs polled the largest number of votes.

Yet as the country slid into civil war, the SRs proved utterly incapable of translating what seemed to be its broad following throughout the country into concrete support for the party's policies, and specifically into popular opposition to the Bolshevik dictatorship. Smith examines how, following the October Revolution, the SR leadership sought to explain this failing, and to find a way forward that would remain true to the revolution while not acceding to the Bolshevik usurpation of it. He follows the party's debates over whether to side with the new Soviet regime or to resort to "direct action" against it (including both armed resistance and assassination of Bolshevik leaders). The first two chapters trace how the party sought to respond to the Bolshevik challenge and the debates over the legitimacy of using assassination. The SRs were a central player in the early military challenge to the Bolshevik state. When in mid-1918 the Czechoslovak Legion drove out local Soviet power in the Volga region, the SRs entered the vacuum and organized an anti-Soviet government championing the re-establishment of the Constituent Assembly. The book's next two chapters trace how this government, first in the Volga and then in Siberia, fell under the control of mil-

itary counterrevolution. The book concludes with the party's destruction and the Soviet state's show trial of its leaders in 1922. The author argues that the specter of the "renegades of socialism," and the SRs in particular, provided an enduring template for Bolshevik cosmology into the 1920s and 1930s. While the SRs were certainly an important figure in the Bolshevik worldview, Smith perhaps overreaches here.

The chronology of Smith's book dictates a tale of defeat and disappointment. He notes in the introduction that the party confronted two major weaknesses on the eve of the civil war (pp. xvi-xix). The first was the longstanding fractious nature of the party itself. While all SRs were committed to socialism and revolution, the party had longstanding fissures between radicals and more moderates over how to achieve these ultimate goals. Indeed, when Smith's narrative opens, the SRs splintered, with the more radical wing forming an independent "Left Socialist Revolutionary Party" and taking many of the rank and file with it. The second major problem the party faced was its own conviction that electoral support indicated strong political commitment to the party's policy among its followers. In this, it was very wrong. The party's support in 1917 had been very broad, but it had not been very deep. Smith finds, in addition, that the party's field of action became severely constrained by the Bolsheviks' success in framing the political field in binary terms, as one of revolution and counterrevolution. Therefore to oppose the Bolsheviks was to appear to side with counterrevolution.

All of this is very true. And it is a major achievement to cover the party's tortured passage through the twists and turns of the civil war. Nevertheless, readers will regret that the narrative begins so abruptly in early 1918, with little discussion of how the events of 1917 shaped Russians' views of the SRs and, equally, how the party's stupendous expansion shaped the party leadership's own views of its role. Equally, readers will miss a discussion of the elections to the Constituent Assembly and the SRs split with the Left SR Party, all of which occurred prior to the start of Smith's narrative.

The book's focus is very much the party leadership, rather than the dynamics of local party life. But this story is an important one. In tracing it, Smith untangles several key questions, such as the SR Central Committee's connection to the attempted assassination of Lenin in summer 1918, an event that provided a pretext for the Soviet Red Terror. The author is to be commended for his sober and clear-eyed analysis of the SRs, warts and all. It is easy to sympathize with this party in its struggle with the Bolshevik dictatorship. Yet he also shows that the party leadership was suicidally unable to unite around a common set of tactics and goals. While the party leaders may have wished to believe that it was Bolshevik repression that prevented more public support for the party in early 1920, Smith finds instead that by this time the party's agenda simply did not find much traction among ordinary Russians. At the end of the day, the party leadership's cosmology

"proved better suited to the familiar confines of prison and distant shores of exile than it did to everyday politics in the new Soviet world" (p. 237): the SRs were more successful as persecuted oppositionists than as revolutionary actors.

Captives of Revolution provides a fair and valuable account of the SRs, a crucial player in the Russian Civil War. It goes a long way to explaining the party's inability to capitalize on what appeared to be a promising amount of political support in the Russian Revolution. The book assumes some degree of familiarity with the events and figures of the Russian Revolution and civil war, and therefore will be most valued by historians of Russia and the Soviet Union.

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IRINA PAPERNO. *Stories of the Soviet Experience: Memoirs, Diaries, Dreams*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2009. Pp. xv, 285. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$22.95.

Vladimir Putin once famously described the end of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century. But it is rather the catastrophic quality of the Soviet experience itself that informs many of the hundred some diaries, memoirs, and life stories under consideration in this volume, which follows a number of historical works that draw on the crush of personal documents rushed into publication in the late perestroika period and the dozen or so years after. Irina Paperno, a distinguished literary scholar, brings to the enterprise the skill of close textual reading and also a sometimes untrammelled imagination that in places takes her beyond her sources. The result is a dappled compilation of deconstructed documents that proffer glimpses of previously unseen Soviet realities. "Historical events are always occurring—if they are not visible, you have to find the invisible ones," wrote one of the diarists (p. 173). This is just what Paperno set out to do.

The welcome revelation of that which had been hidden provides an ironic reversal of the Stalinist "unmasking" of hidden traitors and enemies of the state. Paperno's ambitious—if not entirely coherent—tripartite volume starts with an overview of her documents in the aggregate and ends with a daring, extravagant, and not altogether successful attempt at offering up dreams as a source base for the writing of history. The middle, and by far the strongest (and longest) section of the book, proffers an authoritative and imaginative reading of two apposite and wildly divergent texts: the editor and literary critic Lidiia Chukovskaia's *Notes About Anna Akhmatova* (1976), and an autobiographical narrative by Evgeniia Kiseleva, an ordinary peasant woman, sent to a film studio in 1976 with the request that that her life story be made into a movie.

No single argument could possibly run through this multiplex volume, which demonstrates on every page the impossibility of any single argument for just about anything. But Paperno illuminates much more. We see the utter pervasiveness of the state in people's lives in

ways likely inconceivable to the Western reader. Many might know about how Akhmatova, together with many other members of the intelligentsia in the late 1930s, lived in fear of arrest. But more than anything else, what comes out in the two long texts by the poet's chronicler and by the peasant is the constricting impact of the state's role in the allocation of housing. A permit was needed to register a residence in a particular city and only the government issued apartments and rooms to its subjects. Akhmatova, poor and incapable of taking care of herself, lived in a shambolic apartment with her then husband, Nikolai Punin, along with his ex-wife and their daughter, as well as a family of former servants whose inclusion had transformed the residence into a tension-riddled communal apartment. When she left Punin she could do so only by exchanging the room she shared with him for the single space formerly inhabited by the ex-wife, who now moved in with him. Many divorced couples, unable to procure alternative living arrangements, continued to live this way for years. So when we contemplate "private," as opposed to public life in the Soviet Union, what do we mean? What manner of private life could such a home actually provide? That the word "privacy" has no proper equivalent in the Russian language only adds to the confusion.

The peasant Kiseleva, too, found herself forced to sleep in the same room with her husband and his "other wife," one of two mistresses he had taken at the end of World War II, when he refused to return to his real spouse and the mother of his son. Writing in simple descriptive prose riddled with mistakes in spelling and grammar, Kiseleva, a victim of great poverty and her second husband's alcoholism and debauchery, observed philosophically, "who don't drink nowadays it's the vodka century" (p. 128). She wove Biblical apocalyptic imagery into her prose together with phrases learned from the television that served as her only comfort. She found reassurance in seeing Leonid Brezhnev, whom she wished would be immortal; he was her protector from a future nuclear war threatened by President Jimmy Carter, who she considered "another accursed Hitler" (p. 141). Such thoughts reminded her of the trauma of the past war in her village, where "the wounded call out save us the last judgment" (p. 142). By 1991, when excerpts of Kiseleva's memoir were finally published, the "end time" had indeed come, for the second time in less than a century.

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WILLIAM JAY RISCH. *The Ukrainian West: Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv*. (Harvard Historical Studies, number 173.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. xi, 360. \$49.95.

William Jay Risch has written a well-documented book about a hitherto little-researched aspect of the integration of western Ukraine into Soviet Ukraine after World War II. As Risch points out, western Ukrainians never believed the Soviet system could be improved and

they were alienated by the 1933 Holodomor (terror-famine) and the Great Terror that Joseph Stalin inflicted on Soviet Ukraine. Dissidents and opponents of the regime who emerged in Lviv were therefore more radical than their counterparts in central and eastern Ukraine. Of the 749 known dissidents in Soviet Ukraine between 1969 and 1972, twenty-five percent were from Lviv, only thirteen percent less than Kiev, and Lviv was second to Kiev in the number of arrests by the KGB.

In the decades leading up to Ukrainian independence, young people in Lviv were anti-Soviet and supporters of Ukrainian independence, and the city's nationalist and anti-Soviet ferment laid the basis for western Ukraine's mobilization of central Ukrainians in the late 1980s toward the August 1991 declaration of independence (eastern Ukrainians remained passive at the time). Risch argues that Lviv represented a "fault line of rival projects of nation building and imperial dominance" and therefore played a crucial role in the fate of Soviet Ukraine (p. 1).

Like in Kiev, Lviv's Communist Youth League (Komsomol) became a major force demanding political liberalization and Ukrainianization (pp. 183–184). New dissident youth clubs established under the aegis of the Komsomol in Kiev inevitably spread to Lviv. In the late 1980s the Komsomol in Lviv established *Tovarystvo Lev* (The Lion Society), a cultural and educational NGO, and became the radical wing of the Democratic Platform in the Communist Party of Ukraine.

Risch shows that the nationalist insurgency in western Ukraine was far larger, more vicious, and longer-lasting than anti-Soviet insurgencies in the Baltic states. Between 1944 and 1946 110,825 nationalist partisans were killed and the insurgency lasted another five years, in isolated cases until 1960. Another quarter of a million western Ukrainians accused of being nationalists were arrested and deported to Siberia. Forty-one thousand former nationalist guerrillas returned to live in western Ukraine by 1956, and they provided an example, encouragement, and members for various nationalist and dissident groups. Nationalists who had evaded death or arrest infiltrated Soviet institutions such as the Communist Party of Ukraine and Komsomol. Folk songs paid homage in private to the World War I *Sich* Riflemen, the post-World War I Galician Army, and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) nationalist partisans in the 1940s. When censorship was liberalized in the late 1980s, hitherto privately promoted homage went public.

Leading western Ukrainian writers such as Dmytro Pavlychko and Rostyslav Bratun flirted with Ukrainian nationalists in their youth, then went to work for the Soviet regime and in the late 1980s supported democratization and eventually Ukrainian independence. Prewar intellectuals encouraged an accommodation with the Soviet regime, but they identified themselves first and foremost as Ukrainians. Lviv's writers were always close to dissidents and oppositionists who published *samvydav* (samizdat). According to Risch, this meant that "establishment intellectuals thus agreed

with dissidents' concerns about Ukrainians' identity. In return, dissidents came to incorporate the agendas of establishment intellectuals to justify more radical change" (p. 140). Pavlychko's poems, for example, were used to legitimize calls for independence. Many of Lviv's writers moved to Kiev and influenced institutions such as the Writers Union of Ukraine and Soviet nationality and cultural policies by increasing support for a Ukrainian sense of nationhood. The Ukrainianization of Kiev took place in the Soviet Union (in the tsarist empire Ukrainians were a minority in the city), and Lviv played a major role in this process. In the post-Soviet era, Kievans have voted with western Ukrainians in elections and aligned with western Ukrainians, most demonstrably in the 2004 Orange Revolution.

Lviv's intellectuals typified what Risch describes as accommodation, but not submission, to the Soviet system by western Ukrainians, writing attacks against Ukrainian nationalist groups while also condemning Soviet nationality policies and russification. In this sense western Ukrainians were similar to eastern Europeans in that communism never sank deep roots. Lviv never became completely Soviet, and the city's inhabitants viewed Soviet rule as imported, alien, Russian, and colonial.

Following the Soviet Union's annexation of western Ukraine, the region underwent a transformation from Polish, Hungarian, and Romanian identities to Ukrainian. This aspect of Soviet nationality policy is largely ignored in western studies, which have traditionally focused on Soviet policies of denationalization and russification rather than nation-building. Soviet policy in Transcarpathia, for example, erased Rusyn identity, which had competed as an identity orientation in interwar Czechoslovakia, and decreed that the region was populated by Ukrainians.

The proportion of Poles in Lviv dramatically declined from two thirds of the population during World War II to only two percent a decade later, which Risch describes as the "unmaking of Polish Lwów" and the "making of Soviet Ukrainian Lviv" (p. 34). Polish names, monuments, and cemeteries made way for Ukrainian. Lviv's Jan Casimir University became Ivan Franko State University. Lviv's postwar radical de-polonization was supported by Galicians, whose national identity had grown in violent opposition to Polish nationalism since the nineteenth century.

An additional reason Lviv became more Ukrainian was that far fewer Russians moved to the city compared to the three Baltic states, and Lviv was the least ethnic Russian city in the European part of the Soviet Union. The proportion of Ukrainians grew from a quarter in World War II to seventy-nine percent of Lviv's population by the 1989 census. Ninety-seven percent declared Ukrainian to be their native language.

Risch provides a good analysis and discussion of the links between Lviv and Ukrainians living in Slovakia and especially Poland. Until the Prague Spring in 1968, Ukrainians in Poland and Czechoslovakia could publish far more freely than in the USSR. Ukrainian minorities

in Eastern Europe therefore acted as intermediaries, transporting Ukrainian *samvydav* westward and Ukrainian émigré publications eastward.

The author does not, however, adequately describe the interaction of Ukrainian émigré organizations in Western Europe and North America, most of whose members were from western Ukraine and were virulently anticommunist, with Soviet Ukraine. Risch discusses in a brief and unsatisfactory manner émigré groups such as OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) without discussing different strategies adopted by its three wings, the distribution of émigré publications in Soviet Ukraine, KGB infiltration of underground OUN networks, and the collaboration of one OUN group with the CIA from the mid-1940s through 1991. The author also does not adequately cover the influence of the Polish émigré magazine *Kultura* upon Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation, the impact of the election of a Polish pope on the underground Ukrainian Catholic Church, and cooperation by Ukrainian émigrés and dissidents, especially in the second half of the 1980s, with the Polish Solidarity movement and other Polish anticommunist groups.

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MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA

PHILIP WOOD. *'We have no King but Christ': Christian Political Thought in Greater Syria on the Eve of the Arab Conquest (c.400–585)*. (Oxford Studies in Byzantium.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. ix, 295. \$110.00.

Are national identities exclusively modern? This question is hotly debated among political scientists and historians of modernity. Philip Wood brings this debate to a premodern setting: the eastern Roman and western Persian empires in the fifth and sixth centuries. Here, as Wood reads political and religious discourse, he finds versions of Syrian identity based on shared language, religion, myths of origin, and territoriality. While he posits no mass participation or ancient nationalism, he sees regional identities with political implications.

Wood situates his work amid debates about nationalism, Roman imperial discourse, and provincial ethnic communities. Roman-era regional identities have long drawn interest from historians. Early twentieth-century scholars saw regional languages as marking nations. Divergent theologies seemed to harbor separatism—especially devotion to a “one-nature” (miaphysite) Christ. After 1950, these essentialist views were demolished; since then many scholars have minimized regional identity. Fergus Millar stressed elite Greek cultural dominance. Averil Cameron cast Christian imperial rhetoric as totalizing. Others have dissented. Garth Fowden saw regional identities emerging from monotheistic faith. Now Wood joins a recent trend by finding new social meanings in Syriac literature.

This book's first four chapters discuss the fifth-cen-

tury creation of Syrian cultural identity. Chapter one surveys Greek ecclesiastical historians' expressions of orthodox imperial ideology. Imperial elites had once seen Greek learning as encouraging self-control, guiding emperors and improving barbarians. Later, the self-controlled emperor's support for orthodoxy was cast as taming heretics and barbarians (pp. 28–32). But this ideology faced problems in Syria, with its distinct Christian practices. Chapter two explores how Theodoret (in his *Historia religiosa*) dealt with ascetics who represented Syrian cultural distinction. According to Wood, Theodoret ignored “heteropract” ascetics and erased others' troubling activities, while still casting their “barbarian” wisdom as holy (pp. 56–66).

Chapter three summarizes research on Roman-era ethnic identity. Supporting Millar's view of Greek predominance, Wood focuses on exceptions—Jews and Samaritans—who sustained distinct identities (pp. 71–75). Then he turns to Syrian Edessa and shows how its “Syriac” dialect spread and gained prestige due to Christian missionizing. The result was not separatism, but cultural independence (pp. 75–81). Chapter four scrutinizes fifth-century Syriac literature for evidence of Syrian identity. Wood starts with the *Doctrina Addai*, which revised the legend of first-century King Abgar hosting Addai the Apostle. Wood sees a linguistic, Christian, Edessan pride, here and in other texts (pp. 94–95, 98–99). Next, Wood considers anti-Jewish additions to the *Doctrina Addai*, which, he claims, employed Edessan holiness to critique imperial policy (pp. 107–110). He also surveys Persian Christian legends (the *Acts of Mar Mari* and *Cave of Treasures*), which broadened Edessan identity to support various doctrines and reify a faithful Syrian race (pp. 116–117, 121–124).

The final chapters explore sixth-century redeployments of Syrian identity. Chapter five locates Edessan pride in the *Julian Romance* through its retelling of the “apostate” emperor's reign. Here an uncontrolled Julian meets resistance in faithfully Christian Edessa, while Jews, and nearby pagans, appear as unconvertible enemies. Wood sees Edessan identity used to sharpen confessional boundaries (pp. 148–149). He also discerns criticism of Emperor Justinian for ousting Edessa's miaphysite bishop (pp. 159–162). Chapter six probes the use of Syrian identity in sixth-century doctrinal conflicts. As emperors supported a “two-nature” (dyophysite) Christ, miaphysite Syriac writers (especially John of Ephesus) touted their region's special holiness, which trumped the unreliable emperors' authority (pp. 186–198). Chapter seven looks to Ethiopia and Yemen, regions visited by miaphysite missionaries, and to their texts (the *Book of the Himyarites* and *Kebrā Nagast*), which celebrated sanctity in Syria and locally. Wood claims that writers reused Syrian political discourse to build a commonwealth of miaphysite identities. As identity formation reached northern Arabs, Wood perceives a precedent for Islam (pp. 254–256). Wood concludes by comparing fifth-century resurgent Jewish identity with these other nascent *ethnie*. In each

case, language, religion, myths of origin, and territoriality enabled marginal groups to limit imperial power.

Wood's argument is valuably provocative. His contribution is not just new textual readings, but a framework whereby texts reveal ethnic political identity. Wood's discussion of fifth-century Greek writers assumes that they represent imperial ideology, sometimes overlooking their idiosyncratic concerns. But his work with Syriac writers is compelling, as he finds fragments of resistant identity *within* the discourse of empire. Wood launches welcome debate by borrowing from social scientists (especially Anthony Smith). His work, though, begs a question: what social forces supported ancient ethnic identities, in circumstances different from nineteenth-century Europe? We might consider the impact of hagiography, congregational preaching, ascetic and educational centers, patronage networks, or jurisdictional boundaries. Wood does fine work surveying textual discourse; further steps may require different approaches.

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TAYEB EL-HIBRI. *Parable and Politics in Early Islamic History: The Rashidun Caliphs*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. Pp. xi, 471. \$60.00.

Tayeb El-Hibri invites us to read the medieval chronicles of the early, formative period of the Islamic community in the same way we approach the plays of William Shakespeare. When we read the ninth-century annals of al-Tabari, we may find a framework of events grounded in the actual events and persons of the first decades of the Islamic community: the Rightly Guided caliphs, the Arab conquests, the first civil war between the supporters of 'Alī and his opponents. But, like Shakespeare in *Julius Caesar*, Tabari ascribes motives, argumentations, and portrayals of character that are intended as parables about political power and morality, about the different approaches to solving the tensions between religious and moral ideals and *realpolitik*.

Reading Tabari this way makes sense; in fact, it seems the intuitive way of approaching Tabari and other Abbasid historians. The authors cared less about accurate chronology and more about communicating allusive meanings and dramatic storylines. The long speeches ascribed to the caliphs could not be verbatim quotations but are construed to convey a complex set of meanings about the speaker, or to allude to connections with biblical or qur'anic rulers and themes. Similarly, the details of the ominous meetings of characters who will later confront each other, and of course the frequent prophesying, make this the "Islamic parabolic novel" (p. 237).

Trying to sift myth and facts in the Abbasid chronicles is futile. These works were not collections of earlier fragments but authored texts that should be read as a whole, for their dramatic impact. And, as with Shakespeare, the main characters are rarely one-dimensional. Although all the chroniclers discussed are Sunni, they

communicate both points of view, empathizing with the sense of injustice expressed by the supporters of 'Alī. Even in the key dramatic event, the assassination of 'Uthmān that would lead to civil war, the involvement of 'Alī remains an enigma, an unsolved mystery.

Each of the caliphs and each of the characters gets a chapter in El-Hibri's book. Abū Bakr, the first caliph, is a symbol of wisdom and religious piety, mirroring the qualities ascribed to the Prophet Muhammad; in a biblical framework, Abū Bakr is Moses's Aron (Hārūn). 'Umar, by contrast, is rough and practical; his character symbolizes the Arab element in Islam, and egalitarian cohesive ideals as opposed to the hierarchy of the Persianate Abbasid state. The third caliph, 'Uthmān, is a tragic figure, an aging, sometimes unjust and indecisive ruler who maintains the moral right to expect obedience. And finally 'Alī, the opposite of 'Umar, represents puritanism, philosophical wisdom, and a symbol of the Persian element in Abbasid society.

El-Hibri points out many biblical allusions, mostly referring to the experience of the Israelites who were led by Moses but then deserted him. The conduct of 'Uthmān before his assassination, telling his guards to leave the gate open so that the murderers could come in, evokes the image of Jesus allowing himself to be sacrificed. Many motifs are universal. The last Sasanian emperor Yazdajird dies at the hands of a simple miller; the mill serves as a motif of the turns in life. Beyond individual anecdotes, the overall parable is about the genesis of the Islamic community, like the biblical genesis of Adam, with civil war and a biblical fall caused by the temptations of power, greed, and excessive zeal.

El-Hibri replicates in this book the methodology he applied in his earlier monograph on al-Tabari's narration of the early Abbasid caliphate. Yet, the material here is more controversial, as it touches on the founding fathers of Islam. Thus, he can be faulted for not refining his methodology. There is no attempt to compare Abbasid chronicles to other narratives of the Rightly Guided caliphs, so it is impossible to know whether al-Tabari's generation had a distinct narrative, specific to the concerns of its Abbasid audience; El-Hibri tells us this is so and we have to take his word for it. Similarly, the reading of biblical allusions is a fascinating literary exercise, but there is no evidence that these allusions would have been picked up in medieval Baghdad. El-Hibri beautifully compares 'Umar's death at the mosque in Medina to Julius Caesar's at the steps of the Roman forum, with 'Alī the caliph's Brutus. This, of course, could not have been an allusion intended by the ninth-century authors, which El-Hibri does not imply. But one is left to wonder whether this book as a whole is just an appealing exercise in literary interpretation, one that tells us little about the Abbasids or their attitude to politics.

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NORMAN CALDER. *Islamic Jurisprudence in the Classical Era*. Edited by COLIN IMBER. Foreword and afterword

by ROBERT GLEAVE. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. vii, 233. \$95.00.

This publication provides a welcome addition to the advanced literature of Islamic jurisprudence in English. The book contains an introduction and afterword by Robert Gleave and four chapters based on Norman Calder's findings from the project that he did not complete prior to his death in 1998.

In chapter one (The Hanafi Law on Fornication), Calder presents a preliminary assessment of the works of *fiqh* focusing on the difference between *mukhtasar* (epitomes of law) and *mabsūṭ* (expansums), together with the indication of how they developed through time. By using the law of fornication or *zina* as an example, Calder focuses on the techniques of legal presentation and reasoning displayed in the different texts. After discussing a hermeneutical tradition in section three and the problem of social reality in section four, Calder concludes by stating that "the contents of the law were always potentially a judgment of reality . . . But the fundamental trajectory of the literary tradition seems best expressed in terms of the type I have chosen" (p. 71). Unfortunately, we do not know why he chose such a type.

In chapter two, "Nawawī and the Typologies of Fiqh Writing," Calder focuses on Nawawī's commentary *sharh* of the *Muhadhdhab* by Shirazi (d. 476/1083). Calder chooses the distribution of alms (*sadaqat*) as an example in this work of *mabsūṭ*. Distinguishing and filling logical gaps, according to Calder, represents an important way that Nawawī developed (or changed) Shirazi's work. Calder argues that Nawawī demonstrates a very pure sense of the jurist's task. Chapter three, "Scholars, Muftis, Judges and Secular Power: The Need for Distinctions," highlights the meaning and the role of muftis. Here, Calder analyzes the work of Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 756) and concludes by assessing various functionaries of Islamic jurisprudence. Chapter four focuses on the social functions of *fatwas*.

My main difficulty with Calder's work in general is also found in this volume. Such difficulty stems from his unclear and sometimes confusing translation of the Arabic texts provided. The following are examples of this taken from Calder's translation of Mawsili's text (pp. 24–26), followed by my comments and suggested translation in the brackets: 3.1 Confession means . . . [Zina is established by confession which means. . .]. 3.1 . . . to be out of vision . . . [to be out of vision of the *qadi*]. 4. A woman is not to be stripped save of padding and stuffing. This translation is not clear and could be misleading since the original word for padding is *faru*, which refers to all kinds of clothes made from animal skin. The word can lead to variation in the legal injunction deduced. 4.2 Stoning and beating are not combined for a *muhsan*, nor beating and banishment for a non *muhsan* unless the Iman considers the [banishment] a benefit. The object of this sentence is not [banishment] but the [combination of the two punishments]. 6.1 If a man has intercourse with the slave girl . . . of his thrice-

divorced wife during *idda* and says, I thought it was permitted, he is not subject to *hadd*. [I thought she was a permitted woman to have intercourse with, he is not subject to *hadd*.] 6.3 If a woman other than his wife is brought to him after a wedding ceremony, and he has intercourse with her, he is not subject to *hadd*. Here there is a mistranslation for the word *zuffat* that Mawsili used in his text (passive voice of *zaffa*), which designates the ceremonial procession of carrying the bride to her husband. It has to be realized that the non-validity of *hadd* here is due to the fact that the bridegroom could have been confused by the ceremony to think that he is entitled to have intercourse with the bride brought to him.

Still there remains little doubt that Calder understood almost all the complex texts that he was dealing with. His superior translation skills are reflected in a fine English text. Yet, sometimes he makes less sense to the reader who cannot understand his statements without referring to the Arabic text.

Gleave and Colin Imber should be recognized for skillfully salvaging an important posthumous work. I have to add that while reading the book I felt that it was an incomplete story that could still be understood, even without an ending.

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WALTER E. KAEGI. *Muslim Expansion and Byzantine Collapse in North Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. xx, 345. \$99.00.

Byzantine North Africa was one of the Roman Empire's wealthiest provinces, at least as far as the archaeological evidence informs us about connections between it and the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean regions up to the middle of the seventh century. Its importance as a resource for the beleaguered eastern Roman capital of Constantinople is attested to by the presence of high-ranking fiscal officials there from the middle of the seventh century until the final demise of Byzantine authority in the late 690s. But its history, especially from the period after the reconquest from the Vandals under Justinian, has remained in many respects a puzzle. Very little is known about Byzantine North Africa's Latin cultural life or the relations between its urbanized littoral and the hinterland. The greatest puzzle of all, however, concerns its conquest by Islam in the period from the mid-640s to the end of the seventh century: not so much because this is surprising, given the Islamic conquest of the greater Syrian region and Egypt, but in view of the drawn-out and piecemeal process of conquest, the fact that we know little about either the reaction of the indigenous populations to Islamic invasion, their response in terms of defensive actions, or the strategy followed by the local military is surprising. It is not clear what support or assistance, if any, was sent from other parts of the empire, even though the government at Constantinople placed considerable value

on the provinces from an economic point of view. In twelve chapters Walter Kaegi's book sets out to analyze the background, process, and results of the Islamic conquest from the perspective of warfare. The book examines factors that played pivotal roles in the conquest: terrain, environment, logistics, manpower, military organization, and leadership, as well as local provincial attitudes. This is an important contribution, and while some historians might have preferred a volume more focused on the cultural and economic history of Byzantine North Africa, Kaegi does try to take these issues into account.

The book begins with a chapter on the challenges raised by the subject, discussing a series of methodological and context-setting issues before proceeding to a second chapter that deals with the sources and the literature, as well as the attendant politics of North African history writing in relation to Byzantium. Chapter three takes the landscape as its focus and deals with issues of settlement and demography as well as with social, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic frameworks. Chapter four examines the ways Christian North African society responded to the threat of conquest, the challenges of regional identity, and a distant government in Constantinople. Subsequent chapters explore the military's local organization, personnel, broader strategic interests, and defenses on the ground: the initial Byzantine defeat at Sufetula (Sbeitla), the immediate Byzantine and provincial North African response, as well as the Constantinopolitan and imperial perspectives, including the strategic advances made by Constant II in Italy and Sicily. More could probably have been made of aspects of the fiscal history, especially the role and significance of *kommerkiarioi*. The final chapters bring into the foreground Islamic perspectives and, in a series of important and valuable discussions, paint a more integrated picture of how the Byzantine, Islamic, and non-Roman indigenous populations interacted during this period. The author treats the fall of Carthage and describes how, in the aftermath, Islamic forces were able to push into southern Spain and into the western Mediterranean.

There are many points where one might disagree with, or at least wish to nuance, some of Kaegi's arguments, but this does not detract from his achievement in presenting a more balanced, persuasive, and integrated account of the Islamic conquest of North Africa than has appeared hitherto. This is an important and timely contribution, and it should stimulate further discussion and debate on a crucial aspect of seventh-century Byzantine, Islamic, and North African history.

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CHRISTINE M. PHILLIOU. *Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2011. Pp. xxx, 286. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$24.95.

This book attempts to analyze the turbulent changes that occurred in the Ottoman Empire in the late eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries through the biography of Stephanos Vogorides. Vogorides's life story is also used to demonstrate how a man of Bulgarian origin used his multiple ties to Phanariot households to climb up within the Ottoman administrative system, and how he survived the tumultuous years following the Greek revolt in 1821, and re-established himself as Prince of Samos thanks to his connections to the British embassy and the Ottoman court.

Although the book promises a fresh approach to the history of the period, the author fails to execute her idea effectively. Taking Vogorides's 1852 letter, an "apologia," according to Christine M. Philliou (pp. 1–4), to Stratford Canning, the British ambassador in Istanbul, as her starting point, Philliou proceeds to draw an anachronistic picture not only of Vogorides himself but also of the Ottoman Empire. Accepting at face value such schematic divisions as Muslim/non-Muslim (pp. 5–6) and formal, official/informal politics (p. xxiv), or regarding "religious dogma and political ideology" as "underpinning Ottoman governance, which forbade Christians a formal share in Ottoman sovereignty" (p. 5), Philliou constructs her book within a framework of such general and superficial concepts.

Rather than focusing on Vogorides and analyzing the political history of the period through the prism of his life experience, the author dwells on events such as the abolition of the janissaries, Muhammad Ali's revolt, and his campaign against Mahmud II, topics to which she brings no fresh research but for which she instead relies heavily on a few secondary sources such as the outdated Ph.D. dissertations of Howard Reed and Avigdor Levy, dated 1951 and 1968 respectively, on the abolition of the janissaries, and Henry Dodwell's 1976 publication, *The Founder of Modern Egypt: A Study of Muhammad Ali*, on the Greek rebellion and the international reaction to it. Philliou is also very partial to certain primary sources, such as the memoirs of the Englishman Reverend Robert Walsh for a depiction of the events in Istanbul in 1821, and Photeinos's history, published in 1818–1819 in Vienna, considered by Philliou as one of the "remarkable, highly valuable, and all but ignored" Phanariot sources (p. 43), for a narrative of the events of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In contrast, her use of Ottoman sources, both archival material and published chronicles, is very limited. Her treatment of international discussions about the application of the Treaty of London held in Istanbul in 1832, for example, suffers from a conspicuous lack of Ottoman sources and is based largely on Dodwell's book and various British Public Record Office documents (pp. 111–117). Although she refers to two Ottoman documents on this issue, one is only tangentially relevant (p. 111, n. 21), while that from the Samos *İradeleri* (referred to on p. 115, n. 38) includes neither the catalogue number nor date. Certain material from

the Ottoman archives on the Vogorides family is surprisingly not made use of in the book.

Some of Philliou's statements are somewhat unconvincing, particularly given the lack of supporting data. Can one really claim that Mahmud II was "desperate for information" (p. 125), that Istanbul "was like a gift in the 1830s, ready to be offered up to one of several recipients" (p. 107) but which was "in the end" handed over "not [to] one or another state or *paşa*" but to "the multistate arena of European politics" (p. 108), or that "The void left by phanariots at the Ottoman court . . . was particularly difficult for the sultan and his advisers to ignore in 1821–22, first and foremost because the dragoman had been a member of the court, therefore, someone whose physical absence was palpable to the sultan" (pp. 90–91)? Various comparisons made by Philliou also fail to convince, such as that between the demise of the Phanariots following the Greek revolt and that of the janissaries, between Vogorides and his "friend and rival" (p. 174) Muhammad Ali, or that between Mughal India and the Ottoman Empire (p. 9).

In short, this book neither contributes to an understanding of the Ottoman politics of the period, nor offers a convincing explanation for the central role the author attributes to the Phanariots in the running of Ottoman foreign relations, the Ottoman government's reaction to Vogorides's close relations with the British, nor to his owning "protégés" (p. 148) within the Ottoman state, nor does it fulfill its promise to do so through the biography of an individual. As the book's focal point, Vogorides loses his centrality, and Philliou's attempt to rescue the situation by inserting a series of sections headed "biography of an empire" fails to remedy this and instead introduces repetitions (for example, pp. 63–64, which repeats the information on law concerning the four Phanariot dynasties discussed earlier).

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PAULA SANDERS. *Creating Medieval Cairo: Empire, Religion, and Architectural Preservation in Nineteenth-Century Egypt*. New York: American University in Cairo Press. 2008. Pp. xv, 216. \$29.95.

Historical scholarship has for some time been understood as an ongoing project that constructs not the past but its reflection in the present. Not so with much of the research on cities, which often regards its subjects as straightforward expressions of their history. Paula Sanders challenges this tendency by providing a well-written and carefully argued account of the manner in which a medieval Cairo that was primarily focused on its Mamluk past was invented during the nineteenth century. Her book's most immediate precursor is Nezar AlSayyad, Irene Bierman, and Nasser Rabbat, editors, *Making Cairo Medieval* (2005). While the earlier book covers a wide range of concerns, its contributors focus primarily on the construction of medieval Cairo as a

project of Orientalism. One of the great strengths of Sanders's work is that it examines an equally wide variety of sources and influences in an effort to understand the conflicted manner in which the conservation of the city and the image of its medieval past emerged—without imposing an oppositional narrative.

In the first two chapters, Sanders establishes the basic conditions under which Mamluk Cairo was made to be medieval under the auspices the Comité de Conservation des Monuments de l'Art Arabe (Comité). She begins this discussion by linking the preservation efforts of the Comité with British imperial practices, such as the Archaeological Survey of India (1861). The book then examines the relationship between prior attitudes to the preservation of Mamluk sites by religious endowments or *waqfs* during the Ottoman period and the emerging European sense of Ottoman decline and neglect that led to the Comité's preservation mandate. One particularly compelling aspect of Sanders' argument is her careful revelation of the different meanings of the Mamluk medieval identity of Cairo. The book shows that to the British, it defined Egyptians as backward and incapable of modernization, while to the Egyptians Cairo embodied an increasingly important "national" past.

The second chapter deepens the sense of competing views of medieval Cairo by contrasting the attitudes of Egyptian modernizers involved in religious and educational reforms with those of their British imperial counterparts. Muhammad 'Abduh (1849–1905), a jurist and religious scholar who called for a rejection of past interpretations of Islam and for acceptance of new subjects and materials, thought that preservation should be tied to the proper religious functioning of mosques. Although similarly supportive of religious and educational reform, 'Ali Mubarak (1823–1893), Minister of Public Works under Khedive Ismail, openly rejected preservation, arguing that Egyptian monuments should reflect the effects of time. On the British side, the book examines figures like Lord Cromer (1841–1917), Consul General of Egypt, whose view of Islam as a medieval religion incapable of reform fit well with the Comité's view that the preservation of Egyptian culture was a European responsibility.

The book's final chapters offer two quite specific, and arguably somewhat eccentric, examples of preservation. The first is an in-depth study of *The One Thousand and One Nights*, whose process of amalgamation as a literary text during the modern period is seen as analogous to the creation of a Mamluk medieval identity through the Comité's preservation activities. The final chapter examines relatively recent preservation projects in Cairo by the Dawoodi Bohras, a sect of Ismaili Shi'ites from the Indian subcontinent. This rather unfortunate choice effectively diffuses the impact of Sanders's scholarship relative to its main object of study: the construction of medieval Cairo during the nineteenth century. It also reveals a more general flaw in the book, which is that while it displays an impressive command of a broad range of issues, it sometimes lacks depth. Nev-

ertheless, this book successfully shows that what we take to be historical sites that give us direct access to the past are, in fact, extremely problematic historical constructions. Its concluding chapter perhaps unwittingly indicates that not all contemporary preservationists have learned this lesson.

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FATMA MÜGE GÖÇEK. *The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era*. (Library of Modern Middle East Studies, number 103.) New York: I. B. Tauris. 2011. Pp. viii, 310. £59.50.

This book interprets the history of the Turkish Republic through the lens of the late Ottoman period, from the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 and the Berlin Congress down to 1923, when the republic was established under Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). It dissects Turkish politics to reveal at its center an all-powerful military apparatus, drawing its legitimacy from the “Sèvres Syndrome,” the perception of dangerous internal and external enemies threatening, often in collaboration, to destroy Turkey as they once did the Ottoman Empire. Fatma Müge Göçek examines the military’s continuous use of the Sèvres Syndrome, named after the unratified 1920 Treaty that would have divided up Anatolia among World War I’s victorious powers and allowed for the creation of an independent Kurdish state. Turkey’s most pressing issues—the Armenian, Cyprus, and Kurdish questions—all trace back to the late Ottoman period and thus, Göçek argues, must be considered together. The persistence of the Sèvres Syndrome is not just owed to the vagaries of memory, however. Those who ruled the Ottoman Empire during its final decade, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), also ruled the republic, if under different labels, for decades. Until 1973, all of the men who succeeded Mustafa Kemal as president had been members of the CUP. President Cemal Gürsel (1960–1966) and President Cevdet Sunay (1966–1973) both served in World War I and had been taken prisoner. Sèvres, as Göçek shows, imbued Turkish life with a national security culture that cast minorities as enemies, emasculated political parties that answered to military generals rather than an electorate, and scorned the individual rights and liberties of citizens. Göçek argues that Turkey continues to be defined by “the tense co-existence of the Ottoman past and the Republican present” (p. 12).

Drawing on a careful reading of memoirs, Göçek offers an astute assessment of rule under the CUP. She underscores the importance of political assassinations before 1914 and the ethnic cleansing and slaughter of the Armenian population beginning in 1915. She makes a powerful argument that without coming to terms with its past, the Turkish Republic will not be able to transform itself into a full-fledged democracy. Describing the lives of twelve Armenian intellectuals killed in 1915

and 1916, Göçek shows that these were remarkable individuals who had made significant contributions to Ottoman society. She suggests that these were victims in whose commemoration Turks today must join if Turkey is ever to come out of the shadow of Sèvres.

The military’s dominant role remained unfettered until the 1990s and the end of the Cold War, at which point economic liberalization could connect businesses and manufacturers directly to global markets. This economic opening paved the way for the formation of a new Anatolian bourgeoisie, which in turn propelled its own political organization, the Justice and Development Party (JDP). Göçek explores the irony behind the JDP’s embrace of European Union membership while the military, which had historically pushed for inclusion in Europe, now worried about its domestic supremacy and its enormous share of the state budget and opposed membership. With the formation of a new political and economic class in Turkey has come a questioning of the official Turkish historical narrative that sustained previous elites. One aspect of the new climate explored in the book is the appearance, in Turkish translation, of Armenian literature by authors who survived 1915 as well as works by their descendants. This literature, like Göçek’s book, is integral to demythologizing the context in which the Turkish Republic was born.

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JOSHUA SCHREIER. *Arabs of the Jewish Faith: The Civilizing Mission in Colonial Algeria*. (Jewish Cultures of the World.) New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 2010. Pp. xiii, 233. \$49.95.

Joshua Schreier’s well-researched and engaging monograph joins a growing number of English-language studies that focus on the neglected military phase (1830–1870) in the history of French Algeria. Conceptually, it adds critical dimensions to recent imperial histories that underline how “indigenous” communities—in this case, the Jews of Algeria—exerted counter-pressures on colonial power and impacted the discourses and practices of the civilizing mission. His research demonstrates convincingly how French policies of assimilation developed as “a strategic response” to Algerian realities and how the civilizing mission’s underlying ideology of modernization was appropriated purposefully by local and metropolitan Jewish elites with their own timetables for reform.

In this regard, the book provides key revisions to histories of French imperialism and the colonial regime in Algeria. Its title, taken from the words of a former prefect of Oran, summarizes effectively the tension at the heart of France’s indigenous administration until 1870: how to cultivate and regulate manifest boundaries between the colony’s Muslim and Jewish natives while keeping both groups at a conspicuous cultural distance from its European population. Here, Schreier delivers valuable and corrective material to our knowledge of the military period and reinforces with archival evi-

dence the argument for a fuller integration of republican and imperial narratives of modern French history. The strength of his analytic framework resides in its capacity to set colonial processes against the backdrop of domestic developments, specifically, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic experiments with Jewish emancipation between 1791 and 1808, and subsequent private and institutional pronouncements for or against the assimilation of Algerian Jews. Schreier is very skillful in exposing dissonance or echo in metropolitan and colonial attitudes toward North African Jewry, and his review of individual policies that aimed to separate faith from law, the private from the public and the "progressive" from the "archaic" opens promising prospects for historical inquiries into developing notions of modernity in nineteenth-century France.

On the whole, however, the scope of the book, in geographical and historical terms, is rather narrow. Schreier's overriding focus on the Jewish society of Oran, especially its elite members, invites—but does not address—questions about the conditions of North African Jewry before the French conquest and the general experiences of the colony's diverse Jewish populations, from the deep-rooted urban communities of Constantine or Tlemcen to the pastoral and nomadic groups of the southern oases, Laghouat, Souk Ahras, and the Mزاب.

Moreover, a handful of Schreier's conceptual claims merit deeper analysis. For example, while he is careful to treat colonial officialdom as heterogeneous, Schreier does not delve into the ideological variations within it, and he fails to expand upon the distinct uses and deployments of the term "civilization" by contentious and interested parties. The lack of clarity is compounded by overstating the military-civilian dichotomy in the face of growing evidence that the political and ideological divide between colonial officials was not so neatly compartmentalized. In the same vein, Schreier pays little regard to the influence of proponents of "colonial association" and anti-assimilationist Saint-Simonians, some of whom, like Gustave d'Eichtal, Olinde Rodrigues, or the brothers Émile and Isaac Pereire, were themselves Jewish and greatly concerned with cultural renewal in Algeria and France. As a result, despite his attentiveness to variability and adjustment in the French discourse on Algeria's Jews, Schreier is somehow more ready to concede an immutable character to colonial statements about Muslims. In reality, until the naturalization of most Algerian Jews by the Crémieux Decree in 1870, French colonial decrees concerning Muslim and Jewish religious instruction, family and gender relations, land ownership, and legal status were remarkably congruent, and the governing discourse on Islam tended to fluctuate just as much according to strategic calculation and the directives of political pragmatism.

These observations do not detract from the overall significance of this book to French Algerian studies. Ultimately, Schreier's findings should promote a more nuanced "third way" for reading the outcome of 1870.

Much less satisfying now are historical descriptions of the Crémieux Decree as a one-sided calculation made in France and imposed upon the colonialist establishment in Algeria. By the same token, his chapters also make clear that the political impulse for the Decree did not derive solely from France's differentiated civilizational posture toward Algerian Jews. Between these conventional interpretations, Schreier has suggested an alternative that situates the multiple French discourses on North African Jewry within the broader development of colonial categories and hierarchies of race. Thus, he makes possible the examination of the "constructedness" of colonial Jewish subjectivities against other operations of France's racial imaginary, such as the Kabyle Myth. To this extent, this book makes important strides toward the author's stated and laudable aim to tell "together" the histories of "the various sides and strategies of French colonialism" (p. 7).

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

CAROL POLSGROVE. *Ending British Rule in Africa: Writers in a Common Cause*. (Studies in Imperialism.) New York: Manchester University Press. 2009. Pp. xviii, 186. \$89.95.

Carol Polsgrove possesses an acute historical intelligence. In *Divided Minds: Intellectuals and the Civil Rights Movement* (2001), she offered a thoughtful account of the often awkward relationship of publicly recognized intellectuals, of all political stripes, to civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s, a strangely neglected theme. She was also part of the small editorial team that assembled the magnificent two-volume Library of America collection, *Reporting Civil Rights* (2003). Her knowledge of black politics, and of the journalistic practices in which race politics was articulated, runs deep. Her new volume, which appears under the imprint of Manchester University Press's important, lively, and ever-expanding "Studies in Imperialism" series, takes a wider conspectus: the group of black, diasporic anti-colonial agitators who found themselves in the imperial capital of London in the 1930s. She tells the story of their efforts to fund, with negligible financial backing, the publication and distribution of pamphlets and periodicals that they hoped would find their way across oceans and bring alive a new politics among those Frantz Fanon called "the wretched of the earth."

This is a dramatic story to tell, and Polsgrove's steady hand does it justice. There is something riveting about both the paucity of the resources that the London militants could call upon and the global scope of their political investments. At the heart of the London network of Pan-Africanists were West Indians, C. L. R. James, George Padmore, and Ras Makonnen. Gathered around them were a minority of Africans, including Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame Nkrumah, and Hastings Banda, all of whom came to be tutored in the essentials

of Pan-Africanism, notwithstanding their own particular evolutions when political power came their way. Close to them, too, was the future prime minister of Trinidad, Eric Williams. As the European colonial powers were engaged in collective destruction, the lineaments of the postcolonial order could be discerned in the lives of those anti-imperial agitators who congregated in the unforgiving urban landscape of the old metropole.

The broad contours of this history are well known. But Polsgrove's careful archival research does much to illuminate the emotional costs that incessant political activity, combined with daily economic penury, imposed upon the exiles who found themselves thrown together. Although Polsgrove feels compelled to recognize the grandeur of their collective enterprise and its moral worth, for the most part she eschews an epic tone. She is sensitive to the ways in which their hand-to-mouth daily existence registered inside their politics, and she charts the shifting emotional eddies through which the politics ran, and the consequent intimacies and fallings out. We see Peter Abrahams moving away from Padmore; the rifts appearing between Padmore and James; the shifting political allegiances of Richard Wright, whose later anticommunism led him to share ill-judged intimacies with U.S. intelligence agencies; the spats between James and Wright; and W. E. B. Du Bois's deep hostility to Wright's ethnographic account of his travels in independent Ghana.

It is not clear, finally, how Polsgrove chooses to read these episodes. There has long been a suspicion that relations between James and Padmore were not as harmonious as James's later tributes lead us to suppose. Maybe not. On the whole, however, seeing all these hurt feelings close up, as we do here, I tend to take a more skeptical view as to their political significance. They were real enough, and not unexpected. But, with some exceptions, too pointillist a reading can exaggerate their historical import.

Polsgrove's interpretation of the journalistic brio of the London Pan-Africanists is persuasive, and she is good on the diligence of the metropolitan and colonial states in attempting to censor or destroy a great swathe of the publications emanating from London. She demonstrates, as no one before her has done, the degree to which anticolonialism was a politics founded on the medium of the written word: the movement of cyclostyled sheets, on cheap paper, from dingy London workshops to distant, tropical locales offers a suitably subaltern rendering of empire, allowing us to focus on what generally remains unseen or overly abstract. The dynamic imperatives of empire had, from early on, propelled the movements, back and forth, of the written word, involving subtle transfigurations in thought itself; but so too they set in motion human lives and relationships, whose outcomes we are only now beginning to grasp.

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Collected Essays

These volumes, recently received in the *AHR* office, do not lend themselves readily to unified reviews; the contents are therefore listed.

EUROPE: ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL

CHRISTIAN KRÖTZL and KATARIINA MUSTAKALLIO, editors. *On Old Age: Approaching Death in Antiquity and the Middle Ages*. (Studies in the History of Daily Life, volume 2.) Tournhout, Belgium: Brepols. 2011. Pp. xix, 346. €80.00.

MARY HARLOW and RAY LAURENCE, Viewing the Old: Recording and Respecting the Elderly at Rome and in the Empire. TIM PARKIN, The Elderly Children of Greece and Rome. KATARIINA MUSTAKALLIO, Representing Older Women: Hersilia, Veturia, Virgo Vestalis Maxima. JILL BRADLEY, The Changing Face of Death: The Iconography of the Personification of Death in the Early Middle Ages. JUDIT MAJOROSSY, "I wish my body to hallowed ground": Testamentary Orders of the Burghers of Late Medieval Pressburg about Their Own Burial. ENNIO BAUER, Old Age as a Principle of Social Organization: *Gerousiai* in the *Poleis* of Hellenistic and Roman Southern Asia Minor. ALEKSANDR KOPTEV, The Massacre of Old Men by the Gauls in 390 BC and the Social Meaning of Old Age in Ancient Rome. KIRSI SALONEN, What Happened to Aged Priests in the Late Middle Ages? KATALIN SZENDE, Coping with Old Age in Medieval Hungarian Towns. EMILIA JAMROZIAK, Burials and Politics of the Living and the Dead in Scotland and Pomerania in the High Middle Ages: The Case of Two Cistercian Monasteries. JUSSI RANTALA, No Place for the Dead: *Ludi Saeculares* of 17 BC and the Purificatory Cults of May as Part of the Roman Ritual Year. ILDIKÓ CSEPREGI, Disease, Death, Destiny: The Healer as *Soter* in Miraculous Cures. IONA MCCLEERY, Medical Perspectives on Death in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe. MIikka TAMMINEN, Who Deserves the Crown of Martyrdom: Martyrs in the Crusade Ideology of Jacques de Vitry (1160/70–1240). SARI KATAJALA-PELTOMAA, Rituals and Reputation: Immature Death in the Fourteenth-Century Canonization Processes. NIRIT BEN-ARYEH DEBBY, Pulpits and Tombs in Renaissance Florence.

THOMAS F. X. NOBLE and JOHN VAN ENGEN, editors. *European Transformations: The Long Twelfth Century*. (Notre Dame Conferences in Medieval Studies.) Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press. 2012. Pp. xi, 562. \$65.00.

JOHN VAN ENGEN, The Twelfth Century: Reading, Reason, and Revolt. JOHN GILLINGHAM, A Historian of the Twelfth-Century Renaissance and the Transformation of English Society, 1066—ca. 1200. DOMINIQUE BARTHÉLEMY, Chivalric One-Upmanship in France, ca. 1100. ADAM J. KOSTO, Reconquest, Renaissance, and the Histories of Iberia, ca. 1000–1200. MAUREEN C. MILLER, Italy in the Long Twelfth Century: Ecclesiastical Reform and the Legitimization of a New Political Order, 1059–1183. HANNA VOLLRATH, Sutri 1046—Cannossa 1077—Rome 1111: Problems of Communications and the Perception of Neighbors. SVERRE BAGGE, The Europeanization of Europe: The Case of Scandinavia. PIOTR GÓRECKI, Ambiguous Beginnings: East Central Europe in the Making, 950–1200. DAVID NICHOLAS, Lords, Markets, and Communities: The Urban Revolution of the Twelfth Century. PAUL FREEDMAN, Peasants, the Seigneurial Regime, and Serfdom in the Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries. OLIVIA REMIE CONSTABLE, Clothing, Iron, and Timber: The Growth of Christian Anxiety about Islam in the Long Twelfth Century. ANNA SAPIR ABULAFIA, Continuity and Change in Twelfth-Century Christian-Jewish Relations. ANDERS WINROTH, The Legal Revolution of the Twelfth Century. BARBARA NEWMAN, Liminalities: Literate Women in the Long Twelfth Century. JOHN MARENBON, Philosophy and Theology. BRIGITTE MIRIAM BEDOS-REZAK, Semiotic Anthropology: The Twelfth-Century Approach. RACHEL FULTON BROWN, Three-in-One: Making God in Twelfth-Century Liturgy, Theology, and Devotion. C. STEPHEN JAEGER, John of Salisbury, a Philosopher of the Long Eleventh Century.

EUROPE: EARLY MODERN AND MODERN

FLORENCE BUTTAY and AXELLE GUILLAUSSÉAU, editors. *Des saints d'État? Politique et sainteté au temps du concile de Trente*. (Collection Roland Mousnier.) Paris: Presses de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne. 2012. Pp. 184.

MIGUEL GOTOR, Le théâtre des saints modernes: La canonisation à l'âge baroque. CORNEL ZWIERLEIN, Les saints de la communion avec le Christ: Hybridations entre Églises et États dans le monde calviniste dans les années 1560. DAVID EL KENZ, Les martyres protestants du royaume de France face au concile de Trente: Affrontement et convergence. DAMIEN TRICOIRE, À la quête de l'universel: Constructions étatiques et patronages mariaux en Bavière et en France (de 1600 à 1660 environ). CÉCILE VINCENT-CASSY, Saint Michel et la Monarchie hispanique: L'invocation de la protection angélique en 1643. ANNICK DELFOSSE, Le patronage immaculiste des Pays-Bas: Une consécration manquée. NAÏMA GHERMANI, Des princes plutôt que des saints? Protestantisme, pouvoir politique et sainteté dans

l'Allemagne du XVI siècle. MICHEL MERLE, *Le portrait du saint prince: Les représentations du bienheureux Amédée IX de Savoie durant la seconde moitié du règne de Charles-Emmanuel Ier (1612–1630)*. CÉDRIC MICHON, *Thomas More, saint ou chancelier? ÉRIC SUIRE, Du "saint dynastique" au "saint d'État."*

SILVANA PATRIARCA and LUCY RIAL, editors. *The Risorgimento Revisited: Nationalism and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Italy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2012. Pp. xi, 303. \$95.00.

PAUL GINSBORG, *European Romanticism and the Italian Risorgimento*. ADRIAN LYTTTELTON, *The Hero and the People*. SIMONETTA CHIAPPINI, *From the People to the Masses: Political Developments in Italian Opera from Rossini to Mascagni*. ARIANNA ARISI ROTA and ROBERTO BALZANI, *Discovering Politics: Action and Recollection in the First Mazzinian Generation*. ROS PESMAN, *Mazzini and/in Love*. MARINA D'AMELIA, *Between Two Eras: Challenges Facing Women in the Risorgimento*. SILVANA PATRIARCA, *A Patriotic Emotion: Shame and the Risorgimento*. LUCY RIAL, *Men at War: Masculinity and Military Ideals in the Risorgimento*. ALBERTO MARIO BANTI, *The Remembrance of Heroes*. MANUEL BORUTTA, *Anti-Catholicism and the Culture War in Risorgimento Italy*. TULLIA CATALAN, *Italian Jews and the 1848–49 Revolutions: Patriotism and Multiple Identities*. MAURIZIO ISABELLA, *Liberalism and Empires in the Mediterranean: The View-Point of the Risorgimento*. DOMINIQUE REILL, *The Risorgimento: A Multi-national Movement*.

MAARTEN VAN GINDERACHTER and MARNIX BEYEN, editors. *Nationhood from Below: Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2012. Pp. xi, 267. \$85.00.

JOHN BREUILLY, *What Does It Mean to Say that Nationalism is "Popular"?* FERNANDO MOLINA and MIGUEL CABO VILLAVERDE, *An Inconvenient Nation: Nation-Building and National Identity in Modern Spain; The Historiographical Debate*. ILARIA PORCIANI, *On the Uses and Abuses of Nationalism from Below: A Few Notes on Italy*. LAURENCE COLE, *Differentiation or Indifference? Changing Perspectives on National Identification in the Austrian Half of the Habsburg Monarchy*. MAARTEN VAN GINDERACHTER, *Nationhood from Below: Some Historiographic Notes on Great Britain, France and Germany in the Long Nineteenth Century*. MIKA TERVONEN, *The Nation and Its Outsiders: The "Gypsy Question" and Peasant Nationalism in Finland, c. 1863–1900*. JAMES M. BROPHY, *Which Political Nation? Soft Borders and Popular Nationhood in the Rhineland, 1800–1850*. SAARTJE VANDEN BORRE and TOM VERSCHAFFEL, *Between or Without Nations? Multiple Identifications among Belgian Migrants in Lille, Northern France, 1850–1900*. JEAN-FRANÇOIS CHANET, *"From the Wound a Flower Grows": A Re-Examination of French Patriotism in the Face of the Franco-Prussian War*. ANTOON VRINTS, *"All the Butter in the Country Belongs to Us, Belgians": Well-Being and Lower-Class National Identification in Belgium during the First World War*.

MARTIN THOMAS, editor. *The French Colonial Mind*. Volume One, *Mental Maps of Empire and Colonial En-*

counters. (France Overseas: Studies in Empire and Decolonization.) Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2011. Pp. xlvii, 370. \$45.00.

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MARTIN THOMAS, editor. *The French Colonial Mind*. Volume Two, *Violence, Military Encounters, and Colonialism*. (France Overseas: Studies in Empire and Decolonization.) Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2011. Pp. liii, 382. \$45.00.

WILLIAM GALLOIS, *Dahra and the History of Violence in Early Colonial Algeria*. BERTRAND TAITHE, *Losing Their Mind and Their Nation? Mimicry, Scandal, and Colonial Violence in the Voulet-Chanoine Affair*. MICHAEL G. VANN, *Fear and Loathing in French Hanoi: Colonial White Images and Imaginings of "Native" Violence*. JOSHUA COLE, *Anti-Semitism and the Colonial Situation in Interwar Algeria: The Anti-Jewish Riots in Constantine, August 1934*. SAMUEL KALMAN, *Fascism and Algérianité: The Croix de Feu and the Indigenous Question in 1930s Algeria*. MARTIN THOMAS, *Colonial Minds and Colonial Violence: The Sétif Uprising and the Savage Economics of Colonialism*. OWEN WHITE, *Conquest and Cohabitation: French Men's Relations with West African Women in the 1890s and 1900s*. KIM MUNHOLLAND, *The French Colonial Mind and the Challenge of Islam: The Case of Ernest Psichari*. JOE LUNN, *French Race Theory, the Parisian Society of Anthropology, and the Debate over la Force Noire, 1909–1912*. MARTIN S. ALEXANDER, *Colonial Minds Confounded: French Colonial Troops in the Battle of France, 1940*. NEIL MACMASTER, *The "Silent Native": Attentisme, Being Compromised, and Banal Terror during the Algerian War of Independence, 1954–1962*. MATHILDE VON BÜLOW, *Exposing the "Paradoxical Citizen-*

ship": French Authorities' Responses to the Algerian Presence in Federal Germany during the Algerian War, 1954–1962.

ALEX J. KAY, JEFF RUTHERFORD, and DAVID STAHEL, editors. *Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 1941: Total War, Genocide, and Radicalization*. (Rochester Studies in East and Central Europe.) Rochester: University of Rochester Press. 2012. Pp. x, 359. \$85.00.

DAVID STAHEL, *Radicalizing Warfare: The German Command and the Failure of Operation Barbarossa*. ADRIAN E. WETTSTEIN, *Urban Warfare Doctrine on the Eastern Front*. FELIX RÖMER, *The Wehrmacht in the War of Ideologies: The Army and Hitler's Criminal Orders on the Eastern Front*. ALEX J. KAY, "The Purpose of the Russian Campaign Is the Decima-

tion of the Slavic Population by Thirty Million": The Radicalization of German Food Policy in Early 1941. JEFF RUTHERFORD, *The Radicalization of German Occupation Policies: The Wirtschaftsstab Ost and the 121st Infantry Division in Pavlovsk, 1941*. PAOLO FONZI, *The Exploitation of Foreign Territories and the Discussion of Ostland's Currency in 1941*. WENDY LOWER, *Axis Collaboration, Operation Barbarossa, and the Holocaust in Ukraine*. LEONID REIN, *The Radicalization of Anti-Jewish Policies in Nazi-Occupied Belarus*. STEPHAN LEHNSTAEDT, *The Minsk Experience: German Occupiers and Everyday Life in the Capital of Belarus*. MARTIN HOLLER, *Extending the Genocidal Program: Did Otto Ohlendorf Initiate the Systematic Extermination of Soviet "Gypsies"?* THOMAS J. LAUB, *The Development of German Policy in Occupied France, 1941, against the Backdrop of the War in the East*.

Documents and Bibliographies

Books listed were recently received in the *AHR* office. Works of these types cannot normally be reviewed by the *AHR*.

COMPARATIVE/WORLD

PIETSCH, THEODORE W. *Trees of Life: A Visual History of Evolution*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2012. Pp. xi, 358. \$69.95.

ASIA

HUINENG. *The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch: The Text of the Tun-Huang Manuscript*. Foreword by MORTEN SCHLÜTTER. Translated by PHILIP B. YAMPOLSKY. (Translations from the Asian Classics.) Reprint. New York: Columbia University Press. 2012. Pp. xvi, 216. Cloth \$99.50, paper \$32.50, e-book \$25.99.

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

ADAMS, HENRY. *Henry Adams in the Secession Crisis: Dispatches to the Boston Daily Advertiser, December 1860–March 1861*. Edited by MARK J. STEGMAIER. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 2012. Pp. xvi, 237. \$42.50.

BENNETT, M. TODD, and EDWARD C. KEEFER, editors. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976. Volume XXXIV: National Security Policy, 1969–1972*. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 2011. Pp. xxviii, 1064. \$79.00.

GOINGS, HENRY. *Rambles of a Runaway from Southern Slavery*. Edited by CALVIN SCHERMERHORN, MICHAEL PLUNKETT, and EDWARD GAYNOR. (Carter G. Woodson Institute Series.) Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. 2012. Pp. xxxvi, 157. \$45.00.

LOWENTHAL, DAVID. *The Mind and Art of Abraham Lincoln, Philosopher Statesman: Texts and Interpretations of Twenty Great Speeches*. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books. 2012. Pp. viii, 288. Cloth \$85.00, paper \$36.99.

MCKIVIGAN, JOHN R., and HEATHER L. KAUFMAN, editors. *In the Words of Frederick Douglass: Quotations from Liberty's Champion*. Foreword by JOHN STAUFFER. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2012. Pp. xxi, 256. \$22.95.

ROBINSON, GREG, editor. *Pacific Citizens: Larry and Guyo Tajiri and Japanese American Journalism in the World War II Era*. Foreword by HARRY K. HONDA. (The Asian American Experience.) Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2012. Pp. xxxix, 295. \$60.00.

RYAN, KATY, editor. *Demands of the Dead: Executions, Storytelling, and Activism in the United States*. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press. 2012. Pp. xii, 315. \$39.95.

SELVAGE, DOUGLAS E., MELISSA JANE TAYLOR, and EDWARD C. KEEFER, editors. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976. Volume XV: Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974*. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 2011. Pp. xxxi, 1061. \$79.00.

CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA

DÍAZ DEL CASTILLO, BERNAL. *The True History of the Conquest of New Spain*. Translated by JANET BURKE and TED HUMPHREY. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2012. Pp. xlvii, 448. Paper \$15.95, e-book \$14.50.

EUROPE: EARLY MODERN AND MODERN

DE ARÉVALO, RODRIGO SÁNCHEZ. *Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo: Tratado sobre la división del reino y cuándo es lícita la primogenitura*. Edited by JESÚS ÁNGEL SOLÓRZANO TELECHEA. Translated by JOSÉ CARLOS MIRALLES MALDONADO. (Ciencias Históricas, number 20.) Logroño: Instituto de Estudios Riojanos. 2011. Pp. 222.

CALLAGHAN, JOHN, and BEN HARKER. *British Communism: A Documentary History*. (Documents in Modern History.) New York: Manchester University Press. 2011. Pp. 304. \$38.95.

HOLMAN, HANNAH. *Titanic Voices: 63 Survivors Tell Their Extraordinary Stories*. Stroud, UK: Amberley. 2011. Pp. 436. \$29.95.

MONFASANI, JOHN. 'Bessarion Scholasticus': *A Study of Cardinal Bessarion's Latin Library*. (Byzantios: Studies in Byzantine History and Civilization, number 3.) Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols. 2011. Pp. xiv, 306. €65.00.

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA

HALEVI, SA'ADI BEN BETSALEL. *A Jewish Voice from Ottoman Salonica: The Ladino Memoir of Sa'adi Besalel a-Levi*. Edited by ARON RODRIGUE and SARAH ABREVAYA STEIN. Translated by ISAAC JERUSALMI. (Stanford Studies in Jewish History and Culture.) Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2012. Pp. lx, 372. Cloth \$50.00, e-book \$50.00.

Other Books Received

The following books were recently received in the AHR office. Books listed here do not include works scheduled for review.

METHODS/THEORY

- ALLEN, BENJAMIN MARK, and DAHIA MESSARA, editors. *The Captivity Narrative: Enduring Shackles and Emancipating Language of Subjectivity*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 2012. Pp. xviii, 142. \$59.99.
- DE BAECQUE, ANTOINE. *Camera Historica: The Century in Cinema*. Translated by NINON VINSONNEAU and JONATHAN MAGIDOFF. (European Perspectives: A Series in Social Thought and Cultural Criticism.) New York: Columbia University Press. 2012. Pp. xv, 398. Cloth \$105.00, paper \$35.00.
- BAOFU, PETER. *The Future of Post-Human History: A Preface to a New Theory of Universality and Relativity*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 2012. Pp. xxv, 591. \$97.99.
- LEGG, STEPHEN, editor. *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos*. (Interventions.) New York: Routledge. 2011. Pp. xiv, 306. Cloth \$138.00, paper \$42.95.
- OGRIN, MIRCEA. *Ernst Bernheim (1850–1942): Historiker und Wissenschaftspolitiker im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik*. (Pallas Athene: Beiträge zur Universitäts- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte, number 40.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. 2012. Pp. 374. €52.00.
- ditions of Restricted Political Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press. 2012. Pp. xxx, 288. \$49.99.
- DASCĂL, REGHINA, editor. *Episodes from a History of Undoing: The Heritage of Female Subversiveness*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 2012. Pp. xii, 211. \$59.99.
- DAVIDSON, LAWRENCE. *Cultural Genocide*. (Genocide, Political Violence, Human Rights Series.) New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 2012. Pp. vii, 149. \$23.95.
- DORMANDY, THOMAS. *Opium: Reality's Dark Dream*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2012. Pp. x, 366. \$40.00.
- FERBER, SARAH, and SALLY WILDE, editors. *The Body Divided: Human Beings and Human 'Material' in Modern Medical History*. (The History of Medicine in Context.) Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2011. Pp. xi, 249. \$124.95.
- HATTENDORF, JOHN B. *Talking about Naval History: A Collection of Essays*. (Naval War College Historical Monograph Series, number 19.) Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press. 2011. Pp. xiv, 354. \$54.00.
- LUTHER, INGA, et al. *Erinnerung schreibt Geschichte: Lateinamerika und Europa im Kontext transnationaler Verflechtungen*. (Historamericana, number 25.) Stuttgart: Akademischer Verlag Stuttgart. Mexico City: Colegio Internacional de Graduados Entre Espacios. Stuttgart: Verlag Hans-Dieter Heinz. 2011. Pp. 278. €29.50.

COMPARATIVE/WORLD

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- BANNET, EVE TAVOR, and SUSAN MANNING, editors. *Transatlantic Literary Studies, 1660–1830*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2012. Pp. xiii, 281. \$90.00.
- BORNEMAN, JOHN. *Political Crime and the Memory of Loss*. (New Anthropologies of Europe.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 243. \$27.95.
- BOUGHTON, JAMES M. *Tearing Down Walls: The International Monetary Fund 1990–1999*. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 2012. Pp. lxvii, 968. \$90.00.
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- CAMPBELL, GWYN, SUZANNE MIERS, and JOSEPH C. MILLER, editors. *Child Slaves in the Modern World*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. 2011. Pp. vi, 281. Cloth \$49.95, paper \$24.95.
- DAMOUI, JOY, and MARIANO BEN PLOTKIN, editors. *Psychoanalysis and Politics: Histories of Psychoanalysis under Con-*
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- DASCĂL, REGHINA, editor. *Episodes from a History of Undoing: The Heritage of Female Subversiveness*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 2012. Pp. xii, 211. \$59.99.
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REVIEWS

TO THE EDITORS:

I would like to thank Donald R. Kelley for his generous review of *History and Its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence* (AHR, February 2012, 161–162). I would, however, like to respond to a few assertions. I do not agree with the characterization of me as a religious thinker or the notion that I attribute to intellectual history a “quasi-religious mission.” I would, however, agree that I try to give both historiography and the subdiscipline of intellectual history a critical-theoretical dimension as well as a quasi-utopian or transformative impetus. I also try to be open-minded but not uncritical with respect to important aspects of the recent “postsecular” turn in various theoretical approaches.

In the quotation from page 50 of my book that stipulates what “the problem” is for me, a colon is omitted after “world” and before “self-presentation,” which leads to a garbled sentence: “all that goes into the making of a significant, if problematic, world self-presentation, justification, prejudice, fantasy, and affect as well as experience that is not reducible to immaculate perception.” I criticize “Practice Theory” not so much for its “documentary” leanings as for the way it tends to downplay these factors, which have an important role in ideology.

“Traumatropism” is not my technical term but a term that can be found in many dictionaries. It refers to a mutation in a plant subjected to a severe wound. I use the term metaphorically to refer to the “transfiguration” of trauma into the sacred or the sublime—a process I do not advocate but manifestly treat in a critical manner. Hence it is not accurate to attribute to me that which I analyze critically in the work of others. (“For LaCapra trauma resides in the sacred and is something

like a negative sublime.”) On a related note, I do not on my own behalf present or endorse—but instead critically analyze—appeals to violence as an antidote to a “debased sociopolitical and cultural system” or as (what Kelley terms) “the positive side of terrorism.” Nor do I refer to “the shoes on Picasso’s peasant woman in *Guernica*.” With respect to *Guernica* (and the role in it of “an anguished, petrified open mouth”), I refer to “the open mouth of the corresponding figures, including the horse” in Picasso’s famous painting (p. 69). I discuss the shoes of a putative peasant woman with reference to Heidegger’s discussion (in “The Origin of the Work of Art”) of Van Gogh’s painting, and I do so in good part critically, even alluding to Heidegger’s “lyrical, mythologized, and somewhat kitsch evocation of the little old peasant lady who lived in her shoe” (p. 142). A key issue I explore is how to analyze the relation between the two registers in Heidegger that Kelley alludes to but does not explicitly name: the thought-provoking, at times poetic or even postsecular register and the dangerous, dubious register resonating with Nazi ideology.

Finally, Kelley’s account includes one truly uncanny elision. With respect to my “rather serious deconversion experience,” I refer to something Kelley does not mention: an event in my early life wherein “religious language, in its intimate relation to religious experience, had broken down or fallen apart into fragments or nonsense syllables that could not be fitted together meaningfully” (p. 205). In marked contrast, I refer to what Kelley substitutes for the latter (to wit, my father’s question about whether the alternative to intellectual history is “dumb” history) as “my parodic founding trauma—a joke of sorts” (p. 206). And, in case the parody and irony in both my father’s question and my presentation of it might be missed, I state explicitly that “the point, however, is not that all history is either intellectual history or dumb history.” Instead, a point I stress is that “all history should have a self-reflexive and critical theoretical component—indeed a gadfly element—in which the very questions and concepts employed are themselves interrogated, disciplinary limits are subjected to scrutiny, and room is made for the issue of the relation between inquiry into the past and its implications for the present and future” (p. 207).

DOMINICK LACAPRA
Cornell University

Donald R. Kelley does not wish to respond.

TO THE EDITORS:

Colin Newbury's review of my book *Intimate Strangers* (AHR, February 2012, 185–186) contains a number of specific errors, which may have the unfortunate effect of misrepresenting the book's project to AHR readers. Newbury writes: "From the outset, Smith concentrates on the epistemological significance of the term *taio* (friend), which was used by islanders to greet visitors . . . Smith does so without exploring its cognates as recorded in the 1830s by John Davies in his *Tahitian and English Dictionary* (1851). Davies explained the relationship between the words *tau'a* and *hoa* and the consolidation of missionary power." Davies's 1851 dictionary in fact offers no explanation of the relationship between the three terms: it simply records them as synonymous. But even had it been an important source for such an exploration, my book's historical framework, as clearly stated on page 2, is the "forty years of early European-Oceanic encounter" from 1767 to 1806. This early contact period has its own political texture, distinct from that of the mid-nineteenth-century era of missionary imperialism that Newbury references here. It is integral to the book's project that it maintains an awareness of the peculiar characteristics of imperialism in that period, rather than conflating these with the later missionary/settler politics exemplified by either the field observations or the writings of the Pacific missionary Davies.

As *Intimate Strangers* demonstrates, there are good reasons for keeping a consideration of *taio* distinct from one of *hoa* and *tau'a*. The book seeks to address the fact that during the first forty years of significant contact, *taio*—a word whose complexity, for Europeans, went well beyond simple translations as "friend" or "greeting"—was the most recurrent and interrogated Polynesian word to appear in European sources, and it also seeks to explain its subsequent, equally surprising, disappearance. As I write on page 69, "Alternative Tahitian friendship terms *hoa* and *tau'a* rarely figure in the same way in these early accounts." I am nonetheless careful to distinguish *taio* from these later dominant concepts, using ethnohistories that draw on Tahitian oral evidence, as well as archival sources (for example, pp. 63–70). Given the changing implications of the word over more than eighty years of Pacific history, to emphasize mid-nineteenth-century evidence of cognate friendship terms in constructing my account of the politics of late-eighteenth-century *taio* would not only have been inaccurate, it would have implied an understanding of both cultural practice and the politics of Empire as unduly monolithic. Instead the book argues for the specific and precarious significance the term achieved during the first forty years of sustained contact, precisely because this provides a lens through which to view the investment of both Europeans and Polynesians in modes of exchange and discourses of friendship that became unfeasible during later periods of missionary and settler imperialism.

VANESSA SMITH
University of Sydney

COLIN NEWBURY RESPONDS:

I stand by my statement that Vanessa Smith does not explore the cognates of *taio* ("friend"). True, I should not have implied that Davies explained the terms *hoa* and *tau'a* in his *Dictionary* of 1851. But he certainly does so in correspondence and in his work as a translator over the previous half-century. The point is important, because the cognate terms *taio* and *tau'a* have quite distinct denotations from the common reference to casual acquaintances and trading partners. Moreover, they were commented on early in the period of European contact. During Cook's second visit, 1773–1774, John Reinhold Forster noted that *hoa* was used for client chiefs. James Morrison, too, in 1789, made a similar distinction based on the status of such "friends." (Detailed references can be found in my article "Pacts, Alliances and Patronage: Modes of Influence and Power in the Pacific," *Journal of Pacific History* 44, no. 2 [2009]: 141–162. See, too, Douglas Oliver, *Oceania: The Native Cultures of Australia and the Pacific Islands*, 2 vols. [Honolulu, 1989], 2: 924.) *Tau'a* referring to the associate and acolyte of a god is more specialized in its status denotation of priests; it is rare in the sources and disappears during the religious and secular power struggles of the first decade of the nineteenth century. As, indeed, does *taio*, because from about 1807, *hoa* appears in Tahitian correspondence with missionaries and with captains of vessels sent by Governor King, denoting useful clients of higher status than beach traders. It was specifically used, for example, by Pomare II in an appeal to the London Missionary Society for material support. A further point worth considering is that the Tahitian language itself was in the course of considerable modification over the period, including the elimination of terms associated with earlier beliefs and practices.

I stick to my view, therefore, that it would have been important to extend the time frame of the chronology by about a decade to take into account these status changes in Tahitians' perceptions of European visitors and missionary settlers. The "lens" of a single term used for "friends" in the early period of contact gives too narrow a focus to help explain the complex cultural and political interactions of Tahitians and Europeans as "*Intimate Strangers*." I see no evidence that this "intimacy" led, moreover, to British settler or missionary "imperialism," but, ironically, to the very real imperialism of France in 1842.

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ERRATUM

In Matthew Butler's review of Jason Dormady, *Primitive Revolution: Restorationist Religion and the Idea of the Mexican Revolution, 1940–1968* (AHR, April 2012, 579), Luis Cabrera was mistakenly referred to as Miguel Cabrera. The editors regret the error.

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

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
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
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
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
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
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


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

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
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

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




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
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
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
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
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
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
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



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
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
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

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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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
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
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
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
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